ML20078S063

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Final Rept on Significant Const Deficiency 76 Re Damage to Pressurizer Heaters During pre-core Hot Functional Testing. Heaters Replaced & Electrically Tested & NDT Performed on Welds.Heaters Will Receive Inservice Leak Test
ML20078S063
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/17/1983
From: Gerretis T, Gerrets T
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Jay Collins
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, 76, W3K83-1552, NUDOCS 8311150378
Download: ML20078S063 (3)


Text

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,j l OUISIANA P OWE R & LIG H T/Waterford 3 SES/P.O. Box B/Killona, Louisiana 70066 MIDDLE SOUTH UT!UTIES SYSTEM October 17, _983 W3K83- 1552 Q-3-A35.07.76 l

\i-bjbdlbh5, Mr. John T. Collins k GCT 2 41983 ,L Regional Administrator, Region IV [

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 i

h h Arlington, Texas 76012

REFERENCE:

LP&L letter W3183-0306 dated September 15, 1983

Dear Mr,

Collins:

SUBJECT:

Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-382 Significant Construction Deficiency No. 76

" Damage to Pressurizer Heaters During Hot Functional Testing Final Report In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing tso copies of the Final Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 76,

" Damage to Pressurizer Heaters During Hot Functional Testing.

If you have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours, Hs YW bz.uR l T. F. Gerrets Quality Assurance Manager TFG:CNH:VBR '

cc: Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 (15 copies)

. 8311150378 831017 PDR ADOCK 05000382 S PDR 4 Official F1.lo j 1 E-2

[ _

Mr. John T. Collins October 17, 1983 W3K83-1552

.Page.2 cc: Director Office of Management Information and Program ~ Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.- 20555 Mr. E.!L. Blake Shaw, Pittman, Potts, & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036-Mr. W. M. Stevenson Monroe.& Lemann 1424 Whitney Building New Orleans, Louisiana 70130' Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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  • y Final Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 76

" Damage to Pressurizer Heaters During Hot Functionai Testing" Introduc' tion This report is. submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e).- It' describes damage which

. occurred to the pressurizer heaters during pre-core hot functional testing.

-This problem is considered to be not reportable under the requirements of

- 10CFR50.55(e). (1) (iii).

Description of Problem On March 10, 1983, Pre-core Hot Functional Testing was in progress with the plant conditions stable at a primary system test plateau of 460*F and 1100 psi for testing and equipment surveillance. Channel "X" was selected for

. pressurizer Level Control while leaking instrument tubing connections on the Channel "Y" system were being repaired by I&C technicians. Throughout the afternoon, unrecognized by Control Room personnel, the Channel "X" Level Control System erroneously indicated a. pressurizer level of approximately 40%

while Channel "Y" ranged from 31% down to 2.8%. Channel "Y" repairs had been completed by'I&C technicians but this information was unknown to Control Room personnel.

A low-low pressurizer level signal deenergizes all heaters to protect the heaters should they become uncovered. Channel "X" was selected for this function and due to the anomalous Channel "X" level indication, the-pressurizer heaters were maintained energized while uncovered resulting in known damage to 21 heaters and suspected damage to the remaining 9 heaters.

Subsequent to the pressurizer heater damage it was determined that the Channel "X" pressurizer level measurement and control system was inoperable

-due to leaks at instrument tubing connections and that Channel "Y" was providing valid level indication.

Safety-Implications

-The pressurizer heaters are not safety-related; therefore, the damage to the i hee.ers has no safety significance.

Corrective Action

'The need for proper approvals and communications with the Nuclear Operations Supervisor prior to and at the completion of maintenance activities was emphasized to Hot. Functional Test Coordinators, Test-Directors, and Plant

-Staff Maintenance personnel. The personnel were also instructed in the use of Startup Administrative Procedure (SAP-08), " Condition Identification and Corrective Action."

All pressurizer heaters have been replaced, electrically tested and the welds nondestructively tested. The heaters will receive an in-service leak test dur$ng post-core hot functional testing.

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