Text

Proposed Tech Specs Re TS Improvement Program
	ML20079B120
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	01/03/1995
From:	; SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20079B118	List: ML20079B117; ML20079B120;
References
	NUDOCS 9501050195
	Download: ML20079B120 (323)
	v • d • e

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NPF-10/15-299 i

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ATTACHMENT "A" (Marked-Up Proposed Specifications)

Unit 2 i

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%O1050195 950103 PDR ADOCK 05000361 P PDR

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Completion Times 1.3 1.3 Completion Times I m EXAMPLE 1.3-3 pDk EXAMPLES (continued) q ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION M ION TIME l i

A. One A.1 Restore 7 days ;

Function X Function X tr in train to OPERABLE AND inoperable. status.

10' days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO M

B. One B.1 Re tore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months a function Y F nction Y train -

train o OPERABLE AND gh inoperable. status, 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO

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C. ]ne C.1 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Function X Function X train train to OPERABLE inoperable. status.

A!El 93 One C.2 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Function Y Function Y train -

train to OPERABLE ,

inoperable. status. l l

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(continued)

S ONOFRE--UNIT 2 1.3-6 AMENDMENT NO. -

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Completion Times

'1.3 1.3 Completion Times

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I EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.3-3 (continued) t, When one Function X train and one Functio Y train are inoperable Condition A and Condition B e concurrently applicable. The Completion Times for C dition A and Condition B are tracked separately for ach train starting free the time each train was declared noperable and the Cond!ition was entered. A separate C pletion Time is established for Condition C and tra ed from the time the second train was declared inoperab (i .e., the time the situation described in Condition wasdiscovered).

If Required Action C.2 is comp ted within'the specified Completion Ti onditions and C are exited. If the 2 Completion T Requir Action A.1 has not expired, -

operation ma cont' nue i ccordance with Condition A. The remaining Cc pleti in in Condition A is measured from g the time the -

train was declared inoperable (i.e.,

initial entry int ConditionA).

The Completion T mes of Conditions A and B are modified by a logical connec r, with a separate 10 day Completion Time measured from he time it was discovered the LCO was not met. In this example, without the separate Completion Time,

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.. it would be ossible to alternate between Conditions A, B, and C in s 1 a manner that operation could continue indefinit y without ever restoring systems to meet the LCO.

The separ te Completion Time modified by the phrase "from discove of failure to meet the LC0" is designed to prevent indefi te continued operation while not meeting the LCO.

This spletion Time allows for an exception to the normal "ti zero" for beginning the Completion Time " clock." In thi instance, the Completion Time " time zero" is specified a commencing at the time the LCO was initially not met, {

stead of at the time the associated Condition was, entered.

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I SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 1.3-7 AMENDMENT NO.

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Completion Times j

1.3 1.3 -Completion Times EXAMPLE 1.3-3 391 EXAMPLES (continued) $g.) ;

ACTIONS l

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Restore valve (s) 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months valves to OPERABLE inoperable. status.

i B. Required B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Action and associated MQ Completion l Time not B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months met.

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A single Completion Time is used for any number of valves :

ino)erable at the same time. The Completion Time associated 5 witi Condition A is based on the initial entry into Condition A and is not tracked on a per valve basis.

Declaring subsequent valves inoperable, while Condition A is still in effect, does not trigger the tracking of separate !

Completion Times. !

Once one of the valves has been restored to OPERABLE status, !

the Condition A Completion Time is not reset, but continues- !

from the time the first' valve was declared inoperable. The .

Completion Time may be extended if the valve restored to OPERABLE status was the first inoperable valve. The l Condition A Completion Time may be extended for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months provided this does not result in any subsequent l valve being inoperable for > 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . -

l If the Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months (including any extensions) expires while one or more valves are still inoperable, ;

Condition B is entered. ,

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SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 1.3-8 AMENOMENT NO. ;

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O Comple' tion Times 1.3 l 1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.3- W,3 (continued) yM ACTIONS t ,

-.-.---.----..--------------NOTE-------.---..--.....--......

Separate Condition entry is~ allowed for each. inoperable valve.

}COMPLETIONTIME l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION i 5

i A. One or more A.1 Restore valve t) 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months valves - OPERABLE sta',as. l inoperable.

l B. Required B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months I Action and associated Ag Completion Time not B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 7 met.

s/

The Note above the ACTIONS table is a method of modifying how the Completion Time is tracked. If this method of modifying how the Completion Time is tracked was applicable only to a specific Condition, the Note would appear in that Condition rather than at the top of the ACTIONS Table.

The Note allows Condition A to be entered separately for each inoperable valve, and Completion Times tracked on a per i valve basis. When a valve is declared inoperable. l

' Condition A is entered and its Completion Time starts. If subsequent valves are declared inoperable, Condition A is entered for each valve and separate Completion Times start and are tracked for each valve.

(continued)

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SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 1.3 9 AMEN 0 MENT NO.

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Completion Times 1.3 1.3 Completion Times 0

EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.3 d)

If the Completion Time associated with a valve in

'43 Condition A expires, Condition B is entered for that valve.

If the Completion Times associated with subsequent valves in Condition A expire, Condition B is entered separately for each valve and separate Completion Times start and are tracked for each valve. If a valve that caused entry into Condition B is restored to OPERABLE status, Condition B is exited for that valve.

Since the Note in this example allows multiple Condition entry and tracking of separate Completion Times, Completion Time extensions do not apply.

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< S4P EXAMPLE 1.3-/{f g.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME ,

A. One channel A.1 Perform Once per inoperable. SR 3.x.x.x. 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months E

A.2 Reduce THERMAL 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months POWER to i 5 50% RTP.

- i B. Required B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months i Action and associated Completion _---

Time not met.

(continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 1.3-10 AMENDMENT NO.

ComplGtion Times 1.3 1.3 Completion Times ,

$ ( Y' .\

EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.3/ i

' inued)

StyP-}

Entry into Condition A offers.a choice between Requirel Action A.1 or A.2. Required Action A.1 has a "Once per" ,

Completion Time, which qualifies for the 25% extension, per SR 3.0.2, to each perfonnance after the initial performance.

If Required Action A.1 is followed and the Required Action is not met within the Completion Time (including the 25%

extension allowed by SR 3.0.2), Condition B is entered. If Required Action A.2 is followed and the Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months is not met, Condition B is entered. l

' l If after entry into Condition B, Required Action A.1 or A.2 l is met, Condition B is exited and operation may then :

continue in Condition A. ;

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i SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 1.3-11 AMENOMENT NO.

Completion Times 1.3 j

1.3 Cornpletion Times EXAMPLE 1.3 SN EXAMPLES (continued) g.3 ,

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One A.1 Verify affected 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months subsystem subsystem 4 inoperable. isolated. AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter 651 A.2 Restore subsystem 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to OPERABLE status.

B. Required B.1 8e in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Action and associated AND Completion Time not 8.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months met.

Required Action A.1 has two Completion Times. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time begins at the time the Condition is entered and each "Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter" interval begins upon performance of Required Action A.I.

i If after Condition A is entered, Required Action A.It not met within either the initial 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or any subsequent 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months interval from the previous performance (including the 25%extensionallowedbySR3.0.2),ConditionBisentered.

(continued) 4 SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 1.3-12 . AMENDMENT NO. -

Completion Times 1 1.3 1.3 Completion Times 0 gg -

s[+'tinued)

EXAMPLE 1.3-7 4.t EXAMPLES g.3 The Completion Time clock for Condition A does not stop after Condition B is entered, but continues from the time Condition A was initially entered. If Required Action A.1 is met after Condition B is entered, Condition B is exited and operation may continue in accordance with Condition A, provided the Completion Time for Required Action A.2 has not expired.

IMMEDIATE When "Immediately" is used as a Completion Time, the COMPLETION TIME Required Action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. j l

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t SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 1.3-13 AMENDMENT NO.

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3.1.10 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ,

3.1.10 Boration Systems - Shutdown p

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LC0 3.1.10 One of f:llwin boron y injection flow path shall be f OPERABLE and ::p:ble :f b:! ; p=:r:d fr= :n OPEa^SLE y -t g =:rgen;y p=:r ::"rce. ,y

a. A flow path from either boric acid makeup tank via either one of the boric acid makeup pumps, the blending tee or the gravity feed connection and any charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if the boric acid makeup tank in Specification 3.1.11.a is OPERABLE, y

c

b. The flow path from the refueling water tank via .ither a ,

D' charging pump or a high pressure safety injection pump to the Reactor Coolant System if the refueling water storage tank in Specification 3.1.11.b is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME bow snu.t'aJ A. a#the:bev8 flow A.1 Suspend all Imediately None paths 2bPERABLE 4e - operations involving q ::p:bl: if b:in I CORE ALTERATIONS or i l p;= red fr= ::g-s- # $ positive reactivity w OPEPl*LE := rg:acy v g changes.

' p ~er sa"r::.s e

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SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.1-22 AMENDHENT NO. );

g % v ,- @ y .[M en uu$e

.w3 , , , , gygry y _ sp -% ,pj,,,, _

Boration Systems - Shutcown

, 3.1.10 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS O, < SURVEILLANCE

' ' ~ '

FREQUENCY

' + -

'T'NSER.TA SR 3.1.10.f Veriify that at least one of the above 31 days required flow paths is OPERABLE and-nd ,

1:' :: (a r r', pow m pa "+ad s 2 + = tL,'g f is in its correct position.

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y , ,f vyyv %, v vmr vy , ^/5 / ', 5,vv .

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wk ea ae&nd 9-< ecetAc 1 x 7 automtic , tAnr is net locjced, senkdf'or W

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V ctherw;te. se.wcef) l, the wn f

( recgv. rut psa gA i

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s e 3.1-23 AMENDHENT NO.

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INSERT A ~

4 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Verify RWST temperature is within limitQ 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months SR 3.1.10.1 4

=m- - _ -

..................-N0TE-------------------- 1 Only required when the RWST is the source f%

of borated water and the outside temperature is < 40*F or > 100 *F. Q r '

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7 days SR 3.1.10.2 Verify volume of available borated water is within limits.

Verify boron concentration is within 7 days SR 3.1.10.3 limits.

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3.1.13 g

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3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS Qo N

3.1.13 Special Test Exceptions (STE)N;CC; '.~ dtPcuse.r . Phydc5 - Tc w3 b

During erformance of PHYSICS TESTS, tAa seq"4--~~t #

LCO 3.1.13 the. oHowing LCOs twv be. susPendesl::sf LCO 3.1.7, "Regurating Control Element Assembly (CEA) h'D I Insertion Limits";

LCO 3.1.8, "Part Length CEA Insertion Limits";

LCO 3.2.2, LCO 3.2.3, " Planar POWER

' AZIMUTHAL Radial TILT Peaking (Factors';Tq)"; and LCO 3.2.5, ' Axial Shape Index';

%\ % M 3 - ,,. h -" r- d d> provided:

a. THERMAL POWER

Y;^ ;?it :# :

FMJ, .h".=nokexeee(85% RTP; and (4CC%%#;)y-LHR does not exceed the limit specified in the COLR. t';

b.

APPLICABILITY: H0DE 1 during PHYSICS TESTS..

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME f} yeca' A. Test power ;':n._ f A.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER 15. minutes g 4, . . . s 2 A_ _ t #

,%)tolessthanorequal

) 65% RTP, t

t o " ^ "' ' m 'M' .

V' ' .-

Wa+++= 85% RTP.

B. LkR exceeds the limit B.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER 15 minutes specified in the COLR. to satisfy the LHR limit specified in the COLR.

(continued)

O SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.1-28 AMENDMENT NO.

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bastwa (eManyTartm STE - C:"-- "y, ".'.:..:".

" ;"':ti.., 0C : L: *t:g 3.1.14 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS Ruc*wdy C shantTm.

I 3.1.14 Special]est Exceptions (STE[ ,C: t:r :2 ::: ;;, . ... ... ,-

LCO 3.1.14 Dm hig performance of PHYSICS TESTS the following LCOs may l be suspended: I LCO 3.1.5, " Control Element Assembly (CEA) Alignment;" and LCO 3.1.7, " Regular.ing CEA Insertion Limits;"

provided that: :

a. Only the canter CEA (CEA #1) is misaligned, or only l regulating CEA Group 6 is inserted beyond the transient insertion Limit of LCO 3.1.7; and

b. The LHR and DNBR do not exceed the limits specified in the COLR. i APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTIONS l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. LHR or DNBR outside A.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER 15 minutes the limits specified to restore LHR and in the COLR. DNBR to within limits.

B Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.1-30 AMENDMENT NO.

NIV89y bEedsafTesti$

STE - C;;t:r 0:e "i::'i;ns;;t : f;T

":;"': tin; CEe ::; . S ... : :...

3.1.14 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

NOTE-------------------

Only required with THERMAL POWER < 20% RTP SR 3.1.14.1 Verify LHR and DNBR do not exceed the Continuously limits specified in the COLR using any OPERABLE CPC channel.

NOTE-------------------

Only required with THERMAL POWER t 20% RTP SR 3.1.14.2 Verify LHR and DNBR do not exceed limits Continuously specified in the COLR using the COLSS or, if COLSS is out of service, using any OPERABLE CPC channel.

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i SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.1-31 AMENDMENT NO.

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t RPS Instrumentation-Operating 3.3.1 p SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

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SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.9 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each 24 months

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channel, including bypass removal functions.

24 months SR 3.3.1.10 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each CPC channel.

Using the incore detectors, determine the Once after each SR 3.3.1.11 refueling prior shape annealing matrix elements to be used by the CPCs. to exceeding 85% RTP O

V Perform a CHAN NCTIONAL TEST on euch Once within SR 3.3 .12 92 days prior

="+a='tishbypass re oval function.

to each reactor D g; D startup SR 3.3.1.13 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Neutron detectors are excluded.

......................--------------------- l Verify RPS RESPONSE TIME is within limits. 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS 5

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3.3-7 AMENDHENT NO.

$ SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 t

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RPS InstrumentatiotL-Operating i 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1 1 (page 1 of 2)

Reactor Protective System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED SURVEILLANCE FUNCTION CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE P

Linear Power Level- High 1,2 SR 3.3.1.1 s 111.0% RTP 1.

1R 3.3.1.4 SR 3.3.1.6 i SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.8 i SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.13 .N (yO I

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Logsrithmic Pewer Level- High(a) 2(b,) 3g 3,3,g,g RTP l 2.

SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.13 Pressurizar Pressure - High 1,2 SR 3.3.1.1 s 2385 psia 3.

SR 3.3.1.7 <

SR 3.3.1.9 l SR 3.3.1.13 4 Pressurf ter Pressure - Low fC) 1,2 - SIL 3.3.1.1 a 1700 psfa 1 SR 3.3.1.7 e

SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.13

5. Containment Pressure - High - 1,2 SR 3.3.1.1 s 3.4 pstg i SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.13

6. Steam Generator 1 Pressure Low 1,2 SR 3.3.1.1 m 729 psia SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.13 i

7. Steam Generator 2 Pressure Low 1,2 SR 3.3.1.1 t 729 psia SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 ,

SR 3.3.1.13 (continued)

L 3 (a) Trip ypassed when THE M L POWER is

1E.4% RTP. Bypass shall be automatically removed when THE W L p.\

POWER i RTP. Trip may be manually bypassed during physics testing pursuant to LC044 40, .

3.l. O g I(b) When an closed.

(c) The setpoint may be decreased to a e imum value of 300 psfa, as pressurizer pressure is reduced, provided I e the n between pressurizer re and the setpoint is maintained s 400 psia. Trips may be bypassed .J i.

wh ssurizer pressure is 7 psfa. Bypass shall be automatically removed when pressuriser pressure is

, a The setpoln automatically increased to the normal setpoint as pressurizer pressure is in ed. ,

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, SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.3-8 AMENOMENT NO.

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b. , -..

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fT RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown 3.3.2 7

o i ACTIONS (continued) ;

'[:

REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

'y CONDITION

,0 B. Two RPS logarithmic B.1 --------NOTE---------

power level trip LCO 3.0.4 is not

' channels inoperable. applicable.

4' t 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Place one channel in I- by) ass and place the otler in trip.

,~%i f opn%* ~4 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months I

C. One 2"+- -ti: 4bfpass C .1 Disable bypass removal channel I channel, inoperable.

01 C.2.1 Place affected I hour 5 automatic trip channel in bypass or I 4 trip.

AND C.2.2 Restore bypass Prior to removal channel and entering MODE 2 associated automatic following next trip channel to MODE 5 entry OPERABLE status.

[

(' e*~j i D. Two N q bypass -----------NOTE-------------

removal channels

/LC03.0.4isnotapplicable.

~

inoperable. -----------------------------

D.1 Disable bypass 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

- channels. ,

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.e 3.3-12 AMENDMENT NO.~

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 l

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h RPS Instrumentatien-Shutdown

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3.3.2 k * -

ACTIONS 3)

's CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME s

y D. (continued) D.2 Place one affected 1. houri automatic trip channel in bypass and place the other in trip. .

E. Required Action and E.1 Open all RTCBs. 11 hour1.273148e-4 days 0.00306 hours 1.818783e-5 weeks 4.1855e-6 months ,

associated Completion Time not met.

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY i

SR 3.3.2.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of each logarithmic 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months power channel.

SR 3.3.2.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 92 days logarithmic power channel.

SR 3.3. . Perform a CHANNEL UNCTIONAL TEST on each Once within autoshWbypass r oval function. 92 days prior i to each reactor 94$ startup -

(continued) l J

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N SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3'.3-13 AMENDMENT NO.~ l t

- _ - - . . _ . . , . ~~

m.

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.5 e

Table 3.3.5 1 {page 1 of 1) ,

Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systes Instrumentation

~.

APPLICABLE MODES OR CTEER $P[CIFl[D CONDITIONS ALLOWABLE VALUE FUNCTION

1. Safety Injection Actuation $tsna1I *I 1,2,3 s 3.7 psig

a. Containment Pressure - Higg) t 1700 psia

b. Pressurizer Pressure - Low isupp.I l

2.

Containment $ pray Actuation $lgnal g 1,2,3 s 15.0 psig

a. Containment Pressure - High.High

3. Containment Isolation Actuation $fgnal 1,2,3 s 3.7 psig

a. Containment Pressure - High

4. Main Steam Isolation $1gnal 1,2(d) 3(d) a 729 psia

s. Steam Generator Pressure - Low (C} ,

5. Recirculation Actuatiod $tgnal 1.2.3.4 19.27% t tap span a 17.73%

a. Refueling Water $torage Tank Level- Low l

[

g.I

6. Emergency Feedwater Actuation $lgnal SG f. '

(EFA$-1) 1,2,3 2 20%

a. Steam Generator Level- Lov s 140 psid ,)

b. $G Pressure Difference - High M t 729 psia

c. Steam Generator Pressure - Low I

A

7. Emergency Feedwater Actuation $lgnal $3 i (IFA$.2) 1,2,3 a 20%

a. Steam Generator Level- Low 5 140 psid

b. $G Pressure Difference - High a 729 psia

c. Steam Generator Pressure - Low M (a) Automatic $1A5 also initiates a Containment Cooling Actuation Signal (CCAS).

-p

) The setpoint may be decreased to a nimum value of 300 psia, as pressurf ter pressureTrips is reduced, provided

, the margin betwegressurfrer p psia ure and 2 _ggtpoint is maintained 8 400 psia..

may be bypassed typass shall M .O ss be automatically removed pressure i <

Ola when pressurft .

pressure is a W. ' = Th all be automatically increased to the normal setpoint as pressurfter pressure is g 3 (c) The setpotet may be decreased as steam s reduced, provided the margin between steam pressure and the setpoint is maintained s 200 psi. The setpolnt shall be automatically increased to the normal setpoint as steam pressure is intressed.

(d) The Main Steam Isolation Signal Function ($ team Generator Pressure- Lov) is not required to be OPERABLE when all associated valves isolated by the MS!$ Function are closed and de-activated.

G) WUc SMS 4 3,tud 4 cA, u( q Y

=

Ac.tu we~ str^- .

Cos45) .

SAN ON0rRE--UNIT 2 3,3-26 AMENDHENT NO.

61 Te CPIS l

$$ 3.3.8 y

t L

E 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION e ,

3.3.8 Containment Purge Isolation Signal (CPIS)

LCO 3.3.8 One CPIS channel shall be OPERABLE.

)

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, During CORE ALTERATIONS, radiated fuel assemblies within i s- vur?us mov a... vi t containment.

NOTE----------------------------

Only required when the penetration is not isolated by e4-Wat8- manual '~+ ^= closed and de-activa valve [,'Jor blind flange l.'jed automatic va ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CPIS Actuation Logic, A.1 Enter applicable Immediately A.

or one or more Conditions and required channels of Required Actions for containment area affected valves of radiation monitors LC0 3.6.3, '

inoperable in MODES 1, " Containment 2, 3, and 4. Isolation Valves,"

made inoperable by CPIS instrumentation.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met in AND MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued) e SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.3-26 AMENDMENT NO.

i

.w.

CRIS 3.3.9

! 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.9 Control Room Isolation Signal (CRIS)

LCO 3.3.9 One CRIS channel shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS

. ___ ..................---N0TE------------- ,

I The provisions of LCO 3.0.3 are not applicable.

REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION A. CRIS Manual Trip, A.1 --------NOTE---------

Actuation Logic, or Place Control Room one required channel Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACUS) in

'j -b otAgaseous radiation . Q3, w/ isolation mode if .

~

MODE i [Tgy;7 1,2,3,or4.Ftdmonitorsinoperablein automatic transfer to A

isolation mode y

9 ....$...$.......____

Place one CREACUS train in emergency 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months mode.

(continued) 4 3.3-40 AMEhDMENT NO.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2

CRIS I

3.3.9

\

l e- ACTIONS (continued) 4 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. CRIS Manual Trip, B.1 --------NOTE---------

M Actuation Logic, or Place CREACUS in r k requiredfgaseous isolation mode if ,3 l g;g radiation monitors automatic transfer to inoperable in MODE 5 isolation mode ,

or 6, or during inoperable. L movement of irradiated i) Place one CREACUS train in emergency Imediately mode.

OE j B.2.1 Suspend movement of ;

irradiated fuel assemblies. Imediately -

M t B.2.2 Suspend positive '

n g reactivity additions.

Immediately s l I

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Perform a CHANNEL CHECK on the required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ;

SR 3.3.9.1

control room radiation monitor channel.

(continued) t l' t

!O 3.3-41 AMEN 0 MENT NO,.

f it SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 i

k i

Source Range Monitoring Channels 3.3.13 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.13 Source Range Monitoring Channels LCO 3.3.13 Two channels of source range monitoring instrumentation shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3, 4, and 5, with the reactor trip circuit breakers open or Control Element Assembly (CEA) Drive System not capable of CEA withdrawal.

ACTIONS m

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Suspend all Imediately channels inoperable. operations involving positive reactivity additions.

10 AND g,g.4-A.2 Perform SOM 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months verificatio in accordance ith AND SR 4.1.^ if Once per q .3 T, 0 F, r S 3 .1. 2{., ,yi 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months i T,,, s 200*F thereafter SWPP 1 i /

U F I g t.1.1 I

u SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.3-52 AMENDMENT NO. -

anu C / ktYfressure, leggwstun, 5

g3 3.4 REACTO 00LANTSYSTEM(RCS) ressure, Temperature, and Flo Limits 3.4.1 R RCS parameters for pressurizer pressure, cold le!hin the LCO 3.4.1 temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be wi K -- p p limits specified below:

-P ALSeRT Pressurizer pressure t 2025 psia and s 2275 psia;

- a.

b. RCS en'd '=n +*mrat nr* f Y \ :

4 ' .imit not aoolicableaS#rg7eggsyy i

V . For RTP s 30% /I.

2. For 30% < RTP < 70%, 535'F 5 T e s 557 F, N 3. For RTP t 70%, 544*F s T. s 557 F: and ~

N' (

i 3rtT ;

c. RCS total flow rate (is specified by the COLRJ '

U W'I - lkI4966'*19e and 4 sit.626 Wir !

APPLICABILITY: H0DE 1. ;

r hm -----..--------------------NOTE----.----------------.--

Pressurizer pressure limit does not apply during: )

S+ -

et THERMAL POWER ramp > 5% RTP per minute; or

a. 2

b. THERMAL PC'.4ER step > 10% RTP. ,

q s at 4

c1

-I i ACTIONS COMPLETION TIME CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION

) Restoreparameter(s) 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months A. Pressurizer pressure A.1 or RCS flow rate not to within limit. -

within limits.

\ M ontin'ued p 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 2.

B.

associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. * -

3 4-1

^" " "

SAN ONOFRE.-UNIT 2, e

i INSERT "A" @ ggpz,3 $

s

az

1. Ior THERMAL POWER lessa equal to 30% RTP, FsT5e F

2. For THERMAL POWER less than 70% RTP and greater than 30% RTP, 535'F s eT sq$af g,3

3. For THERMA OWER greater 4 0r equal to 70% RTP, 544*F s Te s *F.

.fs8 3%fd* 3 l

O g &y]p. UKt

-- ~ - " -

.ges 9N6(Fusw".1*al*9* **~'"~~ ..'.. '

, 3_,y. 's ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION TIME

< CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION C.1 Restore cold leg 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months C. RCS cold leg temperature not within temperature to within limits. limits.

Reduce THERHAL POWER 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months D. Required Action and D.1 associated Completion to 5 30% RTP.

Time of Condition C .,

not met.

~*eh SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FREQUENCY SURVEILLANCE 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.4.1.1 Verify pressurizer pressure a 2025 psia and s 2275 psia.

cy -

~ ~~f58 erify RCS cold leg temperature: 4%flL.3I12 hours SR 3.4.1.2 1. For 30% < RTP < 70%, 535 F s T. 5 h F,

.3 2. For RTP 2 70%, 544*F s Te 5 F ggpag SS8lSu pl.S _

...------------------------NOTE---------- -----ing. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Required to be met in H0DE 1 with all RCPs runn SR 3.4.1.3 Verify RCS total flow ratehs within limyd

, q}ci,% in wc wg .

fyg,3 lll8lb lr an$

6 I77.6 Et */Ar .

1 AMEN 0HENT NO.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.4-2

INSERT "B" b M " Verify RCS cold leg temperature:

Y 1. For THERMAL POWER less than or equal to 30% RTP, g 522*F s Tc 5 558'F

2. For THERMAL POWER less than 70% RTP and greater than 30%

RTP, 535'F s Te s 558'F

3. For THERMAL POWER greater than or equal to 70% RTP, 3 544*F s Te s 558aF."

l l . j 5

q.

[ RCS Minimum Terperature for Criticality j

- 3.4.2 3

)

i -

3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.2 RC!, Minimum Temperature for Criticality g

.-J.y LC0 3.4.2 ' Each RCS loop cold leg temperature (T,) shall be n M ~~

l A

APPLICABILITY: 1 MODE I, RTP s 30% and T < 535'F, anOp dA/3fkT k<-I MODE 2. K,f, a 1.0 anc T, < 535 F.

c gg ed h ]

ACTIONS

& ?*r &>$ 3 $$$Wsf"$N o COMPLETION TIME CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Be in H00E 3. 30 minutes A. T, in one or more RCS .

loops not within .

limit.

.[j StiRVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FREQUENCY SURVEILLANCE

($Q) 52.2 hypt.3 Verify RCS T, in each loop a [F. 30 minutes SR 3.4.2.1 5 l O

e AMENDHENT NO.

,$] SANONOFRE--UNITk 3.4-3 f; .- .

a a INSERT"A"h as.,+...o s

" MODE 1 , THERMAL POWER equa nd T, < 535*F, and".

e

k D RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentatien 3.4.15 p

9 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

.- t -

(

3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation LCO 3.4.15 The following RCS leakage detection instrumentation shall be OPERABLE:

a. One containment sump inlet flow monitoring system; and

b. One containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring system; or one containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitoring system.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS

" " REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Required containment ------------NOTE-------------

sump inlet flow LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.

monitor inoperable. -----------------------------

j

[T A./$. Restore containment sump inlet flow 30 days monitoring system to OPERABLE status.

\ (continued) J k la./ Ra, arm GR M ' / liy%,sj

% .\

An f-3.4-37 AMENDHENT NO.

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2

l Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 l l

1 ACTIONS COMPLETION TIME CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Verify the OPERABLE 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months A. (continued) door is closed in the affected air lock.

AND A.2 Lock the OPERABLE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months door closed in the affected air lock.

AND A.3 --------NOTE---------

Air lock doors in high radiation areas may be verified locked closed by administrative means.

Verify the OPERABLE Once per 31 days door is locked closed in the affected air lock.

B. One or more

NOTES------------

containment air locks . Required Actions B.1, with containment air B.2, and 8.3 are not I \

lock riock applicable if both doors anism erable in the same air lock are inoperable and i Condition C is entered. ,

2. ntry and exit of g 3 c.ntainment is 3 pt nnissible under the l

c.ntrol of a dedicated

s dividual. Suff-l

~~J. % h a a w J c. .........................

L w u.c z.c4 au. <

(continued)

Y dybic4Sk. ..

J AMENDMENT NO.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.6 4

p a..a... - -

n

[ft' i

Containment Air Locks l 3.6.2 W i

--J SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY h ;

iv

>OoT ES SR 3.6.2.2 -------------------WOMd------------------- . . _ . . _ . .

l. Only required to be performed upon entry

) _ into containment.

r ...........................................

(

Verify only one door in the air lock can be 184 days g.

opened at a time. .

- G a s.o.A . s.+ ~@A -

G s w- -

O l

l l

\

l

s jk -

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.6-7 AMENDMENT NO.

I r

eq - -

p-e

^

Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 r

3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves LCO 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS

NOTES------------------------------------

1. Penetration flow paths except for 42 inch purge valve penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for system (s) made inoperable by containment isolation valves.

4. Enter applicable Conditiens and Required Actions of LC0 3.6.1,

" Containment," when leakige results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.

)

The nenvie4nme nf i rn ? nae: as, ogy; ,,,bi c . HL ,/

5.

.. 'Lt w 'f"W M" 6 /. Section A, B, C, D, and E isolati valves are located in th CS)L

_--------------------------- -3r -------------------------------------

CORUTTIDN COMPLETION TIME REQUIRED ACTION A. ---------NOTE--------- A.1 Isolate the affected 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Only applicable to penetration flow path penetration flow paths by use of at least with two containment one closed and isolation valves. de-activated

automatic valve, closed manual valve, One or more blind flange, or penetration flow paths check valve with flow with one containment through the valve isolation valve secured.

inoperable exce?t for purge valve leacage AND not within limit.

(continued) a bL 3.6-8 AMENDMENT NO.

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2

q. .

r b; '

' Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3 -----------------------------------N0TE------------------------------------

Section A, B, C, D, and E isolation valves are located in the LCS. 3 l _________________________________________________________ ________________

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.1 )

C. Verify each 42 inch purge valve is 31 days )

I

,g sealed closed except for one purge valve in -

a penetration flow path while in Condition 0 of this LCO.

31 days SR 3.6.3.2 Veri each 8 inch purge valve is closed except when 3I, g the 8 inch purge valves are open for pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or for Surveillances that require the valves to be open.

SR 3.6.3.3y 3 Y ,g

' -------------------NOTEA-------------------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may 3 be verified by use of administrative means.

M ___________ ______________________________

Verify each containment isolation manual valve and 31 days blind flange that is located outside containment and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed, except for containment isolation valves that are open under administrative controls.

& , (continued)

2. , S t. S.0A 5 ** kO6 . i M

I-i f T.

p y SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.6-13 AMENDMENT NO.

e asSee =** **

d1 "9 y 9 ' ** **q *Opae

Containment Isolation '/al t.o. & h*

p _ _

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY i SR 3.6.3.4 3

NOTE--------------------

I h

kva-ves_andblindflangesinhighradiationareasmay l

i be verified by use of administrative means, g.3 ,

Verify each containment isolation manual valve and Prior to blind flange that is located inside containment and entering MODE 4 required to be closed during accident conditions is from MODE 5 if closed, except for containment isolation valves that 'not performed are open under administrative controls. within the previous 92 days In accordance I

l g.)

SR 3.6.3.5J with the

( (Vetiiy the isolation time of each Section A and B

( power operated and each automatic containment Inservice Testing Program L isolation valve is within limits.

3.6.3.6

NOTE--------------------

I I

q.I I

[Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria l of SR 3.6.1.1 in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions.

Perform leakage rate testing for containment purge 184 days Vvalveswithresilientseals. AND Within 92 days after opening the valve._ _

(continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.6-14 AMENDMENT NO.

Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3

._s SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.7 $

3 ,l

NOTE-------------------- L LThe provisions of the Inservice Testing Program are not applicable when the valves are secured open.

15..........____ ..__ ...._______ _______..

Verify each Section D1 and D2 containment isolation In accordance valve is OPERABLE. with the Inservice

- 7 Testing Program %3 2, SRS,0.44 M MI ' .

s*- andthoseSP[h, associate those 2L Specifica pertaining to each valve or system in which it is installed.

S 3.6.3.8dy 24 months Idif>' I Ven ry each Section A, B, C, and E automatic containment isolation valve actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

1 l

l l

I

\

e

.)

l SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.6-15 AMEtiDMENT NO.

Containment Spray and Cooling Systems 3.6.6.1

) 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.6.1 Containment Spray and Cooling Systems LCO 3.6.6.1 Two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One containment spray A.1 Restore containment 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months train inoperable, spray train to 4 OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months s associated Completion I

Time of Condition A AND not met.

B.2 Be in MODE 4. 84 hours9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months i

C. One containment C.1 Restore containment 7 days cooling train cooling train to c--

inoperable. OPERABLE status.

(continued) 6 l A!$.0 i

I

! 10 4 h l _ g

m.= of Au /

4 to 44. Leo i J

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.6-18 AMENDMENT N0.

ar -s

f.-

- assys 3.7.1 e

. ') . 9 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS Nl s IANc3.7,/~[

3.7.1 Hali) Steam Safety Valves (HSSVs) i' -

~

The HSSVs shall be OPERABLE as specified in E LCO 3.7.1 pes .oy%Gh dmy unnre Thl)le 3.7.nAvw) l;--2 . &a MODES 1, 2, and 3.

APPLICABILITY:

ACTIONS - --------------------------~~

..................................... NOTE ----- V. ....................

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSS COMPLETION TIME -

REQUIRED ACTION CONDITION .

4 Reduce power to less One or more required A.1 the A. g.3 MSSV per SG than %Lsv0 t: applicable o-NNN4' RTP _

inoperable. listed inettTF"5AV S g9@ mw s.r.i-t 4 -

TN<MT 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months B.1 Be in HODE 3.

B..

Required Action and associated Completion A_HQ Time not met.

g Og B.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months g

d One or more Steam Generators with,less J' than two MSSVs .'

g OPERABLE per.SG.

, I'v6L J /2 l7M*.

2 )Qgdygg h14Kra & LINacLA PoweA ree c.eror~r m eccadcwceggrgy,, e S4pt S ,

Q /

c AMENDMENT NO 3.7 1 SAN ON0fRE.-UNIT 2 e

e

~

l l

MSSVs 3.7.1 l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 1: ~

... l FREQUENCY

' SURVEILLANCE i

NOTE--------------------

SR 3.7.1.1 Only required to be perfomed in MODES 1 and 2. ... . ..

l In accordance

Verify each required MSSV liftGTessus-- with the within limits per une sw-min accordance inservice i with the inservic esting h aram, testing program

(}j) ;

Table 3.71-2] .

l f

I e

P l

l

]

O 3.7-2 AMENDMENT NO.

, l SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 1

b

/

l

^

gL. ; .x - . . . - .

l P

.5 apple. men + 3

?

Table 3.7.1-1 (page 1 of 1)

Maximum Allowable Linear Power Level-High Trip Setpoints versus OPERABLE MSSVs MINIMUM NUMBER OF MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE MSSVs PER STEAM GENERATOR LINEAR POWER REQUIRED OPERABLE LEVEL HIGH TRIP

(% RTP) 8 98.6 7 86.3 6 74.0 5 61.6 4 MODE 3 l

\

3 MODE 3 2 MODE 3 l

l l

G 1

9 I

ob Onyt- %N 2 i

yu =m , ,

2 '

} .,

, l hplAemerth 3 Q ,

4 !

I. - Table 3.7.1-2 (page -1 of 1)- !

y (MainSteamSafetyValves(LiftSettings)

- VALVE NUMBER LIFT SETTING

Steam Generator Steam Generator (psig)- !

1 #2 2PSV-8401 2PSV-8410 1085**

l 2PSV-8411 1092 .;

~

2PSV-8402 2PSV-8412 1099 2PSV-8403 2PSV-8413 1106 ;

2PSV-8404 2PSV-8414 1113 ,

2PSV-8405 2PSV-8406 2PSV-8415 1120- l 2PSV-8416 1127 2PSV-8407 J

2PSV-8408 2PSV-8417 1134 2PSV-8409 2PSV-8418 1140 .

t t

The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure. Each MSSV has an l as-found tolerance of +2%/-3%. Following testing according to Specification 4.0.5, MSSVs will be set within +/-1% of the specified lift f setpoint. '

- Valves 2PSV-8401 and 2PSV-8410 have an as-found lift setting of 1100 psia with a tolerance of +1%/-3%. ]

h f

i i .

ji i L

f & $* 1 i

1

~MSIVs' 1 3.7.2

.v

_P SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l p: I si SURVEILLANCE -FREQUENCY

-h -.

fi t SR 3.7.2.1 Verify closure time of each MSIV is In accordance j s 8.0 second on an actual or - with the i

., (simulated ac uation signa . inservice . ~ , - .a cts; testing program y

Ft . :

i p ;

P !

e !

I

h. 8 Y

y.

I e

t q

i i

\

l l

r l

I r .

p !

W i ht a

y ,

k 1

[

p. . . _ i t

i SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.7-6 AMENDMENT N0. i

~

?

e

@,q.;-~ ., . , 1 .

7{

% ; ' .. . ,, s

,,,,,;,j -

m. -

r se r 1,' i!

MFIVs n

~'

3.7.3 .

$l[v u +-

3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS i:

I

' 4.1 sE r fj SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FREQUENCY f~ SURVEILLANCE Ni Verify the closure time _of each MFIV Jg2,- In accordance t.

t SR 3.7.3.1 _

with the p s 10 secondsjon an actual or simulatgs

({~ctuation signa 14 inservice j testing program

[

b 6:

i

{l-h 9 :

6 SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.7-8 AMENDMENT NO.

.k ADVs 3.7.4 t

& 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS i9. 3.7.4 Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs)

LCO 3.7.4 One ADV per required Steam Generator (SG) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3

- MODE 4 when steam generator is being relied upon for heat removal.

1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l l

A. One required ADV A.1 --------NOTE--------- I inoperable. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.

..................... l Restore ADV to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OPERABLE status. l B. Two ADVs inoperable. B.1 Restore one ADV to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OPERABLE status.

C. Backup nitrogen gas C.1 Restore backup 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months supply system ca city nitrogen gas supply ty) s 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for system capa for Y*'"

(continued)

I / /

(ma er mes repu'ual ADV)) A ,

$ SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3 .7.-7 AMENDMENT NQ.

'. 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System i

4- >LCO 3.7.5 Three AFW trains shall be OPERABLE.

............................N0TE-.-...-.-.----------------..

Only one AFW train, which includes a motor driven pump, is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4.

i APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal. i ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION E

One steam supply to A.1 Restore steam supply 7 days A.

turbine driven AFW to OPERABLE status.

pump inoperable. T B. One AFW tr in B.1 Restore AFW train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable for reasons OPERABLE status. {

v other than Condition A f4T in MODE 1, 2, or 3. l C. Two AFW trains with C.1 Restore one AFW train 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months two motor driven pumps to OPERABLE status inoperable in MODES 1, 2, or 3

' (continued)-

AW y w &;s /*" &%"7 4/*Yum .4 me/ 0**n

{l SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.7-9 AMENDMENT NO.

.y

7 h 00'3.ia % e % -d Hakeup Systea '

4* 3.7.7.1 1

'h; 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

,}

3.7.7.1 Component Cooling Water (CCW) Safety Related Makeup System f

f fwo trains of Componen't Cooling Water (CCW) Safety Related I. LCO 3.7.7.1 Makeup System Shall be OPERABLE with a contained volume in the

' Primary Plant Makeup Storage Tank a the level specified in Figure 3.7.7.1-1. l l

.............................N0TE.--- --..-......-.............

LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.

l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS !

4 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION i

i One CCW Safety Related A.1 Restore the flow path 7 days A.

Makeup flow path to OPERABLE status.

inoperable. .

1 Two CCW Safety Related 8.1 Restore one CCW 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months B.

Makeup flow paths Safety Related Makeup in:,perable. flow path to OPERABLE status. ,

OR/AND j 8Ql0f The Primary Plant Makeup Storage Tank B.2 Restore the Primary Level < that required Plant Makeup Storage by Figure 3.7.7.1-1. Tank level to OPERABLE status.

(continued)r O

) @ g.' wilt A. .ruA $ M d AV Ix<erry "

SAN OMFRE.-UNIT 2 3.7 18 AMENDMENT NO.

{

r 1

L

ctwsafetyRelatedMakeupSysten\ ;

3.7.7.1

.i '

l

[

I' ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months [

C. Required Ac'tions and f l associated Completion . !

~

Times of Conditions A AtlQ i

or 8 not met. 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months C.2 Be in MODE 5.

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY 4

7 days .'

SR 3.7.7.1.1 Verify the contained water volume in the i Primary Plant Makeup Storage Tank is within its limits.

In accordance i

")- SR 3.7.7.1.2 Verify each CCW Safety Related Makeup pump develops the required differential pressure with inservice r testing prograi !

I on recirculation flow.

l i

')

SR 3.7.7.1.3 Measure CCW Leakage. 24 months I L

T N$

Ql $ g g/srk ffeWIfag f fysear "U 3.7 19 AMENDMENT NO.

d t'

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2

- 1

==...sw.= , n e.w. . . . . - ,,

I CCW Safety Related Makeup Systea 2.1.1.1 3

p TOTAL ALLOWABLE CCW LEAKAGE VERSUS THE PPMU TANK LEVEL 76-60 tu 50 Y9 30-

/ !

y l

.u-g-

/

l 0 ...........

9 10111213141516171 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

- ALLOWABLE LEAKAGE,in gpm e.

Figure 2.7.7.11 b

h &y ffe mu be Y'

.(,Isseer "c

j- SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.7-20 AMENDMENT NO.

4 i,' .

t

4 DELETED INTENTIONALLY i

i SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.7-18 AMENDMENT NO. l l

l

Ik[O DELETED INTENTIONALLY I

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.7-19 AMENDMENT NO.

l b$kf DELETED INTENTIONALLY l l

l l

I i

l r

SAN ON0FRF--UNIT 2 3.7-20 AMENDMENT NO.

y:mm m.m s- . . , , _ .

9 kt "

CREACUS h 3.7.11 9

Y .

ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

-f CONDITION E i

$ Imediately C. (continued) C.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

- AND

} Imediately t

C.2.2 Suspend movement of e irradiated fuel assemblies. ,

e D. Two CREACUS trains D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

E. Two CREACUS trains E.1 Suspend CORE Immediately inoperable in MODES 5 ALTERATIONS.

or 6, or during movement of irradiated AND _

fuel assemblies.

E.2 Suspend movement of Immediately :

irradiated fuel assemblies.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Q-SR 3.7.11.1 Operate each CREACUS train for 31 da na t 15 minutes. D TEST

' SIS h j; (continued) ke 8 SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.7-25 AMENDMENT NO.

h.

t A i

ML JUuf bcD = Uptf dLing j 3.8.1 i 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating ,

LCO 3.8.1 'The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE: )

l

a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission i network and the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power !

Distribution System; and j

b. Two diesel. generators (DGs) each capable of supplying i one train of the onsite Class IE AC Electrical Power !

Distribution System. l l

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME j A. One required offsite A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months circuit inoperable. for required OPERABLE l offsite circuit. 3 Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter a q. s A.2 Restore required 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months _

offsite circuit to 3- ]

OPERABLE status. g g g Q disco j

)

(Continued' SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.8-1 AMENDMENT NO F

AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 -

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. .--.....-NOTE--------- 8.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Required Action B.3.1 for the OPERABLE or B.3.2 shall be required offsite M completed if this circuits.

Condition is entered. Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months

..--.-.-.--...--....-- thereafter One required DG M inoperable.

B.2 Declare required 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months from feature (s) sup)orted discovery of l by the inoperaale DG Condition B I inoperable when its concurrent with .

redundant required inoperability of l features is redundant I inoperable. required i feature (s)

M B.3.1 Detemine OPERABLE DG 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is not inoperable due to common cause failure.

9_R' B.3.2 Perfom SR 3.8.1.2 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months f for OPERABLE DG.

E ^**'

B.4 Restore required DG 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months L i 4^ii.5 l to OPERABLE status. g - -

l

[ Gdaphr#fd85404^1 J

/

n 4 M rrinaufLC4j ,-

-. p(continued) I SAN Or.0FRE--UNIT 2 3.8-2 AMENDMENT NO. i 1

I l

fa[PS@ inverters cper .

ACTIONS (con ued) /

DITION i

[ REQUIRED ACTION COMPLET!CN TIME A \

Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months (7equired Action and associated Completion (

jTimenotmet [,1 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months L

[ [ 6gdictEM b

_-j A$

. Be in MODE 5.

k 1.V /

jo -

1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

(

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Verify correct inverter voltage and 7 days SR 3.B.7.1 '

alignment to required AC vital buses.

. L --y

.........N0TE---------

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9 .

with one AC vital bus de-energized.

B. One required B.1 Restore inverter 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Train C or Train to OPERABLE D inverter status.

inoperable.

t

<k

/

lo l 3.8-35 AMENDMENT NC SAN ONOFRE-. UNIT 2 i

l

Inverte rs - Shutdoen 3.8.8 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.8 Inverters -Shutdown k Q [g rg !*

LCO 3.8.8 ~ '- : shall be OPERABLE to support the onsite Class 1E 7 'C A vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10. " Distribution Systems-Shutdown.' '

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i

A. One or more required A.1 Declare affected Innediately inverters inoperable. required feature (s) inoperable.

98 A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

AHQ A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies. l AND A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.

850 (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3. 3.8-36 AMENDMENT NO.

Distribution Systems-Operating 3.8.9 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating /

}

LCO 3.8.9 Train A and Train B AC; Trains A, B, C, and D DC; and Trains !

A, B, C, and D AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. . .

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

/

A. One AC electrical A.1 Restore AC electrical 8 ours power distribution i gy power distributionsubsysteminomerahlal. subsystem to 0PERABLE h g g:

emm es r gnL l ,B. o .. r-w n2 hours _-

C vital bus B. ! Restore AC vital bus (t noperable, re subsystem to OPERABLE (M

$ l rT status. / le hczas Svom

)I M M86 [h.Sl i @#)TY'#

O

-mm y , , u . , r , . ,s o c b[E electrical er distribution 1 Restore DC electrical power distribution q

, 2_'ours

/

h subsystem inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLEy eug status. . . cove

[ "-}l)y +s Mtet

~

) .

l 9 9 w/

. Required Action and .1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, f tut. Q, O e

2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months of

~ -. -

or

.g,y, yv f

f SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.8-38 MENDMENT NO.

ee m - _ m -_ _ ____m

k

- Tr C:ntainment Penetrations 3.9.3

-Y l 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS l

~'

5. .

3.9.3 Containment Penetrations 4 !

r LCO 3.9.3 The containment penetrations shall be in the following ig status:

4 a. The equipment hatch closed and held in place by four ;

bolts; g

$ hgp8f a7 F.b One door in each air lock closed, but both doors of the containment personnel airlock may be open provided that one personnel airlock door is OPERABLE and the plant is in MODE 6 with 23 feet of water above the fuel.

3 c. Each penetration providing direct access from the to containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either: l l

1. closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, ;

blind flange, or equivalent, or l i

2. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Containment Purge System. l APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS, ,

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within ;

containment.

1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION CONPLETION TIME l A. One or more A.1 Suspend CORE Imediately ,

containment ALTERATIONS. ;

penetrations not in required status. MiQ ,

A.2 Suspend movement of. Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

j l

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.9-4 AMENOMENT NO. l l

phl+t.tM .

INSERT "A" O f

b. One door in each air lock closed

NOTE---------------------------------

Both doors of the containment personnel airlock may be open provided:

a. one personnel airlock door is OPERABLE

b. the plant is in MODE 6 or defueled configuration, and

c. with 23 feet of water above the fuel. [

1 I

1 l

l i

% 04 -UniU

SDC and Coolant Circulatien-High Water Level 3.9.4 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.4 Shutdown Cooling (SDC) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level LCO 3.9.4 One SDC loop shall be OPERABLE and in operation.

...........................-N0TES---------------------------

(h L The required SDC loop may be removed from operation for "J s I hour per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months period, provided no operations are g permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant t System boron concentration.

p..___......................................................

.---- OT -------------

2,Acontanmentspraypumpmay e used in place of a low pressure safety injection pump to provide shutdown cooling flow.

............................................................ i APPLICABILITY: MODE 6 with the water level a 23 ft above the top of reactor vessel flange. >

l ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 1

l A. SDC loop requirements A.1 Suspend operations Immediately not met. involving a reduction in reactor coolant boron concentration.

AND (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.9 6 AMENDMENT NO.

Design Features I 4.0 l i*. , l f t 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES l

}

4 ;

d 4.1 Site .

4.1.1 Exclusion Area Boundarv f The exclusion area boundary 'shall be as shown in Figure 4.1-1. f i

I 4.1.2. Low Population Zone (LPZ)

The LPZ shall be as shown in Figure 4.1-2.

4.2 Reactor Core 4.2.1 Fuel Assemblies The reactor shall contain 217 fuel assemblies. Each assembly ;

shall consist of a matrix of Zircaloy clad fuel rods with an :

l initial dioxidecomp)osition of natural or slightly enriched uraniumIntegra (00, as fuel material. :

AbsorberRodsmaybeused.fTheymayinclude: borosilicate glass l 0-B,0 -Si0 componentsF, boron carbide - B.C, zirconium boride ,

gL -- Nal1, 3 gadolin,ium oxide -alioy Gd 0or, stainless erbium oxide ;

Zr substitutions of zirconium 3 steel-. Er 0" filler rod Limited i l

for fuel rods, in accordance with approved a>plications of fuel rod configurations, may be used. Fuel assem>1ies shall be limited l to those fuel designs that have been analyzed with applicable NRC #

staff approved codes and methods and shown by tests or analyses to comply with all fuel safety design bases. A limited number of lead test assemblies that have not completed representative testing may be placed in nonlimiting core regions.

4.2.2 Control Element Assemblies ?

The reactor core shall contain 83 full length and eight part length control element assemblies (CEAs). The control material i t

shall be silver indium cadmium, boron carbide, and inconel as approved by the NRC. ,

l l

l c

(continued) g I SAN'ONOFRE--UNIT 2 4'0-1

. AMENDMENT NO.

i i

p 15

f-r bI! TS Bases C:ntrol 5.4 4

g 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

'i' 5.4 Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control I

T 5.4.1 Changes to the Bases of the TS shall be made under appropriate

- administrative controls.

5.4.2 Changes to the Bases may be made without prior NRC approval provided the changes do not involve either of the following:

3

a. A change in the TS incorporated in the license; or

b. A change to the updated FSAR or Bases that involves an i unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.

5.4.3 The Bases Control Program shall contain provisions to ensure that the Bases are maintained consistent with the UFSAR.

5.4.4 Proposed changes that meet the criteria of (a) or (b) above shall be reviewed and approved by the NRC prior to implementation. Changes to the Bases implemented without prior NRC approval shall provided SgQ 3 to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71I 1

l l

i i i j SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 5.0-6 AMENDMENT NO.

f l

-~ __ _ _ _ _ ____ _ . .

7

- 4 Reporting Requirements ,

. . . 3, , 5,7 5.7 Reporting Requirements 5.7.1.6 RCS PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS REPORT (PTLR) . )

The RCS pressure and temperature limits,' including heatup and '

s .

cooldown rates, criticality, and hydrostatic and leak test limits, .~

f/ shall be established and documented in the PTLR he foranalytical S ecification

$ 3.4.3, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits."

!, methods used to detemine the pressure and tem >erature limits including the heatup and cooldown rates shall se those previously The reactor vessel pressure and' t* reviewed and approved by the NRC.

1 temperature limits, including those for heatup and cooldown rates, shall be determined so that all applicable limits (e.g., heatup and j cooldown limits, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing limits) of the analysis are met. The PTLR, including revisions or supplements thereto, shall be provided to the NRC upon issuance for each reactor vessel fluency period.

f 5.7.1.7 Hazardous Cargo Traffic Report Hazardous cargo traffic on Interstate 5 (1-5) and the AT&SF railway shall be monitored and the results submitted to the NRC Regional Administrator once every three years. 6 5.7.2 Snecial Reports Special Reports may be required covering inspection, test, and maintenance activities. These special reports are determined on an individual basis for each unit and their preparation and submittal are designated in the Technical Specifications.

Special Reports shall be submitted to the U. S. Nucleer Regulatory Commission, Attention: Document Control Desk, Washington, D. C.

20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator of the Regional Office of the NRC, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.4 within the time period specified for each report.

g The following Special Reports shall be submitted:

g se

- dl8, Any abnormal degradation of the containment structure detected e during the tests required by the Pre-Stressed Concrete 7 containment Tendon Surveillance Program shall be reported to the NRC within 30 days. The report shall include a description of the tendon condition, the condition of the concrete (especially at tendon anchorages), the inspection j

procedures, the tolerances on cracking, and the corrective '

action taken.

Y .

i.

(continued) .

.w.

, ; . j.

AMENDMENT'NO.

! SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 . 5.0-20

\

b. . . . . . . _ _ . . _ . . .

~

Spp'emed 3 @

INSERT "A" or MN

a. When a pre-planned alternate method of monitoring ost-accident instrumentation functions is required by Condition 8 of LCO 3.3.11, a report shall be submitted within 30 days from the time the action is required. The report shall outline the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrumentation channels of the function to OPERABLE status.

(

I l

l

\

nt N ht) 0/40 ft "

i j

-r 4 Reporting Requirements 5.7 1

r 5.7 Reporting Requirements

?

? Special Reports (continued) 5.7.( '

. Following each inservice inspection of steam generator (SG) >

tubes, in accordance with the SG Tube Surveillance Program, .

the number of tubes plugged and tubes sleeved in each SG shall be reported to the NRC within 15 days. The complete results of the SG tube inservice inspection shall be submitted to the NRC within 12 months following the completion of the inspection. The report shall include: .

1. Number and extent of tubes inspected, and

2. Location and percent of wall-thickness penetration for each indication of an imperfection, and

3. Identification of tubes plugged and tubes sleeved.

Results of SG tube ins)ections which fall into Category C-3 shall be reported to t1e NRC prior to resumption of plant operation. This report shall provide a description of investigations conducted to determine cause of the tube degradation and corrective measures taken to prevent recurrence.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 5.0-21 .. AMENDMENT NO.

l 1

I I

NPF-10/15-299 i

l i

1 ATTACHMENT "B" (Marked-Up Proposed Specifications)

Unit 3

Completion Times 1.3 1.3 Completion Times g

(

x EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.3-3 (continued)

ACTIONS ;

CONCITION REQUIRED TION COMPLETION TIME A. One A.1 Res re 7 days Function X Fr etion X train '

train OPERABLE 68Q inoperable. status.

10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO ,

B. B.1 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Fu ction Y Function Y train w) s train to OPERABLE ANA '

in perable. status.

^ 10 days from

) discovery of sJ failure to meet

'the LCO C. One C.1 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months function X Function X train train to OPERABLE inoperable. status.

AND 93 One C.2 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Function Y Function Y train train to OPERABLE inoperable. status.

(continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 1.3-6 AMENDMENT NO.

- - -_J

Completion Times 1.3 1.3 Completion Times q EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.3-3 (continued)

When one Function X train and one F cti train are inoperable, Condition A and Condit n B are concurrently applicable. The Completion Timer for Condition A and ,

Condition B are tracked separate'y for each train starting fromthetimeeachtrainwaspfclaredinoperableandthe Condition was entered. A separate Completion Time is and tracked from the time the established for Condition [ inoperable (i.e., the time the secondtrainwasdeclarep situation described in onditionCwasdiscovered).

' If Required Action g/2 is completed within the specified Completion Time, C ditions B and C are exited. If the Completion Time r Required Action A.1 has not expired, operation may ntinue in accordance with Condition A. The en remaining Co etion Time in Condition A is measured from $

the time t affected train was declared inoperable (i.e., ~,

initial e ryintoConditionA). g .

The C pletion Times of Conditions A and B are modified by a d al connector, with a separate 10 day Completion Time

- rea ured from the time it was discovered the LCO was not

-) met, it In this example, without the separate Completion Time, rould be possible to alternate between Conditions A, B, an C in such a manner that operation could continue i i efinitely without ever restoring systems to meet the LCO.

T e separate Completion Time modified by the phrase "from iscovery of failure to meet the LC0" is designed to prevent ndefinite continued operation while not meeting the LCO.

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal

" time zero" for beginning the Completion Time " clock." In this instance, the Completion Time " time zero" is specified as connencing at the time the LCO was initially not met, ,

instead of at the time the associated Condition was entered.

l l

(continued) l O !

1.3-7 AMENDMENT NO.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3

- Completion Times h 1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLE 1,3 V EXAMPLES (continued) M M ,

ACTIONS l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME- !

[

A. One or more A.1 Restore valve (s) 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months !

valves to OPERABLE inoperable. status, i

1

8. Required B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ;

Action and f associated AHQ Completion :

Time not B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months met.

l l

A single Completion Time is used for an number of valves ino)erable at the same time. The Completion Time associated 1 witi condition A is based on the initial entry into l Condition A and is not tracked on a per valve basis. .

Declaring subsequent valves inoperable, while Condition A is i still in effect, does not trigger the tracking of separate :

Completion Times.

Once one of the valves has been restored to OPERABLE status, the Condition A Completion Time is not reset', but continues from the time the first valve was declared inoperable. The Completion Time may be extended if the valve restored to OPERABLE status was the first inoperable valve. The Condition A Completion Time may be extended for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months provided this does not result in any subsequent valve being inoperable for > 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

If the Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months (including any extensions)-

expires while one or more valves are still inoperable, Condition B is entered.

(continued)

U SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 1.3-8 AMENDMENT NO.

I

- ~. __ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

i

'l Completion Times 1.3 ,

1.3 Completion Times

< ( gl EXAMPLES EXAMPLE ~~V- ,~~

~~4., ;~~

~~EXAMPLES (continued)~~

~~EXAMPLE 1.3d~~

~~. Y '3 ACTIONS CONDITION PEQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One A.1 Ver:fy affected I hour ;~~

subsystem subsy. stem inoperable. isolatt'd. M j Once per f 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months i thereafter E ,

~~A.2 Restore subsystem 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to OPERABLE status. -~~

B. Required B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Action and associated M Completion .

~~Time not B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months met.~~

Required Action A.1 has two Completion Times. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time begins at the time the Condition is entered and each "Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter" interval begins upon .

~~performance of Required Action A.I.~~

If after Condition A is entered, Required Action A.1 is not met within either the initial 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or any subsequent 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months interval from the previous performance (including the 25%extensionallowedbySR3.0.2),ConditionBisentered.

~~(continued)~~

~~SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 1.3-12 AMEN 0HENT NO. i t~~

~~, ,- -- r ~ , - - - . , , . . . - , . . _ _ _~~

~~t i Completion Times ,~~

~~1.3~~

~~() 1.3 Completion Times I~~

~~t 1h4'k supp.(~~

[

~~i t~~

~~EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1,3-)# (continued) y, ,;gg i The Completion Time clock for Condition A does not stop -~~

after Condition B is entered, but continues from the time Condition A was initially entered. If Required Action A.1 l is met after Condition B is entered, Condition B is exited and operation may continue in accordance with Condition A, provided the Completion Time for Required Action A.2 has not- .

~~expired. !~~

IMMEDIATE When "Immediately" is used as a Completion Time, the COMPLETION TIME Required Action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. ;

f

,e*

?

~~b F~~

~~P i~~

~~AMENDMENT NO. :~~

~~SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 1.3-13 t~~

~~- ~. .. ... -~~

~~. _.. v&xwn 3.1.10 --~~

~~.3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS~~

^

~~ie 3.1.10 Boration Systems - Shutdown '~~

l

~~t ,~~
LCO 3.1.10 One of foll wir.dboron inje ion flow path shall be OPERABLE. = d :p:bl: Of b:ing pe sred fr= = ^"E"/"LE i
[ 1 I
~~rg=q pewer seur::.r w~~
a. A flow path from either boric acid makeup tank via either one of the boric acid makeup pumps, the blending tee or the gravity feed connection and any charging pump 4 to the Reactor Coolant System if the boric acid makeup !
g tank in Specification 3.1.11.a is OPERABLE, c
. .4 :
E' p
b. The flow path from the refueling water tank via either a charging pump or a high pressure safety injection pump to the Reactor Coolant System if the. refueling water storage tank in Specification 3.1.11.b is OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: NODES 5 and 6.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 6&on anse.aioJ - .
A A. f--the above Y flow A.1 Suspend all Imediately .(,
g None-o' paths' OPERABLE g w operativ.s involving 7--
cap 91e ^'f bety < CORE ALTERATIONS or p
e

r

d f = erns- 4 positive reactivity CPE"X LE es ig = :y r g' changes.
n nn ,- n..~ -
r i
i l
9 SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 3 3.1-22 AMENDHEN) NO. il l
l l
Boration Systems - Shutdown
, 3.1.10 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
+ SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
'rNSERT A
' + -
31 days SR 3.1.10.f Verify that at least one of the above " #
required flow paths is OPERABLE and
~~' :: '==:' , pwan.or-- +=d a- su4emaMe)(~~
-I is in its correct position.
g , ..
r
~~v. ,~~
s C j k e rvm v W W ^ & N %
F
/ Wi e alve.(%ud vuer oprat#ce abomt k., <Aar is net lockect, se.q(4 or Pl OtbWI5c-- Sehfed th t k e, ci . ; f '
rw e red Fica stk L i d
% v vvv l
b S
S 4
4
~~4 e~~
, 4 e m 3 mm -
j ,
SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 3 3.1-23 AMENDHENT NO.
4 INSERT A c.
1 hG
,d SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Y : : , , - , , , , , . _
Verify RWST temperature is within limitQ 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months SR 3.1.10.1
- wx- -- f P
...................N0TE--------------------
Only required when the RWST is the source y
- m of borated water and the outside temperature is < 40*F or > 100 *F. @
r 7 days SR 3.1.10.2 Verify volume of available borated water is within limits.
7 days SR 3.1.10.3 Verify boron concentration is within limits.
M i
4 r
f in c;
f
STE Ar Pcwer PhysicsTsdn =: =:.;
3.1.13 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS se,.
[i e
3.1.13 Special Test Exceptions (STE) C;;--D dtPwer . Phyde 5 heg b
Durin erfomance of PHYSICS D l LCO 3.1.13 swy bm.TESTS, th- ---"'---- * -ef:# by Lhe.g[ellowmg LCCS susrinded: '
i LCO 3.1.7, "Regurating Control Element Assembly (CEA)
Insertion Limits";
LCO 3.1.8, "Part length CEA Insertion Limits";
LCO 3.2.2, LCO 3.2.3, " Planar POWER "AZINUTHAL Radial Peaking TILT (Factors";Tq)"; and LCO 3.2.5, " Axial Shape Index';
%\ %
3-3.h-"fr--f:S provided:
l %54n :t:tlp+ea er, Mer*\ *# '" - ,t . _ _
~~a. THERMAL POWER H . _ -t- ___.~~
3.;
ph,J. .h:1 :t :: :aq85% RTP; and (gf%Ne;)
Cc g'
~~b. LHR does not exceed the limit specified in the COLR. l')~~
APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 during PHYSICS TESTS.. l
[
ACTIONS I
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A yawer Test power ;':tx'"f A.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER 15. minutes g g g.
A
. . . . d ' #- - - % to less than or equal
~~65% RTP, @*,2 to " ^ ' ^' ' m --Y v O (c'A)~~
.;':t:n- 85% RTP.
B. Lihtexceedsthelimit B.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER 15 minutes specified in the COLR. to satisfy the LHR limit specified in the COLR.
(continued) l 1
a SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.1-28 AMEN 0HENT NO.
l 9 4
b$wt b N ant STE - 0::t:r ""h"i::'i- nunt L' ::Test ,
" ;f':t':; CE" '-- -t!-- '_i !t: 7 3.1.14
.- 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS .
, R , m otev d y" M 5ese t 7 est h 3.1.14 Special Test Exceptions (STE) - f:-t:r !_. ":;_i:,.. ..." . ..2 ,
" :; tin; CE". ::::.-;%.." i: ; y LCO 3.1.14 During performance of PHYSICS TESTS the following LCOs may be suspended:
LCO 3.1.5, " Control Element Assembly (CEA) Alignment;" and LCO 3.1.7, " Regulating CEA Insertion Limits;"
provided that:
a. Only the center CEA (CEA #1) is misaligned, or only regulating CEA Group 6 is inserted beyond the transient 4 insertion Limit of LCO 3.1.7; and j
~~b. - The LHR and DNBR do not exceed the limits specified in the COLR.~~
APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. LHR or DNBR outside A.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER 15 minutes the limits specified to restore LHR and in the COLR. DNBR to within limits.
B Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met.
t 4 .
ti T
L F -
B y SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 - 3.1-30 AMENDMENT NO.
g.. . , - , -
. W 5 s m. $ .asar=F 3.1.14 i ,
~.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS .
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

~~.---NOTE-------------------~~

~~Only required with THERMAL POWER < 20% RTP SR 3.1.14.1 Verify LHR and DNBR do not exceed the Continuously limits specified in the COLR using any OPERABLE CPC channel.~~

~~NOTE-------------------~~

Only required with THERMAL POWER t 20% RTP SR 3.1.14.2 Verify LHR and DNBR do not exceed limits Continuously !
specified in the COLR using the COLSS or, i if COLSS is out of service, using any OPERABLE CPC channel.
h I
o E- SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.1-31 AMENDMENT NO.
3 .. - .
l 5 l RPS Instrumentation-Operating g[. 3.3.1
( )
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
FREQUENCY
~~.- SURVEILLANCE~~
? , l
< $- SR 3.3.1.9 -------------------NOTE-------------------- '
Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL V CALIBRATION. .
L ------.------------------------------------
L 24 months Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each
.' . " channel, including bypass removal
- functions.
24 months SR 3.3.1.10 Perfom a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each CPC channel.
Using the incore detectors, determine the Once after each SR .3.3.1.11 shape annealing matrix elements to be used refueling prior to exceeding by the CPCs. 85% RTP hv Once within SR 3.3.1.12 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 92 days prior it " removal function.
to each reactor W -) startup SR 3.3.1.13 -------------------NOTE---------- ---------
Neutron detectors are excluded.
Verify RPS RESPONSE TIME is within limits. 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS 3.3-7 ANENOMENT NO.
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3
W ..
e RPS Instrumentatica_-Operating 3.3.1 Table 3.3.11 (page 1 of 2)
Reactor Protective System Instrue.entation .
2 APPLICABLE H00E5 CR OTHER $PECIFIED SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ALLCWA!LE VALUE CCNDITIONS FUNCT!cN SR 3.3.1.1 s 111.0% RTP 1,2
~~1. Linear Pcwer Level -High SR 3.3.1.4 SR 3.3.1.6 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.13 *$3 gypp.)~~
~~1R 3.3.1.1 s RTP i~~
~~7. Legarith:tc Pcwer Level-HighI ") 2(b)~~
$R 3.3.1.7 4
SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1 s 23!5 psis Pressurf ter Pressure -High 1,2
3. SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1 e 1700 psla-1,2 4 Pressurizer Pressure-LewIC) SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.12 .
SR 3.3.1.13
- SR 3.3.1.1 8 3.4 psig Containment Pressure -High 1,2
~~5. SR 3.3.1.7~~
%.- SR 3.3.1.9
. SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1 t 729 psfa 1,2
~~6. Steam Generatcr 1 Pressure Lew SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.13 3R 3.3.1.1 t 729 psta 1,2 .~~
~~7. Steam Generator 2 Pressure.Lew SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.13 i (continued),~~
Bypass shall be automatfeally removed when THEltMAL 3 (a) Trip may POWER is ssed when THESHLL POWER is > 1E.4% RTP.
IP. Trip may be manually bypassed during physics testing pursuant to LCO .
i eftWPr i
~~closed. /~~
L(b) ilhen any 5 provided
~
(c) The setpotnt may be decce .o a a n nu alue of 300 psf a. as pressurfrer ressure sia. Tripsis reduced, may be bypassed g*
between press ie
a. and the setpotnt is maintained s 400ss shall be automatically removed the wh surfrer p s 8 a sia. pot it sha e automati 11y increased to the normal setpoint as pressurtter pressure is 14 ase I
Sy.3 soo I j U AMEN 0 MENT NO.
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.3-8
y , . . _ . . .- '
h s- RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown ft 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
' REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION h
Two RPS logarithmic B.1 --------NOTE---------
[~ B.
power level trip LCO 3.0.4 is not * '
channels inoperable. applicable.
Place one channel in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months by) ass and place the
~~4. otler in trip.~~
-j s C.1 Disable bypass 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months C. One _t removal channel channel.
inoperable.
OR C.2.1 Place affected I hour automatic trip channel in bypass or trip.
e AND
'i C.2.2 Restore bypass Prior to removal chanit.1 and entering MODE 2 associated automatic following next trip channel to MODE 5 entry OPERABLE status.
[Nw W D. Two aseemenca ypass ------------NOTE-------------
LCO 3.0.4 is not appif cable. .
removal channels -----------------------------
inoperable.
D.1 Disable bypass 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months channels.
93 (continued) 3.3-12 AMENDMENT NO.
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3
r
'y RPS Instrumentation-Shutdo:n
)^
3.3.2
@s
/
3 ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION
/
R^
g 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months D.2 Place one affected i
D. (continued) automatic trip
. channel in bypass and place the other in L trip.
p L.
t E.1 Open all RTCBs. I hour V .E. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FREQUENCY ;
SURVEILLANCE Perfom a CHANNEL CHECK of each logarithmic 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR. 3.3.2.1
' power channel.
92 days SR 3.3.2.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each logarithmic power channel. .
Once within SR 3.3.2.3 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 92 days prior mu+ "u"a=ss removal function.
s ar up g .
(continued) l, O 3.3-13 AMENOMENT NO.
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 t
m .-
t ESFAS Inst _rumentation 3.3.5 Table 3.3.5-1 (page 1 of 1)
. O, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation
? -
APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPICIFIED CONDITIONS ALLOVABLE VALUE FUNCTION
- p
~~1. SafetyInjectionActuattonSfgnal(')~~
a. 1,2,3 s 3.7 psfg Containment Pressure- Higg} t 1700 psia
~~b. Pressurtzer Pressure - Low~~
~~2. Containment Spray Actuation Signsl~~
~~a. Contalement Pressure - High-High 1,2,3 s 15.0 psig~~
~~3. Containment Isolation Actuation Signal~~
~~a. Containment Pressure - High 1,2,3 s 3.7 psig~~
~~4. Main Steam Isolation Signal~~
~~a. Steam Generator Pressure - Low (C) 1,2(d)3(d) e 72g psia~~
~~5. Recirculation Actuation Signal~~
~~a. Refueling Water Storage Tank Level- Low 1,2,3,4 19.27% e tap span a 17.734~~
~~6. y Feedwater Actuation $f snal SG #1 I >~~
,,,)
' Steam Generator Level - Low 1,2,3 e 20%
~~a. s 140 psid q~~
~~b. $G Pressure Of fference - High Q a 729 psla~~
~~c. Steam Generator Pressure - Low ,l~~
~~7. Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal SG #2W l (EFAS-2)~~
~~a. steam Generator Level- Low 1,2,3 e 20%~~
~~b. $G Pressure Olfference- High s 140 psid~~
~~c. Steam Generator Pressure - Low M e 729 psia a) Automatic $1A5 also initiates a Containment Cooling Actuation signal (CCAS).~~
{b(Ib)The setpoint may be decreased to a e (mum value of 300 psf a, as pressurizer pressure is reduced, provided the margin between essurizer re and the setpoint is maintained s 400 psia. Trips may be bypassed when pressurit sure is < psia m.--w,Mypass shall be automatically removed when pressurizer i
pressure is a psis (_. _ etpna all be automatically increased to the normal setpoint as I g pressurf ter p re is increas g I
(c) The setpoint may be decreased as steam u is reduced, provided the margin between steam pressure and the setpoint is maintained s 200 psi. The setpoint shall be automatically increased to the normal setpoint as steam pressure is increased.
is not required to be OPERABLE when (d) The all Main Steamvalves associated Isolation $lgnal isolated byFunction the M515(Steam Generator Function Pressure are closed - Low) ivated.
and de.act g uw v. ya & w~s sq M~53W ces*C.
O i SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.3-26 AMENDMENT NO.
i l
I
~ -- _
g CPIS b 3.3.8 1
/
2 3.3 I'STRUMENTATION N
e 3.3.8 Containment Purge Isolation Signal (CPIS)
[S ,
LCO 3.3.8 One CPIS channel shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4,
~~During CORE ALTERATIONS, .~~
During movement of irradiated fue) assemblies within
, [ containment.

~~NOTE----.-----------------.-----~~

Only required when the penetration is not isolate y at-losed a y 'M6 '-*rt := cl ed and de-activ tpd automatic valv manual valv , or blind flangg. J ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION. COMPLETION TIME CONDITION CPIS Actuation Logic, A.1 Enter applicable Imediately A.
or one or more Conditions and required channels of Required Actions for containment area affected valves of radiation monitors LCO 3.6.3, inoperable in MODES 1 " Containment 2, 3, and 4. Isolation Valves,"
made inoperable by CPIS instrumentation.
8.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met in AND MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.
B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months ,
(continued)
O 3.3-36 AMENDMENT N0.
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3
F 4'
CRIS' :
3.3.9 ,
-) 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION k' 3.3.9 Control Room Isolation Signal (CRIS) f
.. LCO 3.3.9 One CRIS channel shall be OPERABLE. l l
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, ;
During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTIONS i

~~NOTE-----------------------------~~

The provisions of LCO 3.0.3 are not applicable. l REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION A. CRIS Manual Trip, A.1 --------NOTE-----_---
Actuation Logic, or Place Control Room ,
g f one required channel gaseous radiation yhdely %onitorsinoperablein Emergency-Air Cleanup System (CREACUS).ir, Y'5 i s-.} l ;,gg.S m isolation mode if i MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. automatic transfer to
isolation mode inoperable.
Place one CREACUS train in emergency 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months i
mode.
(continued) l i
1
~~i. AMENDMENT NO.~~
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.3-40
{
- - &- T -
r P W &-
$ CRIS fj 3.3.9 t-ACTIONS (continued)
COMPLETION TIME I CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION i --------NOTE---------
B. CRIS Manual Trip, B.1 Ac Logic, or Place CREACUS in .
^
$so.3
_ u uj requ' re gaseous isolation mode if V P~ 7 adiation monitors automatic transfer to I M*' inoperable in MODE 5 isolation mode or 6, .or during inoperable. i se ---------------------
movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
Place one CREACUS
( train in emergency Imediately mode.
98 B.2.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. Inmediately A_!Q B.2.2 Suspend positive reactivity additions.
ihc Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FREQUENCY SURVEILLANCE Perform a CHANNEL CHECK on the required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.9.1 control room radiation monitor channel.
(continued)
~
3.3-41 AMENDMENT NO.
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3
Source Range-Honitoring Channels 3.3.13 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION
'~' 3.3.13 Source Range Monitoring Channels LCO 3.3.13 Two channels of source range monitoring instrumentation shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 3, 4, and 5, with the reactor trip circuit breakers open or Control Element Assembly (CEA) Drive System not capable of CEA withdrawal.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Suspend all Immediately i channels inoperable, operations involving ,
positive reactivity i additions.
m s.u.* )0 i
... A.2 Perfona SDM 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months verification n accordance th AND SR 0.1.".1,if T > 200*F, or Once per
$3 SE,31"'7 f 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months isupp1 T,,, s 20 F. thereafter L 3-g.l.3.I I
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.3-52 AMENDHENT NO.
U ressure, Temperature, and r6 L{ ts 0 '
3.4 REAC R 00LANTSYSTEH(RCS) ressure, Temperature, and Flo Limits 3.4.1 R RCS parameters for pressurizer pressure, cold le!hin the )
LCO 3.4.1 temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be wi l K p limits specified below: ,
l
-P TNSegT "
- a. Pressurizer pressure t 2025 psia and 5 2275 psia; !
IT i y q l' N I b. RCS ce1d tac +am aratfraimit not acoMcablea Q 4'( Te g fg7 p j Q . For RTP s 30%/I. l
2. For 30% < RTP < 70%, 535 F s T, s 557 F. l N 3. For RTP t 70%, 544*F s T, s 557'F: and N 1 1 *
~
ZWggT
\ l
~~c. RCS total flow rate [is specified by the COLRJ h~~
U W H0DE 1.
[h NRE6'*1%r and 4 lT1M6 Wir) 3 APPLICABILITY: '
% . .. .. ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .N0T E ---- - ---- d u r i n g : l Pressurizer pressure limit does not apply -
= W) ,
" a. THERHAL POWER ramp > 5% RTP per minute; or THERMALPOWERstep>10%fiTP.
I b. .
k g
[34 E ACTIONS
~~CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME L~~
Restoreparameter(s) 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months A. Pressurizer pressure A.1 or RCS flow rate not to within limit. -
within limits.
\ M ontin'ued))
6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Required Action and 8.1 Be in H0DE 2.
B.
associated Completion -
Time of Condition A .
not met. s .
~
. AMENDHENT NO.
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3.4-1
INSERT "A" @ Suppl.3
.e sa
~~1. For THERMAL POWER lessa equal to 30% RTP, F5Tse F~~
~~2. For THERMAL POWER less than 70% RTP and greater than 30% RTP, 535cF se T sfQ,oF g gg )$ pp ,3~~
~~3. For THERMA OWER greater or equal to 70% RTP, 544*F s T, 5 *F.~~
58 .SQPl S
/
h O'7 3 e/ $0h
~ ~~
g S CN6(& W ,7 @ M *d N " ], l
. -9 )/,1 - l i
ACTIONS (continued)
COMPLETION TIME CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION C.1 Restore cold leg 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months C. RCS cold leg temperature rot within temperature to within limits. limits.
l l
D.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months D. Required Action and associated Completion to s 30% RTP.
Time of Condition C .,
not met. 1
(
l
1
. 1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FREQUENCY SURVEILLANCE l
Verify pressurizer pressure a 2025 psia and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.4.1.1 l 5 2275 psia. l ey _
~ $58 MflL3 p 7 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 
@SR 3.4.1.2 erify RCS cold leg temperature:
~~1. For 30% < RTP < 70%, 535'F s T 5 h., *F, f- ,~~
bph.k 2. For RTP a 70%, 544*F 5 T, 5 F gggag
~
558lupl.S _}
...__.__......--N0TE--------------------------
....______ 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Required to be met in MODE 1 with all RCPs running.
SR 3.4.1.3 Verify RCS total flow rate (is within limpd
. pec?': w .o g uic cu I
k hi 3.4-2 AMENDMENT N0.
SANONOFRE--UNITj
I INSERT "B" h i ni l
" Verify RCS cold leg temperature: !
Y 1. For THERMAL POWER less than or equal to 30% RTP, .
g 522aF 5 Tc 5 558aF
~~2. For THERMAL POWER less than 70% RTP and greater than 30%~~
~~RTP, 535'F 5 T, s 558af~~
~~3. For THERMAL POWER greater than or equal to 70% RTP, 544*F s Te s 558'F."~~
1
,G/ 6spe- %/3
i.
j RCS Minimua Te:perature for Criticality
.T
- 3.4.2 D*
i i
8 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)
O, -
3.4.2 RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality @ s2Zggyppg3 l
' Each RCS loop cold leg temperature (T,) shall be t LCO 3.4.2 C2 a
APPLICABILITY: 1 MODE I, RTP s 30% and T_ < 535 F, anO 143f87 N_ l k MODE 2, K,f, a 1.0 and T, < 535'F . "M47 aV& "A* ME k R 4 t~pwl 1 gi
@ Tor fapf3 fu#1M8 M*M.
ACTIONS COMPLETION TIME CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION Be in MODE 3. 30 minutes T, in o'ne or more RCS A.1 A. .
loops not within -
limit.
{J SU'RVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
@ S32 hypt.2- l 30 minutes SR 3.4.2.1 Verify RCS T, in each loop a hF. l i
)
e 1
~~AMENDHENT NO.~~
SANONOFRE--UNITg 3.4-3 f .
y=.- . _.
1 1o '
r f
h INSERT"A"@
httphntens 3 6 ,
rn ^
l
" MODE 1, THERMAL POWER l'No.,,1 0% RTP and eT < 535=F, and".
e---
l 4
O QaOno,<etini3
gg . __
RCS Leakag2 Detection Instrumentation 3.4.15 I
$h 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation LCO 3.4.15 The following RCS leakage detection instrumentation shall be
OPERABLE:
~~a. One containment sump inlet flow monitoring system; and~~
~~b. One containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring system; or one containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitoring system.~~
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS ONDWON REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Required containment ------------NOTE-------------
A.
sump inlet flow LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.
monitor inoperable. -----------------------------
~
1
@A/2, Restore containment 30 days Y gk{
sump inlet flow monitoring system to
/ g OPERABLE status.
t (continued) 9 A- -d N -
q g p./ Seferm SA 3 4' /3 /
~~j[$,T ee -~~
3.4-37 AMENDHENT NO.
SANON0FRE--UNIT 3 I f
I
. "1 ,
Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 l r
ACTIONS COMPLETION TIME CONDITION. , REQUIRED ACTION
~.
'r _
~ .
Verify the OPERABLE 1 hour
- A.1 A. (continued) - 2 door is closed in the
affected air lock.
ANQ Lock the OPERABLE
_ 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months A.2 door closed in the affected air lock.
AND A.3 .-------NOTE---------
Air lock doors in high radiation areas may be verified.
locked closed by administrative means.
Verify the OPERABLE Once per 31 days door is locked closed' in the affected air lock.

~~NOTES------------~~

B. One or more 1. Required Actions B.1, centainment air locks B.2, and B.3 are not with containment air applicable if both doors lock interlock
'( mechanism inoperable. in the same air lock are inoperable and I Condition C is entered.
~~2. Entry and exit of Supp 3~~
containment is permissible under the MS' control of a dedicated s individual. . 39,I
~I. % Novia[e~,s c. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . .
w Lt.e 2.c 4 asa (continued.
M dpyLsc.4$(a.
f -
AMENOMENT NO.
3.6 4 SAN ONOFRE--UNIT g3
~~5 Containment Air Locks~~
~~'4;- 3.6.2 B~~
~~n. -~~
$D
'?) SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) k.: ,
FREQUENCY SURVEILLANCE
}~
N91C f . - . . . - . . . - - - - - - - - - Jefr4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . -
E SR 3.6.2.2
~~t. Only required to be performed upon entry~~
{ into containment. ~ '~ '
f; & ...........................................
Verify only one door in the air lock can be 184 days
} opened at a time.
1.
9 c -
i:
2 st 3.o.4 h p+ YN - .
sW d o
3.6-7 AMENDMENT NO.
~~SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 I~~
l
f6 Containment Isol.ation Valves
) 3.6.3
!=
3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves
$y '
fw LCO 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.
t +
, APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
f- ACTIONS .

~~NOTES----------------------- =-----------~~

~~1. Penetration flow paths except for 42 inch purge valve penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.~~
~~2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.~~
~~3. Enter a-)plicable Conditions and Required Actions for system (s) made inopera)1e by containment isolation valves.~~
~~4. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.6.1,~~
" Containment," when leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.
c "^ p. m ; a iun> of _w a.o.* ai e nog opp n caDIe. M OM 5, sp.A.Ad
~~f. Section A, B, C, D, and E isolation valves are located_________6.____________~~
in theQ.CS),
CONDITION REQUIREDACTI[ COMPLETION TIME A. ---------NOTE--------- A.1 Isolate the affected 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months i Only applicable to )enetration flow path l penetration flow paths ay' use of at least j with two containment one closed and l isolation valves. de-activated 1 l

automatic valve, closed manual valve, One or more blind flange, or penetration flow paths check valve with flow with one containment through.the valve isolation valve secured.

inoperable exceat for purge valve teacage AND'
& not within limit.
y ~
(continued)
.b SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.6-8 AMENDMENT NO.
.e n .-.-r ,. a m s .e 2 @ w. * ? ?? R'~ ~-'
i l
Containment Isolation Valves i 3.6.3 i 1
I i F
.' I)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS l

~~NOTE-----------------------------_------.~~

1 Section A, B, C, D, and E isolation valves are located in the LCS. SWI SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY I l
SR 3.1 31 days Veri ch 42 inch purge valve is ~
i sealed closed except for one purge valve in -
l a penetration flow path while in l Condition D of this LCO. )
SR 3 erify
.2 ch 8 inch purge valve is closed except when 31 days M'I .
the 8 inch purge valves are open for pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel :
entry, or for Surveillances that require the valves to be open.
SR 3.6.3.3f---------NOTE,-------------------- '%pp . l lValves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may r-* I be verified by use of administrative means. SUPP3 Verify each containment isolation manual valve and 31 days blind flange that is located outside containment and is recuired to be closed during accident conditions is closec, except for containment isolation valves that v are open under administrative controls. ,
- e_ -
L set 3.0.4 15 pf aplit.* kit. (cntinued)
L w l
1 SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 3.6-13 AMENDMENT NO. ;
\
4 l
l 1
~~2. N 3'0'( ls Mt Ab' b Containment Iso ktion Valves~~
^ ^
3.6.3 m
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.4 s t
.)
--.-_---- --------NOTE------'-------------. ,
hl o and blind flanges in high radiation areas may g'be verified by use of administrative means.
___. ____________._______...__________..... g Q.3 Verify each containment isolation manual valve and Prior to lind flange that is located inside containment and entering MODE 4 equired to be closed during accident conditions is from MODE 5 if closed, except for containment isolation valves that not performed dre open under administrative controls. within the previous 92 days SR 3.6.3.5 In accordance W' er e isolation time of each Section A and B with the power operated and each automatic containment Inservice isolation valve is within limits. Testing Program
- SR 3.6.3.6 ,;
- ------ -------NOTE--------------------
Resul s s all be evaluated against acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1 in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions.
Perform leakage rate testing for containment purge 184 days jvalves with resilient seals. AND Within 92 days after opening .
the valve I (continued) 3.6-14 SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 AMENDMENT NO.
e J
1 Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 I
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.7 s l

~~----------NOTF-------------------- ,~~

i* he provisions of the Inservice Testing Program are ,
b> not applicable when the valves are secured open.
Verify each Section D1 and D2 containment isolation In accordance valve is OPERABLE. with the s rogram 7, sg $0,4 4 uaf glidt andthoseSRg' associated those 1) l -
Specificat{'o j jf pertaining o each valve or system in which it is
. installed.
SR 8 24 months PPI Verify ch Section A, B, C, and E automatic containment isolation valve actuates to the isolation position on an actual or. simulated actuation signal.
I SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.6-15 AMENDMENT NO.
Containment Spray and Cooling Systems 3.6.6.1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.6.1 Containment Spray and Cooling Systems LC0 3.6.6.1 Two containment spray trains and two containment cooling i trains shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One containment spray A.1 Restore containment 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 1 train inoperable. spray train to OPERABLE status. d
)
l B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months r
*g associated Completion l Time of Condition A AND not met.
B.2 Be in MODE 4. 84 hours9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months i i
C. One containment C.1 Restore containment 7 days :
cooling train cooling train to '
inoperable. OPERABLE status. 4- .
(continued)
V AND to y b l h dim ww3 e& A ;
- 1 A
o SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.6-18 AMENDMENT NO.
T'; , -
"$f.$
3, 3
~~5l s 3.7 3.7.1 PLANT SYSTEMS Hain Steam Safety Valves (HSSW) Tab F.7,1-/ } J~~
~ ~
The MSSVs shall be OPERABLE as specified in nAvw).
~ LCO 3.7.1 o y n,> y wannrt 0 .a p fivesGh d T&hle 3.7./;~2 s9 H0 DES 1, 2, and 3. .
APPLICABILITY:
ACTIONS ------------------------------
..................................---NOTE------SV. ........................
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each MS =
COMPL ET10N T1HE ,
REQUIRED ACTION t CONDITION ~
4 s Reduce power to less A.1 0 ^-: the A. One or more required MSSV per SG g ,3 than W 4 applicable o %NNMRTP' 3 _
inoperable. listed in dfFTAym 1arbte .r.~r.t-l w-O/ JgQ Q A W A 7" 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months B.1 Se in HODE 3.
B,.
Required Action and associated Completion AND Time not met. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months g B.2 Be in H00E 4.
g .3 0
d One or more Steam Generators with,less
$ than two MSSVs ,'
y OPERABLE per.SG.
g A
_ h hwn g -~ ~
9 2 Radece AI4tGr Hu. Lear Poa Leve<.
H TatP sa.rPoTur m accct&cwcr 72:t me wire 3 ~~2.l-- I
/
ASENDMENTNO.
3.7 1 SANONOFRE--UNIT %.3
HSSVs l 3.7.1 l 1
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS '
FREQUENCY
' SURVEILLANCE
-...-............--N0TE....-...............
SR 3.7.1.1 Only required to be perfonned in MODES 1 and 2.
each required MSSV lift pressure In accordance Veri with the withi limits per une urnhin accordance inservice j with the inservic esting h aram. testing program
($
j) ;
I fafte 3.71-2n) :
l l
l i
l 1
o 1
3.7-2 AMENDMENT NO.
SANONOFRE-. UNIT 3 k
I bapf{t.MtKh b Table 3.7.1-1 (page 1 of 1) l Maximum Allowable Linear Power Level-High Trip Setpoints verr,us OPERABLE MSSVs MINIMUM NUMBER OF MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE MSSVs PER STEAM GENERATOR LINEAR POWER i' REQUIRED OPERABLE LEVEL HIGH TRIP
(% RTP) 8 98.6 7 86.3 .
6 74.0 5 61.6 4 MODE 3 3 MODE 3 2 MODE 3 i
a o$2sOAi$4-%i/3 l
- 1
l 7 '
I 1 duA# bed 3 Os ;
Table 3.7.1-2 (page 1 of 1) !
(Main Steam Safety Valves (Lift Settings) l VALVE NUMBER LIFT SETTING
~~l Steam Generator Steam Generator (psig)~~
1 #2 2PSV-8401 2PSV-8410 1085**
2PSV-8402 2PSV-8411 1092 1
2PSV-8403 2PSV-8412 1099 2PSV-8404 2PSV-8413 1106 j i
2PSV-8405 2PSV-8414 1113 2PSV-8406 2PSV-8415 1120 2PSV-8407 2PSV-8416 1127 2PSV-8408 2PSV-8417 1134 2PSV-8409 2PSV-8418 1140 ;
The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the ;
valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure. Each MSSV has an as-found tolerance of +2%/-3%. Following testing according to Specification 4.0.5, MSSVs will be set within +/-1% of the specified lift setpoint.
~~Valves 2PSV-8401 and 2PSV-8410 have an as-found lift setting of 1100 psia with a tolerance of +1%/-3%.~~
f 9
ha Oniofre- %$
MSIVs. l' 3.7.2-
- SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 7 8=
~~g. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY i I~~
. Ny SR 3.7.2.1 Verify closure time of each MSIV is In accordance t- s 8.0 seconds En an adual or with the l s @uiatedactuationsigna. inservice o. 4 .;
testing program t
ce !
[
I t
f t
t I
-l
?
I i
t I
i t
l e ,
4
^
},-
p- .
t
{.
Y
o :
SANON0FRE--UNIT 3 3.7-6 AMENDMENT NO. l e ;
e :
P. }
i i
- a 77 4 .
".57 - '. J. , _ .: _1__,_ . , _ ,. , ,- ., ,, , ,,
ib MFIVs Il s
~~3.7.3 g 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS~~
~
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY In accordance SR 3.7.3.1 Verify the closure time of each MFIV [ with the 5 10 secondsjon an actual or simulated
-- inservice fuationsignay, testing program k
s WI 3.7-8 AMENDMENT NO.
fk SANON0FRE--UNIT 3
- , e,-
ADVs ki' 5 ,
3.7.4
~
1 A 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs)
LCO 3.7.4 One ADV per required Steam Generator (SG) shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is being relied upon for heat removal.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required ADV A.1 --------NOTE--------- ,
inoperable. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable. j i
Restore ADV to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OPERABLE status. l I
B. Two ADVs inoperable. B.1 Restore one ADV to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OPERABLE status.
C. Backup nitrogen gas C.1 Restore backup 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months supply system capacity nitrogen gas supply s 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for @ system capacity for tr)
Y ""
(continued)
/ /
(ne er men repu'unf ADVe9 s
i 3 .7.-7 AMENDMENT NO.
SANONOFRE--UNIT {
t 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS i 3.7.5 Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) System i
f'- LCO 3.7.5 Three AFW trains shall be.0PERABLE. ,

~~........................N0TE------..--------------------~~

Only one AFW train, which includes a motor driven pump, is ,
required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4.
e APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, ,
MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal. '
i l
' i ACTIONS 1
I REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION i
One steam supply to A.1 Restore steam supply 7 days -
'f A.
to OPERABLE status.
I turbine driven AFW pump inoperable. t One AFW train B.1 Restore AFW train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months B.
inoperable for reasons other than Condition A OPERABLE status.
d{
in MODE 1, 2, or 3.
i Two AFW trains with C.1 Restore one AFW train 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months C.
two motor driven pumps to OPERABLE status inoperable in MODES 1, 2, or 3 (continued)
AA/O y to Arp /en dhang yfetum .4 meef 0*Ma l
SANONOFRE--UNITf 3.7-9 AMENDMENT NO.
- --- ~- .- - .- ___
}i-
= 3.ivty Related Make'up SysteE !
'h -'
- 3.7.7.1 ;
t I- 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS <
.h
'}.-
3.7.7.1 ComponentCoolingWater(CCW)SafetyRelatedMakeupSystem f
k . I Two trains of Componen't Cooling Water (CCW) Safety Related
[ LCO 3.7.7.1 Makeup System Shall be OPERABLE with a contained volume in the ,
Primary Plant Makeup Storage Tank a the level specified in Figure 3.7.7.1-1. l
.............................N0TE----------.------.............
LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.
- ............................................................... l 1
APPLICA8ILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
i i
ACTIONS :
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME j One CCW Safety Related A.1 Restore the flow path 7 days A. ;
Makeup flow path to OPERABLE status.
inoperable. 'l l
Two CCW Safety Related 8.1 Restore one CCW 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months 
~~8. !~~
Makeup flow paths Safety Related Makeup flow path to OPERABLE ;
inoperable, status. l QEl.8fE aglor The Primary Plant '
Makeup Storage Tank 8.2 Restore the Primary Level < that required Plant Makeup Storage .
by Figure 3.7.7.1 1. Tank level to OPERABLE status. {
(continued)r l O
) g yg.#
pio A. .ruA$M 4 AW Ipseer9" SANONOFRE.. UNIT 5 3.7 18 AMENDMENT NO.
{
s e,
~~f. ..~~
xy LLW safety Related Makeup Systea 3.7.7.1 k ~
I
" ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION
.r;-
f Required Ac'tions and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months C. f associated Completion .
Times of Conditions A A!!Q
, or B not met. 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months C.2 Be in MODE 5.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.7.1.1 Verify the contained water volume in the 7 days Prima Plant Makeup Storage Tank is within its 11 its. '
.)
- SR 3.7.7.1.2 Verify each CCW Safety Related Makeup pump develops the required differential pressure In accordance with inservice on recirculation flow. testing prograr 8
SR 3.7.7.1.3 Measure CCW Leakage. 24 months TbbG ff6 W/U $
sd4%s fy Psear"N b SANONOFRE--UNIT 5 3.7-19 AMENDMENT NO.
e e
* * * * * * * * > = . . . . . ,.
--- - __ _____-_m. __- - - ____-_ - - _ _ _ - - . _ _ .___m--_____ --_
a: M
't CCW Safety Related Makeup System 3.7.7.1 4
3
[3 I
~
TOTAL ALLOWABLE CCW LEAKAGE l VERSUS THE PPMU TANK LEVEL . I 76-60- ,
i
~
I d 50 -
Pu ..
a .
j
~~40.-~~
o A 30- .
20- -.
10 g 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516171 0
O 1 2 3
- ALLOWABLE LEAKAGE,in gpm 6
4 Pigure 3.7.7.1 1 i
N
@ ,, a a . a saa u , ,,,f,zo.w,er v*
j- SANONOFRE--UNIT,$ 3.7-20 AMENDNENT M). C p -
i b .
.v ZN. set 7 'A
~~y DELETED INTENTIONALLY l~~
i l
l SANONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.7-18 AMENDMENT N0.
_LN.seRr W g
[
?
DELETED INTENTIONALLY l l
l l
t' SANONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.7-19 AMENDMENT NO.
)
, 4A _A A.
l r
DELETED INTENTIONALLY 1
l 9
SANONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.7-20 AMENDMENT NO.
b
? CREACUS fi 3.7.11
(
S A ACTIONS
- CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME s
QA C.2.1 Suspend CORE Imediately
,' C. (continued)
ALTERATIONS.
AND i
C.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately t
irradiated fuel assemblies.
D. Two CREACUS trains D.1 Enter LC0 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.
Two CREACUS trains E.1 Suspend CORE Immediately E.
inoperable in MODES 5 ALTERATIONS.
or 6, or during movement of irradiated AND fuel assemblies. Immediately E.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Operate each CREACUS train for da SR 3.7.11.1 STAGGERED TEST a 15 minutes.
SIS f
- (continued) y 0-7 h: 3.7-25 AMENDMENT NO.
f SANON0FRE--UNITJ i r
i
AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:
~~a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System; and~~
~~b. Two diesel generators (DGs) each capable of supplying one train of the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System.~~
APPLICABILITY- MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CORDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TINE
, A. One required offsite A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months circuit inoperable. for required OPERABLE offsite circuit. M Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter M I A.2 Restore required 72 ho _
offsite circuit to @ _urs OPERABLE status.
4g c)(scowr o!/oikan fe Ma6i icontinued) 4/' S SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.8-1 AMENDMENT NO.
AC Sources-Operating 3.8.1
,- ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Perform SR 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months B. ---------NOTE.--.-.... B.1 Required Action B.3.1 for the OPERABLE or B.3.2 shall be required offsite M completed if this circuits.
Condition is entered. Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months 
...................... thereafter One required DG M inoperable.
B.2 Declare required 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months from .
feature (s) supported discovery of '
by the inoperable DG Condition B '
inoperable when its concurrent with redundant required inoperability of features is redundant I inoperable. required l feature (s)
M 1 B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE DG 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 
( is not inoperable due to consen cause failure.
E !
B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months I for OPERABLE DG. !
M B.4 Restore required DG 71 hours8.217593e-4 days 0.0197 hours 1.173942e-4 weeks 2.70155e-5 months _ -
to OPERABLE status. g -
,N!
' (,cly hm cb5Ce e, 47 6il4Wf. "b j l continued) 3 i
SAN ONOFRE.-UNIT 3 3.8-2 AMEN 0 MENT NO. l 1
l I
I inverters-Operating 3.8.1 3
AC?:CNS (continued)
CONDI REQUIRED ACTION CCMPLETICN TIME
/ l h
F
.R ired Action and ssociated Completion
.1 p I Se in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Tigejnot met. _ E
~~2 Se in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months C~~
f &a d i Q AMS or hf
\
f*%
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.7.1 Verify correct inverter voltage and 7 days alignment to required AC vital buses. .
A [-
........-NOTE--------- l r
Enter applicable ,
Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9 with one AC vital bus I de-energized.
B. One required B.1 Restore inverter 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Train C or Train to OPERABLE D inverter status.
inoperable.
~
L -
~3 L v
,+
Vlo I
i 3.8 35 AMENOMENT NO.
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3
Inve rte rs - Shutdown 3.8.8 3.8 Ei.ECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3
3.8.8 Inverters -Shutdown k Ftd /NVerkr5 LCO 3.8.8 ' x rt_:: shall be OPERABLE to support the onsite Class IE
[AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10. " Distribution Systems-Shutdown."
APPLICA8ILITY: MODES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
I ACTIONS l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Declare affected Immediately inverters inoperable. required feature (s) inoperable.
93 A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.
AND A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies. j i
M A.2.3 Initiate action to Innediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.
M (continued) i SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.8-36 AMENOMENT NO.
Dis:ribution Systems-Operating 3.8.9 3.3 ELECTRICAL PCWER SYSTEMS 3.B 9 Distribution Systems-Operating LCO 3.3.9 Train A and Train B AC; Trains A, B, C, and 0 CC; and Trains A, B, C, and 0 AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE.
Y APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. @
ACTIONS [
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A
ln 1 A. One AC electrical A.1 pRestoreACelectricalrmcy 8 rours -
4 power distribution 3 2
~ '
power distribution ,
subsystem inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE y, pets status. L oincoven%.3 i JN ,gM,> > ,~ . , ,. onea %I.v L4a wJkHere. J B. vi a B.1 or inoperable. L subsystem to OPERABLE /
i status. % tc, (owl ,
M***fri *Ef*'I*
T *f / Ostt h ) ,.. v Restore DC lectrical a s
$ gZ power distribution 1
power distribution q
- ~
subsystem inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE @'tIg,gggggm status. ,
T'W'9 * -
( [ R_ 0
, rw E.1 Be in MODE 3.
m w e dm 6 acurs f sf Required Action and associated Completion m.
Time f Condition A, T B, et met. #
A_N_Q D
=aa h Pf.Y I
(Ar.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months or ?
~~f mor f, lt x INSERT' 4 f)~~
U s m OsorRE untT 3
@m 3.8-38 mEnostat n0.
]u C ntainment Penetrations P
3.9.3
)
3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS i..
3.9.3 Containment Penetrations t
LCO 3.9.3 The containment penetrations shall be in the following
.h status:
4 a. The equipment hatch closed and held in place by four
{ / bolts; _g_
_ hgg *g a7 F.
I b One door in each air lock closed, but both doors of the containment personnel airlock may be open provided that 4{' one personnel airlock door is OPERABLE and the plant is in H0DE 6 with 23 feet of water above the fuel.
3 c. Each penetration providing direct access from the tr) containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:
i
~~1. closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent, or~~
~~2. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Containment Purge System.~~
APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within l containment. l l
ACTIONS l
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Suspend CORE Immediately containment ALTERATIONS.
penetrations not in required status. AND A.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.
3.9-4 AMENDMENT NO.
SANONOFRE--UNITY
phtKGMh*
INSERT "A" @
~~b. One door in each air lock closed~~
.....................---------N0TE---------------------------------
Both doors of the containment personnel airlock may be open provided:
~~a. one personnel airlock door is OPERABLE~~
~~b. the plant is in MODE 6 or defueled configuration, and~~
~~c. with 23 feet of water above the fuel.~~
e k odo 6# 3
SDC and Coolant Circulatian-High Water Level i 3.9.4 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.4 Shutdown Cooling (500) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level LC0,3.9.4 One SDC loop shall be OPERABLE and in operation.
...........................--N0T5---------------------------
L The required SDC loop may be removed from operation for s 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months period, provided no operations are s permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant 5 System boron concentration.
g g.___-......................................................
............................. T ..-.-... ...
2,Acontainmentspraypumpmay e used in lace of a low hs pressure safety injection pump to provid shutdown cooling I......................................................
APPLICABILITY: MODE 6 with the water level a 23 ft above the top of reactor vessel flange.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. SDC loop requirements A.1 Suspend operations Immediately not met. involving a reduction in reactor coolant boron concentration.
8!iQ -
(continued) i l
l
)
SANONOFRE-.UNITj 3.9-6 AMENDMENT NO. !
I Design Features 4.0 !
h ;
4 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES 4.
~~4.1 Site 4.1.1 Exclusion Area Boundary The exclusion area boundary 'shall be as shown in Figure 4.1-1.~~
4.1.2 Low Population Zone (LPZ)
The LPZ shall be as shown in Figure 4.1-2.
4.2 Reactor Core l
4.2.1 Fuel Assemblies The reactor shall contain 217 fuel assemblies. Each assembly shall consist of a matrix of'Zircaloy clad fuel rods with an l initial com sition of natural or slightly enriched uranium dioxide (UO ) as fuel material. Integral or Discrete Burnable AbsorberRosmaybeused.fTheymayinclude: borosilicate glass componentsy, boron carbide - B4 C, zirconium boride g*g i -- Zrb 3
Na 0-B,0 -SiO,ium oxide
, gadolin 3 - Gd 0 , erbium 0. Limited oxide - Erl
' filler l substitutions of zirconium alboy or stainless stee for fuel rods, in accordance with approved amplications of fuel l j
rod configurations, may be used. Fuel assem)1ies shall be limited !
to those fuel designs that have been analyzed with applicable NRC staff approved codes and methods and shown by tests or analyses to comply with all fuel safety design bases. A limited number of lead test assemblies that have not completed representative testing may be placed in nonlimiting core regions.
4.2.2 Control Element Assemblies .
The reactor core shall contain 83 full length and eight part length control element assemblies (CEAs). The control material shall be silver indium cadmium, boron carbide, and inconel as approved by the NRC.
r (continued) f I 4.0-1 AMENDMENT.NO.
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3
in
(
N TS Bases C ntrol I 5.4 l
, j 4 .
s.
f- 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS i 5.4 Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Y
5.4.1 Changes to the Bases of the TS shall be made under appropriate administrative controls.
5.4.2 Changes to the Bases may be made without prior NRC approval provided r the changes do not involve either of the following:
1
~~a. A change in the TS incorporated in the license; or~~
~~b. A change to the updated FSAR or Bases that involves an i unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.~~
5.4.3 The Bases Control Program shall contain provisions to ensure that the Bases are maintained consistent with the UFSAR.
5.4.4 Proposed changes that meet the criteria of (a) or (b) above shall be i reviewed and approved by the NRC prior to implementation. Changes to Of the Bases implemented without with prior10NRC i
to the NRC on a frequency consistent CFR approval 50.71 $ shall(be)provide Q4 3 b
t SANONOFRE--UNIT 3 5.0-6 AMENDMENT NO.
}Wp
~ - - - - --__ _.
I Reporting Requirements I f &
5.7
~-
L .
l( 5.7 . Reporting Requirements ll. '
RCSPRESSUREANDTEMPERATURELIMITSREPORT(PTLR),
5.7.1.6 The RCS pressure and temperature limits,' including heatup and ,
+V . cooldown rates, criticality,smented in the PTLR for S ecificationan shall be established and doc '
3 ., 3.4.3, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits." he analytical-methods used to determine the pressure and tem >erature limits I including the heatup and cooldown rates shall >e those previously
? reviewed and approved by the NRC. The reactor vessel pressure and f temperature limits, including those for heatup and cooldown rates, f
shall be determined so that all applicable limits (e.g.. heatup and j cooldown limits, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing limits) )
of the analysis are met. The PTLR, including revisions or supplements thereto, shall be provided to the NRC upon issuance for each reactor vessel fluency period.
5.7.1.7 Hazardous Cargo Traffic Report HazardouscargotrafficonInterstate5(I-5)andtheAT&SFrailway l shall be monitored and the results submitted to the NRC Regional Administrator once every three years.
5.7.2 Soecial Reports Special Reports may be required covering inspection, test,'and
-. maintenance activities. These special reports are detemined on an individual basis for each unit and their preparation and submittal are designated in the Technical Specifications.
Special Rports shall be submitted to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,' Attention: Document Control Desk, Washington, D. C.
20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator of the Regional Office of the NRC, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.4 within the time period specified for each report.
g -
The following Special Reports shall be submitted: l g
- M. Any abnormal degradation of the containment structure detected t
hy -
during the tests required by the Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program shall be report'ed to the NRC within 30 days. The report shall include a description of the tendon condition, the condition of the concrete (especially at tendon anchorages), the inspection 1 ,
procedures, the tolerances on cracking, anel the corrective '
- action taken. *
~ . .
~~i. .~~
(continued) .
f -
,, ;,. ..A.- '
]- .
AMENDMENT'N0.
5.0-20
,g SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3
,,-e..- , ,-- ,, -
ApMoned 3 g INSERT "A" .
A a.Whenapre-plannedalternatemethodofmonitoringg -accident l instrumentation functions is required by Condition g of LCO 3.3.11, a report shall be submitted within 30 days from the time the action is required. The report shall outline the action taken, the cause of the increrability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrumentation channels of the function to OPERABLE status.
i I
0 I
n La O&- U+ 3 P
y- . _ _ _ _ _ .
I
k
.i Repsrting Requirements
' 5.7 s
l 1 5.7 Reporting Requirements
1
, i 2 5.7. Special Reports (continued)
I
,'Followingeachinserviceinspectionofsteamgenerator(SG) tubes, in accordance with the SG Tube Surveillance Program, -
the number of tubes plugged and tubes sleeved in each SG shall
- be reported to the NRC within 15 days. The com>1ete results ,
of the SG tube inservice inspection shall be su mitted to the )
NRC within 12 months following the completion of the ;
inspection. The report shall include: l
~~1. Number and extent of tubes inspected, and l~~
~~2. Location and percent of wall-thickness penetration for .~~
~~l each indication of an imperfection, and~~
~~3. Identification of tubes plugged and tubes sleeved. )~~
~~Results of SG tube inspections which fall into Category C-3~~
shall be reported to the NRC prior to resumption of plant j operation. This report shall provide a description of investigations conducted to detemine cause of the tube i degradation and corrective measures taken to prevent recurrence.
i
[
l l
i
- l SANONOFRE--UNITg 5.0-21 .. AMENDMENT NO. j t
n,. . - - - . - - , . , _ . , , - - , , - , , . - . . - , .,
NPF-10/15-299 ATTACHMENT "C" (Marked-Up Proposed Bases)
Unit 2
5 I
l B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS )
Control ~ Element Assembly (CEA) Alignment B 3.1.5 .
BASES Y
i.e. 4 V
BACKGROUND The OPERABILITY (sM, initial assumption in all safety regulating CEAs is an ,
analyses that assume CEA inserbion upon reactor trip. l Maximum CEA misalignment is an initial assumption in the .
safety analyses that directly affects core power distributions and assumptions of available SDM. -
i
.The applicable criteria for these reactivity and power
. distribution design requirements are 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, l
, GDC 10 and GDC 26 (Ref. 1) and 10 CFR 50.46 Cooled Nuclear Power Plants" (Ref. 2).
' Mechanical or electrical failures idy cause a CEACEA to become' l
inoperable or to become misaligned from its group.
inoperability or misalignment may cause increased power peating, due to the asymetric reactivity distribution and a I reductionTherefore, in the total CEAavailable alignment and CEA worth are operability for reactor shutdown.
related to core operation in design power peaking limits and ,
the core design requirement of a minimum SDM. .
Limits on CEA alignment and operability have been established, and all CEA positions are monitored and :
controlled during power operation to ensure that the power ,
distribution and reactivity limits defined by the design i Lee i power peaking and SDM limits are preserved. ~
CEAs are moved by their control element drive mechanisms i tl M"/g
~~- (CEDMs).~~
~~% inch) Each at a CEDM time, moves but atitsvarying CEA W;: one 'rt: ML ste~~
~~r rates Lwp~~
'p (appro CAAs q depending on the signal output from the Control Element 20 mg A Drive Mechanism Control System (CEDMCS).
The CEAs are arranged into groups that are radially I
& Partt g k C44s symetric. Therefore, movement of the CEAs does not
%;G Qt. . introduce radial asymmetries in the core power distribution.
The shutdown and regulating CEAs provide the required reactivity worth for imediate reactor shutdown upon aT reactortrip).
(power level control during no. mal operation and ,
~ .
(continued)
AMENDMENT N0. ,
B 3.1-22 I SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2
__, ,_ _._m_.. __
CEA Alignment B 3.1.5
. BASES (continued)
ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.3.1. a A.3.2.B.I.DA.I, 1. Dad D3 l
' A CEA may become misaligned, yet remain trippab'le. In this "
, condition, the CEA can still perfonn its required function ..
of ' adding negative. reactivity should a reactor trip be necessary. .
If one or more regulating CEAs are misaligned by 7 inches A but trippable, continued operation in H0 DES 1 and 2 may J.
Ser3 IL5Eg3 continue, provided, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , the power is reduced'in' 7" accordance with Figure 3.1.5-1, and SDM is t 5.15% Ak/k, and
'within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months the misaligned CEA(s) is aligned within .
7 inches of its group or the misaligned CEA s roup is -
aligned within 7 inches of the misaligned CEA(g). s
.2 .
_w_i A m + 1 Xenon redistribution in the core starts to occur as soon as a CEA becomes misaligned. Reducing THERMAL POWER in accordance with F'T2 ? . i. " ' 9 a + ' :::e q,;.., Z h(4ke.(4tJ i ensures acceptable power distributions are m;aintained (Ref.6). For small misalignments (< 7 inches) of 4h8CEAd there is:
a. A small effect on the time dependent long term power q distributions relative to those used in generating s/ LCOsandlimitingsafetysystemsettings(LSSS) setpoints; ;
~~b. A small effect on the available SDH; and~~
~~c. A small effect on the ejected CEA wptth used in the accident analysis.~~
With a large CEA misalignment ('t 7 inches), however, this
" misalignment would cause distortion of the core power distribution. This distortion may, in turn, have a significant effect on:
. a. The available SDM; -
~~b. ~~~
The time dependent, long tenn power distributions
. relative to those used in generating LCOs and LSSS
.setpoints; and ~
~~c. The ejected CEA worth used in the accident analysis.~~
(continued) 5 SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.1-27 AMENDMENT NO.
O g, , . ., .
1 l
INSERT B "If one or more regulating CEAs are misaligned by 7 inches but tripable, continued operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue, provided; within 15 minutes a power reduction is initiated in accordance with COLR requirements, SDM is verified to be 15.15% ak/k within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , and within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months the misaligned CEA(s) is aligned within 7 inches of its group or the misaligned CEA's group ,
isalignedwithin7inchesofthemisalignedCEA(s)." )
1 l
l l
i
)
i 1
i i
l 3 of 4
RegulatWnser@Fo~nVmM n B 3.1.7 BASES APPLICABLE increased power peaking and corresponding increased local SAFETY ANALYSES .LHRs.
(continued) The SDM requirement is ensured by limiting the regulating and shutdown CEA insertion limits, so that the allowable -
inserted worth of the CEAs is such that sufficient reactivity is available in the CEAs to shut down the reactor to hot zero power with a reactivity margin that assumes the g
maximum worth CEA remains fully withdrawn upon trip 4 1
(Ref../w) . 3 p,
v- r Operation at the insertion limits or ASI may approach th maximum allowable linear heat generation rate or peaking' p4 4
present. Operation at the '
'insertion factor, with the allowed T,dicate limit may also in the maximum ejected CEA worth could be equal to the limiting value in fuel cycles ^ -
that have sufficiently high ejected m ,m . g CEA worths.
The regulating and' shutdown CEA ins ~ertion limits ensure that safety analyses assumptions for reactivity insertion rate, SDM, ejected CEA worth, and p'ower distribution peaking [
factorsarepreserved(Ref.J). @
The regulating CEA insertion limits satisfy Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.
CEA sequence, W and hysical LCO' The limits on regulatin! the COLR, must be maintained 'r insertion, as defined i because they serve the function of preserving power distribution, ensuring that the SOM is maintained, ensuring that ejected CEA worth is maintained, and ensuring adequate
~~. negative reactivity insertion on trip. The overlap between regulating banks provides ,more unifom rates of reactivity %a insertion and withdrawal. ;f:D :. F J ;. xit;!c.~~
m +@ c ;c c ;=hi;; tr';, m a . n C ....f m. .; }
The power dependent insertion limit (PDIL) alarm circ 0it is required to be OPERABLE for notification that the CEAs are outside the required insertion limits. When the PDIL alarm circuit is inoperable, the verification of CEA positions is increased to ensure improper CEA alignment is identified
- before unacceptable flux distribution occurs.
6oorkt 4 t.ks %AeMn3 growPs emy 6c -
Int.re.* sad, p .W d.J +w.y gh., q v w es. f r e lata 3 3
p' er's, greurw menen (?
6s E.J. K . ud *%e. mssch NWs(continued) O B 3.1-42 AMENDMENT NO.
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 l
-w~-~=-~~~- .. .
..y _ _ __
{
Regulating CEA Insertion Limits s B 3.1.7 l BASES-ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued) intervals > 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period, - ' '" tc; ::q '.!i, !
4 :'--dy '-^ : '..;;ct L : :;. .m.. J;d, peakin can develop that are of immediate concern (Ref.))g* factors
{ :
Additionally, s'ince the CEAs can be in this cond tion without misalignment, penalty factors are not 47. .. mu ij 9M.J by { i the core protection calculators to compensate for the developing peaking factors. Verifying the short term steady "i state insertion limits are not exceeded ensures that the peaking factors that do develop are within those allowed for
. continued operation. Fifteen minutes provides adequate time -
for the operator to verify if the short tem steady state i insertion limits are exceeded.
Experience has shown that rapid )ower increases in' areas of l the core, in which the. flux has ieen depressed, can result i in fuel damage as the LHR in those areas rapidly increases, i Restricting the rate of THERMAL POWER increases to 5 5% RTP per hour, following CEA insertion beyond the long term.
steady state insertion limits, ensures the power transients experienced by the fuel will not result in fuel failure g i
). ]
, (Ref.)5
~-
L1
. With the regulating CEAs inserted between the long tem ,
&c of eteadistate insertion limit and the transient insertion ,
limit = d "' ' ' " : r ee-ep m ::S' 9-ehe 5 effective full @
p( power days (EFPD) per 30 EFPD, oD14 EFPD per 365 EFPD l i s wo u , me wi e : :- - :- a ~-M' r ' ' ' t: p:::d- d ;
F g bg M-~er "' flux patterns outside those assumed in the long term burnup assumptions. In this case, the CEAs must be returned to withinJthe long term steady state insertion limits, or the core must be placed in a condition in which i the abnormal fuel burnup cannot continue. A Completion Time ;
of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months is a reasonable time .to return the CEAs to within i the long term steady state insertion limits.
The required Completion Time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months from initial discovery of a regulating CEA group outs.ide the' limits until 1 its restoration to within the long tern steady state limits, shown on the figures in the COLR, allows sufficient time for .
(continued)
. b SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.1-44 AMENDMENT NO.
. l
,.-.._ ., 1
-. . . i
Part Length CEA Insertion Linits B 3.1.8 BASES (continued)
ACTIONS A.1. A.2. and B.1 If the part length CEA groups are inserted beyond the transient insertion limit or between the long term (steady state) insertion limit and the transient limit for more than 7 effective full power days (EFPD) out of any 30 EFPD period, or for more than 14 EFPD out of any 365 EFPD period, flux patterns begin to develop that are outside the range assumed for long term fuel burnup. If allowed to continue beyond this limit, the peaking factors assumed as initial' conditions in the accident analysis may be invalidated (Ref Q , Restoring the CEAs to within limits or reducing THERMAL POWER to that fraction of RTP that is allowed by CEA l group position, using the limits specified in the COLR, I ensures that acceptable peaking factors are maintained.
, _ .Since these effects are cumulative, actions are provided to . i limit the total time the part length CEAs can be out of limits in any 30 EFPD or 365 EFPD period. Since the cumulative out of limit times are in days, an additional Completion Time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months is reasonable for restoring the part length CEAs to within the allowed limits.
C,d If the part length CEA groups cinnot be restored to within the long term steady state insertion limits within two hours, a controlled shutdown should commence. A Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, for reducing power to s 20% RTP from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.8.1 REQUIREMENTS 1 Verification of each part length CEA group position every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is sufficient to detect CEA positions that may approach the limits, and provide the operator with time to undertake the Required Action (s), should insertion limits be found to be exceeded. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Frequency also takes into ;
account the indication provided by the power dependent insertion limit alarm circuit and other information about -
(continued)
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.1-51 AMENDHENT NO.
Part Length CEA Insertien Licits B 3.1.8 l
BASES SURVEILLANCE CEA group positions available to the operator in the control i REQUIREMENTS room.
(continued) l SR 3.I.8.2 j i
Verification of the accumulated time during which the part length CEA groups are inserted beyond the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limit every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is sufficient since long term operation at the Transient Insertion Limit could have affects on core power distribution.
REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 10 and GDC 26.
~~2. 10 CFR 50.46. _ _ .~~
~~3. SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Section 15.4.~~
~~b. 00Z$ Units 2 and LT0"". w+ ion 14+;-~~
~~SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.1-52 AMENDMENT NO.~~

,n

Boration Systems - Operating B 3.1.9 8 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM B 3.1.9 Boration Systems - Operating
~ BASES BACKGROUND The Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) functions to provide a means for reactivity control and maintaining reactor coolant inventory, activity, and chemistry. The CVCS includes the letdown and boron injection subsystems.
The boron injection subsystem is required to establish and maintain a safe shutdown condition for the reactor. The letdown portion of the CVCS is used for normal plant operation, however, it is not required for safcty.
Two OPERABLE boron injection flow paths are required while operating in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. One flow path includes the OPERABLE RWST (TS 3.5.4) the associated gravity feed valves, and the charging pumps. The second flow path includes the Boric Acid Makeup (BAMU) tanks with their individual or combined contents in accordance with the LCS, the associated gravity feed valves, BAMU pump (s), and charging pumps. Power is provided by the OPERABLE onsite emergency power supply specified by TS 3.8.1.
The boron concentration is controlled to provide shutdown margin (SDM) for maintenance, refueling and emergencies.
Boron concentration is adjusted d o obtain optimum CEA positioning and compensate for normal reactivity changes associated with changes in reactor coolant temperature, core burnup, and xenon concentration. The boration capability is sufficient to provide a SDM of 3.0% ok/k assuming the highest worth CEA is stuck out after xenon decay and cooldown to 200*F.r For Small Break Loss Of Coolant Accidents (SBLOCA) the charging pumps supply water to (maintain inventory until the RCS pressure decreases below the HPSI pump shutoff hea . In addition, the boration system injects boron into the RCS to mitigate a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB).
{,m neu,nknc u'A GCc. 26==.t 27(R4 i %.1 2.')
m M ance G A 6Dc. 3 3 (R.f.3) 3 O
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 8 3.1-53 AMENDMENT NO.
Boration Systems - Operating B 3.1.9 BASES -
SAFETY ANALYSIS The charging pumps inject borated water into the RCS to provide reactivity control. There are three installed charging pumps with one normally in operation balancing the letdown purification flow and the reactor coolant pump ,
controlled bleed-off flow. For SBLOCAs that do not initially depressurize the RCS below the HPSI pump shutoff i head, the charging pumps supply borated water to help maintain reactor coolant inventory. A Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) is initiated by either low pressurizer pressure or high containment pressure in Modes 1 through 3. All three charging pumps receive start signals from SIAS and the associated boric acid flow path valves open to provide emergency boration via the charging pumps.
The capacity of the charging pumps and the required amount of borated water stored in the RWST and BAMUs is sufficient to maintain shutdown margin during a plant cooldown to MODE 5 with a shutdown margin of at least 3%Ak/k at any time during plant life. The maximum expected boration capability requirements occurs at the end of core life from full power equilibrium xenon conditions. During this condition the required boric acid solution is sup) lied by the BAMU tanks with the contents in accordance wit 1 the LCS plus approximately 13,000 gallons of 2350 ppm borated water from the OPERABLE RWST.
The design of the boration systems incorporates a high degree of functional reliability by providing redundant components, an alternate path for charging and either offsite or onsite power supplies. Gravity feed lines from ,
each Boric Acid Makeup (BAMU) tank and the RWST assures that '
a source of borated water is available to the charging pump !
suction header. Should the charging line inside containment >
be inoperative, the line may be isolated outside containment t and flow redirected through the high pressure safety injection headers to assure boron injection. If the normal i power supply system should fail, the charging pumps, boric I acid makeup pumps, and all related automatic control valves are powered from an emergency bus. The malfunction or failure of one active component would not reduce the ability to borate the RCS since an alternate flow path is always -
available for emergency boration.
Tk % % Ssws y sary C n n e:m 3 av th NRC.
bl[<-7 5mh wr . ,
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.1-54 AMENDMENT NO.
Boration Systems - Operating B 3.1.9 BASES SURVEILLANCE that a sufficient volume of borated water is available for REQUIREMENTS RCS makeup. The minimum required volume and concentration (continued) of stored boric acid in the BAMU tank (s) is dependent upon the RWST boron concentration and is.specified in a Licensee Controlled Specification. The 7 day Surveillance Frequency
~~ensures that an adequate initial water supply is available for boron injection.~~
SR 3.1.9.3 and 3.1.9.4 ,
These SRs demonstrate that each automatic boration system pump and valve is operable and actuates as required. In response to an actual or simulated SIAS the charging aumps ;
start, the VCT is isolated, and the charging pumps ta ce suction from the OPERABLE BAMU tank (s) and RWST.
Verification of the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the Boration System Flow paths provides assurance that proper boration flow paths are available. These SRs do not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, because these valves were previously verified to be in the correct position.
t REFERENC.E5 Q lo CS R. S o, App W i> A, GDC 26 -
~~2) to cSR so, ArpJ,c. A, Gbc.>_7 t~~
~~3) to cFt. So, A ppd *, 4, G Vc 33.~~
l
~
i i
l l
l l
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.1-54 c AMENDMENT NO. {
I
Boration Systems - Shutdown B 3.1.10 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM .
m accoac.s. w A Gbc. 24 27, d 53 :
8 3.1.10 Boration Systems - Shutdown Chc. 1, 2., w 3) -
1 BASES BACKGROUND The Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) functions to provide a means for reactivity control and maintainin reactor coolant inventory, activity, and chemistry. The CVCS includes the letdown and boron injection subsystems.
The boron injection subsystem is required to establish and maintain a safe shutdown condition for the reactor. The letdown portion of the CVCS is used for normal plant operation, however, it is not required for safety.
One OPERABLE boron injection flow path is required while operating in Modes 5 and 6. The required flow path may include either: 1) The RWST via a char Pressure Safety Injection Pump, or; 2)ging A Boricpump or High Acid Makeup (BAMU) Tank via the BAMU pump or gravity feed valve to a charging pump. AC electrical power is available from the OPERABLE power sources specified by TS 3.8.2.
SAFETY ANALYSIS The charging pumps inject concentrated boric acid into the RCS to provide negative reactivity control in MODES 5 and 6.
With the RCS below 200*F one injection system is acceptable without single failure considerations on the basis of the stable reactor condition and additional restrictions on CORE ALTERATIONS.
Boron dilution is conducted under strict procedural controls j which specify limits on the rate and magnitude of any l required change in boron concentration. Therefore, the !
probability of a sustained or erroneous dilution is very i low. In Mode 5, administrative controls allow only one charging pump to be in operation and require that power be removed from the remaining two charging pumps with their ;
breakers locked out. Analyses show that an inadvertent )
boron dilution while in MODE 5, results in the least time available for detection and termination of the event. The high neutron flux alarm on the startup channel instrumentation will alert the operator of a boron dilution event. The operator will terminate the dilution before !
losing shutdown margin by either turning off the charging pumps, turning off the primary makeup tank pump, isolation of the reactor makeup water supply, or actuating safety ,
injection.
(continued)
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.1-55 AMENDMENT NO.
l
Boration System - Shutdown B 3.1.10 BASES SAFETY ANALYSIS The design of the boration systems incorporates a high (continued) degree of functional reliability by providing an alternate path for charging and either offsite or onsite power supplies. Gravity feed lines from each Boric Acid Makeup (BAMU) tank and the RWST assures that a source of borated water is available to the charging pump suction header in the event of a failure of the power supply to the bamu pump discharge valves. Should the charging line inside containment be inoperative, the line may be isolated outside containment and flow redirected through the high pressure safety injection header No. 2 or hot leg injection header No. I to assure boron injection. If the normal power supply system should fail, the charging pumps, high pressure safety injection pumps, boric acid makeup pumps, and all related automatic control valves are powered from emergency buses.
The RCS boron concentration in MODES 5 and 6 is controlled to provide shutdown margin (SDM) for maintenance and, refueling. The required boration capability ensures that a SDM of 3.0% Ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 140*F is available. For this SDM requirement, 4150 gallons of borated water shall be available from either the BAMU tanks (35% Control room indicated level) or the RWST (2% control room indicated level), with a concentration of at least 2350 ppm boron.
LCO In MODES 5 and 6, one of the following RCS boron injection flow paths shall be operable:
I. BAMU Tank (4150 gallons with 2350-4250 PPM Boron) via: -
A.1. BAMU pump, 08 >
A.2. Gravity feed, AND B. Charging Pump; Th %%A T yn.m3 wacy Cntus 3
~~cx A._ MPA AW.y St.e .o. (continued)~~
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.1-56 AMENDMENT NO.
l
i Boration System -. Shutdown i B 3.1.10 l
i BASES I
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.10.4 REQUIREMENTS !
(continued) 'These SRs demonstrate that each boration system pump and i valve is operable and actuates as required. In response to an actual or simulated SIAS the charging pumps. start, the ;
VCT is isolated, and the charging pumps take suction from i theOPERABLEBAMUtank(s)andRWST. Verification of the i correct alignment for manual,. power operated, and automatic -
valves in the Boration System Flow paths provides assurance that proper boration flow paths are available. These SRs do not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise i
secured in position, because these valves were previously ;
verified to be in the correct position. i
~~1. A flow path from either boric acid makeup tank with a !~~
minimum boron concentration of 2350 ppm and a minimum -
borated water volume of 4150 gallons, via either one of the boric acid makeup pumps, the blending tee or the gravity feed connection and any charging pump to the RCS, or; :
~~2. The flow path from the refueling water tank with' a minimum borated water level of 2%, a minimum boron f; concentration of 2350 ppm, and a solution temperature !~~
between 40*F and 1000F via either a charging pump or a i high pressure safety injection pump to the RCS. l REFEREMCES D C CER So, kPa& A, GDc 26, l 2') A CFA, So, APP = A'v b bDC 17 l
~~3) to cpt So, A?Pw !& A, GD c_ 'n .~~
~
i i
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.1-56c AMENDMENT NO.
w,,...,...
. n.
STE-Lsw Power Physics Testing B 3.1.12 BASES ,
BACKGROUND core are consistent with the design predictions and that the (continued) core can be operated as designed (Ref. 4).
PHYSICS TESTS procedures are written and approved adel i Accordance with established formats. The procedures 97 4 i$clude all information necessary to permit a detailed execution of testing required to ensure that the design intent is met. PHYSICS TESTS are performed in accordance with these procedures and test results are approved prior to continued power escalation and long term power operation. '
Examples of PHYSICS TESTS include determination of critical boron concentration, CEA group worths, reactivity '
coefficients, flux symmetry, and core power distribution.
APPLICABLE It is acceptable to suspend certain LCOs for PHYSICS TESTS SAFETY ANALYSES" because additional limits on power level and shutdown capability are maintained during PHYSICS TESTS.
Reference 5 defines the requirements for initial testing of the facility, including PHYSICS TESTS. Requirements for reload fuel cycle PHYSICS TESTS are defined in ANSI /ANS-19.6.1-1985 (Ref. 4). PHYSICS TESTS for reload fuel cycles are given in Table 1 of ANSI /ANS-19.6.1-1985.
Although these PHYSICS TESTS are generally accomplished within the limits of all LCOs, conditions may occur when one or more LCOs must be suspended to make completion of PHYSICS TESTS possible or practical. This is acceptable as long as the fuel design criteria are not violated. As long as the linear heat rate (LHR)~ remains within its limit, fuel design criteria are preserved.
During PHYSICS TESTS, the following LCOs may be suspended:
~~a. LCO 3.1.1, " SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)-T,y > 200*F"; and~~
~~b. LCO3.1.4,"ModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)";~~
~~c. LCO 3.1.5, " Control Element Assembly (CEA) Alignment"; !~~
~
% h(ste,
~~d. LCO 3.1.6, " Shutdown Control Element Assembly (CEA) I8ES Insertion Limits";~~
(continued)
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.1-60 AMENDMENT NO.
y I?
F STER. 4 /.g- _^
-C::t:r Co."i::E Mx T s1iii,. ai.t (4oi..g a
R ; & tin; CE? S::rti r, L 5tt w w B 3.1.14
{
?.f
); BASES i
P APPLICABLE PHYSICS TESTS include measurement of core parameters or :
SAFETY ANALYSES exercise of control components that affect process
. (continued) variables. Among the process variables involved are the Center CEA and and regulating EddyaiFtTTEstli CEAs, which affectpowerpeakingandarerhijniNd"I'5Pshutdownofthe reactor. The insertion limits for these variables are specified for each fuel cycle in the COLR.
. PHYSICS TESTS meet the criteria for inclusion in the Technical Specifications since the components and process variable LCOs suspended during PHYSICS TESTS meet Criteria 1, 2, and 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO This LCO provides exceptions to LCO 3.1.5, " Control Element Assembly (CEA) Ali nment"? end LC0 3.1.7, " Regulating CEA Insertion Limits , sjdKC0}371^{8{"fggtsiisth;CEOihsytT6W Elkilts." In addi on, ths CCO requires 16st only~the center CEA'(CEA #1) is misaligned, or only regulating CEA Group 6 is inserted beyond the transient insertion Limit of LC0 3.1. 7g6fff6H193thiip'WtilidithTCEArit6iliiKiY!CiWisFtid TWf"6Hd LEs?.trasilsntg[Wiert'iorj%imityfj@C0f3s1Mi^ind"ths*DiR ahd ..
DNBR"do not^ exceed ths liinits speciffid i*6 the COLR. These ;
exceptions are required to determine the isothermal i temperature coefficient moderator temperature coefficient? ^*
gypplyfjj{egjdgDylg,f and power coefficient.
APPLICABILITY This LC0 is applicable in MODE 1.
ACTIONS A.1 3 g
With the LHR or DNBR outside the limits specified in the COLR, adequate safety margin is not assured and power must be reduced to restore LHR and DNBR to within limits.
The required Completion Time of 15 minutes for initiating boration allows the o)erator sufficient time to align the valves and start the aoric acid pumps.
O.! ,
2 INSERT C (continued) W h
h SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.1-74 AMENDMENT NO.
l INSERT C With LHR or DNBR outside the limits specified in the COLR and Action A.1 not completed within the associated completion time, power must be reduced to MODE 3 operating conditions within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .
The required Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allows sufficient time to reduce power to Mode 3 conditions in an orderly manner without challenging plant systems.
2 of 4
7 x1 4
RPS Instrumentation-Operating T
B 3.3.1 1 f.9 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.4 (continued) ,
Y e
REQUIREMENTS located in the control room to detect deviations in cng(hi ndl outputs. The Frequency is modified by a Note indicat fter '
Surveillance need only be perfomed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months a reaching 20% RTP. The 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after reaching 20% RT s i required for plant stabilization, data taking, and flow )
verification. The secondary calorimetric is inaccurate at lower power levels. A second Note in the SR indicates the l 1
SR may be suspended during PHYSICS TESTS. The conditional suspension of the daily calibrations under strict 1 administrative control is necessar to a11 ~ Sacial testing 4 mgt $syp.l to occur.
sv% aTP, e i e
SR 3.3.1.5 The RCS flow rate indicated by each CPC is verified to eM) i less than or equal to the RCS total flow rate eve ryff W.
The Note indicates the Surveillance is perfome4within h l 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER is a 85% RTP. This check (and,'
if necessary, the adjustment of the CPC addressable flow ensures that the DNBR setpoint is constant conservatively adjuste with respect to actual flow ...
coefficients)d indications as determined by a calorimetric calculation.
Operating experience has shown the specified Frequency is adequate, as instrument drift is minimal and changes in actual flow rate are minimal over core life.
SR 3.3.1.6 The three vertically mounted excore nuclear instrumentation detectors in each channel are used to determine APD for use in the DNBR and LPD calculations. Because the detectors are mounted outside the reactor vessel, a portion of the signal from each detector is from core sections not adiacent to the detector. SR 3.3.1.6 ensures that the preassigned gains are still proper.
The 92 day Frequency is adequate because the demonstrated long tem drift of the instrument channels is minimal.
(continued) d 8 3.3-31 AMENDMENT NO.
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 l
7._
p t-RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown B 3.3.2
, I BASES f.\
REFERENCES 1- M 6f A wr 2.
,. a10 CFR o s1 un- . --
0 3 4 ,FSAR, Section 7.2.
s
~~4. PPS Setpoint Calculation CE-NPSD-570.~~
~~t - 5. NRC Safety Evaluation Report.~~
~~6. CEN-327, June 2, 1986, including Supplement 1, March 3, 1989.~~
B 3.3-51 AMENDMENT NO.
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2
V&try Slad DG -ttr9 A B 3.3.7
^') B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION gg
.; B 3.3.7 Diesel Generator (DG)-1.::: Of V0lt;S St M SOVC)
BASES BACKGROUND The DGs provide a source of emergency power when offsite power is either unavailable or insufficiently stable to allow safe unit operation. Undervoltage protection will Y,3 l
W 'p y#gU y - TJenerate OVS)in the event a Loss of Voltage or Degraded voltage co dition occurs. There are two LOVS Functions for l each 4.16 kV vital bus.
Four undervoltage relays with inverse time characteristics are provided on each 4.16 kV Class 1E instrument bus for the purpose of detecting a loss of bus voltage. Four undervoltage relays with definite time characteristics are provided for the purpose of detecting a sustained degraded voltage condition. The relays are combined in a two-out-of-four logic to generate a LOVS if the voltage is below 75% for a short time or below 90% for a long time.
The LOVS initiated actions are described in "Onsite Power Systems" (Ref. 1).
~
Trio Setooints and Allowable Values The trip setpoints and Allowable Values are based on the analytical limits presented in " Accident Analy' sis,"
Reference 2. The selection of these trip setpoints is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account. To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, ,
and instrument drift, Allowable Values 4.. :1 '- sg Gm 2.2.7 t are conservatively adjusted with respect to i the analytical limits. The actual nominal trip setpoint is normally still more conservative than that required by the plant specific setpoint calculations. If the measured trip
~
setpoint does not exceed the documented Surveillance acceptance criteria, the undervoltage relay is considered OPERABLE.
Setpoints in accordance with the Allowable Values will ensure that the consequences of accidents will be acceptable, providing the plant is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the accident and the equipment functions a's designed.
(continued)
~~s. p' SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.3-124 AMENDMENT NO.~~
l
i CPIS B 3.3.8 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.8 Containment Purge Isolation Signal (CPIS)
BASES BACXGROUND This LC0 encompasses the CPIS, which is a plant specific instrumentat - d r M M ou n ctuation function required plant protection but s not rwise included in LCO . 6, " Engineered Safety Features tion Systen 3
(ESFAS' Logic and Manual Trip," or LCO 3.3.7,- 4 tart i1t449)."joie Genera ;or (DG)-L::: :f '!:'t: M: &
The CPI rovides protection from ra ioactive contamination in the con inment in the event a fuel asse ly should be severely dam
-. handlin It al closes the purge valves during plant ope in re., onse to a Reactor CoolantSystem(RCS) leak.
The CPIS will detect any abnormal amounts of radioactive material in the containment and will initiate purge valve closure to limit the release of radioactivity to the environment. Both the minipurge and large volume purge supply and exhaust valves are closed on a CPIS when a high radiation level in containment is detected.
The CPIS includes two independent, redundant logic subsystems, including actuation trains. Each train employs two sensors, each one detecting one of the following:
. Gaseous Gamma (area)
If any one of these sensors exceeds the bistable trip setpoint, the CPIS train will be actuated (one-out-of-two logic).
Each train actuates a separate series valve in the containment purge supply and return lines. Either train controls sufficient equipment to perform the isolation function. These valves are also isolated on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) and Containment Isolation Actuation S.ignal (CIAS).
(continued)
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 ,
B 3.3- AMENDMENT N0.
%k IS}
l
- - - - 1
CPIS B 3.3.8 BASES
~
~~b. C LCO Airborne Radiation and Containment Area Radiation E p~~
(continued) The LCO on the radiation channels requires that eech h channel be OPERABLE for each Actuation Logic channel, (
d m th :, .. ..o m a;ly icuuuuant to eau.. ;;h:r.
The trip setpoint of twice background is selected to mal The '
allow absolute detection oftrip value of the small deviations setpoint in MODE from nor86 differs from the setpoint in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 so that a fuel handling accident can be detected in the -
19wer background radiation ex
~~ik 6t*- 4 h it.A444he*pected N6 ut. in 4hese MODEffe Crad.lf*d . gI .~~
8
~~c. Actuation Loaic se}K,. % opp.8Het# et ,tm Assetb,~~
~k. kAnom kMa% ekanadh w ut vt4 One channel of Actuation Logic is required, since the L valves can be shut independently of the CPIS signal b DE6 either manually from the control room or using either the SIAS or CIAS push button.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the minipurge valves may be open.
In these MODES, it is necessary to ensure the valves will shut in the event of a primary leak in containment whenever any of the containment purge valves are open.
With the purge valves open during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies wi containment, a '
f tr.?d14pyrrcu oen vd i cqu i on hig diation ,
n containment. appreyisto ;
The APPLICABILITY is odified by a Note, which states that he CPIS Specificat on is only required when the penetratic h is not isolated y s' '-"' ^- closed and de-activate f automatic valv , closed manual valvefor blind ' flange 9g f
(co'ntinued)(
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 S AMENDMENT NO. k ,
B3.3-[$(
CRIS B 3.3.9
\ B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION
- B 3.3.9 Control Room Isolation Signal (CRIS)
BASES BACKGROUND This LCO encompasses CRIS actuation, which is a plant specific instrumentation channel that performs an actuation function required for plant protection but is not otherwise included in LC0 3.3.6, " Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Generator (ESFAS)
(DG)-LossLogic and Manual of Voltage Trip,"(orThis Start LOVS)." LCOis3.3.7, a " Dies non-Nuclear Steam Supply System ESFAS Function that, because of differences in purpose, design, and operating requirements, is not included in LC0 3.3.6 and LCO 3.3.7.
The CRIS terminates the normal supply of outside air to the control room and initiates actuation of the Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACUS) to minimize operator radiation ex1osure. The CRIS includes two independent, including
~~actuation trains. Each A redundant suasyst ms, separatesensortodetect(gaseousactivity.~~
m I train employs l( +,y'M Since there are separate sensors in eachJrain, the trains O
are redundant. If the bistable monitoring either sensor "M indicates an unsafe condition, that train will be actuated d (one-out-of-twologic). The two trains actuate separate equipment. Actuating either train will perform the intended function. Control room isolation also occurs on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS).
Trio Setooints and Allowable Values Trip setpoints used in the bistables are based on the analytical limits (Ref. 1). The selection of these trip setpoints is such that adequate protection is provided when l all sensor and processing time delays are taken into !
account.- To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, and instrument drift, Allowable Values specified in LCO 3.3.9 are conservatively adjusted with respect to the analytical limits. The actual nominal trip setpoint entered into the bistable is nomally still more (continueo SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.3-1 AMENDMENT N0. Sg*
(4 3
m CRIS B 3.3.9 BASES y.
BACKGROUND Trio Setooints and Allowable Values (continued) conservative than that.specified by the Allowable Value to account for changes in random measurement errors detectable ~l t
by a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. One example of such a change in measurement error is drift during the surveillance interval. If the measured setpoint does not exceed the .
Allowable Value, the bistable is considered OPERABLE.
Setpoints in accordance with the Allowable Value will ensure the consequences of Design Basis Accidents will be acceptable, providing the plant is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the accident and the equipment ,
functions as designed. l l
APPLICABLE The CRIS, in conjunction with the Control Room Emergency Air :
SAFETY ANALYSES Cleanup System (CREACUS), maintains the control room atmosphere within conditions suitable for prolonged occupancy throughout the duration of any one of the accidents discussed in Reference 1. The radiation exposure of control room personnel, through the duration of any one of the postulated accidents discussed in " Accident
? .. . ~ l Analysis," SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 1),
does not exceed the limits set by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, 2 GDC 19 (Ref. 3).
The CRIS satisfies the requirements of Criterion 3 of tNe NRC Policy Statement.
LC0 LCO 3.3.9 requires one channel of CRIS to be OPERABLE. The required channel consists of Actuation Logic, Manual Trip, en i
-m l and gaseous radiation monitors. The specific Allowable y M k/ 4 Values for the setpoints of the CRIS are listed in the SRs.
gg Only the Allowable Values are specified for each trip l Function in the LCO. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint; but within its l Allowable Value, is acceptable, provided that the difference j between the nominal trip setpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or greater than the drift allowance assumed for l each trip in the transient and accident analyses. l (continuec' w
.'} 'N SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2
]
B 3.3-1p AMENDMENT NO. g
. (44 4 l
CRIS B 3.3.9
,^l BASES LCO The Allowable Value specified is more conservative than the (continued) analytical limit assumed in the transient and accident '
analysis in order to account for instrument uncertainties appropriate to the trip Function. These uncertainties are b
defined in th; ""h t "retatier. Sy;t= !&:ti:n :f Trip 2 Sctp 6 t " i c," (hi. 2). A channel is inoperable if its Y
i actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value.
The Bases for the LCO on the CRIS are discussed below for each Function:
a. Manual Trio The LC0 on Manual Trip backs up the automatic trips and ensures operators have the capability to rapidly initiate the CRIS Function if any parameter is trending toward its setpoint. One channel must be OPERABLE. This considers that the Manual Trip capability is a backup and that other means are available to actuate the redundant train if required, including manual SIAS.
. b. Airborne Radiatio 3 One channel of Airborne Radiation detection in the required train is required to be OPERABLE to ensure the control room isolates on/iioh gaseous concentration. 4 g;g g.3
~~c. Actuation loaic Y# / #~~
One train of Actuation Logic must be OPERABLE, since there are alternate means available to actuate the redundant train, including SIAS.
~
A APPLICABI Y The CRIS Functions must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2 3 M SWI S d4 q 2nd =0; ; ;. 5, and during movement of irradiate el
{ assemblies to ensure a habitable environment for the ntroll g room operators.
L
., (continued)
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 . B 3.3- AMENDHENT NO.
5
w u CRIS b B 3.3.9 F
. cc ,
I~ BASES (continued)
_p i A CRIS channel is inoperable when it does not satisfy the C ACTIONS
.0PERABILITY criteria for the channel's function. The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure or drift of the bistable or process module sufficient to exceed the tolerance allowed by the plant specific setpoint f-analysis. Typically, the drift is not large and would t result in a delay of actuation rather than a total loss of f
~~function. This detennination is generally made during the perfonnance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST when the process~~
7. instrument is set up for adjustment to bring it within specification. If the trip setpoint is not within the Allowable Value, the channel is inoperable and the appropriate Conditions must be entered.
A.I. 8.1. 8.2.1. and B.2.2 Conditions A and B have been modified by a Note, which specifies that CREACUS be placed manually in the isolation mode if the automatic transfer to the isolation mode is inoperable.
h -
conditions A and B are ap licable to manual and automatic actuation of the CREACUS y CRIS. Condition A applies to the failure of the CRIS Manual Trip, Actuation Logic, and
, Mgh TrequireTJgaseous radiation monitor channels in MODE 1, 2, 3
~~4. Entry~~
/ orrestore into this Condition requires action to either the failed channel (s) or manually perfonn the CRIS safety function (Required Action A.1). The Completion Time 1 of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is sufficient to complete the Required Actions and accounts for the fact that CRIS supplements control room l isolation by other Functions (e.g., SIAS) in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. i i
Condition B applies to the failure of CRIS Manual Trip, Actuation Logic, and required gaseous radiation monitor 2 h "^^5 5 r 9. or when moving irradiated c Ah The Required Actions are insnediately t Q3 Tssemblies.
place one OPERABLE CREACUS train in the emergency mode, or i to suspend positive reactivity additions, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The Completion Time recognizes the fact that the radiation signals are the only Functions available to initiate control room isolation in the event of a fuel handling accident.
t .
40 <ceetineed)
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.3-1 AMENDMENT N0. g2. l I4(o t
pw , . .
% CRIS !
B 3.3.9 a h
k ,.
V BASES (continued) '
it t SR 3.3.9.5 SVRVEILLANCE
{1 Every 18 months, a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on the manual CRIS actuation circuitry.
f This test verifies that the trip push buttons are capable of f
)
opening contacts in the Actuation Logic as designed, de-energizing the iniation relays and providing Manual Trip b of the function. The 18 month Frequency is based on the ,
p need to perform thb Surveillance under the conditions that i apply during a plant outage and the potential for an r unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at a Frequency of once every 18 months.
~~1. SONGS Units 2 and R, Chap er 5.~~
~~REFERENCES Valut5 '3 !~~
~~2. PPS Selection of I rip 'l i : 4 ocu D nt.~~
~~3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix 1.~~
f k
B 3.3- - AMENDMENT NO. Sj7 1
~~SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2~~
PAM Instrumentation 8 3.3.11 ,
1
~
i BASES LC0 11. Pressurizer level (continued)
Pressurizer Level is used to determine whether to terminate safety injection (SI), if still in progress, or to reinitiate S1 if it has been stopped. Knowledge of pressurizer water level is also used to verify the plant conditions neceuary to establish natural circulation in the RCS and'to verify that the plant is maintained in a safe shutdown condition.
12. Steam Generator Water level Steam Generator Water Level is provided to monitor operation of decay heat removal via the steam l generators. The Category I indication of steam generator level is the wide range level instrumentation. Temperature compensation of this indication is performed manually by the operator.
Redundant monitoring capability is provided by two trains of instrumentation.
Operator action is based on the control room '
indication of Steam Generator Water Level. The RCS
' response during a design basis small break LOCA is dependent on the break size. For a certain range of break sizes, the boiler condenser mode of heat transfer is necessary to remove decay heat. Wide range level is a Type A variable because the operator Swd. g ) must manually raise and control the steam generator f- {54 P3
> level to esta011shJbe"-- cr4-re- Ht trr a loss of subcooled Operator action iPi ,
~~r a d until the margin. Feedwater low i p ige 1velreachesthe~~
~
indicated ;;" d' .Orte tvPP.2.
u- d ut m- e==qme-t{ g.3 ,
~~13. Condensate Storace Tank (CST) level CST Level is provided to ensure water supply for AFW.~~
The CST provides the ensured, safety grade water
"' - ^ " e i c + c d + =
1 d
supply for the AFW System. fPP (continued)
? i B 3.3-163 AMENDMENT NO.
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.11 t i
BASES LC0 13. Condensate Storace Tank (CST) Level (continued) y ,-q g--o,.+ a q, , ,- ~ -^ n t ' : t 5 ;;d; c . CST Level is displayed on a control room indicator, strip chart recorder, and plant computer. In addition, a control room annunciator alarms on low level. g CST Level is considered a Type A variab because the control room meter d _ . _ . _ _ - . . . onsidered the SfP 3 primary indication used by the operato . The DBAs that require AFW are the loss of electric power, steam line break (SLB), and small break LOCA. The CST is the initial source of water for the AFW System.
14, 15, 16, 17. Core Exit Temperature Core Exit Temperature is provided for verification and long term surveillance of core cooling. '
An evaluation was made of the minimum number of valid core exit thermocouples necessary for inadequate core cooling detection. The evaluation detemined the complement of core exit thermocouples necessary to detect initial core recovery and trend the ensuing core heatup. The evaluations account for core nonuniformities including incore effects of the radial decay power distribution and excore effects of condensate runback in the hot legs and nonuniform inlet temperatures. Based on these evaluations, adequate or inadequate core cooling detection is ensured with two valid core exit thennocouples per quadrant.
The design of the Incore Instrumentation System includes a Type K (chromel alumel) thennoccuple within each of the 56 incore instrument detector assemblies.
The junction of each thermocouple is located a few inches above the fuel assembly, inside a structure i that supports and shields the incore instrument i
(continued)
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.3-164 AMENDMENT NO.
l l
l
i Source Range Monitoring Channels e B 3.3.13 i i
B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION j
]'
B 3.3.13 Source Range Monitoring Channels f 1
BASES i BACKGROUND I The source range monitoring channels provide neutron flux \ ;
power indication from < 1E-7% RTP to > 100% RTP. They also provide reactor protection when the reactor trip circuit f; i breakers (RTCBs) are shut, in the fom of a Logarithmic Power Level-High trip. .
/ !
This LCO addresses MODES 3, 4, and 5 with the RTCBs open. ;
When the RTCBs are shut, the source range monitoring i channels are addressed by LCO 3.3.2, " Reactor Protective j g( \ System (RPS) Instrumentation-Shutdown." ;
When the RTCBs are open, two of the four wide range power channels must be available to monitor neutron flux power.
. In this application, the RPS channels need not be OPERABLE since the reactor trip Function is not required. By monitoring neutron flux (wide range) power when the RTCBs are open, loss of SDN caused by boron dilution can be detected as an increase in flux. Alams are also provided
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when power increases above the fixed bistable setpoints.
For plants employing separate post accident, wide range nuclear instrumentation channels with adequate range, these can be substituted for the source range range channels. Two channels must be OPERABLE to provide single failure protection and to facilitate detection of channel failure by (providingCHANNELCHECKcanability, j APPLICABLE uW The source rangegmonitoring' channels are necessary to SAFETY ANALYSES monitor core reactivity changes. They are the primary means for detecting and triggering operator actions to respond to reactivity transients initiated from conditions in which the RPS is not required to be OPERABLE. They also trigger operator actions to anticipate RPS actuation in the event of reactivity transients starting from shutdown or low power conditions. The source range monitoring channel's LC0 requirements su GDC13(Ref.1)pportcompliancewith10CFR50,AppendixA
. Reference 2 describes the specific source range monitoring channel features that are critical to comply with the GDC.
(continued)
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. SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 8 3.3-179 AMENDMENT NO.
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:D The source range (s rtup)gmonitoring channels l
provide neutron fl x coungrate le4el indication j SMPP'$
from 0.1 to 500,00 cps. They so provide a Boron Dilution. Mon tor an a . in the Control Room to alert the r of a boron dilution event.
This LCO addresses MODES 3, 4, and 5 with the l RTCBs open. LCO 3.9.2 addresses the source range monitors during Mode 6 refueling operations.
Both source range monitoring channels must be le to monitor neutron flux level when the nTCBsa a e open. By monitoring source range coungYat evel, loss of SDM caused by a boron Sq%)3
. event can ba eted as an increase in neutron flux. Th or ution Monitor provides an alarm when th coun ate evel exceeds the setpoint which i adjus ed 0.5 volt above background.
GN n
h RCs ressure. Temperature,andFich.4.1 B3 ,
1-
)h 8 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) ressure, Temperature, and Flow Limits B 3.4.1 RCS
.% @ BASES =
/
These Bases address requirements for maintaining RCS BACKGROUND pressure, temperature, The and safety flow rate within limits1)assumed analyses.(Ref. of in the safety analyses.
normal operating conditions and anticipated operational occurrences assume initial limits conditions within the nomal
$ g [g m g f 3- steady state envelope.
The placed on DNB related
,,, - parameters ensure that these parameters will
~!VSERT%"
provide assurance that the minimum departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) will meet the required criteria for i each of the transients analyzed.
The LCO limits for minimum and max.imum RCS pressures as measured at the pressurizer are consistent with operation within the nominal operating envelope and are bounded by g those used as the initial pressures in the analyses.
N The LCO limits for minimum and maximum RCS cold leg ka temperatures are consistent with operation at the indicated power level and are bounded by those used as the initial ~O W = temp 3ratures in the analyses. -
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Since KRflow:? isr instrument M 4*+ 4-z~: ['Y'b -
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" and due to ~;a'd +^ - :: . ; "" '? ;; e, monitoring of this u s..
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j 7y g g g parameter during plant COLR).op(eration The COLR limits will for beminimum specifie j
l er te VM %
. Operating Limits Reportand maximum RCS flow ratesm f =j initial flow rates in the anal-~
uncerfahrfyl j 4A/Qj @d Ms asce+1WRCSficWemendew,ah -
3 f w y APPLICA8LE' The requirements of LCO 3.4.1 represent th SAFETY ANALYSES The safety analyses have shown that analyses (Ref. 1). transients initiated from the limit the DNBR criterion of a 1.31. Changes to the facility that for the RCS DNB parameters.
^
could impact these parameters must be assessed for impact on the DNBR criterion. include loss of coolant (continued)
AMENDHENT NO.
B 3.4-1 SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 O
$: fypweo/3 :
' V; i
INSERT "A" i E +
V. ,
) The LCO limits for minimum and maximum RCS flow rates are bounded by those used as T the initial flow rates in the analyses. The RCS flow rate is not expected to vary during ,
~~plant operation with all pumps running. i~~
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RCS DNB (Pressure, Temperature, and Flow) Limits h B 3.4.1 y
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@ SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.1R/ (continued) i1 REQUIREMENTS
< a normal operation, steady state condition following load - -
changes and other expected transient operations. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months interval has been shown by operating practice to be
.(Yl sufficient to regularly assess for potential degradation and
_y y*y /[) _ verify operation is within safety analysis assumptions.
~
a nce Required Action A.1 allows a Completion Time of
'N b M W /l./M M b 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to restore arameters that are not within limits, S gg/46A(dy/7$ the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Surveil ance Frequency for cold leg temperature is sufficient to ensure that the RCS coolant temperature can be restored to a normal operation, steady state condition following load changes and other expected transient operations. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months interval has been shown by operating practice to be sufficient to regularly assess for potential degradation and to verify operation is within safety analysis assumptions.
C*#
e SR 3.4.1.3 S T
._N6ee.7"8 7The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Surveillance Frequency for RCS total flow rate
is performed using the installed flow instrumentation. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Frequency has been shown by operating experience to be sufficient to assess for potential degradation and to verify operation is within safety analysis assumptions This SR is modified by a Note that only requires performance of this SR in MODE 1. The Note is necessary to allow measurement of RCS flow rate at normal operating conditions at power with all RCPs running.
REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 15.
B 3.4-5 AMENDMENT NO.
'. SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2
QC a. -
L / NSeRT "O "
t i
'The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Surveillance Frequency for RCS total flow rate has been shown by fj J
~~L{d operating experience to be sufficient to assess for potential degradation and to verify operation is within safety analysis assumptions.~~
4 The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Surveillance Frequency for RCS total flow rate is normally I performed using the Core Operating Limits Supervisory System (COLSS) g R COLSS utilizes sensor inputs of RCP speed, RCP differential pressure, i % flow.
y x cold leg temperature, and Pressurized pressure to calculate the vo flow through each RCP.
K 9 of the flows of each of the four RCPs.
'. N An
( When COLSS is out of service, RCS Mass Flowrate is determined manually.
evaluation of the heat balance between primary and secondary plant powers isAno the preferred methodology to determine RCS Mass Flowrate.
~~(3 methodology is to determine RCS Mass Flowrate by performing an evaluation of the differential pressure across each RCP.~~
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LTOP Systen l V F RCS Temperature > LTOP Enable Temperature
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'B 3.4.12.2 f
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BASES f
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LC0 Each of these methods of overpressure prevention is -
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I (continued) of mitigating the limiting LTOP transient.
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[ APPLICABILITY This LCO is applicable in MODE 4 when the temperature of all RCS cold legs are above the enable temperatures specified in
{
the PTLR. When the temperature of any RCS cold leg is equal ,
F to or below the enable temperatures specified in the PTLR p
the Shutdown Cooling System Relief valve is used for overpressure protection or if the RCS is also depressurized,
' then an RCS vent to atmosphere sized 5.6 inches or greater can be used for overpressure protection. When the reactor vessel head is off, overpressurization cannot occur.
LCO 3.4.3 provides the operational P/T limits for all MODES.
LCO 3.4.10, " Pressurizer Safety Valves," requires the OPERABILITY of the pressurizer safety valves that provide overpressure protection during MODES 1, 2, and 3.
Low temperature overpressure prevention is most critical during shutdown when the RCS is water solid, and a mass or heat input transient can cause a very rapid increase in RCS pressure when little or no time allows operator action to mitigate the event.
ACTIONS A.1 With no pressurizer code safety valves OPERABLE and the SDCS '
Relief Valve IN0PERABLE overpressurization is possible.
The 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time to be in MODE 5 and vented r
through a greater than or equal to 5.6 inch vent reflects l
the importance of maintaining overpressure protection of the i l RCS. (Y) l B.1 and B.2 l The 24-hour Allowable Outage Time A0T) for a single channel I i l
SDCS Relief Valve isolation valv s) increases the y l availability of the LTOP syste to mitigate low tempera !
overpressure transients '- giay duringouuts 5 ano'"~
~~= uutentiai Tor tuc>e tranmi.t; a 9: q A~~
s f (gesEO (continued) l SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-61 AMEN 0HENT NO.
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E i: LTOP Syst a RCS Temperature > LTOP Enable Temperature B 3.4.12.2 A ,
Sf'
,a BASES
,e empera iiroe bet':cer 90 r 3r.a ion F and the RCS is water )
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D oli .
The 24-hour A0T implements the guiaance provided in Generic Letter 90-06. .
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8 3.4-62 AMENDMENT NO.
[ .
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 h
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RCS PIV Leakage B 3.4.14 L
,'.. BASES
.1 APPLICABLE study concluded that periodic leakage testing of the PIVs SAFETY ANALYSES can substantially reduce the probability of an intersystem (continued) LOCA.
RCS PIV leakage satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.
Lt9 LC0 b RCS PIV leakage is identified LEAKAG nto closed systems connected to the RCS. Isolation valve leakage is usually on the order of drops per minute. Leaktge that increases significantly suggests that something is operationally wrong and corrective action must be taken.The LC0 PIV leakage limit is 0.5 gpm per nominal inch of valve size, with a maximum limit of 5 gpm. The previous criterion of 1 gpm for all valve sizes imposed an unjustified penalty on the larger valves without providing information on potential valve degradation and resulted in higher personnel radiation exposures. A study concluded a leacage rate limit based on valve size was superior to a single allowable value.
Reference 7 permits leakage testing at a lower pressure differential than between the specified maximum RCS pressure and the normal pressure of the connected system during RCS operation (the maximum 3ressure differential) in those types of valves in which the ligher service pressure will tend to diminish the overall leakage channel opening. In such cases, the observed rate may be adjusted to the maximum pressure differential by assuming leakage is directly proportional to the pressure differential to the one half power.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, this LC0 applies because the PIV leakage potential is greatest when the RCS is pressurized.
In MODE 4, valves in the SDC flow path are not required to meet the requirements of this LC0 when in the SDC mode of operation.
In MODES 5 and 6, leakage limits are not provided because the lower reactor coolant pressure results in a reduced potential for leakage and for a LOCA outside the containment, o
! (continued) f, SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-71 AMENDMENT NO.
l
Q:n .
hi i
n RCS PIV Leakage
[ B 3.4.14
?
4 i BASES
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i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.14.1
. REQUIREMENTS Performance of leakage testing on each RCS PIV or isolation i q valve used to satisfy Required Action A.1 or A.2 is recuired s
4 to verify that leakage is below the specified limit anci to identify each leaking valve. The leakage limit of 0.5 gpm
~~} g4 nch ofi nominal valve diameter up to 5 gpm maximum y~~
~~appMes to each valve. Leakage testing requires a stable~~
~~, pressure condition.~~
For the two PIVs in series, the leakage requirement applies to each valve individually and not to the combined leakage across both valves. If the PIVs are not individually leakage tested, one valve may have failed completely and not be detected if the other valve in series meets the leakage requirement. In this situation, the protection provided by redundant valves would be lost.
Testing is to be performed every 9 months, but may be extended up to a maximum of 24 months, a typical refueling cycle, if the plant does not go into MODE 5 for at least 7 days. The 24 month Fre 10 CFR 50.55a(g) (Ref. 8)quency is required in, as conta -
Testing Program, is within the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code,Section XI (Ref. 9), and is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.
In addition, testing must be performed once after the valve has been opened by flow or exercised to ensure tight reseating. PIVs disturbed in the performance of this Surveillance should also be tested unless documentation shows that an infinite testing loop cannot practically be avoided. Testing must be performed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after the valve has been reseated. Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is a reasonable and practical time limit for performing this test after opening or reseating a valve.
The leakage limit is to be met at the RCS pressure associated with MODES 1 and 2. This permits leakage testing at high differential pressures with stable conditions not possible in the MODES with lower pressures.
(continued)
B 3.4-73 AMENDMENT NO.
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2
L RCS PIV Leakage B 3.4.14 BASES l-l
~~SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.14.1 (continued)~~
L REQUIREMENTS
~
M Entry into MODES 3 nd 4 is allowed to establish the necessary differ tial pressures and stable conditions to -
allow for performance of this Surveillance. The Note that allows this provision is com)limentary to the Frequency of prior to entry into MODE 2 w1enever the unit has been in
? g MODE 5 for 7 days or more, if leakage testing has not been performed in the previous 9 months. In addition, this
, Surveillance is not required to be performed on the SDC Q ' System when the SDC System is aligned to the RCS in the shutdown cooling mode of operation. PIVs contained in the SDC shutdown cooling flow path must be leakage rate tested after SDC is secured and stable unit conditions and the necessary differential pressures are established. ,
REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.2.
~~2. 10 CFR 50.55a(c).~~
~~3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Section V, GDC 55.~~
~~4. WASH-1400 (NUREG-7!,/014), Appendix V, October 1975.~~
~~5. NUREG-0677, May 1980.~~
~~6. UFSAR, Section 5.4 I~~
~~7. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Article IWV-3423 (e) .~~
~~8. 10 CFR 50.55a(g).~~
~~9. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Article IWV-3422.~~
. .)
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h SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-74 AMENDMENT NO.
y 4
L 7
4 '
RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentaticn b B 3.4.15 !
4 9 .
f BASES (continued)
~
i LCO One method of protecting against large RCS LEAKAGE derives from the ability of instruments to rapidly detect extremely small leaks. This LC0 requires instruments of diverse .
monitoring principles to be OPERABLE to provide a high degree of confidence that extremely small leaks are detected in time to allow actions to place the plant in a safe condition when RCS LEAKAGE indicates possible RCPB degradation.
The LCO is satisfied when monitors of diverse measurement means are available. Thus, the containment sump monitor, in combination with a particulate or gaseous radioactivity monitor, provides an acceptable minimum.
APPLICABILITY Because of elevated RCS temperature and pressure in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, RCS leakage detection instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE.
In MODE 5 or 6, the temperature is s 200*F and pressure is maintained low or at atmospheric pressure. Since the temperatures and pressures are far lower than those for .
~
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the likelihood of leakage and crack propagation is much smaller. Therefore, the requirements of this LCO are not applicable in MODES 5 and 6.
ACTIONS A.1,Mcd .b j
If the containment sump monitor is inoperable, no other form of sampling can provide the equivalent information.
}t However, the containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor will provide indications of changes in leakage. p Restoration of the sump monitor to OPERABLE status is M.$d$7N
(
g required to regain the function in a Completion Time of 30 days after the monitor's failure. This time is acceptable considering the adequacy of the RCS water 9 inventory b erionneo every n hours as a requiremeny /l
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4, (continued)
B 3.4-77 AMENDMENT NO.
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2
i hb6Mt4#t INSERT "A" Together with the atmospheric monitor, the periodic surveillance for RCS water inventory balance, SR 3.4.13.1, must be performed at an increased frequency of .
24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to provide information that is adequate to detect leakage.
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RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.15 f
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[?- ACTIONS Required Action A.
fied by a Note that indicates the As a result, a , -
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?- provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable. MODE 7, channel is inoperable. This allowance is provided because other instrumentation is available to monitor for RCS LEAKAGE.
k I B.1.1. B.1.2. and B.2.1 h
With both gaseous and particulate containment atmosphere
. i, radioactivity monitoring instrumentation channelsEither grab
{ inoperable, alternative action is required.
.7 samples of the containment atmosphere must be taken and
?
analyzed, or water inventory balances, in acc With a sample obtained and analyzed or an information.
inventory balance performed every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , the reactor may be operated for up to 30 days to allow restoration of at least one of the radioactivity monitors.
The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months interval provides aeriodic information that is T1e 30 day Completion Time adequate to detect leakage. recognizes at least one othe available.
Required Actions B.1.1, B.1.2, and 8.2.1 are modified by a Note that indicates that the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not As a result, a MODE change is allowed when the applicable.
gaseous and particulate containment This allowanceatmosphere is provided radioact monitor channel is inoperable.
because other instrumentation is available to monitor RCS LEAKAGE.
~
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~' C.1 and C.2 If all required monitors are inoaerable, no automatic means of monitoring leakage are availa31e, perform RCS water inventory hours.
balance in accordance with SR 3.
to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
t (continued) r h E AMENDMENT NO.'"
B 3~.4-78 Y.' SAN'ONOFRERUNIT 2
,, . - m go.e m
~~O.M powe-~~
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' Containment Air Locks f B 3.6.2 1
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.h SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.1 (continued) ,
S REQUIREMENTWS :
h- requirements with regard to air lock leakage (Type B leakage
~~p. tests). The acceptance criteria were established during~~
< initial air lock and containment OPERABILITY testing. The
{f periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall ,
containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by
?}, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions. Thus, .
SR 3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply. l
! i :
The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that b an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous E
successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.
This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event !
i of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR requiring the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of :
SR 3.6.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accounted for in determining the overall containment leakage rate.
e SR 3.6.2.2 y .
The air lock interlock is desi ned to prevent simultaneous !
l opening of both doors in a sin le air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an ai lock are designed to i withstand the maximum expected post accident containment pressure, closure of either door will support containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the door interlock feature supports <
containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used for.
personnel transit into and out of containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous opening of gg the inner and outer doors will not inadvertently occur. Due pM M to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is only challenged when containmentisentered,jthistestisonlyrequiredtobe perfomed upon entering containment but is not required more ,
frequentlythanevery184 days.fThe184dayFrequencyis
- based on engineering judgment a.M h r x M x :d adequate in ;
j view of other indications of door and interic ek mechanism ;
status available to oneratione norsonnel.;
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~~i. (continued) 8 3.6-11 AMEN 0 MENT NO. ,~~
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2
[
- - = .-.- .. . . .
.4<
Containment Isolation Values 4
gr B 3.6.3 ,
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BASES
+ ACTIONS controls. These administrative controls consist of 0 (continued) stationing a dedicated operator at the valve controls, who E is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a
[ need for containment isolation is indicated. Due to the t
size of the containment purge line penetration and the fact
{ that those penetrations exhaust directly from the
't ;
i containment atmosphere to the environment, these valves may ,
j not be opened under administrative controls.
4 A second Note has been added to provide clarification that,
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for this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each V penetration flow path.
The ACTIONS are further modified by a third Note, which ensures that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if
' necessary, if the affected systems are rendered inoperable by an inoperable containment isolation valve.
A fourth Note has been added that requires entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1 when leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage limit.
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A.1 and A.2 .
In the event one containment isolation valve in one or more penetration flow paths is inoperable except for purge valve leakage not within limit, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely,affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic containment isolation valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow through the valve secured. For penetrations isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the valve used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available one to containment. Required Action A.1 must be completed within the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time is ;
e
" (continued) f I
a SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.6-17 AMENDMENT NO.
m____---
p M
y.
9-i y-L E
h 4
ji- pg INSERT f'i AsMhanotes cifies the location of the Section A, B, C, D, and E valves as N-th LCS. T e valves are identified as: Section A valves are automatic
(
J n isolation valves; Section B valves are containment purge valves;
~~Section C valves are manual valves; Section D valves are either safety injection or other valves; and Section E valves are other valves.~~
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h Containment Isolation values h B 3.6.3 l y
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2 SR 3.6.3.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR ensures that the minipurge valves are closed as E required or, if open, open for an allowable reason. The SR
- is not required to be met when the purge valves are open for pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or for Surveillancts that require the valves to be open. The minipurge valves are capable ofclosing in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, these valves are allowed to be open for limited periods of time. The 31 day Frequency is consistent with other containment isolation valve requirements discussed in SR 3.6.3.3.
SR 3.6.3.3 This SR requires verification that each containment isolation manual valve and blind flange located outside containment and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it O involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those valves outside containment and capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. Since verification of valve position for valves outside containment is relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and was chosen to provide added assurance of the correct positions. Valves that are mnu dministrative controls are not required to meet t1e du ing the time the valves are open.
TheANote appl es to valves and blind flanges located in high adia as and allows these devices to be verified c osed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 for ALARA reasons.
Therefore, the robability of misalignment of these valves, once t h ' . Mer posiinn, y ,a a w,w v.* se s.o A 6 -
ut eppLite e .
A (continued)
O SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.6-23 AMENDMENT NO.
c-
n ,w u .. . .n c . _ . _ _ _.-
Containment Iso.lation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES i
4 SR 3.6.3.4 i 1
SURVEILLANCE l
REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR requires verification that each containment i isolation manual valve and blind flange located inside ,. m containment and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the ,
containment boundary is within design limits. For valves ;
inside containment, the Frequency of'" prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not perfomed within the previous l 92 days" is appropriate, since these valves and flanges are !
operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. Valves that are open under ;
administrative controls are not required to meet the SR n time that they are open.
esk lows valves and blind flanges located in high The4 Note areas to be verified. closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1. 2, 3, and 4 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of :
misalignment of these valves. once f =y % "- y ;rif M ,
n 6.Xproper'poTTtion,1s small .
O w g A y As Q se.s.o.4 (s J W i/ I Verifying that the isolation time of each power operated and ;
automatic containment isolation valve is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures the valve will isolate in a time period less '
than or equal to that assumed in the safety analysis. The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance f with the Inservice Testing Program. !
SR 3.6.3.6 :
i For containment purge valves with resilient seals, additional leakage rate testing beyond the test requirements l of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 5), is required to ensure i
OPERABILITY. Operating experience has demonstrated that this type of seal has the potential to degrade in a shorter time period than do other seal types.
(continued)
B 3.6-24 AMENDMENT N0.
i_. SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 ,
4' f
?
Containment Isolation valves B 3.6.3 l^ r ' BASES a
'? 3.6.3,.6, SURVEILLANCE SR (continued)
REQUIREMENTS Based on this observation and the importance of maintaining this penetration leak tight (due to the direct path between , ' ' '
~~containment and the environment), a Frequency of 184 days was established as part of the NRC resolution of Generic Issue B-20, " Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration" (Ref.3).~~
Additionally, this SR must be performed within 92 days after opening the valve. The 92 day Frequency was chosen recognizing that cycling the valve could introduce additional seal degradation (beyond that occurring to a valvethathasnotbeenopened). Thus, decreasing the interval (from 184 days) is a prudent measure after a valve has been opened.
QMh
[MMb%4.s. MM I A Note to this SR requires the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1. This ensures Y 43 Q N that excessive containment purge valve leakage is properly accounted for in determining the overall containment leakage ,
pmVM g &
~~rate to verify containment OPERABILITY.~~
ksvvice. tmh M ws*st MP4- (R 3.6.3.7 O# he containment isolation valves covered by this SR are h
' p, N MM 1 J.fre46 required to bev0PERABLE at the indicate.d frequency, d**wa64mfc.4 i b
g $,0 4 4 d SR 3.6.3.8
Automatic containment isolation valves close on a containment isolation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment following a DBA. This SR ensures each automatic containment isolation valve will actuate to its isolation position on a containment isolation c actuation signal. The'24 month Frequency was developed d considering it is prudent that this SR be performed only during a unit outage, since isolation of penetrations would eliminate cooling water flow and disrupt nonnal operation of many critical. components. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this SR when performed on
.the 24 month Frequency. _Therefore, the frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
v (continued) m M
B 3.6-25 AMENDHENT NO.
[
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2
% ,a.s.m ___._ _ - . _ _ _ - -
Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.5.6.1 BASES c.J ACTIONS Ad (continued) removal capability afforded by the Containment Spray System, reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurr'ng during this period. n B.1 and B.2 If the inoperable containment spray train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Com)1etion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which tie LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 84 hours9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months . The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in' an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. The extended interval to reach MODE 4 allows additional time for the restoration of the containment spray train and is reasonable when considering that the driving force for a release of radioactive material from the Reactor Coolant System is reduced in MODE 3.
9 .
. .) S.d With one required containment cooling train inoperable, the inoperable containment cooling train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The components in this degraded condition provide iodine removal capabilities and .
are capable of providing at least 100% of the heat removal needs after an accident. The 7 day Completion Time was developed taking into account the redundant heat removal capabilities afforded by combinations of the Containment Spray System and Containment Cooling System and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
?
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t SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.6-38 AMENDMENT NO.
E
9' ,
p MSSVs 7t
' B 3.7.1 I
P i B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)
BASES 1
BACKGROUND The primary purpose of the MSSVs is to provide overpressure protection for the secondary system. The MSSVs also provide protection against overpressurizing the reactor coolant pressure boundary by providing a heat sink for the removal of energy from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) if the preferred heat sink, provided by the Condenser and Cir>:ulating Water System, is not available.
Nine MSSVs are located on each main steam header, outside containment, u) stream of the main steam isolation valves, as described in t1e UFSAR, Section 5.2 (Ref.1). The MSSVs' rated capacity THERMAL POWER (passes the full steam flow at 102% RA the valves full open. This meets the requirements of l SectionIIIoftheASMECode(Ref.2). )
The Safety valve > vaeraoility Report (9Avno) nrovia 2 i Allowable Ranna d E9Vs Setoointc I The ASME requirement that mdvs lift settings s'iould be within 1% of the ,
I specified setpoint reflects two separate objectives: the )
objective to maintain lift setpoints within the bounds of !
i.
the Safety Analysis and an objective to minimize the number l of valves which operate to mitigate an event by staggering l the valve setpoints.
4 This second requirement to stagger setpoints reflects good
( engineering design, but not safety requirements. The objective to stagger valve setpoints constrains the less restrictive Safety Analysis requirement as a condition of k '
O
( [yability.une LOWAULt VALUEva6 basis vecr apiiity as defined n uenocJ by the Safety Analysi er. ; L.vouc 5 .
~~he lower Allowaose value at 1053 osig is e nded by)~~
~
existing analysey ine radio'ogical release assumptions in the s;eam Generator Tube Rupture dose assessment 4 - bound the source tems which are based on a low HSSV setpoint of 1085 psig with 15% MSSV blowdown and no consideration made for setpoint tolerance.
1 (continued)
B 3.7-1 AMENDMENT NO.-
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2
i p MSSVs B 3.7.1 N BASES
-i 4 desi ressure where deformation may occur. The f APPLICABLE prob i ity of this event is in the range of 4 E-6/ year.
SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) The MSSVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO f This LCO requires all MSSVs to be OPERABLE in 'pliance
_ with Reference 2, even though this is not a requ'rement of the DBA analysis. This is because operation witt less than the full number of MSSVs requires limitations on allowable gM##f 4 THERMAL POWER (to meet Reference 2 requirements),tf These limitations are according to thos < n tne uvuR ouJ in mu d Mr gpg,4/,', , , c. J .
1 -in too 3. i . n An MSSV is considered k k, hd' -
inoperable if it fails to open n-n demand.
t y ].[ M g [f k ,The OPERABILITY/ opentwn nin tne of the MSSVs Allowable E defined Mnne as theGenerator relieve Steam ability to
%, red Aeth,v 4. /> ov9fpressure, and reseat when pressure has been reduced, struf Tte OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is determined by periodic
%dudIdNW s)rveillance testing in accordance with the inservice LA
~~4, f -~~
,festin,} tor .
.,sng S 74 3,7. -j -Z, h enauda. war wdk The^"
^^ ^
specified in @ correspond to a tent conditions of the valve at nominal operating Q is,4Ma $ gg'ag g g,g mperature and pressure.
This LCO provides assurance that the MSSVs will perform their designed safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in a challenge to the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary.
[tvt APPLICABILITY In MODE 1, the accident analysis requires a minimum of e4w MSSVs per Steam Generator which is limiting and bounds all lower MODES. In MODES 2 and 3, both the ASME Code and the accident analysis require only one MSSV per Steam Generator to provide overpressure protection.
In MODES 4 and 5, there are no credible transients requiring the MSSVs.
The Steam Generators are not normally used for heat removal in MODES 5 and 6, and thus cannot be overpressurized; there e
(continued)
.- l B 3.7-3 AMENDMENT NO. l SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 l
x !
t-
{! MSSVs B 3.7.1 6
. BASES L
y APPLICABILITY is no requirement for the MSSVs to be OPERABLE in these (continued) MODES.
~~i. .~~
ACTIONS The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSSV.
g With one or more MSSVs inoperable reduce power so that the available MSSV relieving capacity meets Reference 2 requirements for the applicable THERMAL POWER. Operation with less than all nine MSSVs OPERABLE for each Steam Generator is permissible, if THERMAL POWER is proportionally limited to the relief capacity of the remaining MSSVs. This is accomplished by restricting THERMAL POWER so that the energy transfer to the most limiting Steam Generator is not greater than the available relief capacity in that Steam Generator.
Allowable Steady State Power Levels with inoperable MSSVs )
are based on analysis of primary and secondary system
'j pressures following loss of Condenser Vacuum and Feedwater Line Break events initiated from the allowable power limit, t con _servatively biased for power measurement errors #= 3
% uperation at or Deivw tiit: eB owable Tower will ensure the design overpressure limits will not )e exceeded.
a g With one or more MSSVs inoperable, the ceiling on the lower y
Level-High trip setpoint is reduced (iv on omuunt over thN iiowao e 5imuY STATE POWER trvt3. TIie reduced reactor trip al1owable values are derived on the following bases:
{ SP=([X-Y*V]/X)*111.0, where SP - reduced reactor trip allowable value in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER,
?
V - maximum number of inoperable safety valves per i steam line, (continued)
SAN ONOFRS-UNIT 2 B 3.7-4 AMENDMENT NO.
> MSSVs
" B 3.7.1 c
BASES
,,~
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies the OPERABILITY of the MSSVs by the verification of each MSSV lift setpoints in accordance with .
the inservice testing program. The ASME Code,Section XI (Ref. 4), requires that safety and ielief valve tests be performedinaccordancewithANSI/ASMEOH-1-1987(Ref.5).
According to Reference 5, the following tests are required for MSSVs:
~~a. Visual examination;~~
~~b. Seat tightness determination;~~
~~c. Setpoint pressure determination (lift setting); and~~
~~d. Compliance with owner's seat t!ghtness criteria.~~
This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. This is to allow testing of the MSSVs at hot conditions. The MSSVs may be either bench tested or tested in situ at hot conditions using an assist device to simulate lift pressure. If the MSSVs are not tested at hot conditions, the lift setting ,
pressure shall be corrected to ambient conditions of the valve at operating temperature and pressure.
REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 5.2.
~~2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Article NC-7000, Class 2 Components.~~
~~3. UFSAR, Section 15.2. ,~~
~~4. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Article IWV-3500.~~
~~5. ANSI /ASME OH-1-1987.~~
1 l
l 1
)
(continued) h SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.7-6 AMEN 0 MENT NO.
"^ "^
!$2@
I!*i- -- - -
f W n MSIVs B 3.7.2 E
b
~~g. BASES 4~~
~~b ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 f (continued) If the MSIVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, or, closed, within the associated Completion Time, the unit must~~
be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The
[ allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating
[
~~f. experience, to reach the required unit conditions from MODE 2 conditions in an orderly manner and witho~ut~~
~~challenging unit systems.~~
f f
4 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.1 REQUIREMENTS y This SR verifies that the closure time of each MSIV is &
s 8.0 seconds f6fF an actual or simulated actuation signq7.
P 4 The HSIV closure time is assumed in the accident and containment analyses. The MSIVs should not be tested at power since even a part stroke exercise increases the risk of a valve closure with the unit generating power. As the MSIVs are not tested at power, they are exempt from the ASME Code,Section XI (Ref. 5), requirements during operation in MODES 1 and 2.
REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 10.3.
~~2. UFSAR, Section 6.2.~~
~~3. UFSAR, Section 15.1.5.~~
~~4. 10CFR 100.11.~~
[:
~~5. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI,~~
$. Inservice Inspection, Article IWV-3400.
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B 3.7-12 AMENDMENT NO.
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2
- -.. a -._ . --
&1c.w. .. . s . . . . - . . . . = .
Q ,
v y e MFIVs
[ B 3.7.3 D
n, bl -
BASES '
f B.I and B.2
$ ACTIONS s (continued)
- - ' - If the MFIVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, closed, "
f or isolated in the associated Completion Tiine, the unit must d- To l
$ be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. !
achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least A
MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The i i
allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating l
experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full i
^ power conditions in an orderly manner and without ;
challenging unit systems.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures the verification of each MFIV isclorec/
510 secondsCtrn' aii actual or simulated actuation signaj). ,
The MFIV closure time is assumed inYaccident and '
containment analyses. This Surveillance is normally ,'
performed upon returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage. The MFIVs should not be tested at power since even a part stroke exercise increases the risk of a ,
valve closure with the unit generating power. As these valves are not tested at power, they are exempt from the ,
ASME Code,Section XI (Ref. 2) requirements during operation in MODES 1 and 2. ,
The Frequency is in accordance with the Inservice Testing
[
Program.
i REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 10.4.7.
" 2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, I. Inservice Inspection, Article IWV-3400.
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m; b B 3.7-16 AMENDMENT NO. p SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 .
e.
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2 ADVs a'
B 3.7.4
.. BASES (continued)
ACTIONS M Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.4 does not apply. , , ;
With one required ADV inoperable, action must be taken to restore the OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .
M With two ADVs inoperable, action must be taken to restore one of the ADVs to OPERABLE status. As the block valve can be closed to isolate an ADV, some repairs may be possible with the unit at power. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable to repair inoperable ADVs, based on the availability of the Steam Bypass System and MSSVs, and the low probability of an event occurring during this period that requires the ADVs.
HplemulW ene orneore ruswW If backup nitrogen gas supply system capacity for M ADV is less than or equal to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , action should be taken to restore nitrogen gas supply system capacity in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .
The backup nitrogen capacity is controlled to a minimum accumulator pressure of 1050 psig. This pressure represents enough backup nitrogen gas system capacity for each ADV to have up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months of pneumatic operation. This time period is consistent and conservative relative to the SONGS Units 2 and 3 emergency operating instructions.
The completion time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is based on operating experience and on the fact that normal operating instrument air supply system is still available.
i (continued)
B 3.7-20 AMENDMENT NO. ;
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2
~~BASES APPLICABILITY In MODE 4, the AFW System may be used for heat removal via y)~~
(continued) the steam generator.
' In MODES 5 and 6, the steam generators are not normally used for decay heat removal, and the AFW System is not required.
l ACTIONS M If one of the two steam supplies to the turbine driven AFW pumps is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable based on the following reasons:.
~
~~a. The redundant OPERABLE steam supply to the turbine driven AFW pump;~~
~~b. The availability of redundant OPERABLE motor driven i AFW pumps; and . .~~
~~c. The low probability of an event requiring the .~~
inoperable steam supply to the turbine driven AFW go U""k T
[ M
.,9
' With one of the required AFW trains (pump or flow path) ino)erable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status '
1 wit 1in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . This Condition includes the loss of two t steam supply lines to the turbine driven AFW pump. The W 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the AFW System, the time g needed for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA event D occurring during this period. Two AFW pumps and flow paths N remain to supply feedwater to the steam generators.
y s smrs =
(continued) e B 3.7-27 AMENDMENT NO.
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2
-_m_.
V N $4?Mtt M / 5 TAssepr "A" The hiund Completion Time for Required Action A.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any '
combination of Conditions to be inoperable during any continuous failure to meet this LCO.
The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time l allowed in this saecified Condition after discovery of failure to meet tie LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The AND connector between 7 days and 10 days dictates that both Completion Times apply s'.niultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.
l l
& second Completion Time for Required Action B.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be inoperable during any continuous failure to meet this LCO.
The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The ANiQ connector between 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and 10 days dictates that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met, i
1 1
$w Ow!a- M 2
y .
l I' CCW Safety Related Makeup Systea 8 3.7.7.1 f L
~
3 8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS i
6 8 3.7.7.1 Component'CoolingWater(CCW)SafetyRelatedMakeupSystem
't .,
BASES BACKGROUND TheSONGSComponentCoolingWater(CCW)Systemconsistsof two independent critical loops (trains) and one non-critical loop (NCL). All three loo >s are interconnected, such that the non-critical loop can ze aligned to either one of the
' critical loops. Each CCW train is provided with a dedicated pump and a surge tank. A third, swing pump is also provided and can be aligned to either CCW train. Normal makeup to
.the CCW trains is provided from the non-safety related,
' Seismic Category II Nuclear Service Water (NSW) System via the CCW surge tanks.
The makeup system is designed to supply water to the CCW trains following loss of normal CCW. makeup from the nuclear service water system. It is train; oriented and provides '
sufficient water inventory to accommodate a maximum allowable leakage from both CCW trains for a period of seven days. The CCW askeup system is an integral part of the CCW 4 system.
1 The CCW makeup system for each Unit consists of a common makeup)
Unit 2 water storage tank (T-055 for Unit 3 and T-056 for associated CCW train. Each transfer train includes a 100%
capacity makeup pump, pump discharge solenoid valve, check valve, isolation valves and interconnecting suction and discharge piping. A test loop is provided for each makeup train to enable In-service Testing (IST) of each pump. All components and piping of the CCW makeup system are either designed or upgraded to Quality Class II, Seismic Category I. Power supp y to each transfer train component is provided from independent Class 1E sources.
'5 Makeup to the CCW trains is initiated / terminated manually on N loss of normal CCW makeup capability, as required. The
~
pumps are started / stopped from the Control Room or from the associatedMotorControlCenter(MCC),basedontheCCW surge tank level indication (remote or local). Manual operation of the CCW makeup is acceptable because:
f (continued o SAM ONOFRE--UNIT 2 8 3.7-42 AMENOMENT NO. ht5 W Weii $ $n$$kbY h NUY t . - . . . . . . . . . . .
{. CCW Safety Related Makeup System 2 8 3.7.7.1 l g 8ASEs BACKGROUND -
- sufficient time is available after the limiting event (continued) ,- for the operator to initiated manual action - emergency makeup is a continuously supervised f ~
operation and continuous safety related CCW surge tank 1 level indication is being provided. CCW makeup utilizes the FPMUs located in the Radwaste '! Building at El. 9' as a source of makeup water. The PPMUs l are provided with a floating diaphragm to maintain air tight integrity. This diaphragm is made of elastomer with a specific gravity less than 1.0.
~~/The nominal capacity of each PPMU is 300,000 gallons.~~
203,800 gallons in tank T-056 and 203,719 gallons in tank T-055 are dedicated to the CCW safety related makeup. This amount includes the total tank level instrumentation loop ' uncertainty (TLU)andtheunrecover.ablevolume. For both f j
~~- tanks, this volume corresponds to the water level at plant .~~
elevation 30'-9%" (or 65.6% tank level as indicated in the - I Control Room). The dedicated volume allows makeup for CCW i system leakage (from both CCW trains) of up to 18 gpa for a i ' period of seven days. The minimum water level required in the PPMU for the CCW makeup system to be considered operable ' is a function of the CCW system total leak rate. The volume l above that controlled by the TS is available for the Primary Plant Makeup (PPMU) System use. > A common suction header connects the CCW makeup pumps to the PPMU at elevation 11'-0". The suction nozzle has a pointing downward elbow attached inside the tank. This is done to '
~~- increase the tank usable volume and to provide an adequate l margin to prevent vortex femation. After transferring the !~~
TS volume from the tank, the level of water remaining in the tank is 10' above the pump suction nozzle inlet. . In order to enable in-service testing of the CCW makeup c pumps, a test loop capable of passing a flow approximately
~~; equal to the nominal makeup flow is provided.~~
The high and low level alams annunciate in the Radwaste f - Control Room on Panel 2/3L-5 at 95% (LSH-7133) and 75% tanlf l level (LSL-7133), respectively. The high level alarm also annunciates in the main Control Room. I , e v SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 . 8 3.7-43 AMEN 0 MENT NO.
~~$ ff Wib$ $ Y$b W h$d?8Y$ ,erm , - , - - --~~
E O - CCW Safety Related Makeup Syste [ 8 3.7.7.1 , i q BASES 7 Safety related instruments are required to monitor the CCW
~~' surge tank 1'evel. To satisfy the provisions of 10CFR50, i~~
BACKGROUND (continued) Appendix A GDC-19, the capability to safely shutdown the ~ plant from outside the Control Room is required. To operate the CCW makeup system from outside the control room, the capability to. start /stop the makeup pumps and to monitor the
~~) ,~~
CCW surge tank level is required. QC II, SC I gages are f used to monitor the tank level to support safe shutdown from ) outside the Control Room. All components of the CCW safety related makeup system are located within the Radwaste Bulloing and Penetration Area
~~.(Seismic Category I structures), wh'ch are capable of The withstanding the impact of tornado generated missiles.~~
only potential p(ath for intrusion of tornado missiles into the PPMU rooms 127A and 1278) are external access doors AR307 and AR311 in the Radwaste Building east wall. These metal doors are nomally closed and. two arewalls p(rotected and a by .. L-shaped, roof). 12" thick concrete enclosuresThese enclosures are op to the North in Unit 3. APPLICABLE The CCW makeup system for each Unit consists of a cosmon SAFETY ANALYSES passive component (storage tank) and two redundant transfer trains employing active components. The CCW makeup system is designed such that passive component failures do not have to be postulated. Each makeup transfer train is powered from a separate Class 1E Bus, the same as the CCW train it supports. This design assures that only one CCW train can be affected by a single component failure within the CCW makeup system. It is conservatively assumed that such failure would result in loss of the affected CCW makeup train and eventually in loss of the associated CCW train. The remaining CCW train (critical loop) is available for accident mitigation, as required. From the safety analysis ! perspective, loss of one CCW train is acceptable as shown in the UFSAR Chapter 15 analyses. i
~~. klowever, loss of a CCW train is not a-limiting consequence '~~
of some single failures within the CCW makeup system. The I ' limiting consequence of inadvertent / spurious actuation of the CCW makeup system (makeup pump start) is the potential ) for depletion of the PPMU water inventory credited for long I (contin
~~, v AMENDMENT NO.~~
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 8 3.7-44 hN/dpt.wtU d.Sc48$[rI4/ h IW8IT
g k O CCW Safety Related Makeup System]
~~! 8 3.7.7.1 ?~~
~~BASES ters accident mitigation, coianon for both CCW trains. Such I APPLICABLE depletion of the inventory would take place should relief SAFETY. ANALYSIS i~~
' valves on the CCW surge tank lift as a result of tank (continued) overfilling and water being discharged from the CCW system into the plant vent stack. Makeup water inventory depletion would impact the CCW makeup system capability to perform its safety function.
Operator action is required outside the control room to mitigate the single active failure of a CCW pumaHecause motor this control relay stuck in the " operate" position, l failure prevents both pump trip and discharfle valve closure ; using the control switches. The specific m<tigating action l
~~'is to open the respective pump breaker at the MCC in the El.~~
50' switchgear room. The assumed above operator action time i of 30 minutes is sufficient to mitigate this failure. The common tank and suction nozzle configuration of the CCW makeup system is subject to the sin'gle passive failure . criteria of ANSI Standard N658-1976, because the system is - required to operate for more than 24 hours post-accident. Concurrent passive failures which must be considered under / this standard are flow path blockage and pressure boundary failures. d- Flow path blockage due to entrainment of foreffin material is not credible because the system is operated us ng only { filtered and desineralized water. Furthemore, blockages due to component internal failures are not credible because: a) there are no valves in the common flow path, and b) tank diaphragm is made of material with the specific gravity less ; than 1.0 (closed cell elastomer which would float even if l the diaphragm were to disintefirate), and the system suction line is provided with a point <ng downward elbow inside the tank (which ensures sufficient submergence of the suction inlet to prevent entrainment of any floating debris even at , l themaximumsuctionvelocity). Passive failure of the pressure bounda may be limited to f failed valve packing and pump mechanica seals for systems !
" designed and maintained to ASME Section 111 and Section XI criteria. All such failures in the proposed makeup system can be isolated because the suction isolation valve dor eact train has a back seat to prevent leakage due to fallarre of its packing. This valve can be used to isolate all other (continued) / '
L SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.7-45 AMENDMENT NO. wn pap. M fe suts/deka' /g Imur "fV
3 - {. CCW Safety Related Makeup Systes
~~/ 8 3.7.7.1 j~~
~~q 2 BASES~~
~~,f- ~ ? APPLICABLE packing or seal failures in this train. Therefore, the - SAFETY ANALYSIS limiting passive failure is a pump shaft seal failure.~~
(continued) The design function of the makeup system is to maintain the water inventory in the CCW trains during a 7-day post-accident period. For this purpose, sufficient water inventory is contained in the storage tank (PPMU) conson for both CCW trains. From the PPMU water is transferred to the CCW return heads by two safety related pumps. LC0 ..The wate'r source for the Component Cooling Water Safeti Related Makeup System is the PPMU Tank. The total capacity of each PPMU Tank is approximately 303,500 gallons. The curve for PPMU Tank volume represents a seven day supply of makeup water at a specific allowable leakage rate from the CCW system. The requirement for'seven days is consistent . with Standard Review Plan, Section'9.2.2.III.c.' Specification 3.0.4 requires that entry not be made into an f OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified condition unless the conditions of the Limiting Condition for Operation are met without reliance on provisions contained in the Action requirements. The exemption from this requirement gives Operations more flexibility to change MODES.while still perfoming required Actions. Exemption from Specification 3.0.4 will not restrain Operations from changing MODES. The CCW Safety Related Makeup Systes is only required to support the CCW system in the event of a Design Basis Earthquake. It should be noted that the CCW system itself does not have a 3.0.4 exemption. Therefore, the CCW system is always OPERABLE during up MODE changes. The PRA has demonstrated that the allowed outage times specified would result in an acceptably small risk of core damage. Therefore, a 3.0.4 exemption for the CCW Safety Related Makeup System is considered acceptable. fi' 3 L i I (continue i 2 9 N - - AMENOMENT NO. 4 SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 8 3:7-46
~~% P3fW WIN 6 SadSNbtlW h IMSee7 "E~~
~~7 --~~
~~% - CCW Safety Related Makeup Syste B 3.7.7.1 T~~
~~h) 2G BASES (continued) APPLICA8ILITY The Component Cooling Water Safety Related Makeup System is~~
# . a support system to the CCW System. This means whenever the CCW System is required to be OPERABLE its support system - should be OPERABLE also. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. Technical Specification 3/4.7.7, " Component Cooling Water" requires "At least two indepndent component Therefore, in MODES cooling1,water 2, 3, loops and 4, the shall be OPERABLE.
PPMU Tank and both trains of the makeup flow of the Component Cooling Water Safety Related Makeup System shall be OPERABLE. ACTIONS hd With one CCW Safety Related Makeup System's flow path inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. ', . The allowable completion of 7 days is considered reasonable based on the low probability of a DBE occurring during the 7 days and the redundant capability of the OPERABLE CCW Safety
/ Related Makeup flow path. A Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) was performed to assess the increased risk of core y damage from a 7 day allowed outage time for one train of the CCW Safety Related Makeup System.' The PRA indicated that the increased risk of core dagge from a 7 day allowed outage time is less than 1x10 per year. This increase in core damage risk is considered acceptably small.
8.1 and B.2 This operating condition is more restrictive than the Action A condition. If the level in the PPMU Tank drops below that required to support two CCW critical loops operation for seven days, the. condition is similar to loss f '. of both CCW Safety Related Makeup System flow paths. g Actions should be taken to restore the PPMW Tank level f within 8 hours. If both CCW Safety related Makeup flow f? paths are inoperable, one CCW Safety Related Makeup flow path should be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. The allowed completion time of 8 hours is based on operati g experience and a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). (continue
~ ~ .j r3 ~_ -
~~v AMENOMENT N0. SAN OM0FRE--UNIT 2 8 3.7-47 W l j Ykd5 />2 y MAf $ h Y~~
~~},.~~
s CCWlafetyRelatedNakeupSyst B 3.7.7.1 S l BASES ! S I e; B.1 and 8.2 (continued) f ACTIONS , l Operating experience shows that the likelihood of Primary
' Plant Makeup Storage Tank level dropping below 66% (which I ' corresponds to an allowable CCW 1eakage of 18 gpa based on : - Figure 3.7.7.1-1) is extremely low! Also, a Probabilistic ;
Risk Assessment (PRA) was performed to assess the increased ' risk of core damage from an 8 hour allowed outage time for two trains of the CCW Safety Related Makeup System. The PRA indicated that the increased risk of core damage 4 from an , 8 hour allowed outage time is less than 1x10 per year. This increase in core damage risk is considered acceptably small. C.1 and C.2 In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 two CCW System critical loops provide cooling to a number of safety related systems, such as HPSI, LPSI, shutdown cooling, emergency chillers, etc. The CCW Safety Related Makeup $ysten 's a support system for , the CCW System. Two CCW Safety Related Makeup flow paths are required to provide makeup to the two CCW critical : loops. If one CCW Safety Related Makeup flow path can not - be restored to OPERABLE status in seven days, the Unit must ;
- be placed in a MODE in which the LIMITING CONDITION.FOR OPERATION does not apply. l To achieve this status, the Uritt must be placed in at least H0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours, and in COLD SHUTDOWN within hours.
36 Simila ly, action should be taken if the PPMU Tank level is f below that required for two CCW critical loops operation and/or both CCW Safety Related Makeup flow paths are inoperable. If both the PPMU Tank level and at 'least one flow path are not OPERABLE within 8 hours, the Unit must then be placed in a MODE in which the LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION does not apply. To achieve this status, the Unit must be placed in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, and in COLD SHUTDOWN within 30 hours. The allowed completion time is consistent with other Technical Specification completion time requirements to 4 (continuqd)
] ~ ] ~ H, _
yy - B 3.7-48 AMENDMENT NO. SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 N '$ , t to![b b M h.M27 h
NafetyHeiatedMakeupSystM B 3.7.7.1 [C Y Y g BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) ?
~~'t reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner.~~
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1.1 REQUIREMENTS c This SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT verifies that the PPMU Tank contains the required volume of makeup water. The 7 days frequency is based on similar SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT frequencies. The 7 days fre mancy is considered adequate in view of other indications in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to abnormal PPMU Tank level deviations. SR 3.7.7.1.2 , This SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT verifies that the CCW makeup pumps develop sufficient discharge pressure to deliver the required flow to the CCW system from the Primary Makeup Water Storage Tank. Performance of inservice testing, O, discussed in the ASME Code, Section XI at three month intervals, satisfies this requirement. SR 3.7.7.'1.3
/ This SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT measures CCW leakage to ensure the PPMU Tank level is adequate in accordance with Figure 3.7.7.1-1. The specified frequency is considered adequate in view of the special alignment required to perform this test. This measurement can be performed only when one CCW critical loop can be removed from service.
Therefore, this measurement needs to be perfomed during refueling outages. Q t j REFERENCES None. l thy pp ea se sea.cM4d fyIweer W SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.7-49 AMENDMENT NO.
0 i DELETED INTENTIONALLY l l l j l 9 O SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 8 3.7-42 AMENDMENT N0.
n 4.J s a ~-m A k DELETED INTENTIONALLY SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.7-43 AMENDMENT NO.
*see r "C
~~l DELETED INTENTIONALLY f~~
~~l SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.7-44 AMENDMENT N0. I~~
~~-TA lsel y ' $ e DELETED INTENTIONALLY l~~
~~l l l O SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2~~
~~AMENDMENT NO,~~
DELETED INTENTIONALLY 1 t O SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.7-46 AMENDMENT N0.
e. O DELETED INTENTIONALLY i i 9 e SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.7-47 AMENDMENT NO.
~~--m ,~~
DELETED INTENTIONALLY l e SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 8 3.7-48 AMENDMENT NO. i
1 b.Segf 'g" i l DELETED INTENTIONALLY 1 l 1 l 1 o SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.7-49 AMENDMENT NO. ,
f#
~
~~CREACUS 8 B 3.7.11 h e~~
~~.b.~~
~~ft BASES E ig E SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.11.1 (conttnued) b i~~
/
~~h REQUIREMENTS Systems not requiring humidity control need o ly be operated ,~~
~~'t .~~~
~~for a 15 minutes te-demonstrate the func~~
~~the system. - u, u .~~
The 31 day Frequency bn a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is based on y the known reliability of the equipment, and tne two train l ft redundancy available. , 3 f SR 3.7.11.2 f,'p This SR verifies that the required CREACUS testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The CREACUS filter tests are based on Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 3). The VFTP includes testing ' HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP. SR 3.7.11.3 This SR verifies each CREACUS train starts and operates on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The Frequency of 24 months is consistent with that specified in Reference 3. SR 3.7.11.4 This SR verifies the integrity of the control room enclosure and the assumed inleakage rates of potentially contaminated air. The control room positive pressure, with respect te i potentially contaminated atmosphere, is periodically tested to verify proper function of the CREACUS. During the g emergency radiation state of the emergMcy mode of 4 operation, the CREACUS is designed to pressurize the control e L room a 0.125 inches water gauge positive pressure with respect to the atmosphere in order to prevent unfiltered . f inleakage. The CREACUS is designed to maintain this l f positive pressure with one train. j 6 k b k n 5" (continued) ! p[ B 3.7-59 AMENDMENT NO. , b SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 l 1
~~-,,..e,, ...p,r 5 / ' g of , m -~~
r AC Sources-Operating 1 8 3.8.1 i i BASES ACTIONS u (continued) time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. , I N 5 6 lt.T M u ige To ensure a highly reliable power source remains when one of i the required DGs is inoperable, it is necessary to verify q y 3 the availability of the offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perfom," l a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result , in a Required Action being not met. However, if a circuit : fails to pass SR 3.8.1.1, it is inoperable. Upon offsite circuit inoperability, additional Conditions and Required l Actions must then be entered. i l u Required Action B.2 is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that a DG is ( inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are designed with redundant safety related trains. This includes motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. Single train systems, such as turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, are not included. Redundant required feature failures consist of inoperable features associated with a train, redundant to the train that has an inoperable DG. The Completion Time for Required Action B.2 is intended to allow tte operator time to evaluate and repair any i discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the nomal " time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock." In this Required l Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both: l l
a. An inoperable DG exists; and

b. A required feature on the other train is inoperable.
(continued) I ~ SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.8-6 AMEN 0 MENT N0.
I N A/ e /
~~. = N SE R es"" - I l~~
The second Com letion Time for Required Action A.1 l l establishes a imit on the maximum time allowed for any j combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet j f the LCO. If Condition A is entered while, for instance, a l DG is inoperable, and that DG is subsequently returned ! OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to k 72 hours. This could lead to a total of 144 hours, since ! initial failure to meet the LCO, to restore the offsite - circuit. At this time, a DG could again become inoperable, f the circuit restored OPERABLE, and an additional 72 hours (for a total of 9 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 6 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "MD" connector between the 72 hour and 6 day Completion Time means that both , Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more ! restrictive Completion Time must be met. As in Required Action A.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock." This will result in establishing the " time zero" at the time that the LCO was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition A was entered. (f 3 er O O
AC Sources -Operating 8 3.8.1 i BASES ACTIONS 8.3.1 and B.3.2 (continued) longer exists and Required Action B.3.1 is satisfied. If the cause of the initial inoperable OG cannot be confinned not to exist on the remaining DG, perfonnance of SR 3.8.1.2 suffices to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of that DG. According to Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 7), 24 hours is reasonable to confirm that the OPERLBLE DG is not affected by the same problem as the inoperable DG. l l Ed According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition B for a period that should not exceed 72 hours. l In Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE DG and offsite a0 3 circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the l i T onsite Class IE Distribution System. The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the ( __ remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the , low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. j b
, c.1 and C.2 Required Action C.1, which applies when two offsite circuits are inoperable, is intended to provide assurance that an event with a coincident single failure will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions. The Completion Time for this failure of redundant required features is reduced to 12 hours from the 24 hours allowed by Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) for two inoperable required ,
offsite circuits. The 24 hour allowance is based upon the ' assumption that two comple_te safety trains are OPERABLE.- When a concurrent redundant required feature failure exists, this assumption is not the case and a shorter Completion
. Time of 12 hours is appropriate. These features are powered from redundant AC safety trains. This includes motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. Single train turbine driven auxiliary pumps, are not included in the list.
(continued) ( SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.8-8 AMENDMENT NO.
INSERT "S o The second Co letion Time for Required Action B.4 establishes a imit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. If Condition B is entered while, for instance, an offsite circuit is inoperable and that circuit is 1 subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 72 hours. This could lead to a total i of 144 hours, since initial failure to meet the LCO, to restore the DG. At this time, an offsite circuit could again become inoperable, the DG restored OPERABLE, and an additional 72 hours (for a total of 9 days) allowed prior to i complete restoration of the LCO. The 6 day Completion Time provides a limit on time allowed in a specified condition l after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "AND" connector between the 72 hour and 6 day Completion Times means that both ! Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more. restrictive Completion Time must be met. ! As in Required Action B.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for beginning the allowed time " clock." This will result in establishing the
~~" time zero" at the time that the LCO was initially not met, ,~~
instead of at the time Condition B was entered, ! l 1 i t y. 3 9 9
AC Sources -C;erating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.3- (continued) REQUIREMENTS The nomal 31 day Frequency for this Surveillance (Table 3.8.1-1) is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.g (Ref. 3). This SR is modified by four Notes. Note 1 indicates that , diesel engine runs for this Surveillance may include gradual loading, as recomended by the manufacturer, so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are minimized. Note 2 states that momentary transients because ' of changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limi: will not invalidate the test. Note 3 indicates that this Surveillance should be conducted on only one OG at a time in order to avoid common cause failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations. Note 4 stipulates.a prerequisite requirement for perfomance of this SR. A successful DG start must precede this test to credit satisfactory perfomance. ,
~~,3 !!1~~
~~Guff 3 l~~
~~- SR 3.8.1.4 l This SR p ides verific ion that th 1 of fue oil %~~
the day k is at or at ve the level __. " _. .__. _. ,, Nd 5 . Tic, So atto b""-M'ay$dd? Tl eleglisexpressedas_an _ _ i M 4 % etectea to ensure i l 4 NY
%$.) pOons, g O e3uivalent oil for in' minimum c' equate fuelvolume 11loadplus10%p n'a of hour of DG operation %j I M o.(A , The 31 day Frequency is adequate to assure that a sufficiet# >
T supp y of fuel oil is available, since low level alams are. , prov ded and unit operators would be aware of any large use, i of fuel oil during this period. j 3 ) c 1 ical fouling is a major cause of fuel oil D 2_ degradation. There are numerous microorganisms that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the fuel oil day tanks once every 31 days eliminates the necessary environment for microbial survival in the dog (contin W44 SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 8 3.8-15 AMENDMENT NC I l l l ~.
Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES l REFERENCES 6. ASTM Standards: 04057-81; 0975-81; 02276-83. i (continued) ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel de, Section XI. j 7. i 5 p652' S ,
)
~~h- lI' Dl166" pzca - i 94M -~~
~~^ % O T16 '~~
~~I 1~~
~~' I b" ' ' ) SS" ' '~~
~~k d ( 9%tt *lsj D4214-10 3 D cf74 -il ,~~
.\
I 8 3.8-43 AMENONENT NO. SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2
I g} DC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4 BASES 3.Wg 9 Y3 ,
~
SURVEILLANCE srb 3.8.4.5 (continued) REQUIREMENTS /' is consistent with the existing licensing basis and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. SR 3.8.4.6 This SR requires that each battery charger be capable of supplying at least 300 amps and a 125 V for a 12 hours. These requirements are based on the design capacity of the ! chargers (Ref. 4). According to Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref.10), the battery charger supply is required to be based on the largest combined demands of the various steady state loads and the charging capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge state to the fully charged state, irrespective of the status of the unit during these demand occurrences. The minimum required amperes and duration ensure that these requirements can be satisfied. The Surveillance Frequency is acceptable, given the unit conditions required to perform the test and the other administrative controls existing to ensure adequate charger performance during these 24 month intervals. In addit. ion, this Frequency is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. This SR is modified by a Note which acknowledges that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. SR 3.8.4.7 A battery service test is a special test of battery capability, as found, to satisfy the design requirements (battery duty cycle) of the DC electrical power system. The discharge rate and test length should correspond to the design duty cycle requirements. The Surveillance Frequency of 24 months is consistent with l the recommendations of Regulator ! Regulatory Guide 1.129 (Ref. 11)y
~~, which Guide state 1.32 (Ref. 1 that the battery service test should be performed during refueling >~~
operativt, or at some other outage, with intervals between l tests not to exceed 24 months. l i (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.8-51 AMENOMENT NO.
Inverters-Shutdo n B 3.8.8 BASES (continued)
=- . T LC0 The inverters ensure the availability of electrical power fodhe instrumentation for systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA. The battery powered inverters provide uninterruptible supply of AC electrical power to the AC vital buses even if the 4.16 kV safety buses are de-energized. OPERA 8ILITY of at least two of the four inverters and the associated vital buses is required. This ensures the availability of sufficient inverter power sources to operate the unit in a .
safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated 3-events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents). , APPLICA8ILITY The inverters required to be OPERA 8LE in MODES 5 and 6, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that: ,
a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core;

b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident .
~~g are available; j~~
~~c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events ,~~
~~that can lead to core damage during shutdown are i available; and i~~
~~d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold ,~~
shutdown condition or refueling condition. Inverter requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LC0 3.8.7. ACTIONS A.1. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 If two trains of 120 VAC Vital Buses are required by LC0 3.8.10, " Distribution Systems-Shutdown," the remaining 0PERABLE inverters may be capable of supporting sufficient ' required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, , fuel movement, and operations with a potential for positive ! t I (continued) I 1 SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.8-69 AMENOMENT NO. 1 i
Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9 BASES 20TICNS A.1 (continued) train by stabilizing the unit, and on restoring power to the
~~. affected train. The 8 hour time Ifmit before requiring a l ,~~
(h,,,,, y , unit shutdown in this condition is acceptable because of: a he potential for decreased safety if the unit perator's attention is diverted from the evaluations g nd actions necessary to restore power to the affected train, to the actions associated with taking the unit ( to shutdown within this time limit; ar.) 1 The potential for an event in ::niunct'en o n a
~~)*p b.~~
~~single failure of a redundant cog "nen: in r . train I with AC power. _ j;' p T diff 4 # fthd g>~~
~~, A Siper k 16 1 g With aw>~~
~~vital AC are buses vitalcapable bus inoperable, of supportingthethe remaining OPERABLE AC minimum safety g functions necessary to shut down the unit and maintain it in I~~
~~/ $6 the safe shutdown condition. Overall reliability is reduced, however, since an additional single failure could l~~
~~result in the minimum required ESF functions not being M supported. Therefore, the required AC vital bus must be A j~~
.
~~res re o OPERA 8LE status within 2 hours.~~
cition B repres AC vital bus without power; I Aygyg potentially both the DC source and the associated AC source I are nonfunctioning. In this situation, the unit is ( significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all noninterruptible power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining vital buses, and rcstoring power to tse affected vital bus. This 2 hour limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that are without adequate vital AC power.
*I l The 2 hour completion Time takes into account the importance the AC vital bus to OPERABLE status, to safety of restoringty the redundant capabil afforded by the other OPERABLE vital buses, and the low probability of a DBA occurring T during this period.
n v F' (Continued) SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 8 3.8-75 AMENDMENT NO.
l j The second Completion Time for Required Action A.1 I i establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any j combination of required distribution subsystems to be j 4 inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of : failing to meet the LCO. If Condition A is entered while,
.for instance, a DC bus is inoperable and subsequently I restored OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for f 4 I up to 2 hours. This could lead to a total of 10 hours, I since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the AC distribution system. At this time, a DC circuit could again I
~~become inoperable, and AC distribution restored OPERABLE. \) This could continue indefinitely. The Completion Time allows for an exception to the nomal~~
~~" time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock."~~
This will result in establishing the " time zero" at the time { the LCO was initially not met, instead of the time Condition A was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an f acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LCO indefinitely. - . pl%2T "2" ' i The second Completion Time for Required Actica B.1 establishes a limit on the maximum allowed for any
)
T combination of required distribution subsystems to be l l inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of ' failing to meet the LCO. If Condition B is entered while, for instance, an AC bus is inoperable and subsequently f> returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for l up to 8 hours. This could lead to a total of 10 hours, since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the vital bus - distribution system. At this time, an AC train could again become inoperable, and vital bus. distribution restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely. . This Completion Time allows for an exception to the nomal i
~~" time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock." .~~
This will result in establishing the " time zero" at the time g} the LCO was initially not met, instead of the time . Condition 8 was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LCO indefinitely.
~~'A l of W Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9 op&~~
EASESg V, fff b I inued l With eehC bus woone=tef9m inoperable, the remaining DC 4 electridal power distribution subsystems are capable of 7( supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut . [ w, ,,,. down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown gu 4rurg ' condition, assuming no single failure. The overall 6 i r",,N)y 1
~~,f) reliability is reduced, however, because a single ailure in / ;~~
I y6q the remaining DC electrical power distribution sub ystem could result in the minimum required ESF function not being supported. Therefore, the required DC bus must b restormd S to OPERABLE s tus within 2 hour _ Tnigggg ' without adequate DC power; Wy Condition represents potentially both with the battery significantly degraded and (f the associated charger nonfunctioning. In this situation, I the unit is significantly more vulnerable to a complete less of all DC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, , minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remair:1~ng trains and restoring power to the affected train. [ This 2 hour limit is more conservative than Completion Times I
~~. ]@f]~~
~~p n l allowed for the vast majority of components whfeh would he~~
without power. gg g gg*
~~s i l The 2 hour Completion Time for C buses is consistent with l R ulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 3). Y_ E - -~~
~~f. k p.1 nd[2 the inoperable distribution subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the <~~
unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not [ apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to (&el" lgf A i at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within ~ 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, ppti based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner i and without challenging unit systems. (continued) B 3.8-76 AMENDMENT NO. SAN ONOFRE--tJNIT 2
~~-. l~~
IMRT *E" The second Completion Time for Required Action C.1 ' establishes 'a limit on the maximum time allowed for any J) l combination of required distribution subsystems to be f ' inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of I falling to meet the LCO. If Condition C is entered while, i for instance, an AC bus is inoperable and subsequently j returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for ! up to 8 hours. This could lead to a total of 10 hourt, l since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the DC ' distribution system. At this time, an AC train could again j l I become inoperable, and DC distribution restored OPERABLE. ! This could continue indefinitely. This Completion Time allows for an exception to the nomal
~~" time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock."~~
This will result in establishing the " time zero" at the time l l the LCO was initially not met, instead of the time Condition C was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LCO indefinitely. I 93 G 9 1
6 Boron Concentration B 3.9.1 BASES LCO COLR ensures a core k,f, of 5 0.95 is maintained during - (continued) fuel handling operations. Violation of the LC0 could lead to an inadvertent criticality during MODE 6. APPLICABILITY This LCO is applicable in MODE 6 to ensure that the fuel in the reactor vessel will remain subcritical. The required boron concentration ensures a k ' 5 0.95. Above MODE 6, LCO 3.1.1, " SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDii)-T > 200'F," and LCO 3.1.2, " SHUTDOWN MARGIN-T o s2IidF,"ensurethatan adequate amount of negative reac,tivity is available to shut down the reactor and to maintain it subcritical. i ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 Continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity , additions (including actions to reduce boron concentration)
@f is contingent upon maintaining the unit in compliance with , > the LCO. If the boron concentration of any coolant volume in the RCS, or the refueling canal is less than its limit, 4 all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity additions must be suspended immediately.
Temperaturefluctuationsneednotbeconsideredwhen) q suspending positive reactivity additions. f fSuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivity additions shall not preclude moving a component to a safe I position.
~~- u A tt A.3~~
~ Mhfg7 ffJ In addition to immediately suspending CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity additions, boration to restore the concentration must be initiated immediately. In determining the required combination of boration flow rate and concentration, there is no unique design basis event that must be satisfied. The only requirement is to restore the boron concentration to its required value as (continued) SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.9-3 AMENDMENT NO.
g,...-...--.-- - (1 i
~~._T_.W4eRT"/i" 2~~
~~P Temperature fluctuations associated with maintaining i the plant status are permissible provided they remain within limits established for the plant conditions. l l~~
/
~~i (. i k y~~
~~& h)O W" hl v~~
~~px.,..<__. 4: L Nuclear Instrumentation 7 B 3.9.2 4~~
4. BASES (continued)

s APPLICABILITY In MODE 6, the SRMs must be OPERABLE to determine changes in core reactivity. There is no other direct means available to check core reactivity levels.
~~In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the installed source range detectors and circuitry are required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.3.13~~
~~" Source Range Monitors."~~
ACTIONS A.I and A.2 With only one SRM OPERABLE, redundancy has been lost. Since these instruments are the only direct means of monitoring core reactivity conditions, CORE ALTERATIONS and positive n() reactivity additions must be suspended immediately.
~~'l' Performance of Required Action A.1 shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.~~
Temperature fluctuations need not be considered w g aspending positive reactivity afditi p - B.1 With no SRM OPERABLE, actions to restore a monitor to OPERABLE status shall be initiated immediately. Once initiated, actions shall be continued until an SRM is restored to OPERABLE status, e go N B.2 With no SRM OPERABLE, there is no direct means of detecting changes in core reactivity. However, since CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity additions are not to be made, the core reactivity condition is stabilized until the SRMs are OPERABLE. This stabilized condition is determined by perfonning SR 3.9.1.1 to verify that the required boron concentration exists. (continued) SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.9-6 AMENDMENT NO.
SV5 ,^<, gr.u, x_ - au = . - - . . . . P - ' 5 -
~~!_M5eRT"d" b..~~
~~1 [ Temperature fluctuations associated with maintaining f- the plant status are permissible provided they remain within limits established for the plant conditions.~~
=
~~I t [ ,~~
~~b. M Yr F~~
~~y Da)ofre - 72nll 0~~
* - % - - - ~ ~ ~ ~ , . . . .;
. Containment Penetratiens B 3.9.3 BASES [ W LCO exhaust penetrations d the containment pers;onnel airlock. ! (continued) For the containment pe sonnel airlock, this LCO ensures that the airlock can be clo ed after containment evacuation in l the event of a fuel hardling accident. The requirement that the plant be in MODE 64with 23 feet of water above the fuel u ensures that there is sufficient time to close the personnel MI e airloc_k following a loss of shutdown cooling before boiling w w u n .v The OPERABILITY requirements ensure that the airlock door is capable of performing its function, and that a designated individual located outside of the affected area is available to close the door. For the 0.PERABLE containmer) purge and exhaust penetrations, this LCO ensures i that these. O netrations are isolable by the Containment i Purge Isolation System. The OPERABILITY recuirements for this LCO ensure that the automatic purge anc exhaust valve closure times specified in the UFSAR can be achieved and ' therefore meet the assumptions used in the safety analysis-to ensure releases through the valves are teminated, such that the radiological doses are within the acceptance limit. I
- APPLICABILITY The containment penetration requirements are applicable during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment because this is when there is a potential for a fuel handling accident. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, containment penetration requirements are addressed by LC0 3.6.1, " Containment." In MODES 5 and 6, when CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irra'diated fuel assemblies within containment are not being conducted, the potential for a fuel handling accident does not exist. Therefore, under these conditions no requirements are placed on containment penetration status.
ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With the containment equipment hatch, air locks, or any containment penetration that provides direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere not in the required status, including the Containment Purge Isolation System not capable of automatic actuation when the purge and exhaust valves are open, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the isolation function is not needed.
~~, (continued) v SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.9-13 AMENDMENT NO.~~
~~. $ap/>lamen / 3 l~~
~~INSERT "A" This LCO is modified by Note which allows to keep both doors of the 1 containment personnel airlock open provided:~~
a. one personnel airlock door is OPERABLE

b. the plant is in MODE 6 or defueled configuration, and

c. with 23 feet of water above the fuel.
~~1 Y Y* M~~
~~SDC and Ccolant Circulation-High Water Level B 3.9.4 BASES LCO The flow path starts in one of the RCS hot legs and is (continued) returned to the RCS cold legs.~~
/
~~The LCO is modifie ows the required gI'y3 Nottf.tt~~
. operating SDC loo) to e removec rom service for up to I hour in each 8 lour period, provided no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration.
This permits operations such as core mapping or alterations in the vicinity of the reactor vessel hot leg nozzles, and RCS to SDC isolation valve testing. During this 1 hour period, decay heat is removed by natural convection to the large mass of water in the refueling canal. 6 mis u,v is modified Dv ';ne Note ows budt>b+ ysan 4 3 % opera,tions to use a containmen'; spray pump in p pressure safety injection pump to provide shutdown cooling flow. APPLICABILITY One SDC loop must be in operation in MODE 6, with the water level a 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, to 3rovide decay heat removal. The 23 ft level was selected
~~)ecause it corresponds to the 23 ft requirement established for fuel movement in LCO 3.9.6, " Refueling Water Level."~~
Requirements for the SDC System in other MODES are cevered by LCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS). SDC loop requirements in MODE 6, with the water level < 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, are located in LCO 3.9.5, " Shutdown Cooling (SDC) and Coolant Circulation-Low Water Level." ACTIONS SDC loop recuirements are met by having one SDC loo) OPERABLE anc in operation, except as permitted in tie Note to the LCO. 8.d If SDC loop requirements are not met, there will be no forced circulation to provide mixing to establish uniform , boron concentrations. Reduced boron concentrations can (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 8 3.9-18 AMENDMENT 'V.
NPF-10/15-299 ATTACHMENT "D" (Marked-Up Proposed Bases) Unit 3 i l I i s l
B 3.1.5 , 8 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS Control Element Assembly (CEA) Alignment 8 3.1.5
~
BASES L e. [ 1 The OPERABILITY ( M trip ability) of the shutdown and W BACKGROUND regulating CEAs is an init al gssumption in all safety analyses that assume CEA insertion upon reac safety analyses that directly affects core power , distributions and assumptions of available SDM. ' I d power
.The applicable criteria for these reactivity an . distribution design requirements are 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 10 and GDC 26 (Ref. 1) and 10 CFR 50.46, "Acceptancey . Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Cooled Nuclear Power Plants" (Ref. 2 . -
~~Mechanical or electrical failures sky cause a CEA CEAto become'~~
~~- inoperable or to become misaligned from its group.~~
inoperability or misalignment may cause increased power peaiing, due to the asymetric reactivity distribution and a reductionTherefore, in the total CEAavailable alignment and CEA worth are operability for reactor , shutdown. related to core operation in design power peaking limits and the core design requirement of a minimum SDM. ' Limits on CEA alignment and operability have been established, and all CEA positions are monitored and i controlled during power operation to ensure that the power ' distribution and reactivity limits defined by the design power peaking and SDM limits are preserved. bon L >
. CEAs are moved by their control;:r element ' 4tdrivehs.pme "O**/-l!
(CEDMs). ' 4 inch) at a time,'but at varying rates M:;:l Element A (.E A s q depending on the signal output from the Contro 20 mAsp . Drive Mechanism Control System (CEDMCS). I A Part( Y i[. The CEAs are arranged into groups that are radially Therefore, movement.of the CEAs does not kC445
~~'W .- syunetric. . introduce radial asymetries in the core power distribution.~~
The shutdown and regulating CEAs provide the required reactivity worth ateforreactor imed shutdown upon aThe regulating reactortrip). (power level control during no.rsal operation and (continued) r
~~f. AMENDMENT NO.~~
~~. B 3.1-22 SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3~~
CEA Alignment B 3.1.5 BASES (continued) ACTIONS A.1. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.3.1. a A.3.2. B.l. D.1.L D.1.1, and D3 A CEA may become misaligned, yet remain trippable. In this ' condition, the CEA can still perform its required function of adding negative reactivity should a reactor trip be , necessary.
~~,v,,,,,~~
If one or more regulating CEAs are misaligned by 7 inches M but trippable, continued operation in MODES 1 and 2 may T48 ,TNSERTD continue, provided, within 1 hour, the power is reduced in' 4' accordance with Figure 3.1.5-1, and SDH is a 5.15% Ak/k, and -
'within 2 hours the misaligned CEA(s) is aligned within . P, 7 inches of its grou) or the misaligned CEA's aligned within 7 incies of the misaligneds). CEA(group J is -
~~_m:JJAW Xenon redistribution in the core starts to occur as soon as a CEA becomes misaligned. Reducing THERMAL POWER in accordance with e4 - ~~~
,e $ (43 +s. q;g ng;;g4ggg ensures acceptable power distributions are maintained (Ref.6). For small misalignments (< 7 inches) of #r/CEAd m there is:
~~a. A small effect on the time dependent long term power a distributions relative to those used in generating~~
) LCOs and limiting safety system settings (LSSS) l setpoints; ,
J
b. A small effect on the available SDM; and j

c. A small effect on the ejected CEA worth used in the l
~~accident analysis. ; With a large CEA misalignment (t 7 inches), however, this~~
.-: misalignment would cause distortion of the core power distribution. This distortion may, in turn, have a significant effect on: . a. The available SDH; -
b. The time deperident, long term power distributions relative to those used in generating LCOs and LSSS setpoints; and

c. The ejected CEA wor.th used in the accident analysis.
I
~~. . l (continued) i~~
'N.. SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3' ' B 3.1-27 AMENDMENT NO.
INSERT B "If one or more regulating CEAs are misaligned by 7 inches but tripable, continued operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue, provided; within 15 minutes a power reduction is initiated in accordance with COLR requirements, SDM is > verified to be h5.15Ss ak/k within 1 hour, and within 2 hours the misaligned CEA(s) is aligned within 7 inches of its group or the misaligned CEA's group isalignedwithin7inchesofthemisalignedCEA(s)." < t i i i t I i 4 [ t I h 3 of 4
Regulating CEA Insertion Limits B 3.1.7 BASES APPLICABLE increased power peaking and corresponding increased local SAFETY ANALYSES .LHRs. i (continued) The SDM requirement is ensured by limiting the regulating and shutdown CEA insertion limits, so that the allowable . inserted worth of the CEAs is such that sufficient reactivity is available in the CEAs to shut down the reactor 4 to hot zero sower with a reactivity margin that assumes the 4 maximum wort 1 CEA remains fully withdrawn upon trip 9 (Ref.f.3 r, w Operation at the insertion limits or ASI may approach th, g maximum allowable linear heat generation rate or peaking 4
~~' factor, with the allowed T, present. Operation at the m, insertion limit may also indicate the maximum ejected CEA t--~~
~~worth could be equal to the limiting value in fuel cycles ^- that have sufficiently high ejected~~
. - CEA worths. 2 The regulating and shutdown CEA insertion limits ensure that safety analyses assumptions for reactivity insertion rate, SDM, ejected CEA worth, and power distribution peaking (1 factorsarepreserved(Ref.f). ;
3 u The regulating CEA insertion limits satisfy Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement. LCO' The limits on regulating CEA sequence, r"--' and physical N
~~
insertion, as defined in the COLR, must be maintained because they serve the function of preserving power distribution, ensuring that the SDM is maintained, ensuring that ejected CEA worth is maintained, and ensuring adequate
. negative reactivity insertion on trip. The overlap between regulating banks provides more unifonn rates of reactivity w insertion and withdrawal.1.2 :. !w..J .. .._!-i! . ; 4
~-y " r ; n'i;' M' .,, . 4. u . .i3 --'. .... ; . . . .e .r The power de)endent insertion limit (PDIL) alann circ 6f t is required to )e OPERABLE for notification that the CEAs are outside the required insertion limits. When the PDIL alarm circuit is inoperable, the verification of CEA positions is increased to ensure improper CEA alignment is identified . before unacceptable flux distribution occers.
~~6- **(Isf of the- Nwlsien3 egeewPs 7647,.be y ~ , 4 ,, , _ ,.ms [' $rouf' pionneto# sad %e. aussch (W#s(continued-) (7~~
~~- -re, Set 6,(fJ. o B 3.1-42 AMENDMENT NO.~~
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 , l
Regulating CEA Insertion Liaits B 3.1.7 BASES g-. ACTIONS , B.1 and B.2 (continued) intervals > 4 hours per 24 hour period, - ' -tc; t:n; 4* y '-t: f x;r L " 't: :.. . m .if, peaking factors ,6 L :'--' can develop that are of immediate concern (Ref.f. 3' V 3 Additionally, s'ince the CEAs can be in this condition i without misalignment, penalty factors are not L.,...e if9 w d by [ the core protection calculators to compensate for the *; i developing peaking factors. Verifying the short tem steady F) state insertion limits are not exceeded ensures that the I peaking factors that do develop are within those allowed for continued operation. Fifteen minutes provides adequate time ! for the operator to verify if the short tem steady state insertion limits are exceeded. Experience has shown that rapid sower increases in areas of the core, in which the. flux has ieen. depressed, can result in fuel damage as the LHR in those areas rapidly increases. Restricting the rate of THERMAL POWER increases to s 5% RTP per hour, following CEA insertion beyond the long tem. steady state insertion limits, ensures the power transients experienced by the fuel will not result in fuel failure 4 j (Ref.J). ;
.5 W Ed With the regulating CEAs inserted between the long tem - f,.c V steady' state insertion limit and the transient insertion y*
~~limit w : :::: :;;r::: ; it: 5 effective full ' p( power days (EFPD) per 30 EFPD, oD14 EFPD per 365 EFPD iim a, i.iic w iu -- -~~
- ---' "-i t : - r y
7. .. - flu'x' patterns outside' those assumed'?:::f in the :: /
long tem burnup assumptions. In this case, the CEAs must i be returned to within the long tem steady state insertion limits, or the core must be placed in a condition in which the abnomal fuel burr.u) cannot continue. A Completion Time of 2 hours is a reasona)le time to return the CEAs to within the long tem steady state insertion limits. ! The required Completion Time of 2 hours from initial discovery of a regulating CEA group outs.ide the limits until its restoration to within the long tem steady state limits, shown on the figures in the COLR, allows sufficient time for (continued) J SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 B 3.1-44 AMENDMENT NO.
l Part Length CEA~Insertien Liaits -)
~~-B 3.1.8 -~~
BASES (continued) : l ACTIONS A.1. A.2. and-B.1 If the part length.CEA groups are inserted beyond the ; transient insertion limit or between the long term (steady. state) insertion limit and the transient limit for more than : 7 effective full power days (EFPD) out of any 30 EFPD-period, or for more than 14 EFPD out of any 365 EFPD period, flux patterns begin to~ develop that are outside'the range 1 assumed for long term fuel burnup. If allowed to continue beyond this limit, the peaking factors assumed as initial' conditions in the accident analysis may be invalidated (RefR Restoring the CEAs to within limits or reducing- t THERMAL 70WER to that fraction of RTP that is allowed by CEA i group position, using the limits specified in the COLR, , ensures that acceptable peaking factors are maintained. , Since these effects are cumulative, actions are provided to ; limit the total time the part length CEAs can be out of limits in any 30 EFPD or 365 EFPD period. Since the cumulative out of limit times are in days, an additional , Completion Time of 2 hours is reasonable for restoring the , part length CEAs to within the allowed limits. ful I If the part length CEA groups cannot be restored to within , the long term steady state insertion limits within two ! hours, a controlled shutdown should commence. A Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable, based on operating t experience, for reducing power to s 20% RTP from full power
~
conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.8.1 i REQUIREMENTS Verification of each part length CEA group position every ; 12 hours is sufficient to detect CEA positions that may - approach the limits, and provide the operator with time to undertake the Required Action (s), should insertion limits be found to be exceeded. The 12 hour Frequency also takes into ; account the indication provided by the power dependent insertion limit alam circuit and other information about . (continued) l l SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 B 3.1-51 AMENDMENT NO. I
Part Length CEA Inserticn Linits B 3.1.8 BASES l SURVEILLANCE CEA group positions available to the operator in the control REQUIREMENTS room. (continued) SR 3.1.8.2 Verification of the accumulated time during which the part length CEA groups are inserted beyond the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limit every 24 hours is sufficient since long term operation at the Transient Insertion Limit could have affects on core power distribution. . l REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 10 and GDC 26.
2. 10 CFR 50.46. .

3. SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Section 15.4.

k. 00Z3 Units e and 3 Urs"J', he+ ion 15,+.--
~~..m SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 8 3.1-52 AMENDMENT NO.~~
P Boration Systems - Operating ; B 3.1-9 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM B 3.1.9 Boration Systems - Operating , BASES BACKGROUND The Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) functions to provide a means for reactivity control and maintaining reactor coolant inventory, activity, and chemistry. The CVCS includes the letdown and boron injection subsystems. t The boron injection subsystem is required to establish and , maintain a safe shutdown condition for the reactor. The letdown portion of the CVCS is used for normal plant operation, however, it is not required for safety. j Two OPERABLE boron injection flow paths are required while operating in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. One flow path includes the OPERABLE RWST (TS 3.5.4) the associated gravity feed valves, and the charging pumps. The second flow path includes the Boric Acid Makeup (BAMU) tanks with their individual or combined contents in accordance with the LCS, the associated gravity feed valves, BAMU pump (s), and charging pumps. Power is provided by the OPERABLE onsite ; emergency power supply specified by TS 3.8.1. ! The boron concentration is controlled to provide shutdown i margin (SDM) for maintenance, refpeling and emergencies. Boron concentration is adjusted 4 0 obtain optimum CEA positioning and compensate for normal reactivity changes associated with changes in reactor coolant temperature, core burnup, and xenon concentration. The boration capability is 1 sufficient to provide a SDM of 3.0% Ak/k assuming the highest worth CEA is stuck out after xenon decay and . cooldown to 200*E. For Small Break Loss Of Coolant [ Accidents (SBLOCA)thechargingpumpssupplywaterto maintain inventory until the RCS pressure decreases below
~~, In addition, the boration l~~
{theHPSIpumpshutoffhea system injects boron into e CS to mitigate a Main Steam ' LineBreak(MSLB). L m %s wl& GDC 24, =~,1 1*7 f M.1 J 2)7 m weu wk GDC 33 IhC N ~ -' SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 8 3.1-53 AMENDMENT NO. l
Boration Systems - Operating B 3.1.9 BASES SAFETY ANALYSIS The charging pumps inject borated water into the RCS to provide reactivity control. There are three installed charging pumps with one normally in operation balancing the letdown purification flow and the reactor coolant pump controlled bleed-off flow. For SBLOCAs that do not initially depressurize the RCS below the HPSI pump shutoff head, the charging pumps supply borated water to help maintain reactor coolant inventory. A Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) is initiated by either low pressurizer pressure or high containment pressure in Modes 1 through 3. All three charging pumps receive start signals from SIAS and the associated boric acid flow path valves open to provide emergency boration via the charging pumps. The capacity of the charging pumps and the' required amount of borated water stored in the RWST and BAMUs is sufficient ' to maintain shutdown margin during a plant cooldown to MODE 5 with a shutdown margin of at least 3%Ak/k at any time during plant life. The maximum expected boration capability requirements occurs at the end of core life from full power equilibrium xenon conditions. During this condition the required boric acid solution is supplied by the BAMU tanks , with the contents in accordance with the LCS plus : aaproximately 13,000 gallons of 2350 ppm borated water from t1e OPERABLE RWST. The design of the boration systems incorporates a high degree of functional reliability by providing redundant components, an alternate path for charging and either Gravity feed lines from offsiteoronsitepowersupp) eachBoricAcidMakeup(BAMU lies. tank and the RWST assures that a source of borated water is available to the charging pump i suction header. Should the charging line inside containment i be inoperative, the line may be isolated outside containment ; and flow redirected through the high pressure safety ' injection headers to assure boron injection. If the normal power supply system should fail, the charging pumps, boric acid makeup pumps, and all related automatic control valves are powered from an emergency bus. The malfunction or failure of one active component would not reduce the ability ; to borate the RCS since an alternate flow path is always available for emergency boration. ! Th e. h e M S st y ms x4,c Crt.ch 3 .c h Ngt. 7 [ Pala y %w.e. ' SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 B 3.1-54 AMENDMENT NO. .
i Boration' Systems - Operating B 3.1.9 BASES SURVEILLANCE that a sufficient volume of borated water is available for REQUIREMENTS RCS makeup. The minimum required volume and concentration (continued) of stored boric acid in the BAMU tank (s) is dependent upon the RWST boron concentration and is specified in a Licensee ! Controlled Specification. The 7 day Surveillance Frequency ensures that an adequate initial water supply is available for boron injection. SR 3.1.9.3 and 3.1.9.4 [ These SRs demonstrate that each automatic boration system 1 pump and valve is operable and actuates as required. In " response to an actual or simulated SIAS the charging pumps start,'the VCT is isolated, and the charging pumps take t suction from the OPERABLE BAMU tank (s) and RWST. , Verification of the correct alignment for manual, power ' operated, and automatic valves in the Boration System Flow , paths provides assurance that proper boration flow paths are available. These SRs do not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, because ( these valves were previously verified to be in the correct ; position. ! 1 I RF_FERENCE5 D 16CFR SO i APPm L A, GDc. 2_6 .
~~2) to GR So, APP o-t m A, G Dc. 2. 7 .~~
~~i i~~
~~3) /c uR So, A Pped,v 4, G D C_ 3 S.~~
i I SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 B 3.1-54c AMENDMENT NO. l
Boration Systems - Shutdorn B 3.1.10 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM in aconk.m c.A GDC. 26 27, d 5 8 3.1.10 Boration Systems - Shutdown C h c. 1 ,2., w O - 1 BASES BACKGROUND The Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) functions to provide a means for reactivity control and maintainin reactor coolant inventory, activity, and chemistry. The CVCS includes the letdown and boron injection subsystems. The boron injection subsystem is required to establish and maintain a safe shutdown condition for the reactor. The , letdown portion of the CVCS is used for normal plant operation, however, it is not required for safety. One OPERABLE boron injection flow path is required while operating in Modes 5 and 6. The required flow path may include either: 1) The RWST via a char Pressure Safety Injection Pump, or; 2)ging pump A Boric Acid or High Makeup (BAMU) Tank via the BAMU pump or gravity feed valve to a charging pump. AC electrical power is available from the OPERABLE power sources specified by TS 3.8.2. SAFETY ANALYSIS The charging pumps inject concentrated boric acid into the RCS to provide negative reactivity control in MODES 5 and 6. With the RCS below 200*F one injection system is acceptable without single failure considerations on the basis of the stable reactor condition and additional restrictions on CORE ALTERATIONS. Boron dilution is conducted under strict procedural controls I which specify limits on the rate and magnitude of any 1 required change in boron concentration. Therefore, the probability of a sustained or erroneous dilution is very low. In Mode 5, administrative controls allow only one l charging pump to be in operation and require that power be removed from the remaining two charging pumps with their breakers locked out. Analyses show that an inadvertent ; boron dilution while in MODE 5, results in the least time i available for detection and termination of the event. The ! high neutron flux alarm on the startup channel ! instrumentation will alert the operator of a boron dilution event. The operator will terminate the dilution before i losing shutdown margin by either turning off the charging ! pumps, turning off the primary makeup tank pump, isolation of the reactor makeup water supply, or actuating safety - injection. (continued) l SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 8 3.1-55 AMENDMENT NO.
Boration System - Shutdown . B 3.1.10 I BASES SAFETY ANALYSIS The design of the boration systems incorporates a high (continued) degree of functional reliability by providing an alternate path for charging and either offsite or onsite power supplies. Gravity feed lines from each Boric Acid Makeup (BAMU) tank and the RWST assures that a source of borated water is available to the charging pump suction header in the event of a failure of the power supply to the bamu pump i discharge valves. Should the charging line inside containment be inoperative, the line may be isolated outside i containment and flow redirected through the high pressure safety injection header No. 2 or hot leg injection header ; No. I to assure boron injection. If the normal power supply i system should fail, the charging pumps, high pressure safety ! injection pumps, boric acid makeup pumps, and all related ' automatic control valves are powered from emergency buses. ; The RCS boron concentration in MODES 5 and 6 is controlled to provide shutdown margin (SDM) for maintenance and, , refueling. The required boration capability ensures that a SDM of 3.0% Ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 140af is available. For this SDM requirement, 4150 gallons of borated water shall be available from either the : BAMU tanks (35% Control room indicated level) or the RWST (2% control room indicated level), with a concentration of m m at least 2350 ppm boron.
~
LC0 In MODES 5 and 6, one of the following RCS boron injection flow paths shall be operable: I. BAMU Tank (4150 gallons with 2350-4250 PPM Boron) via: A.1. BAMU pump, , 0.8 A.2. Gravity feed, AND , B. Charging Pump; Tw E m e S ny u.a wary Cnwl% 3 (continued)
~~.c h NILC Pe th.y Sw.mwt.~~
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.1-56 AMENDMENT NO. t
Boration System'- Shutdown ! B 3.1.10-BASES . n l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.10.4 i REQUIREMENTS . 1 (continued) These SRs' demonstrate that each boration system pump and j valve is operable and actuates as required. In response to , an actual or simulated SIAS the charging pumps start, the ' i VCT is isolated, and the charging pumps take suction from , theOPERABLEBAMUtank(s).andRWST. Verification of the ; correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the Boration System Flow paths provides assurance that proper boration flow paths are available. These'SRs do-not apply to valves that are locked, sealed,- or otherwise ; secured in position, because these valves were previously -
~~. verified to be in the correct position.~~
~~1. A flow path from either' boric acid makeup tank with a '~~
minimum boron concentration of 2350 ppm and a minimum i borated water volume of 4150 gallons, via either one ! of the boric acid makeup pumps, the blending tee or ' the gravity feed connection and any charging pump to ; the RCS, or; i
~~2. The flow path from the refueling water tank with' a I minimum borated water level of 2%, a minimum boron -!~~
concentration of 2350 ppm, and a solution temperature [ between 40*F and 100*F via either a charging pump or a j high pressure safety injection pump to the RCS.. -; RGERENcEs 0 lo cFR. So , A p e n l.L A , caDc 24 i) to cet so, APP ~14 A, Gbc. z7 j i) to cFR So, MPadi A, GDC. 33
~~'I 4~~
~~G d SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 B 3.1-56 c AMENDMENT NO. , 4 4~~
'A P ** 9 "* *8"**-N *
~~STE-Low Power Physics Testing B 3.1.12 BA$d BACKGROUND core are consistent with the design predictions and that the (continued) core can be operated as designed (Ref. 4).~~
PH SICS TESTS procedures are written and approved a4J i ccordance with established formats. The procedures gpg id clude all information necessary to pemit a detailed execution of testing required to ensure that the design intent is met. PHYSICS TESTS are performed in accordance with these procedures and test results are approved prior to continued power escalation and long term power operation. . Examples of PHYSICS TESTS include determination of critical boron concentration, CEA group worths, reactivity coefficients, flux symmetry, and core power distribution APPLICABLE It is acceptable to suspend certain LCOs for PHYSICS TESTS SAFETY ANALYSES because additional' limits'on power level and shutdown capability are maintained during PHYSICS TESTS. Reference 5 defines the requirements for initial testing of the facility, including PHYSICS TESTS. Rec uirements for reload fuel cycle PHYSICS TESTS are definec in ANSI /ANS-19.6.1-1985 (Ref. 4). PHYSICS TESTS for reload fuel cycles are given in Table 1 of ANSI /ANS-19.6.1-1985. Although these PHYSICS TESTS are generally accomplished within the limits of all LCOs, conditions may occur when one or more LCOs must be suspended to make completion of PHYSICS TESTS possible or practical. This is acceptable as long as the fuel design criteria are not violated. As long as the linear heat rate (LHR) remains within its limit, fuel design criteria are preserved. During PHYSICS TESTS, the following LCOs may be suspended:
a. LCO 3.1.1, " SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) -Tm > 200*F"; and

b. LCO3.1.4,"ModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)";

c. LC0 3.1.5, " Control Element Assembly (CEA) Alignment";
~~%)s(e.f s. ~~~
~~d. LCO 3.1.6, " Shutdown Control Element Assembly (CEA) b *-~~
Insertion Limits"; (continued) SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 B 3.1-60 AMENDMENT NO.
T STE-0; .t:r CE^. "hM 4=_,,_u._ n__.a.o__ ,c. um
~~.t :.c.f f, b5'Iy'EiENAh' E 3.1.U '~~
~~4 BASES [J~~
~
APPLICABLE PHYSICS TESTS include measurement of core parameters or SAFETY ANALYSES exercise of control components that affect process (continued) variables. Among the process variables involved are the l Center CEA and and regulating 5'Hd?piFtrlFn~gtli CEAs, which affect power peaking and are rihijfidd*f6Fshutdown of the reactor. The insertion limits for these variables are specified for each fuel cycle in the COLR. PHYSICS TESTS meet the criteria for inclusion in the Technical Specifications since the components and process variable LCOs suspended during PHYSICS TESTS meet Criteria 1, 2, and 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LCO This LCO provides exceptions to LCO 3.1.5, " Control Element and LCO 3.1.7, " Regulating CEA Assembly (CEA) Alignment"?j3Mj8]EPiffitinityCEg liigstt;ig InsertionLimitsihnql.00 Liinits." In addition, ths TCO requires that oni'i e center CEA"(CEA #1) is misaligned, or only regulating CEA Group 6 is inserted beyond the transient insertion Limit of LC0 3.1 7FWoi11y* the?pirt9TehithTCEAW6 uMfRidsittedi b'sibhd
~
th s>t ran si en ts i n sertio'n2 Limi tf of iLC0k3'.E 8 l^"and"tNs* LHR ~ and DNBR"d6~hiit*ensid"the*TissitTspecifisd'i6 the COLR. These exceptions are required to determine the isothermal temperature ctefficient, moderator temperature coefficient? ~ doppjurjy6peggoyffi'c]e,nj and power coefficient. APPLICABILITY This LC0 is applicable in MODE 1.
< O ACTIONS A.1 [ k V3 With the LHR or DNBR outside the limits specified in the COLR, adequate safety margin is not assured and power must be reduced to restore LHR and DNBR to within limits.
~~The required Completion Time of 15 minutes for initiating boration allows the operator sufficient time to align the valves and start the boric acid pumps.~~
~~"A L ?). l _~~
k , l NS ERT C- (continued) [ SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.1-74 AMENDMENT NO. . Y i
1 i l INSERT C ; i With LHR or DNBR outside the limits specified in the COLR and Action A.1 not completed within the associated completion time, power must Le ieduced to MODE l 3 operating conditions within 6 hours. ! The required Completion Time of 6 hours allows sufficient time to reduce power l to Mode 3 conditions in an orderly manner without challenging plant systems. 2 of 4
x -- 3 g RPS Instrumentation-Operating B 3.3.1 Y
~~~ , BASES y -~~
SR 3 . 3 .1. 4_ (continued) SURVEILLANCE 3 at REQUIREMENTS located inThe theFrequency control room to detect in gg outputs. is modified bydeviations in ting is a Note indicafter i Surveillance need only be 1erformed within 12 hour reaching 20% RTP. The 12 tours after reaching 20% required for plant stabilization, data taking, and flowT verification. A second Note in the SR indicates the lower power levels. The conditional SR may be suspended during PHYSICS TESTS. suspension of the daily calibrations under stricta to occur.
e In W a,w.e NN i SR 3.3.1.5 g The less thanRCS flowtorate or equal indicated the RCS total flowby each rate ev CPC is vert i try The Note indicates the Surveillance is performehwithinThis ' $1 chec 12 hours after THERMAL POWER is a: BS% RTP. Surp.3 if necessary, the adjustment of the CPC addressable fl constant coefficients) ensures that the ONBR setpoint is conservatively adjusted with respect to actual flow indications as determined by a calorimetric calculation.
Operating experience has shown the specified Frequency is adequate, as instrument drift is minimal and changes in actual flow rate are minimal over core life. SR 3.3.1.6 The three vertically mounted excore nuclear instrumentation detectors in each channel are used to determine APD for in the ONBR and LPD calculations. Because the detectors mounted outside the reactor vessel, a portion of.the signal from each detector is from core sections not adjacent to the detector. SR 3.3.1.6 ensures that the preassigned gains are still proper. The 92 day Frequency is adequate because the demonstrated long term drift of the instrument channels is minimal. (continued) AMENDMENT NO. l B 3.3-31 SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 , l l
~~..v ll RPS Instrumentation-Shutdotn i hl u~~
B 3.3.2 l 3' A K BASES l T]S ; -s . k REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 20. i
~~. I 10 .~~
~~s - I~~
4. PPS Setpoint Calculation CE-NPSD-570.

5. NRC Safety Evaluation Report.

i. i

6. CEN-327, June 2, 1986, including Supplement 1, March 3,.1989.
f r I I l l l O AMENDHENT NO. SANONOFRE--UNIT'2? B 3.3-51
Vadwvoty.Y l DG 45VS- , B 3.3.7 ! B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION Wvoky &g 4$' B 3.3.7 Diesel Generator (DG)-!cU r# "^' 2 5: Start-(LOVS) BASES BACKGROUND The DGs provide a source of emergency powei when offsite power is either unavailable or insufficiently stable to D allow safe unit operation. Undervoltage protection will 1 nerate a' OV9 in the event a Loss of Voltage or Degraded S*PP3 lMLes ,f Ve h M Voltage co dition occurs. There are two LOVS Functions for each 4.16 kV vital bus. Four undervoltage relays with inverse time characteristics i are provided on each 4.16 kV Class 1E instrument bus for the purpose of detecting a loss of bus voltage. Four L undervoltage relays with definite time characteristics are provided for the purpose of detecting a sustained degraded .
~~. voltage. condition. The relays are combined in a two-out-of-four logic to generate a LOVS if the voltage is below 75% for a short time or below 90% for a long time.~~
The LOVS initiated actions are described in "Onsite Power Systems" (Ref. 1). , Trio Setooints and Allowable Values The trip setpoints and Allowable Values are based on the analytical limits presented in " Accident Analysis," Reference 2. The selection of these trip setpoints is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken Anto account. To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, ' and instrument drift, Allowable Values :;xifid ir,- Sppl ! Ji;.. ~;.3. W re conservatively adjusted with respect to ( the analytical limits. The actual nominal trip setpoint is : nomally still more conservative than that required by the plant specific setpoint calculations. If the measured trip setpoint does not exceed the documented Surveillance acceptance criteria, the undervoltage relay is considered i OPERABLE. Setpoints in accordance with the Allowable Values will ensure that the consequences of accidents will be acceptable, providing the plant is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the accident and the equipment functions as designed. , (continued) b ,= SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 B 3.3-124 AMENDMENT NO. t J
p i-CPIS B 3.3.8 8 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.8 Containment Purge Isolation Signal (CPIS) BASES BACKGROUND This LCO encompasses the CPIS, which is a plant specific instrumentation channel that performs an actuation function required for plan e ot herwise included in LCO 3.3.6 gineere Safety Featu s Ac ation Systen) f (ESFAS) Log c and Manual Trip," 'or LC0 3.3.7, " lesel Generator G) - L::: :# :M;;;tStart M ." g,3 The CPIS p ovides protection f d tive c ntaminatipn should be in the cont
~~ent in the event a fuelh assemb a v closes the purge severely damage ,~~
valves during plant operation in response to a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak. The CPIS will detect any abnormal amounts of radioactive material in the containment and will initiate purge valve closure to limit the release of radioactivity to the environment. Both the minipurge and large volume purge supply and exhaust valves are closed on a CPIS when a high radiation level in containment is detected. The CPIS includes two independent, redundant logic subsystems, including actuation trains. Each train employs two sensors, each one detecting one of the following:
~~Gaseous~~
~~. Gamma (area) .~~
If any one of these sensors exceeds the bistable trip setpoint, the CPIS train will be actuated (one-out-of-two logic). Each train actuates a separate series valve in the containment purge supply and return lines. Either train controls sufficient equipment to perform the isolation function. These valves are also isolated on a Safety Injection Actuation Si nal (SIAS) and Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS . ; (continued: I Q-l 8 3.3- AMENDMENT NO SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 ' 19 l i
~
l
1 CPIS B 3.3.8 ,, BASES
~.
LCO b. Airborne Radiation and Containment Area Radiation ' g"- o w4., (continued) The LCO on the radiation channels requires that eech- w channel be OPERABLE for each Actuation Logic channel, m :: the) 2ra nn+ totally redo-d et te a , oth:n The trip setpoint of twice background is selected to The allow detection of small deviations from no 1. f6 absolute value of the trip setpoint in MOD (3 differs from the setpoint in MODES I, 2, 3, and 4 so that a fuel handling accident can be detected in the ~ lower background radi N C*Waa4M Am btion*TfA. expected chanulsinaeseeee M00Eff.4. I ersddfdd Actuation Looic ulN bl e*C4A&W b A00G . 'fk, $ c. kviper.4. /ta44.h. c muds en Mrf rW n M4 I One channel of Actuation Logic is required', since the I valves can be shut independently of the CPIS signal either manually from the control room or using either the SIAS or CIAS push button. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the minipurge valves may be open. In these MODES, it is necessary to ensure the valves will , shut in the event of a primary leak in containment whenever any of the containment purge valves are open. With the purge valves open during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, a fuel handung a,ccidpt-wouhia1gdTFe 645.an kign ca ion tainment. g The APPLICABILITY is odified by a Note, which states that h the CPIS Specificat'on is only required when the penetratf or
) is not isolated b I automatic valv $ y manual closed :t !c t --- closed valve and @or blind de-activated flange 9 A - ' (continued)d 8 3.3-1 AMENDMENT NO.
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 . t%
u _ . g CRIS B 3.3.9 [4o
~~? i B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.9 Control Room Isolation Signal (CRIS) f.~~
BASES i BACKGROUND This LCO encompasses CRIS actuation, which is a plant specific instrumentation channel that performs an actuation function required for plant protection but is not otherwise included in LCO 3.3.6, " Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Generator (ESFAS) LogicVoltage (DG)-Loss'of and Manual Trip,"(orThis'is Start LOVS)." LCO a3.3.7, " Diei j non-Nuclear Steam Supply System ESFAS Function that, because of differences in purpose, design, and operating i requirements, is not included in LCO 3.3.6 and LCO 3.3.7. The CRIS teminates the normal supply of outside air to the i control room and initiates actuation of the Control Room ! Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACUS) to minimize operator radiation exposure. The CRIS includes two independent, , redundant subsy as, including actuation trains. Each ! train employs eparatesensorgtodetect@aseousactivity. % Since there are separate sensors in each i rain, the trains h-FhN are redundant.- If the bistable monitorint either sensor inoicates an unsare condition, that train will be actuated y h g edi gt, g .(one-out-of-twologic). The two trains actuate separate equipment. Actuating either train will perfom the intended function. Control room isolation also occurs on a Safety, Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS). , l Trio Setooints and Allowable Values Trip setpoints used in the bistables are based on the i analyticallimits(Ref.1). The selection of these trip l setpoints is such that adequate protection is provided when :' 4 all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account. To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, and. instrument drift, Allowable Values specified in LCO 3.3.9 are conservatively : adjusted with respect to the a'nalytical limits. The actual i nominal trip setpoint entered into the bistable is normally i still more l (continued) l 4 O-j' SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 B 3.3- AMENOMENT NO, g2, l43 1
m CR!S-B 3.3.9 BASES ; y ;
~
BACKGROUND Trio Setooints and Allowable Values (continued) conservative than that specified by the Allowable Value to- ; account for changes in random measurement errors detectable i by a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. One example of such a change' in measurement error is drift during the surveillance interval. If the measured setpoint does not exceed the
~~-Allowable Value, the bistable is considered OPERABLE.~~
Setpoints in accordance with the Allowable Value will ensure the consequences of Design Basis Accidents will be acceptable, providing the plant is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the accident and the equipment ' functions as designed. I APPLICABLE The CRIS, in conjunction with the Control Room Emergency Air SAFETY ANALYSES Cleanup System (CREACUS), maintains the control room atmosphere within conditions suitable for prolonged , occupancy throughout the duration of any one of the The radiation exposure accidents discussed in Reference 1. l of control room personnel, through the duration of any one ,
~~,s of the postulated accidents discussed in " Accident~~
[* } Analysis,"SONGSUnits2and3UFSAR, Chapter 15(Ref.1), s does not exceed the limits set by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, l GDC 19 (Ref. 3). : The CRIS satisfies the requirements of Criterion 3 of the . NRC Policy Statement. ,
)
i LCO LCO 3.3.9 requires one channel of CRIS to be OPERABLE. The q . required channel consists of Actuation Logic, Manual Trip, and gaseous radiation monitors. The specific Allowable F Values for the setpoints of the CRIS are listed in the SRs. i leLiu Only the Allowable Values are specified for each trip Function in the LCO. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptabit, provided that the difference. between the nominal trip setpoint and the Allowable Value is
~
equal to or greater than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the transient and accident analyses. 1 (continued) B 3.3-1 AMENOMENT NO. SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 i44 .
CRIS B 3.3.9 BASES LCp The Allowable Value specified is more conservative than the (continued) analytical limit assumed in the transient and accident analysis in order to account for instrument uncertainties appropriate to the trip Function. These uncertainties are o T T. ,p OM*l. defined in the Voi S+;yvin. 71out m I,
~~" Lacuder.~~
~~i. 2). Otca Limme voA channel is inoperabl actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value.~~
~~The Bases for the LC0 on the CRIS are discussed below for each function:~~
a. Manual Trio The LC0 on Manual Trip backs up the automatic trips and ensures operators have the capability to rapidly initiate the CRIS Function if any parameter is trending toward its setpoint. One channel must be OPERABLE. This considers that the Manual Trip capability is a backup and that other means are available to actuate the redundant train if required, including manual SIAS.
Airborne Radiation b. One channel of Airborne Radiation detection in the required train is required to be OPERABLE to ensure the control room isolates on hi concentration. gg q;g r4
~~c. Actuation Looic M fob #f I One train of Actuation Logic must be OPERABLE, since there are alternate means available to actuate the redundant train, including SIAS.~~
~~A 1 ') APPLICABILIT 5 ad (a, The CRIS Functions must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2~~
~~" " - ' and during movement of irradiat d fue Ng 9o- ( a"sse"m^blies to ensure a habitable environment ontrol for L room operators.~~
u (continued) SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 B 3.3-1 AMENDMENT NO. 1
j
~~- pp CRIS j B 3.3.9 ;~~
i y i BASES (continued) , y , A CRIS channel is inoperable when it does not satisfy the i 1 ACTIONS y OPERABILITY criteria for the channel's function. The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure or drift of the bistable or process module suffictent to exceed l l the tolerance allowed by the plant specific setpoint .m analysis. Typically, the drift is not large and would result in a delay of actuation rather than a total loss of . l
~~function. This detemination is generally made during the~~
~~? perfomance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST when the process ;~~
instrument is set up for adjustment to bring it within ! V' specification. If the trip setpoint is not within the Allowable Value, the channel is inoperable cnd the g appropriate Conditions must be entered. i A.I. B.1. B.2.1. and B.2.2 Conditions A and B have been modified by a Note, which r specifies that CREACUS be placed manually in the isolation i mode if the automatic transfer to the isolation mode is l inoperable. Conditions A and B are applicable to manual and au'tomatic > _ actuation of the CREACUS by CRIS. Condition A applies to jv) A the failure of the CRIS Manual Trip, Actuation Logic, and ggaseous radiation monitor channels in MODE 1, 2, 3, Q_ n _. FW/laiht dad y require Entry f into this Condition requires action to either 1 # or 4. l restore the failed channel (s) or manually perfom the CRISTh safety function (Required Action A.1). ' of 1 hour is sufficient to complete the Required Actions and - accounts for the fact that CRIS supplements control room : isolation by other Functions (e.g., SIAS) in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. Condition B applies to the failure of CRIS Manual Trip, l Actuation Logic, and required gaseous radiation monitor- , channels in MODE 5 or 6, or when moving irradiated innediately taken to - . assemblies. The Required Actions are d 6 place one OPERABLE CREACUS train in the. emergency mode, or l
' to suspend positive reactivity additions, and movement of l - irradiateu fuel assemblies. The Completion Time recognizes-the fact that the radiation signals are the only Functions l 7
available to initiate control room isolation in the event of a fuel handling accident. J s ;
~~'f (continued).~~
G,
~~- Sin 0 0,RE..U,IT 3 83.31/~~
~~AMEN-n1 0. p , m 3 .~~
,{
i _.L- .. e ~ m . --.~, -
CRIS B 3.3.9 I e
~~) BASES (continued)~~
~~SURVEILLANCE . SR 3.3.9.5 (continued) REQUIREMENTS de-energizing the initiation relays and providing Manual ;~~
^
Trip of the function. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at a Frequency of once every 18 months.
~~1. SONGS Units 2 and FSAR, Ch er 15.~~
~~REFERENCES Value 1~~
2. PPS Selection ofj Trip .SahesgDo ament.

3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix , .
G l 9 4 s I W s B 3.3-149 AMENDMENT NO. 4 SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 , 4
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.11 l I BASES LC0 11. Pressurizer level (continued) Pressurizer Level is used to determine whether to terminate safety injection (SI), if still in progress, or to reinitiate SI if it has been stopped. Knowledge , of ;,ressurizer water level is also used to verify the l plant conditions necessary to establish natural l circulation in the RCS and to verify that the plant is maintained in a safe shutdown condition.
12. Steam Generator Water level Steam Generator Water Level is provided to monitor operation of decay heat removal via the steam generators. The Category I indication of steam generator level is the wide range level instrumentation. Temperature compensation of this indication is performed manually by the operator.
Redundant monitoring capability is provided by two trains of instrumentation. Operator action is based on the control room indication of Steam Generator Water Level. The RCS response during a design basis small break LOCA is dependent on the break size. For a certain range of break sizes, the boiler condenser mode of heat transfer is necessary to remove decay heat. Wide range level is a Type A variable because the operator must manually raise and control the steam generato sun sevel to estaD1ishP " a nd:::e- M t + = dar. SVPP 3 Operator is initi Ma onloss of subcoole ! marg Feedwater flow is g hppilthe ated: tend:d:trte;jkrretsduntilthenge le el reaches ind M'* e ."d
~~' I8" er :: d-. = ::tp 9 t.4 {q3~~
~~13. Condensate Storace Tank (C Level CST Level is provided to ensure water supply for AFW.~~
The CST provides the ensured, safety grade water supply for the AFW System. ".: Eri :....:,3 ;f t hPPA ( bM) Syp.2 8 3.3-163 AMENDMENT NO. SAN ON0FRE*-UNIT 3
y
,)
~~PAM instrumentation B 3.3.11 1~~
~~,. i BASES i~~
~~i LCO 13. Condensate Storace Tank (CST) Level (continued) i~~
~~+,.t ,. ___ u u . ______um <_. '~~
CST Level is displayed on a control room indicator, strip chart W ! I recorder, and plant computer. In addition, a control , room annunciator alarms on low level. ' l$ CST Level is considered a Type A variabl cause the Y3 control room meter "d --'"- ~ onsidered the primary indication used by the operato . The DBAs that require AFW are the loss of electric power, steam line break (SLB), and small break LOCA. The CST is the initial source of water for the AFW System. 14, 15, 16, 17. Core Exit Temperature Core Exit Temperature is provided for verification and long term surveillance of core cooling. An evaluation was made of the minimum number of valid core exit thermocouples necessary for inadequate core cooling detection. The evaluation determined the complement of core exit thermocouples necessary to detect initial core recovery and trend the ensuing core heatup. The evaluations account for core nonuniformities including incore effects of the radial decay power distribution and excore effects of condensate runback in the hot legs and nonuniform inlet temperatures. Based on these evaluations, adequate or inadequate core cooling detection is ensured with two valid core exit thermocouples per quadrant. The design of the Incore Instrumentation System includes a Type K (chromel alumel) thennocouple within each of the 56 incore instrument detector assemblies. The junction of each thermocouple is located a few inches above the fuel assembly, inside a structure that supports and shields the incore instrument
'~
~~y.} (continued) SANONOFRE--UNIT 12 B 3.3-164 AMENDMENT NO.~~
~~.- n , p~~
~~(. PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.11 L- BASES f LCO 13. Condensate Storace Tank (CST) Level (continued)~~
~~+,.o. ____m_; u - ____ " " '- '--~~
CST Level k is displayed on a control room indicator, strip chart recorder, and plant computer. In addition, a control room annunciator alarms on low level. I$ CST Level is considered a Type A variabl cause the Y3 r control room meter =ad --'"- ~ onsidered the primary indication used by the operato . The DBAs that require AFW are the loss of electric power, steam line break (SLB), and small break LOCA. The CST is the initial source of water for the AFW System. 14, 15, 16, 17. Core Exit Temperature Core Exit Temperature is provided for verification and long tem surveillance of core cooling. An evaluation was made of the minimum number of valid core exit thermocouples necessary for inadequate core cooling detection. The evaluation determined the complement of core exit thermocouples necessary to detect initial core recovery and trend the ensuing core heatup. The evaluations account for core , nonuniformities including incore effects of the radial decay power distribution and excore effects of condensate runback in the hot legs and nonuniform inlet temperatures. Based on these evaluations, adequate or inadequate core cooling detection is ensured with two valid core exit themocouples per quadrant. The design of the Incore Instrumentation System includes a Type K (chromel alumel) thermocouple within each of the 56 incore instrument detector assemblies. The junction of each thermocouple is located a few inches above the fuel assembly, inside a structure that supports and shields the incore instrument 1 (}, (continued) SANONOFRE--UNIT 12 B 3.3-164 AMENOMENT NO. 1
Source Range Monitoring Channels B 3.3.13 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.13 Source Range Monitoring Channels BASES BACKGROUND The se"cra "Mge riteritnfthTirnels provide neutron flui They 1so power indication from < 1E-7% RTP to.> 100% RTP. rovide reactor protection when the reactor trip circuit
~~reakers (RTCBs) are shut, in the form of a Logarithmic f ower Level-High trip.~~
T 11s LCO addresses MODES 3, 4, and S with the RTCBs op n. W hen the RTCBs are shut, the source range monitoring g 1 channels are addressed by LCO 3.3.2, " Reactor Protective S.ystem (RPS) Instrumentation-Shutdown." y W 1en the RTCBs are open, two of the four wide range p ower wer. I c nannels must be available to monitor neutron flux pc RABLE I n this application, the RPS channels need not be OPE s ince the reactor trip Function is not required. By m ani oring neutron flux (wide range) power when the eITCBs a re open, loss of SDM caused by boron dilution can b ected as an increase in flux. Alanns are also provided hen power increases above the fixed bistable setpoi nts. F ar plants employing separate post accident, wide range , these n Jclear instrumentation channels with adequate rang c an be substituted for the source range range chan is. Two e c lannels must be OPERABLE to provide sinole fa4 p otection and tn N"'t .ti Mecuon of channel failure by pr L CHECK capability. The source ran ring channels are necessary to APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES monitor core reactivity changes. They are the primary means for detecting and triggering operator actions to resaond to reactivity transients initiated from conditions in w1ich the RPS is not required to be OPERABLE. They also trigger operator actions to anticipate RPS actuation in the event of reactivity transients starting from shutdown or low power conditions. The source range monitoring channel's LCO requirements su GDC 13 (Ref.Reference 1)pport2 describes compliance withsource the specific 10 CFR 5 range monitoring channel features that are critical to comply with the GDC. (continued) B 3.3-179 AMENDMENT NO. SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3
Y ',% ' . . * . ,e Ip$ b {
~
ia E .'. /".'D The source range (s rtup)gmoni ring channels i Sepp 3 provide neutron f x coungrate evel indication l from 0.1 to 500,0 0 cps 7 hey so provide a ) Boron Dilution Moni a in the Control Room to alert the operator of a boron dilution event. l This LCO addresses MODES 3, 4, and 5 with the RTCBs open. LCO 3.9.2 addresses the source range monitors during Mode 6 refueling operations. Both source range monitori.ng channels must be 1 l e to monitor neutron flux level when the RTCBgar open. By monitoring source range %g coun ate level, loss of SDM caused by a boron event can b ted as an increase in neutron flux. Th or@ D1 ution Monitor provides an alarm when the coun Tat level exceeds the setpoint which is 'u to 0.5 volt above ' background.
-)*
L GN ,n i ., ressure Tem;:erature. and Mc t' j h 3.4.1 p 5 U '
% REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) g ]h B 3.4 ressure, Temperature, and Flow Limits h B 3.4.1 RCS .
~~N --~~
=
~~BASES ~~~
=
These Bases address requirements for maintaining d RCS BACKGROUND pressure, temperature, The safety andanalyses.(Ref. flow rate within 1) of l limits ass in the safety analyses. nonnal operating conditions and anticipated operationa occurrences assume initial conditions within the
~~steady state envelope. parameters ensure that th -~~
h g g g g gboiling ]. conservativeratio (DNBR) will meet the than each of the transients analyzed. required criteria werfo T I The LCO limits for minimum and maximumtion measured at the pressurizer are consistent RCS pressu d dwith by opera m a g I within the nominal operating envelope a N The LCO limits for minimum and maximum RCS cold l indicated il k3 ( temperatures e an are consistent a' -
# with ope M - _ temoerat es as i forjw.cHe f/* Safefy*Molytt's 94 ^" 9fe &l'S dVG'* *ted ~ +- ""4=+#~ "^~
~~94~' c' "I'h -~~
~~SinceRKflowiand c' " 9 instrument~~
~~n. ;due erz :~~
~~to monitoring of this~~
,, t r*c, ## #." # pa a .. . ,,6 +,' ified by Core l # <r m#d Tw q g %g The COLR limits for mini parameter during plantuncufgasfy Operating Limits Report COLR).
~~op(erati l d initial flow ray in tha4 anawe~asc M d ACS, W } edenfed w k 4/' @. yN (3is,4 Me s~~
~
x - The requirements of LC0 3.4.1 represent the ft initia APPLICA8LE' conditions for DNB The safety limited analyses transientshave shown analyzed that t in SAFETY ANALYSES analyses (Ref.1). transients initiated from the lim the DNBR criterion of a 1.31. Changes to the facility that i for the RCS ONB parameters.could impact the impact on the DNBR criterion. include loss of (continued) AMEN 0HENT NO. B 3.4-1 SANONOFRE--UNITj - L'*_***'M=ggaewe
~~,_ NOt9"inp q~~
)D/)[eJ9t2n INSERT "A" The LCO limits for minimum and maximum RCS flow rates are bounded by those used as the initial flow rates in the analyses. The RCS flow rate is not expected to vary during f plant operation with all pumps running.
~~I { I~~
~~' RCS DNB (Pressure, Temperature, and Flow) Limits B 3.4.1 i~~
~~BASES~~
~~.~ r SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.1. (continued) % REQUIREMENTS t~~
~~i a normal operation, steady state condition following load k changes and other expected transient operations. The~~
% 12 hour interval has been shown by operating practice to be a sufficient to regularly assess for potential degradation and verify operation is within safety analysis assumptions.
kX 3. k. /. 2 Tince Required Action A.1 allows a Completion Time of g gyg( g ygg 2 hours to restore parameters that are not within limits, the 12 hour Surveillance Frequency for cold leg temperature NNI-Mb is sufficient to ensure that the RCS coolant temperature can be restored to a normal operation, steady state condition
' following load changes and other expected transient operations. The 12 hour interval has been shown by operating practice to be sufficient to regularly assess for potential degradation and to verify operation is within safety analysis assumptions.
~~SR 3.4.1.3 _~~
~~& ~~~
~~fg7 [lhe 12 nour durveillance Frequency for,RCS total flow rate is aerformed using the installed flow instrumentation. The .~~
, 12 lour Frequency has been shown by operating experience to ' be sufficient to assess for potential degradation and to verify operation is within safety analysis assumptions.
This SR is modified by a Note that only requires performance of this SR in MODE 1. The Note is necessary to allow measurement of RCS flow rate at normal operating conditions at power with all RCPs running. REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 15. l B 3.4-5 AMENDMENT-N0. l
~~. SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 1~~
~~y . T '.~~
~~+ -~~
-e
~~//SCRX "0 "~~
~~_n 4 .~~
~~.i 'The 12 hour Surveillance Frequency for RCS' tota~~
~~(? (y to verify operation is within safety analysis assumptions.~~
~
y hYg The COLSS F 12 hour Surveillance Frequency for RCS total f utilizes, sensor inputs of RCP, speed, RCP differential pressure, t flow. I cold leg temperature,Total andRCS Pressurized pressure to calculate the volumetric - + flow is then calculated by COLSS as the sum t l' ( flow through each RCP. of the flows of each of the four RCPs.
~~l. y An~~
*' S When COLSS is out of service, RCS Mass Flowrate is S the preferred methodology to determine RCS Mass Flowrate. l 3 methodology is to determine RCS Mass Flowrate by performing an evaluati]
~~the differential pressure across each RCP. i l l l~~
.l h 'n b l t :
s 4 i: 6 L E r b , b l tp a i _ . . ...-. . .x .m
9p.,._ _.- p LTOP System k RCS Temperature > LTOP Enable Temperature F
~~'B 3.4.12.2 e~~
~~BASES~~
~~' LCO Each of these methods of overpressure prevention is capable (continued) of mitigating the limiting LTOP transient.~~
APPLICABILITY This LC0 is applicable in MODE 4 when the temperature of all RCS cold legs are above the enable temperatures specified in the PTLR. When the temperature of any RCS cold leg is equal to or below the enable temperatures specified in the PTLR the Shutdown Cooling System Relief valve is used for overpressure protection or if the RCS is also depressurized, then an RCS vent to atmosphere sized 5.6 inches or greater can be used for overpressure protection. When the reactor vessel head is off, overpressurization cannot occur. LCO 3.4.3 provides the operational P/T limits for all MODES. LC0 3.4.10, " Pressurizer Safety Valves," requires the OPERABILITY of the pressurizer safety valves that provide overpressure protection during MODES 1, 2, and 3. Low temperature overpressure prevention is most critical during shutdown when the RCS is water solid, and a mass or heat input transient can cause a very rapid increase in RCS pressure when little or no time allows operator action to mitigate the event. ACTIONS A.1 With no pressurizer code safety valves OPERABLE and the SDCS Relief Valve IN0PERABLE overpressurization is possible. The 8 hours Completion Time to be in MODE 5 and vented through a greater than or equal to 5.6 inch vent reflects the importance of maintaining overpressure protection of the RCS. B.1 and B.2 gg d The 24-hour Allowable Outage Time (A0T) for a singlehnnel U SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve (s) increases the T i availability of the LTOP system to mitigate low tem > erat are
~~^pdDDi&~~
~~overpressure, transients gavevars duringC00ESg A pu uns u. .u. uiet t rane enx m. - .. . om m g, _ , (continued) SANON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.4-61 AMENDMENT NO. l~~
~~m. w w. . ..t_ c .~~
~~R< (t gy -~~
' LTOP Systea I RCS Temperature > LTOP Enable Temperature 'f- B 3.4.12.2 4, i r ?
~~8-j, ' BASES~~
~~+.,~~
h I era ures ha+waan 80 F and 190 F and the RCS is watar J s 1 d' 24-hour A0T implements the guiaance provided in gl Gener c Letter 90-06. , ... ^7 e i i g# l
)
i
)
~~1 h F~~
'~
s , T. b e,. y ! (continued) s .
~~.s.~~
~~Q .. - p . B 3.4-62 AMENDMENT NO. l s SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3~~
?
A-
y_. _ - __ _ 0 RCS PIV Leakage b B 3.4.14 s
$t p BASES APPLICABLE study concluded that periodic leakage testing of the PIVs SAFETY ANALYSES can substantially reduce the probability of an intersystem . (continued) LOCA. .w o RCS PIV leakage satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement. ev i[
Y LC0 g RCS PIV leakage is identified LEAKAG E into closed systems connected to the RCS. Isolation valve leakage is usually on : the order of drops per minute. Leakyge that increases significantly suggests that something is operationally wrong and corrective action must be taken.Jhe LCO PIV leakage l limit is 0.5 gpm per nominal inch of valve size, with a L maximum limit of 5 gpm. The previous criterion of 1 gpm for tA all valve sizes imposed an unjustified penalty on the larger
\1j valves without providing information on potential valve degradation and resulted in higher personnel radiation exposures. A study concluded a leakage rate limit based on valve size was superior to a single allowable value.
Reference 7 permits leakage testing at a lower pressure differential than between the specified maximum RCS pressure and the normal pressure of the connected system during RCS , operation (the maximum pressure differential) in those types of valves in which the higher service pressure will tend to diminish the overall leakage channel opening. In such cases, the observed rate may be adjusted to the maximum pressure differential by assuming leakage is directly proportional to the pressure differential to the one half power. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, this LCO ap)1ies because the PIV leakage potential is greatest when t1e RCS is pressurized. ! In MODE 4, valves in the SDC flow path are not required to ! meet the requirements of this LC0 when in the SDC mode of operation. In MODES 5 and 6, leakage limits are not provided because the lower reactor coolant pressure results in a reduced potential for leakage and for a LOCA outs.ide the containment. l
~~. (continued)~~
~~B 3'.4-71 AMENDMENT NO. SANONOFRE~-UNITJ t l: o~~
~~g . .~~
~~1 RCS PIV Leakag B 3.4.14~~
~~BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.14.1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of leakage testing on each RCS PIV or isolation i~~
~~valve used to satisfy Required Action A.1 or A.2 is recuired~~
% 4 to verify that leakage is below the specified limit anc; to identify each leaking valve. The leakage limit of 0.5 gpm (Qer inch of nominal valve diameter up to 5 gpm maximum appies to each valve. Leakage testing requires a stable g pressure condition.
For the two PIVs in series, the leakage requirement applies to each valve individually and not to the combined lea < age across both valves. If the PIVs are not individually leakage tested, one valve may have failed completely and not be detected if the other valve in series meets the leakage requirement. In this situation, the protection provided by redundant valves would be lost. Testing is to be performed every 9 months, but may be extended up to a maximum of 24 months, a typical refueling cycle, if the plant does not go into MODE 5 for at least 7 days. The 24 month Frequency is required in 10 CFR 50.55a(g) (Ref. 8), as contained in the Inservice Testing Program, is within the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code, Section XI (Ref. 9), and is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. In addition, testing must be performed once after the valve has been opened by flow or exercised to ensure tight reseating. PIVs disturbed in the performance of this Surveillance should also be tested unless documentation shows that an infinite testing loop cannot practically be avoided. Testing must be performed within 24 hours after the valve has been reseated. Within 24 hours is a reasonable and practical time limit for performing this test after opening or reseating a valve. The leakage limit is to be met at the RCS pressure associated with MODES 1 and 2. This permits leakage testing at high differential pressures with stable conditions not possible in the MODES with lower pressures. (continued) B 3.4-73 AMENDMENT NO. SANON0FRE--UNIT 3
2 L RCS PIV Leakage B 3.4.14 A BASES y t SURVEILLANCE g , SR 3.4.14.1 (continued)
~~r. REQUIREMENTS % '~~
~~! Entry into MODES nd 4 is allowed to establish the necessary differ tial pressures and stable conditions to -~~
~~- i U~~
~~, j y~~
~~l allow for performance of this Surveillance. The Note that~~
~~, allows this provision is com)1imentary to the Frequency of 6 prior to entry into MODE 2 w1enever the unit has been in ~~~
MODE 5 for 7 days or more, if leakage testing has not been ' performed in the previous 9 months. In addition, this Surveillance.is not required to be performed on the SDC System when the SDC System is aligned to the RCS in the shutdown cooling mode of operation. PIVs contained in the SDC shutdown cooling flow path must be leakage rate tested after SDC is secured and stable unit conditions and the necessary differential pressures are established. REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.2.
2. 10CFR50.55a(c).

3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Section V, GDC 55.

4. WASH-1400(NUREG-75/014),AppendixV, October 1975.

5. NUREG-0677, May 1980.

6. UFSAR, Section 5.4

7. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, '
~~Article IWV-3423 (e).~~
8. 10CFR50.55a(g).

9. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, Article IWV-3422.
~~6 a E-B 3.4-74 AMENDMENT NO. SANONOFRE--UNIT 3 9 6~~
's
~~j g . .. .. _~~
; ::... ej - n g '
~~RCS' Leakage Detection Instrumentation J~~
'~
(j
., . B 3.4.15 . h I
~~H BASES (continued) j~~
~~'s. ~ .~~
One method of protecting against large RCS LEAKAGE' derives LCO from the ability of instruments to rapidly detect extremely ! y# This LCO requires instruments of diverse .. ' small leaks. - i monitoring principles to be OPERABLE to provide a high- I T degree of confidence that extremely small leaks are detected i
.f . in time to allow actions to place the plant in a safe l h condition when RCS LEAKAGE indicates possible RCPB 4 degradation.
j The LCO is satisfied when monitors of diverse measur means are available. I combination with a particulate or gaseous radioactivity 0 monitor, provides an acceptable minimum. [ y Because of elevated RCS temperature and pressure in MODES 1, APPLICABILITY 2, 3, and 4, RCS leakage detection instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE. ' In MODE 5 or 6, the temperature is s 200*F Since andthe pressure is maintained low or at atmospheric pressure. ,, temperatures and pressures are far lower than those for ' MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the likelihood of leakage and crac propagation is much smaller.this LCO are not applicable in ACTIONS A.1,le d N.b_ If the containment sump monitor is inoperable, no other form I of sampling can provide the equivalent informa will provide indications of changes in leakage. pp ( 3 e
-r /.$d4 7 [ vMestoration of the sump monitor J ,. A to OPERAB 30 days after the monitor's failure. This time is F, A j
y. e acceptable considering the' adequacy of the RCS water inventory balanc eriomeo every /z nours as a rey 4 )l ' w \ g . , . .n. . "-yss syy apuw Mw A,
~~%y 1 . e -~~
~~e .~~
~~. .. . (cont'inued) $2 n - >. . ~~~
~~ev.t.. nw.x a:'~~
)gk .a .. rv. AMENDMENT NO.
~~SAN,ONOFRE--UNIT 3~~
~~'B. 3. .: : '4~-77 'y w, p pp ,o g- .g v .e =~~
Q--. k a =-e + -s e g 7
l I
~~& h & Mti n f I~~
INSERT "A" Together with the atmospheric monitor, the periodic surveillance for RCS water inventory balance, SR 3.4.13.1, must be performed at an increased frequency of 24 hours to provide information that is adequate to detect leakage. 5 h fh
N
~~7 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation f~~
~~- B 3.4.15 ,~~
~~5 f w BASES a n. z. - g g f.,rf g g, d ,2 ~gn-f '~~
~~'- ACTIONS A_d (continued)~~
Required Action A.Mfied by a As Note tMaindicates a result, , _ . . . provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable. MODE change is allowed when the containment sum
~~' channel is ir. operable.other instrumentation is available l LEAKAGE.~~
~~1 1~~
~~] B.1.1. B.1.2. and 8.2.1_~~
J Nith both gaseous and particulate containment atmosphe radioactivity monitoring instrumentation charinels Either grab fd inoperable, alternative action is required. d Iri samples of the containment ctmosphere must h be taken f analyzed, or water inventory balances, With a sample obtained and analyzed or an information. inventory balance performed every 24 hours, the react be operated for up to 30 days to allow restoration of a least one of the radioactivity monitors. The 24 hour interval provides periodicTime Tae 30 day Completion information th adequate to detect leakage. recognizes at least on available. Required Actions B.1.1, B.1.2, and B.2.1 are modi Note that As indicates that the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 a result, a MODE change is allowed when the i applicable. gaseous and particulate Thiscontainment allowarice is provided atmosphe monitor channel is inoperable.because other instr RCS LEAKAGE. ..
~~E C.1 and C.T .- ..~~
l7 If all required monitors are inoperable,'.no automatic 3" of monitoring' leakage are available, perform RCS wate inventory hours. balance in accordance with
.. to OPERABLE status within M hcurs. - . . , .y .y. ,.g .. _ ,
~~kn . * -(continued)~~
~~y. s - - .~~
g y. .; *
~~+ ,. . .:.. a .' . c '~~
~~s . , 3*. ,, . i '.t . .~~
~*
~~C1 AMENDMENT'N01f~~
~~,~ ^ , ~~~
~~B' 3'.4 , .- l? .f . iSAN'ONOFREMUNIT j-f[ .~~
'-- . 40B % a ^ .N. '~ ^ ~ ~-mw ,~ *s
~~r~- ; e.~~
~~Containment Air Locks-~~
~~$/ # B 3.6.2 l p~~
~~n , BASES-k 2: SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.1 (continued) , l 7 REQUIREMENTWS~~
? requirements with regard to air lock leakage (Type B 1,eakage j - tests). The acceptance criteria were established during - ;
~~initial air lock and containment OPERABILITY. testing. The~~
~~.' periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall l~~
4 containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions. Thus, , i t- SR 3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply. The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that i an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test. ; This is considered reasonable since either air. lock door is capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event ; of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR requiring the i results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of 1 SR 3.6.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accounted for in determining the overall containment leakage j rate. SR 3.6.2.2 The air lock interlock is desi ned to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in a sin le air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an ai lock are designed to j withstand the maximum expected post accident containment pressure, closure of either door will support containment : OPERABILITY. Thus, the door interlock feature supports : containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used for l personnel transit into and out of containment. Periodic ! testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock ! will function as designed and that simultaneous opening of OI J the inner and outer doors will not inadvertently occur. Due t[*S to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is only challenged when conta neent sentered.Jthistestisonlyrequiredtobe perfomed.upon entering containment but is not required more : frequently than every 184. days. Vhe 184 day Frequency is
~~- based on engineering judgment and is conuidored adequate in .~~
~~view of other indications of door and inner' och mechanism status available to onoratianc w oonnel. [] [M SR 3 0 4^ I5 Ehbb l f M~~
~~~ ~ +~~
~~l (continued) ; 7 i SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 8 3.6-11 AMEN 0 MENT NO.~~
~~.p I t !~~
~~k la . . - _ .. ._ . -~~
~~-,_ ~ __~~
?
Centainment Isolation Valves 8 3.6.3 j l, r W BASES ! controls. These administrative controls consist of f
~~-5 ACTIONS !~~
stationing a dedicated operator at the valve controls, who (continued) In ! is in continuous communication with the control room. ! this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a I
~~need for containment isolation is indicated. Due to the - !~~
size of the containment purge line penetration and the fact j that those penetrations exhaust directly from the i containment atmosphere to the environment, these valves may not be opened under administrative controls. ; A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each ! j penetration flow path. ! The ACTIONS' are further modified by a third Note, which ! ensures that ap)ropriate remedial ctions are taken, if
~~- necessary, if tie affec'ted sysu. :.re rendered inoperable by an inoperable containment isolation valve. -~~
A fourth Note has been added that requires entry into the f applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1 when leakagt results in exceeding the overall containment leakage ; limit. i
~~$3 i?!!tij:t: :;;;!!!;, .:..; ;h; g n ;':f r : ;f L ; ~; .0. ^ .. . p l~~
r= - - r r W , ; - O@) A.1 and A.2 [ In the event one containment isolation valve in one or more penetration flow paths is inoperable except for purge valve ; leakage not within limit, the affected penetration flow path ! must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the i use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a. single active failure. Isolation i' barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and ' de-activated automatic containment isolation valve, a closed _ manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow l through the valve secured. For penetrations ' isolated in ; accordance with Required Action A.1, the valve used to i
- isolate the penetration should be the closest available one to containment. Required Action A.1 must be completed within i F the 4 hour Completion Time. The 4 hour Completion Time is l; i
~~y * (continued) f A.J~~
~~% SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 B 3.6-17 AMENDMENT NO.~~
g . L l
f
~~.r INSERT i ~~~
~~- MK '~~
A s+x+hgnot specifies the location of t e Section A, B, C, D, and E valves as SW.3 : the LCS. T e valves are identified as: Section A valves are automatic ! cnn+ : isolation valves; Section B valves are containment purge valves; l
~~~Section C valves are manual valves; Section D valves are either safety !~~
~~injection or other valves; and Section E valves are other valves. f i i I l l i y ht t~~
~~k. ;~~
~~p 1 gI a u~~
~
D . Containment Isolation Valvos f .J - B 3.6.3 t BASES ; i k SURVEILLANCE - SR 3.6.3.2 f REoVIREnENTS !
~~.L. ' This SR ensures that the minipurge valves are closed as '~~
~~M (continued) The SR~~
~~required or, if open, open for an allowable reason.~~
is not required to be met when the purge valves are open .for - ., , pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations f~or personnel entry, or for Surveillances that require the valves to be o>en. The minipurge valves are capable in tie environment fo lowing a LOCA. Therefore, ofclosing' these va ves are allowed to be open for limited periods of. i time. The 31 day Frequency is consistent with other containment isolation valve requirements discussed in . SR 3.6.3.3. , i SR 3.6.3.3
~~- This SR requires verification that each containment '~~
isolation manual valve and blind flange located outside - . containment and required to be closed during accident ' conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the t containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does . not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those. : O- valves outside containment and capable of being '! i mispositioned are in the correct position. Since verification of valve position for valves outside l containment is relatively easy, the'31 day Frequency is l based on engineering judgment and was chosen to provide added assurance of the correct positions. Valves that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet ring the time the valves are open. ; e4- 1 ! The ote applies to valves and blind flanges located in high
~~/. !~~
rad n areas and allows these devices to be verified sed by use of administrative means. Allowing l verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically l' restricted during n0 DES 1, 2, 3, and 4 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves,
~~- once they have een verifiedpa~~
~~ya- F(n. ;~~
~~g w A pf45 M SG. 80'4 la~~
+
~~wgx (continued)~~
~~;O t~~
~~8 3.6-23 AnEnonEnT no. san onoFRe--unit 3 i l l l~~
~~,_ _ _ .a~~
Containment Isolation Valees B 3.6.3 e E BASES O SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR requires verification that each containment isolation manual valve and blind flange located inside containment and required to be closed during accident ' conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the containment boundary is within design limits. For valves inside containment, the Frequency of " prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not perfonned within the previous 92 days" is appropriate, since these valves and flanges are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. Valves that are open under ad trative controls are not required to meet the SR ing t ' time that they are open. ( Vesk+ llows valves and blind flanges located in high The#ote areas to be verified closed by use of rad ministrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they har haan varif M in i.heis-pftptr aosinar, is small! k uM wLepunk at. S.O.4 6 A
+
L 9 usht< 1.6 1 _ . L , Verifying that the isolation time of each power operated and automatic containment isolation valve is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures the valve will isolate in a time perind less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analysis. The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. SR 3.6.3.6 For containment purge valves with resilient seals, additional leakage rate testing beyond the test requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 5), is required to ensure OPERABILITY. Operating experience has demonstrated that this type of seal has the potential to degrade in a shorter time period than do other seal types. (continued) SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 8 3.6-24 AMENOMENT NO.
~~~ ~ -~~
7, _ _ _ . _ _ 2:1 Containment Isolation /ahes T B 3.6.3 j . f f w
~~'l b) c ^~~
~~BASES 3.6.3.6 d}e R SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS-SR (continued)- l~~
% -Based on this observation and the importance of maintaining i this penetration leak tight (due to-the direct path between !
containment.and the environment), a frequency of 184 days # j was established as part of the NRC resolution of Generic ! Issue B-20. " Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration" l (Ref.3). l Additionally, this SR must be perfomed within 92 days after ! l
~~- opening the valve. The 92 day Frequency was chosen !~~
~~recogn zing that cycling the valve could introduce : additional seal degrtdation (beyond-that occurring to a valvethathasnotbeenopened). Thus, decreasing the~~
~~St is interval (from 184 days) is a prudent measure after a valve.~~
nea#M b 9* has been opened. I wiss. M 4# I A . A. Note to this SR requires the results to be evaluated t 1 Yg pg,3 pf. M against the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1. This ensures 1 l
~~/ P"' *;"# ,~~
n ___ that excessive containment purge valve leakage is properly l j i Imewvi* "U" ccounted for in determining the overall containment leakage ! ate to verify containment OPERABILITY. m M app * " g MN t"-- d 7 b
, , . ' i ! I SL 3.6.3.7 O-W w h isJ/ M he containment isolation valves covered by this SR are I, ed kl ;
VI i M et 3.0 gg 4*(5 required to beAPERABLE at the indicated frequency. N *fP h ty A d I - i SR 3.6.3.8 , Automatic containment isolation valves close on a containment i. solation signal to prevent leakage of ; radioactive material from containment following a DBA. This ;
]
SR' ensures each automatic containment isolation valve will ' actuate"to its isolation position on a containment isolation actuation signal. The 24 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this SR be performed only during a unit outage, since isolation of penetrations would eliminate cooling water flow and disrupt nomal operation of many critical components. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this SR when performed on the 24 month Fregancy. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be icceptable from a reliability standpoint. U (continued) 1 _- AMEN 0HENT NO. g SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 8 3.6-25 t e 1
Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6.1 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) removal capability afforded by the Containment Spray System, - reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. B.1 and B.2 If the inoperable containment spray train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 4 within 84 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. The extended interval to reach MODE 4 allows additional time for the restoration of the containment spray train and is reasonable when considering that the driving force for a release of radioactive material from the Reactor Coolant System is reduced in MODE 3.
~~- L.1 ,~~
With one required containment cooling train inoperable, the inoperable containment cooling train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The components in this degraded condition provide iodine removal capabilities and are capable of providing at least 100% of the heat removal needs after an accident. The 7 day Completion Time was developed taking into account the redundant heat removal capabilities afforded by combinations of the Containment Spray System and Containment Cooling System and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. E'
~~, x ,~~
r s., soy peket %. Co gts% % % & W %wl W JRwd \ 4y. A % 4 4. W polm,Wuh e4 celeM %s ik g y n e y wts. L Iw p4aeMU) q oF 14u.hoe =~ M cu w rt
~~4. A n a 4 4~~
~~pwpu. 4, m A. i.3~~
~~%, s p e, %v44-tAh e~~
pw A e4 N Q A tA4 saam of W . to n~ * % L w " (continued) Q ^ - 1 SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.6-38 AMENDMENT N0.
i MSSVs fp . B 3.7.1 O ' .y!? Jj ,B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) N B 3.7.1 { - BASES
)~ The primary purpose of the MSSVs is to provide overpressur ; BACKGROUND protection for the secondary system. ; protection against overpressurizing the r i of energy from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) if the ; preferred heat sink, provided by the Condenser and Circulating Water System, is not available.
Nine MSSVs are located onTheeach MSSVs' main s described in t1e UFSAR, Section 5.2 (Ref.1). with rated capacity (passes the full steam THERMAL POWER RTP) (100% + 2% for instrument error)f flow at 1 This meets the requirements o the valves full open. Section III of the ASME Code (Ref. 2).nrovid Q The Safety volve> v;eraoility 4%Vs Setooin+#The ASME'Report requirementMaVAD) - that Mnys lift settings s1ould be within 1% of the the specified setpoint reflects two separate objectives: i oajective to maintain lift setpoints within the bounds of l h 1I the Safety Analysis and an objective to minimize the numb of valves which operate to mitigate an event by staggerin d the valve setpoints. f 4 This second re uirement to stagger setpoints The reflects go engineering de ign, but not safety requirements. h ob.tective to stagger valve setpoints constrains the less k restrictive Safety Analysis requirement L uauci as a c O arabil pit .lowantt. VALUE basis as defined by the Safety A 1053 osig 11pmaea hv; he lower Allowante value et existing analyseMadiological release assum 4 - bound the source terms which are based on a lo setpoint of 1085 psig with 15% MSSV blowdown and no consideration made for setpoint tolerance. l . E i (continued) AMENDMENT NO.- B 3.7-1 2 SANONOFRE--UNITj n'
p . k5 . V MSSVs I B 3.7.1 l 6 I N BASES 54 The ressure where deformation may occur. I APPLICABLE destbiityofthiseventisintherangeof4E-6/ prob year, I SAFETY ANALYSES j (continued) The MSSVs satisfy criterion 3 of the NRC Policy, Statement.
, l LC0 [ This LCO requires all MSSVs toless bethanOPERA Y~ the DBA analysis. This is because operation witt allowable the full number of MSSVs requires limitations on g)(difN h d tt O THERMAL POWER (to meet Reference 2 requirements),tr limitations are according m These4 to thos ~ rne sv6a -1,uAn MSSV is consid M r g,gga/,', ,,a _ _ : . -- -.u, ttu 4. i .n Sys k 4*,P h d8 Tnoperable if it fails to open n_n demand.
~~QM g h[/ ' openAntoin Ine Allowable rel{ eveRKnneThe Steam Generator OPERA r~~
~~%, red MAN 4.l> ovgfpressure, and reseat when pressure has been reduced.~~
Tre OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is determined by periodic druf s)rveillance testing in accordance with the inservice Ll A g [kau%dalIdNW /estin , f to r n,. Tinge 3.7.I-2. Ther.E; b-aLa ,-is'pg ue, 6 specified in @ correspond to
~~- i h we,ude;was wlO ient conditions of the valve at nominal operating g gg;gg g,7,g g gg'ag a mperature and pressure.~~
This LCO provides assurance that the MSSVs will perform their designed safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in a challenge to the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary.
+'I VL In MODE 1, the accident analysis requires a minimam of Mst-APPLICABILITY MSSVs per Steam Generator which is limiting and bounds all In MODES 2 and 3, both the ASME Code and the lower MODES. ;
accident analysis require only one MSSV per Steam Generator , to provide overpressure protection. q In MODES 4 and 5, there are no credible transients requiring the MSSVs. The Steam Generators are not normally used for heat removal i in MODES 5 and 6, and thus cannot be overpressurized; there ,
~~~i .~~
~~(continued)~~
~~!c ) AMENDMENT NO.-~~
~~B 3.7-3 [ SANONOFRE--UNIT 3~~
~~. i =..~~
~~}? MSSVs 1-~~
~~," B 3.7.1 i~~
~~g . BASES 2 P is no requirement for the MSSVs to be OPERABLE in these /E APPLICABILITY MODES.~~
~~; (continued) i.~~
Y The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indicating that l ACTIONS separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSSV. e" 1 U With one or more MSSVs inoperable reduce power so that the available MSSV relieving capacity meets ReferenceOperation 2 requirements for the applicable THERMAL POWER. with less than all nine MSSVs OPERABLE for each Steam Generator is permissible, if THERMAL POWER is proportionally This limited to the relief capacity of the remaining MSSVs. is accomplished by restricting THERMAL POWER so that the energy transfer to the most limiting Steam Generator is not greater than the available relief capacity in that Steam Generator. Allowable Steady State Power Levels with inoperable MSSVs are based on analysis of primary and secondary system l
- pressures following loss of Condenser Vacuum conservatively biased for power measurement errorse % Mperation at or Deiu Um oTTowableaeiower will ensure the exceeded. l design overpressure limits will not E l I
~~d With one or more MSSVs inoperable, the ceiling~~
~~-i sowao e s o utif STAT E POWER lag. Tfic reduced reactor l~~
~~trip allowable values are derived on the following bases:~~
~~'{ SP = ([X - Y*V)/X)~~
~~111.0, i~~
where l ; SP - reduced reactor trip allowable value in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER, l V - maximum number of inoperable safety valves per
' l .> steam line, ,
1
~~4 .~~
~~'i (continued)~~
,+( AMENDMENT NO. k 8 3.7-4 i' SANONOFRS-UNIT 3
?
~~n =.,.-.: =. . ;~~
~~. MSSVs j B 3.7.1 ; .)'~~
~~2 f' - BASES 2a SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.1.1 J~~
~~& l O~~
~~REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies the OPERABILITY of the MSSVs by the ; verification of each MSSV lift setpoints in accordance The ASME Code, Sectionwith XI' ' .,~~
~~.J the inservice testing program.~~
~~y (Ref. 4), requires that safety and relief valve tests be 7-~~
~
~~performed in accordance with ANSI /ASME O ,~~
~~" for MSSVs:~~
a. Visual examination;

b. Seat tightness determination;

c. Setpoint pressure determination (lift setting); and

d. Compliance with owner's seat tightness criteria.
This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into'and This is to operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR.The MSSVs may allow testing of the MSSVs at hot conditions. be either bench tested or tested in situ at Ifhot theconditions using an assist device to simulate lift pressure.MSSV , , pressure shall be corrected to ambient conditions of the l valve at operating temperature and pressure.
~~1. UFSAR, Section 5.2. t REFERENCES l 2 .-~~
~~ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, l Article NC-7000, Class 2 Components. l~~
3. UFSAR, Section 15.2.

4. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI,
=
~~Article IWV-3500. r4~~
~~5. ANSI /ASME OH-1-1987. .~~
~~a 4, ND -~~
~~\. (continued).~~
~~AMENDMENT NO. ,, B 3.7'-6 1 SANONOFRE--UNITJ i l~~
~~,, J L - L _ _.~~
~~,l? wn au .~ - .~~
~~a, :2.=w 2 =.w.:. - _. _ _ h y ; MSIVs~~
~~# B 3.7.2 '_~~
y
+
F BASES 3, f4 ACTIONS (continued) D.1 and 0.2 If-the MSIVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, or, ,. 4 closed, within the associated Completion Time, the unit must ; be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To
~~" . achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating~~
~~i experience, to reach the required unit conditions from MODE 2 conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.~~
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the closure time of each MSIV is s 8.0 seconds /on an actiia14mulated ac_tuation signAT. The MSIV closure time is assumed in the accident and containment analyses. The MSIVs should not be tested at power since even a part stroke exercise increases the risk of a valve closure with the unit generating power. As the MSIVs are not tested at power, they are exempt from the ASME .*' Code, Section XI (Ref. 5), requirements during operation in MODES 1 and 2. REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 10.3.
2. UFSAR, Section 6.2.

3. UFSAR, Section 15.1.5.

4. 10CFR 100.11.

5. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, Inservice Inspection, Article IWV-3400.
~~j t L k t-k- lb i l~~
~~% 8 3.7-12 AMENDMENT NO. ,. SANON0FRE--UNIT 3 i~~
~~J - ________2~~
~~= = = = =~~
{ shDL L. vt: m L: - ma- .a=.= =a.=- - 1 p* MFIVs B 3.7.3 N-f ' ki BASES g e B.1 and B.2 p; ACTIONS n (continued) If the MFIVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, closed, y or isolated in the associated Completion Time, the uni't must 1 be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To
~~s. achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least l MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4 within 12 hours. The l~~
'- allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating L experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full ' power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures the verification f 3 each MFIV is c[o.Ga9/ 510 seconds (un an RTual or simuiatFd actuai.ioTsignap. The MFIV closure tTEis assumed in the acciaent and containment analyses. This Surveillance is normally performed upon returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage. The MFIVs should not be tested at power since even a part stroke exercise increases the risk of a , , '~ valve closure with the unit generating power. As these valves are not tested at power, they are exempt from the ASME Code, Section XI (Ref. 2) requirements during operation in MODES 1 and 2. The Frequency is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 10.4.7. F 2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI,
~~' Inservice Inspection, Article IWV-3400.~~
~~T-4 7~~
~~$y:~~
i
~~'l 1~~
~~g., M L In g g B 3.7-16 AMENDMENT N0. l SANONOFRE--UNIT 3 l~~
~~.. w ADVs ~~~
~~B 3.7.4~~
~~. BASES (continued)~~
ACTIONS M Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note indicating that LC0 3.0.4 does not apply. , , With one required ADV inoperable, action must be taken to restore the OPERABLE status within 72 hours. i M i With two ADVs inoperable, action must be taken to restore ; one of the ADVs to OPERABLE status. As the block valve can l be closed to isolate an ADV, some repairs may be possible with the unit at power. The 24 hour Completion Time is 1 reasonable to repair inoperable ADVs, based on the availability of the Steam Bypass System and MSSVs, and the low probability of an event occurring during this period that requires the ADVs. I C.1 g_,4g,,,, Q ,, ,, ,,, ,,,,y If backup nitrogen gas supply system capacity for M ADV is less than or equal to 8 hours, action should be taken to ; restore nitrogen gas supply system capacity in 72 hours. The backup nitrogen capacity is controlled to a minimum accumulator pressure of 1050 psig. This pressure represents ! enough backup nitrogen gas system capacity for each ADV to ) have up to 8 hours of pneumatic operation. This time period is consistent and conservative relative to the SONGS Units 2 and 3 emergency operating instructions. The completion time of 72 hours is based on operating experience and on the fact that normal operating instrument air supply system is still available. (continued) B 3.7-20 AMENDMENT NO. SANONOFRE--UNIT $
b
~~3. 7.T BASES APPLICABILITY In MODE 4, the AFW System may be used for heat removal via.~~
.s
~~-) (continued) the steam generator.~~
' In MODES 5 and 6, the steam generators are not normally used for decay heat removal, and the AFW System is not required. ACTIONS M If one of the two steam supplies to the turbine driven AFW pumps is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable based on the following reasons:
a. The redundant OPERABLE steam supply to the turbine driven AFW pump;

b. The availability of redundant OPERABLE motor driven i AFW pumps; and . .

c. The low probability of an event requiring the .
inoperable steam supply to the turbine driven AFW pump. 4/.6MI N M/ 7 ' With one of the required AFW trains (pump or flow path) l inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status Y within 72 hours. This Condition includes the loss of two steam supply lines to the turbine driven AFW pump. The i 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on the W redundant capabilities afforded by the AFW System, the time g needed for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA event I g occurring during this period. Two AFW pumps and flow paths N remain to supply feedwater to the steam generators, y lasear A",
~~= .~~
1 (continued) B 3.7-27 AMENDMENT NO. SANONOFRE--UNIT 3 , o T 1--
V b2AtttM/ S TA/ SERT "A" The second Completion Time for Required Action A.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be inoperable during any - continuous failure to meet this LCO. The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time ! allowed in this specified Condition after discovery of . failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered ( reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The AND connector between 7 days and 10 days dictates that both Completion Times ap)1y simultaneously, and the more restrictive must se met. ! l i
~~?Nseer *.8 " -~~
7)hg second Com)letion Time for Required Action B.1 establishes a limit on tae maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be inoperable during any continuous failure to meet this LCO. The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The AND connector between 72 hours and 10 days dictates that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met. % ow'a- WH 5
jm I CCW Safety Related Makeup Systea
~~' B 3.7.7.1 n~~
~~[ g 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 8 3.7.7.1 ComponentCoolingWater(CCW)SafetyRelatedMakeupSystem~~
.e .i BACKGROUND TheSONGSComponentCoolingWater(CCW System consists of two independent critical loops (trains and one non-critical All three loops are interconnected, such that loop the non-cr (NCL)itical loop can >e aligned to either one of the critical loops. Each CCW train is provided with a dedicated pump and a surge tank. A third, swing pump is also provided and can be aligned to either CCW train. Normal makeup to .the CCW trains is provided from the ton-safety related, ' Seismic Category II Nuclear Service dater (NSW) System via the CCW surge tanks.
The makeup system is designed to supply water to the CCW trains following loss of normal CCW. makeup from the nuclear service water system. It is train; oriented and provides ~ sufficient water inventory to accommodate a maximum allowable leakage from both CCW trains for a period of seven days. The CCW makeup system is an integral part of the CCW system. The CCW makeup system for each Unit consists of a common makeup) Unit 2 water storage tank (T-055 for Unit 3 and T-056 for associated CCW train. Each transfer train includes a 100% capacity makeup pump, pump discharge solenoid valve, check valve, isolation valves and interconnecting suction and discharge pi ng. A test loop is provided for each makeup train to ena e In-service Testing (IST) of each pump. All components and piping of the CCW makeup system are either desi ned or upgraded to Quality Class II, Seismic Category I. r supp y to each transfer train component is - provided from independent Class 1E sources. C Nakeup to the CCW trains is initiated / terminated manually on
~~'. loss of normal CCW makeup capability, af, required. The ~~~
pumps are started / stopped from the Control Room or from the associated Motor Control Center (MCC), based on the CCW surge tank level indication remoteorlocal). Manual operation of the CCW makeup s acceptable because: f (continued)) v B 3.7-42 AMENDNENT NO. SANONOFRE--UNITJ
& tis y A n C L & S a $.$ k 'b r N W h ~ % 9 6 A Y E. _ . _ _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . - _ * ' " " " we--ar- - , , - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
~
~~CCW Safety Related Makeup Systea 6 3.7.7.1 BASES BACKGROUND~~
- sufficient time is available after the limiting event (continued) ,- for the operator to initiated manual action - emergency makeup is a continuously supervised .
operation and continuous safety related CCW surge tank level indication is being provided. CCW makeup utilizes the PPMUs located in the Radwaste Building at E1. 9' as a source of makeup water. The PPMUs l are provided with a floatinti diaphragm to maintain air tight integrity. This diaphragm < s made of elastomer with a specific gravity less than 1.0.
~~.The nominal capacity of each PPMU is 300,000 gallons.~~
203,800 gallons in tank T-056 and 203,719 gal,ons in tank T-055 are dedicated to the CCW safety related makeup. This amount includes the total tank level instrumentation loop uncertainty (TLU) and the unrecover.able volume. For both f
~~- tas.ks, this volume corresponds to the water level at plant .~~
elevation 30'-9%" (or 65.6% tank level as indicated in the - ControlRoom). The dedicated volume allows makeup for CCW system leakage (from both CCW trains) of up to 18 gpa for a period of seven days. The minimum water level required in the PPMU for the. CCW makeup system to be considered operable is a function of the CCW system total leak rate. The volume atave that controlled by the TS is available for the Primary P1AntMakeup(PPMU)Systemuse. A common suction header connects the CCW makeup pumps to the PPMU at elevation 11'-0". The suction nozzle has a pointing downward elbow attached inside the tank. This is done to
- increase the tank usable volume and to provide an adequate margin to prevent vortex formation. After transferrinti the TS volume from the tank, the level of water remaining tank is 10' above the pump suction nozzle inlet. n thef In order to enable in-service testing of the CCW ' makeup c pumps, a test loop capable of passing a flow approximately 7,. equal to the nominal makeup flow is provided.
The high and low level alarus annunciate in the Radwaste Contro, Room on Panel 2/3L-5 at 95% (LSH-7133) and 75% tani level (LSL-7133), respectively. The high level alam also l annunedates in the main Control Room. (continugd) o B 3.7-43 AMENDMENT NO. SANONOFRE--UNIT 3
~~'Th's pnf Wh' A SAA A<4d' ( IA%eA7"8~~
O O __ __ CCW Safety Related Make p i 3 ,
~~1. BASES 7'~~
~~' ' Safety related instruments are required to monitor the CCW~~
~ surge tank level. To satisfy the provisions of 10CFR50, , BACGROUND (continued) Appendix A GDC-1g, the capability to safely shutdown the ~ plant from outside the Control Room is required. To operate the CCW askeup system from outside the control room, the I :
capability to. start /stop the makeup pumps and to monitor the f CCW surge tank level is required. QC II, SC I gages are used to monitor the tank level to support safe shutdown from , outside the Control Room. i All components of the CCW safety related makeup system are located within the Radwaste Building and penetration Area
~~..(Seismic Catcgory I structures), which are capable of The withstanding the impact of tornado generated missiles.~~
only the PPMU potential p(ath rooms 127A andfor intrusion 1278) of tornado are external access doorsmissiles into 7 AR307 and AR311 in the Radwaste Building east wall. These metal doors are normally closed and two are walls p(rotected and a by L-shaped, roof). 12" thick concrete enclosuresThese enclosures are op to the North in Unit 3. APPLICA8LE The CCW askeup system for each Unit consists of a coanon SAFETY ANALYSES passive component (storage tank) and The twoCCWredundant transfer makeup system trains employing active components. is designed such that passive component failures do not have to be postulated. Each makeup transfer train is powered from a separate Class 1E Bus, the same as the CCW train it supports. This design assures that only one CCW train can be affected by a single component failure within the CCW askeup system. It is conservatively assumed that such failure would result in loss of the affected CCW askeup train and eventually in loss of the associated CCW train. The remaining CCW train (critical loop) is available for accident mitipation, as required. From the safety analysis pers mtive, ,oss of one CCW train is acceptable as shown in the JFSAR Chapter 15 analyses.
~~' However, loss of a CCW train is not a limiting consequence of some single failures within the CCW makeup system. The I~~
~~limiting consequence of inadvertent / spurious actuation of theCCWsakeupsystem(makeuppumpstart)isthepotential for depletion of the PPMU water inventory credited for long~~
~~- J e 8 3.7-44 AMDWMENT NO.~~
SANONDFRE--UNITj 1hk page. una fe, suis (n(udd Af IratT"C*
~~- - - - _ _ - ~ -_,._m._~~
(,
~~--- - _ _ _ _ _ _ -~ - . , _ _~~
~~N CCWSafetyRelatedMakeupSystes] B 3.7.7.1~~
}
SASES hA APPLICABLE ters accident mitigation, cosmon for both CCW traint. Such L SAFETY ANALYSIS . depletion of the inventory would take place should relief (continued)
~~' valves on the CCW surge tank lift as a result of tank '~~
overfilling and water being discharged from the CCW system into the plant vent stack. Makeup water inventory depletion would impact the CCW makeup system capability to perform its , safety function. Operator action is required outside the control room to mitigate the single active failure of a CCW pump motor - control relay stuck in the "o rate" position, because this failure prevents both pump tr and discharge valve closure using the control switches. e specific m<tigating action is to open the respective pump breaker at the MCC in the El. 50' switchgear room. The assun d above operator action time of 30 minutes is sufficient to mitigate this failure. The cosmon tank and suction nozzle configuration of the CCW askeup system is subject to the sin'gle passive failure , criteria of ANSI Standard N658-1976, because the system is - required to operate for more than 24 hours post-accident. Concurrent passive failures which must be considered under f this standard are flow path blockage and pressure boundary failures, d- Flow path blockage due to entrainment of foreign material is not credible because the system is operated using only j filtered and domineralized water. Furthemore, blockages due to component internal failures are not credible because: a) there are no valves in the conson flow path, and b) tank diaphragm is made of material with the specific gravity less than 1.0 (closed cell elastomer which would float even if the diaphragm were to disintegrate), and the system suction line is provided with a pointing downward elbow inside the tank (whichensuressufficientsubmergenceofthesuction
~~- inlet to prevent entrainment of any f oating debris even at themaximumsuctionvelocity).~~
~~b Passive failure of the pressure bounda may be limited to failed valve packing and pump mechanica seals for systems 1~~
designed and maintained to ASME Section III and Section XI criteria. All such failures in the pro can be isolated because the suction tionisoNsed valve for eac makeup sy train has a back seat to prevent leakage due to failure of its packing. This valve can be used to isolate all other (continued)
~~/ ~~~
~~[ B 3.7-45 ANENOMENT NO. SANONOFRE--UNITJ~~
~
~~Thk pyre. &L4sats&4a'GImg"9"~~
~~~~ ~- - - -- -. _-~~
If 't CCW Safety Related Makeup Systea 1 8 3.7.7.1 5. BASES ] h APPLICABLE pa'cking or seal failures in this train. Therefore, the limiting passive failure is a pump shaft seal failure. t SAFETY ANALYSIS (continued) The design function of the makeup system is to maintain the
' water inventory in the CCW trains during a 7-day post-accident period. For this purpose, sufficient water inventory is contained in the storage tank (PPMU) cosmon for both CCW trains. From the PPMU water is transferred to the CCW return heads by two safety related pumps. -
~~LCO ..The wate'r source for the Component Cooling Water Safety Related Makeup System is the PPMU Tank. The total capacity~~
' of each PPMU Tank is approximately 303,500 gallons. The curve for PPMU Tank volume represents a seven day supply of makeup water at a specific allowable leakage rate from the CCW system. The requirement for'se.ven days is consistent I with Standard Review Plan, Section'g.2.2.III.c.
Specification 3.0.4 requires that entry not be made into an f OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified condition unless the conditions of the Limiting Condition for Operation are met without reliance on provisions contained in the Action requirements. The exemption from this requirement gives Operations more flexibility to change MODES while still i l performing required Actions. Exemption from Specification 3.0.4 will not restrain Operations from changing N00ES. The ! CCW Safety Related Makeup System is only required to support l the CCW system in the event of a Design Basis Earthquake. It should be noted that the CCW system itself does not have a 3.0.4 exemption. Therefore, the CCW system is always OPERABLE during up MODE changes. The PRA has demonstrated that the allowed outage times specified would result in an acceptably small risk of core damage. Therefore, a 3.0.4 exemption for the CCW Safety Related Makeup System is considered acceptable. fi' t f - 1 \ (continue [ 3 G b % 8 3.7-46 AMEN 0 MENT NO. p SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3
~~% E@y MN $ ditt$$NhhW ?g$tg7 "[~~
l
7 I, CCW Safety Related Makeup Syst 7 B 3.7.7.1 8ASES'(continued) r APPLICA8ILITY The Component Cooling Water Safety Related Makeup System is
., . a support system to the CCW System. This means whenever the ' CCW System is required to be OPERABLE its support system should be OPERABLE also. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. Technical Specification 3/4.7.7, " Component Cooling Water" requires 1 'At leastbe shall twoOPERAS,LE.pndent inde component cooling wa l PPMU Tank and both trains of the askeup flow of the l Component Cooling Water Safety Related Makeup System shall .
be OPERABLE. t ACTIONS 'Ad With one CCW Safety Related Makeup System's flow path - inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. , The allowable completion of 7 days is considered reasonable' based on the low probability of a DBE occurring during the 7 days and the redundant capability of the OPERA 8LE CCW Safety y/ Related Makeup flow path. A Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) was perfomed to assess the increased risk of core j damage from a 7 day allowed outage time for one train of the CCW Safety Related Makeup System.~ The PRA indicated that the increased risk of core dasjge from a 7 day allowed outage time is less than 1x10 per year. This increase in j core damage risk is considered acceptably small. 8.1 and B.2 - l This operating condition is more restrictive than the Action A condition. If the level in the PPMU Tank drops below that required to support two CCW critical loops the. condition is similar to loss operation of both CCW forSafety sevenRelate days,d Makeup System flow paths. N. Actions should be taken to restore the PPMU Tank level f
~~/ within 8 hours. If both CCW Safety related Makeup flow paths are inoperable, one CCW Safety Related Makeup flow pathshouldberestoredto0PERABLEstatuswithin8 hours./~~
~~g The allowed completion time of 8 hours is based on operati experienceandaProbabilisticRiskAssessment(PRA).~~
~
(continue w _- C' AMENDMENT NO. B 3.7-47 SANONOFRE--UNITJ "f%is pn u Y.4 de Sedtbide U h Iss d "
j s - CCWifetyRelatedMakeupSys B 3.7.7.1 3
~~. BASES~~
~~[' ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued) f - Operating experience shows that the likelihood of Primary , i Plant Makeup Storage Tank level dropping below 66% (which~~
.' corresponds to an allowable CCW 1eakage of 18 gpm based on j is extremely low.' Also, a Probabilistic Figure 3.7.7.1-1)(PRA) was perfomed to assess the increased - Risk Assessment risk of core damage from an 8 hour allowed outage time for i
two trains of the CCW Safety Related Makeup System. The PRA indicated that the increased risk of core damage4 from an 8 hour allowed outage time is less than 1x10 per year. This increase in core damage risk is considered acceptably small. C.1 and C.2 In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, two CCW System critical loops provide cooling to a number of safety related systems, such as HPSI, LPSI, shutdown cooling, emergency chillers, etc. The CCW Safety Related Makeup System s a support system for the CCW System. Two CCW Safety Related Makeup flow paths are required to provide makeup to the two CCW critical ; loops. If one CCW Safety Related Makeup flow path can not -1 be restored to OPERABLE status in seven days, the Unit must - be placed in a MODE in which the LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION does not apply. To achieve this status, the Unit must be placed in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, and in COLD SHUTDOWN hours. wign Similarly, action should be taken if the PPMU Tank level is f below that required for two CCW critical loops operation and/or both CCW Safety Related Makeup flow paths are inoperable. If both the PPMU Tank level and at least one flow 1ath are not OPERABLE within 8 hours, the Unit must r then He placed in a MODE in which the LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION does not apply. To achieve this status, the Unit must be placed in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, and in COLD SHUTDOWN within 30 hours. The allowed completion time is consistent with other Technical Specification completion time requirements to x
~~' (continu(d) ~ -~~
~~j !.Q, e ~ - 6 8 3.7-48 AMENDMENT NO. SANONOFRE--UNIT 3 71un pge. wW f &SAb4/ f .Zuseer W~~
~~afetyneiatedMakeupSystQ F B 3.7.7.1 f.~~
~~>l E~~
~~BASES k ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) P.~~
~~? reach the required unit conditions from full power - - conditions in an orderly manner.~~
~~r SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1.1~~
~~. This SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT verifies that the PPMU Tank contains the required volume of makeup water. The 7 days frequency is based on similar SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT~~
~~. frequencies. The 7 days frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications in the control room, including alams, to alert the operator to abnomal PPMU Tank level deviations.~~
SR 3.7.7.1.2 ,- This SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT verifies that the CCW makeup pumps develop sufficient dischar e pressure to deliver the required flow to the CCW system rom the Primary Makeup Water Stora e Tank. Performance of inservice testing, ) discussed i the ASME Code, Section XI at three month l O. l intervals, satisfies this requirement. l SR 3.7.7.1.3
/ This SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT measures CCW 1eakage to ensure the PPMU Tank level is adequate in accordance with i Figure 3.7.7.1-1. The specified frequency is considered ade uste in view of the special alignment required to per ora this test. This measurement can be perfomed only l I
~~when one CCW critical loop can be removed from service. Therefore, this measurement needs to be perfomed during~~
~~!" refueling outages.~~
~~C ; REFERENCES Mone.~~
~~-% pp ea se s dcM 4d fy.Taetr W o SANONOFRE--UNITj B 3.7-49 AMENDMENT NO.~~
~~1 l l~~
)
4 , , . _ . _ , _ + . . _ __ -- DELETED INTENTIONALLY l I i l SANON0FRE--UNIT $ B 3.7-42 AMENDMENT N0.
I i Marr e " l 1 l l DELETED INTENTIONALLY SANON0fRE--UNITJ B 3.7-43 AMENDMENT NO.
J - , , _ n-4 ,_ T*see r "c " DELETED INTENTIONALLY l l l l l i i l O SANONOFRE--UNITj B 3.7-44 AMENDMENT NO.
~~-TAdelT "29 e i~~
e DELETED INTENTIONALLY i T e w h e SANONOFRE--UNIT 3 8 3.7-45 AMENDMENT NO.
I
~~'[ S e e r "E "~~
~~i I DELETED INTENTIONALLY l 1 i l i i SANON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.7-46 AMENDMENT NO. l i~~
}
~~$N. SERT Y' DELETED INTENTIONALLY SANON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.7-47 AMENDMENT NO.~~
~~YNSetY "Q~~
~~DELETED INTENTIONALLY 9~~
9 e SANONOFRE--UNIT} B 3.7-48 AMENDMENT NO.
l N$f f DELETED INTENTIONALLY l SANON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.7-49 AMENDMENT NO.
w - t CREACUS
~~B 3.7.11 P :~~
~~p $$ BASES ' If~~
~~' SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.11.1 (continued) k, REQUIREMENTS :~~
I Systems not requiring humidity contro need only be operated for a 15 minutes to em M rate _ thy ~ function of the system. ,_ 9 The 31 day Frequenc on a STAGGERED TEST BASf3)is based on the known reliability o the equipment, and tle two train , I. redundancy available. SR 3.7.11.2 This SR verifies that the required CREACUS testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing ' Program (VFTP). The CREACUS filter tests are based on RegulatoryGuide1.52(Ref.3). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional l information are discussed in detail in the VFTP. SR 3.7.11.3 _ This SR verifies each CREACUS train starts and operates on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The frequency of 24 months is consistent with that specified in Reference 3. SR 3.7.11.4 i This SR verifies the integrity of the control room enclosure and the assumed inleakage rates of potentially contaminated i air. The control room positive pressure, with respect to potentially contaminated atmosphere, is periodically tested ; to verify proper function of the CREACUS. During the emergency radiation state of the emergency mode of > operation, the CREACUS is designed to pressurize the control [ room a 0.125 inches water gauge positive pressure with t-tj respect to the atmosphere in order to prevent unfiltered inleakage. The CREACUS is designed to maintain this L positive pressure with one train. V: u e (continued) f ! f. SANON0FRE--UNIT 3 8 3.7-59 AMENDMENT NO. i-dise - l
P AC Sources-Operating , B 3.8.1 BASES . j ACTIONS M (continued) time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA cccurring during this period. ' M JAlsERT
~~,, u -~~
To ensure a highly reliable power source remains when one of i the required DGs is inoperable, it is necessary to verify the availability of the offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies " perform," j a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result 6 3 in a Required Action being not met. However, if a circuit falls to pass SR 3.8.1.1, it is inoperable. Upon offsite circuit inoperability, additional Conditions and Required Actions must then be entered. M Required Action B.2 is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that a DG is i ( inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are designed with redundant safety related trains. This includes motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. Single train systems, such as turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, are not included. Redundant required feature failures consist of inoperable features associated with a train, redundant to I the train that has an inoperable DG. The Com>1etion Time for Required Action B.2 is intended to allow tte operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for l beginning the allowed outage time " clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:
a. An inoperable DG exists; and

b. A required feature on the other train is inoperable.
(continued) I SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 8 3.8-6 AMENOMENT NO.
0
.n = . RSER==I nApp \ The second Com letion Time for Required Action A.1 establishes a imit on the maximum time allowed for any )I combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet f the LCO. If Condition A is entered while, for instance, a DG is inoperable, and that DG is subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to
( 72 hours. This could lead to a total of 144 hours, since initial failure to meet the LCO, to restore the offsite circuit. At this time, a DG could again become inoperable, I the circuit restored OPERABLE, and an additional 72 hours (for a total of 9 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 6 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "AND" connector between the 72 hour and 6 day Completion Time means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met. J As in Required Action A.2, the Completion Time allows for an f exception to the nonnal " time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock." This will result in i establishing the " time zero" at the time that the LC0 was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition A was entered. Y f L 3 4 O
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES . ACTIONS 8.3.1 and B.3.2 (continued) longe r exists and Required Action B.3.1 is satisfied. If the cause of the initial inoperable DG cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining DG, performance of SR 3.8.1.2 suffices to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of that DG. According to Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 7), 24 hours is reasonable to confirm that the OPERABLE DG is not affected l by the same problem as the inoperable DG. , l Hd According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition B for a period that should not exceed 72 hours. In Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE DG and offsite 1 circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the l l ( , onsite Class 1E Distribution System. The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the i ( remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. [ C.1 and C.2 i ,, 9 Required Action C.1, which applies when two offsite circuits are inoperable, is intended to provide assurance that an event with-a coincident single failure will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions. The Completion Time for this failure of redundant required features is reduced to 12 hours from the 24 hours allowed by Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) f6r two inoperable required i offsite circuits. The 24 hour allowance is based upon the assumption that two complete safety trains are OPERABLE. When a concurrent redundant required feature failure exists, this assumption is not the case and a shorter Completion Time of 12 hours is appropriate. These features are powered from redundant AC safety trains. This includes motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. Single train turbine driven auxiliary pumps, are not included in the list. (continued) { SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 8 3.8-8 AMENDMENT NO.
INSERT "8* N The second Completion Time for Required Action B.4 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. If Condition B is entered while, for instance, an offsite circuit is inoperable and that circuit is subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LC0 may already have been not met for up to 72 hours. This could lead to a total I of 144 hours, since initial failure to meet the LCO, to restore the DG. At this time, an offsite circuit could again become inoperable, the DG restored OPERABLE, and an additional 72 hours (for a total of 9 days) allowed prior to I complete restoration of the LCO. The 6 day Completion Time provides a limit on time allowed in a specified condition ( after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "AND" connector between the 72 hour and 6 day Completion Times means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more. j restrictive Completion Time must be met. l As in Required Action B.2, the Completion Time allows for an i exception to the nomal " time zero" for beginning the ! allowed time " clock." This will result in establishing the
~~" time zero" at the time that the LCO was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition B was entered.~~
g.3
AC Scur:es - 0;erning l B 3.8.1
]
3ASES SURVEli. LANCE SR 3.8.1.3 (centinued) , REQUIREMENTS The normal 31 day Frequency for this Surveillance ! (Table 3.8.1-1)isconsistentwithRegulatoryGuide1.9 (Ref.3). This SR is modified by four Notes, Hote 1 indicates that diesel engine runs for this Surveillance may include gradual loading, as reconnended by the manufacturer, so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are minimized. Note 2 states that momentary transients because ofchangingbusloadsdonotinvalidatethistest. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limit will not invalidate the test. Note 3 indicates that this Surveillance should be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to avoid connon cause failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations. Note 4 stipulates a prerequisite requirement for performance of this SR. A successful DG start must precede this test to credit *
~~.V satisfactory performance.~~
M
~~I C~~
S jf3 SR 38I4 gg g evel of fuel o in g d.g h This SR pr vides verific tion that th I ! gig *2
~~%(,g ga(loHi J~~
~~h the day nk is at or~~
~~^ r:t:xt. ::"y 'd'i atove the level _t 2 kb '..'. a .~~
~~TP e legel is expressed as an~~
~~/ ecuivalent volume in enam,..: wieiectee to ensure ':/ >~~
~~0 or I hour of OG operation at [M ot ( . i (htequate Tuei ois Uull lead clus 10p~~
~~-a minimum The 31 day Frequency is adequate to assure that a sufficient ,~~
supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alares are provided and unit operators would be aware of any large ces of fuel oil during this period. l% g' In W 3.8.1.5 (f SR { Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous microorganisms that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water ) l 3 from the fuel oil day tanks once every 31 days eliminates the necessary environment for microbial survival in the day l (continal) SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 B 3.8-15 AMENDHENT HO 1 i
l Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B.3.8.3 ! BASES
~~6. ASTM Standards: 04057-81; 0975-81 2276-83.~~
~~REFERENCES (continued) de, Section XI.~~
~~7. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel~~
((3d(*
g.*
~~f pu<. - 3 t W-= nue.lusz-no; 3~~
~~< 9.ms -%; 942w -Soj ;~~
P9%-9l , [N 1 a, SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 8 3.8-43 AMENDMENT N0.
I
~
DC Sources -Operating ! B 3.8.4 2 $,$ 4* k 3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR" 3.8.4.5 (continued) REQUIREMENTS is consistent with the existing licensing basis and is I intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. - SR 3.8.4.6 This SR requires that each battery charger be capable of , supplying at least 300 amps and a 125 V for a 12 hours. l These requirements are based on the design capacity of the i
/ chargers (Ref. 4). According to Regulatory Guide 1.32 l (Ref.10), the battery charger supply is required to be i I
based on the largest combined demands of the various steady state loads and the charging capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge state to the fully charged state, irrespective of the status of the unit during these demand occurrences. The minimum required amperes and duration ensure that these requirements can be satisfied. The Surveillance Frequency is acceptable, given the unit conditions required to perform the test and the other administrative controls existing to ensure adequate charger , performance during these 24 month intervals. In addition, . this Frequency is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. This SR is modified by a Note which acknowledges that credit ! may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. i SR 3.8.4.7 A battery service test is a special test of battery capability, as found, to satisfy the design requirements (battery duty cycle) of the DC electrical power system. The discharge rate and test length should correspond to the design duty cycle requirements. The Surveillance Frequency of 24 months is consistent with the recomendations of Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref.10) and . Regulatory Guide 1.129 (Ref. 11), which state that the ! battery service test should be performed during refueling operations, or at some other outage, with intervals between tests not to exceed 24 months. (continued) SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 B 3.8-51 AMENOMENT NO.
Inve rters - Shutdown [, B 3.8.8 BASES (continued) 9, nl p.J LCO The inverters ensure the availability of electrical power fod The instrumentatilon for systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an. ; anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated 08A. The battery powered inverters provide uninterruptible supply of
~~. AC electrical power to the AC vital buses even if the 4.16 kV safety buses are de-energized. OPERABILITY of at i~~
least two of the four inverters and the associated vital buses is required. This ensures the availability of sufficient inverter power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents). APPLICA8Ii.ITY The inverters required to be OPERABLE in M00E3 5 and 6, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that:
a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core;

b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available i for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold ,
shutdown condition or refueling condition. j Inverter requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered ! in LCO 3.8.7. , l l ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 l If two trains of 120 VAC Vital Buses are required by LCO 3.8.10, " Distribution Systems-Shutdown," the remaining , OPERABLE inverters may be capable of supporting sufficient i required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, j fuel movement, and operations with a potential for positive (continued) ( SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 8 3.8-69 AMEN 0 MENT NO. i i
Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9 BASES Aci!0NS - M (continued) train by stabilizing the unit, and on restoring power to the affected train. The 8 hour time limit before requiring a 3 unit shutdown in this condition is acceptable because of:
a. The potential for decreased safety if the unit g operator's attention is diverted from the evaluations 4 and actions necessary to restore power to the affected I I (hh ,, ,,
~~train, to the actions associated with taking the unit to shutdown within this time limit; and~~
~~b. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component in the train with AC power. _ S~~
~~$g%y M ill h 6sv T r a m s F e~~
~~gb . or # u yP0 Alth w e-AC vita bus inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE AC vital buses are capable of supporting the minimum safety~~
~~/ /~~
f otf L A functions necessary to shut down the unit and maintain it in the safe shutdown condition. Overall reliability is i reduced, however, since an additional single failure could [.,l result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required AC vital bus must be f restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours, aOY A,'r l r 5 e A
~~%. )~~
~~C "di ti " ' "P ""* ^C ' b"5 "i th "~~
~~8 ""'~~
potentially both the DC source and the associated AC source 1:a are nonfunctioning. In this situation, the unit is l significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all l I s* y noninterruptible power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for loss of sower to the remaining ( i i I p vital buses, and restoring power to tie affected vital bus. This 2 hour limit is more conservative than Completion Times
~~- allowed for the vast majority of components that are witho.: ; adequate vital AC power.~~
The 2 hour Completion Time takes into account the importan:+ l 3 the AC vital bus to OPERABLE status, to thesafety of restoringty redundant capabil afforded by the other OPERABLE vital buses, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. [W? p
~~% (contin.e. .~~
~~SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 8 3.8-75 AMENOMENT NO. 1 l l~~
~~- - .- . - .- - . =-. .. - -- - - . - . . . . _ . . ~~~
l The second Completion Time for Required Action A.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. If Condition A is entered while, for instance, a DC bus is inoperable and subsequently restored OPERABLE, the LC0 may already have been not met for up to 2 hours. This could lead to a total of 10 hours, since initial failure of the LC0, to restore the AC distribution system. At this time, a DC circuit could again become inoperable, and AC distribution restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely. The Completion Time allows for an exception to the nomal
~~" time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock."~~
This will rasult in establishing the " time zero" at the time the LCO was initially not met, instead of the time Condition A was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LCO indefinitely. - 1 p%2T "p" i The second Completion Time for Required Action 8.1 establishes a limit on the maximum allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be i inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LC0. If Condition B is entered while, l for instance, an AC bus is inoperable and subsequently ) returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for j up to 8 hours. This could lead to a total of 10 hours, since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the vital bus distribution system. At this time, an AC train could again become inoperable, and vital bus. distribution restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely. .u. This Completion Time allows for an exception to the nomal
~~" time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock." -~~
This will result in establishing the " time zero" at the time the LCO was initially not met, instead of the time . Condition 8 was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LCO indefinitely.
b ' I g g MD Distribution Systems-Operating 8 3.8.9 BASES - a/ M r
~~- .f ?~~
~~3 f.V inued)~~
~~~{? tta dr TrGin S h OC bus 4e=vmaWeise inoperable, the re aining DC i[~~
~~electri a power distribution subsystems are c able of j supporting the minimum safety functions neces ary to shutT ,~~
. l f down the reactor and maintain it i- safe s tdown g pg ,, I condition, assuming no single fail 4. The verall i I
yfg reliability is reduced, however, because a ingle f ilure in the remaining DC electrical power distribu ton subs stem I Q could result in the minimum required ESF < nctions et being k supported. Therefore,therequire(DCbu) mgbe stored to OPERABLE tus within 2 our - g , Conditlon represents :_ tn. mit out ade C power; Pf'y potentially both with the battery significantly degraded and j the associated charger nonfunctioning. In this situation, the unit is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all DC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the w w operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, { {[p minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining trains and restoring power to the affected train.
~~) This 2 hour limit is more conservative than Completion Times j~~
allowed for the vast majority of ponents whic]Lwould be I e de without power. gg A gy g The 2 hour Completion Time for DC buses s consistent with egulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 3). - P
])
nd Fl2_ p p If the rable di' itribution subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status w thin the required Completion Time, the Q p unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCD does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to T' . at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, [ l
. based on operating experience, to reach the recuired unit H f ,, conditions from full power conditions in an orcerly manner & and without challenging unit systems.
~~(continued) SAN ONOFRE -UNIT 3 8 3.8-76 AMENDMENT N0.~~
~~- It%RT T" }~~
l l The second Completion Time for Required Action C.1 establishes'a limit on the maximum time allowed for any l combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of l falling to meet the LCO. If Condition C is entered while, for instance, an AC bus is inoperable and subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 8 hours. This could lead to a total of 10 hours, since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the DC distribution system. At this time, an AC train could again become inoperable, and DC distribution restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely. This Completion Time allows for an exception to the nomal
~~" time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock."~~
This will result in establishing the " time zero" at the time the LCO was initially not met, instead of the time Condition C was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an l acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the , l
)
~~LCO indefinitely. i l I frfP 3 I o~~
~
Boron Concentration B 3.9.1 BASES LCO COLR ensures a core k,,, of 5 0.95 is maintained during (continued) fuel handling operations. Violation of the LCO could lead to an inadvertent criticality during MODE 6. APPLICABILITY This LCO'is applicable in MODE 6 to ensure that the fuel in the reactor vessel will remain suberitical. The required boron concentration ensures a k ' 5 0.95. Above MODE 6, LC0 3.1.1, " SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDN)-T > 200*F," and LC0 3.1.2, " SHUTDOWN MARGIN-T y 52Iid*F,"ensurethatan adequate amount of negative re, activity is available to shut I down the reactor and to maintain it suberitical. ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 Continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity additions (including actions to reduce boron concentration) is contingent upon maintaining the unit in compliance with
~~@f the LCO. If the boron cor. centration of any coolant volume in the RCS, or the refueling canal is less than its limit.~~
3{ all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive retctivity additions must be suspended immediately. p / [sk Temperature g fluctuations suspending positive need not be considered wheng reactivity additions. N f Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity
~~$y additions shall not preclude moving a component to a safe position.~~
A.3 NN In addition to immediately suspending CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity additions, boration to restore the concentration must be initiated immediately. In determining the required combination of boration flow rate and concentration, there is no unique design basis event that must be satisfied. The only requirement is to restore the boron concentration to its required value as (continued) SANON0FRE--UNITj B 3.9-3 AMENDMENT NO.
74L4e 4 T M # L Temperature fluctuations associated with maintaining the plant status are permissible provided they remain within limits established for the plant conditions. I Qu 0N9%kt NMY b l l
Ja,nChaawam~Lw.u w . ....; .a.w..- Mpy Nuclear Instrumentation
% B 3.9.2 a ' ._ BASES (continued) -
7 In H0DE 6, the SRMs must be OPERABLE to determine changes in .UI APPLICABILITY core reactivity. There is no other direct means available to check core reactivity levels. g$ , k In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the installed source range detectors
~~3. and circuitry are required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.3.13,~~
~~" Source Range Monitors."~~
g Fi A.1 and A.2 f ACTIONS Since With only one SRM OPERABLE, redundancy has been lost. these instruments are the only direct means of monitoring core reactivity conditions, CORE ALTERATIONS and positive y- reactivity additions must be suspended immediately. Performance of Required Action A.1 shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. ature fluctuations need not be considered whenj g ( suspending positive reactivity additions. _ B.1 With no SRM OPERABLE, actions to restore a monitor to OPERABLE status shall be initiated immediately. Once p initiated, actions shall be continued until an SRM is restored to OPERABLE status. TuSeer "& _- u With no SRH OPERABLE, there is no direct means of detecting changes in core reactivity. However, since CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity additions are not to be made, the core reactivity condition is stabilized until the SRMs are OPERABLE. This stabilized condition is determined by performing SR 3'.9.1.1 to verify that the required boron concentration exists.
~~-- - n ...~~
~~7 (c~ontinued) d B 3.9-6 , AMENDMENT NO. a ,z. SANONOFRE--UNITj~~
~
~~M - y _l_W.5 e R T "d, #~~
~~.je _~~
~~g a b R 9. E p I Temperature fluctuations associated with maintaining the plant status are permissible provided they remain f([ within limits established for the plant conditions.~~
+
~~hi-b: A y h i;~~
~~$l h~~
n f? gy hyp%- min r y J
Containment Penetrations
~~. B 3.9.3 ,'~') .~~
BASES [ M LCO exhaust penetrations d the containment personnel airlock. (continued) For the containment pe sonnel airlock, this LC0 ensures that the airlock can be clo ed after containment evacuation in the event of a fuel har dling accident. The requirement that the plant be in MODE 64with 23 feet of water above the fuel ensures that there is sufficient time to close the personnel hM edu airlock following a loss of shutdown cooling before boiling v w o u .* The OPERABILITY requirements ensure that the airlock door is capable of performing its function, and that a desirinated individual located outside of the affected area is ava lable to close the door. For the OPERABLE~ containment purge and exhaust penetrations, this LCO ensures , that these penetrations are isolable by the Containment Purge Isolation System. The OPERABILITY requirements for this LCO ensure that the automatic purge and exhaust valve closure times specified in the UFSAR can be achieved and , therefore meet the assumptions used in the safety analysis to ensure releases through the valves are terminated, such that the radiological doses are within the acceptance limit.
- APPLICABILITY The containment penetration requirements are applicable during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment because this is when there is a potential for a fuel handling accident. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, containment penetration requirements are addressed by LCO 3.6.1 , " Containment." In MODES 5 and 6, when CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment are not being conducted, the potential for a fuel handling accident does not exist. Therefore, under these condit'ons no requirements are placed on containment penetration status.
ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With the containment equi > ment hatch, air locks, or any containment penetration t1at provides direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere not in the required status, including the Containment Purge Isolation System not capable of automatic actuation when the purge and exhaust valves are o>en, the unit must be placed in a condition in which tie isolation function is not needed. (continued) s _- SANONOFRE--UNITj B 3.9-13 AMEN 0 MENT NO.
~~$ap/>lamsnd k INSERT "A" l This LCO is modified by Note which allows to keep both doors of the 1 containment personnel airlock open provided:~~
a. one personnel airlock door is OPERABLE

b. the plant is in MODE 6 or defueled configuration, and

c. with 23 feet of water above the fuel.
O A 0AJO YM fHkh b
SDC and Csolant Circulation-High Water Level B 3.9.4 BASES LCO The flow path starts in one of the RCS hot legs and is (continued) returned to the RCS cold legs. k/ The LCO is modifie Nottf,tt ows the required
-Ng c- 3 operating SDC loop to e removec rom service for up to 1 hour in each 8 hour period, provided no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration.
This permits operations such as core mapping cr alterations in the vicinity of the reactor vessel hot leg nozzles, and RCS to SDC isolation valve testing. During this I hour k period, decay heat is removed by natural convection to the large mass of water in the refueling canal. h mis ow is modified Dv tus Note ows b e b 4 3y% ope,v,
~~rations to use a containment spray pump in place of a low pressure safety injection pump to provide shutdown cooling flow.~~
~~APPLICABILITY One SDC loop must be in operation in MODE 6, with the water level a 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, to~~
~~)rovide decay heat removal. The 23 ft level was selected )ecause it corresponds to the 23 ft requirement established for fuel movement in LCO 3.9.6, " Refueling Water Level."~~
Requirements for the SDC System in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS). SDC loop requirements in MODE 6, with the water level < 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, are located in LCO 3.9.5, " Shutdown Cooling (SDC) and Coolant Circulation-Low Water Level." ACTIONS SDC loop recuirements are met by having one SDC loo) OPERABLE anc in operation, except as permitted in tie Note to the LCO. Ad If SDC loop requirements are not met, there will be no forced circulation to provide mixing to establish uniform boron concentrations. Reduced boron concentrations can (continued) SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 B 3.9-18 AMENDMENT NO.}}

ML20079B120

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