ML20237J781
Text
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ _ _
. s , s. . . w~ r .,~.
n ,v .. ...n g=...
~ u.
. ;"~. a . . . ,
.%. f ,;;. , . . g , * .,c s
, . l,,,..,;., .. w. ,.g~,.
i'? .. .
n' d,% .
- i y; *
- myf..q7,Q,. y, ,,.[g.
- .c
. y q.
.r,..j.. s*- . . s .? ? ? ? .:4 ~.
.m , . . . ,
7.. .
n .- -
. , w. m. . , .. . . ,
~
av . ., .
3
- y. ( .
- fm, J % . .M, ; , _. ;, .m.CASE N'o. g 013 ._
4.y
. m. ' f. "., t #.
n *-
/. ,
,. . . -(" . .jQ*,
. , . .owi j /. - g d: . , ._.,-a .
. g* 3 i j
~
' '. . . l; j$$w&,.1,.. . m .;.+.&~. e . w we&.e&n'Lm.. \,
L[- . -
.,.-.~.~.. .; ..
.m
. .v ,v 1
Um.ted States - ^ ~
r ..
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,$ $. $.. a n, .
5~ VM.m.. 7 ...
e ~~
- am Report of Investigat'onM,. .
.wMM
. .I.. s .w: ., ' w r .. a.1,r.".tn s g.s .n,uw. sw' 5'*.r...*.~
- ,-
- q n ~. .
Enr.ico Ferm.i 2: :- + .
w M M N, a m. a .; ..yr - -
,.. R 4 *f > Q" ..'. .. Q *p5+ * . ? ' *C
. . .' . i '" _
.^ . *? .; .q ; ', ' :4
.. Fy..c . A'.79:w ,,.f ; ? :..
Material False Statement Regarding Fuil Power Licensing .
+
. %s. ,
a.- ( .
p.,.,,,_.,...
...;.,.'.3,.
ur
,. ' ....,..'f.7 y
, . . ; 7, .A . . - e : . .< . +
L
- t
'. ',,'.N, u., . .., ,. Q. ,. ,.. .; . .g. . . . ..<.
'e
. , L ss . , ,j.e - - - e y .. .
d
. s ll** l. -
,,... .,;,u,?. j, .
n.
w,r Is
^::6 . w., , .w.e p't. . " >c .. r. % ,, .
- r
- y . 4.g -
- q:;. q.y ; . ;1.. . :,y.g:.,7~ . :
n- _
,e y. s. :.qp,.;. yg 7. , j: g y -g .;,v....; p e.;y
- 1. i . . . , . .s,
- .y ' :,. .. . . ,.
5
,, . - I q. '.'[*
- N W hy ,%
/
S . I. '... j T'.V
~ ';g .,
- m. ! ,
~
....a .
. . ..~ : , . . , . . , u .. y , .
1
~ e -
n & .
2' .,a.......;Q-g$'j @;;,q v..; i 'J 4. ;;. W.... .
.Qa.p'.g,f~ q,,,.
,: ,' J,9
,, j
~
Q;%;. ,.. 3.'.' 3,;,. . - , uy~.a.., .
m , 6j_m-;.g. XQ,)$u.?-(t rg, .
.r 4. <'
~#.
. ,. , o._ -
e3. O, ff.lCO Of InVOSt.ig8t. .lOnS ~ . ....r.E4}~=.i -J.n. .,..*.e <.n%yM&v.',W. . M. . ..l'./.
~
, ... .,*4*a..
9* ' . ** ,='...FN
- e.s?
e.*p*** ..
s
&a , , . e ; ,.*6 g
h* %,
- - ' ' 2 L
- &, e.
Reported by 01: '
, $ ,, . , L,. Q
- ~ ' y: . ~ ' M
-1 s
' M,J'
, , 'x WW' '*'4, ,m ,# s* \&,
-l*: t" %:h:h g d#j ~: 1.t'a 7
9A*d , .6 f. . g, . f :,q
- ?t'A.Y Y
- l), :
. *C
- s , g. -
a *J .t ;p@v .m ae .
3..
g @e(# ..afan g. . g Q^f(g' .. ,.
..r w..
h ,f - * -
- * * ~ . -
- *u
,.pu M, -,u- a, agg p r.' . .
.f. .s p . ( ...
.. b. *ry' #. 44,,,t pfh,N yg y*r ft
- -f v,, .,
o *.sq'., 4 .y t s.g / F n, w 4M;._.
- ...ps 3
7.*y,Q ..gts.*. p u.f ts.j . ,
' ] . '* C' ' - [_. M i g ( .. J,%
' , - ' h ,~'.f, .. {
3
- 3 yf
.e. .y-
- a. - .n. :. pm3~..Q.M6,.A< s.:m,.mn +y d.K.m,Fh .'. vQ~/ "v4"7 .
- g. n. St1nforma m
c :,:* a:.a . -
f.y. ...p - $c M'_ r%tfp
. t ..z u.; w .s v. r ,
~ +- >.v.; .
,q. ',
, . . . m > , g -;g.*b, .,X*, ?4.2
. . .gp W.To gf
- .. .y 9 h, ., ,*e ., . .'% . a .V.*. .' % f,.,**h' 9
n s ;
W;g};.;rQS 3 ,r .-m E.$
g , g, . ,f.
- 7>,
. v ~, W, 4. ' ,, . . y
.**V'
- 7 ,.), p. 4
".. . 'n *.';g .%
yw.+ .,:q2 :m .g,, , gg,q
. ,mn x m', .. Q:.,i:c?,:: n ,- %;L,m ys . c ; y- %*
r..
.'. h tr <
- n. .
- ,;,py-q;4
.~. : y n
- r{;i Q ..yW'?
r ,' r ,. ],. ...'.. A; k,- Q p&iN,,f;.;m.w.;;e,m.
.;~, m g n. 9lQ.gp?;?[$.
s W.a.,v .c <. . u.,.n ,v m,Q. ,yn3
- 4. z ,,; f.- ,,f.
,.Q; n.~ ; r,. gg;'y.ml*;.cpy;.u:*?M,
.n. s . :, - .
.. . ~. . ..l ,.,:*
?.g . w .m ;;f 4.w ;.;s4 e, .. .... w n ...x./.t.,.,,.,,9 .. e.u
....~..
sm. ,,:]f.%,y;?f.Q. .,.e.,%**.,-.,
' ?*
. 'sy t)bl., a.
,A
. .f- ,- ' ' ,s. JQ
.4 4
. . .. . . . . . ' < .* p y t * *: w. kp p3
...~.
s
.,g..',,'
.,.. . ., 2. : .,. W] p.. <e . :n g.). .q '.'.p.--
.. - ~. p: ..' m. .,,.. n. ;, i v. n:W. e;,S N L y, p,?.,$. . <. n..,9 , pp ,
q' yy,ph .,p-, . . . .~.
- u .: h:Ju, Th.%. h. .r,w;n. ym,.:.-y{:. (( h[. $ c ..
h
'., - -' v;y. ' k , .
m .3, 44; +,g, ,p g..;y, r
- v: ?. .Q<>~ .g .. 4;... ,
g,g .
g .
,.j m .
p; , -g 'ij g /g,,g%.gv,7 p.mg, s W3.ynu . y m* ;J . :,, p w 8700Da,0314 870819 A y..p.
~ww*y'%
r.,
3 +a PDH F0m .~.
_.i'id$ ,';Dch MMf%. a f M{U.NT!M= ~h(A.;~4&*f%.[-yhhtf['. ;. -
Q,J- ,. PUNTENN86-245 PDR .
w ..
W.
,.. .I
'I d
5 j
b .
i l l-
Title:
ENRICO FERMI 2
! j FULL POWER LICENSING MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENT RE:
1 i
Licensee: Case Number: 3-85-013 Detroit Edison Company Report Date: February 14, 1986' q Detroit, MI Control Office: 01:RIII j.
Docket No. 50-341 Status: CLOSED. l Reported by: Rev ed by:
- - j n ,
- n. $ }$w* Y$44 )
/ James N. Kalkman ugene T. Jawlik' :
Investigator Director l Office of Investigations Office of ff Investigations >
l Field Office, Region III Field Office, Region III Approv y:
' Ben B. Hayes- '
h1 /
Director / l Office of Invest gations ]
l Participating Personnel:
T. E. Lang, Reactor Inspector, RIII l
Information in this record was deleted l' in accordance with the Free om information Act, exem tions b a 7 F01A- 'W r l
WARNING The attached document / report has not been reviewed pursuant to 10 CFR.
@ 2.790(a) exemptions nor has any exempt material been deleted. Do not disseminate or discuss its contents outside NRC. Treat as "0FFICIAL USE ONLY."
I l .
J 1
. SYNOPSIS-4 I
On July 22, 1985, NRC Region III Administrator requested the Office of-Investigations (01) s.onduct an investigation of an alleged material false statement by Detroit Edison Company (DECO) relating to an' operator error which .
J occurred on July 2, 1985, at the Fermi 2 facility.
This investigation has developed evidence indicating that on July 3,1985, DECO plant management had reason to believe that a premature _ reactor criticality resulting from an operator error.had occurred. Deco management recognized the i incident as non-reportable'under the. Code of Federal Regulations; however, it was perceived as a significant public relations and licensing issue. The afternoon of July 3, li days after the operator error occurred, DECO management did notify the NRC Resident Inspector of_ the operator rod pull error and stated, contrary to the advice of a nuclear consultant and one of their- .j reactor engineers, that the error did not result in reactor criticality. Deco . 1 did advise that reactor engineeri6; was performing a review of data to assess l
criticality. The NRC Resident Inspector understood that he would be advised of the reactor engineering group's findings as soon as they became available. l On July 5,1985, DECO management again met and were purportedly' convinced by reactor engineering that, in fact, the reat or had been critical for a 110-114 second period. On that date, and subsequently on July 8-12, 1985, the NRC Resident Inspector and the Resident Inspector trainee were on the Fermi site. ,
l They interacted with licensee personnel and attended the Deco staff meetings l chaired by the same individuals who notified the NRC Resident Inspector on l
July 3,1985 of the operator error. Those DECO employees were fully aware of j the changed criticality findings and made no effort to notify the NRC represen-tatives of the new Deco position regarding premature criticality. l i
On July 10, 1985, the Comission met to discuss significant issues-relating to j Fermi 2 and to vote on a full power license for that facility. The Deco Vice l President Nuclear Operations, and Assistant Manager Nuclear Production were '
present and observed the discussion of significant operator errors.. Neither DECO representative, both of whom were admittedly aware of the July 2 operator error and the latter aware of the premature criticality, attempted to clarify information which was furnished by NRC Region'III to the Commission, that only one operator error had occurred following fuel load.
On July 12, 1985, NRC Director, Division of Licensing, signed the Fermi 2 full l power license. On July 15, 1985, DECO advised the NRC Senior Resident Inspector of the premature critica1My of July 2. That notification was the first 3 public admission by Deco of what was their official corporate position regarding !
reactor criticality resulting from an operator error, established on July 5, 1985.
l 1
l I
i
6 2
I 1
)
l 1
1 THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY ;
I i
1 i
l i
i 1
l
)
J i
Case No. 3-85-013 2 )
)
l
.a'
-ACCOUNTABILITY-1 l
The following portions of the .N port of. Investigation (Ca'se No. 3-85-013).
will not be included'in the matei al~placed i in the PDR. They. consist of l pages 2 through 22. {
l f
i I
1 l
l l
]
\
i 1
i t
(
Case No. 3-85-013 3
,j
1 1
. \
\
s 6 i
{
1 I
i i
~
THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY 3
4 l
l l
Case No. 3-85-013 4
o I
i 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS q 0
- Page 1
SYNOPSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3 ;;
AC COL'NTAB I L I T Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
l APPLICABLE REGULATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9 i DECO NUCLEAR OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION CHART . . . . . . . . . . .
DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 l Background ........................ 11 11 l Chronology of Events ...................
17 Willfulness / Intent ....................
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 19 l
LIST OF EXHIBITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 i
1 1
l l
l 1
1 l
l Case No. 3-85-013 5 l
l
l l
P l
l l
t i
J
- 1
! l I
I I
l l - i l i i
THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY i
l l
l i
1 1
I lI l
l 1
Case No. 3-85-013 6
APPLICABLE REGULATIONS Allegation: Material False Statement Regarding Full Power Licensing Atomic Energy Act, Section 186(a), Revocation: "Any license may be revoked for any material false statement in the application or any statement of fact required under Section 182, or because of conditions revealed by such applica-tion or statement of fact or any report, record, or inspection or other means which would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on an original l application, or for failure to construct or operate a facility in accordance i i
with the terms of the cer.struction permit or license or the technical specifica-tions in the application, or for violation of, or failure to observe any of f the terms and provisions of this Act or of any regulation of the Commission." l Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2, Appendix C, Supplement VII, Section B.1-
"A material false statement or a reporting failure, involving information {
which, had it been available to the NRC and accurate at the time the information should have been submitted, would have resulted in regulatory action or would likely have resulted in NRC seeking further information." I
\
l I
l<
7 Case No. 3-85-013
(
f i
l
! i l
l
! 'l 4 t 1 1
1 THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY I 1
l 1
l I
Case No. 3-85-013 8
- 1 l
1 l
DETROIT EDISON COMPANY 1
. NUCLEAR OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION CHART Dr. JENS 1 VP Nuclear F. AGUSTI {
- Mgr, Nuc Ops 1 i
I R. LENART j Asst Mgr, Nuc Prod l
L. LESSOR '
' Nuc Consultant I I 'i G. OVERBECK H. ARORA i Asst Supt Nuc Ops Supy Reactor Eng i
E. PRESTON B. MYERS (RE)
Ops Supv J. THORPE (RE)
D. ANIOL Nuc Shift Supv (NSS) l i
J. BURT (NSQl_ J.DEWE5(STAIT) l T. DONG '(STA)
E.DVDA(SOA)
B. MYERS (RE)
Case No. 3-85-013 9
l i
THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY l
i l
l I
l l
i Case No. 3-85-013 10 J t.
j DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION
Background
Fermi 2 Nuclear Pcwer Station achieved its first reactor criticality on June 21, 1985. On the evening control room shif t of July 1,1985, Fermi was ,
in the process of a startup to 5% power. The control room personnel consisted 4
of a Shift Supervisor, Assistant Shift Supervisor, Senior Reactor Operator, Reactor Operator, Reactor Engineer, Shift Technical Advisor (STA), STA in .
training, and a Shift Operations Advisor (SOA). The reactor operator, who was I not experienced at operating the Fermi 2 reactor, was to continue the control rod pull started on the afternoon shift. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector who followed plant operations, was scheduled to leave for Washington, DC, at noon on July 3 to attend the July 10 Commission hearing and vote regarding a Fenni 2 full power license. ;
1 Chronology of Events On July 1,1985, at approximately 11:00 p.m., DECO Reactor Operato[
took over the already in-process reactor startup procedure at Step 38.
I was advised by the_ previous reactor operator to expect criticality at !
'T proximately Step 156. was performing his first rod pull to criticality l on the actual Fermi 2 re to His only other experience had been in the l Fermi 2 simulator. When began withdrawing the first group 3 rods, he -
did not observe the proc ure nstruction to pull from 00-04, but rather he l with w 10 group 3 rods to position 48. On the eleventh group 3 rod Step 56, nd the STA in training, John DEWE noticed the increasing neutron coun on the source range monitors.I immediately began to insert the misaligned rods and directed the stain t ining to sumon the Shif t Supervisor, ;
David ANIOL, and the Reactor Engineer, Barry MYERS. ANIOL, who, pas _ig the l Shift Supervisor office, came out to the 603 panel and directed to continue inserting the eleven group 3 rods to their proper posiNon.~ MYERS ,
was advised by the STA in training of an out-of-sequence criticality and he proceeded to log the premature criticality in the Reactor Engineering Log (Exhibits: 1, pgs. 6-15; 2, pgs. 8-15; 3, pgs. 6-9; 4, pgs.18-29).
ANIOL contacted the Operations Supervisor, Eugene PRESTON, and advised him of the operator error to include a statement that the reactor had not achieved criticality. Contrary to his sworn testimony given to 01, ANIOL did not consult the SOA, STA, or the Reactor Engineer for input to that reactor criticality decision. PRESTON requested that ANIOL prepare a Deviation Event Report (DER) documenting the incident and granted approval to continue the rod pull to achieve a planned startup. ANIOL did prepare a DER, however, he did not document the operator error in his Shift Supervisor Log, nor did he advise the Lead Reactor Operator, Stephen BURT, of the incident; therefore, the operator error was not documented in the Reactor Operator's Log. During the same evening shift, sometime after the rod pull incident occurred, ANIOL became aware of the fact that the Reactor Engineer, MYERS, had entered a premature criticality in the Reactor Engineering Log. ANIOL advised MYERS that his log was incorrect and the reactor had not been declared critical.
Based on ANIOL's suggestion, MYERS altered the Reactor Engineering tog to read, "the count rate began to increase on one of the SRM's as if we may have Case No. 3-85-013 11
/ )
1 l
been critical (Exhibits: 3, pgs. 6-9; 4, pgs.19-29; 5, pgs.14-17; 6, pgs. l 9-13; 7, pgs. 7-10; 8, pgs. 8-13; 9, pgs. 8-13; 10, Reactor Engineer Log; l 11 DECO NSS Log; 12, DECO NSO Log)." l On July 2,1985, at approximately 6:00 a.m., PRESTON arrived at the Fenni 2 site and obtained the already prepared DER from ANIOL. ANIOL advised PRESTON }
that he should be aware of the Reactor Engineering Log entry of criticality.
At 7:00 a.m., during the shift turnover meeting, PRESTON advised the Assistant Manager, Nuclear Production, Robert LENART, of the out-of-sequence rod pull ;
error; however, he did not mention the Reactor Engineering Log entry. At l 8:00 a.m., during the DECO staff meeting, PRESTON gave the DER to the Assistant '
Plant Superintendent, Gregg OVERBECK, who read the DER and stated to PRESTON that he would a'ddress that DER during the Corrective Action Review Board I (CARB) meeting following the staff meeting. At the morning CARB meeting, OVERBECK was cognizant of the dissenting opinion by reactor engineering regarding criticality, and therefore, he assigned reactor engineering the task of analyzing the rod pull event to settle the criticality issue. Concurrently, several other corrective actions relating to operator actions and verification.
were instituted. No one from the DECO staff cognizant of the operator error, advised the NRC Resident Inspectors of that incident on July 2,1985 (Exhibits:
4, pgs. 24-27; 9, pgs.18-25; 13, DECO DER, dtd 07/02/85; ISA, pgs. 3-4; 16, !
pgs. 5-13), j On July 3,1985, reactor engineering advised Operations that a decision had been teached as to criticality. A meeting was convened with Plant Operations Managers LENART, OVERBECK, PRESTON, Deco Nuclear Consultant Leo LESSOR, and from reactor engineering, Hari ARORA, Jon THORPE, and Melvin BATCH. THORPE r.ade reactor engineering's presentation, which stated that based on computer models, a review of the source range monitor charts, and his " detailed knowledge of how the core is loaded and the worth of the control rods at the peripheral locations as opposed to the anterial locations, the reactor was, in fact, ,
critical . " LENART's nuclear consultant, LESSOR, a former Plant Manager at the J Cooper Nuclear Power Station in Nebraska, stated:
"In my opinion, you were critical...just from my experience of I looking at these charts back in Nebraska, I was just almost certain that especially after interviewing the operator and what he said, I just pretty well knew what the results were going to be.... It really doesn't make that much difference, the error. You pulled 11 rods in error, the seriousness of the event is the same, you did not i stop. But as a minimum, you better go right over and talk to the '
resident inspector and make him aware of what happened."
LEMART stated in an interview with 01, that his gut feeling was that he agreed with LESSOR, but did not express that opinion at that review meeting. Contrary to reactor engineering and LESSOR's advice, OVERBECK defended his operating staff and reiterated that the reactor had not been declared critical and he believed the reactor engineering analysis was inconclusive. LENART and l OVERBECK made e decision to ask reactor engineering to perform an additional l analysis, and meanwhile, to officially advise the NRC Resident Inspector, l Michael PARKER, of "the operator error and that we had the meeting that was l held on July 3, and that the issue of criticality was still an open issue, and there was further analysis going to be done in that regard." LESSOR, not l agreeing with LENART's decision, requested that PARKER also be advised that )
l Case No. 3-85-013 12 l l
l J
the DECO position on criticality was not unanimous. LESSOR stated, during an interview with 01, that had the NRC Resident Inspector queried him as to the rod pull error, he would not have supported the DECO position, but rather would have confirmed the reactor criticality based on his reading of the SRM ,
l l charts (Exhibits: 9, pgs. 25-34; 9A. pgs. 16-20; 14, pgs. 9-14; 15, pgs.
! 6-16; 15A, pgs. 5-8; 16, pgs. 13-20; 16A, pgs. 9-25; 17, pgs. 18-19; 17A, pgs. 6-12; 18, pgs. 7-12).
LENART's decision on the DECO " management position" with regard to premature f
! criticality was admittedly not the conservative approach. LENART stated: i "From this particular incident in question, the most conservative, after everything was done and over with, the most conservative approach to take with regard to taking a management position and erring on the conservative side is to say it went critical."
LENART, rationalizing why he chose the non-critical decision, stated:
l "It was also recognized by me to some degree the significance of that internally and externally, and with regard to any immediate subsequent actions it really didn't make any difference. In other words, if on the 3rd that had been the position of that meeting, it wouldn't have made any difference with regard to the plant conditions, personnel, or anything else. And therefore, before that was made, I felt the prudent thing to do was to make sure that there weren't any mistakes. It's the same old case, you know. It is always difficult to get an accurate and complete retraction of something that has already been stated. It was a judgment call on my part with the information I had available from experts, both from an Operations viewpoint and the Reactor Engineering viewpoint. I weighed all of those and made the decision that I did."
OVERBECK's account of the July 3 meeting and discussion of what to advise the NRC Resident Inspector also revealed Deco management having a problem in deciding how to describe the event. OVERBECK states:
"Because there was a discussion at the end of our meeting on the 3rd, well, we've got to go tell the Resident Inspector. What are we going to tell him? Are we going to tell him it's critical or not critical? The decision was made, supported by Bob LENART, i to tell him that the reactor was not critical, but that we still l had a controversy between our Reactor Engineering people and our !
operators, and that we are going to go back and do some more evaluation. That's exactly what he was told (Exhibits: 15A, l pgs. 12-14; 16A, pgs. 15-16)."
In the early afternoon of July 3, 1985, shortly after the Senior Resident Inspector (SRI), Paul BYRON, who was following plant operations, left the Fermi site, PARKER was requested to attend a meeting with OVERBECK and PRESTON.
At that meeting, he was advised the rod pull error had occurred and that criticality was not achieved, although reactor engineering was reviewing the event. In addition, PARKER stated that the impression given was that they would get back to him if and when the Corporate position on criticality had Case No. 3-85-013 13
l changed. When OVERBECK discussed the notification to PARKER on July 3, he stated it was the direct result of:
" Clearly the fact whether the reactor was critical or not critical. The more we got into it, the more we did the .
evaluation, the more we found out, boy, we really blundered here. We didn't make a simple mistake, we made a big mistake."
Although the element which elevated the operator error to the threshold of NRC notification was apparently the potential reactor criticality. Deco's notiff cation of the criticality implied that there was a consensus within the Deco organization that the reactor had not achieved criticality and failed to mention there was disagreement among DECO personnel as to the reactor criticality decision. That notification did not provide the dissenting opinions of the nuclear consultant, LESSOR, or the Nuclear Engineer, THORPE, both of whom had significantly more experience and knowledge in startup and nuclear reactivity, respectively, than any of the DECO operations management present at the July 3 meeting. PARKER stated that he and OVERBECK discussed civil enforcement action resulting from the operator error and recalled that OVERBECK stated "the event could be sensitive to licensing because it involved an operator l error (Exhibits: 9, pgs. 34-37; 16, pgs. 18-21; 16A, pgs. 22-32; 19, pgs. 1-2; I 19A, page 2)."
Following the afternoon meeting with OVERBECK and PRESTON, PARKER telephoned Reactor Engineer Supervisor, ARORA, to verify that reactor engineering was conducting an analysis. ARORA confinned reactor engineering's assignment, but did not relate the fact that reactor engineering's John THORPE had already performed an analysis and informed operations personnel of the suggested criticality. PARKER subsequently contacted NRC Region III, Nicholas CHRIS50TIMOS, and advised that DECO had notified him of the reactor operator error, and that reactor engineering was reviewing for reactor criticality.
PARKER did not pursue the incident further due to other pressing matters and expected that Deco would keep him apprised of any developments regarding reactor criticality (Exhibits: 18, page 12; 19, pgs. 1-2).
Also on the afternoon of July 3. LENART met with Dr. Wayne JENS, DECO Vice President of Nuclear Operations, to advise him of the rod pull error. LENART stated to JENS:
"We had earlier in the morning had a meeting in which this subject was discussed with regard to whether the reactor did or didn't go critical. There were differences of opinion in that meeting, and that I wanted him to be aware of that fact; and I basically told him because, you know, I thought it would be oh, from a PR standpoint, a sensitive issue, and told him what the game plan was: reactor engineering was to go back and do another analysis, and that there would be further results."
Dr. JENS corroborated his discussion with LENART, and when asked if he perceived a necessity to get back with LENART on this issue, JENS stated:
"I talked to the head of our Nuclear Engineering Department, and I asked him to see if he could get the matter resolved because reactor engineering reported to him. I asked him to.
1 Case No. 3-85 013 14
- make sure that the people weren't talking about an issue like the angels dancing on a head of a pin, whether it was l a trivial issue, or whether it was significant. But I never i heard back on that either, and in retrospect, I probably should have followed up more on the matter (Exhibits: 15, pgs. 8-10; ISA, pgs. 8-10; 20, pgs. 1-2 and 19-20)."
On July 4,1985, THORPE contacted OVERBECK at his residence to relate that reactor engineering's final analysis was complete and substantiated the already assumed criticality. OVERBECK contemplated arranging an operations sneeting that same day, presumably because of the sensitivity of the issue; however, he decided the following morning meeting would suffice (Exhibit 16, pgs. 21-22).
On July 5,1985, reactor engineering again met with Operations to advise them I of the final engineering analysis and at that time, OVERBECK was convinced l that the operator rod pull error had in fact resulted in reactor criticality. )
OVERBECK recalled his reaction:
"0kay, that's no longer an issue. The reactor was critical.
But I had in my own mind, already known that it didn't make any difference to deportability. I didn't feel any obligation at that time to make any reports."
He did manage to advise LENART of the criticality finding that same afternoon. )
NRC Resident Inspector PARKER was onsite that day, however, he was not advised l of the new position of reactor criticality. OVERBECK stated that he attempted l to telephone the Resident Inspector's office on the late afternoon of July 5, !
1985, but no one was present at the time of his call. William COLBERT, 1 Director of Nuclear Engineering, advised that on July 5 he received information l from Melvin BATCH that the issue of reactor criticality had been resolved. In a memo of that date to COLBERT, BATCH states, "the data indicate the reactor was critical and on a 100-120 second period." COLBERT recalled that he attempted to contact Dr. JENS by telephone on July 5 to relate the criticality findings, but that JENS was unavailable. When COLBERT was asked why he did not make subsequent attempts to contact JENS, he stated:
"Because somewhere along there, it became general knowledge.
I believe. I think it became a moot point (Exhibits: 16, pgs. 23-26; 16A, pgs. 22-24; 21, pgs.11-12; 22, BATCH Memo; 23, pgs. 7-10)."
On Saturday, July 6,1985, at the Deco morning staff meeting, OVERBECK advised all present of the reactor engineering analysis. He stated:
! " Hey, we went critical; and we really look bad on this one.
This is a significant violation of procedure, not following the pull sheet is, and we got to pay attention to detail."
He stated in an 01 interview that he thought PARKER was present at the staff rneeting, but later changed his mind about the fact of PARKER's presence.
LESSOR stated that at the staff meeting on July 6,1985, he was surprised at the lack of concern relative to the rod pull error by OVERBECK'r staff and he personally advised the members present that they were not perceiving this Case No. 3-85-013 15
. incident seriously (Exhibits: 16, pgs. 26-30; 16A, page 24; 17, pgs. 15-17).
On July 8-12, 1985, NRC Resident Inspector PARKER and his assistant Craig JONES were present on the Femi 2 site, and either he or JONES were present at the Deco staff meetings. Those meetings were chaired by LEMART, OVER3ECK, or PRESTON, who made no attempt to notify NRC of the reactor criticality findings '
during those meetings or at any other time on those dates (Exhibit 9, pgs. 1-2).
On July 10, 1985, the Comission convened to hear testimony regarding the operability status of Fermi 2 and to vote on a full power 11cer.se. The Commission heard NRC Deputy Regional Administrator, Bert DAVIS, complement Deco on the few significant operator errors. LENART and Dr. JENS had knowledge of the operator rod pull error of July 2 and of the circumstances surrounding the criticality issue. LENART had attended the meeting of July 3, when LESSOR and Deco reactor engineering advised that the reactor had gone critical. He was also advised by OVERBECK of the final criticality finding of July 5, 1985; however, he did not make the Commission or the staff aware of the fact, arguing that it was not a 10 CFR reportable incident, therefore, DECO was l under no obligation to raise the issue before the Commission (Exhibits:' 15 j pgs.12-20; 20, pgs. 8-13).
On July 15, 1985, the day DECO received the Fermi 2 full power license, l OVERBECK informed the NRC SRI (BYRON) of the reactor engineering findings !
regarding reactor premature criticality on July 2, 1985. BYRON stated that he l was advised of the rod pull incident by PARKER, but that he was unaware of the reactor criticality. When asked if he thought the NRC was adequately briefed as to reactor criticality, OVERBECK stated: i "At the time I thought they were, particularly initially. I can fault myself for not providing them updated information that I knew. In retrospect now, clearly there weren't, in my opinion, and still even today, there are not legal requirements for deportability. And in my opinion, we did make an effort to ;
inform the resident inspector. What we fell short in was, in '
my opinion, following up later to make sure that they shared the same degree of concern that we thought we had for it (Exhibit 16, ,
pgs . 31-39)." '
On September 10, 1985, during an interview with 01, Darrell G. EISENHUT, Director, Division of Licensing, stated that had he been aware of the July 2, 1985, operator error which resulted in premature criticality at Femi 2, he would not have signed the full power license until a thorough investigation of the matter was concluded. During interviews with Region III Administrator, James G. KEPPLER, and his Deputy Administrator, A. Bert DAVIS, they indicated that knowledge of a premature criticality at Fermi 2 would have prompted them to recommend that the Comission vote be postponed pending an investigation.
KEPPLER stated the Region III staff is sensitized to premature criticalities and he views that type of incident as a significant indicator of the licensee's ability to safely operate a nuc' lear facility (Exhibits 24,25,26).
Case No. 3-85-013 16
f 0 Willfulness / Intent David ANIOL ANIOL, control room Shift Supervisor, did not document the rod pull error in his personal log, and also did not notify the Senior Reactor Operator of the incident for entry on the Reactor Operator's Lo not documented on any official operationsExhibits log (g; therefore, 4,7,8). the incident is I
ANIOL statement persuaded the Reactor of criticality Engineer less definitive to amend (Exhibits 3, the 4 . entry)on his log to make his ANIOL prepared a DER at the Operations Supervisor's direct' n and noted that
" reactor was not critical," but did not report the Reactor Engineer's dissenting opinion on that document (Exhibits 4,13).
l l Contrary to other testimony, ANIOL states that he discussed reactor criticality l
with the STA and SOA, who agreed with his position of non-criticality (Exhibits:
l 2,4,5,6).
Eugene PRESTON PRESTON, Operations Supervisor, was advised by ANIOL of the Reactor Engineer's I differing professional opinion regarding reactor criticality, however, he approved the DER, which did not address that point (Exhibits 4, 9, 9A).
PRESTON and OVERBECK participated in the July 3,1985, Operations / reactor l engineering meeting, heard evidence pro and con toward the criticality issue, i and advised the NRC Resident Inspector of the corporate position; however, he did not advise that reactor engineering and the nuclear consultant had already argued in favor of criticality (Exhibits 9, 9A,16,16A,19). ,
Gregg OVERBECK OVERBECK heard THORPE and LESSOR argue that criticality was achieved, though he disregarded their expertise in favor of his own limited experience, stating the reactor was not critical (Lxhibits 14,16,16A,17,17A).
OVERBECK realized the element of criticality elevated the operator error to the threshold of deportability to the NRC, although not 10 CFR reportable.
OVERBECK perceived the operator error as an event which could be sensitive to licensing (Exhibits 16,16A,19A).
OVERBECK became aware of a confirmed criticality on July 4,1985, and made no attempt to advise NRC Resident Inspector PARKER of the ne,, pyre oosition until July 15, 1985 (Exhibits 14,16,16A,19).
Robert LENART LENART knew of Reactor Engineer's dissension, heard LESSOR and THORPE support criticality, stated his gut feeling was that he agreed with LESSOR, however, he decided to advise the NRC of the Corporate position of no criticality (Exhibits 14,15,15A,17,17A).
Case No. 3-85-013 17
1
{
j
- LENART perceived operator error / premature criticality as a public relations issue; therefore, he advised Dr. JENS of the incident so as to be prepared for i press and intervenor questions (Exhibits 15,15A, 20). l l
LENART was aware of criticality on July 5,1985, but did not inquire from l subordinates if in fact MRC was notified of new posit on regarding criticality j (Exhibits 15, 15A).
q 8
LENART attended the Comission hearing on July 10, 1985, heard NRC testimony regarding operator errors at Femi 2, and made no ottempt to advise the Commission of the July 2 operator error, which he knew resulted in premature )
criticality (Exhibits 15, 15A).
Dr. Wayne JENS I JENS was advised of the rod pull error and the pu;11c relations sensitivity of the incident by LENART on July 3, 1985. JENS directed the Director cf Nuclear l
Engineering, COLBERT, to settle the controversy of criticality. JENS stated -
that COLBERT did not report back. COLBERT stated that by July 5, when he {
found out that criticality was achieved, that information was comon knowledge to JENS (Exhibits 15,20,23).
Dr. JENS attended the Comission hearing on July 10, and like LENART, he made no effort to advise the Comission of the July 2, operator error / criticality (Ex.hibit 20).
Agent's Conclusion Based upon the evidence developed through this investigation, it is the opinion of the reporting investigator that from July 5-15, 1985. DECO's Fermi 2 management knowingly withheld information from NRC; specifically, that a premature criticality resulting from an operator error had occurred, which they perceived had the NRC known, would have adversely impacted Deco's receipt of the Fermi 2 full power license.
l 1
)
1 Case No. 3-85-013 18
_ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __-_-__----S
. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION In 1983, NRC deleted from 10 CFR Section 50.72 the reporting requirements of an inadvertent criticality.
- On October 25,1985, 01:RIII received an affidavit of David A. ANIOL in which )
he contradicts several key elements of his sworn testimony to OI of July 23, {
1985(Exhibit 4A). j On August 12,1985, 0 A initiated an investigation at the request of Region III Administrator, KEPPLER, relating to a possible mishandling of information relative to the July 2,1985, Fenni 2 operator error incident by NRC staff (Exhibit 27; OIA File 85-36).
1 J
Case No. 3-85-013 19
l o
9 4
I 1 l l \
l l
l l
l l
I l
l t
I THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY l
Case No. 3-85-013 20
LIST OF EXHIBITS I
9""
- 1. Testimony of, patedJuly 30, 1985.
- 2. Testimony of John DEWES dated July 31, 1985.
- 3. Testimony of Barry MYERS dated July 31, 1985.
- 4. Testimony of David ANIOL dated July 23, 1985.
i A. Affidavit of David A. ANIOL dated October 23, 1985.
- 5. Testimony of Edward DVDA dated July 31, 1985.
- 6. Testimony of Thomas DONG dated July 30, 1985.
- 7. Testimony of Jerome FLINT dated September 26, 1985.
- 8. Testimony of Stephen BURT dated July 31, 1985.
- 9. Testimony of Eugene PRESTON dated July 30, 1985.
A. Testimony of Eugene PRESTON dated August 20, 1985.
- 10. Fermi 2 Reactor Engineer Log dated July 1,1985,
- 11. Deco NSS Log dated July 1-2, 1985.
- 12. DECO NSO Log dated July 2, 1985.
- 13. Deco Deviation Event Report dated July 2, 1985.
- 14. Testimony of Jon THORPE dated September 26, 1985.
- 15. Testimony of Robert LENART dated July 23, 1985.
A. Testimony of Robert LENART dated August 20, 1985.
- 16. Testimony of Gregg OVERBECK dated July 23, 1985.
A. Testimony of Gregg OVERBECK dated August 20, 1985.
- 17. Testimony of Leo LESSOR dated July 23, 1985.
A. Testimony of Leo LESSOR dated August 20, 1985.
- 18. Testimony of Hari ARORA dated August 20, 1985. !
- 19. Report of Interview of Michael PARKER dated July 31, 1985.
A. Statement of flichael E. PARKER dated October 3,1985. I 1
4 20. Testimony of Dr. Wayne JENS dated July 23, 1985.
- 21. Testimony of Melvin BATCH dated september 26, 1985.
- 22. Memo signed by M. 2ATCH dated July 5, 1985.
i
- 23. Testimony of William COLBERT dated September 26, 1985.
- 24. Report of Interview of Darrell G. EISENHUT dated September 11, 1985.
I
- 25. Report of Interview of James G. KEPPLER dated October 10, 1985. l
- 26. Report of Interview of A. Bert DAVIS dated October 10, 1985.
- 27. OIA Fermi Premature Criticality Report 85-36. ;
l
- j l
i j
l l
Case No. 3-85-013 22
o 1 I
I l
l l
w
{
a rt ~ l 1, .i l
i 1
1I ll l
i iI i l
i 1
I t
\
., 1
),
o t.l .
i1
.,1
'1l9' 1
I I
M !
3 e
b w
O C- 9 W e 1
1 1
_ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _