ML20091L813

Outdated Rev 0 to Training Lesson Plan RQ-LP-63107-00, Requal Current Events

ML20091L813
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	05/22/1990
From:	Kilpatrick G GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20091B437	List: ML20091L777 ML20091L782 ML20091L789 ML20091L799 ML20091L813 ML20091L833 ML20091L882 ML20091L893 ML20091M094
References
RO-EP-63107, RO-EP-63107-00, NUDOCS 9201280249
Download: ML20091L813 (8)

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GEORGIA POWER ..

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1TrLE: Requal Curttet Events ,. ,

a NUMBER: Sp-63107-00

)j'ROGRAM:

P IJoenad Operator Requal , . KEVISION: 0

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.MJDiOR: G. Kilpatrick - DA1T.:. 05/21/90 4.PPROVED: f . ,., DATE:

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' - 4 49 INSTRUCTOR GUIDELINES: -

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A. Wrballecture with visual aids.

II. MATERIALS: w i

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EVALUATION -

A. Oral or wrinen exam in exxyunction with other lesson plans

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IV. REMARKS s.,

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• RQ.t.P43107 00

1. PURPOSE STATEMENT:

T'.as lesson provides a periodic update of significant plant rnodifications and pmcedural changes. In addition, trJormation from selected operating events is provided to reinforce lessons learned from those events.

II. 1.!ST OF OBJECTIVES:

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1. Describe how operation of input Error Inhibit switd> resulted in a Feedwater Isolation during Mode 4 operations.

2. Describe how oper tlen of the input Error inhibit switch resulted in deenergization of the Source Range detectors. . ,

3. Discuss lessons teamed from the Unit 2 trip following the Unit I loss of power event.

4. Describe how a power excursion event resulted from bypassmg the condensate demineralizers.

5. Describe procedu:al changes resulting from the Vogtle specific midloop analysis.

REFERENCES:

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1. ER 90.004

2. ER 290.001

3. LER 90.001

. 4. LER 90.003

5. LER 90.044

6. LER 90.005

7. LER 290.003

8. MEMO 90.008

9. PROC 90.004

10. PROC 90.005

11. PROC 90.006

12. PROC 90.007

13. PROC 90.008 1

1 Page 2

, RQ.LP.63107 00 111. LESSON OUTLINE: NOTES A. OPERATING EVENTS 1.0 i FR 90.001 1he format of the surveillwe task sheets for 14475 2, Containment Integrity Verification . Valva Outside Cnn'= lament, resulted in incomplete performance, witich failed to meet the requimnents of Tech Spec 4.6.1.1.a.

Following discovery, all valves were verified locked closed and 14475 1 & 2' 's revised to include all componenu to be surveilled.

2.0 1 FR 90,003 After discovering transformers IAB04X and 1 AB05X www missing seismic required clamp bolts, switchgears I ABM and 1A305 were declared inoperable and Tech Spec 3.8.3.1 was entered.

1 ABM wu deenergized and Tech Spec 3.6.3 was entered because HV-81l'. was deenergized. After 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, a unit shutdown was commencaland an NUE was decimd.

Approximately 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after being desnergizd 1 AB04 was reenwgized and declared operable, and Tech Spec 3.6.3 mss exited. However, with 3.8.3.1 still applicable, the decision was made to continue shutdown,

, entering the refueling outage - 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> early.

3.0 LER 90 DM .

With Source Range channel N31 inoperable for an 18 month channel calibration, approval was granted and Mode 6 was entered. The failure to comply with Tech Spec 3.0.4 was recognized later and reported.

4.0 LER 90.001

' While checking the QHVC, both trains of RIB Pos: Accideot Ventilation were observed in operation (Previously Train A had been in service with Train B in standby). No alarms were detected by cordrol room personnel, no abnormal radiation conditions exixed, wel MiB was being maintained at a negative pressure. Since Trahi B had not been deliberately stand it was determmed to be an automatic actuation of ESF equipment.

Investigation revealed personnel failed to verify the low pressure c=% signal was blocked when Train A was placed in service and Train B was most p obably actuated on low pressure when FHB perunnel access doors were opened.

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RQ L.P.63107 00 III. LESSON OUTLINE: NOTE.S 5.0 Oper=tt=1 pmblems are experienced during 1R2 following operation of the Input Error Inhibit switch.

On several occasions, both a>ume range detectors wre deenergtzed wkn both input Ermr Inhibit (IEI) switches were positioned to IN7flBIT.

a. When the IEI switch la positioned to IA7fIBIT, a signal to deenergize the source range detectors is generated. This b normally needed because both trains are requind to doenergize the detectors; i.e. loss of either train would allow the detectors to reenergize.

b. If the SR detectors are energized, this signal does not normally deenergize the detectors, since both trains are requirai. Howver, once the other train's switch is repositioned, the SR detectors are deenergued.

In Mode 4 with long cycle recire established, SSPS was being operated to support reactor trip bypass breaker testing. Feedwater Isolation was actuatea when the Mode Selector switch was positioned to NcWUWAL following operation of the IEI switch.

a. When the IEI switch is positioned to INNIBIT, inputs to the logic cards are opened, removing any preealsting signal. This removed the actuation signal and cleared the 6ctuation

• block".

b. When the IEI switch was positioned to NORMAI, the inputs were reinstated, and the acturtion signal was generated without a block.

This sf gnal energized the innster relays, but the manne4ated slaves were inhibited with the Mode Selector switch in TES7: ,

c. When the Mode Selecter switch was positioned to OPEJtNtE ll8V AC was reinstated to the slaves and a Feedwater Isolation was actuatai.

6.0 The following describe lessons learned from the Unit 2 trip following faulty differential relay actuation .

a. During event reconstruction determination of equipment pmblems is impaired Jf relays and targets are reset without documeritating each item that occurred. Procedures have been revised to require documentatloa prior to restoration.

b. With RCP 1 or 4 secured and spray valves in auto, spray flow will be short cycled thmugh the idle sprsy header, reducing the spray flow available for pressure control.

The PRZR pressure controller's demand will integrate (further opening the spray valves) until a PORV is opened. 'Iberefore, the spray valve for the idle RCP should be manually closed.

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RQ LP.63107 00 III. LESSON OiJIUNE: NOTES 7.0 / toww excursion occwted on Unit 2 when the standby condensate

- pussy was started following :he trip of a heater drain pump. During the event, poww remained > 100% for = 9 minutes with a peak power of 105.2 %.

a.  %%n the condensate demins wwe bypanned for backwash and precoat, MFP suction pressure increased s!!shtly. This increased pressure resulted in a decrease in HDT pump discharge flow and a w-.+-ding increase in HDT level.

b. As HDT level continued to increase, the high level dump valve The manual actunnon failed to open and level seeched the high level setpoint. pin was inscried ,

.j, inhibiting auto At this point the MSDT drain valva and Heater 4 extraction valve OPwedon c.

were closed. %%n Hester 4 extraction valve rad =4 > 75%

clonal, Hec'er 5 normal level control valves received a close signal.

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f Hester DrainTank d, With the HDT basically isolated, level the began to decrosse and subsequently tripped the pump on low level.

e. Wben the HDT pump tripped, the standby condensate pump was started. The replacement of " hot

• beater drains with *coV condensate re-=rt feedweeer semperstwe and caused a decrease ivi Tavg.

f. As Tava lowered, positive nectivhy was =%d ard reactor poww increased, an OPAT Rod Stop and Tudnne Runback was automatically initiated. At this point, reactor and turbine power were manually reduced and stabilized at 90%.

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. RQ LP 63107 00 Ill. 1.ESSON OUTUNE: NOTES B. DESIGN CHANGES 1.0 The following Unit I centrollers have been changed to contml the process vice the parameter (i.e. the "up" pushbutton will raise temperature and the "down" pushbunon will lower temperature).

1. tlc 5498 MWT A Bearing Oil 1.T1C.5499 MWT B Bearing Oil 171C 7097 Generator H2 Cooler 171C.7116 Turbine Lube Oil Cooler 171C.7356 EHC Cooler

C. PROCEDURE

CHANGES 1.0 Various UOPs Tech Spec Amendment 28 allows non-borated chemical additions during Mode 5 with the loops not filled and Mede 6. This is accomplished by opening 1208.U4 176 and 1208.U4 177 under administrative controls provided Shutdown Margin requirements are met and the High Flux at Shutdown alarm is operable at 2.30 times background.

12000 C,12006.C and 12007.C have been revised to a!!ow opening of these valves for short periods of time chemistry control provided Tech Spec compliance is maintained.

2.0 12006.C. Unit Cooldown to Cold hedown .

Vogtle specific midloop analysis limitations won incorporated as follows:

a The containment hatch must be capable of being closed within 57 minutes or verified closed prior to reducing level below 191'.

b. If SG nozzle dams are to inaanited with a cold leg opening estab!!shed, a vent path through an SG manway on a hot les that will not be dammed must be established. In this situation, the PRZR manway is rot sufficient to adequately relieve the heer load generated following a loss of RHR.

c. During midloop operations,4 r='aian=at Cooling Units will be operabie and capable of being started if requaed 3.0 13011 1/2. Re 1Ai=1 Hamt Emmaval System Section 4.9 was added, providing dhoction for operating RHR with one train of cold les ch=charp flowpath isolated for maintenance. This sectics provides guidance for isolaten and restoration of a train.

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RQ.LP.63107 00 III. LESSON OUTLINE: NOTES 4.0 135021/2. Control Rod Drive and Position Indication System Due to industry problems with rod tip wearing, the ARO position for control and shuthwn rods is periodically changed to mintml* wear at any one position. As a rvsult, Tech Spec Amendment 29 reduces rod insertion limits to 222 steps and 135021 & 2 were revised to provide dinction for repositioning rods to the ARO position using PEB Tab 14.

Notes wen added to ensun the "tip to tip" distance existing prior to repositioning is maintamed following repositioning.

In addition,14000-1 & 2 now reqube verifying shutdown rods := 222 steps for shutdown margin verifkation.

5.0 19.110 C. toss of All AC Pows

a. Sample lines are no longer required to be checked shut when verifying RCS is isolateo. These valves are no longer considend

" major" RCS leakage paths.

b. Operators an directed to notify maintenance to install adr., smal emergency 11shting for prolonged loas of all AC.

c. Attachments B and C were added to allow verifying CIA and CVI using the ERF computer.

6.0 19211.C. Response to Nuclear Power Generation / AM Step 6a RNO now dincts local trip of Reactor Trip and Bypass breaken before local trip of MG Set supply bnakers.

D. TECH SPEC (Interpretations) 1.0 Tech Soee 3.4.1.4 RCS loops are considered filled when the RCS is filled and vented (i.e.

SG tubes are full) and level has I wn maintained > 192' elevation. _

2.0 IHB Post Accident Ventilation Actuation

a. With the AP actuation signal blocked, the FHB Post Aa:ident Vent 11ation system is considered uperable. AP actuation was intentionally excluded from Tech Specs.

b. The actuation of the FHB Post Accident Ventilation system by a AP signal is a reportable event. NUREG 1022 says that cven if the ESF as.tuation is spirious or unneccssary, the actuation is reportable.

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