ML20134H384

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Requests That OI Investigate Circumstances Surrounding Possible Wrongdoing by Stokely Enterprises of Norfolk,Va & Spectronics of Mobile Re Misrepresented Potter & Brumfield Relays to Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
ML20134H384
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/26/1990
From: Murley T
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Hayes B
NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI)
Shared Package
ML20134F836 List:
References
FOIA-96-475 NRR-90-A-0020, NRR-90-A-20, NUDOCS 9702110271
Download: ML20134H384 (5)
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10: Ben Hayes, Director Office of Investigations FROM: Thoras E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation REQUE_ST FOR lhyESiluT10N

_Stgkely Enterprises N/A _ ,

Vehdor Docket No.  !

Norfolk, Virginia Site tout %h I

S ectronics N/A en or Docket No.

Mobile, Alabau Site Location ~~

Thrvr4s E. Murley pne 26.1990 Dffice Director ae i

A. Bequest What is the matter that is being requested for investigation?

We are requesting the Office of Investigations (01) to investigate the circuinstances surrotnding possible wrongdoing by Stokely Enter) rises Virginia, and Spectronics of Mobile, Alasama, who (Stokely) a of Norfoll.

> pear to have sup?l led misrepresented Potter & Brumfield (PB) relays to tw Shearon Harris nuclear power plant. Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) issued a purchase order (PO) on May 24,1990, to Spectronics, an authorized distributor of PB relays, for the supply of coninercial-grade PB relays for use at the Shearon Harris nuclear site. In response to this F0, the licensee reported receiving a drop shipr$nt of 22 relays froc.

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LIMITED DISTRIBUTION -- NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE w/o 01 APPROYAL Ben Hayes Stokely. We presume that Stokely is a subvendor of Spectronics. The licensee indicated that the nameplates of the relays appeared to be counterfeit. Further review and testing witnessed by t,ie Vendor Inspection Branch (YlB) sulgest that Stokely and Spectronics supplied unauthorized refurbished Potter & Brumfield relays as new relays to the ShearonHarrIspowerstation. At this time, the breadth and depth of the supply is not clear and may not be limited to the $hearon Harris site. An investigation is requested to identify and confirm the facts involving the unauthorized refurbishment of the relays and to detennine how the relays wererepresented(neworused). This information will assist the staff in determining the safety significance of this matter.

B. Purpose of Investigation

1. What is the basis for the belief that the violation of a regulatory requirement is more likely to have been intentional or to have resulted from careless disregard or reckless indifference than from error or oversight?

The relays, which have a normal lead delivery time of 10 to 14 weeks, were shipped in less than a week. The licensee personnel examined the relays on receipt and determined that the relays had counterfeit nameplates, and observed that several other characteristics of the relays were different from the manufacturer-su) plied relays which were in storage. The licensee personnel informed t:)e NRC on June 7, 1990, that they suspected having received PB relays vith counterfeit name-plates. The apparently counterfeit nameplates on the relays and the refurbishment of the relays with obsolete parts and poor quality workmanship, thcicate that the representation of the relays as new was apparently intentional.

2. What are the potential regJ14 tory requirements that may have been violated?

Appendix A and Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. Even though the s >ecific relays in question were su pplied as commercial-grade items, tie licensee intended to dedicate t1em for safety-related service.

Similar relays from different suppliers have previously been used in emergency diesel generator load-sequencing systems to minimize the effects of excessive voltage drops on the safety-related electrical buses during a LOCA or LOOP. Historically, the relay manufacturer (Potter & Brumfield) has always sup)1ied the subject relays as cosinercial-grade items and the purciaser was responsible for establishing suitability for use in safety-related applications.

If undetected by a utility, the substandard relays could have caused the utility to be in non-compliance with the regulations.

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION -- NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE w/o 01 APPROVAL

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION -. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE w/o 01 APPROVAL Ben Hayes 3. If no violation is suspected, what is the specific regulatory 4

concern?

N/A

4. Why is an investigation needed for regulatory action and what is the regulatory impact of this matter, if true?

The )urpose of this request is to determine the extent, breadth, and de)ts of the misrepresentation of the relays supplied, or if other suastandard parts were supplied to other nuclear utilities under i

fraudulent conditions by Stokely Enterprises or Spectronics.

Furthermore, we require additional information from Stokely Enterprises and Spectronics relative to their involvement in the supply of parts to nuclear power plants.

1 the 6

operation of licensed plants and the restarting of I plants.The issu material of indete.radneta cuality is used in safety (load-sequencing systems) or other important appitcations, this could potentially result in a pubib: health tad safety concern requiring NRC and licensee actions.

, C. Requester's Priority

1. Is the priority of the investigation high, normal, or low?
High
2. What example from Appendix 0517 Part III, does this incident most

, closely fit, if any?

' Example B.4.a.(5) requiring an immediate investigation to ensure preservation and tvailability of evidence.

3. What is the estimated date when the results of the investigation are needed?

July 30,1990

4. What is the basis for the date and the impact of not meeting this

, date?

! The expedited completion date is based upon the results of the electrical testing of the relays. A YlB inspector along with tech-nical experts from Potter & Brumfield (PB) visually inspected the relays and conducted inspections and electrical tests at the PB facilities in Princeton, Indiana, on June 23 and 21, 1990. PB

- factory standards were used to inspect and test the relays. None of the 22 relays supplied by Stokely and Spectronics met all the acce).

tance criteria. The extent of the proljferation of the relays wit)

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION -- NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE w/o 01 APPROYAL

LIMITEDDISTklBUT10h--NOTFORPUBLICOlsLOSUREe/oO!APPROYAL Ben Hayes i substituted parts needs to be established. Because these relays are nore11y procured as comercial-grade items and subsequently codicated for use in safety-related system, norr41 inspections and tests my not be sufficient to detect inherent flaws rasulting from substitution of obsQta, incompatible ano substandard internal components without the benefit of PB factory specifications, which require tight tolerances and stringent acceptshce criteria, The impact of not meeting this date promptly is that actions would n6td to be requested of icensees without infora tion as to the potential scope of the problem.

D. Actions by Staf_f f

1. What actions have beer. taken by the staff?

A V6hcor Insp6ction Brant.h (VIB) inspector, accot. panted by an 01 investisctor, visited the Shearch Harris site on June 14 anc 15, 1990, eyamined the relays in the presence of a FB applications engineer, and confirred that the relays a)peared to have been refurbished in an unauthorizac anner. 11e relays were confiscated by 01 on June 14,1990, based on confirm tton by the PB representative that mcv nameplates of the relays had been counterfeited. Arrangements were ude to reir,tain a chain of custooy and to transfer the relays to the PB facilities located in Princeton Indiana. The relays wert visually inspected and i

altetrically tested in the presence of a YlB inspector on June 20 and 21,1990. All the relays fa11ec to poet the unufacturer's acceptance criteria. Three relays (one of each uds1) were

disass6n. bled at the conclusicn of the tests. All the disassambled relays had genuine inccspatable PB parts,For exampit, one 125 VDC coil had beenbut th relay mocals.

reassembled with a 200 VDC coil. In addittun to the counterfeited nameplates, the inspector observed other abnormal features such as missing cate code staeps on the relays and re-used terstnal boards which were assembled with poor quality work:anship. The PB personnel confirred that the relays Mao been asserbled with genuine PB parts, ,

but from various vintages without the benefit of factory instruc-tions. CP&L purchased the relays as cocnercial-grade items with the Intent to dedicate the relays prior to replacing the existing PB relsys in the emergency diesel generator load sec,uencing system.

This a safety-related system whose primry function is to start the

< safety related equiptent during a LOCA or LOOP in order to minimize

the ef fects of excessive voltage drops on the safety-related electrical buses.

4 LIMITED DISTRIBUTION -- NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE w/o 01 APPROYAL

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION -- NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURL w/o 01 APPROVAL Ben Hayes 2. Actions to be taken if investigation is closed without a report.

The staff intends to conduct an inspection of the activities of Stokely in order to confirm the facts surrounding the unauthorized refurbishnant of the relays and the breadth and capth'of Stokely's supply of these apparently counterfeit relays and other corponents to the nuclear industry.

E. Contact ,

1. Staff centers: K. R. Naidu, SPIS/VIB/DRIS/NRR C. YanDenburgh, Section Chief, SPIS/VIB/DRIS/NRR
2. Allegers identification with address and telephone nutter if _not confidential N/A F. Other Relevar.t Inforration N/A e

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' Thomas E. Me}rley, D rector Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc: EDO OGC RA/RI!

OE DEDS LIMITED DISTRIBUTION -- NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE w/o APPROVAL

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