ML20116C186
| ML20116C186 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1992 |
| From: | Mcmeekin T DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9211030245 | |
| Download: ML20116C186 (44) | |
Text
> ' ll I Dakr 1%vwr Com;,ey T C Atmuus
~
AlcGuire Nuclear Generati..n hq>artrnent bict (*rnident lli@ ilop n Ittry Road (MG01A } tIb418754MM Hantetuille. hClCis M5 (TOUXiS609 in DUKE POWER October 26,1992 U, S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 _
Subject. McGuire Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50 59, please find attached a commary of Nuclear Station Modifications, Exempt Changes, and Procedure Changes made to the McGuire Nuclear Station for the period of March 1,199.
to March 31,1992.
Questions or problems should be directed to Kay Crano, Regulatory Compliance at (704) 875-4306. ,
Very truly yourt,
+ *!
T C McMockin, Vice President McGu;te Nuclear Station Attachment cc: Mr. T. A. Rood, Project Manage:
Ottice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator U. S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 11 101 Marietta Street. NW ~ Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georg'a 30323 Mr. P K. VanDoom Senior Resident laspc',, tor McGuiro Nuclear Stte R. O Sharpe 9 (\(\ n t o 9211030245 92O331 PDR R
ADOCK 0500G369 PDR
//p
/ f,
( l
- n. ,1.,,1,e f j
o Dukt Power Company- 1 McGuire Nuclear Station Summary of Nuclear Station Modifications Completed Under 10CFR50.59 MG-22185
Description:
This NSM involves the turbine runback inputs and the Bailey /ETSI tuibine control (DEH)is) .em, part of the ITE system (turbino instrumentation). The NSM will:
- 1) Rectistribute the turbine runback inputs among 4 or 5 turbine runback circuits available in the DEH system.
Present input configuraticm Circuit #1: (runback rate: 200% per minute)
FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE A AND B TRIP AT 56% - LOAD. REACTOR OVERTEMPERATURE/ OVERPOWER LOW STATOR COOLING WATER FLOW AT 10% LOAD Circuit #2: (runback rate: to 56% power in 3 minutes)
MAIN GENERATOR BREAKERS A OR B OPEN AND SWITCHYARD BREAKERS 8 & 9 0R 11 & 12 OPEN MAIN GENERATOR BREAKERS A AND B CLOSED AND SWITCHYARD BREAKERS 7 & 9 OR 10 & 12 OPEN Circuit #3 (spare)
Circuit #4 (spare)
Circuit #5 (spare)
New input configuration:
Circuit #1: (runback rate: 200% per minute) l FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE A AND B TRIP AT SE% LOAD l Circuit #2: (runback rate: to 56% power in 3 minutes) _
l (no change)
Circuit #3: (runback rate; 200% per minute)
REACTOR OVERTEMPERATURE/ OVERPOWER Circuit #4 (runback rate: 200% per minute)
- LOW STATOR COOLING WATER FLOW AT 10% LOAD Circuit #5: (spare) ,
- 2) Redistribution of turbine runback inputs enables the runback permissives now derived
- l. _
using mechanical pressure switches to be implemented by DEH software. DEH software will be implemented to provide the ru_nback permissives for LOW STATOR COOLING -
l WATER FLOW AT 10% LOAD (switch SMPS5211) and FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE '
A AND B TRIP AT 56% load (switch SMPS5212). This will eliminate an inherent response time problem associated with the mechanical _ pressure switches. Pressure switch -
SMPSS211 will be revised to delete its DEH permissive and SMPS5212 will be deleted;
- 3) A reiay will be added to the DEH load permissive speed control circuit to add redundancy, so that a single relay failure will not lead to a turbine trip.
1
.~
4 w
9- e.
9
- 4) Redistribution of the turbine runback inputs provides the capability to adjust the turbine runback rates. The presently used rate of 200% per minute causes the turbine system to experience a f ast trasient condition, which is detrimental to system equipment.
Adjustment of the rates was originally within the scope of the NSM, however, new optimized rates were not determined (from simulator testing) by the 'ime of design completion, Runback rate adjustment is excluded from the scope of the NSM (and this 50.59 evaluation) Runback rates will be modified by a future NSM or MEVN).
Safety Review and USQ Evaluation:
FSAR Section 15.2.3 addresses the Turbine Trip event. No other FSAR Chapter 15 accidents or events are initiated by the Turbine or DEH systems. Implementation of turbine runback permissives using DEH software rather than mechanical pressure switches is exoected to improve system r%ponse time and .
reliability. Existing turbine ru1back inputs will be redistributed with no additional turbine runback inputs added, and no existing inputs deleted. Neither the existing turbine runback logic or runback rates will be changed by this modification. Therefore, turbine runback control functions will remain unchanged. The chances of a Turbine Trip due to a single relay failure are reduced by the added relay in the DEH load permissive speed control circuit. The DEH system is non-safety, and is located in the Computer Room of the Service Building. The Service Building is a non-seismic structure Neither seismic qualification or electrical separation are required. An Appendix R review was performed and no concerns were identified. Therefore the probability of an accident of malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.
Neither the turbine or DEH system are a.cident nutigators. They perform no plant safoty function. The function of these components are not changed by this modification. Therefore the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the SAR is not increased.
No new turbine runback inputs are added, and no new f ailure modes are created. No accidents previously thought incredible are made credibio by this NSM. Thus the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than evaluated in the SAR will not be created.
There are no changes of safety limits, setpoints, or plant parameters because of the modifications. The fission product barriers (RCS pressure boundary, containment, tuel pellets -and cladding) are net degraded, No assumptions made in any accident analysis are affected by the NSM Therefore the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not decreased. This modification does not involve any Unroviewed Safety Question.
MG-22188 Desctlption:
The containment vessel personnel air locks provide safe access to and from the inside of containment during plant testng and operation without breaching the containment pressure boundary, Cach personnel -
air lock has inner and outer doors. Sealing for each door is accomplished by the inflatable seals mounted to the door itself. Each seal inflates against a stainless steel sealing st/ face on the bulkhead door frame.
This NSM involves replacing existing personnel air lock seals and seal clanips. - The bulging effect that occurs wit's the current clamping arrangement will be eliminated, thus extending seal wear. The new design eli ninates the pre-drilling of the seal base requirements during installation. Thus, the redesigned seals and seal clamps will extend seal wear and limit installation and removal time.
Safety Review and USQ Evaluation:
The modified seals are a straight replacement that are bolted in place. The ability of the modified seal to
o- .i perform its intended function during a safe shutdown earthquake and a design basis accident is unchanged. The pressure bulb area is made of the same materials and has the same dimensions as the original seals and the modified seals should be capable of functioning under as many cycles as the previous seals. The double inflatable seals provide a top connection between the seals for local leak rate testing and the function of the seals to maintain a containment barrier is unchangea. Therefore, this modification will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR.
The double inflatable seals are OA1. The seal clamps are non-safety related. The clamps secure the seals to the doors as a convenience during opening and closing of the doors but are not required once the seals are inflated. The existing seal clamps and seal clamp bolts are non-OA. The new seals and seal clamps are modified so that drilling holes for installation it not required eliminating the bulging effect.
All other details with respect to pressure bulb, materials and the details of production remain the same.
The air tank, supplying back up air to the seals, remains the same. Because the pressure bulb area is the same materials and dimensions the vendor indicated the modified seals should be capable of functioning under at least as many cycles as the previous seals. Thus, the possibility of an accident or the mallunction of equipment important to safety not evaluated in the SAR is not created. No Unreviewed Safety Question exists.
MG-22208/00
Description:
This modification will replace the air operators for valves 1 & 2 RN-253A and 1 & 2 RN-276A with electric motor operators (EMO's). The existing valve bodies will be used with the new EMO bonnet assemblies.
No piping arrangement changes will be made; however, hangers and supports will be modified to accept the ditferent loading conditions. Since these valves are OA Condition 1, power will be provided from class 1E motor control conters.
These valves are located insido containment; therefore, McGuire Technical Specification Tables 3.8-1a would need to be revised to inc;ude the containment penetration overcurrent protective devices used in .
these circuits. However, a Technical Specification change has been submitted to remove these tables from the Technical Specifications and add them to the Selected Liceawe Commitments Manual. The following saf ety review and USO valuation is based on the assumption that the Technical Specification change will be approved poor to implementation of this modification.
Safety Review and USQ Evaluation:
Valves R+253A and RN-276A are the train A supply and return containment isolation valves for the RN system cooling water to the Reactor Coolant Pump motor air coolers. The original air operators are designed to close the Jalves automatically on an Sp signal. Also, the valves fait closed on the loss of instrument air or power to the solencios. Losing instrument air during unit operation will cause these valves to close resulting in operational problems. Loss of cooling water can cause the Reactor Coolant Pump motors to overheat and can result in the shutdown of the unit.
The new electric motor operators are also designed to close the valves automatically on an Sp signal.
However, the dependence on instrument air will be eliminated. The valve will fail *as-is" on a loss of 3
electrical power and will be unaffected by a loss of instrument air. Redundancy is not affected by this modification. Only train A valves, which are located inside containment are affected. The redundant train B valves located outside containment will remain air operated and will have the "f all closed" feature. Since the redundant valves are outside containment and in a more accessible location, the potential for unnecessary unit shutdowns rer"!!ing from loss of cooling water to the Reactor Coolant Pump motors is reduced. The capacity of the valves to perform their intended safety function is not degraded. The
' function of the valves is nnchanged. Performance tequirements specified in the FSAR are also met.
- u- -
r ~ - 4 a n,
e .,
Therefore, the consequences of an accident or of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR is not increasedc Tbe componor.4s meet all seismic and environmental requiroments. All desi0n and separation critcria havo also boon mot. An appendix R review was performed and no concerns were identified. The reliability is improved sinco the now operators are no longer dependent on instrument air. Also, power to the now oporators is from reliable, class 1E sources, Thorofore, the probability of an accident or of a rnalfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR is not increased.
Although the failure mode for the train A valves is bein0 reviewed, tht failure modo for the redundant train B valves will remain the same. Tho system is more reliable sinco class 1E power is more reliable than
- instrument air. The configuration is also more diverso sinco train A valves havo electric motor operators and the redundant trin B valvos have air operators. All components have been qualified for use in this application. All design requiroments and separation critoria have been met.' Thorofore, the possibility for an accident or for a malfunction of equi mont of a different type than any evaluated in the SAR will not be created.
this modification will have no ottect on any fission product barrier within the assumptions set forth in the design basis. No safety hmits, setpoints, or paramoors assumed in any accident analysis or Technical Specification have tzen affocied. Thorobro, the mar 0lial safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.
Assuming the Technical Specification changes identified in the
- Description of Moditication" section of this ovaluation are approved prior to implomontation of this modification, there are no Untoviewed Safety Questions.
MG-22268
Description:
This modification will install a drain heador in the auxiliary building mechanical penetration rooms at olevations 716*, 733' and 750% 'This modification reducos personnel-exposure by reducing the timo required to spend in these areas to decontaminato or drain equipments, This modification consists of a main drain header, and branched piping at each elevations. Starting at elevation 750', the main header will go through a fire penetration to 733' and then through the floor grating to 716' elevation, This main header will be of stainless stool piping, and will be rigidly secured. Plastic piping made of CPVC materials will be used to branch-out fro'm the main header. The CPVC piping has a service temperature of 180 degrees F. This is sufficient for purpose of drainin0 equipments, and emptying contaminated water. The operating pressure of all piping associated with this modtlication will be atmospheric. The joints of the CPVC piping will be glued, and in some casos will be threaded Gluod CPVC piping can handle pressures of up to 400 psia, and the threaded piping can handle pressures of -
up to 200 psia The plastic piping will be routed a!ong-side the wall, away from high traffic areas as much as possiblo.
The horizontal branches of the piping will be supported overy 5 to 8 foot, and will be stopped for proper drainage. The main header will be equipped with a vont to provent the contaminated Oases from entering the rooms. The gases will be piped to a VA return duct where it will be routed to be fillored, monitored and released through the unit vent stack.
The Drain Header will be tied into a WL piping which will route the drain to Wasto Evaporator i cod Tank-Sump A. Various drains aro routed to this sump, The water contained in _this sump will be fillored and disposed. This sump has enough capacity to handle the additional input from this header.
~
..- - - -- - ~ _ - - . . . .
Safety and USQ Evaluation:
The WL system is not an accident mitigating system. This system is classified as a OA condition 2 system, implementation of this modification will not affect the safety of the WL system, The Technical Specification and the FSAR will not be affected, and there will be no Unreviewed Safety questions associated with this modification.
MG-22301/01
Description:
This modification will install additional pressure monitoring instruments, which will momtor wide range annulus pressure for the annulus ventilation system. These instruments will trip the exhausting fan should annulus pressure exceed a low-low setpoint (-7.0" w.g.) and the dampers are in the exhaust alignment.
Without these new instruments, should the existing instruments f ail in such a way that the system exhausts continuously, then annulus pressure could react a vacuum as low as 22" w.g., which could cause deformation of the VP and VE ductwork.
Safety Review and USO Evaluation:
The annulus Ventilation (VE) system is affected by this modification.
The annulus ventilation system provides a negative pressure zone between the steel containment structure and the concrete reactor building wall. The annulus ventilation system creates a negative pressure by exhausting air through the unit vent, This negative pressure is monitored by transmitters that regulate the vacuum between -0.5 and -3.5"w.g. Filtration of the air within the annutus is required to ensure that the thyroid and whole body doses at the exclusion area boundary and the low population zone are within the limits of 10 CFR 100 following a severe loss of coo" int accident with substantial core melt.
The installed instrumentation will be safety class 1E, OA condition 1, seismic category 1.
The VE system is not an accident initiator. Therefore, the probability of an accident evaluated in the FSAR l3 not increased.
The VE system is an accident mitigation system. Installation of the new instrumentation will not introduce any common mode f ailures into the system. The VE system will be less likely to fail due to high vacuum (VE fan continuously on/ Exhaust damper continuously open). The VE system continues to meet single failure criteria. Failure of one instrumentation loop will still allow operation of the other VET train. A 10 CFR 50 App.ndix R review revealed no safety conuerns. Therefore, the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased.
No accident analysis assumptions are' altered. No new failure modes are introduced. The radiological consequences of any Chapter 15 FSAR ac0ident remain the same Therefore, the consequences of an accident of a malfunction of equipment important to safety are not increased.
No operating parameters are changed. The function of the VET system will remain the same. No new failure modes are introduced. No previously incredible uccidents are made credible. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or a malfunction of equipment important to safety different from any evaluated in the SAR is not increasedi No fission product barriers are affected adversely. No plant safety limits,~ limiting safety setpoints, or design parameters are affected. No Technical Specification changes are required. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to the Technical Specifications will not be reduced. This modification does rmt involve any Unreviewed Safety Questions, I
MG-22303/00 MG-22304/00
Description:
These modifications change the Main Sicam Safety Valves from a butt-weided inlet design to a flanged inlet and outlel desi0n. New valvo bodies and internals, with flanged inlet and outlet connect ons, have been procured. Additionally, these modifications will rotato the valves 15 do0rees to the vertical position, to prevent excessivo seat leakage.
Safety Review and USQ Evaluation:
The Main Steam system is affected by this modification.
The main steam safety valves are OA condition 1 and Nuclear Safety related. The valves are built to ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section lil, Class 2.
The safety valves are set for progressive relief at increasing pressure within the ASME Code allowed for range of pressure, to avoid more than one valvo actuating simultaneously. Syetem shock may cause other valves to open. The safety valvo dischargo path is sized assuming all valves are dischar0in0 simultaneously. ~lho safety valves have a combined capacity equal to maximum calculated heat balance steam flow conditions.
The relevant FSAR Chapter 15 accidents are loss of external load, main steam line break, loss of foodwater, loss of offsito power, loss of condenser vacuum l inadvertent closuto of MSIVs , and turbino trip.
In the event the non-safety class steam dump valves fail to open following a large loss of load, the steam generator safety valves may not lif t and the reactor may be tripped by a high pressure, high pressurizer tevel, or overtemperature signal.
A hydroutic test will be performed after initial installation of the new valves A leak check will be performed af ter subsequent valve joint disassembly and reassembly, por ASME Vol 11, IWA 5214.
The main steam safety valves are accident initiators and accident mitigators. They are constructed to the same design, material, and coastruction standards as the present valves, The valves will be tested prior to installation so that the MS system wilt not be operated outside of its design limits. Accumulation innd blowdown characteristics are the same. The flanged joints meet all design requirements of the SSC. >
Therefore, the probability of an accident of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the SAR is not increased.
The operational characteristics of the safety valves have nct been changed. No assumptions previously mado in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident have been altered. The safety valves l
function as a fission product barrier has not been altered. Therefore, the consequences of an accident i or a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the SAR is not increased.
No new failure modes or operating characteristics are created. No previously incredible accidents are made credible. The valves will be tested and selsmically analyzed. Therefore, the probability of an l accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety different from any analyzed in the FSAR is not L increased.
t The valves are constructed to OA 1 specifications; the fission product barrier function of the valvos is not altered.~ No safety so! points, limiting safety settings, or operating characteristics are changed. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced. This E modification does t'ot involve any Unreviewed Salety Questions.
l-i i;
MG-22308/0
Description:
The Feedwater Pump TurbMe Seal Water injection System (CL) provides high quality water at the required tempera *ure and pressure for sealing the main feodwater pumps. Original system design controlled the flow to the seals in two stages: (1) cooler discharge control valve in the common seal supply header (2CL12) and (2) bearing supply control valve in each supply line (2CL16,20,24,29). New Westinghous6 parameters allow for a broader operating range and a less complex control system. In fact, the CL system has been operating successfully since early in unit life with portions of the control system defeated. CL system pipiig and controls are to be permanently modified to optimize its operation.
Safety Review and USO Evaluation:
The CL system smd the Main Feedwater system are involved with this modification.
The CL system provides high quality water to the main feedwater pumps at 10 psid above the feedwater pump suction pressure. One pump will automatically start when seal injection supply is less than 10 psid.
The pressure transmitter 2CLPT5000 will be replaced with a broader range transmitter for differential pressure. The pressure switch which starts / stops CL pumps (2CLP5000) wil; be changed. The cooler discharge control valve (2CL12) and the associated isolat;c7 and bypass valves (2CL11,13,14) and piping will be removed and replacert with hard piping.
The piping design parameters are 690 psig,220 degrees F, class G, carbon steel, non OA, non safety related, non scbmic pressure boundary.
The loss of normal foodwater flow accident is the relevant design basis accident.
The CL system is described in the FSAR in section-10.4.7.5. The CL system is not addressed in the Technical Specitication. T here will be no effect on the main feedwater system.
This modification will make the CL system more reliable than it is now because the hard piping will be more reliable, and less prone to failure than it is now. Thb iatlure of the CL system, causing the loss of a main feedwater pump is no more likely now than prior to the installation, based on past successful operation. Therefore, the probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.
The main feedwater system and CL system are not safety related or accident mitigation systems. The loss of the CL system is no more likely with this modification. Therefore, consequences of accidents or malfunctions of equipment important to safety evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.
No new failure modes are created. The operating characteristics of the CL system and feedwater system are unchanged. The CL system has operated with this modification control arrangement as a temporary modification for a number of years. Therefore, the possibility for an accident or a malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.
This modification does not degrade any fission product barriers. This modification does not affect any plant safety limits, setpoints, or design parameters. No changes to the Technical Speciiications are required. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to the Technical Specifications will not be reduced. No Unreviewed Safety Questions are involved with this modification.
MG-22324 '00
Description:
lhe purpose of these modshcations are to prevent pumping potenhally contaminated water from the Refuehng Water Storage Tank (RWSt) trench, by disabhng i Wbi Sump Pump A, should excessivo /,
overliow from the l'WS1 tank occur.
PIR 0 ""B-0010 identihed that the F WS1 ovcflow kne capacity was incet'icient to relieve the normal mput flow to the I WS1 in the event of overhlhng This could result in failuro of the F WS1 due to overpressuritation.
Mi VN-1316 and 1317 were wntten to correct this problem by modifying ao cxisting vont bne in the tank to that the vont kno may be used to rel evo the excess input flow The hquid discharged from the vent line will be directed to the FWST trench.
6 F WS1 Sump Pump A, located in the i WS1 trench, is used to pump rainwater to the yarc Routing the tank overtlov. to the trench introduces tha possibthly of pumping contatmnated water to the yard by the i WS1 Sump Pump.
1 hose modifications wit! add an additional current alarm in the level loop (FWS15341) to prevent automatic operation of the cump pump in the event of FWST overflow. A computer alarm will also be added on the Operator Aid Computer (OAC) m the Control Room to indicato an excess ovarflow condition. A manual roset will be provided for pump operation once the water has been analyzed.
The levelindication circuitry is non safety, and does not affect the ability of the FW system to perform its safety functions, Changes will be made on the non safety control panel in tho yard, which houses the electncal circuitry for the instrument toop. A non safety enclosure to houso the roaet circuitry will be located near the pump.
afety Review and USO Evaluation:
lhe i WST is not an accident initiator. The edded overflow protection circuitry and the modiiiod control o panel are non safety. Seismic quahhcation or mounting of the added equipment is unnecessary. An Appendix H review M conducted, with no concems identihed. Therefore, the probabihty of an accident e or malfunctiori of , _ , ment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased The FWST is used as a source of borat9d water for refuehng operations, and for rultigation of a toss-of-coolant accident.1he overflow protection circuitry has no safety function, however, will be used to prevent the potential tpreaC of contaminated water into the yard area of the plant. The added circuitry does no interf ace with the Refuehng Water Storage Tank itself, or an> associated safety related equipment. Iho performance of plant safety functions will not be preveated, not degraded by the modihcations The FWST will continuo to perform the same functions. The FWST Sump Pump A will continue to perform its non safety function of pumping rainwater out of the FWST trench, except in caso of FWST overflow, when analysis of the water is desired prior to pumping the water out. No common failure rnodes are created.
g Therotore, the conscquences of an accident or malfunction of equipment iniportant to safety evaluated in the FSAR is not mcreased.
No new f ailure rnodos are created by this NSM. If the added current alarm fails to operato sin ultaneous with a tank overflow condition, the potential will exist (due to MEVNs 1310 and 1317) for pum! ng mild!y 3dioactive water into the plant yntd The water will be carried by the yard drain system tr the wasto treatment system, Elfluent releases f rom the waste treatment system are monitored prior to offsito release to ensuro regulatory limits are not exceeded. No accidents previously thought inctedible ato mado credible by these NSMs. Thus the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different 1/po than
evaluated in the SAR will not be created.
1here are no changus of sately hmits, setpoints, or plant parameters because of the modification.1ho hssion product barriors (RCS pressuto boundary, containment, fuel pellets, and cladding) are not degraded. No assumptions mado in any accident analysis are affected by the NSMs, lhereforn the margin of sr'ely as dehned in the basis for any T echnical Specihcation is not decreased, l hls modthcation involved no Unreviewed Safety Question-MG-22333'O
Description:
T his NSM will provide a contioucus drain for the loop seals on ;ho Pressuriter Safety Valves and replace the valvo intemals with new flex-i-disc internals desioned to seal on steam. Also, new tied expansion jolnts will be installed on the dischargo piping. In addition, new insulation for the piping from the pressurizer nozzle lo each of the safety valves will be installed lho new Insulation is qualified for uso in contairiment and is compatible with the piping material. Ehminating the water in the loop seals required re. analysis of the discharge piping. T he loads on the supports will bo tignificantly reduced because tho water hammer loads will be ehminated 1his will permanently resolve concerns with NUREG-0737, lho drain line will be connected to an existin0 nottle on the pressurizer which is used for determinin0 pressurizer lovel. Tho integration of functions for this noizio have been ovaluated and no degrading effect on the existing safety related instrument will occur T he drain hne is sited to continuously drain the loop seal There are no vams in the line which could be inadvertently closed to interrupt this func on. The drain lino is orthced on both ends (pressurizer and loop scal) which serve to limit flow in the event of a break. All of the piping is Sat / Class 1. which is quahhed as Paactor Coolcnt System pressure boundary por ANSI-N-18.2 definitions.
T here are no now break locations created by the piping re-analysis for the dischargo piping. The added drain knes are Class 1, mostly 0.75 inch, and are exempt frorn consideration from pipo rupture based on smaH size.
This NSM will permanently resolvo concerns with Pressurizer Sa'oly valvo setpoint shift by climinating water in the loop coats. T hese industry concems wero identified through VIL-W 89-23 and IN 80-90 and Supplements 1 and 2, Neither the function of pressure rehef for the reactor coolant system nor the setpoint at which reket occurs is being allected by this NSM. The Code Salety Limit is still 2750 psia and the setpoint is still 4485 4/-
1% psig. The valves and piping ato OA-1, Safnt/ Class 1, ASME til components.
A strap on RTO is being provided with control room indication via the plant computer. 1ho RID is compatible with the stainless steel piping. The R1 D is not sately related, however, but for information only.
The drain line function is not dependent on the RTD. The RTD ls seismically quahfied.
Safoty Review and USQ Evaluation:
The Safety Valvos are accident initiators as addressed in FSAR Chapter 15, section 15.0.1. Modifying the internals to seal on steam w:!I not make them more likely to open at design setpoint or experienco drift of setpoint under any conditions. Thereforo, the probability of accidents previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.
1ho accident mitigation function of Reactor Coolant System pressure relief will not be affect 6d by this NSM. The Technical Specihcation value setpoint is unchanged at 2485 +/- 1% psig. Theretoro, the consequences of accidents previously evaluated in the FSAR are not increasect
t <
L i iliminatin0 the water harnmer loads in the dischargo piping will make that part of the system more rehablo. Also the industry ancerns rolated to setpoint shift of safety valves will be resolved by eliminating the water in the loop seats. All of the added components aro Class 1 and ato consistent with the Reactor Coolant System. The euting instrument nozzio used for pressurizer level has not boon do0tadod by the integration of functions o cluding a drain path to the pressurizer. Thorofore, the probability of a malfunction of oculpment differont than previously cvaluated is not created.
No new pipo rupturo locations are created by this NSM, The Safety VMvos function is unaffected. Somo Class 1 piping is being added to the drain lines consistent with the specification for Class 1 piping and components. T he manual valves that wero notmatly closed to prevent draining of the loop seals ato being removed to ehminato the possibility of proventing draining of the water in the now Seal on steam design.
Thorofore, no now malfunctions are created.
Sinco no now failures are created, the consequences of malfunctions of oquipment previously evaluated in the FSAM are not increased and no now accidents are created.
1 ho margin of safety defined in the basis to the T ochnical Specifications is tolated to the confidence in the fission product bar76ers. The pressurizer safety valves have a safoly limit of 2750 psla to ensure the reactor coolant pressure boundary integrity is not compromised. Since the function of tho safety valvos is unchanged, the margin of safety betwoon the safety limit and the unknown f ailure pressure of the RCS '
is not reduced Thereforo, the mrA! m of safety defined in the basis to the Technical Specifications is not reducod. No Untoviewed Safety Questions are created as a result of this NSM.
MG-12296/0 ,
Description.
This nodification will provido flow instrumentation in the recirculation piping Mr testing the Doric Acid Transfer (OAT) pumps; this instrumentation is added to support in service to. ig.
A pump suction pressure transmitter and a pump dischargo pressure transmitter will be added for each DAT pump. A flow orifice and D/P transmitter will be added in the recirculation piping.
Safety Review and USQ Evaluation:
The Chemical and Volume Control (NV) System is affected by this modification.
T he added flow orifico design parameters are 50 psig,250 F. Class C, stainless stool, cafety related (safety class 3), seismic category ?. OA condition 1. The suction pressure transmitter is Class C,50 psig, safety class 3, seismic category 1, OA condition 1. The discharge pressure transmitter is Class C,150 psig, safety class 3, seismic category 1, OA condition 1.
The 4 shared BAT pumps are normally aligned with two pumps _ por unit. On each unit, one pump is normally ahgned to supply boric acid to the boric acid blondor, while the second serves as a standby.
Manual or automatic initiation of the reactor coolant makeup system starts a pump to provido normal-makeup of boric acid solution through the boric acid blonder. Emergency boration, supplying 4 weight porcent boric acid solution ditoctly to the suction of the charging pumps, can be accomplished by manually starting either pump. The transfer pumps also function to transfor boric acid from the batching tank to the toric acid tanks.
The relevant FSAR Chapter 15 accidents are reactivity addibon accidents and loss of coolant accidents.
The NV system is an accident initiator for a reactivity addition accident and a loss of coolant accident.
The added instrumentation is dosi0ned to the same parameters as the instatlod 2 ping , and has been 3
seismically quahfied. T herefore, the added instrumentation will not inctcase the probability of an accident evaluated in the i SAR.
The NV system is an accident initigation system. Installation of the pressure transmitters will aid the operators in operation of the system; failuto of the indication will not preclude prcpor operation of the system, a - transmitters do not provido any control function. No new failuro modos are introduced.
Thorole 'e ,)robabihty or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increae - t ,ho consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.
No operatmg pararnotors are changed. The function of the NV system will remain the same. No now failuto modos at0 introduced. Thorofore, the possibility of an accident or a malfunction of a di'forent type than any evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.
No fission product barriors are affected. No plant safety limits, limiting safoty sotpoints, or design parameters are affected. Thoroforo, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to the Toohnical Specifications will not be reduced. This modification involves no Untosolved Saloty Questions. ,
MG-22331/00
Description:
T his NSM opgrados the instrumentation for measuring and displaying the Nuctoar Servico Water (RN) flow to the Diocol Generator (KD) heat exchangers, to OA Condition 1. The upgrado will includo the flow clomonts, flow transmitters, and the Main Control Board recolver gaugos, for flow loops RN5220 and RN 2330.
T he upgrado is being done to cortoct a problem discovered during the devolopment of the RN design basis '
document.1ho problem was investigated by PIR 0-M90-0145. KD Heat Exchanger outlet control valves, RN73A and RN147B, are safety-related motor-operated throttle valves. Thoso valves have no automatic controls or travel stops. During a design basis event, they must be manually throttled by the operator to re-establish the proper RN flow to the KD heat exchangers. The NSMs solve the problem that only non-safety flow indication, which may be unavailable or unrollable in some accident scenarios, is provided on the Main control Board for uso in making the required RN lim ' hustment. The NSMs will provido assured post accident indication of the RN flow.
The upgraded instrumentation will be included as part of the Regulatory Guido 1,97 (Post Accident Monitoring -PAM) instrumor,tation.
Safety Review and USO Evaluation:
The RN and KD system are not accident initiators. The upgraded instrumentation is more rollable than the existing instrumentation. The added equipment meets OA Condition 1 requiivments. The installation moots applicable separation critona. A seismic review of the Main Control Board and affected electrical enclosures was porformod. The equipment will bo installed to meet scismic requirements. An Appendix R review was performed, with no concems identified. Thereforo, the probabihty of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to saloty previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.
The RN and KD systems are accident mitigators. The new equipment will provide nocessary plant information to the operators attor a postulated accident. Required tags for operator identification of the PAM instruments will be added. The functions of the RN and KO systems, or the RN.to KD flow instrumentation are not changed by those modifications. The two trains of diesel generators and RN supply remain independent and redundant, no common failuro modes are crcated by those modifications, Thorofore the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the SAR is not increasod.
I
~-- - - r_mr.e._.- .% ,, m ,_r .,_..m. , ,,, . -,,s~.,,,.m . - . . . , _ , , . , , . . - . . _# . ,,. _. .m.
Mue rollable (OA Condition 1) instrumentation will be installed, to replace non-safety instrumentation.
No now failuro modes ate ercated by this instrumentation. No accidents previously thou0ht inctodib10 ato i made crodible by the NSMs. Thus the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different ;
type than ovaluated in the SAR will not be created.
There are no changes of safety limits, sotpoints, or plant parameters because of those modifications. The fission product barriers (RCS pressure boundary, containment, fuel pollets, and cladding) are not degraded. No assumptions made in any accident analysis are affected by the NSMs. Therefore the i margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not decreased. These modifications involvo no unreviewod Safety Questions.
MG-22340/00 l
Description:
Test panels and power-sensing equipment will be installed on the incoming fooders and safety system -l Supply foodors for the following power distribution equipment:
l 7 KV Switchgear (EPO system) :
4 KV Switchgoar (EPC systom)
- 600 V Load Centers (EPE system) 000 V Motor Control Conters (EPE system) 125 VDC Vital Power System (EPL system) 3 The power sensing equipment is nooded to verify analytical models used in nuotar satety-rotated auxiliary power calculations. The power-sonsing equipment itself has no safety-related functions. )
Curront transformers (CTS), potential transformers (Pis), will be installed on the AC power distributio'i equipment, for power sensing. The cts and pts allinterface with voltago, currer.t, and watt transducers which provide signals to ind;cating equipment.
Existing DC shunts, will be used on the 125 VDC Vital Power system for power stnsing. The DC shunts will be wired to added test blocks, where signals will bo obtained for indicating equipment.
Safety Review and USO Evaluation:
The subioct power systems are not accident initiators. The OA Condition 1 portions of the added equipment are seismically qualified. Applicable train separation requirements will bo implemented. An Appendix H review was conducted with no concerns identified. Therefore the probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.
The subject power systems supply power for accident mitigation equipment. The power systems will continue to porform the same power distribution functions. _ For the AC power systems, the added instrument transformers are designed and qualified for interface with safety related power foodors.
Existing DC shunts, that interface with the DC power foodors, will be utilized for DC power sensing. The ability of the power systems to perform their safety functions is not degraded by the power sensing equipment. No common failure modos are created by the modifications. Thorofore the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the SAR is not increased.
The added power sensing equipment functions the same as the existing power sensing equipment utilized for other purposes on the subject power systems. No now failure modes are created. - No accidents previously thought incredible are mado credible by this NSM, Thus the possibility of an accident or .
malfunction of equipment of a different type than evaluated in the FSAR will not be c7eated.
I 4
1 There are no changes of safety limits, setpoints, of plant parameters because of the nodifications. The fission product barriers (RCS pressure boundary, containment, fuel pollets, and cladding) are not degraded. No assumptions mado in any accident analysis ato affected by the NSM. L.sreforo the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any lochnical Specification is not docteased. Those modifications involvo no Unroviewod Safety Questions.
MG-22349/00
Description:
T hose NSMs will electrically isolato cohain Main Control Board rocorders from the Operator Aid Computer (OAC). The modifications are required because of NRC commitments resulting from an NRC Audit of the Regulatory Guido 1.97 (Post Accident Monitoring, or PAM) compliance.
The recorders and their signals are required for PAM cornplianno. The recorders are OA Condition 1. j The OAC has no associated QA Condition. An electrical fault in the OAC could result in a loss of signal to a PAM recorder, therefore the recorders will be isolated from the OAC.
The signal isolation will be accomplished using optical circuit isolator cards to be installed in the Process Control System (PCS) cabinets. No new cabling is required.
Tags required to designato these recorders as PAM to the Control Room operators, will be added when the signal isolation is complotod.
Safety Review and USO Evaluation:
The PAM recorders and signals are not accident initiators. They are not addressod in FSAR Chapter 15 analyses. The circuit isolators improve the reliability of the PAM recorders and signals. The added equipment (circuit isolator cards) is OA Condition 1 (10CFR50, Part 21 dodication is providod), lho installations moet applicablo separation critoria. A scismic review of the Process Control Cabinets is not required, because seismic qualification with the additional weight is bounded by the existing qualification, and operability of the same model circuit isolator cards was included in the qualification. An Appendix R revioW was performed, with no concerns identified. Thorofore the probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.
1ho recorders and signals are not accident mitigators, however, they provido nocessary plant information to the operators after a postulated accident. Required tags for operator identification of the PAM rocorders will be added. The functions of the recorders and signals are not changed by the modifications No common failure modos are created by the modifications. T horofore the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the SAR is not increasod.
The modifications nave no significant effect on any SSCs evaluated in the FSAR or addressed in the Technical Specifications. No now failuro modos are created. An existing failure mode (electrical fault propagation from the plant computer to the PAM rocorders) has boon otiminated. No accidents previously thought incredible are made crodible by those NSMs. Thus the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than ovaluated in the FSAR will not be croated.
Thero are no changes of safety limits, setpoints, or plant parameterr because of thoso modifications, The fission product barriors (RCS pressure boundary, containment, tuoi pollots, and cladding) are not degraded. No assumptions mado m any accident analysis are affected by those NSMs. Therefore the-margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Spocification is not decreasod. These modifications involve no Unroviewed Safety Questions.
MG-22349/01
Description:
NSMs MG-12349/00 and MG-22349/00 will electrically isolato certain Main Control Board recorders from the Operator Aid Ccmputer (OAC). The modihcations are required because of NRC commitmonts resulting from an NRC Audit of the Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Post Accident Monitoring, or PAM compliance).
Ihe rocorders and iheir signals aro requirod 1or PAM complianco. The rocordors ato OA Condition 1.
The OAC has no associated QA Condition, An electrical fault in the OAC could result in a loss of signal to a PAM recorder, therefore the recorders will bo isolated from the OAC.
The signal isolation will be accornphshed using optical cist isolator cards to bo installed in the Process Cor, trol System (PCS) cabinets. No new cabling is required.
Tags required to designato thoso recorders as PAM to the Control Room operators, will be added when the signal isolation is completod.
NSMs MG-12349/01 and MG-22349/01 will substitute PCS-installed opticalisolators for opticalisolators installed outsido the PCS The PCS isolator cards are orpocted to enhanco instrument loop main onanco and rollabihty.
- Safety Review and USO Evaluation:
The PAM recorders, signals, and instrument loops are not accident initiators. They ato not addressed in the FSAR Chaptor 15 analysos. The circuit isolators improve the rollability of the PAM rocorders, signals, and instrument loops, lho added equipment (circuit isolator cards) is OA Condition 1 (10Cf R50, Part 21 dedication is providod). 1ho installations meet applicable separation critoria. A seismic review of the Process Control Cabinets is not required, because solsmic qualification with the additional weight is bounded by the existing qualification, and oporability of the same model circuit isolator cards was included in the qualification. An Appendix R review was performed, with no concerns identif od. Thorofore the probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previousir ' valuated in the ,
FSAR is not increased.
The recorders, signals, and instrument loops ato not accident mitigators, however, they provido necessary ,
_ plant information to the operators aller a postulated accident. Required tags for operator identification of the PAM recorders will be added. The functions of the recorders, signals, and instrument loops are not changed by the modifications. No common failure modes aro crcated by the modifications. Thoroloro the consequmicos of an accident or malfunction of equipmont important to safety evaluated in the SAR is not increased.
The modifications have no significant offect on any SSCs evaluated in the FSAR or addressed in the Technical Specifications. No now failuto modos are created. An existing failuro mode (electrical fault propagation from the plant computer to the PAM rocorders) has boon ohminated. No accidents previously thought incrothble are mado crediblo by thoso NSMs. Thus the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than ovaluated in the SAR will not be created. ;
-i
-There are not changes of safety limits, setpoints, or plant paramotors because of theso modifications. Tho fission product barriors (RCS pressure boundary, containment, fuet pollots, and cladding) are not a degraded. No assumptions mado in any accident analysis are alfocted by the NSMS. Thorofore the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not decreasod. Those modifications involvo no Unreviewod Sately Questions, ,
MG-22373/00 Each train of Containment Air Return fans and associated dampers and Containment Spray (NS) Pumps and dischar00 valves receive a permissivo start from a separato CPCS pressure transmitter (8 CPCS'
4 l
transmitters total). After an Sp signal, the equipment will stop when its individual pressure transmitter i indicates that containment pressure is less than 0 35 psig. !
The deadband of the bistable associated with the Containment Pressure Control System (CPCS) is so small that under certain accident conditions excessivu cychng of equipment r7ay occur. This problem was l identified by Plh 0-M91 -0032 and cornpensatory measures were established for the VX system to alleviato this concern had this system been challenged Calculation MCC-1552.08-00-0141 concluded the NS system safety function would have been fulhlled by the tirne the cycling phenomena occurred and no componsatory measures were required, This NSM will change the control circultry of tho subject equipment to eliminate the need for compensatory measures for the Contalnment Air Return stJbsystem :
of the VX system. As a matter of good engineerin0 judgoment, changos will also be made to the NS control circuitry to prevent the cycling possibikty, even though the cately function is not in question. ,
Definitions. Re-start control setpoint - 0 80 psig CPCS Permissive / termination = 0.35 psig Note t' The 0.80 psig ro-start control setpoint is not a permissive fiko the 0.35 psig value in that the compononis may be manually started below this valve as long as the CPCS permissivo is satisfied (prossure > 0 35 psig).
1 Note 2: An Sp signalwill govern the initial start of the pumps and fans and inillaf opening of the Air Retum dampers
- 1) The NS pumps will be interlocked with their respecuv1 dischargo valves (2 per train) to prevent dead heading the pumps. Opening oither valve will allow pump start and closing both valvos will trip the NS pump A separate ro ttart contrei st tpoint and CPCS perrnissivoltermination aro incorporated to introduce a control dead-bank of 0 45 psid in the pump controts. The discharge valves cannot bo opened unless the CPCS start permissivo is satisfied upon initial pressure increase. They wi!! close and re-open on subsequent pressuro increases at the CPCS permissive / termination value o10.35 psl0-
- 2) The Containment Air Return fan dischar00 dampers will open when the CPCS permissivo is satisfied and other start conditions met and remain open T he redundant CPCS permissive provided by the damper will bo incorporated into the fan controls. A seal-in teaturo will be added to assure full travel.
- 3) The Containment Air Return fan corittols incorporato a to-start control setpoint and CPCS permissive l termination to provido a control doad-band of 0.45 psid. The redundant CPCS l permissive! termination from the damper controls is incorporated. This providos redundant trip functions in redundant motor starters for each fan.
i lhe design basis of Containment Air Return part of the VX system is to return air from the upper ompartment to the lower compartment aller the initial high energy lino break blowdown, to enhance ico condonsor performanco. This system is also assumed to provido uniform mixing of the post-accident containment environment as part of the "Supplomontal Hydrogen Control /Hydrogon Mitigation System" analysis (FSAR 6.2.7). These fans are actuated 0+/- 1 min, following an Sp signal with CPCS permissivo present. The dampers aro opened 10 sec. following an Sp signal with < 0.5 psid (lower positivio to upper) i containment pressure differential.
LThe design basis of the NS system is to spray cool water into the centainment atmosphere following receipt of an Sp signal with CPCS permissive present. The cool water drop!ets remove heat from the containment atmosphere by absorbing heat until the temperature of the NS fluid is raised to thermal equihbrium conditions reachmg saturation (phase change to steam) within a few icot of the nozzies. Tho -
steam condenses; flows to the sump, and hot water is removed from the sump and cooled by the NS heat exchangers before being sont back to the NS spray nozzles.
1 I~ . , . - - . .. .~ . ~;..,w_-.. , .,
. - _._-..- ~ .~- - - - - - - - - . - _ - - - - - - - . . - -
FSAR t,0ction 6.5.4 states the CPCS system is designed to prevent underprossuritation of the containment structuro. Under normal operating conditions, the interlock provents inadvertent actuation by requiring
- the prosence of a containmont pressero signal of at least 0.35 psig prior to actuation. Under accident conditions, the Air Retum fans and NS pumps continue operating until they ato shut off manually or automatically terminated when the CPCS setpoint is reached as pressure docays. This NSM preservos the CPCS permissivollermination functions for the fans and pumps. FSAR section 7.6.16 states that no singlo f ailuro can prevent proper NS pump or Air Rotum f an initiation nor can it allow oporation when not required (below 0.35 psig). This NSM preserves this statomont.
The removal of the CPCS permissive /torminating interlock from the Air Return damper circuit does not introduce any now failure modos. This featuro provided indirect fan protection earlier as the damper was interlocked with the fan (og damper closuro actuated by CPCS would terminato f an oporation 11 the CPCS interlock in the f an circuit f ailurc). Now, redundant protection is provided in the fan circuit in series such that:
- 1) Failuto of either contact to close (pormitting operation) does not result in more than one failure to run,
- 2) Failure of either contact to open (terminating operation) does not focult in either fan continuing to operato. ;
The single failuto design is preserved as it is acceptable for one fan to fail to start il required, since they ato 100% capability each. However, it is unacceptable for oither Ian to continuo to run il requlrod to stop, becauso containment pressure may be reduced to unacceptably low levels. Also, sinco all Technical Specification surveillanco requirements can still be performed (Toch. Spoc. 4.6.5.G.1,4.0.5.02 and tablo .
3.3-4), no lochnical Specification changes are requirod. Several FSAR sections in chapters 0 and 7 and table 7-15 and figuro 7-19 will be revised as a result of this NSM.
Safety Review and USQ Evaluation:
The Containment Air Return (CAR) fans and dampors and NS pumps and valves-are not accident 1 initiators.1herofor0, the probability of accidents previously evaluated in the FSAR aro not increasod. The Air Return equipment is used to mitigato accidents via containment pressuro control by enhancing the ice condensor porformanco following an actuation signal that satisfies the start logic discussed earlier for tho ,
fans and dampers. The NS components are used as accident mitigation equipment to directly remove i heat from the containment atmosphoro following an Sp signal with CPCS permissivo present. This NSM ;
will ensulo the functions are still accomp,1ched consistent with the design bases of those s, : toms.
Thoroforo,'the consequences Jf accidents previously evaluated in the FSAR are not increased. The operation of the system will be changed as a result of the corditions. The air return dampers will not --
closo, once started, and the pressuro at which the fans restart will now be 0.80 psig instead of 0.35 psig:
Also, the NS pumps will restart at 0.00 psig (instead of 0.35 psig) and the pumps and valves will bo ,
interlocked as described above, eliminating the dead-heading possibility. No now failure modos are; introduced by this system operation configuration as rodundant protection has boon provided consistent '
with the original design. Existing potential failures related to the cycling phenomena of the NS pumps, ,
valves, air return fans and dampors will bo otiminated and compensatory actions now in offect can be-removod. Therefore, the probability of malfunctions of equipment important to safety previously evaluated is not increased and no now malfunctions are created. Since the design basis will bo maintained in this conhguration, the consequences of malfunctions of equipment important to safety will not be increased.
- No accidents previously thought incredible aro mado credible since the assumption for mixing by the Air Return fans is preserved and no detonation or deflagration of hydrogen will occur.
Sinco containment and other SSCs located within will not soo any adverso offects with respect to Ice Condenser, Containment Spray and Hydrogen Mitigation performanco, no fission product barriors are -
degraded. Tho 0.80 psig ie-start control point is not considered a permissive. Theroforo, no safety limits, setooints, or limiting safety sottings have been affected. Thus, the margin of safety defined in the basis. ,
t w, ,,_.- _ , . , _ . .u.- .-,_.,--_-_--m ,--
to the Tochnical Specifications is not ioduced. No Unroviewed Safety Questions cro cicated by this NSM.
MG-22380/00
Description:
T he six Unit 2 525 kV bustine motor operated disconnect (MOD) switches are to be replaced with now, moro reliable switches. T he switches curtonUy installed ato obsoleto, and roplacement parts ato not longer produced by the rnanuf actorer. Also, in January,1991 two of the three switch polos on busline 2D lalled, resulting in the uso of temporary cablo jumpers. This replacement will increase the reliability of the switches, and provide sparo parts to back up other switches at McGuire.
The replacement switches will not use the same rnotion to perform switching functions. The currently installed Allis-Chalmers VorticalIsolating Pantograph switch uses a scissof typo motion when connecting and disconnecting from the bus, while the Momco Typo VR-1 Vortical Roach switch to be instauod uses ~
an arni-liko reaching motion. The now arrangement will be wolded onto the existing buswork.
1ho Unit 2 buslino MOD switches are in the closo position during normal operation. Those switches make it possible to isolate the buslines without operating the disconnect switches for the Power Circuit Breakers (PCBs). The PCBs operate to clear 1 system f ault, whereas the buslino MOD switches do not serve this protectivo function.
Saloty Review and USO Evaluation:
1 he buslino switch Ioplacements will affect the OfIsite Power System, which is descnood in FSAR Section .
8.2.1.1ho SSCs ditoctly affocted 6nclude the Unit 2 buslino MOD switches and the structuros supporting them, which will nood to be modified to accomodate the now switches The existing motor operators, por vendor information, will be capable of driving the now switches. No control circuitry changes will be requirod.
The buslino MOD switches do not perform any safety functions as described in the FSAR. Events which could occur as a result of the buslines MOD switches f ailing open include the Loss of External Load (FSAR Section 15 2.2), Turbino Trip (FSAR Section 15.2.3), and the Loss of Non-Emergency AC Power to Station Auxillarios (f SAR Section 15.2.6). If the bustino MOD switches were to fait closed, the busline could still ~
be isolated by operation of the MOD switches associated with the PCSs.
The buslines and MOD switches are not safety-related. They are located in the switchyard, where seismic requirements are not applicablo. Thoto are no Appendix R concerns.
As a result of this modification:
- 1) May the probability of an accident previously described in the FSAR bo increased?
No. The Loss of External Load, Turbino Trip, and Loss of Non-Emergency AC Power to Station Auxiliarios events described in the FSAR would not be more probable, because the new MOD switches will bo inora reliable.
- 2) May the consequences of an accident previously described in the FSAR be increasod?
No. This modification will not adversely affect the operating characteristics of the buslino MOD switchns. The operation of those switches is not taken credit for in the FSAR ovants described above,
- 3) May the posdbility of an accident which is different than any altcady described in the FSAR be created?
r r
No. The ; allure of buslino MOD switches is not rpocifically addressed in the FSAR, However, !
failure of these switches could result in a loss of offsite power (LOOP), which would result in a Turbino Trip and Loss of Non-Emergency AC Power to Station Auxillaries. No now failure modes will be created by this modification. The failure of these switches would not result in any failuto modes not described in the FSAR. ,
- 4) May the probabihty of a rnattunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR f be inctcased?
No. Although these switches are not safety-relatod, they are important to safety (ITS) because their failure could result in a transient (LOOP). The probability of their failure will not increase, ,
because the new switches will be more reliable. The PCl3s and generator breakers are designed to operato to clear busline or switchyard faults.
- 5) May the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evalu1ted in the ;
FSAR bo incteased?
No. Assuming that the busline MOD switches f ail, the consequences of the resulting LOOP will not be increased. The event will be mitigated the same as before, with emergency power being supplied by an oporablo diesel generator. This modification will improve the roliabihty of offsite power.
- 6) May the poss.Mity of a malfunction of equipment important to safety different than already evaluated in the FSAR be created?
No No new failures modes will be created by this modification. The new busline MOD switches will be more reliable than those currently installed.
- 7) Will the rnargin of safety as dehned in the bases to any technical specification be reduced?
No. This modification willincrease the reliability of offsito power. The availability of AC power via an operable diesel generator will not be degraded, therefore, the margin of safety will not be reduced.
No Unreviewod Safety Questions oxist as a result of this modification.
MG-22400/00
Description:
This NSM installs an Annulus Door Monitoring System to monitor the open and closed status of the Annulus doors. This NSM is intended to preclude future occurrences of Annulus Doors being left open which impact operability of th6 Annulus Ventilation (VET) System. Limit switches will be installed in the door frames and provido indication after the door has been unlatched for a pre-set timo.
The SSCs of concern are the Annulus Doors and their potential impact on the VET system. The VET system is an Engineered Safety Featura. VET is nuclear safety related and mitigates the consequences of accidents. The saloty functions of the VET system are as follows:
- 1) produce and maintain a negative pressure in the annutus following a LOCA 2; minimize the r9l case of annulus air relative to the volume of air discharged for pressure maintenance >
- 3) provide long term fission product removal capability by decay and filtration
e - _ - - - - - - - . _ _ _ _ _
The details of this NSM will not affect the capability of VET to perform any of its design basis functions.
1he Door Monitoring function should improve the continuous availabil!!y of a leak tight prossure boundary (annulus) on which to draw and maintain a vacuum Also this NSM will make it easier to comply with the relevant Technical Spocifications.
An Appendix R ovaluation has been performed with no concerns identified. New cables will bo pulled.
No control changes will be made. An annunciator in the control will indicate that a door has boon open for a pre-set timo but will not indicato the particular door. A cabinet will bo insta!!od in the MG set Room which identif od the door which has boon opened. This cabinet is seismically qualified,0-4 mounted.
Safety Review and USQ Evaluation:
The VET syclem is an accident mitigation system, not an accident initiator. No now accidents previously thought incredible ato mado credible by this NSM. No now Ialluros ate created. T herefore, the probabihty of accidents evaluated in the FSAR is not increased and no now accidents are created.
No control changes are being made to the VET system. No now failures are created. This NSM makes 11 casler to maintain the presburo boundary aspects of the annulus satisfying the assumptions on which the VET system was designed and which the Technical Specifications are basod. No bypass leak paths ero crea;od that would allow any untillered air to escape the annulus. The VET filters and flowrates are unaffocied by this NSMc The VET system functions will not be affected and the post accident performance will be unchanged. Thorotore, the consequences of accidents and malfunctions of equipmont important to safety are not increased.
An Appendix R evaluation has boon performed with no concorns identified. The now cabinet in the MG Set Room is seismically mounted to proctudo any adverso interactions with other SSCs shou!d an '
earthquake occur. The limit switches added to the doors will not create any additional leak paths. All applicable design cnteria have been preserved. -Therefore, the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased. Also, sinco no now f ailures have boon created, the possibility ;
of a malfunction of a different type has not been created.
The VET system contnbutes to the " Defense in Depth" concept by collecting and filtering any actual and assurried leakago that makes its way out of primary containment (stoet shell) and into the annulus (secondary containment). Serving such a function VET's performanco can directly affect offsito dose calculations and this qualities VET as a fission product barrier, as part of tho " Containment System", and makus it relevant to margin of safety. Aa stated earlier, there are no changes to any flowrates or filter performance of the VET system. Sinco lhls NSM will not affect the function of the VET system or degrade -
its post-accident performanco, there can be no impact to margin of safety as margin or safety relatos to the confidence in the fission product barriors. No assumptions made in any accident analysis have been affected. There are no changes to any safety limits, setpoints, or limiting safety settings -Therefore, the ,
margin of safety as defined in the basis to the Technical Specifications is not reduced. No Unteviewod Safety Questions are created by this NSM.
MG-52125/0
Description:
An oli reclaim line is being added to both YC Control Area Chillors, CRA-C-1 and CRA-C-2. The oil reclaim line is a 3/8 inch copper tubo connecting the evaporator and the compressor just upstream of the first slago impeller. The line will have isolation valves and a sight glass for visual inspection. Once installed, the oil reclaim line will allow oil to return to the compressor from the evaporator even during low cool;ng load operation.
Safety Review and USQ Evaluation:
The Control Area Ventilation (VC) and Chi!!or Water (YC) Systems are designed to maintain the environment in the Control Room, Control Room Area and Switchgcar Room within acceptablo limits for the operation of unit controls and for uninterrupted safoty occupancy of the control room during post-accidoni shutdown. The YC System is designed as pan of the Engineered Safety Featuro System and the failure of any component does not result is loss of function due to sedundancy of components. The system is seismically qualified and all ossential electrical components are connocted to omorgency standby power.
The YC System is an accident mitigating system. These compononts are not descnbod in the FSAR as an initiator for any design basis accidents. T horofore, the probability of any accidents previously evaluated in the FSAR will not bo increased.
The modification only involves connecting copper tubing betwoon tho evaporator and condenser of the chlilors. Thoto will be no impact on containment leakage or fuel cladding integrity. Thorofore, the consequences of any accidents previously ovaluated in the FSAR will not bo increannd.
This modification only involves the ovaporator and condensor iri the chillors of the YC System. Thoro are no now failuto modos that could possibly crocto any now type of accidents not previously ovaluated in the FSAR.
The probability of malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not bo increased. T he installation of the coppor tubing has been seismically reviewed and the tubing has boon -
reviewed for piping interactions. The oil roclaim system is a manual systom; thereforo, thoro are not Appendir R or environmental qualification concoms. Engincorod safety features control logic has not changed.
The YC System will continue to be qualified and redundant. The (nodtfication has boon judged to decrease the cooling capacity of the chillors loss than 1%, but has no impact on the chillors' design basis requirements of maintaining proper temperaturo controlin tho Control Area. Thoroforo, tho consoquences of any mallunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased.
Thoro are no now Ialluro modos, since there aro no now siosmic, Appendix R, environmental qualirication or piping interaction concerns, Thereforo, no now type of malfuncation of equipment important to safety will be created.
This modification does not adversely affect any safoty/ design parameters; therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the bases of the Technical Specification are not reduced. There are no Unreviewod Safety Questions.
MG-52176/00 l
Description:
The 125 VDC Vital instrumentation and Control Power System battery banks will be replaced with now-batteries and battery racks. The existing batteries are being replaced because they are nearing the end of thott useful life The battery racks will be replaced because of dotorioration and corrosion.
Required battr.ry ratings and equipment capacities wero verified. The instantaneous sottings on incoming and tio circuit breakers wili requito chango. Existing conductors are appropriately sized, thorofore, will not requiro roplacortant. The roplecoment battorios are purchased to moet GA Condition 1 requirements with 10CFR50, Part 21 dodication provided by AT&T.
Replacement of each battery bank w:1 requiro 3 weeks, and implomontation will occur during normal plant sb , - - c -, . . , b .._-.,_ - , . . -.._,....,_,_m., .,_A,., ,. ,._m... .- ,.
operations. During the 3-week duration for each battery bank replacement, a temporary battery will be installed and connected as a backup for the battery being replaced. Initially, one of the new battery banks i will be used as the backup battery. Atter the first battery bank is replaced, the replaced battery will be '
used as the backup battery. The temporary battery bank will be installed in the Shared Equipment Room of the Servico Building. Temporary cabling will be routed from the temporary battery bank to the Standby Battery Charger electrical bus, locakd in the Battery room. The Standby Battery Charger and temporary battery bank will be connected in place of the battery bank being replaced and its associated battery chargor. ;
Following each 3-week changout period, the 125 VDC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System will be returned to the normal configuration.
1 Safety Review and USQ Evaluation:
- QaltWyllep!0compat ;
The 125 VDC Vitat instrumentaion and Control Power System is not an accident initiator, however, it serves as an accident mitigation system. The replacement batteries are purchased to meet GA Condition 1 requirements with 10CFR50, Part 21 dedication provided. The new batteries and racks will be }
seismically mounted Thero is no chango in cabling required for the new batteries. An Appendix R review was performed with no concems identified. There is change in the physical and electrical separation provisions for the batteries. The performance of plant safety functions will not be degraded by the now batteries Therefore, thero is no signihcant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
T here are no new or common f ailuro modes created by the new batteries. The new batteries perform the same function as the existing battereis. The eCsting batteries are nearing the end of their useful life, therefore, now batteries are expected to be more reliable than the existing batteries. The possibility of a new or different kind of accident is not created by the baery changoout.
A Tochincal Specification change is involved with the modifications to add a table with the new battery '
specifications. T he Diesel Generator Sequencers are poworod by batteries EVCA and EVCD. The Diesel Generator Sequencers have the potential to impact the performance of all safety-related equipment that relios on AC power to function (ECCS pumps, valves, etc.) Ultimately,3 of the 4 fission product barriers -
fuel, claddmg and containment - rely on the proper functioning of those components tv preserve their integrity (The RCS pressuto boundary is not included, as it is passively protected by the code safety valvos, which have a safety limit setpoint of 2735 psig, per Technical Specifications). The new batteries t
are as capable of performing their accident mitigation function as the old batteries, and are fully qualified.
Thus the battery changoout does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
IfLmpqmryjattetyjgsta!! align implementation of each battery replacement will require a 3-week duration of time. During the replacemont period a safety-grade battery bank will be connected to substituto for the battery bank being replaced. The temporary battery will be installed in the Shared Equipment Room of the Servico Building, because space is unavailable for locating the temporary battery in the Battery Room. The Service Building is not a Seismic Category 1 structure, therefore, the temporary battery mounting will not be seismically qualified The 125 VDC Vital Instrumentation and Con *ol System will be restored to the fully qualifiod .
configuration following each 3-week battery replacement period. This condition has been discussed in a telocon with NRC statt personnel. Due to the relatively short Smeframo for battery replacement, ,
ev0luation of the temporary batiq stallation will exclude seismic considerations. !
The 125 VDC Vital Power Sy 1.em is not an accident initiator. However,it is an accident mitigation system.
i During each battery replacement, the other 3 batteries and associated distribution equipment will remain :
h
i
. in their normal conhguration. The pmformance of their safety functions will not be degraded.
< 1he ability to cross-tio the cloctrical buses for the 125 VDC Vital Batteries, by rnanual action, tornains ,
available as a backup option 10 the event that the lomporary battery is rendered unavaliable during the replacement periods. However, it should be noted that cross-tyin0 the batteries af ter an accident, should the need ariso due to failure of the tarnpolary battay, is outsido the bounds of the curront accident ,
analys3s, unless it can bo done within 11 seconds (the required timo for the diesel generators to start and - '
loads to be sequenced on). The ability to porform this manual action is stated in McGuiro Nuclear Station FSAR, Section 8.3 2.1 A3. FSAR Section 8.3 2.1.4.2 states that each battery is sized to carry tho-continuous amorgency loads and anticipated momentary loads of its own vital busos, and assume the loads of another battery in a backup capacity for the required one hour period. Technical Specification 3.8.2.1 discusses the limitations for this configuration during normal operation. This cross-tio function can be performed without lying opposito trains to the same bus.11 tho cross-tio was made prior to commencing battery r,,han000ut (with the 1 ochnical Specihcation operationallimit extended for the duration of the changoout), all loads would be supplied by fully qualified battorios, and the configuration would . ,
albw the 11 second diosol generator start-up and sequencing l'mo hmit to bo mot.
The ambient temperature of the Shared Equipment Room will be periodically monitored by McGuiro -
Operations personnel, to ensure the ambient temperature remains within battery specifications. The ventilation in the Shared Equipment Room is sufhcient to provent accumulation of excess hydrogon. ,
Thorotore, with exclusion of seismic considerations, ) temporary battery installation does not involyn a -
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
T he temporary backup battery will be a now battery for the first replacement modification, and for each subsequent modification will be a replaced battery. In olther caso, the temporary battery and rack will be the samo quahfied eqit Tient as normally used There are no now fallare modos created for the batteries and associated distribution equipment not involved in the particular changoout modification. ' With tho i temporat> Jattory connectod, thero ato no now Ialluto modos for the distribution equipment associalod with .
the battery installation (no scismic mounting, is considorud insignificanf), due to the short duration for which the temporary configuration will be used. Thorofore, the possibility of a now or different kind of accident from any accident provously evaluated is not created.
4 T horo is a 1 ochnical Specification change associated with the temporary battery installation, to include the specihcations of the now battery that willinitially be used as the backup battery. As stated, the potential to impact fission prodot barriers exists, but excluding seismic consideration, no fission product barrior will be do0redod, Thus, there is no significant reduchon in the margin of safety.
FSAR and Technical Specification rovisions aro required to include the specihcations for the new battories.
Since the modifications involvo Technical Specification changes, the tJnroviewed Safety Question critoria of 10CFR50 59 are not applicable to this ovaluation Instead tho Technical Specification changos must be approvod por 10CFR50.91 and 10CFR50.92 before the modifications are implemented.
l l-
Duko power Company McGuiro Nuclear Station
'iummary of Procedure Changes Under 10CFR50.59 i
TN/2/A/2200/00/AMI Chango O to O
'i This procedure provides guidelines for the replacement of Air Oper? tors on insido containment isolation valves 2RN253A and 2RN270A with a new electric motor operator model.
Safety Evaluation: ,
i This modification involves the replacement of operators on containment Isolation valves 2RN253A and 2RN276A. The existing valves have air operators and fail closed on loss of power. The now operators ,
are electrical motor operated and f all as-is on loss of power. .
Valve oporator replacement will be performed in pipo chaso during Modos 5,6, or No Mode oporation of U2EOC7. Containment closure requirements of Station Directivo 3.1.42 will be followed as required in
- Modos 5 or 6.
The FSAR and Technical Specifications will not be affected in any significant mannor duo to the implomontation of this controlling procedure. The probability and consequences of accidents and/or equipment malfunctions previously or not previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased, sinco containment closure requirements of Station Directive 3.1.42 will be followed as required in Modco 5 or -
- 6. Sinco containment closure requirements will be mot, the margin of safety as defined in the Bases to Technical Specifications will not be reduced. No USO exists. t TT/2/A/9100/397 Chango 01 The purpose of this proceduto is to functionally verify that all changes to the NS and VX System control logic implomonted under NSM-22373 are functioning as designed.
r Safety Evaluation:
As part of it.is test, the Coritainment Pr6sure Transmitter loops are tested to ensure that upon a loss of ,
electrical power, the loops will f ail-safe. That is the loops will not inillate an inadvertent spray down of containment.
This proceduro chango corrects several errors found in Section 12.9 and 12,10 of the test. These errors were discovered while preparing to perform these sections. Correction of these errors ermuros that the response of those loops in a loss of power condition is correctly verified.
Neithot uo possibility, probability, or consequences of an accident previously or not previously evaluated .
In the FSAR will be increased by this proceduro change. The margin of safety as defined in the bases of Technical Specificat%1s will not be reduced as a result of this proceduro change, No USO exists, TN/2!A/2304/00/AM1 Change O to O
( This proceduto provides guidelines for the replacement / reorientation of Main Steam Safety Valves 2SV8, 2SV9,2SV11 and 2SV12.
Safety Evaluation:
t.
l' -i
. __ ., .. - -_ . . - , , _ , . , . . . - . . .. _, . __._,-,_....x.
- , .-m... -- . . - . ~ ,. ,.
~ _. _ _ ___ _ __ .._ _ ._
NSM MG-223N will replaco existing Main Steam ASME Codo Safety Valves on the 'C' Steam Generator with now flanged valves. The existing valves are butt welded on the intet side, which toquires that the '
valves be cut out for maintenance. The modification will also totato each valve 15 dogtoos to the vortical position to provent excessive seat leakage. This sufoty evaluation will addross safety concerns associalod with the implomontation of NSM MG-22304 and tpocifically with activities included in implomontation procoauro 1N/2/A/2304/00/AM1, Tvchnical Specification 3.7,1.1 requires the Main Steam Safety Valvos to be operable in Modos 1,2, and 3.1ho implomontation proceduro requires that all work that ronders the valves inoperable be porformod in Mode 5 or below; theroloro, valvo oporability will not be a concern during the imptomontation process. l 1he valvos will be installed and functionally verified prior to entering Mode 3 at the cornpletion of tho :
refueling outag r.
Much of the imptomontation process wi!! occur while the NC system is grained to the mid-loop level and with the ND system providing residual heat removal to the core, in the event of a loss of both trains of ,
ND with the unit in this configuration, the station is conimitted to being capable of achloving containment integrity within two hours. During mid-loop operation, the implomontation proceduro toquires that CMD Craft have the ability to seal each Main Steam Safety Valvo nozzio within two hours whenover the Operations Containment Closure Coordinator assigns closure responsibility to the modification, in those situations the procedure also prohibits CMD Craft from leaving the nozzios unattended at any timo.
Moving the valves in ar,d out of the doghouse will requito CMD Craft to remove sucurity bars for access.
1N/2/A/2304/00/AM1 requires the Craft to notify Security prior to removing the bars to ensure that all security requitoments ato mot and maintained while the bars ate tomovod. Also, temoving the dischargo piping from any of the valvos results in an open path to the doghouse root. Thoroforo, the proceduto toquires CMD to wold security plates on the vont stacks, and Security to inspect those platos prior to dismantling any of the dischargo piping.
Implomontation proceduto TN/2/A/2304/00/AMt provides adoquate controts to ensure that no nuclear safety related structure, system, or component will be degraded in modos in which they are required to be operable. The probability and consequences of accidents and/or equipment malfunctions previously .
l or not previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased by implomontation of NSM-2i304. Also, implomontation of the mod does not affect procedutos described in the FSAR or tests or experiments not addressed in the FSAR. No USO exists.
IP/0/0/3006/09 Chango O to 19 ,
The purpose of this procedure is to establish a method for calibration of Radiation Monitoring System channels containin0 RP-30A roadout modules. Analog Channel Operational Test and functional Verification requirements are also mot by this procedure.
Safety Evaluation:
There were several changes to this procedure that were significant, but have no detrimental offect on the overall safety of the plant. Thoso changes are as follows:
1). Moved references for soveral EMFs to the Selected Licensoo Commitment manual, Section 16.11 as a result of moving the Radioactivo Eftluont Monitoring section of Technical Specifications to the SLC.
References to this control action have boon doloted in this procedure, The actual modification has boon previously reviewed by Design Engineerin0 (covered in Operability Evaluation for PIR 0-M91-0033), Sections 7.6.10.1.2 and 6 4.2 of FSAR presently include retoroncos to the automatic y -
- w y' wr.w , , , . . . . -,.m..,.w, ,.,',_ ._ , ,.e.,,% E , .. _, ,,.,,-w,., ,. , .,,, ..m_4,..g.,.n._. , ,. 1, _ , .q. . y . .,.m.,c., e r .,
control action provided by these channels.
- 3) Control action has been addod to 2 emf 59 by NSM 2 u.01 Added toferencolo this in proceduro.
(Rolorenco drawing MCEE 231-05.01, MCEE 231-05.02).
- 4) AURWSU-1 is no longer controlled by the EMF 35 Deleted this reference from the proceduto (Reference drawing MC-1577-1).
- 5) In stop 10.7,34, added equipment number in parenthesis (OMVAXf0049) for clarification. Also added location of control panel for clarthcation.
f None of the above changes to IP/0/0/3006/09 a!!oct the Tochnlcal Specifications or FS AR in a significant mannot that was not addressed when the actual modification was made. Other " human factors" changos were made to the procedure, but hava no offect on th6 Technical Spocifications/FSAR or the overall safety ,
of the plant. No USO exists.
1 OP/2/A!6100/02 Change O to 49 The purpose of this proceduto is to outlino the stops nocessary to take the plant . rom an operation [
condition (15% Power) to a shutdown condition. This proceduto may be used for shutting down from ,
conditions other than the above, but stops must be verified and si0 nod off to prevent possible omission.
Safety Evaluation:
The now enclosuto for Rod Control System Evaluation providos for starting Rod Drivo M/G sets, closing '
Reactor Trip Breakers, and withdrawing a single Hod Bank at a time for Rod Control System testing. This has becomo nocessary due to possible undetected Rod Control System problems as indicated by at least one Reactor Trip where a specific causo could not be dolormined but whore the Rod Control System was suspect. The Rod Withdrawals allowed by this onclosure are strictly controlled and include verification '
by the Reactor Unit of maintenance of adequate Shutdown Margin to criticality. The testing allowod is similar to the RCCA Movement Test procedure PT/2/A/4600/01 and includes all of its applicable pro-checks. This enclosure is por'ormed only while NC System temperaturo is stable, which providos control over moro than one positivo reactivity addition to the core at a time. Performance of this onclosure will enhance future nuclear safety in that the Rod Control System can be mado more rollable with likely ,
avoidance of fcture Reactor Trips caused by malfunction of this system. The probability of previously analyzod accidents is not increased by this onclosure and now accidents not previously analyzed are nol ;
created. The changes are editorial in nature (other than the now enclosure) and do not involvo an USO or InhNso the risk of radiation release.
TT/1/A/9100/397 Change O to 0 The purpose of this proceduro is to:
1)- Verify proper operation of the Containment Spray System (NS) Pumps and Outside Containment lsolation Valves following the implementation of the pump-valve interlock portion of NSM-MG 2373 Revision 0.
- 2) Vorify prvpor operation of the Containment Pressure Control System (CPCS) Interlocks with regards to the starting and stopping of the Containment Spray System (NS) Pumps following the Implementation of NSM-MG-1-2373 Revision 0.
- 3) Verify proper operation of the Containment Pressure Control System (CPCS) interlocks with rogards to the starting and stopping of the Containment Air Return Fans (VX) and Fan Discharge .
- Dampers operation following the implementation of NSM-MG-1-2372 Revision O.
Safety Evaluation:
Conservativo provisions have been placed within this lost proceduro to provent NS spray of containment l i
(during testing of NS pump circuitry changos) and to provent potentialico condonsor door opening (lower doors) due to VX operation in nortnal lineup. All testing is conducted in discrete parts to minimlzo confusion and picyont unexpected occurrences. No USO exists.
P!/1/A/4450!00A Change O to 20 1ho purposo of this procedure is to verify that the VX lans and dampers operato as designed and rnoot '
, Technical Specihcation surveillanco requiromonts, Safety Evaluation:
The purpose of this proceduto is to satisfy requirements mandated in Technical Specifications.
Performance of this proceduto does not place the VX System in any unanalyrod condition which would degrado nuclear safety. System component checkouts are performed using existing VX tost circuitry.
l TN/t/Al2373/00!AE1 Chango O to 0 The purpose of this proceduto is to provido instruction for implomonting NSM MG-i-2373: Reviso Containtnent Pressure Control System to limit potential for VX and NS cornponent cyclin 0 1 Safety Evaluation: ;
1 nit /A/2373/00/AEt providos guidance and direction for the cloctrical Imptomontation of NSM MG 2373. NSM MG-1-2373 will reviso the Containment Prossure Control System to limit the potential for the VX and NS component cycling.
All work required to implement NSM MG-1-2373 is currently scheduled for Modes 5,0, and No-Modo.
Equipment being modiflod by this NSM is not required during Modes 5,0, and N-Mode. No unroviewed safety questions are created by the imptomentation of this NSM. No fission product barriors are affected.
TN/2/A/2373!00/AE1 Chango O to 0 1ho purposo et this proceduto is to provido instruction for implementing NSM MG-2-2373: noviso Containment Pressuro Control System to limit potential for VX and NS component cycling.
Safety Evaluation:
Tit 2/A/2373/00/AE1 provides guidanco and direction for the electrical implomontation of NSM MG 2373. NSM MG-2-2373 will reviso the Containment Pressure Control System to limit the potential for the VX and NS component :ycling.
All work required to implenunt NSM MG-2-2373 is currently scheduled for Modos 5,6, and No-Modo.
- Equipment being modified by this NSM is not required during Modos 5,6. and N-Mode. No unroviewod safety questions are created by the implomontation of this NSM. No fission product barriors are affected.
TT/2/A/9100/397 Chango O to O The purposo of this proceduto is to:
I - .
- 1) Verify proper operation of the Containment Spray System (NS) Pumps and Outsido Containment
~ ~ 1,-, . . -
r -
- n.-,,.. ,,- , , , + - - . , - , . . , . --- ,, . ,--, - # em, , ., v, - -- r e-
- --r+ 7-'
Isolation Valvos following the imptomontation of the pump-valve interlock portion of NSM-MG 2373 Revision O.
- 2) Venty proper operation of the Containment Pressure Control System (CPCS) interlocks with regctidS to the starting and stopping of the Containmerit Spray System (NS) Pumps following the implementation of NSM-MG-2-2373 Revision 0.
- 3) Verify proper operation of the Containment Pressure Control System (CPCS) interlocks with regards to the starting and stopping of the Containment Air Return f ans (VX) and Fan Discharge Dampers operation following the implementation of NSM-MG-2-2373 Hovision 0.
Safety Evaluation:
NSM-2-2373 modihod the control circuitry for the NS and VX systems to alleviate the potential for components to cycto on and off about the actuation setpoint. -
This test proceduto will verif y that all changes to the control logic are functioning as designed. All testing will be performed and verified complete prior to the unit entering Modo 4.
This modification increases the rollability of the NS and VX components by alleviating the component cycling concerns. Nolther the possibihty, probability, or consequences of an accident previously or not previously evaluated in the FSAR will be increased. The margin of safety as defined in the bases of Technical Specifications will not be reduced by either modification or the post-modification test. No USO erlsts. ,
TN/1/Al2303/00/AMI Chango O to O The purpoco of this proceduto is to provide guidelines for 1ho replacement /rocrientation of Main Steam Safety Valves 1SV14,1SV15, ISV10, ISVt7 and ISV18 and to provide Engincoring instructions for installation.
Safety Evaluation:
NSM MG-12303 will replaco existing Main Steam ASME Codo Safety Valves on the 'C' Steam Generator with new flanged valves. The existing valvos are butt wolded on the inlot sido, which requires that the valves be cut out for maintenance. The modification will also rotato each valvo 15 degroos to the vertical ,
position to provent excessivo seat leakage. This safety evaluation will addross safety concerns associated
" with the implomontation of NSM MG-12303 and specifically with activities included in implomontation proceduto TN/1/A/2303/00/AM1, Technical Specification 3.7.1.1 requires the Main Steam Safety Valves to be operable in Modos 1,2, and
- 3. The implementation proceduro requires that all work that ionders the valves inoperable be performed in Mode 5 or below; therefore, valvo operabihty will not be a concern during the implementation process.
The valves will bo installed and functionally verified prior to entering Modo 3 at the completion of tho iofueling outage.
= Much of the imptomontation process will occur while the NC system is grained to the mid-loop level and with the ND system providing residual heat removal to the core. In the event of a loss of botil trains of ND with the unit in this configuration, the station is commit 4d to being capable of achloving containment integrity within two hours. During mid-loop operation, the implementation proceduro toquires that CMD Craft have the abihty to seal cach Main Steam Salety Valve nouta within two hours whenever the Operations Containment Closure Coordinator assigns closure responsib3ity to the modification in theso situations the proceduto also prohibits CMD Cratt from leaving the nozzled unattended at any time.
I
.n n .. .
Movin0 the valvos in and out of the doghouse will requito CMD Craf t to remove security bars for access.
TN/1/A/2303/00/AMt requires the Craft to notify Security pilor to removing the bars to ensure that all security requirements are mot and maintained while the bare aro .emoved. Also,iornoving the dischargo piping from any of the valves results in an open path to the doghouse roof lhorofore, the proceduto requires CMD to weld security plates on the vont t, tacks, and Socurity to inspect thoso platos prior to dismantling any of the dischar00 piping implomontation procedure TN/t/A/2303/00/AM1 providos adoquato controls to ensure that no nuclear safely related t,tructuro, sy!,lom, or component will be do0raded in modos in which they are required to be operable.1ha probability and consoquences of accidents and/or equipment malfunctions previously or not previously evaluated in the i SAR will not be increased by implementation of NSM-22304. Also, implomontahon of the mod does not affoct proceduros descr' bod in the FSAR of tests or experiments not addressed in the FSAR. No USO oxists.
TN/2/A/2303/00!AM1 Chango O to 0 1ho purpose of this proceduto is to provide guidelmos for the replacement /roorlentation of Main Steam Saloty Valves 2SVt4,2SV15,2SV10,2SV17 and 2SV18 and to provido Engincorin:, instructions for installation.
Safoty Evaluation:
NSM MG-22303 will replaco existing Main Steam ASME Codo Safety Valves on the 'C' Steam Gonorator with now flanged valves. Tho existing valves aro butt wc:dod on the inlet side, which requires that the valvos be cut out for maintenanco. The modification will also rotato each valvo 15 degrees to the vortical position to provent excessivo t. oat leakagn.1his safety evaluation will addross safety concerns associated with the irnplementation of NSM MG-22303 and specifically with activities included in lmptomontation procoduro TN/2/A/2303/00/AM1, lochnical Specification 3.7.1.1 requiros the Main Steam Saloty Valves to be operablo in Modos 1,2, and
- 3. The implomontation proceduto requires that all work that iendors the valves inoperablo be performed in Modo 5 or below; thereforo, valvo operability will not be a concern during the implomontation process, The valvos will be installed and functionally verified prior to entering Mode 3 at the completion of the refueling outage.
Much of the implomontation process will occur while the NC system is Orained to the mid-loop level and with the ND system providing residual heat removal to the core, in the event of a loss of both trains of ND with the unit in this configuration, the station is committed to being capable of achieving containment integrity within two hours. During mid-toop operation, the implomontation pocoduro nsquires that CMD Craft havo the ability to seal each Main Stoam Safety Valvo nozzio within two hours wheriever the Operations Containment Closuro Coordinator assigns closure responsibikty to the modification. In thoso situations the procedure also prohibits CMD Craft from leaving the notzlos unattended at any time.
Moving the valves in and out of the do0 house will requito CMD Craf't to remove security bars for access.
TN/2/A/2303/00/AM1 requires the Craft to notify Security prior to removing the bars to ensure that all security requiromonts ato mot and maintained while the bars ate removed. Also, removing the dischargo piping from any of the valvos results in an open path to the doghouse roof. Therefore, the proceduro requires CMD to wold security plates or, the vont stacks, and Security to inspect those plates prior to disniantlin0 any of the dischargo piping.
Implomontation proceduto TN/2/A/2303/00/AMI providos adog .to controls to ensure that n3 nuclear safety related structuro, system, or component will be degraded in modos in which they are required to be operable, The probability and consequencos of accidents and/or equipment malfunctions previously or not previously ovaluated in the FSAR will not be increased by implementation of NSM-22304, Also,
.. .- ~ .. -, , , . ,
implementation of the mod does not affect procedures described in the FSAR or losts or experiments not addressed in the FSAR. No USO exists.
1N/2/A!2208'00!AE1 Chango O to 0 1ho purposo of this procedare is to provido instruction for implementing NSM MG P-2208: Replaco Air Operated Valvos (2RN253A and 2RC276A) with Motor Operated Valves.
Safety Evaluation:
All work requitod to implement NSM MG 2-2208 is scheduled to completo during No Mode, in the event that the isolation valvos referenced above are not in service by Modo 0, measuros will be taken to ensure proper containment integrity in accordance with Station Directive 31.42, Containment Closuro Requirements During Outages.
T he now method of oporation of the valvos being replaced by this modification will be functionally verified beforo Unit 2 is returned to Modo 4. Therefore, there are no saloty concerns with the containment closuro ,
requirements specified in the Technical Specifications. There are no USO's associated with this NSM.
TT/1/A/9700/77 Chango O to 4 The purpose of this procedure is to test the 'O' train VC/YC safety circuit post installation of applicable portions of NSM MG-52005 Revision 0 by CMD-N.
Safety Evaluation:
TT/1/A/9700/77 will test the 'B' train VC/YC safety start and control circuit. This proceduto will be conducted immediately following CMD-N completing the associated wiring in this circuit por NSM MG-52065. The 'O' train of VC/YC will be inuperable while conducting this proceduto. - Completion of this procedure will be required before dochring 'B' train of VC/YC operable, if olther of MNS's units are running and 'A' train of VC/YC is operable then the plant will to operating under the constraints of Technical Specification 3/4.7.6 which allows operation up to seven days with one train of VC/YC out of service.
During this test the VC/YC system will bo operated in an unusual configuration with Doth trains of CRA-AHU's operating at the same time. T his configuration will have already been tested ourin0 the functional test for 'A' train under WR 98347 TUlrA/9700/076. Due to the implomontation of the 'B' train portion of MEVN--2850 which will increase the RPM of CRA-AHU-2 the test will be reconducted. While both trains are running current readings' to CRA-AHU-1 and CRA-AHU-2 will be measured as well as noiso and vibration of the f ans. This will assure that with both trains aligned and running that motor loads are not excooded and that neither fan is operating in surgo. Equivalent testin0 will not be necessary for the-i Battery room oxhaust fans or the Switchgear room exhaust fans based on Design Engineering's review of the ventilation conditions in those rooms. The VC/YC chillors may exporlonce oillevel problems in their associated evaporators due to low toads but this should not creato a major problem, based on the longth -
of this lost and the fact that there will be Maintenance Group HVAC personnel present to monitor the chillers during this lost.
l- This test will vonfy propor equipment response to a LOOP /LOCA signal from either unit. The safety sl0nal roset button and the safety signal actuation button will both be functionally tested. The train select circuit will be testod by this procedure. Equipment that have (manual / auto) select capability will have their associated switch functionally verified in the manual and auto position.
This procedure affocts 'B' train of VC/YC only and will not place 'A' train of VC/YC at risk. Since 'B' train i
of VC/YC will bo inoperablo during this proceduto the affects of this protoduto on 'B' train are of no consequence to the sato operation of the station. Changes 0 to 4 allow testing Min SGR-AHU's 18 and 10 out of service, as well as incorporating steps to make testing more thorough and practical. No USO exists.
TN/0/A/2125/00/AM2 Chango O to 0 The purpose of this proceduto is to provide guidotinos for the addition of an oil reclaim line from a new 3/8" nozzio on the evaporator shell to a now connection on the compressor head.
Safety Enluation:
Woldmg and drilling on the evaporator shell, drilling and tapping of the comprostor housing, and subsequent valvo and turbino installation shall tako placo during a scheduled sovon day Toch Spoc for YC chiller maintenance and modification. Unit status is not affected as long as the other train romains .
operablo, The wold to the evaporator shall bo in accordance with ASME Section XI and is additionally subject to the requirements of ASME Section Vill, since the evaporator shell is considorod a sec on Vill pressuro vessel or boundary.
The FSAR and Technical Specificatlons will not be aftocted in any significant manner due to the implomontation of this controlling procedure, The probability and consequences of an accident proviously evaluated and accidents not previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be inctcased, sinco all work will be performed during the scheduled removal of YC train 'A' for maintenanco purposes, Sinco unit and Technical Specification iequirements will be met by the operabihty of YC train 'B' during this period, the margin of saloty as defined in the bases to Technical Specifications will not be reduced.
TT/2/A/9100/389 Change O to 0 T he purpose of this proceduro is to setup and maintain Auxiliary Foodwater System oporation for sutticient duration to ensure satisf actory differential pressure testing of Turbino-Driven Pump dischargo isolation valvos 2CAGGAC,2CA500, or 2CA38B as mandated by NRC Generic Letter 89-10, Saloty Evaluation:
During the performance of this test procedure, the Auxiliary Feodwater System will not be placed in an alignment or condition that has not boon previously analyzod in the FSAR, This lost proceduro does not place tho system in a unique alignment which would degrado the systom's ability to perform its design function, No USO exists, TT/2/A/9100/387 Chango O to O The purpose of this proceduro is to setup and maintain Auxiliary Foodwater system operation of sullicient duration to ensuro satisf actory differential prossure testing of Motor-Driven Pump 2A dischargo isolation valves 2CAG2A or 20A58A as mandated by NRC Generic vetter 89-10, Safety Evaluation:
During the performanco of this test proceduro, the Auxiliary Feedwater System will not be placed in an alignment or condition that has not boon previously analyzed in the FSAR. This test proceduro does not place the system in a uniquo alignment which would degrado the system's ability to perform its design function.
TT/2/A/9100/388 Chango O to 0 l
e .
The purpose of this proceduro is to setup and maintain Auxiliary Foodwater System operation of suthcient duration la ensure satisfactory differential pressure testing of Motor-driven Pump 28 dischar0e Isolation valvos 2CA40B or 2CA42B as mandated by NRC Generic Lotter 09-10.
Shiety Evaluation:
During the performance of this test proceduro, the Auxiliary Foodwater System will not bo placed in an abgnment or condition that has not booq previously analyzed in the FSAR. This test proceduto does not place the system in a uniquo alignment which would degrado the system 1 ability to perform its design function, TN/0/A/2065/00!AE4 Change O to O This proceduro is to provide instruction for implomonting NSM-2005. Series operation of the YC system chillors will be doloted, rain selection controls modified. LOOP /LOCA actuation circuitry simplified and human engineering enhancoments to the HVAC Main Control Board incorporated by his NSM.
This portion of the NSM is identified as Part BL Changes made by Part B2 willincludo modifications to Train Select and Safety Start Control Circuitry ('B' Train).
Safety Evaluation:
1 N/0/A/2065/00/AE2 Part B2 will make 'B' train of VC/YC inoperable. The station will be operating under the operating constraints of Technical Spec *::ation 3/4.7.0. This procedure will affoct the VC/YC train 'B' train select and safety start circuits. These circuits will be functionally verified by NPD IAE under procedure TT/1/A/9700/077 prior to being declared operable. :
This procedure willinstall two jumpcts which will remain in place post completion of this procedure. One jumper will bo in the CR-AHU-2 circuit betwoon links M21 and M23 in the HVAC Aux, Relay Cabinet 'B'.
The other jumpor will be in the CRA-AHU-2 circuit between links M9 and M10 in the HVAC Aux. Relay Cabinet 'B'. Thoso jumpors do not a!!oct the saloty start capauility of either air handling unit and can romain in placo without making their associated circuits inoperable. Those jumpers bypass the smoke detoctor interlock to the fan motors circuits of those AHU's. Those AHU's are equipped with high ,
temperature alarms which will still be operable, thus there will be a means for the Operational group to superviso the AHU's. There is a stop in the procedure that will notify Operations when the jumpers are in place and what the jumpers do to the circuit. These jumpers will be removed while implementing procedure TN/0/A/2065/00/AEG (Part E3).
This procedure does not affect the operability of any operating 'A' train picco of VC/YC equipment. No USO exists.
f TO!1/A/9600/059 Change 2 This procedure, Emergency VX System Operation Following a Safety injection was deletod.
!~
! Safety Evaluation: f NSM MG-12373 will onsure VX f ans and dampers do not exceed their motor starting duty. This proceduro f'-
for operator actions is not required when the NSM is incorporated, since the NSM will perform the actions l
' of the procedure automatically, . The Safety Evaluation for NSM MG-22373 is described under the summary for NSM's to this report. No USO exists.
l PT/1/A/4450!O6B Change O to 26 i r.
~ - . , -r_w ,, , m .% , ,,--~_s, , #. r,,m ,a v 9.,~y.--. ~, m._ . ~ . , - _ y ..m..., ,my. -
- T he purpose of this procedure is to verify that the VX lans and dampers operate as designed and meet Technical Specihcation surveillance requirements.
Safety Evaluation:
Performance of this procedure does not place De VX system in any unanalyzed condition which would degrado nuclear safety. Safety component checkouts are performed using existirig VX test circuitry. No USO exists.
TN/1/Al2304'00/AM1 Change O to 0 The purpose of this procedure is to provide guidelines for the replacement /roorientation of Main Steam Safety Valves 1SV8, ISV9, ISV10, ISV11 and ISV12. This procedure also providos Engineering instruction for installation, Safety Evaluation:
NSM MG-12304 will replace existing Main Steam ASME Codo Safety Valves on the 'C' Steam Generator with new flanged valves. The existing valves are butt welded on the inlet side, which requires that the valvos be cut out for maintenance. The modification will also rotate each valve 15 degrees to the vertical position to provent excessive seat leakage. This safety evaluation will address safety concerns associated with the implementation of NSM MG-12304 and specifically with activities included in implementation proceduro TN/1/At2304/00/AMt.
Technical Specification 3.7.1.1 requires the Main Steam Safety Valves to be operable in Modos 1,2, and
- 3. The implementation proceduto requires that all work that renders the valves inoperable bo performed in Modo 5 or below; thereforo, valve operability will no be a concern during the implementation process.
The valves will be installed and functionally verified prior to entering Mode 3 at the completion of the .
refueling outage.
Much of the impbmentation process will occur while the NC system is drained to the mid-loop level and with the N5 system providing residual heat removal to the coro. In the event of a loss of both trains of
. ND with the unit in this configuration, the station is committed to being capable of achieving containment integrity within two hours. During mid-loop operation, the implementation procedure requires that CMD -
Cratt have the ability to seal each Main Steam Safety Valve nozzle witnin two hours whenever the-Operations Containment Closure Coordinator assigned closure responsibility to the modification. !n these situations the procedure also prohibits CMD Craft from. leaving the nozzles unattended at any time.
Moving the valves in and out of the doghouse will require CMD Cratt to remove security bars for access.
TN/1/A/2304/00/AM1 requires the Craft to notify Security prior to removing the bars to ensure that all security requirements are met and maintained while the bars are removed. Also, removing the discharge piping from any of the valves results in an open path to the doghouse roof. Therefore, the procedure requires CMD to wold secur.ty plates on the vent stacks, and Security to inspect these plates prior to dismantting any of the discharge piping, linplomontation proceduto TN!1/A!2304/00/AM1 provides adequate controls to ensuro that no nucleaf saf ety related structure, system or component will be degraded in modes in which they are required to bo operable. The probabihty and consequences of accidents and/or equipment malfunctiono previously or not previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased by implementation of NSM MG-12304. Also, implementation of the mod does not affect procedures described in the FSAR or tests or experiments not addressed in the FSAR. No USO exists.
IP/0!A!3250/16C Change 2
. o Tho purpose of this procedure is to calibrato speed switches on the diesel generators. The purpose of this change is to support the new speed switch setpoint. ;
Safety Evaluation:
This procedure reflects a reduction of the setpoints for diesel generator fleid flashing and starting air solenoid closure from 50% to 40% engino speed. The setting changes to the switches are being ,
implernented under MEVN 5035 and MEVN 5030. All affected components have been considered and no problems woro predicted to occur by the manufacturers of each component.
The diesels for Unit 2 have been tested with the new setpoints and the results for the startup times have been sulficiently within the required 11 seconds to reach the necessary engino speed / voltage. No changes to the FSAR will be needed. No USO exists.
TN!0/A/2065/00/AE4 Port D2 This procedure is to provide instruction for implementing NSM #MG5-2065. Series operation of the YC
- system chillors will be deleted, train selection controis modified, LOOP /LOCA actuation circuitry simplified and human engineering enhancements to the HVAC Main Con;rol Board incorporated by this NSM. This portion of the NSM is identified as Part B2. Changes inade by Part B2 willinclude modifications to Train Select and Safety Start Control Circuitry ('B' Train).
Safety Evaluation:
TN/0/A/2065/00/AE2 Pari B2 will make 'B' train of VC/YC inoperable. The station will be operating under the operating constraints of Technical Specification 3/4.7.6. This procedure will affect the VC/YC train 'B' train select and safety start circuits. These circuits will be functionally verified by NPD lAE under ~
procedure TT/l/A/9700/077 prior to being declared operable.
This proceduto will install two jumpors which will remain in place post completion of this proceduro. Ono jumper will be in the CR-AHU-2 circuit between links M21 and M23 in the HVAC Aux. Relay Cabinet 'B'.
The other jumper will be in the CRA-AHU-2 circuit betwoon links M9 and M10 in the HVAC Aux Relay cabinet 'B'. These jumpors do not affect the safety start capability of either air handling unit and can remain in place without making their associated circuits inoperablo. These jumpers bypass the smoke detector interlock to the fan motors circuits of these AHU's. These AHU's are equipped _with high ,
temperature alarms which will still be operable, thus there will be a means for the Operations group to supervise the AHU's.- There is a step in the procedure that will notify Operations when the jumpers are in place and what the jumpers do to the circuit. These jumpers will be removed while implementing procedure TN/0/A/2065/00/AE6 (Part B3). This procedure does not affect the operability 'A' train ploce of VC/YC equipment. No USO exists.
MP/0/A/7450/05 ,
The purpose of this procedure is to provide guidance in (VC) system outsido air ductwork access for - e monitor cleaning, valve and damper inspections.
Safety Evaluation: .
Based on an evaluation by Design Engineering, the revised VC Technical Specification interpretation allows the access covers to be removed for maintenance. Open covers will have no effects on the ability of the equipment to perform the intended functions for which they were designed The liketihood or consequences of failures will not be changed. No USO exists.
TN!1/Ar2208/00/AM1
___ _ , _. - _ _ _. ~ __ , _ . _ _ __
The purpose of this procedure is to provido guidelinos for the replacement of Air Operators on insido I containment isolation valves 1RN253A and IRN276A with a new electric motor operator model. ;
Safety Evaluation:
The basic function of this implementation pro.:odure is to provide for the safe and officient installation of NSM MG-1-2208. This modification involves the replacement of oporalors on containment isolation valves 1RN253A and 1RN276A. The existing valves have air operators and fall closed on loss of power. The new valve operators are electrical motor operated and fail as-is on loss of power.
Valvo operator replacement will be performed in pipe chase during Modes 5, 3 or No-Modo operation of ,
I U1EOC7. Containment closure requirements of Station Directivo 3.1.42 will be followed as required in Modes 5 or 6= l l
The FSAR and Technical Specification will rot be affected in any significant manner due to the implementation of this controlling proceduro The probability and consequences of accidents and/or equipment malfunctions previously or not previously evaluated in the FSAR will not bo increasod, sinco centainment closure requirements of Station Directive 3.1.42 will be followod as required in Modos 5 or
- 6. Sinco containment closuro requirements will be met, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to ,
Technical Specifications will not be reduced. No USO exists.
TN!0/A/2065/00/AE3 The purpose of this procedure is to provide instruction for implementing NSM #MGS-2005. Series oporation of the YC system chillers will be deleted, train selection controls modified, LOOP /LOCA ac*uation circuitry simplified and human enginocring enhancements to the HVAC Main Control Board incorporated by this NSM. This portion of the NSM is identified as part A2. Changes made by Part A2 willinclude modifications to Train Select and Safety Start control circuitry (W Train).
Safety Evaluation:
TN/0/A/2065/00/AE3 (Part A2) will make 'A' train of VC/YC inoperable. The station will be oporating under the operating constraints specified in Technical Specification 3/4.4.6. This procedura will aff oct the 'A' train select and safety start circuits. This procedure will not affect any 'B' train equipment. All equipment will be functionally tested by NPD IAE under procedure TT/1/A/9700/076 prior to being declared operable.
NO USO exists.
TNI1/A/2373/00/AE1 This procedure is to provide instruction for implementing NSM #MG-1-2373: Revise Containment Pressure Control System to limit potential for VX and NS component cycling.
Safety Evaluation:
TN/1/A/2373/001AE1, provides guidance and direction for the electricalimptomentation of NSM #MG 2373. NSM 1-2373 will revise the Containment Pressuro Control System to limlt the potential for VX and NS component cycling,-
All work required to implement NSM 1-2373 is currently scheduled for Modes.5, 6, and no modo. ;
Equipment bein0 modified by this NSM is not required during Modes 5,6, and no mode. No USO's are created by the implementation of this NSM. No fission product barriers are affected.
PT/1/Al4200/08B Change 35 t.
3
l The purpose of this change is to ahon the NC system to the suction of the ND system using a 3/4 inch bypass kno around 2ND2AC. IND2AC will be closed during this test, and 1ND1B will be open. This portion of the test will be performed immediately after securing ND system from residual heat removal.
NC system pressure will be approximately 350 degrees F.
Safoty Evaluation:
1FW27A the MOV from the FWST will be opened and a temperature element in the FWST suction lino ,
will be monitored to verify no change in temperaturo. Less than 1 degree change in temperature will ensure chock valve 1FW28 is performing its intenood function. Using the 3/4 inch system via the NV pumps in the unkkoly event of a catastrophic failure of 1FW20 (design temperature of 400 degrees F, design pressure of 000 psig). The portion of the ND system pressurized by this test will not see pressures grcator than thoso experienced during normal operation. Il over pressurization were to occur, the suction piping relief valve would relieve pressure to the PRT. This leakage could again be mado up by the NV ,
pumps.
Finally, a caution is included in the proceduto to ensure the FW line ter:.perature does not exceed 100 degroos F. The design temperature of this pipo is 110 degrees F primarily due to the base of the FWST.
T he temperature element being monitored is located in the Auxiliary building and any leakage due to the unlikely catastrophic failure of 1 FW28 could be quickly isolated (close 1ND1 B, IFW27a and/or any of the other four manual test valves) before reaching the expansion joint. Over pressurization of the FWST is vented and the size of the vent lino could more than accommodate the flow from the 3/4 inch test bypass. [
1his test does not constituto an USO.
TT/1/A!9700/076 The purpose of this procedure is to test the 'A' train of VC/YC safety circuit post installation of applicable portions of NSM MG-52065 Rev. O by CMD-N, Safety Evaluation:
This procedure will be conducted immediately following CMD-N completing the associated wiring in this circuit por NSM MG-52065, The 'A' train of VC/YC will be inoperable while conducting this procedure.
Completion of this procedure wil' be required beforo declaring 'A' train of VC/YC operabic. if either of-MNS's units are runt'ing and 'B' train of VCIYC is operable then the plant will be operating under the constraint:, of Technical Specifical;on 3/4.7.6 which allows operation up to seven days with one train of VC/YC out of service.
During this test the VC/YC system will be operated in an unusual configuration with both trains of VC/YC l operating at the same time, While both trains are running curront readings to CRA-AHU-1 and 2 will be -
measured as well as noise and vibration of the f ans. This will assure that with beth trains aligned and running that motor loads are not exceeded and that neither fan is opera'ing in surgo. Equivalent testing I will not be necessary for the Battery room exhaust lans or the Switchgoar room exhaust fans based on Design Engineering's review of the ventilation conditions in theso rooms. The VC/YC chillers may i experience oil level problems in their associated evaporators due to low loads and the fact that there will be Maintenance Group HVAC personnel present to monitor the chillers during the test.
This test w;il verify proper equipment response to a LOOP /LOCA signal from oither unit. The safety signal roset button (VC/YC113) and the safety signal actuation button (VC/YC82) will both be functionally tested.
The train select circuit will be tested by this procedure. Equipment that have (manual / auto) select capability.will have their associated switch fu,,ctionally verified in the manual and auto position.
This procedure affects 'A' train of VC/YC only and will not place 'B' train of VC/YC at risk. Since 'A' train of VC/YC will be inoperable during this procedure the affects of this procedure on 'A' train are of no L
L L _
consequence to the sale operation of the station. No USO exists.
TN/0!Al2125/00/AM1 ,
This procedure provides guidelines for the addition of an oil reclaim fine from a new 3/8" nozzio on the evaporator shell to a new connection on the compressor head.
Safety Evaluation:
The basic function of this implementation proceduto is to provido for the safe and efficient instailation of NSM MG-5-2125. This modification involves the addition of a 3/8" oil reclaim line to ensure that lubrication oil i., eturned to the compressor from the evaporator during low chiller load operation.
Welding and e ..,9 on the evaporator shell, drilling und tapping of the compressor housing, and subsequent valvo anct tubing installation shall take place during a scheduled seven day Technical -
Specification for YC chiller maintenanco and modification. Unit status is not affected as long as the other train remains operable The wed to the evaporator shall be in accordance with ASME Section XI and is considered a section Vill pressuro vessel or boundary.
Tho FSAR and Technical Specification will not be atfocted in any manner duo to the implementation of this controlling procedure. The probability and consequences of an accident previously evaluated and accidene not previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased, sinco all work will be performed during the scheduled removal of YC train 'B' for maintenance purposes. Since unit cM Technical Specifications requirements will be met by the operability of YC train 'A' during this period. 7 J margin of safety as defined in the bases to the Technical Specifications will not be reduced. No USO exists.
TN/1/A/2208/00/AE1 This procedure is to gvido instruction for implementing NSM #MG-1-2200: Replace Air Operated Valves (1RN253A and 1RN2%A) with Motor Operated Valves.
Safoty Evaluation:
TN/1/A/2208/00/AE1 provides guidance and direction for the electrical and instrument portion of the replacement of air operated valvm (1RN253A and 1RN276A) with motor operated valves. All work required to implement NSM #MG : -2208 is scheduled to be completed during no mode. In the event that
> the isolation valves referenced abovo are not in service by Mode G, measures will be taken to ensure proper containment integrity in accordance with Station Dircctive 3.1.42, Containment Closure Requirements During Outages.
This new method of operation of the valves being replaced by this moditication will be functionally verified be; ore Unit 1 is retumed to Mode 4 Thorofore, there are no safety concerns with the containment closure requirements specified in the Technical Specifications. There are no USO's associated with this NSM.
l TN!0/Al2065/AE1 Part A1 The purpose of this procedure is to provide Instruction for implementing NSM #MG5-2065. Series operation of the YC system chillers will be deleted, train selection controls modified, LOOP /LOCA actuation circuitry simplified and human engineering enhancements to the HVAC Main Control Board incorporated by this NSM. This portion of the NSM is identified as part A1. Changes made by Part A1 will encompass modifications to 'A' Train valve wiring and associated circuitry. Valves affected are 1YC2A,~1YC10A, 1YC29A.1YC30A and 1YC38A.
Safety Evaluatinn:
l
.. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ .
l TN/0/A/2065/00/AE1 will affect valves 1YC2A,1YC16A,1YC29A,1YC30A and 1YC38A.1YC29A and 1YC30A will have all their cabling disconnected and will be operated in the future as manual valves.
1YC2A and 1YC38A wiu have their control circuitry modified. At the beginning of this procedure all five of these valves will be f ailed in their safe posit ons by tagging out power to their actuators af ter the valves have been positioned The safe position for these valves will correspond to the parallel VC/YC chiller ah0nn ent. These valves will remain in this position until this procedure is complete and lAE has completed the functional verification on these valves. With these valves f ailed to their safe position 'A' train of VC/YC can remain operable during this procedure. No 'B' train equipment wiH be affected by this procedure.
11 Operations elects to move these valves from their safety positions, the respective train will be declared inopcf able under the provisions / constraints of the respective Technical Specifications.
In the event of an accident which renders VC/YC inoperable MNS will operate under the constraints specified in Technical Specification 3/4.7.6.
TN/1/A/9700'077 The purpose of this procedure is to test the 'B' train VC/YC safety circuit post installation of applicable portions of NSM MG-52005 Rev. O by CMD-N.
Safety Evaluation:
TT/1/A/9700/077 will test the 'B' train VC/YC safety start and control circuit. This procedure will be conducted immediately following CMD-N completing the associated wiring in this circuit per NSM MG-52065. The 'B' train of VC/YC will be inoperable while conducting th;s procedure. Completion of this procedure will be required before declaring 'B' train of VC/YC operable. If either of MNS's units are running and 'A' train of VC/YC is operable then the plant will be operating under the constraints of Technical Specification 3/4.7.6 which allows operation t.p to seven days with one train c1 VC/YC out of service.
During this test the VC/YC system will be operated in an unusual configuration with both trains of CRA-AHU's operating at the same time. This configuration will have already been tested during the functional test for 'A' train under WR 98347 TT/1/A/9700/076. Due to the implementation of the 'B' train portion of -
ME JN-2853 which will increase the RPM of CRA-AHU-2 the last will be reconducted. While both trains are running current readings to CRA-AHU-1 and CRA-AHU-2 will be measured as well as noise and vibration of the fans. This will assure that with both trains aligned and running that motor loads are not exceeded and that neither fan is operating in surge. Equivalent testing will not be necessa;y for the Battery room exhaust fans or the Switchgw room conditions in these rooms. The VC/YC chillers may experience oil level problems in their associated evaporators due to low loads but this should not create a major problem, based on the length of this test and the fact that there will be Maintenance Group HVAC personnel present to monitor the chillers during this test.
T his test will verify proper equipment response to a LOOP!LOCA signal from either unit. The Safety signal reset button and the safety signal actuation button will both be functionally tested. The train select circuit will be tested by this procedure. Equipment that have (manual! auto) select capability will have their associated switch functionally verified in the manual and auto position.
This procedure affects 'B' train of VC/YC only and will not place 'A' train of VC/YC at risk. Since 'B' train of VC/YC will be inoperable during this procedure the affects of this procedure on 'B' train are of no consequence to the sale operation of the station.
Duke Power Company McGuire Nuclear Station Summary of Exempt Chaages Completed Under 10CFR50.59 MEVN-3006
Description:
As a result of required Technical Specification surveillance, all Unit 2 Steam Generator tubes wit:1 excessive defects will be plugged and/or sleeved as corrective action. All field work will be performed under approved pocedures by Babcock and Wilcox personnel. The maximum number of " equivalent plugged tubes" cannot exceed 10% (467 tubes) per Steam Generator. Upon completion of all field work, Project Ser. ices will provide Design Engineering with the numbers and locations of all " repaired" tubes and revise and update affected documeniation.
Safety Review and USQ Evaluation:
i detailed LOCA analysis has been performed by Westinghouse. Babcock and Wilcox has performed a
.OCA analysis for insertion of their fuel in Unit 2 por Report BAW-10174, Rev.1, dated November 1990 md titied " Mark-BW Reload LOCA Analysis for the Catawba and McGuire Units." In addition, the Design Engineering Safety Analysis Group has performed a LOCA Analysis for the limiting case of a Feedwater Line Break which was submitted with the McGuire 1 Cycle 8 Reload Report and subsequently approved in November 1991. The LOCA Analysis was included in the McGuire 2 Cycle 8 Reload Report, which is being submitted for " proval, by reference.
These LOCA Analyses support an " equivalent plugging" limit of 10% (467 tubes) per Steam Generator --
this is a maximum number.11is not expected to exceed the 10% limit during the upcoming Unit 2 EOC7 Refueling Outage. As long as
- equivalent plugging" does not exceed this limit then the FSAR and
' Technical Specifications will not be affected in any significant manner due to the implementation of this exempt change. The possibility, probability, or consequences of an accident not previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased due to this plugging operation. There is potential for tube plugging to L a'fect the Reactor Coolant System flowrate which in turn would affect reactor power levels. The margin ot safety as defined in any Technical Specification bases will not be decreased due to the implementation of this MEVN. The components affected are OA Condition 1 and nuclear safety related.
MEVN-3115 1
Description:
As a result of epcction and testing, all Steam Generator "1 D" tubes with excessive def ects will be plugged and/or sleeved as corrective action. All field work will be performed under approved procedures by Babcock and Wilcox personnel. The maximum number of "equivalem plugged tubes" cannot exceed 10%
l (467 tubes). Upon completion of all field work, Project Services will provide Design E,gineering with the numbers and locations of all" repaired" tubes and revise and update affected documentation.
Safety Review and USO Evaluation:
A d'etailed LOCA analysis has been performed by Wnstinghouse. Babcock and Wilcox has performed.a LOCA Analysis for insertiori of their fuel in the McGuire Units per Report BAW-10174, Rev.1, dated November 1990 and titled "I %BW Reload LOCA Analysis for the Catawoa ana McGuire Units " in addition, the Design Engines 4afety Analysis Group has performed LOCA Analysis for the limiting case of a Feedwater Line Break wnich was submitted with the McGuire 1 Cycle 8 Reload Report and ,
subsequentiy approved in November 1991.
I
. . + .
These LOCA Analyses support an
- equivalent plugging" limit of 10% (467 tubes) per Steam Generator --
this is a maximum number, it is not expected to exceed the 10% limit during the repair of Steam Generator "10." As long as " equivalent piugging" does not exceed this limit, then the FSAR and Technical Specifications will not be affected in any significant manner due to the implementation of this exempt change. The possibility, probability, ard consequences of an accident not previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased due to this plugging operation. There is potential for tube plugging to affect the Reactor Coolant System flowratc which in turn would affect reactor power levels. The margin of safety as defined in any Technical Specification bases will not be decreased due to the implementation of this MEVN. The components affected are QA condition 1 and nuclear safety related.
TVN-3128
Description:
As a result of inspection and testing, all Steam Generator "1 A", "18" and "1C* tubes with excessive defects will be plugged and/or sleeved. All field work will be performed under approved procedures by Babcock and Wilcox personnel. The maximum number of " equivalent plugged tubes" cannot exceed 10% (467 tubes) per Steam Generator. Upon completion of all field work, Project Services will provide Design Engineering with the numbers and locations of all " repaired" tubes and revise and update all affected documentation.
Safety Review and USQ Evaluation:
A detailed LOCA analysis has been performed by Westinghouse. Babcc;k and Wilcox has performed a LOCA Analysis for insertion of their fuel in the McGuire Ur;its per Repon BAW-10174, Rev.1, dated November 1990 and titled
- MARK-BW Reload LOCA Analysis for the Catawba and McGuire Units." In addition, the Design Engineering Saf ety Analysis Group has performed LOCA Analysis for the limiting case of a Feedwater Line Break which was submitted with the McGuire 1 Cycle 8 Reload Report and subsequently approved in November 1991.
These LOCA Analyses support an " equivalent plugging" limit of 10% (467 tubes) per Steam Generator --
this is a maximum number, it is not expected to exceed the 10% limi' during the repair of Steam Generator "10 " As long as " equivalent plugging" does not exceed this limit, then the FSAR and Technical Specifications will not be aflected in any significant manner due to the implementation of this exempt change. The possibility, probability, and consequences of an accident not previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased due to this plugging operation There is potential for tube plugging to affect the Reactor Coolant System flowrate which in turn would affect reactor power levels. The margin of safety as defined in any Technical Specification bases will not be decreased due to the implementation of this MEVN. The components affected are QA ccndition 1 and nuclear safety related.
MEVN-3156
Description:
This MEVN was written to allow the plugging of degraded tubes in the 2A and 2B NS heat Exchangers.
As a result of eddy current testing, two (2) tubes will be plugged in the 2A NS HX and 144 tubes will be plugged in the 2B NS HX, Safety Review and USQ Evaluation:
Design Engineering has performed a tube plugging analysis and determined that tube plugging is acceptable in these HXs up to a maximum of 194 tubes. This analysis is docuraented in Calculation File MCC-1223.13-00-0016.
. .~ - - - - . - . - - , - - -. -
4 ' * '*
Gecause of the large number of degraded tubes in the 28 NS HX, portions of three tubes have been removed from the Outlet Pass for f ailure analysis. These three locations will be pluggsd at the tube sheet with a welded tapered plug.
Since the number of tube's to be plugged does not exseed the maximum number allowed, th9 above i referenced calculation ensures that the required neat transfer capabihty of the NS Heat Exchangers will be maintained. - The possibility, probability, or consequences of an accident not previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased due to this plugging operation. The margin of safety as defined in any-Techn' cal Specification bases will not be decreased due to the implementation of this modification. No FSAR or Technical Specification sections are affected. The NS Heat Exchangers are QA Cond! tion 1 and nuclear safety related.
MEVN Valve 3080 2N1332 3052 2Nt010 3001 2N1333 3076 2N1178 3068 2N1135 3072 2N1150 3 0(19 2N1136 3078 2N1184 3061 2N1103 3063 2N1115 3065 2N1120 3082 2N1334 3079 2N1185 3059 2NI96 3058 2N195
-3051 2NI9
-3083 2N1430 3084 2N!431 2881 1NI9 2882 1NII0 2888 IN195 2889 1N196 2890 IN1100 2892 1N!t44 2893- 1Nt147 2894 1N1184 2895 1N1185 2993. 1NI120 2927 1NV95 2930 INV244 2932 1NV265 2930 1NV1047 3088 2NV141 3069 2NV142 3090 2NV150 3091 2NV151 3094 2NV244 3095 2NV245 3097 2NV842 3098 2NV849 l
. 4 ..
l -
MEVN Valve ;
2843 1CA46 2844 1CA42 3021 2CA42 3025' 2CA58 3026 2CA62
'3022 2CA46 2841 1CA62 2842 1CA58 Description / Safety Discussion:
Duke Power Company has committed to the NRC to evaluate all valve electric Motor Operators (EMO) as -
per Generic Letter 89-10. This evaluation is being performed to help ensure that the actuators will perform their intended function under design differential pressure in the event of an accident.
As a result of this evaluation, it has been determined that the existing hotork model 16NA1-57 operator for these valves be replaced with a Rotork model 16NA1-29 to ensure that the required torque is availaole under all conditions.
Design Engineering will evaluate the effect of changing the operator on the seismic qualification of the operator / piping combination and specify appropriate changes, if required. ,
in addition, the previously issued 89-10 Setup Infortnation Sheet (Dated 9/10/91) is being deleted and a new Setup Information Sheet (Dated 11/7/91) added to support the setup of the new model operator for these valves.
This information will be used to setup and verify the valve operator is capable of proper operation during a design basis accident. No new failure mode will be introduced as a result of this modification.
Additionally, the probability, possibility, or consequences of a malfunction will not be increased by this modification. The FSAR or Technical Specifications are not affected.
MEVN Valve 2928 1NV221 2929 1NV222 3092 2NV221 3093 2NV222 Description! Safety Discussion:
Duke Power Company has committed to the NRC to evaluate all valve Electric Motor Operators (EMO) as.
per Generic Letter 89-10. This evaluation is being performed to help ensure that the actuators will !
l perform their intended function under design differential pressure in the event of an accident.
I As a result of this evaluation, it has been determined that the existing Rotork 14NA2-86 operator needs to be replaced with a Rotork 16NA1-86 or Rotork 1GNA2-86 operator _ to ensure that the required torque is available under all conditions. The operator will be replaced with a Rotork 16NA1-86.
Design Engineering will evaluate the etlect of adding a larger operator cn the seismic qualification of the operator / piping combinat.on proper to the implementation of this modification.-
In addition, the existing EMO Setup list does not contain the complete information necessary to support ,
- 4;..
MEVN yalva 3099 2NV 1010 3100 2NV1013 2960 1ND2 2961 -1ND32 -
3140' 2ND2 3137 2ND30 3138 2ND32 2982 1NC35 2981 1NC33 3119 2NC53 2914 1KC430 2913 1KC429 3044 2KC315 3045 2KC345 3047 2KC394 3037 2KC3 3038 2KC18 2857 1CA15 2845 1CA66 3016 2CA9 3015 2CA7 2855 1CA9 2856 1CA11 2858 1CA18 3020 2CA38 3027 2CA66 3023 2CA50 i 3024 2CA54 3017 2CA11 2942 IFW49 2941 1FW33 2940 1FW32 2939 1FW1 3034 2FW32 2980 1NM81 2971 1RN162 Description / Safety Discussion:
- Duke Power Company has committed to the NRC to evaluste all valve Eiectric Motor Operators (EMO) as j
l per Genaric Letter 89-10. This evaluation is being performed to help ensure that the actuators will perform their intended function under deLign differential pressure in the event of an accident.
The existing EMO Setup List does not contain the complete information necessary to support this evaluation for the valves. These MEVN's provide the necessary setup information, developed Lnder DPS-1205.19-00-0002 (Guideline for Performing Motor Operated Valve Reviews and Calculations), in response to Generic Letter 89-10.
l This information will be used to setup and verify the valve operator is capable of proper operation during a design basis accident. No new failure mode will be introduced as a result of these modifications.
Additionally, the probability, possibility, or consequences of a malfunction will not be increased by these modifications. No FSAR or Technical Specifications are affected.
l
this evaluation for valve 1NV221. This MEVN provides the necessary setup intormation, developed under DPS-120519-00-0002 (Guideline for Pe< forming Motor Operated Valve Reviews and Calculations), in response to Genenc Letter 89-10 i
This information will be used to se, tup and verify the valve operator is capable of proper operation during a design basis accident. No now failure mode will be introduced as a result of this modification.
Additionally, the probability, possibility, or consequences of a malfunction will not be increased by this l
modification. No FSAR or Technical Spec fications are affected.
i I