ML20237J810

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Partially Deleted Transcipt of Ofc of Investigation Investigative Interview (Closed Meeting) W/J Dewes on 850731 in Newport,Mi
ML20237J810
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/31/1985
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI)
To:
Shared Package
ML20237J518 List:
References
FOIA-86-245 LB-85-214, NUDOCS 8708260327
Download: ML20237J810 (31)
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Text

~

+ ORIGINAL . .

U.N nED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

IN THE MATTER NF:

'DOOGT NO: i La-85-214 ,

  • OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW

. 1 (CLOSED MEETING) .

I

]i

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LOCATION: NEWPORT, MICHIGAN PAGES: 126

)

DATE: WEDNESDAY,- JULY 31, 1985 e

inform 1 Mon in mis recor In accordance wit' tssc-i;

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ACE-FEDERAdREPORTES, INC.

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I 1

1 UNITED' STATES OF AMERICA l

i 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

3 )

" In the Matter of: )

l

) Case No. LB-85-214 5 OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION )

INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW ) I

  • )

7 The Deposition of JOHN DEWES, taken a

pursuant to Notice before me, Elizabeth Diann Ferguson, Notary 9

Public in and for the County of Wayne,(acting in Monroe County),

10 at 6400 Dixie Highway, Newport, Michigan, on Wednesday, July 31, 11 1985, commencing at about 8:20 a.m.

12 l

13 APPEARANCES:

l' UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Field Office Region III ]

'6 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 1E (By: James N. Kalkman, Esq,)

17 Appearing on behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commissior

'8 JOHN H. FLYNN, ESQ.

i; 2000 Second Avenue

'9 Detroit, Michigan 48226 l 20 Appearing on behalf of Detroit Edison

! 21 i

22 23 24 (oontinued) 25

1 APPEARANCES: (continued) -

2 PETER A. MARQUARDT, ESO.

2000 Second Avenue 3 Detroit, Michigan 48226 4 Appearing on behalf of Detroit Edison 5 . . -

6 ALSO PRESENT: j 7 Terrence Lang and Thomas Randazzo

. 8 9

to j i

11 Elizabeth Diann Ferguson, CSR-1347  !

Court Reporter i 13 1 14 15 l

16 E 17 8

. 18 3

3 19 s

I 20 3

f 21 I

l' 22 l

24 25 2

.i

. . .? ,

1 _I .N _D. E X

2 -j witness Page 3

John Dewes )

4

)

Examination by'Mr. Kalkman -5'  :

)

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l a--___-__--____-__-__-__--____________ _ = _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ ._ .__ _- . - - _ _ _ __ a

.  ?

3 Newport, Michigan 2

Wednesday,. July 31, 1985 {

3 at about 8:20 a.m.

MR. KALKMAN: For the record, this is 5

6 the interview of John Dewes, D-e-w-e-s, who is employe'd j

7 by the Detroit Edison Company. The location of this e interview is the Fermi II Nuclear Power Station.

l g Present at this interview are to Mr. Dewes, Detroit Edison. Counsel, Paul Marquardt, and 11 John Flynn. NRC Reactor Inspector, Terrence Lang, and 12 NRC Investigator, James Kalkman.

13 !l The subject matter of this interview.

!i 14 !i concerns a reactor operator error, which occurred on 15 July 1, 1985, at the Fermi II Nuclear Power Station.

1 16 Mr. Dewes, would you stand and raise

! 37 your right hand?

I

~

. 18 1

19 JOHN DEWES, 20 after having first been duly sworn to tell the truth, 21 the whole truth and nothing but the truth, testified

,I 8 upon his oath as follows:

22 23 24 EXAMINATION 25 i

, 1

    • O j

u 1 BY MR. KALKMAN 1

2 Q Mr. Dewes, how long have you. been employed by Detroit Edison?

A Almost three years.

3 1

In what capacity?

4 Q l i l

5 A I started out as an assistant engineer. I am now an associate engineer.

6 .

1 Do you have an engineering degree? .l l 7 Q g A Yes.

g Q What type? l 10 A Nuclear Engineering, Bachelors, 33 Q So you were the STA on the evening of July 1, 12 A I was the shif t technical advisor in training that night, 13 yes.

34 Q What does that mean?

15 A Well, Prior to our certification, we have to spend time 16 on shift, sort of following the STA around, a certified l 37 STA, to get an idea of what the job is like, and to 4 I

further our training.

J

, is B  !

5 39 0 Are you still an STA in training?

z

! 20 A No, I was certified last week.

3 So you were actually working or observing the STA on that 21 Q t

  • shif t on the evening of July 17 22 I was observing, but not just the STA. I was observing 23 A 24 everything.

25 Q What did you observe on the evening of July 17 .

5

R

. : \

l 3 A Well, what do you mean?-

2 0 What types of things vsre you -- was it just everything 3 in general that happened in the Control Room? Were you 4 observing the reactor operator? Were you observing 5 someone else in a different function?

)

s A Well, I was wandering around generally looking at whatever )

7 caught my interest.

I e ?lothing specific, but everything in l 1 e general, I guess you could say.

io Q So you were not assigned to do anything specific during i, that shift? l 12 A No, I was not.

]

t3 Q So you were at your -- you had'the freedom to. do whatever 54 you wanted, to observe whatever you wanted? )

15 A Yes.

ts 0 Did you attend a shift meeting either prior to or during l.

lh 17 the shift on July 17 i l1

'; is A Not to my knowledge. I don't think I did.

'f*

. sg Q Is there normally a shift meetin??

I 20 A Yes, there is normally a shift meeting.

a 21 Q When and where is the shift meeting?

e 4

8

  • A The shift meeting usually starts half an hour prior to 22 23 the actual turnovers and it is usually locatei in the l

24 shift supervisor'o office.

25 Q So you don't recall attending a meeting prior to the shift?

. 6

. l j l

3 A No.

2 Q If thnre was a meeting, would you have attended?

3 A Not necessarily.

4 Q Would the STA have attended that meeting? l 5 A Well, he is not required to, but he usually does.

6 Q Who is required to attend the shift meeting?  !

)

7 A The on-duty shif t supervisor; the on-coming shif t a supervisor; essentially I would say that is all that is I 9 required to be there.

l 10 Q Did you keep any notes or logs on the evening of July 1?

11 A No.

12 O Did you observe anything unusual during that particular I i i 13 i shift?

I 14 A What do you mean?

15 0 Well, did you observe an operator error?

16 A Yes, I did.

3 17 Q Would you describe that, the events surrounding that error? l I

18 The operator error?

{5

19 A Well, the operator pulled 11 rods from 0 to 48, instead 1 I l m of 0 to 4.

21 On discovery of the error, he began f ,

a to insert the rods again.  !

22 23 Q okay.

24 Could you be a little more specific l l

25 about -- where you present when the operator withdrew all  !

7 l

. l l

. I l

i 11 rods? i j

A What do you mean by present?

2 3

I mean, I was standing there, but I

)l 4

was moving around looking at other things also. l 5 Q Were you at the 603 panel?

6 A At some points in time I was, yes.

l ~ ,

7 Q Did you know when lthereactoroperator, started 8 the rod pull on his shift, were you present when he l 1

g started?

30 A Yes.

3, O Were there other people present in the Control Room?

12 A Yes, quite a few. ,

J 13 Q When did you notice that the rod pull error had occurred?

l i4 jA I was watching the source range monitor charts, and when it l

. is Il; deviated from a straight-line drawing on the chart, I

, n -

think you are critical."

16 turned to

- hnd I said,j - v h 17 And I think at that point is when I noticed that.

I

. 18 Q Was it coincidental that you were observing the SRM's?

i

19 A coincidental with what?

0 Did you just happen to be watching this monitor or did l: 20

21 j the reactor operator ask you to?
A The operator never asked me to watch his charts. It was 22 23 my first real start-up, and the SRM's are one of the key 24 things to tell you when it is critical; so that was 25 gaining most of my attention that evening.

I L_______-_-_______ _ _ _ . _ _

l

]

1 MR. LANG: What was he watching, do.

2 you know? _

3 A I don't know. I could not tell you what he was watching.

4 _ _ _

5 BY MR. KALKMAN:

6 o Did he have his head turned? j 7

A He had his head turned every which way, because the level e

is way over there, the CRD flows are way over there to 8 the left, and looking around like anybody would.

Q Were you surprised that the reactor was at that stage

" when -- in comparison to the step in the procedure that 12 the reactor operator was there?

'3 A Yes, because we had discussed earlier at what point it

'd 1 would go critical, and this was -- it did seem at the l

15 time to be premature.

16 l Q Did it seem at the tiJne to be premature?

'7 l A Yes.

'8

'i Q Could you tell me who discussed this?

l6 '

l? A yas interested. He wanted to know about what l1 '

  • j 20 point did they think it would go critical.

l.

21 l[ Q Who was he asking?

I 22 A I cannot be sure, but I know that Tom Dong and Ed Duda l

23 were there when he asked him, and Barry Myers might have 24 been there, but I don't remembar.

25

'. think he was trying to get an idea of i

I 1 when it went critical the previous start-up.

2 MR. LANG: Do you know what approximate 3 time that was?

4 A It was af ter Lynn Barker lef t.

5 MR. LANG: Does that mean af ter 11:30 6 then?

7 A I could not tell you the time.

8 MR. LANG: Okay. Thank you.

9 MR KALKMAN: Are you referring to the to meeting?

11 MR. LANG: I was wondering when they 12 had this discussion.

13 A It was shortly after f tarted pulling rods.

14 MR. LANG: And you are assuming that 15 I would be af ter Lynn Barker lef t?

r-16 A Yes. I don't remember Lynn being there when g as 3 17 asking the questions.

y 18 MR. LANG: Okay.

l5

; 19 A Because I flipped forward to find out the step that they 20 mentioned to find out where it was in the procedure.

l l 21 MR. LANG: Okay.

_ 22 . - -

23 BY MR. KALKMAN:

24 Q Why did you make the comment that you thought the Plant 25 was going critical?

(si 16,

1 A Based on the five minutes of. data, the definition of 2 criticality in an area of sustained power increase

~

I 3 without further rod motion; and we had beginning indications l

4 of that.

5 Q so you are talking about just what was visible on the  ;

I 6 SRM charts? l 7 A Yes.

s Q Okay.

l 9 A That is what I based my comment on. ,

1

)

to Q Okay. l 11 Did you think that there was -- that 12 during that time period, there was continuous rod motion, l 33 , or was there a short period of time when there was no rod 14 I motion?

15 A I was not correlating the chart movement with his rod 1

16 motion; however I wanted him to be aware that it was, l

17 you know, increasing on the SRM chart. j ls

. is It was deviating from the straight-line, I

l- 19 and when it started that deviation, I pointed it out.

t 20 0 At that time when it became apparent to you that the l

8 21 Plant may be critical, what was the operator's reaction?

,t

I don't remember exactly, but I know he looked at the 22 A 23 charts. He looked at his sequence and said something like, 1

i 24 "I fucked up." Excuse me, ma'am. "Why don't you go get 25 the shift supervisor."

11 e

1 O

well, he realized that he-had not followed the procedure --

2 he did not really, at that point, realize.what he had 3

done or -- l J

d A I don't know what he realized.

5 Q But you did not have any discussion with him, the reactor i

6 operator?

7 A A to what?

j e

Q As to why it was -- he was getting a reading at that 8 stage in the procedure.

l 10 A I don't remember.

'l Q That step --

12 I don't remember, but I looked at his sequence and saw A

i

' that it was 0 to 48, and that is when I knew what had occurred.

1 I don't remember whether he had ever 16 said something.

'7 I (Whereupon, Court Reporter notes

'8 the time at 8:30 a.m.)

I; 19 _ _ _

z 20 BY MR. KALKMAN:

t 21 8 Q Well, I don't understand.

22 When you --

23 A When I was on my way, as far as I can remember, I looked 24 at his pull sheet on my way to get the shift supervisor.

J 25 0 And you could tell from the pull sheet that he was incorrect l

l l

12 l

l

1 he was pulling from 0 to 487 .

2 A Yes, because I was aware that he was pulling the rods to  ;

3 48 because he was doing coupling checks. i 4

O And that is when you discovered that? ]

5 A Yes. .

l 6 Q So he asked you to notifiy the shif t supervisor?  !

I 7

A Yes.

8 And you did that?

Q 9 A Yes.

10 Q And what did you tell the shif t supervisor?

11 A I said, Dave, needs you out here right away.

12 Is that it?

O l 13 A Well, I think the tone of voice is what got his attention.

14 Q Did you say anything else to him?

15 A No, not that I can remember.

16 MR. LANG3 When Dave got up, did he

=

17 go with you back to the --

l g

18 A I don't remember. I renomber him getting up right away; s

18 but I don't remember where I walked from then on. I don't i 20 remember going back, you know. I don't remember what was i ,

t .

21 going on then.

I - 22 . . .

23 BY MR. KALKMAN:

24 Q Who was in the shift supervisor's office?

25 A The shift supervisor and some ether people. I think the

/ J

l 1

INC technicians.

2 MR. LANG: At the time the rod pull 3

b were pulled to 48 and you noticed it and asked d

you to go get the shift engineer, did anyone else --

5 A Do you mean the shif t supervisor?

6 MR. LANG- Yes, sorry .

7 Did anybody else hear the Conversation,

  • 8 like the SOA or the STA?

8 A I don't know.

10 I remember mumbling something to *

' Tom Dong, but for some reason, I also remember a lot 12 of background noise; I was speaking in a very low voice,

'3 and I remember telling him it was critical, out of

'd sequence.

15 . . .

16 BY MR. KALKKAN:

3 '7 Q Telling who?

I.

'8 i

a A Tom Dong and Ed Duda; but I was speaking very low, and it was very loud in there, and I did not make sure that i

20 they heard me.

21

-Q Did you have any discussion later on in the shif t with E

. 22 anyone relating to the rod pull arror?

23 A Well, af ter I got the shif t supervisor and then I went and 24 got the reactor engineer, the shif t Nuclear Engineer, 25 Barry Myers, and told them I think we might have had a j

o l

1 critipal out of sequence. l 2 MR. LANG: Where was he?

i l 3 A well, he was getting a drink of water. He was at the  ;

)

4 water fountain.

5 MR. LANG: Which is outside?

6 A In the hallway to the tagging center.

7 MR. LANG: Okay. 3 8 Thank you.

9 10 BY MR. KALKMAN:

11 Q Was he on shift already or was he just coming on?

12 i A I don't know. '

1 13 They don't follow the same turnover ]

14 routine that we do. They are kind of an individual 15 entity.

I' 16 Q And what was Mr. Myers' reaction?

i 17 A Well, he quit drinking -- he quit drinking water and 18 came back into the Control Room.

19 After that, I, you know, I could not 20 place anybody anywhere. I know what I was doing, I think l

e j 21 for the most part.

t

  • Well, did you observe the shift supervisor with the l

. 22 Q 23 operator? Did Mr. Myers go over there to the 603 panel 24 and --

25 A Well, I remember everybody in the horseshoe at one point 15

i l

3 in time, but I don't remember who did what and anything 2

like that; but I know the shif t supervisor was out there e -

3 talking tol at one point.

4 I know Barry was.out there at some 5 Point. l 6 Q okay.

7 What transpired for the remainder of 8 the shift relating to this rod pull error? Anything you 9 recall specifically?

10 A Yes, r  %

l it I watched insert the rest of l  % $

! 12 the rods.

  • l 13 Q Eleven that had been pulled out?

' I l

d i4 A Yes, the 11 that had been pulled out.

l

'si l

Q How long did that take?

l 16 A I could not tell you. j

\

37 I know now that it took about 14 minutes; l\

,l 18 but that is just from what I have heard.

t

19 MR. LANG
Was the shif t supervisor a

20 !I Present at that time?

l 21 A I don't remember.

Ii 22 I had my back turned to the Control P

23 Room, and I was not paying attention to what was going i s l 24 on behind me. I was watching, hiththerods.

~ >

25 MR. LANGt Okay ,

o (s ,7e '

j l 1

. l l

3 l

2 BY MR. KAI.KMAN:

l 3 0 You watched him re-insert the rods?

4 A Yes, and he had missed one. It did not'go all the way  !

5 in the four, so I pointed that out to him.

l e Once h'e had them all in to the proper 7 position, the neXt thing I remember, this may not be a s e immediately af ter, JhadobtainedanOD-7 option-two, 9 which is a print-out of the computer, what the computer to knows about the control rod positions.

11 We have verified that against the 12 -

rod pull sheet, to insure that we were back in sequence; l

l 13 and then, for the rest of the shif t, we re-commenced the 14 start-up.

15 0 Was there any down time between the time that the rods 16 were re-inserted and --

, i 17 A I don't remember.

1B Q This review process where you looked at the print-out and i 9

19 compared that to the pull sheets, did that take any j 20 considerable time or are we talking a few minutes?

1 j 21 A Well, it did not take long.

22 O Okay.

23 A minute or --

24 A A minute or two.

25 0 were you present when the shif t supervisor gave approval i

j

1 to continue the rod pull --

2 A I don't remember him saying, you know, 'Re-commence."

3 Q

Did the shift supervisor discuss any questions relating I 4 to the rod pull incident at any time during the shift?

5 A Not that I remember. l 6 Q Did you observe the shift supervisor preparing a DER? ]

7 A No.

8 0 of the event?

9 A No, I did not.  ;

1 I

10 Q Did you see him with -- out in the Control Room did you 11 see him with a DER? .

12 A I did not see the DER until the next day.

13 lQ Were you involved in any post-shift meetings relating to ii .

I 14 i! this rod pull incident?

15 A Not post-shift, no.

16 0 Now, the day following the incident --

ii 17 A The day after, there was a meeting in the conference room II j'. 18 next to the shift supervisor's office that I was at.

lI -

19 Q When was that?

l I, 20 A I was working midnights, so it was probably around --

j 21 somewhere between 11 and 12:00.

22 Q And that was on the second or third?

23 A That would be -- well, it was between 11 and 12:00 p.m.,

24 so it would be the second still.

25 Q okay.

18 j

, ,' 1 l

i Who .was at that meeting?

3 Hari Arora, John Thorpe, Barry Myers, myself.

2 A I 3 Did I say Tom Dong? And I think 1 i

4 Ed Duda. They were all there at some point in time.

$ Q Now, this was the normal shif t meeting? ]

6 A No, this was a meeting specifically for the out-of- sequence 7 event. The reactor engineer was trying to correlate a some mistaken data for the real data.

9 Q Well, I don't understand.'

1 to A Okay.

ii Q I don't under p.tand what you are trying to relate here.

12 A well, on the SRM chart, they had the scram from the i 13 Previous -- well, I guess two days previous, the scram ,

14 that we were starting back up from when the accident  !

15 occurred.

16 During that scram, the source range

<: When you do  !

17 monitors are inserted fully into the' corp.

li '

[

is that, your pen pegs out essentially; and then as the power

,a

{

!; 19 decreases af ter the scram.comes back down.

I The reactor engineer mistook that for j j zo

2) the out-of-sequence critical; and then they were trying i

( g i8 22 to correlate the data logger to this particular portion {

23 of the source range monitor chart.

I 24 When I got in that evening, they pointed 25 out that Tom Dong and Ed Duda pointed out that John Thorpe

1 was looking at this and he was trying to explain it; and 2 .I pointed out that that was not'the portion of the chart 3 where it occurred.

4 MR. LANG: Did you go thhough the 5 whole entire licensing program?

6 A I am not sure exactly what all they are required'to take.

7 I took most of the classes that the 8 operators took except for the pre-license preparation.

~

9 MR. LANG: Okay.

to A Which is the last course.

11 ' , .

, MR. LANG: How much trust do you l 12 have in your reactor engineer's judgment, usually?

13 A Well, I really had not dealt with that much, so I had l 14 not made a decision as to how much I had trusted them.

15 MR. LANG: Did you hear anybody else 16 comment about this?

?

6 17 A Well, operators Occasionally make Comments -- well, they b

18 would ask for the reactor engineer in the Control Room 2 19 whenever they had a problem; so that is the only time I 20 had heard comments about them.

What kind of comments were 21 MR. LANG:

1 22 they?

23 A well, I could not remember specifically, not necessarily 24 derrogatory things; but we are all kind of learning RSCS-25 rod-worth-minimizers.

20

MR. LANG: To your knowledge, at any 1

time during the evening, was the rod-worth-minimizer ever 2

l bypassed or shut off?

3 l A Well, it was never shut off. I don't know how you shut 4

s At *SS* <

Oh, the bypass, I don't belfsve it g

was ever bypassed. It was re-initialized at one point, 7

though.

a MR. LANG: During your shift, that  !

9 is an eight-hour shift? ,

to  !

33 A Yes.

MR. LANG: During the eight hours l 12 33 that you are on shif t, were you in the Control Room or l 34 control area at all times?

o  !

A Not at all times, j 15 I would imagine -- I don't recall g

l 37 specifically, but I usually wander up to my office a

'I

  • couple of tLees and --

3g

i MR. LANG: Were you ever sent out

'{ 39 of the control room?

,sI 20 ,<

21 A Sent out?

t I MR. LANG: Yes.

22 A No , s ir .

23 MR. LANG: Other than on your own 24 choosing?

25 21

A Other than on my choosing, no.

3 MR. LANG: Okay.

2

)

At the time you had the rod pull, l 3

4 did you expect the rod-worth-minimizer to stop you or --

5 A I suppose I did.

MR. LANG: Did you have any discussions 6

7 or were there any discussions of whether it was operable l

g or inoperable at the time? j g A Well, we knew at one point in time that it was operable because it was blocking us.

to 33 MR. LANG: That was on that evening?

12 A Yes, because we had -- we tried to determine what was ,

13 giving us the blocki we knew it was the rod-worth-i4 minimizer, but we did not know why.  !

So after some discussion, we re-15 16 initialized it; and, of course, prior to the start-up,

they are required to do a functional test with the )

37

I l: is rod-worth-minimizer.
s l* gg MR. LANG: All right.

A But that was from the day before.

l!: 20 5

21 MR. LANGt Was there any kind of, I

shall I say, 10, 15, 20-minute discussion during the 22 23 night about the whole incident, where more than just e s 24 ( -

jand one other person --

4 25 A Not that I was involved in.

7

(

i 1

MR. LANG: Okay.

2 A There may have been, but I was not at it, if there was q t

3 one.

q 5 BY MR. KALKMAN:

6 Q Now, you said you don't keep any kind of logs or notes 1

7 of the shift? l l

8 A No't when I was in training.

9 Q Okay.

10 Now, the STA does keep a log?

11 A The STA does have a log book.

12 Q Do you know if that log book indicates whether there was 13  ! an operator error?

14 A I believe it does not. l 15 Q It does not?

)

16 A No.

l5 17 Q Is that something that the STA would normally --

!I 18 A Well, it is something that I should have done, because

! I i; 19 the STA was not aware of it.

i I assumed he was aware of it, and I j 20 j

\.

21 assumed he would log it.

l 22 MR. LANG: Who in your mind do you .I 23 feel at the end of the shift was aware of the incident?

24 I mean, maybe not the fact that you went cr'itical, but at 25 the f act that you had the out-of-sequence.

23

A Well, who could I assume?

3 1

. MR. LANG: Yes, just an assumption. I d

Well, who do you know?

3 Who do I know for sure that knew?

, A

, MR. LANG: Yes. i e \ j A Ryself. I astumed that Dave Aniol knew; j 6 {

7 and I assumed that Barry Myers knew.

There were other people who overheard j e

g me telling Barry that we might have gone critical, out- l of-sequence. I cannot tell you who that was.  ;

10

\

12 BY MR. KALKKAN:

13 !O You mentioned earlier that you briefly talked to Mr. Duda l

i4 and Mr. Dong?

15 A Yes.

16 Q But you are not sure whether they --

a 37 A Well, f rom what I know now, Tom Dong heard "Out-of-I is Sequence," he did not haar my first word, " Critical, out-i

19 of-sequence."

! 2o Q Well, so he did know.

21 A Well, I mumbled it. I don't know whether he knew what I i

I 22 had said.

Q But he did not record it in the log?

23 24 A well, I assume he knew, but, you know, from what I know l 25 now, it is because he did not know. He did not hear me.

24

/

l l

1 MR, LANG: Did the shift supervisor 2 over roll back the charts that you know of?

3 A Not that I know of.

4 - - -

5 BY MR. KALKMAN:

6 Q What was Mr. Aniol doing when you went into his office?

7 A Sitting at his desk talking to the INC technicians.

8 I never entered his office. I just 9 poked my head around the door.

l 10 MR. LANG: Are those offices, do they 11 have glass windows?

12 A Yes.

13 MR. LANG: Okay. I 14 How many nights have you been on the 15 shift? Have you ever been on the shift a long time?

]

16 A A Monday -- I don't know.

ls 17 It has been kind of sporatic between lI

'. 18 our training courses. It was a long enough period if they ll l- 10 put us on shift.

20 I could say that I'have been on the 21 shift for six months between 1983 and now.

I 22 MR. LANG: During that time, what would 23 you say would be the typical position of an SAO, are they 24 within that horseshoe area or --

25 A My experience on shif t has largely been prior to the field l

25 ,

t I

t _ . _ _ _ _ . - _ _

1 load; and therefore, they had not assumed their normal 2 Positions.

In the last couple of weeks before -- I 3

l i 4 I am trying to think who the SRO is. The:. shift supervisor 5 usually is in his office; the assistant is usually in his l

6 office. However, they are always coming out to find out 7 what is going on and going back in or whatever. Wherever 8 they are needed.

9 There is usually an RO within the  !

1 to ground area, which is the -- essentially the horseshoes 11 and there is usually an RO at the Control Room desk.

12 Sometimes, there is an SRO, and 13 sometimes it is not, as far as I can remember.

14 MR. LANG: Can you tell me, during 15 the incident that you saw Mr. Burt, Steve Burt, I guess? l I

16 A Yes.

! 17 MR. LANG: What was he doing?

'i.

18 A Well, it was a busy night for him because he was running ls
19 all over the place essentially.

I We had a nice calm collection up there j 20

~

21 watching the rod pull, which is the way it is supposed to i

22 be, and he was taking care of everything else, so he was 23 all over the place.

l 24 MR. LANG: When you sa'f you had a 25 calm collection, was that like a meeting or discussion at 26

l

- l

, j i

i 1 the panel? i l

2 A No. j 3 Well, continuous banter between the i

4 advisors while he was pulling the rods.

5 MR. LANG: Okay.

6 Thank you.

7 8 BY MR. KALKMAN:

l 9 O Do you know if Mr. Myers agreed with you, with your i 10 analysis that the Plant had gone critical?

well, I don't remember specifically talking to him. (

11 A 12 O Did you think -- )

13 MR. LANG: Did anybody ever come back 14 to you throughout the shif t and tell you that yoa were 15 wrong, that it really did not go critical?

16 A No.

f: i 17 MR. LANG: As far as you know, you had

!I'

. 18 a pretty good idea that you did?

I l 19 A Well, I don't know if I ever made up my mind.

T 20 MR. LANG: Well, in your own judgment.

l 21 A Well, in my own judgment, I would not make a decision --

i 22 I don't know.

23 Based on that amount of indication, 24 I thought we had come -- if not crit l. cal, darn close.

! 25 Darn close is all that counts to me. I 1

1 1

27

, mean, I don't care whether it is critical or whether it i 2 is not. It was near.

3 MR. LANG: Okay.

i 4 l 5 BY MR. KALKMANt

( \

6 Q Did you think that also felt that he was critical 7 or the Plant was critical?

s i e A Well,Idon'treallyknowwhat{ ,

'was thinking.

9 Q Did you get the impression that he agreed with you?

to A Well, it was nevar really discussed whether we thought 33 we were critical or not.

12 O Well, let's say -- .

i 13 lA Except for my initially telling him. , j l

14 0 If the reactor operator had not agreed with you, why 15 did he re-insert the rod? Why did he start re-inserting l 16 the rods? Why didn't he just leave it at --

[ A Well, he was out-of-sequence. That is why he inserted I

17

)

1

is the rods.  !

is O So he did not wait to see if -- he did not give the ractor i 20 time to -- I' a

21 A Well, in order to call it critical, you would have to ,

i r

22 have given it a lot more time to see whether that period 23 would have died out.  ;

24 So that is why we never really had a 25 discussion as to whether it was critical or not because it

r

)

. 1; i

1 was not a pertinent issue at the time, l

2 MR. LANG: Were you present whcn f a

3 Dave Aniol came out and talked to 4 A I don't remember what. happened between the time I got 5 Dave and the tiJee I got Barry.

6 I remember doing each of those things, 7 but I' don't remember in between.

8 8 BY MR. KALKMAN:

10 Q But you were at the panel when the rods were re-inserted?

11 A For part of the time that the rods were being re-inserted, 12 yes, towards t.he tail end.

13 Q Did you observe Mr. Myers and Mr. Aniol having any 14 discussion?

15 A I don't remember.

I 16 My back was turned. .

j l'

17 MR. LANG: Can you give us an idea j j

18 in your own judgment how 'you thought Mr. Aniol accepted i 18 the out-of-sequence?

i 20 A Well, do you mean his mood? Did he yell? Did he scream?

21 No. Dave does not scream or yell.

li 22 Usually, he just prescribes the path 23 to extracate yourself and keep going; and I don't 24 remember him -- I could not really tell you what his 25 reaction was because I did not see it when he first came j 9

1 out there, because I did not tell him anything when I 2 went to get him.

3 I could not tell youwwhat his reaction 4

was to it, but I don't remember hearing anything.

5 - - -

1 1

6 BY MR. KALKMAN: I 7

O Mr. Dewes, have I or any other NRC representative here-3 i

8 threatened you in any manner or offered you any reward in j l

9 return for this statement? j i

10 A No. I l

11 O Have you given this statement freely and voluntarily?

12 A Yes.

)

13 Q Is there anything further that you care to ad.d for the 14 record?

15 A No.

16 MR. KALKMAN: Thank you.

3 17 (Deposition concluded at 8:55 a.m.)

l. 18 . . .

l- 19 15 20 21 l 22 23 24 25 30

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