IR 05000483/1993002

Enforcement Conference Rept 50-483/93-02 on 930112.Major Areas Discussed:Review of Apparent Violations & C/A Taken or Planned by Licensee

ML20127N045
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	01/22/1993
From:	Jakiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127M997	List: IR 05000483/1993002 ML20127M993 ML20127N022
References
50-483-93-02-EC, 50-483-93-2-EC, NUDOCS 9301290075
Download: ML20127N045 (32)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 111 Report No. 50-483/93002(DRP)

Docket No. 50-483 License No. NPF-30 Licensee: Union Electric Company Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400 St. Louis, MO 63166 Meeting Conducted: January 12. 1993 - - -

Meeting At: Region 111 Office, Glen Ellyn, Illinois Type of Meeting: Enforcement Conference Inspection Conducted: October 1 through December 18, 1992 Inspectors: B. L. Bartlett D. R. Calhoun Approved By: t- -

2 & ,~ / ,22 - f3 I . .it JackiW' Chief Date Re' actor P 6je, cts, Section 3A

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Meetino Summary Enforcement Conference on January 12. 1993. (Report No. 50-483/93002(DRP))

Areas Discussed: A review of the apparent violations and areas of concern identified during the inspection, and corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee. The enforcement options pertaining to the apparent violation were also discussed with the license PDR ADOCK 05000483

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h l . DETAILS l

1. Persons Present at the Conference Union Electric Company D. F. Schnell, Senior Vice President, Nuclear G. L. Randolph, Vice President, Nuclear Operations W. R. Campbell, Manager, Callaway Plant J. V. Laux, Manager, Quality Assurance C. D. Naslund, Manager, Nuclear Engineering U. S. Nuclear RequlatorY Commission A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator, Rlll E. G. Greenman, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Rill L. R. Greger, Chief, Reactor Projects, Branch 3, RIII B. L. Bartlett, Senior Resident Inspector, Callaway, Rlll D. R. Calhoun, Resident Inspector, Callaway, RIII C. H. Weil, Enforcement Specialist, Rlll B. A. Berson, Regional Counsel, Rt .

J. A. Gavula, Reactor Engineer, Rlli J. N. Hannon, Director, Project Directorate 111-3, NRR L. R. Wharton, Licensing Project Manager, NRR/PDIII-3 Enforcement Conference An enforcement conference was held in the NRC Region III office on January 12, 1993. This conference was conducted as a result of the preliminary findings of the inspection conducted from October 1 through December 18, 1992, in which two apparent violations of NRC regulations and license conditions were identified. The findings related to the incorrect setting of a motor operated valve in the essential service water (ESW) system and the failure of non-licensed personnel to verify-the actual position of the valve on three separate occasion Inspection findings were documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-483/92015(DRP), which was transmitted to the licensee by letter dated December 31, 199 The purpose of this conference was to: (1) discuss the apparent violation, causes, and the licensee's corrective actions; (2) discuss the areas of concern; (3) determine if there were any escalating or mitigating circumstances; and (4) obtain any information which would help determine the appropriate enforcement actio The licensee's representatives did not contest the apparent violations and agreed with the majority of the NRC's understanding of the areas of concern. However, the results of the Union Electric investigation indicated that the second shift electricians did not note the initial 20-turn setting of the close limit switc This differed from the characterization given on page 7 of the inspection report which stated

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, that the second crew realized the setting was incorrect,_but did'not modify the setting. On that' basis, the licensee took issue with the NRC's concern, " Lack of a Questioning Attitude," that was demonstrated-by the second shift electrician The inspection report. version reflected the information provided to the inspectors by:the involved workers about six months after the date' of- the event. - They- subsequently ,

corrected themselves, which was the version provided by the licensee at

- i the enforcement conference. In addition, the_ licensee presented information regarding the resources expended on the operability evaluation of the ESW system and noted that the expenditure was neither '

unusual nor extensive, and that it was not necessary to take credit for the lower ESW reservoir temperature due to the unusually cool weather conditions in order to demonstrate operabilit The licensee's presentation included the root:cause and causal factors of the event, corrective actions, and the safety significance of the

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event. The corrective actions included, in part: (1) formally documenting expectations regarding proper turnover of work in progress; (2) revising the limit switch setting procedure to include verification of complete valve stroke; (3) improving requalification training for maintenance electricians and supervisors; (4) providing previous baseline valve test data to MOVATS coordinators; and (5) training non-licensed ~ operators in expectations and methods for verification of local indication of valves. The licensee's presentation material is included as Attachment A to this repor At the conclusion of the conference, the licensee was informed .that they would be notified in the near future of the final enforcement action.

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NRC ENFORCEAIENT CONFERENCE JA NUA R Y 12,1993

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MISPOSITIONING OF EF-HV-66 CA L LA WA Y PLANT f

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NRC ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE JANUARY 12,1993 MlSPOSITIONING OF EF-HV-66 CALLAWAY PLANT

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Agencia for NRC Enforcement Conference January 12,1993 Mispositioning of EF-HV-0066 Callaway Plant 1. Results of Union Electric investigation W. R. Campbell 11. Operability Determination and Safety C. D. Naslund Significance 111. Information Relative to Appropriate G. L. Randolph Enforcement Action I Conclusion G. L. Randolph I

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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 4/09/92 Mechanical maintenance work completed on EF-HV-0066 during Refuel /12/92 Adjustment of EF-HV-0066 limit switch rotors complete /13/92 MOVATS testing completed per Maintenance procedure MTE-ZZ-QA00 /14/92 EF-HV-0066 stroked and declared operable per Operations surveillance procedure OSP-EF-V001 /29/92 EF-HV-0066 surveilled per OSP-EF-V001 /21/92 10/30/92 An engineer evaluating Refuel 5 MOVATS results for trending purposes questioned the torque switch bypass contact closure tim Visual inspection when the valve stroked closed confirmed the valve was ~25% open when the close limit switch deenergized the actuato (continued)

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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (CONTINUED)

10/30/92 'B' train of Essential Service Water declared I inoperable and four-hour report made per 10CFR50.7 i i

EF-HV-0066 de-energized and manually closed to restore operability of'B' train of Essential Service Wate /2/92 EF-HV-0066 closed limit switch adjusted and valve restored to full operabilit /16/92 Preliminary evaluation of operability complete /25/92 Refined calculation by Bechtel utilizing actual environmental conditions was completed and the four-hour report which had been made on 10/30/92 was withdraw .

12/7/92 Voluntary Licensee Event Report submitte '

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PRINCIPLE ROOT CAUSE l l

INADEQUATE TURNOVER OF WORK STATUS BETWEEN MAINTENANCE CREWS Causal Factors:

. Work Control

- No exact procedural guidance as to where to set close limit switch for butterfly valve '

- Second shift electricians did not verify first shift's settings before completing remaining setting Work package review did not identify steps not signed of Maintenance procedure did not require stroking the valve electrically to verify limit switch settings were correct,

. Post Maintenance Testing

- Surveillance testing following completion of the maintenance activity did not identify the valve was not stroking fully close ,

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i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

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IMPLEMENTATION  ;

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• Inadequate Turnover of Work i Status

- Necessity for clear j communications between work crews at shift change has been  :

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emphasized to involved personnel, completed .

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- Expectations for Maintenance l

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turnover of work in progress-

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will be formally documente /31/93

. Work Control

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- Procedure Revision q

Specific' guidance for setting butterfly valve close limit switch including verification of complete valve stroke'. - 3/01/93-

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (CONTINUED)

IMPLEMENTATION DATES

- Training _

Requal Training for Maintenance electricians and supervisors to include:

- MOVATS testing limitations for butterfly valves

- Revised procedure for setting of valve limit switches

- Documentation of work status on work completion forms

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- Procedural requirements for signoffs

- Review of completed work package /01/93

• Post Maintenance Testing

- Provide previous baseline valve test data to MOVATS coordinator COMPLETED-6-

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (CONTINUED)

IMPLEMENTATION l DATES  :

- MOVATS Procedure Revision Provide clarification in evaluating abnormalitie COMPLETED

- Training Training for non-licensed operators:

- Expectations and methods to use for verification of local indications on Section XI test /01/93

. Other Actions

- Verification that MOV of corresponding 'A' train valve was properly adjuste COMPLETED

- Review of other butterfly valves to assure proper operation and to verify-redundant methods exist to detect failure of valves to

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II. OPERABILITY DETERMINATION AND SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE-8-

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STEPS TAKEN IN ENGINEERING ANALYSIS

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Operability Determination

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Preliminary calculation by UE engineering

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indicated UHS temperature would exceed 95 . Calculation by Bechtel determined maximum UHS pond temperature to be 102 . UE engineering evaluation of maximum UHS pond temperature on related systems and components determined that ESW 'B' train remained operabl Refined Evaluation

. Calculation by Bechtel utilizing actual environmental conditions determined -

maximum UHS temperature to be 101 . .-------.--,.7--,-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - , - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - , - - - -. - . - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - , - - . - - . - - - . - - - - - - . -

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CHRONOLOGY OF EF-HV-0066 ENGINEERING ANALYSIS 10/30/92 -

Identified improperly set limit switch on EF-HV-006 /04/92 -

Preliminary calculation by UE engineering complete .

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Bechtel requested to perform analysi /12/92 -

Maximum pond temperature of 102 F calculated by Bechte /16/92 -

UE engineering evaluation of 102 F UHS pond temperature complete ESW system determined operabl /25/92 -

Refined calculation by Bechtel utilizing actual environment conditions complete Sensitivity to environmental conditions very minima .. ..

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ENGINEERING RESOURCES REQUIRED Task Manhours

. Preliminary calculation = 20 by utility

. Maximum temperature = 80 calculation by Bechtel

. Utility operability ~180 evaluation with increased temperature

. Refined calculation by Bechtel =270 utilizing actual environmental conditions-12-

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SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

. ESW System remained operabl . No impact on Chapters 6 and 15 Accident Analysi . Components supported by ESW were maintained within their design base . Based on the analysis of this event, the total core damage frequency reported in the Callaway IPE is unaffecte .

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IMEACLRN SAFETY NIABGIN

. No safety margin impact during _

Chapter 6 and 15 peak transient periods

. Subsequent to period of maximum heatload, some small reduction in design conservatism was experienced Qualitative conclusion: very little

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EXAMPLES OF PAST OPERABILITY EVALUATIONS lssue Manhours Expended

. RCP Seal integrity 970 . Pressurizer Surge Line Stratification 9100

. Pressurizer Safety Valve Testing 5200

. ESW Water Hammer 1260

. Feedwater Flow Venturi Inaccuracy 980

. Detensioned Reactor Vessel Stud Analysis 900

. Hub Fittings 600

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. Westinghouse Group C Instrument 400 Qualifications - h I

. Containment Cooler Seismic Design- 380 l

. GE Magnablast Breaker Quals 320

• EF-HV-0066 EVALUATION 280

. Foxboro. Cabinet Seismic Design 274

. Degraded Voltage Setpoint- 270

. Target Rock Valve Qualifications 260

. Unsealed Solenold Valves 200

. Rosemount Transmitter Calibration Shifts 160

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CONCLUSION _

. THE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM WAS OPERABLE.

< . COMOARED WITH OTHER OPERABILITY EVALUATIONS, RESOURCES EXPENDED ON EF-HV-0066 EVENT WERE NOT UNUSUAL OR EXTENSIV .

l Ill. INFORMATION RELATIVE TO APPROPRIATE ENFORCEMENT ACTION

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. I BASIS FOR POTENTIAL j '

ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT 1 )

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10CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Supplement 1,  ;

example C.2(b): "A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event

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being degraded to the extent that a detailed evaluation would be required to determine its-operability . . . " (emphasis added).

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This situation involved an unanticipated reduction in the margin of safet "'I J

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GUIDANCE ON ASSESSING LEVEL OF VIOLATIONS (10CFR2 Appendix C, Section IV)

. Level lll violations: Cause for significant regulatory concer . Level IV violations: Less serious but of more than minor concern; i.e., if left uncorrected, they could lead to a more serious concer ____________-________ _ _ _ -

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REGULATORY GUIDANCE

. Part 2, Appendix C, Supplement 1, C.2(b): A system designed to prevent or mitigate a-  :

serious safety event being degraded to the extent that a detailed evaluation is required to  ;

determine operability (example of a Level lli violation).

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. Generic Letter 91-18: Whenever the ability of a system or structure to perform its specified function is called into question, operability must-be determined from a detailed .

. examination of the deficienc . We believe that Part 2 is intended to address detailed evaluations of operability that are far more extensive than the typical detailed '

-examinations of operability addressed in th Generic Lette ;

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O OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 1. Except for reactor parameters, unanticipated reduction in the margin of safety is not mentioned in Part 2, Appendix C examples (whereas actual loss of safety function is mentioned).

2. Condition was licensee identified through a questioning attitude by an enginee . This event was an isolated failure to properly set valve close positio . Personnel could not reasonably be expected to identify this amount of valve travel discrepancy without additional training or guidanc (continued)

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OTHER CONSIDERATIONS (continued)

5. The system was restored to operability in a very timely manne . Thorough, timely, and effective corrective actions were implemente . The initial operability call was conservative and NRC was notifie . This event had no safety significanc ,

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IV. CONCLUSION

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. THE EF-HV-0066 OPERABILITY  !

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EVALUATION WAS NOT EXTENSIVE IN THE SENSE

INTENDED BY PART '

. THIS EVENT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A SEVERITY

LEVEL lll VIOLATIO ,

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