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Partially Deleted Transcript of Ofc of Investigations Investigative Interview of LC Lessor on 850723 in Glen Ellyn,Il Re 850702 Reactor Operator Error at Plant.Pp 1-23
ML20237K226
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Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/23/1985
From: Lessor L
NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI)
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Text

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( UN11ED STATES i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NO:

OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW l 1

CLOSED l

(

l LOCATION: GLEN ELLYN, IL PAGES: 1 - 23 l l

DATE: TUESDAY, JULY 23, 1985 Information in this record was deleted ct e n rmation FolA.bpt on3Lif'

~

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~

AG-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. j offic=1Repurs 444 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20001 '-

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1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l __ 2 1 3

IN THE MATTER OF: Investigative Interview, 4 Closed Meeting.

i 5 l INTERVIEW OF: Leo C. Lessor.  !

6 7

8 Report of proceedings taken at the interview in.

9 the above-entitled cause on Tuesday, July 23, 1985,_

10 at 799 Roosevelt Road, Glen Ellyn, Illinois. I 11 12 PRESENT: '

( 13 -

MR. JAMES N. KALKMAN, Investigator ,

14 MR. TERRANCE LANG, Reactor Engineer l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 15 Office of Investigations Field Office: Region III )

16 799 Roosevelt Road i Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137; 17 MR. PETER A. MARQUARDT, General Attorney 18 Detroit / Edison ,

200 Second Avenue )

19 Detroit, Michigan'48226. l l

20 21 -

Glen Ellyn, Illinois 22 July 23, 1985 23

-- 24 25 1

.. w +

_-_-_____-______-___.m _ _ _ - _ _ _ - . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _.

. i 4 -

1 MR. KALKMAN: For the record then this is an f interview with Mr. Leo Lessor, L-e-s-s-o-r, who is j

- 2 3 employed by Management Analysis company ~and who is l

4 contracted as a consultant to Detroit Edison.

5 THE WITNESS: Yes.

6 MR. KALKMAN: The location of this interview is -

7 NRC Region III, Glen Ellyn, Illinois. Present at 8 this interview are Mr. Lessor; Detroit Edison  !

i 9 general counsel Mr. Marquardt; NRC reactor engineer 10 Terrance Lang; and NRC investigator James Kalkman. -

11 As agreed, this interview is being 12 transcribed by court reporter Lisa. Subject matter

(

13 of this interview concerns a reactor operator error l

14 at Fermi II Nuclear Power Station on' July 2, 1985. j i

15 Mr. Lessor, would you please stand and )

)

16 raise your right hand.  ;

I 17 ,

(Witness sworn.) i 18 LEO C. LESSOR, i

19 called as a witness herein, having been first duly 20 sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

21 EXAMINATION 22 BY 23 MR. KALKMAN:

24 O. Mr. Lessor, what was your function or how 25 did you get involved in performing a review of the-2

~ -

e

-j 1 operator error incident? l j

. .. 2 A. After the meeting of July the 3rd --

excuse l

3- me.

4 MR. LANG: There's a calendar up there.

5 THE' WITNESS: July the 5th I was asked to act as 6 aide, participate --

or I volunteered to participate.

7 MR. KALKMAN: O. I don't understand how.your 8 function as consultant would involve you in an

]

9 investigation of a problem or a review.

10 Do you do whatever type work they --

3 1

11 that whomever you work for requests?

12 A. Yes. I --

my capacity is advisor to the 4

13 superintendent of nuclear production, and I also

14 help out whenever I can.in areas where I feel I.can l 15 contribute. And he asked me --

I volunteered that --

1 16 I stated that it should --

reactor engineering had 17 finished their part of it; and what I said, "Now 18 we've got to firm up the details of the event." And 19 I said, "I could do this for y o u .,"

20 O. And who are you the advisor to, the l 21 individual?

22 A. It was -- Lenart. It was superintendent of 23 nuclear production, now i t's assistant manager of i

- - - 24 operations, I believe i s the title.

25 O. Prior to the 5th, July 5th, did you have --

3 e

ew w w w d-_-______'.__-_---__._-__-___.__-- - _ _ - .

I had you attended any meetings where you.were made .

.l

- 2 aware.cf the inadvertent criticality..or the ,--

3 A. Event.

4 O. -- mispull of the. rod -- the event?

'5 A. Yes. The day of what ~ we call the CARB I 6 meeting, which was July the 2nd, 'I was -- attended a' i

7 part of that meeting. l 8 O. And what was discussed at the CARB meeting?

9 A. Several events, and this particular one was 10 discussed. -j 1

11 O. What was resolved from this --

from the DER j l

12 relating ~ to the rod pull incident?

.13 A. It was assigned to the reactor engineer for

(-

14 evaluation.

15 -0 What -- at that time what did you know of 16 the incident?

17 A. I knew very little of the incident at that-18 time.

19 O. Had you read the DER?

20 A. No, I don't think I had. I knew that it-21 was coming to the meeting.

22 Q. Who would have notified you?

23 A. I am not absolutely certain. I think Bob 24 Lenart before the meeting said that we-had some rod 25 pull errors, I think is how -- what I remember.

4 m lid ed

_ _ _ - _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . _ . -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . .m__ _ _ _ _ . - - - - _ - - __ -

l .

1 O. By the --

-- 2 A. It might have been Gregg'Overbeck, too.

3 O. At the meeting on the 5th of July, the 4 nuclear engineering group came,in and said that in 5 fact the plant had gone critical?

6 A. Yes.

7 O. And you were given the assignment to review 8 or investigate the matter? l I

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Did you have any problem with -- with the 11 nuclear engineering group's analysis?

12 A. No.

( 13 O. You believed-that in fact it had gone

.i 14 critical?

15 A. Yes.

16 MR. LANG: Did you have any concerns at that I

17 point in time of whether or not the rod worth 18 minimizer should have stopped them?

19 THE WITNESS: Did I have any concerns about it?

20 MR. LANG: Questions in regard to -- ,

i 21 THE WITNESS: Well, I had the question of 22 whether it was programmed to or not' programmed to. l 23 MR. LANG: Okay.

-- 24 MR. KALKMAN: O. Was that part --

did you 25 answer your question as a result of your review, 5

i

  • ^

1 your investigation, . as regarding the rod' worth -j

. 2 minimizer?

4 1 3 A. You say -- I' don't understand your question. k 4 O. Well, you had some question as to why'the 5 rod worth minimizer didn't prevent this error.. j 6 A. No . - Let's --

I came --

I managed'a' plant l 7 where we had a rod' worth minimizer that would have. ]

l i

8 prevented this type of thing.

9 0 Oh ,- I see.

10 A. So --

l 11 Q. So you just drew an assumption based on I 12 your experience at a different plant?

l l ~~ 13 A. Yes, but I had already heard that it didn't.

(

14 MR. LANG: Who did you hear that from?

15 THE WITNESS: Well, when I interviewed the 16 operator the morning of the 3rd, you know, he just 17 said, "I thought the rod worth minimizer would ,

l 18 prevent this." And at that time, you know, I said, 19 "Well, I don't know whether it would or wouldn't.

20 It has to be programmed to."

21 And I -- you know, that's the first 22 thing I heard one way or another with respect to the ,

23 concern of the operator error business, you'know. I 24 didn't feel it made that much difference for what I 25 was trying to find out.

6 1

)

J

I.

1 MR. LANG: You interviewed Dave Aniol?

! D

- - 2 THE WITNESS: No. the operator.

kwe a 3 MR. KALKMAN: O. You interviewed him when?

l 4 A. Gane Preston and I interviewed him the 5 morning of the 3rd.

6 MR. LANG: So you were aware on the 3rd that 7 there was a possibility of -- possibility of 8 criticality?

9 THE WITNESS: Yes, I was aware of it on the DER 10 with respect to the possible criticality at that 11 time. I didn't see the charts until that afternoon.

12 MR. KALKMAN: O. What did you conclude from 13 your review or your investigation of this incident?

14 A. What did I conclude? Well, I pretty well

- 15 prepared the outline or a good part of it.

16 Q. For today's presentation?

17 A. Yes. So I concluded that we definitely had 18 a serious procedure violation, and that we had some 19 other erroes to evaluate. Basically the 20 presentation was my conclusions.

21 Q. So we're talking about an operator error 22 resulting from a procedure violation?

23 A. An operator error. The operator made an 24 error in that he didn't pull the rods to the right l

25 position. He pulled them further than he should '

7 67e,p

1 have.

. - 2 Q. And he did tha' by not following the 3 procedure?

4 A. Yes. He's supposed to follow the rod 5 sequence pull sheets.

6 Q. And had he -- had he followed the pull 7 sheets, the event would not have occurred?

8 A. That's true.

, 9 Q. Did you discuss this particular issue with l

l l 10 anyone --

any other management people other than 11 Mr. Lenart, Mr. Preston?

12 A. Yes, I discussed it with Overbeck.

l 13 Q. Did you discuss it with Mr. Jens or Mr. --

14 A. Eventually I did, yes.

15 O. Anyone in the chain of command between l 16 Mr. Jens and --

17 A. I also --

18 Q. --

Mr. Overbeck?

l 19 A. I also discussed the matter with Ed l 20 Griffing.

l 21 Q. What about Mr. Agosti? l 22 A. No.

23 Q. Were you at the Commission meeting --

24 A. No.

25 O. --

for Fermi full power license?

8 t ---- _ -- _ a

n I

1 A. No.

i

.. . 2 O. Were you involved in'the preparation of any i 1

.1 3 information, any agenda items for the Commission?

4 A. Not that I know of.

5 O. One of the agenda items was operator error --

6 A. No. ,

l' l

7 O. Do you recall preparing anything --

8 A. No.

1 9 O. --

for that~ meeting?

l 10 A. No. j

,i When did you discuss the -- your review or 11 O.

, i 12 your -- or this incident with Mr. Jens?

~

13 A. Saturday morning, the 13th.

{ l 14 O. Was this the first time he had heard of 15 the --

of this incident?

1 16 A. I don't know. He knew about the DER, that 17 part of the ten -- as it said in the DER, ten rods 18 out of sequence.

19 MR. LANG: Was he. aware at that time of the 20 criticality?

21 THE WITNESS: I don't think he was because I 22 called him to set up a meeting. We had periodic  !

23 meetings, and I told him'that I thought we needed to

-- 24 have a session that next week.

25 And he asked me in general what I 9

4W w_

1 I wanted to' cover, and I just said, "There's some i H

- - 2 things that I think we should go over." And he said, j 3 "Well, I agree." He said, "I would like to talk.

4 about the rod pull problems," and he said some more  !

5 about it. '

And he stated --

he used the word not l l

6 critical; and I said, "Well, wait a minute. You 7 know, we did determine that we had gone critical."

8 0 This is on the 13th? l 9 A. Yes.

10 O. Did he seem surprised then?

11 A. Yes, he seemed surprised --

I mean not at 12 the event, but at the fact that we had gone critic &l I 13 or it was determined that we had gone critical.

14 0 You had discussed this matter though with l

15 Mr. Lenart --

16 A. Well, he --

17 0 He had assigned the task of doing some 18 review to you?

19 A. He was in the neeting when it was first 20 presented and we first showed the charts. He was in 21 that meeting, and he knows what my reaction was. ,

22 MR. LANG: You did the --

essentially the 23 . investigation for DECO in regard to interviews-with 24 operators a nd shift supe and whoever, right?

s 25 THE WITNESS: (Nodding head.)

10 i

i 1 MR. LANG: Okay.

-- 2 MR. KALKMAN: O. Did you find any 3 irregularities in the shift supervisor's log or the l 4 operator's log relating to the incident?

5 A. Irregularity in the fact there wasn't 6 anything there.

1 7 Q. Was that surprising? l l

8- A. Yes. ]

9 O. Did you make any recommendations based on l l

10 that?

11 A. That's where -- that presentation this i

12 morning, yes. )

~

( 13 MR. LANG: Again, did you interview Dave Aniol?

i 14 THE WITNESS: Aniol.

15 MR. LANG: Aniol, I guess it's pronounced.

16 THE WITNESS: Yes, I did.

I 17 MR. LANG: What did he explain was his reason 18 for not logging anything, or did he --

19 THE WITNESS: He didn't present a reason that I 20 could accept.

21 MR. LANG: Did he give any reasons?

1 22 THE WITNESS: He made a remark about -- I just 23 kept pressing it, "Why didn't you log this type of 24 thing? Why didn't you log this?" You know, and he l'

(

  • 25 said --

well, he said in the past people have 11

1 criticized his log entries so that he was --

in that l 1

- 2 period of time he was a f r a i,d to log.

3 And I said, "What do you mean 4 criticized?" And he said --

I am not sure whether 1

5 it's grammar or spelling, but --

and I said, "Well, 6 this type of event you have to' log." i I

7 MR. KALKMAN: O. He did initiate the DER though? 1 1

8 A. Yes, he did. j 1

l 9 O. As instructed by Mr. Preston? )

10 A. Yes. When I say as instructed, Preston J l

11 told him to. I think he probably would have, I 12 thick he probably would have without that; but it's

~

13 standard practice for shift superyisor.

(

14 MR. LANG: You also interviewed the RO, 15 16 THE WITNESS: Yes, I did.

17 MR. LANG: Did he give you any reason why he did 18 not log anything? I 19 THE WTTNESS: He does not write the log. l l

20 MR. LANG: He does not? I 21 THE WITNESS: No. The person in charge of the 22 control room writes the whole log.

l 23 MR. KALKMAN: 'Q. You talked to the reactor j 24 engineer, Barry Myers?

- i 25 A. Yes.

12 i

1 1

1 Q. And you've seen his log saying the reactor

. 2 had in fact gone critical, which he changed.

3 What did you find out were the 4 circumstances for him changing the log?

5 A. Well, it was more or less that I felt the 6 shift supervisor talked him out of it, and that's 7 about all I could get out of it.

  • 8 MR. LANG: The log for the RO, the person who 9 actually keeps it, that is who?

10 THE WITNESS: It's the --

how could I describe 11 it? It's an NSO in charge of the control r o o m ,. it 12 happened to be.

13 You wouldn't know name of the person?

( MR. LANG: j 14 THE WITNESS: Burt, Steve Burt.

15 MR. LANG: Did you interview him?-

16 THE WITNESS: I talked to him over the telephone.

17 MR. LANG: Did you ask him, or did he give any 18 reason why he didn't log anything?

19 THE WITNESS: Yes.

20 MR. LANG: What was his answer?

21 THE WITNESS: He said he didn't know about the l

l

\

22 event.

23 MR. LAMG: Does the shift engineer, as part of i '

24 his routine on his shift,.does he review all the 25 logs, the RO logs?

13  !

?

1 j

1: THE WITNESS: Excuse me, who now?

2 MR. LANG: .The shift'-- Dave Aniol?

I 3 THE WITNESS: The nuclear shift supervisor? i 4 MR. LANG: Yes.

5 Is it part of his routine to review I

6 the RO's logs during his shift?

7 THE WITNESS: I am not sure if that's-a l 8 requirement. I can't answer that.

9 MR. LANG: At any time through your 10 investigation prior to the time that I came to Fermi, 11 did anybody suggest or did you suggest that the rod q j

12 worth minimizer was inoperable?

i 13 THE WITNESS: No. .With respect to -- make sure i(

14 I understand your question. I consider it operable.

15 The way it was set up, it wasn't set up to prevent 16 this.

1 17 MR. LANG: Right. 3 I

18 THE WITNESS: But it.was operable in their eyes --

19 had done the surveillance test on it.

20 MR. LANG: I guess in their eyes did anybody 21 consider it inoperable?

22 THE WITNESS: Not that I know of.

23 MR. LANG: Okay.

24 THE WITNESS: I didn't hear anything about it, 25 and I didn't suggest it was inoperable..

14

= = * -, ,.

-______-____-_-.-a

4 4

1 1 MR. LANG: Okay.

I ~

. 2 MR. KALKMAN: O. Well just before this, the rod 3' rull incident, there was a rod worth minimizer alarm.

4 A. Yes.

5 O. What --

do you know why that occurred?

6 A. No. I am not certa,in, but I talked to 7 people, several people that indicated that they 8 believe it's a spurious alarm or a hardware problem 9 or component in the rod worth minimizer that sends a'  ;

l I 10 signal to the computer and tells the computer it's 11 not ready. I do not fully understand such signals. I l 12 So, they --

they informed me that it 1

~~

i 13 does happen. It has happened before. And they said 14 they have a --

what they call a PN-21 which is a 15 work order to try to --

they want to try to get it 16 in a configuration or get it to stay in so they can 17 troubleshoot it and find it.

18 I think they've tried it before, but 19 it's some --

sometimes spurious things are sometimes 20 hard to find. I 21 0. So thers was no relationship between that 22 minimizer alarm and the rod pull incident?

23 A. As near as I can tell, there isn't. I've 24 tried to explore its is there anything they could 25 have had on out of sequence position, and I do'not 15

1- feel there was any relationship.

t

- - 2 O. Were you at any meetings where an NRC, any 3 NRC representative, was present where the -- whers 4 this issue was discussed?

5 A. I was at a meeting where I th o.u g h t he was i

I 6 present, but I am not absolutely certain. If I can 7 explain the --

the Saturday morning meeting of the --

8 0 The 6th?

9 A. The 6th. We usually --

Gregg Overbeck, the 10 assistant superintendent, starts the meeting.and l

11 operations, goes through the activities; and some ,

12 people aren't there right at the time, and he --

13 especially Saturdays sometimes, people aren't as

(

14 prompt as they are on other days.  !

15 And there was --

and there was a j u

16 statement made by another person after Gregg had 17 discussed the event, and the statement irritated me. I I

18 I thought they were treating the thing a little bit 19 lightly; and so I made some statement about, you 20 know, "This thing is very serious, and my opinion is 21 part of the cause is you were just going too fast,"

22 and that they hadn't stopped to evaluate after that 23 and say, " Hey, we better settle down and do this."

24 Then when I looked around, kind of 25 talking to the whole group, I noticed that Gregg 16 l

1. .. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ _ . .__--__:__

I wasn't there.at the time.- And I, asked something

. . - 2 about, "Well, where',s Gregg? Did I scare him or" --

3 he said, "No, he got a phone 1 call, a message."

E 4 I also -- I think that' Mike Parker was 5 sitting there at the back of the room at-the time I am not sure because it kind of went' I 6 that I --

7 through my mind, you know,'I wonder what I really 8 said, you know, did I offend anybody.

9 MR. LANG: Was-Bob Lenart at that. meeting?

10 THE WITNESS: I do'not~believe so because I --

11 when Gregg come back in, I repeated -- I didn't.give 12 .the whole speech again, but I explained to him what 13 I had said when he was gone.

(

14 MR. KALKMAN: O. Did you -- okay..

1 15 Other than you think maybeLMike Parker 16 was present at that meeting --

i 1

17 A. I just --

~it seems like that he was, but I 18 can't be certain.

l

  • 19 O. Did you have any other contact subsequent 20 to that?

21 A. With?

22 O. With either Mike Parker or Paul Byron or 23 any other NRC representative.

24 A. No. ,

25 O. Did --

from your prior experience with the.

17 we

1 Cooper Nuclear Plant, do you feel that this event

(

2 was something the NRC should have been aware of? l 3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Whether it be reportable under the codes or 5 not?

6 A. Yes. I made that statement when we had the 7 discussion about the chart. There might have been l

8 others that disagreed and thought they were critical, I l 9 but they didn't speak up. I was kind of a loner.

l 10 And I said, "In my opinion you were I

11 critical." And we had some dialogue back and forth, j l 12 and I said, "You know, I agree with you that you l l

( 13 have to -- and you know, you can't be certain, what 14 we have to do --

I'm more confident we have to plot l

15 the rods along the side; but I am confident you'll

!6 come up" --

just from my experience of looking at I l l 1  !

17 these charts back in Nebraska, I was just almost {

l I

18 certain that especially after interviewing the j I

l 19 operator and what he said, I just -- I just pretty j 1

l I

! 20 well knew what the results were going to be, and I l 21 made this -- '

22 MR. LANG: Did you --

go ahead.

23 'f H E WITNESS: I made the statement that, "I l

24 believe you were --

it really doesn't make that much 1

j I

25 difference, the error. You pulled 11 rods in error; j 18 !

1 l

l

(  !

1 the seriousness of the event is the same, you did ,

1

- - 2 not stop. But as a minimum, you better go right  !

)

3 over and talk to the resident inspector and make him j i

4 aware of what happened," what we talked about at '

5 that meeting.

6 MR. KALKMAN: Q. And it was --

the criticality i

7 was discussed at that meeting?

8 A. Yes.

9 O. Even though it wasn't definite?

l 10 A. Yes, it was discussed. The reactor i 11 engineer made the statement that he thought it was j

.1 12 critical and wrote out the charts. I looked at it. ,

( 13 He's right; I menn it looked like he was correct.

1 14 MR. LANG: In your interview with the RO, )

l 15 did he think he was critical?

i 16 THE WITNESS: Yes, he did, but there's a little  !

I 17 bit of clarification there. When I interviewed him, 18 I didn't know that the reactor engineer had talked 19 to him at 11:00 o' clock the night before. l i

20 In other words --

I didn't know that.

I l

?1 I thought I was the first to interview him, but the 22 reactor engineer talked to him at 11:00 o' clock the 23 night before and may have swayed him one way or the 24 over. So, yes, I was under the impression that he 25 knew at that time that he was critical; but he might 19 i 2-

- di7e., -

1_ have been swayed a little -- he may have been swayed

[

2 a little bit by the 11:00 o' clock discussion.

3 MR. MARQUARDT: Are'you guys comfortable --

'do 4 you' understand the timing of when the interviews 5 took place and the meeting and when this I

6 conversation took place.about telling the resident?- l 7 MR. KALKMAN: This was July 3rd.or thereabout?

8 A.- Yes.

9 MR. KALKMAN: I think in talking to Mr. Overbeck --

i 10 I think everybody called the meeting he referred l  !

11 to --

12 A. Excuse me. The day --

( ,

13 MR. MARQUARDT: I am comfortable, but it's not i 14 on the record. And I was just wondering --

15 THE WITNESS: The day of July 3rd, I am not sure 16 of the time. I thought it was in the afternoon, but 17 I am not sure of the time.

18 MR. KALKMAN: Q. And Mr. Overbeck said he and 19 Mr. Preston talked to Mike Parker immediately after l 20 that meeting.

21 MR. MARQUARDT: Yep.

22 THE WITNESS: I think my presentation, when I 23 drafted it up, I probably had 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> on there; 24 because in my little black book I had 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br />, 25 but it might have been another meeting.

l 20

-~

L___________________________________________.__.____..________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . ______.___________m_

1 MR. KALKMAN: Q. Did you discuss this incident 4

- -- 2 with Paul Byron?

3 A. No -- well, not until after the 5th when I- _,

4 was preparing. He come in and asked questions now 5 and then.

6 Q. Did he relate when he became aware of it, 7 of the incident?

8 A. No.

9 MR. KALKMAN: I don't think I have anything else 10 for you.

11 MR.'LANG: I don't.

12 When you interviewed the SOA, who I

( 13 understand to be Mr. Duda --

14 THE WITNESS: Yes.

15 MR. LANG: -- was he aware of the situation that 16 night, the night of the 1st or early the 2nd?

17 THE WITNESS: He was aware of the event.

18 MR. LANG: Event meaning what?

19 THE WITNESS: I am not absolutely certain. In 20 other words, he definitely --

there's no one that 21 drove back the charts to really describe the event, 22 that was clear. His input into it was at Nine Mils, 23 rod worth minimizer would have prevented this.

I 24 And I said, you know, /How do you know i .

25 that?" He said, "Well, that's where I was --

I was 21

1 a licensed operator at Nine Mile." ,

f i 2 MR. LANG: Okay.

l 3 I don't have anything. l l

4 MR. KALKMAN: I have one other question. l 1

5 The STA who was with the reactor I l

f 6 operator, the STA in training --

)

l 7 A. Yes. I l

8 Q. You interviewed him also? l 9 A. Yes. l 10 Q. And did he feel the plant had gone critical?

11 A. He went over to that station nuclear l

12 engineer and made the statement that we had --

the l

i 13 word is out of sequence critical. Now, whether he l(

14 stated I know we had or I think we had, I do not l l 15 know; but he was positive that he used the words out 16 of sequence critical.

17 Q. When you talked to Mr. Jens about this 18 issue on the 13th, did he relate to you -- did he 19 relate this incident to the Commission license 20 hearing?

21 A. No.

22 O. Did he say anything about that they had 23 discussed operator error at the license hearing?

24 A. No. We had a very short --

it was a 25 telephone conversation.

I called him to set up a 22

.1 meeting. He just-mentionedLthis event and used the

( --

2 words not critical, and I --

it shocked me.-

3 And I thought I'd better at least make 4 sure t h a.t he knew about it.

5 O. Okay.

6 A. And we had a meeting set up for that --

I 7 think we set it up for Tuesday. And I told him that 8 I would discuss the whole thing with him if he 9 wanted to.

10 MR. KALKMAN: Do you have anything else r Terry?

11 MR. LANG: No.

12 MR. KALKMAN: I have some closing questions then.

(~ 13 Mr. Lessor- have I or any other NRC .

14 representative here threatened you in in any manner 15 or offered you any reward in return for this 16 statement?

17 THE WITNESS: No.

18 MR. KALKMAN: Have you given this statement 19 freely an voluntarily?

20 THE WITNESS: Yes.

21 MR. KALKMAN: Is there anything further you care 22 to add for the reccrd?

23 THE WITNESS: No.

> - 24 MR. KALKMAN
Thank you very much.

25 23

NO PAGE NUMBER  ;

.o CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTSR N..

l This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the UNITED STNTES- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION- in the 4 matter of:

l l

NAME OF PROCEEDING: OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW CLOSED DOCKET NO.: ,

PLACE: GLEN'ELLYN, IL i j

DATE:

Tuesday, July 23, 1985 -

were held as herein appears, and that this is the. original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear i

l Regulatory Commission.

(stat) f) , . / u)o (TYPED) j Lisa Jo Selepa '

Official Reporter Sullivan Reporting Company Reporter's Affiliation w w m-

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -'

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