IR 05000483/1993001
| ML20059B492 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 01/21/1993 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059B489 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-483-93-01, 50-483-93-1, NUDOCS 9310280233 | |
| Download: ML20059B492 (6) | |
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l Callaway SALP 11 i
Report No. 50-483/93001 l
! INTRODUCTION The SALP process is used to develop the NRC's conclusions regarding a licensee's safety performance. The SALP report documents the NRC's observations and insights on a licensee's performance and communicates the results to the licensee and the publi It provides a vehicle for clear communication with licensee management that focuses on plant performance f relative to safety risk perspectives. The NRC utilizes SALP results when allocating NRC inspection resources at licensee facilitie This report is the NRC's assessment of the safety performance at Callaway for
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the period February 1, 1992, through September 18, 199 An NRC SALP Board, composed of the individuals listed below, met on
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September 29, 1993, to review the observations and data on perforn,ance and to !
assess performance in accordance with the guidance in NRC Management'
Directive 8.6, " Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance."
Board Chairperson W. L. Axelson, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, RIII Board Members W. L. Forney, Acting Director, Division of Reactor Safety, RIII J. N. Hannon, Director, Project Directorate III-3, Nuclear Reactor Regulation T. O. Martin, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor. Projects, RIII I PERFORMANCE RATINGS The current SALP process will assess performance in four functional areas instead of the previous seven. The four areas are Plant Operations, Maintenance, Engineering, and Plant Support. Safety Assessment / Quality Verification will be considered for each of the four functional areas rather than as a separate functional area. The Plant Support functional area will assess radiological controls, emergency preparedness, security, chemistry, and fire protection. Three category ratings (1, 2, and 3) will continue to be used in the assessment of licensee performance in each functional are Performance trends, improving or declining, have been eliminated as a part of the rating PDR ADOCK 05000483 O
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Current functional Areas and Ratings:
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Functional Area Rating This Period l
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Plant Operations 1 Maintenance 1 Engineering 1 :
Plant Support 2 ;
Previous Functional Areas and Ratings: i Functianal Area Rating Last Period .
, Plant Operations 1 ;
l Maintenance / Surveillance 1 Engineering / Technical 1 1 Support ;
Radiological Controls 2 Emergency Preparedness 1 Security 1 l
Safety Assessment / Quality 1 Declining Verification
Il PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
, Plant Operations ';
i The overall performance in the operations functional area was excellen .
Management vision, direction, and involvement resulted in. effective operations interfaces and coordination on all major station activities. Operability a evaluations were conservative and reflected proper safety focu ;
Excellent management involvement in plant operations was noted in the control of work activities. Operating history improved as scrams, safety system .
actuations, safety system failures, and forced outages were reduced. Teamwork !
and interdepartmental working relationships were noted as strengths throughout i the Operations organization. Corporate resources were effectively employed to properly address issues. Pre-work briefings were regularly conducted by operations for safety system maintenance activities. Additionally, operations routinely participated in detailed, interdisciplinary management reviews which ,
were conducted for all plant modifications and major outage activitie .
t Management involvement was also evident in ensuring that shutdown risk status ;
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b'oards were effectively employed during the outhge and in responding to the .
axial flux distribution anomaly and the fuel failures. Management expectations are being clearly communicated as evidenced by the reduction in operator error .
Control of plant operations and performance of operators was good. Licensed j
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operators exhibited excellent control room decorum and professionalis Operators generally paid close attention to control boards which resulted in timely identification of equipment problems. However, there were occasional ,
occurrences of operator oversights, such as the mispositioned fuel assemblies ,
during fuel transfer activities, inadequate verification of an essential service water valve position, and an inadvertent boration of the reactor coolant system. A weakness was noted early in the assessment period in that i
, operators did not exhibit apprcpriate knowledge and questioning attitud during a loss of annunciator event. Operators responded promptly to '
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transients and plant events and performed routine activities and evolutions in a disciplined, controlled, and organized manne .
Programs and procedures were considered to be strengths that contributed to ,
maintaining safe operation. The Human Performance Evaluation System and the Event Review Team have been excellent initiatives for determining programmatic improvements. The operator license and requalification programs were also very effective, as evidenced by the excellent pass rates for both types of j examinations. Additionally, a procedure improvement and enhancement effort
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was initiated and is resulting in procedures that are more user-friendl Identification and resolution of issues was excellent. The low threshold of
the Suggestion Occurrence Solution (corrective action) program strongly encouraged problem identification by all plant personnel. Quality assurance audits and self-assessment activities were thorough, comprehensive, and effective. Emergent issues were appropriately prioritized and addressed, and root cause analyses were thorough and effective. Examples include the :
resolution of safety tag-out problems, corrective actions following the total ,
loss of annunciator event, and implementation of the balance of plant single j failure trip elimination progra '
The performance rating is Category I in this are Main _tenance The performance of maintenance remained at a high leve Equipment material ,
condition and availability were excellent. There was a stable and experienced staff, and good involvement with industry initiatives. Management involvement was evident and effective in ensuring a proper safety focu In general the quality of maintenance work was good; however, some isolated !
exceptions were noted, including the performance of the instrument and control . :
technicians during the initial repair efforts for the control room annunciator
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failure and the improper setting of the close limit switch for a safety related essential service water valve.
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- . The programs and procedures for the performance of maintenance were noted to be good and in nearly all cases provided the proper level of guidance and direction. Routine maintenance and surveillance activities were consistently conducted in a timely manner and without personnel errors as a result of the -
quality of the procedures and the effectiveness of the program for scheduling
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routine activities. The reliability centered maintenance program, the system of alternating periods for train related maintenance, the motor operated valve maintenance program, and the quality of the written work instructions were all considered strengths. Some minor procedural weaknesses were noted in the calibration of process radiation monitors and in some surveillance procedure ;
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Management involvement in the maintenance area was excellent. There was good !
! scheduling of preventive maintenance, maintenance facilities were improved with the addition of an outage maintenance building, and the work request backlog was manageable. Although the corrective maintenance-backlog exceeded the internal goal early in the assessment period, corrective actions have effectively reduced the backlog such that it is approaching the goal. A minor weakness was noted in inservice testing in that some components were being r
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unnecessarily tested. This resulted in additional out of service time for some safety related equipmen Quality control
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Self-assessment activities were generally very goo observation of field activities continued to effectively identify and resolve isolated performance deficiencies. The effectiveness of performance based ,
audits and surveillances contributed to safety system availability and I reliability and to the reduction in operational events and forced shutdown The performance rating is Category 1 in this are l Engineering i t
Overall performance in the engineering area was excellent. Issues were normally resolved with the proper emphasis-on plant safety. Team work and the quality of work performed by the engineering staff were generally very goo =
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Engineering involvement in support of maintenance activities was also ,
excellent, as was the utilization of senior managers for outage plannin ,
However, there were isolated instances of engineering evaluations that were :
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The engineering department's focus on safety was generally very goed. Safety j evaluations in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 were detailed and well documented, "
post modification testing requirements were clearly identified and appropriate, and testing was appropriately performed. Several plant ;
improvements were initiated as a result of information obtained'through the :
Individual Plant Examination process. However, initial evaluations of l recurring waterhammer events did not consider whether the resulting transient loads would cause design basis pipe stress limits to be exceede Management involvement and oversight was excellent. The high level of staff experience resulted in minimal reliance on architect engineering suppor Site and corporate engineering organizations were always involved in licensing discussions with the NRC staff. All licensee responses to the NRC were
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fimely, technically sound, and of high quality. The backlog of requests for resolution continued to be low this assessment period, with few being older than 60 day The system engineering program continued to be a strength. System engineering cversight was good in its approach to identifying potential problems based upon equipment performance data trend reviews. For example, timely corrective '
actions were taken following the identification of the degraded voltage conditions in the "A" train emergency load shedding and sequencing circuit and ,
the increased leakage on the containment persornel hatch seals. However, a special NRC team inspection associated with.the control room annunciator problem identified weaknesses with interdepartmental communication and depth of knowledge for some back-up system engineer '
The engineering department's understanding of the plant design basis was excellent. The ongoing program to capture available design basis information, including site engineering calculations, vendor calculations, letters, and notes, was a strength. Also, the Safety System Functional Assessment program continues to be a strength, with the long term plan for Quality Assurance to -
perform a sample evaluation and verify that the design information is accurat The identification and resolution of issues was good. Strengths were noted in the identification of EFHV-66 valve problems, and the identification and resolution of degraded components in electrical load shedding and emergency '
load sequencing circuits. However, weaknesses were identified with resolution of waterhammer events in several safety related systems, and with pipe hanger design calculations for a modificatio Support to other organizations was excellen Good teamwork, communications, ,
and engineering support were generally demonstrated once problems were identified by other departments or system engineers. Prompt and effective support was provided to the operations and maintenance departments in the resolution of plant problems such as the annunciator system modification, root cause identification and followup to a reactor trip, resolution of problems identified with the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, and corrective maintenance to the vital inverter. Additionally, engineering provided timely '!
and effective support in making appropriate operability determination The performance rating is Category 1 in this are Plant Support :
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Plant Support was generally considered to be goo The experience and performance levels of the radiation protection and security staffs were excellent. However, insufficient coordination between the emergency preparedness and training departments was apparen I i
A clear focus on safety was evident by reductions in the amount of i contaminated material stored onsite, dose reductions during non-outage periods )
and the routine performance of fire watches. Efforts on ALARA planning, dose reduction during outages and source term reduction were good; however, in one
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- . instance, two operators knowingly violated a radiation controlled area boundar In addition, an Alert was not declared in accordance with the emergency plan during a total loss of annunciators even Management involvement was excellent with respect to ALARA planning for the Fall 1993 outage and support for the security program. However, management was not as aggressive in implementing other areas of the ALARA program in that ALARA expectations were not effectively conveyed.to department heads, first-line supervisors and craft personne Self-assessments were excellent for the security program and very good for the radiation protection program. The radiation protection program's deficiency reporting system was also excellent. The need for further ALARA awareness outside of the radiation protection department was identified and corrective action taken. Self-assessments of emergency preparedness were good. However, insufficient emphasis was placed on training until late in.the assessment period. Course critiques of the emergency organization's dose assessment training were not used to correct inadequacies in this training program. The-timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions were. excellent for the radiation protection and security program Identification and resolution of technical issues was excellent when developing a failed fuel action plan and considering ALARA in plant modification planning. Emergency response facilities and the security program's equipment were maintained in an excellent condition with one exception. At the end of the assessment period, inspectors determined that the primary computer program used to estimate offsite dose had significant error Two challenging emergency exercises occurred during the period. Overall performance during the first exercise was poor with numerous problems in various areas of the response. The effectiveness of numerous corrective actions was successfully demonstrated during a much improved 1993 exercis Support to other organiza^ .3 was generally good. While access. authorization planning for the Fall 1993 outage was excellent, several authorizations were poorly done during the assessment period. Interfaces with State and county -
officials on emergency planning issues was excellent, as evidenced by support provided to upgrade their emergency plans and to revise strategies for evacuating the emergency planning zone when Missouri River flooding made several highways unusabl The training and qualifications of radiation protection technicians and the security force were excellent. However, there was inconsist_ent interaction between emergency planning and training department staffs to ensure quality after the latter revised training materials or performed training.
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Walkthroughs conducted at the end of the assessment period demonstrated that many dose assessors had not been adequately trained to utilize the primary computerized method for estimating offsite dose The performance rating is Category 2 in this are .
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