ML20117J839
| ML20117J839 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 05/30/1996 |
| From: | SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20117J835 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9606030181 | |
| Download: ML20117J839 (63) | |
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Containment 3.6.1
- l. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.6.1.1 Perform required visual examinations and i -----NOTE-----
leakage rate testing except for containment SR 3.0.2 is not air lock testing, .in accordance with applicable l
10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by --------------
approved exemptions.
In accordance The maximum allowable leakage rate, L,, is with 10 CFR 50, I
0.10% of containment air weight per day at Appendix J, as the calculated peak containment pressure, modified by P,. approved exemptions SR 3.6.1.2 Verify containment structural integrity In accordance l in accordance with the Containment Tendon with the Surveillance Program. Containment .
Tendon Surveillance Program i
e !
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l SAN 0NOFRE--UNIT 2 3.6-2 Amendment No. 127 t- -, . _ . -
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l Containment Air Locks l
3.6.2 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION l REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and 0.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met.
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AND l
l D.2 , Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> I 5 i
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.1 -- ----------------- NOTE S = - - - -------
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- 1. An inoperable air lock door does not l
invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.
- 2. Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1 in l accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions. ,
Perform required air lock leakage rate -----NOTE------
testing in accordance with 10 CFR 50, SR 3.0.2 is not Appendix J, as modified by approved applicable '
exemptions. ---------------
The acceptance criteria for air lock In accordance testing are: with 10 CFR 50, a.
Appendix J, as Overall air lock leakage rate is modified by s 0.05 L, when tested at 2 P,. approved exemptions
- b. For each door, leakage rate is s .01 L, when tested at 2 9.0 psig.
(continued) l SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.6-6 Amendment No. 127 i
Containment Isolation Valves
. 3.6.3 -
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.4 ------------------NOTES--------------------
- 1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.
- 2. SR 3.0.4 is not applicable.
Verify each containment isolation manual valve Prior to and blind flange that is located inside entering MODE 4 containment and required to be closed during from MODE 5-if accident conditions is closed, except for not performed containment isolation valves that are open within the under administrative controls. previous '
92 days 1
SR 3.6.3.5 Verify the isolation time of each Section A In accordance and B power operated and each automatic with the containment isolation valve is within limits. Inservice Testing Program SR 3 . 6 . 3 . 6 ------------------NOT ES----- - - --- =--- ---
Results shall be evaluated against acceptance '
criteria of SR 3.6.1.1 in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions.
Perform leakage rate testing for containment 184 days purge valves with resilient seals.
AND Within 92 days l after opening l the valve {
(continued)
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.6-14 Amendment No. 127
SR Applicability B 3.0 l l
l BASES i
SR 3.0.2 not be suitable for conducting the Surveillance (e.g.,
(continued) transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities). 1 The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at l
its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition l
that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance i being performed is the verification of conformance with the l SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in l
the individual Specifications. An example of where SR 3.0.2 does not apply is a Surveillance with a Frequency of "in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions." The requirements of regulations take precedence over the TS.
The TS cannot in and of themselves extend a test interval specified in the regulations.
Therefore, there is a Note in the Frequency stating, "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable."
As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per..." basis. The 25%
extension applies to each performance after the initial I
performance. The initial performance of the Required Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some 1
other remedial action, is considered a single action with a single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 25%
extension to this Completion Time is that such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.
The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly merely as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified.
SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inoperable or an affected variable
- outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not (continued)
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.0-12 Amendment No. 127 l
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Containment B 3.6.1 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.1 Containment BASES l
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! BACKGROUND l
The containment consists of the concrete reactor building (RB), its steel'1iner, and the penetrations through this structure. The structure is designed to contain radioactive material that may be released from the reactor core l
following a Design Basis Accident (DBA). Additionally, this structure provides shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.
i The containment is a reinforced concrete structure with a cylindrical wall, a flat foundation mat, and a shallow dome roof. The cylinder wall is prestressed with a post l
l tensioning system in the vertical and horizontal- directions, and the dome roof is prestressed utilizing a three way post tensioning system. The inside surface of the containment is lined with a carbon steel liner to ensure a high degree of leak tightness during operating and accident conditions.
l The concrete RB is required for structural integrity of the containment under DBA conditions. The steel liner and its
- penetrations establish the leakage limiting boundary of the !
containment. Maintaining the containment OPERABLE limits !
the leakage of fission product radioactivity from the containment to the environment. SR 3.6.1.1 leakage rate requirements comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref.1), as modified by approved exemptions.
The isolation devices for the penetrations in the containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier:
L a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either: '
- 1. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system, or i i I
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(continued)
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.6-1 Amendment No. 127
J Containment B 3.6.1 BASES
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! BACKGROUND 2. closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or (continued) de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LC0 3.6.3, " Containment Isolation Valves." i i
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l APPLICABLE The safety design basis for the containment is that the i SAFETY ANALYSES containment must withstand the pressures and temperatures of t the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate. !
l The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material within containment are a loss of coolant accident, a main steam line break (MSLB), and a control element assembly ejection accident (Ref. 2). In the analysis of each of 1 these accidents, it is assumed that containment is OPERABLE such that release of fission products to the environment is t
controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The containment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of 1 l 0.10% of containment air weight per day (Ref. 3). This l leakage rate is defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref.1), '
as L.: the maximum allowable containment leakage rate at the calculated maximum peak containment pressure (P.} # i 55.7 psig, which results from the limiting DBA, whiv aa !
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design basis MSLB (Ref. 2).
Satisfactory leakage rate test results are a requirement for j the establishment of containment OPERABILITY.
The containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy I Statement.
I I LC0 Containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to l within the acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 1). Compliance with this LCO will ensure a containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that i
l is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analysis. l Individual leakage rates specified for the containment air lock (LC0 3.6.2) and purge valves with resilient seals i
(continued)
! SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.6-2 Amendment No. 127
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i Containment l B 3.6.1 1
1 1 BASES l
l LC0 (LC0 3.6.3) are not specifically part of the acceptance (continued) criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. Therefore, leakage rates exceeding these individual limits only result in the containment being inoperable when the leakage results in exceeding the acceptance criteria of Appendix J.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material into containment. In MODES 5 and 6, i the probability and consequences of these events are reduced i due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive ,
I material from containment. The requirements for containment I during MODE 6 are addressed in LC0 3.9.3, " Containment Penetrations."
l ACTIONS A.1 In the event containment is inoperable, containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the i problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining i containment during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. This time period l also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring l containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when containment is inoperable is minimal. '
B.1 and B.?,.
l If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
f (continued)
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.6-3 Amendment No. 127
Containment B 3.6.1 BASES (continued)
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining the containment OPERABLE requires compliance l
with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref.1), as modified i by approved exemptions. Failure to meet air lock and purge l valve with resi1 Tent seal leakage limits specified in LCO 3.6.2 and LC0 3.6.3 does not invalidate the acceptability of these overall leakage determinations unless their contribution to overall Type A, B, and C leakage causes that to exceed limits. SR Frequencies are as required by Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions.
Thus, SR 3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply. These periodic testing requirements verify that the containment leakage rate does not exceed the leakage rate assumed in the safety analysis.
SR 3.6.1.2 Fcr ungrouted, post tensioned tendons, this SR ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained in accordance with the provisions of- the Containment Tendon Surveillance Program. Testing and Frequency are consistent with the recommendations of hogulatory Guide 1.35 (Ref. 4).
REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.
- 4. Regulatory Guide 1.35, Revision 3.
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l SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.6-4 Amendment No. 127
Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 l B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks BASES l
BACKGROUND Containment air, locks form part of the containment pressure '
boundary and provide a means for personnel access during all MODES of operation.
Each air lock is nominally a right circular cylinder,10 ft in diameter, with a door at each end. The doors are l interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening. During periods when containment is not required to be OPERABLE, the door
! interlock mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of i
an air lock to remain open for extended periods when
! irequent containment entry is necessary. Each air lock door has been designed and tested to certify its ability to withstand a pressure in excess of the maximum expected pressure following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) in containment. As such, closure of a single door supports containment OPERABILITY. Each of the doors contains double gasketed seals and local leakage rate testing capability to l
ensure pressure integrity. To effect a leak tight seal, the air lock design uses pressure seated doors (i.e., an ,
increase in containment internal pressure results in i j increased sealing force on each door).
Each personnel air lock is provided with limit switches on both doors that provide control room indication of door position. Additionally, control room indication is provided to alert the operator whenever an air lock door interlock mechanism is defeated.
l The containment air locks form part of the containment pressure boundary. As such, air lock integrity and leak tightness is essential for maintaining the containment leakage rate within limit in the event of a DBA. Not l maintaining air lock integrity or leak tightness may result l in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in the safety
- analysis. SR 3.6.2.1 leakage rate requirements are in conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref.1), as modified l by approved exemptions.
l (continued) l SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 2 8 3.6-5 Amendment No. 127
i Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES (continued)
APPLICABLE For atmospheric containment, the DBAs that result in a SAFETY ANALYSES release of radioactive material within containment are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), a main steam line break (MSLB) and a control element assembly (CEA) ejection accident (Ref. 2). In the analysis of each of these i accidents, it is assur2d that containment is OPERABLE such l that release of' fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The containment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of ;
0.10% of containment air weight per day (Ref. 2). This i leakage rate is defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 1),
as L.: the maximum allowable containment leakage rate at j
the calculated maximum peak containment pressure (P.) of 55.7 psig, which results from the limiting DBA, which is a design basis MSLB (Ref. 2). This allowable leakage rate forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs associated with the air lock.
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The conta' ament air locks satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
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l LC0 Each containment air lock forms part of the containment pressure boundary. As part of containment, the air lock safety function is related to control of the containment leakage rate resulting from a DBA. Thus, each air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event.
Each air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The door seals and sealing surface are considered a part of the air lock. The interlock allows only one air lock door of an air lock to be opened at one time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of i
containment does not exist when containment is required to be OPERABLE. Closure of a single door in each air lock-is sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following postulated events. Nevertheless, both doors are kept closed when the air lock is not being used for normal entry into and exit from containment.
i (continued)
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.6-6 Amendment No. 127
Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.1 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref.1), as modified by approved exemptions. This SR reflects the leakage rate testing requirements with regard to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). .The acceptance criteria were established during J initial air lock and containment OPERABILITY testing. The periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock 1 leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall l l
containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by. I Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions. Thus, j SR 3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply.
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l The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous 1 successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.
l This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is l capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR requiring the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accounted for in determining the overall containment leakage rate.
SR 3.6.2.2 The air lock interlock is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in a single air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident containment pressure, closure of either door will support containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the door interlock feature supports containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used for personnel transit into and out of containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous opening of '
the inner and outer doors will not inadvertently occur. Due l to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is only challenged when containment is entered, Note I specifies that this test is only required to be performed upon entering containment but l is not required more frequently than every 184 days. The second note states that SR 3.0.4 is not applicable. The 184 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is (continued) l -
l SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.6-11 Amendment No. 127
Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.2 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS considered adequate in view of other indications of door and interlock mechanism status available to operations personnel.
REFERENCES 1.- 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.
- 2. UFSAR, Section' 15.1, 15.4.
- 3. UFSAR, Section 6.2.
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5 SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.6-12 Amendment No. 127 i
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Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verifying that the isolation time of each power operated and automatic containment isolation valve is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. . The isolation time test ensures the valve will isolate in a time period less
! than or equal tothat assumed in the safety analysis. The i
isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.
i SR 3.6.3.6 For containment purge valves with resilient seals, additional leakage rate testing beyond the test requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 5), is required to ensure
- OPERABILITY. Operating experience has demonstrated that j this type of seal has the potential to degrade in a shorter
! time period than do other seal types. i Based on this observation and the importance of maintaining this penetration leak tight (due to the direct path between i containment and the environment), a Frequency of 184 days >
was established as part of the NRC resolution of Generic Issue B-20, " Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration" .
l (Ref. 3). '
! Additionally, this SR must be performed within 92 days after i
' opening the valve. The 92 day Frequency was chosen recognizing that cycling the valve could int.roduce additional seal degradation (beyond that occurring to a-valve that has not been opened). Thus, decreasing the interval (from 184 days) is a prudent measure after a valve has been opened.
l A Note to this SR requires the results to be evaluated I against the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1. This ensures that excessive containment purge valve leakage is properly accounted for in determining the overall containment leakage rate to verify containment OPERABILITY.
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! (continued)
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.6-25 Amendment No. 127
- . . . . _ . _ ~ - . . . - - . - . . . .-
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Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES '
SVRVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.7 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The containment isolation valves covered by this SR are required to be demonstrated OPERABLE at the indicated i
frequency.This SR is modified by two notes. Note 1 specifies that the provisions of the Inservice Testing Program are not applicable when the valves are secured open.
The second note indicates that SR 3.0.4 is not applicable.
SR 3.6.3.8 Automatic containment isolation valves close on a containment isolation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment following a DBA. This SR ensures each automatic containment isolation valve will actuate to its isolation position on a containment isolation actuation signal. The 24 month Frequency was developed ,
considering it is prudent that this SR be perfo.rmed only '
during a unit outage, since isolation of penetrations would eliminate cooling water flov and disrupt normal operation of many critical components. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this SR when performed on the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
REFERENCES 1. SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Section 6.2.
- 3. Generic Issue B-20.
- 4. Generic Issue B-24.
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.6-26 Amendment No. 127
Containment Penetrations B 3.9.3 l
l B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations !
BASES BACKGROUND During CORE. ALTERATIONS or movement of fuel assemblies within containment with irradiated fuel in containment, a release of fission product radioactivity within the ;
containment will be restricted from escaping to the l environment when the LC0 requirements are met. In MODES 1, '
2, 3, and 4, this is accomplished by maintaining containment i OPERABLE as described in LC0 3.6.1, " Containment." In MODE 6, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an accident is not likely; therefore, requirements to isolate the containment from the outside atmosphere can be less stringent. The LC0 requirements are referred.to as
" containment closure" rather than " containment OPERABILITY."
Containment closure means that all potential escape paths are closed or capable of being closed. Since there is no potential for containment pressurization, the Appendix J leakage criteria and tests are not required.
The containment serves to contain fission product radioactivity that may be released from the reactor core following an accident, such that offsite radiation exposures are maintained well within the requirements of 10'CFR 100.
Additionally, the containment structure provides radiation shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.
The containment equipment hatch, which is part of the I containment pressure boundary, provides a means for moving l large equipment and components into and out of containment.
During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, the equipment hatch must be held in place by at least four bolts. Good engineering practice dictates that the bolts required by this LC0 be approximately equally spaced.
The containment air locks, which are also part of the containment pressure boundary, provide a means for personnel access during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 operation in accordance with LC0 3.6.2, " Containment Air Locks." Each air lock has a door at both ends. The doors are normally interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening when containment OPERABILITY is required. During periods of shutdown when containment ,
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(continued) l SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.9-9 Amendment No. 127
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ATTACHMENT B i UNIT 3 AMENDMENT NO. I16 APPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS i.
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Containment 3.6.1 i
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 1
i SURVEILLANCE I FREQUENCY 1
1
! SR 3.6.1.1 Perform required visual examinations and -----NOTE-----
' leakage rate testing except for containment SR 3.0.2 is not I air lock testing, in accordance with applicable 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by -------------- '
approved exemptions.
In accordance The maximum allowable leakage rate, L,, is with 10 CFR 50, l
0.10% of containment air weight per day at j Appendix J, as the calculated peak containment pressure, modified by P,. l approved j
' exemptions l
SR 3.6.1.2 Verify containment structural integrity In accordance ,
in accordance with the Containment Tendon with the !
Surveillance Program. Containment Tendon Surveillance l Program '
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SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.6-2 Amendment No. 116 l
. = , -_ -. . _- = _ . - _ - . -. . . ~ .- .- . _ - -
l l Containmant Air Locks 3.6.2 l ACTIONS (continued)
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CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION
! COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3.
associated Completion 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> -
Time not met. AND D.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> l '
i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.1 -------------------NOTES =
== -----------
- 1. An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock l leakage test.
t l 2. Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1 in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions.
, ________________________..__-=-- _________ .
Perfonn required air lock leakage rate -----NOTE =
L testing in accordance with 10 CFR 50, SR 3.0.2 is not Appendix J, as modified by approved applicable i exemptions. ---------------
The acceptance criteria for air lock In accordance testing are: with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as
- a. Overall air lock leakage rate is modified by
$ 0.05 L, when tested at 2 P,. approved exemptions
- b. For each door, leakage rate is s .01 L, when tested at 2 9.0 psig.
(continued) i SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 3.6-6 Amendment No. 116
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t l Containment Isolation Valves
! 3.6.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY i
SR 3 . 6 . 3 . 4 ------------------ NOT E S--------------------
- 1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of
' administrative means.
r,.
- 2. SR 3.0.4 is not applicable.
Verify each containment isolation manual valve Prior to and blind flange that is located inside entering MODE 4 containment and required to be closed during from MODE 5 if accident conditions is closed, except for not performed containment isolation valves that are open within the under administrative controls. previous 92 days SR 3.6.3.5 Verify the isolation time of eacn Section A In accordance and B power operated and each automatic with the containment isolation valve is within limits. Inservice Testing Program l
SR 3 . 6 . 3 . 6 ----- = - - =-- =----NOTES -- ------------
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' Results shall be evaluated against acceptance l
criteria of SR 3.6.1.1 in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions.
_________=-_
_=___________________________
i Perform leakage rate testing for containment 184 days purge valves with resilient seals.
AND Within 92 days after opening the valve l
!, (continued) 4 SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.6-14 Amendment No. 116
SR Applicability L B 3.0 1
BASES i
SR 3.0.2 not be. suitable for conducting- the Surveillance (e.g., !
(continued) transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or .
maintenance activities). '
The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the -
- , reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Fr6quency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular' Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The' exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the l
Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications. An example of where SR 3.0.2 does not apply is a Surveillance with a Frequency of "in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J,.as modified by i
approved exemptions." The requirements of regulations take precedence over the TS. The TS cannot in and of themselves extend a test . interval specified in the regulations.
Therefore, there is a Note in the Frequency stating, "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable."
As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not ap'ly p to the initial portion of a periodic Completion' Time that 1 i
requires performance on a "once per..." basis. The 25%
extension applies to each performance after the initial performance. The initial performance of the Required Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a single action with a single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 25%
extension to this Completion Time is that such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.
The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly merely as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified.
SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inoperable'or an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not l
(continued)
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 B 3.0-12 Amendment No. 116
Containment B 3.6.1 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l
l B 3.6.1 Containment BASES BACKGROUND The containment consists of the concrete reactor building (RB), its steel' liner, and the penetrations through this structure. The structure is designed to contain radioactive material that may be released from the reactor core following a Design Basis Accident (DBA). Additionally, this structure provides shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.
The containment is a reinforced concrete structure with a cylindrical wal.1, a flat foundation mat, and a shallow dome roof. The cylinder wall is prestressed with a post tensioning system in the vertical and horizontal directions, and the dome roof is prestressed utilizing a th.ree way post tensioning system. The inside surface of the containment is lined with a carbon steel liner to ensure a high degree of leak tightness during operating and accident conditions.
The concrete RB is required for structural integrity of the j
' containment under DBA conditions. The steel liner and its '
3 penetrations establish the leakage limiting boundary of the containment. Maintaining the containment OPERABLE limits the leakage of fission product radioactivity from the containment to the environment. SR 3.6.1.1 leakage rate requirements comply with 10 CFR 50., Appendix J (Ref.1), as modified by approved exemptions.
l The isolation devices for the penetrations in the containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier:
l a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
- 1. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic I containment isolation system, or (continued)
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 8 3.6-1 Amendment No. 116
_ _. . . ~ . . _. . __ . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _
l l
Containment l
l 8 3.6.1 BASES BACKGROUND 2. closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or I (continued) de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LC0 3.6.3, " Containment Isolation Valves."
- b. Each air lock is OPERABLE, except as provided in LC0 3.6.2,
- Containment Air Locks."
APPLICABLE The safety design basis for the containment is that the i SAFETY ANALYSES containment must withstand the pressures and temperatures of l
the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate.
The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material within containment are a loss of coolant accident, a main steam line break (MSLB), and a control element assembly ejection accident (Ref. 2). In the analysis of each of 1 these accidents, it is assumed that containment is OPERABLE I i such that release of fission products to the enitironment is '
l controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The
! containment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of l 0.10% of containment air weight per day (Ref. 3). This l
leakage rate is defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref.1), i as L.: the maximum allowable containment leakage rate at i l the calculated maximum peak containment pressure (P.) of ,
55.7 psig, which results from the limiting DBA, which is a t
design basis MSLB (Ref. 2).
Satisfactory leakage rate test results are a requirement for the establishment of containment OPERABILITY.
l The containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO Containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to within the acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 1). Compliance with this LC0 will ensure a containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analysis.
Individual leakage rates specified for the containment air lock (LC0 3.6.2) and purge valves with resilient seals (continued)
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 8 3.6-2 Amendment No. 116 i
. ~ .. . - . .. . - - - ---- - _ -
l \
Containment B 3.6.1 BASES
'LCO .
(LC0 3.6.3) are not specifically part of the acceptance j (continued) criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. Therefore, leakage rates exceeding these individual limits only result in the
- containment being inoperable when the leakage results in exceeding the acceptance criteria of Appendix J.
L l
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material into containment. In MODES 5 and 6, l the probability and consequences of these events are reduced l
l due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these
' MODES. Therefore, containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment. The requirements for containment during MODE 6 are addressed in LC0 3.9.3, " Containment Penetrations."
l ACTIONS A.1 l
l In the event containment is inoperable, containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> l Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the 1 problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining i
containment during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. This time period
{
l also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring '
containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when j containment is inoperable is minimal.
B.1 and B.2 l
- If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full l power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
1 i
- (continued)
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 8 3.6-3 Amendment No. 116
I Centainment B 3.6.1 l
BASES (continued) i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1 l REQUIREMENTS l
Maintaining the containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref.1), as codified by approved exemptions. Failure to meet air lock and purge valve with resilient seal leakage limits 'specified in LC0 3.6.2 and LC0 3.6.3 does not invalidate the acceptability of these overall leakage determinations unless their contribution to overall Type A, B, and C leakage causes that to exceed limits. SR Frequencies are as required by Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions.
Thus, SR 3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not i
! apply. These periodic testing requirements verify that the containment leakage rate does not exceed the leakage rate assumed in the safety analysis.
l For ungrouted, post tensioned tendons, this SR ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be i maintained in accordance with the provisions of the !
Containment Tendon Surveillance Program. Testing and l Frequency are consistent with the recommendations of 1 i Regulatory Guide 1.35 (Ref. 4). l l
l l
REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.
- 4. Regulatory Guide 1.35, Revision 3.
l l
4 i
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 8 3.6-4 Amendment No. 116
i Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks BASES BACKGROUND Containment air locks form part of the containment pressure boundary and provide a means for personnel access during all MODES of operation.
l Each air lock is nominally a right circular cylinder,10 ft in diameter, with a door at each end. The doors are interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening. During periods l
whea containment is not required to be OPERABLE, the door int erlcck mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periods when frequent containment entry is necessary. Each air lock door has been designed and tested to certify its ability to withstand a pressure in excess of the maximum expected
' pressure following a Design Basis A:cident (DBA) in containment. As such, closure of a single door' supports i containment OPERABILITY. Each of the doors contains double l gasketed seals and local leakage rate testing capability to l ensure pressure integrity. To effect a leak tight seal, the l air lock design uses pressure seated doors (i.e., an increase in containment internal pressure results in increased sealing force on each door).
Each personnel air lock is provided with limit switches on l both doors that provide control room indication of door l position. Additionally, control room indication is provided to alert the operator whenever an air lock door interlock mechanism is defeated.
l The containment air locks form part of the containment pressure boundary. As such, air lock integrity and leak tightness is essential for maintaining the containment leakage rate within limit in the event of a DBA. Not maintaining air lock integrity or leak tightness may result I in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in the safety analysis. SR 3.6.2.1 leakage rate requirements are in
- conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 1), as modified i by approved exemptions.
(continued)
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 B 3.6-5 Amendment No. 116 l
Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES (continued) 1 APPLICABLE For atmospheric containment, the DBAs that result in a SAFETY ANALYSES release of radioactive material within containment are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), a main steam line break (MSLB) and a control element assembly (CEA) ejection accident (Ref. 2). In the anal,< sis of each of these accidents, it is assumed that containment is OPERABLE such that release of' fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The l
containment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of 0.10% of containment air weight per day (Ref. 2). This leakage rate is defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref.1),
as L.: the maximum allowable containment leakage rate at the calculated maximum peak containment pressure (P.) of 55.7 psig, which results from the limiting DBA, which is a design basis MSLB (Ref. 2). This allowable leakage rate forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs associated with the air lock.
The containment air locks satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LC0 Each containment air lock forms part of the containment pressure boundary. As part of containment, the air lock safety function is related to control of the containment leakage rate resulting from a DBA. Thus, each air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event.
Each air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Typo B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors
'nust be OPERABLE. The door seals and sealing surface are considered a part of the air lock. The interlock allows only one air lock door of an air lock to be opened at one
'ime. This provision ensures that a gross breach of (ontainment does not exist when containment is required to be OPEPABLE. Closure of a single door in each air lock is sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following postulated events. Nevertheless, both doors are kept closed when the air lock is not being used for normal entry into and exit from containment.
i (continued)
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 8 3.6-6 Amendment No. 116
l l
l Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 i
BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.1 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref.1), as modified by approved exemptions. This SR reflects the leakage rate testing
! requirements with regard to air lock leakage (Type 8 leakage tests). The acceptance criteria were established during initial air lock' and containment OPERABILITY testing. The periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall I containment leakage rate. The Frcquency is required by Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions. Thus, SR 3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply.
l The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous ,
t successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test. '
This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR requiring the l results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of
' SR 3.6.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly i accounted for in determining the overall containment leakage rate. !
I SR 3.6.2.2 !
The air lock interlock is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in a single air lock. Since both the l inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident containment l
pressure, closure of either door will support containment l
OPERABILITY. Thus, the door interlock feature supports i containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used for l
personnel transit into and out of containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous opening of the inner and outer doors will not inadvertently occur. Due to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is only challenged when containment is entered, Note I specifies that this test is i only required to. be performed upon entering containment but is not required more frequently than every 184 dovs. The second note states that SR 3.0.4 is not applicabie. The 184 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is (continued)
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.6-11 Amendment No. 116
Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.2 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS considered adequate in view of other indications of door and
, , interlock raechanism status available to operations personnel.
REFERENCES 1, 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.
- 2. UFSAR, Section 15.1, 15.4.
- 3. UFSAR, Section 6.2.
t e
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.6-12 Amendment No. 116
i i
l l Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 i BASES l
l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.5 l REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verifying that the isolation time of each power operated and ;
automatic containment required to demonstrate isolation valve is within limits is OPERABILITY.
The isolation time test ensures the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to'that assumed in the safety analysis. The l isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance l with the Inservice Testing Program.
1 SR 3.6.3.6 For containment purge valves with resilient seals, additional leakage rate testing beyond the test requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 5), is required to ensure OPERABILITY. Operating experience has demonstrated that this type of seal has the potential to degrade in a shorter time period than do other seal types.
Based on this observation and the importance of maintaining this penetration leak tight (due to the direct path between containment and the environment), a Frequency of 184 days was established as part of the NRC resolution of Generic Issue B-20, " Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration" (Ref. 3).
Additionally, this SR must be performed within 92 days after opening the valve. Tne 92 day Frequency was chosen recognizing that cycling the valve could introduce additional seal degradation (beyond that occurring to a valve that has not been opened). Thus, decreasing the interval (from 184 days) is a prudent measure after a valve has been opened.
A Note to this SR requires the results to be evaluated against th2 acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1. This ensures that excessive containment purge valve leakage is properly accounted for in determining the overall containment leakage rate to verify containment OPERABILITY.
l (continued) i SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 8 3.6-25 1 Amendment No. 116 I
Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.7 l
REQUIREMENTS (continued) The containment isolation valves covered by this SR are !
i required to be demonstrated OPERABLE at the indicated frequency.This SR is modified by two notes. Note 1 specifies that the provisions of the Inservice Testing i Program are not tpplicable when the valves are secured open. l The second note indicates that SR 3.0.4 is not applicable.
SR 3.6.3.8 Automatic containment isolation valves close on a containment isolation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment following a DBA. This SR ensures each automatic containment isolation valve will actuate to its isolation position on a containment isolation actuation signal. The 24 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this SR be performed only during a unit outage, since isolation of penetrations would eliminate cooling water flow and disrupt normal operation of
- many critical components. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this SR when performed on the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was i concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
c REFERENCES 1. SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Section 6.2.
I
- 3. Generic Issue B-20.
- 4. Generic Issue B-24.
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 B 3.6-26 Amendment No. 116
l I I
l Containment Penetrations i B 3.9.3 l B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS l
B 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations I
1
, BASES I
i BACKGROUND During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of fuel assemblies within containment with irradiated fuel in containment, a I
release of fission product radioactivity within the containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment when the LCO requirements are met. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, this is accomplished by maintaining containment OPERABLE as described in LC0 3.6.1, " Containment." In MODE 6, the potential for containment pressurization as a l l result of an accident is not likely; therefore, requirements to isolate the containment from the outside atmosphere can l be less stringent. The LC0 requirements are referred to as
" containment closure" rather than " containment OPERABILITY."
Containment closure means that all potential escape paths are closed or capable of being closed. Since there is no potential for containment pressurization, the Appendix J leakage criteria and tests are not required.
The containment serves to contain fission product radioactivity that may be released from the reactor core following an accident, such that offsite radiation exposures ;
are maintained well within the requirements of 10 CFR 100.
Additionally, the containment structure provides radiation shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.
The containment equipment hatch, which is part of the l
containment pressure boundary, provides a means for moving large equipment and components into and out of containment.
During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel '
assemblies within containment, the equipment hatch must be l
held in place by at least four bolts. Good engineering practice dictates that the bolts required by this LC0 be approximately equally spaced.
I The containment air locks, which are also part of the '
containment pressure boundary, provide a means for personnel access during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 operation in accordance with LCO 3.6.2, " Containment Air Locks." Each air lock has a door at both ends. The doors are normally interlocked to
! prevent simultaneous opening when containment OPERABILITY is 4
required. .During periods of shutdown when containment (continued) i SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 8 3.9-9 Amendment No. 116 l
ATTACIBfENT C PROPOSED UNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICuTIONS
Containment 3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.1 Perform required visual examinations and -----NOTE-----
leakage rate testing except for containment SR 3.0.2 is not air lock testing, in accordance with applicable '
10CFR50,AppendigJ210ptionFBfas --------------
I modified by approved 'sxemptT6 n and l RegulatoryiGUide
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ M163p#^idated5Se'ptemb'er?
~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ " ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ " "~
In accordance :
1995. with 10 CFR 50,
^
{
Appendix J7 l
The maximum allowable leakage rate, L., is Opt' ion 3B,as 0.10% of containment air weight per day at modified by the calculated peak containment pressure, approved l P,. exemptionsfarid '
RegUlatoFy~ ,
G01deil?163} ~^ )
datsd ~' i Septembsr? ~~ !
1995'.
l SR 3.6.1.2 Verify containment structural integrity In accordance in accordance with the Containment Tendon with the Surveillance Program. Containment Tendon Surveillance Program SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.6-2 Amendment No. 4 N
Containment Air Locks !
i 1
3.6.2 l ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not AND i niet .
D.2 ,Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> l
1 l
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.1 -------------------NOTES-------------------
- 1. An inoperable air lock door does not 1 i
invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock l leakage test. i
- 2. Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1 in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix Ji ~
Optf6M B, as modified by approved l
'6neriihtidns ind:1Redulit6rflGuidss171637 ' ' ' ~ -
. . . . .ditsdQspf6mbep
. r. . . . . .% .~ .;r.#;;^1...................
1995: ~ ~
- - - -- - NOT E - - - - - -
SR 3.0.2 is not Perform required air lock leakage rate applicable testing in accordance with 10 CFR 50, ---------------
Appendix Ji:IOptidd]B, as modified by I approved exemptid W andjR gulatbFf? Guide ~
In accordance i I!163E... .-datid75dpt6mberM19957~~~" '" '
~ . . ..
with 10 CFR 50, g
The acceptance criteria for air lock Opti6rit:B, is testing are: modifi'6d by approved
- a. Overall air lock leakage rate is exemptions Edd s 0.05 L, when tested at 2 P,. Regblatory ^.
Guidesli163;
- b. For each door, leakage rate is dated" s .01 L, when tested at 2 9.0 psig. SeptembeK:
- l. 199 5 ~^.*^
(continued)
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.6-6 Amendment No. 4 N l
i
l i
Containment Isolation Valves '
3.6.3
(
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) i SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.6.3.4 ----------------NOTES------------------
- 1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administr,ative means.
- 2. SR 3.0.4 is not applicable.
l Verify each containment isolation manual valve Prior to l and blind flange that is located inside entering MODE 4 l containment and required to be closed during from MODE 5 if l accident conditions is closed, except for not performed containment isolation valves that are open within the under administrative controls. previous l 92 days l
SR 3.6.3.5 Verify the isolation time of each Section A In accordance and B power operated and each automatic with the containment isolation valve is within limits. Inservice Testing Program SR 3.6.3.6 ------------------NOTES---------------------
Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1 in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J!s0ptTibs%B, as modified by approved exemptionT'andf Rsdi14tdF ~'
if163ffldstidTS6)timbsF~p1995^ ~ ~ ~~FTGdide
- .. = .. 1:..'= .;..:. .:=...............
184 days Perform leakage rate testing for containment purge valves with resilient seals. AND Within 92 days after opening the valve (continued) f
( -
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.6-14 Amendment No. 447
l !
l
! SR Applicability l B 3.0 l
l BASES SR 3.0.2 not be suitable for conducting the Surveillance (e.g.,
(continued) transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities).
The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the
)
reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at ;
its specified Freguency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for l which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications. An cxample of where SR 3.0.2 dec: not apply i: Surveilhnce with ; Frequency of "in acccrdance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as mcdificd by i approved exemptions." The requirement; cf reguhtion take l precedence over the TS. The TS cannet in and of them:cive extend ; test interval specified in the reguhtions.
Thereforc, there i: ; Note-in the Frequency stating, l "SR 3.0.2 is act applicable." !
1 As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply !
to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per..." basis. The 25% !
extension applies to each performance after the initial l l performance. The initial performance of the Required i Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some ]
l other remedial action, is considered a single action with a 1 single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 25% ^
extension to this Completion Time is that such an action l
usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.
The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly merely as an operational convenience to extend
- Surveillance intervals or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified.
l l
! SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inoperable or an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not (continued)
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.0-12 Amendment No. 4 N
4 Containment B 3.6.1 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.1 Containment BASES BACKGROUWD The containment consists of the concrete reactor building (RB), its steel liner, and the penetrations through this i' structure. The structure is designed to contain radioactive material that may be released from the reactor core following a Design Basis Accident (DBA). Additionally, this structure provides shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.
The containment is a reinforced concrete structure with a
, cylindrical wall, a flat foundation mat, and a shallow dome roof. The cylinder wall is prestressed with a post 1
tensioning system in the vertical and horizontal directions, and the dome roof is prestressed utilizing a three way post tensioning system. The inside surface of the containment is 1 lined with a carbon steel-liner to ensure a high degree of leak tightness during operating and accident conditions.
1
' The concrete RB is required for structural integrity of the containment under DBA conditions. The steel liner and its
'
- penetrations establish the leakage limiting boundary of the containment. Maintaining the containment OPERABLE limits the leakage of fission product radioactivity from the containment
)
to the environment. SR 3.6.1.1 leakage rate requirements comply with 10 CFR 50, AppendixJM0ptibdEB (Re f. 1), as modified by approved exemptions 'shd: Reg"ulat6Fy"0GUTd6511163}
'" ~ ~~ ^ " "*' "
ldstidlS @ embe Q 925.
The isolation devices for the penetrations in the containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier:
- a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
- 1. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system, or (continued)
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.6-1 Amendment No. 4 N l
_ _. _ _ = _ . . _ _ _ _ _. ._ . . _ _ _ _
i Containment B 3.6.1 l l
BASES 1 l
l BACKGROUND 2. closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or l l (continued) de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed i
- positions, except as provided in LC0 3.6.3, l
\
" Containment Isolation Valves."
l b. Each air lock is OPERABLE, except as provided in LC0 3.6.2, %ontainment Air Locks."
APPLICABLE The safety design basis for the containment is that the SAFETY ANALYSES containment must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate.
The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material within containment are a loss of coolant accident, a main steam line break (MSLB), and a control element assembly ejection accident (Ref. 2). In the analysis of each of these accidents, it is assumed that containment is OPERABLE such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The containment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of ,
i 0.10% of containment air weigFt per day (Ref. 3 . This leakage rate is defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix JM)0ritioriTB (Ref.1), as L.: the maximum alicwable containment Tiakigs rate at the calculated maximum peak containment pressure (P.)
of 55.7 psig, which results from the limiting DBA, which is a design basis MSLB (Ref. 2).
Satisfactory leakage rate test results are a requirement for the establishment of containment OPERABILITY.
The containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LC0 Containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to within the acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix Ji OptioEB (Ref.1). Compliance with this LC0 will ensure a containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that is structurally. sound and that will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analysis.
Individual leakage rates specified for the containment air
- lock (LC0 3.6.2) and purge valves with resilient seals l
I (continued)
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.6-2. Amendment No. W
Containment B 3.6.1 l
BASES' l
LC0 (LC0 3.6.3) are not specifically part of the acceptance (continued) criteria of 10 CFR 50, AppendixJ;f0ptibh?B. Therefore, leakage rates exceeding these indivi~ dual"limifs only result in the containment being inoperable when the leakage results in exceeding the acceptance criteria of Appendix Ji[ Opt [onTB.
1 APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material into containment. In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES.
Therefore, containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment. The requirements for containment during MODE 6 are addressed in LC0 3.9.3, " Containment Penetrations."
ACTIONS A.1 i
In the event containment is inoperable, containment must be ,
restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> '
Completion Time provides a' period of time to correct the problem t.ommensurate with the importance of maintaining containment during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. This time period
, also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when containment is inoperable is minimal.
B.1 and B.2 If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
(continued)
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.6-3 Amendment No. 447
I l
Containment )
l B 3.6.1 j i l l BASES l
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining the containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of
, 10 CFR 50, Appendix Jhf0ptionMB (Ref. 1), as modified by approved exemptions '"and JRspulatoF90G0idsMlil63fidatEd I
Septembir;u1995? - Faild'r'6"t6mhet"eiF~1sek^^ sad"jiirrgsTal's v ;
With"Fusilisnt"~5bal leakage limits specified in LC0 3.6.2 and ;
l LC0 3.6.3 does not invalidate the acceptability of these l
overall leakage determinations unless their contribution to l
overall Type A, B, and C leakage causes that to exceed limits.
SR Frequencies are as required by Appendix J;f0ptidiPB, as modified by approved exemptions ~an'dlRegUlatorysGui.deil;-163?
dit#dlSsptember$1995. Thus, SR 3:0.'2'(whidh'slloWs FF6qU'hney bit'drisions)" "d6ds* ' hot apply. These periodic testing requirements verify that the containment leakage rate does not exceed the leakage rate assumed in the safety analysis.
l l
SR 3.6.1.2 For ungrouted, post tensioned tendons, this SR ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained ,
in accordance with the provisions of the Containment Tendon '
Surveillance Program. Testing and Frequency are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.35 (Ref. 4).
l REFERENCES 1. 10CFR50,AppendixJ.E_0.iition!B,. .
J
, 2. SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Section 15.1 t
1
- 4. Regulatory Guide 1.35, Revision 3.
1 l 5: T Rs501_ atofylG u i dell 7163fd stsd[S 6pthinbdQ1995.
i
)
l I
l SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.6-4 Amendment No. -1N l
l
Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks-BASES BACKGROUND Containment air locks form part of the containment pressure boundary and provide a means for personnel access during all
-MODES of operation.
Each air lock is nominally a right circular cylinder,10 ft in diameter, with a door at each end. The doors are interlocked :
to prevent simultaneous opening. During periods when containment is not required to be OPERABLE, the door interlock mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periods when frequent containment entry is necessary. Each air lock door has been designed and tested to certify its ability to withstand a pressure in excess of the maximum expected pressure following a Design
-Basis Accident (DBA) in containment. As such, closure of a single door supports containment OPERABILITY. Each of the doors contains double gasketed seals and local leakage rate testing capability.to ensure pressure integrity. To effect a leak tight seal, the air lock design uses pressure seated doors (i.e., an increase in containment internal pressure results in increased sealing force on each door).
t Each personnel air lock is provided with limit switches on i both doors that provide control room indication of door position. Additionally, control room indication is provided to alert the operator whenever an air lock door interlock mechanism is defeated.
The containment air locks form part of the containment pressure boundary. As such, air lock integrity and leak l tightness is essential for maintaining the containment leakage l
rate within limit in the event of a DBA. Not maintaining air lock integrity or leak tightness may result in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in the safety analysis. SR 3.6.2.1 leakage rate requirements are in conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J;f 0ptionYB (Ref. 1), as modified by approved exemp t i o n s 'andj Regul a t 6fyjGuldeM163fda tidJSQtemtisyp l 995.
l l
J l
(continued)
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.6-5 Amendment No. -lM l
l Containment Air Locks l l B 3.6.2 l l
l l BASES (continued) l APPLICABLE For atmospheric containment, the DBAs that result in a SAFETY ANALYSES release of radioactive material within containment are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), a main steam line break (MSLB) and a control element assembly (CEA) ejection accident (Ref. 2).
In the analysis of each of these accidents, it is assumed that containment is OPERABLE such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment
- leakage. The containment was designed with an allowable
! leakage rate of 0.10% of containment air weight per day l (Ref. 2). This leakage rate is defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix 1,40it'ioiHB (Ref.1), as L.: the maximum allowable
! containment"Tdskhys' rate at the calculated maximum peak l containment pressure (P.) of 55.7 psig, which results from the l
limiting DBA, which is a design basis MSLB (Ref. 2). This allowable leakage rate forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs associated with the air lock.
The containment air locks satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC l Policy Statement.
i i
l LCO Each containment air lock forms part of the containment pressure boundary. As part of containment, the air lock safety function is related to control of the containment leakage rate resulting from a DBA. Thus, each air lock's a~
structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event.
Each air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to l be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must l be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the l Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be l OPERABLE. The door seals and sealing surface are considered l a part of the air lock. The interlock allows only one air lock door of an air lock to be opened at one time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of containment does not exist when containment is required to be OPERABLE. Closure of a single door in each air lock is sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following postulated events. Nevertheless, both doors are kept closed when the air lock is not being used for normal entry into and exit from containment.
4
. (continued)
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.6-6 Amendment No. 4N
Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES '
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.1 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 1 , as modified by approved exemptions "M0ptiosVB sndQRegulitofff )nkage rate SeptembirM1995. This SR reflects thi[
idated le Guide @l63b' tasting Fequi'FejnsntTwith regard to air lock leakage (Type B leakage i
tests). The acceptance criteria were established during initial air lock and containment OPERABILITY testing. The periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall '
containment leakage rate.
~ The Frequency is required by ,
Appendix JF0ption?B, as modified by approved exemptions and !
Reg 0l ito Fil Gui,deQ1963 @ a tidj Sept 6mber#1995. Thus, SR 3.0:2 '
(which sllows Frequency extensions) does not apply.
The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.
This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is
- capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event of l a DBA. Note 2 has been aded to this SR requiring the results !
to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1.
This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accounted for in determining the overall containment leakage rate.
SR 3.6.2.2 The air lock interlock is designed to prevent simultaneous l opening of both doors in a single air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident containment pressure, closure of either door will support containment OPERABILITY.
l Thus, the door interlock feature supports containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used for personnel transit into and out of containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as l designed and that simultaneous opening of the inner and outer doors will not inadvertently occur. Due to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is only challenged when containment is entered, Note 1 specifies that this test is only required to be performed upon entering containment but is not required more frequently than every 184 days. The L
(continued) 4 .
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 8 3.6-11 Amendment No. +24
l Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 l
BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.2 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS l
second. note states that SR 3.0.4 is . not applicable. .The r 184 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is !
considered adequate in view of other indications of door and interlock mechanism ,
status available to operations personnel. ;
i REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix Jj[OpM M B.
( .
- 2. UFSAR, Section 15.1, 15.4. ,
l 3. UFSAR, Section 6.2. I l
. ffi Em._! Rs..pGl ithmm.G. d,i_d,i?1_716,3.W_d.;_if_dd_!?
m ; .m; m i5 S_ipt."estifr.m,1._995, .
l l
l l
l
\
i SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.6-12 Amendment No. 4 W I
Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verifying that the isolation time of each power operated and automatic containment isolation valve is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that ass'umed in the safety analysis. The isolation time and frequency of this SR are in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.
SR 3.6.3.6 For containment purge valves with resilient seals, additional leakage rate testing beyond the test requirements of 10 CFR 50, AppendixJ/3pti6C!B (Ref. 5), is required to ensure OPERABILITY. 'Operat'ing" experience has demonstrate that this type of seal has the potential to degrade in a shorter time period than do other seal types.
Based on this observation and the importance of maintaining I this penetration leak tight (due to the direct path between containment and the environment), a Frequency of 184 days was established as part of the NRC resolution of Generic Issue B-20, " Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration" 1 (Ref. 3). !
Additionally, this SR must be performed within 92 days after opening the valve. The 92 day Frequency was chosen recognizing that cycling the valve could introduce additional seal degradation (beyond that occurring to a valve that has not been opened). -Thus, decreasing the interval (from 184 days) is a prudent measure after a valve has been opened.
A Note to this SR requires the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1. This ensures that excessive containment purge valve leakage is properly accounted for in determining the overall containment leakage rate to verify containment OPERABILITY.
(continued)
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.6-25 Amendment No. -1W
l Containment Isolation Valves I B 3.6.3 1 i
BASES l
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.7 REQUIREMENTS l
(continued) The containment isolation valves covered by this SR are i required to be demonstrated OPERABLE at the indicated frequency.This SR is modified by two notes. Note 1 specifies that the provisions of the Inservice Testing Program are not applicable when the valves are secured open. The second note i t
indicates that SR 3.0.4 is not applicable.
SR 3.6.3.8 Automatic containment isolation valves close on a containment {
isolation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment following a DBA. This SR ensures each {
automatic containment isolation valve will actuate to its l isolation position on a containment isolation actuation '
signal. The 24 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this SR be perforr.ied only during a unit i
outage, since isolation of penetrations would eliminate cooling water flow and disrupt normal operation of many critical components. Operating experience has shown that '
these components usually pass this SR when performed on l the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was l l concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. i l \
! REFERENCES 1. SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Section 6.2. l
- 3. Generic Issue B-20.
l
- 4. Generic Issue B-24.
l 5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix Jy0pt'ioriisB.
- 6. Regisl at o ry;Gui defy 1?l 63gd ated f Sept embe ry1995.
l l
l SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 8 3.6-26 Amendment No. -lW
Containment Isolation Valves B 3.9.3 -
B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS i
B 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations '
BASES '
i BACKGROUND During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of fuel assemblies within !
contais.ent with 1rradiated fuel in containment, a release of )
l fission product radioactivity within the containment will be l restricted from escaping to the environment when the LCO requirements are met. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, this is accomplished by maintaining containment OPERABLE as described in LCO 3.6.1, " Containment." In MODE 6, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an accident is not likely; therefore, requirements to isolate the containment from the outside atmosphere can be less stringent. The LC0 requirements are referred to as " containment closure" rather than " containment OPERABILITY." Containment closure means that all potential escape paths are closed or capable of being closed. Since there is no potential for containment
! pressurization, the Appendix JM0pfich?B leakage criteria and tests are not required. ~ ~ ~ ~ " ~ ~ ~ ~ ^
The containment serves to contain fission product radioactivity that may be released from the reactor core following an accident, such that offsite radiation exposures are maintained well within the requirements of 10 CFR 100.
l Additionally, the containment structure provides radiation shielding from the fission products that may be present in the
- containment atmosphere following accident conditions.
The containment equipment hatch, which is part of the !
containment pressure boundary, provides a means for moving j i
large equipment and components into and out of containment. l During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, the equipment hatch must be held in place by at least four bolts. Good engineering practice dictates that the bolts required by this LCO be l approximately equally spaced.
l The containment air locks, which are al so part of the i
containment pressure boundary, provide a means for personnel (continued)
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.9-9 Amendment No. +24
l l
1
~
ATTACHMENT D \
PROPOSED UNIT 3 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 1
,?
Containment 3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS t
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY.
SR 3. 6.1.1. Perform required visual examinations and -----NOTE-----
leakage rate testing except for containment SR 3.0.2 is not j air 1ock testing, in accordance.with. applicable
- 10 CFR 50, Appendix J pti6 nib;' as. --------------
! modified by approved e @xem6tidhr'shd Regnlitor In accordance
!- 1995'.~~ "' i~&G' u " 'idel!17163
' " ~ ~ ~ ^ *}fd
~ " atid
' ^ ^?' Sep~tsmbeW
~ ~
""' with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J?
l The maximum allowable leakage rate, L,, is OptuniB, is 0.10% of containment air weight per day at modified by the calculated peak containment pressure, approved' P. exe,mptionsiland-_
yGuideill_?163_7 n
L Septemb^sr?
_199_57 2 '~^~^
l SR 3.6.1.2 Verify containment structural integrity In accordance '
in accordance with the Containment Tendon with the Surveillance Program. Containment ~
Tendon l Surveillance Program )
l
[
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.6-2 Amendment No. 446
i l
Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> i
associated I Completion Time not AND met.
D.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l
SR 3.6.2.1 -------------------NOTES-------------------
- 1. An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.
- 2. Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1 in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix T,4 Optibh38, as modified by approved "
< bkhmptfons ihd"Ri d(ti@SE@mp@@islitbrf~iGdi'd671?I63 lj95:~" ~ " ~ ~ " y
-----NOTE------
SR 3.0.2 is not Perform required air lock leakage rate applicable testing in accordance with 10 CFR 50, ---------------
AppendixJQ0ptidhiB,asmodifiedby ..
approved eYempt'iohs"'aiid!RE551st6fj"fGu,idd' ~~"~ In accordance 12163?. datsd Se.pte_inberM19,951
_ . - m- -'
with 10 CFR 50, The acceptance criteria for air lock eh 4 Optioh!B, is testing are: modiffed by approved
- a. Overall air lock leakage rate is exemptions ind s 0.05 L, when tested at 2 P,. R gislLatoFi .. ^
Guide}1?I63;
- b. For each door, leakage rate is dated ^
s .01 L, when tested at 2 9.0 psig. SeptembiM 19957" ~~
(continued)
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.6-6 Amendment No. 4%
Containment Isolation Valves l 3.6.3 l
l SURVEILLANCE REQUIPfMENTS (continued) 1 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.6.3.4 ----------------NOTES------------------
l
' 1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.
- 2. SR 3.0.4 is not applicable.
Verify each containment isolation manual valve Prior to and blind flange that is located inside entering MODE 4 containment and required to be closed during from MODE 5 if accident conditions is closed, except for not performed I
containment isolation valves that are open within the l under administrative controls. previo.4 92 days i SR 3.6.3.5 Verify the isolation time of each Section A In accordance i and B power operated and each automatic with the containment isolation valve is within limits. Inservice l Testing Program l
SR 3.6.3.6 ------------------NOTES---------------------
Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1 in accordance with 10CFR50,AppendixJj by approved exemptions andf RegulitbF {pptibhiB, as modified i[Gaids R163 A 9ditiES.E Ltimb6W1995'. ~ ' ~'"y*^~ ~~"_ _.
<. x
..___ .......___.~ ~_~_~____..________..___.
l 184 days
! Perform leakage rate testing for containment l purge valves with resilient seals. AND Within 92 days after opening the valve 1
(continued) e i
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 3.6-14 Amendment No. 146 i
SR Applicability B 3.0 BASES l
SR 3.0.2 not be suitable for conducting the Surveillance (e.g.,
(continued) transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities).
The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for l which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in l the individual Specifications. f.n exampic of wher SR 3.0.2 1 dec: not apply i ; Survcillance with ; Frcquency of "in !
accordance with 10 CFR 50, f.ppendix J, :: mcdified by i approved exemptions." The requirements of regulation; take !
precedence cycr the TS. The TS cannet in and of them;civc l
cxtend a test interval specified in the regulatione Therefore, there 1: ; Netc in the Frcquency stating, l "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable."
)
As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply I to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per..." basis. The 25%
extension applies to each performance after the initial l s
performance. The initial perfonnance of the Required 1 Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a single action with a single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 25% i extension to this Completion Time is that such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.
The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly merely as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified.
l SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring I affected equipment inoperable or an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not (continued)
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 8 3.0-12 Amendment No. +M
I f
l .
t L Containment B 3.6.1 l
B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS i l
B 3.6.1 Containment l
BASES BACKGROUND The containment consists of the concrete reactor building (RB), its steel liner, and the penetrations through this structure. The structure is designed to contain radioactive material that may be released from the reactor core following a Design Basis Accident (DBA). Additionally, this structure provides shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.
The containment is a reinforced concrete structure with a i cylindrical wall, a flat foundation mat, and a shallow dome '
roof. The cylinder wall is prestressed with a post tensioning system in the vertical and horizontal directions, and the dome roof is prestressed utilizing a three way post tensioning system. The inside surface of the containment is lined with a carbon steel liner to ensure a high degree of leak tightness during operating and accident conditions.
The concrete RB is required for structural integrity of the containment under DBA conditions. The steel liner and its penetrations establish the leakage limiting boundary of the containment. Maintaining the containment OPERABLE limits the leakage of fission product radioactivity from the containment to the environment. SR 3.6.1.1 leakage rate requirements comply with 10 CFR 50, . Appendix JM0ptlibli?B (Ref. 1), as modified by approved exemptions (6dlRggulato@[Guijfel17163] ,
d@p?Sej[em, beg 1J9[.
The isolation devices for the penetrations in the containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier:
- a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
- 1. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system, or I.
(continued)
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.6-1 Amendment No. 4%
i
Containment 1 B 3.6.1 BASES BACKGROUND 2. closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or (continued) de-activated autcmatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LC0 3.6.3, ;
" Containment Isolation Valves."
- b. Each air lock is OPERABLE, .except as provided in ;
LC0 3.6.2,
- Containment Air Locks." !
. 1 APPLICABLE The safety design h sis for the containment is that the SAFETY ANALYSES containment must wi<hstand the pressures and_ temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate.
The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material within containment are a loss of coolant accident, a main steam line break (MSLB), and a control element assembly-ejection accident (Ref. 2). In .he analysis of each of these l accidents, it. is assumed that containment is OPERABLE such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The containment was designed with an allowable _ leakage rate of 0.10% of containment air weight per day (Ref. 3 . This leakage rate is defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix JR)0ptf6iilB (Ref.1), as L.: the maximum allowable containment ~^Tsskhss rate at the calculated maximum peak containment pressure (P.)
of 55.7 psig, which results from the limiting DBA, which is a design basis _MSLB (Ref. 2).
Satisfactory leakage rate test results are a requirement for the establishment of containment OPERABILITY.
The containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LC0 Containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to within the acceptance cr'.teria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J7 Optisn7B (Ref.1). Comp 1 ince with this LCO will ensure a bo~nt"a'ihment configuration, including equipment hatches, that is structurally sound. and that will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analysis.
Individual leakage rates specified for the containment _ air lock (LC0 3.6.2) and purge valves with resilient seals (continued)
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.6-2 Amendment No. 144 1
Containment B 3.6.1 PASES LCO (LC0 3.6.3) are not specifically part of the acceptance (continued) criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J M 0ptich? B. Therefore, !
leakage rates exceeding these individusl" limits only result in the containment being inoperable when the leakage results in exceeding the acceptance criteria of Appendix JM;0ptioh78.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material into containment. In N0 DES 5 and 6, the !
probability and consequences of these events are reduced duc l to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. '
Therefore, containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment. The requirements for containment during MODE 6 are addressed in LC0 3.9.3, " Containment Penetrations."
ACTIONS A.1 In the event containment is inoperable, containment must be restored t: OPERABLE status within I hour. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time provides a ceriod of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importhnce of maintaining containment during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when containment is inoperable is minimal.
B.1 and B.2 If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Tiue, the plant must be brought to a ,
MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> i and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Comp:" - n Times i are reasonable, based on operating experience, te . h the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
(continued)
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 8 3.6-3 Amendment No. 116
Containment B 3.6.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1 REQUIREMENTS l Maintaining the containment OPERABLE requires compliance with i
the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of l
10 CFR 50, Appendix JM0ptidnHB (Ref. 1), as modified by approved exemptions ^ and2Rs Septembe@l9957 ' FaiTuFs^^ti^gulstoffjj"fGuidsiili1632 Edated nisst""sirTosk'^"ihd*p0Fgnsivs With'rE5'ilieht" Thal leakage limits specified in LC0 3.6.2 and LC0 3.6.3 does not invalidate the acceptability of these overall leakage determinations unless their contribution to overall Type A, B, and C leakage causes that to exceed limits.
SR Frequencies are as required by Appendix JM0ptWh3B, as modified by app dat'#d?Sipteinber @Thus, l995. rovedSRexemptions and?RsgbllatbrytGeide11 3!0';2'('wh'f6h'slTdWs'FFsquenc9 n nn T'doeT~ dot apply. These periodic testing requirements verify that the containment leakage rate does not exceed the leakage rate assumed in the safety analysis.
SR 3.6.1.2 For ungrouted, post tensioned tendons, this SR ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained in accordance with the provisions of the Containment Tendon Surveillance Program. Testing and Frequency are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.35 (Ref. 4).
REFERENCES _. 10 CFR 50, Appendix Jg0@{6ii[B. I
- 4. Regulatory Guide 1.35, Revision 3.
5; [Regblit6Fy!Gtiid61!163M.
'dstsdlSep~temberM1995.
- - . = .- l, 1
I l
l l
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 8 3.6-4 Amendment No. 4M
Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks BASES BACKGROUND Containment air locks form part of the containment pressure boundary and provide a means for personnel access during all MODES of operation.
Each air lock is nominally a right circular cylinder,10 ft in diameter, with a door at each end. The doors are interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening. During periods when containment is not required to be OPERABLE, the door interlock mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periods when frequent containment entry is necessary. Each air lock door has been designed and tested to certify its ability to withstand a pressure in excess of the maximum expected pressure following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) in containment. As such, closure of a single door supports containment OPERABILITY. Each of the doors contains double gasketed seals and local leakage rate.
testing capability to ensure pressure integrity. To effect a leak tight seal, the air lock design uses pressure seated doors (i.e., an increase in containment internal pressure results in increased sealing force on each door).
Each personnel air lock is provided with limit switches on both doors that provide control room indication of door position. Additionally, control room indication is provided to alert the operator whenever an air lock door interlock mechanism is defeated.
The containment air locks form part of the containment pressure boundary. Is such, air lock integrity and leak '
tightness is essential for maintaining the containment leakage l rate within limit in the event of a DBA. Not maintaining air I lock integrity or leak tightness may result in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in the safety analysis. SR 3.6.2.1 ,
leakage rate requirements are in conformance with 10 CFR 50, j AppendixJji^f0ptionTTB Ref. 1), as modified by approved exemptions hyggulit6fy([Gsideil?1,63gdatsdfS@thmliig1995.
(continued)
, SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.6-5 Amendment No. 4 %
4
Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES (continued)
APPLICABLE For atmospheric containment, the DBAs that result in a SAFETY ANALYSES release of radioactive material within containment are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), a main steam line break (MSLB) and a control element assembly (CEA) ejection accident (Ref. 2).
In.the analysis of each of these accidents, it is assumed that containment is OPERABLE such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The containment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of 0.10% of containment air weight per day (Ref. 2). This leakage rate is defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J,?0ptidhlB (Ref.1), as L.: the maximum allowable containment"'Teakage' rate at the calculated maximum peak containment pressure (P.) of 55.7 psig, which results from the limiting DBA, which is a design basis MSLB (Ref. 2). This allowable leakage rate forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs associated with the air lock.
The containment air locks satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LC0 Each containment air lock forms part of the containment pressure boundary. As part of containment, the air lock safety function is related to control of the containment leakage rate resulting from a DBA. Thus, each air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event.
Each air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The door seals and sealing surface are considered a part of the air lock. The interlock allows only one air lock door of an air lock to be opened at one time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of containment does not exist when containment is required to be OPERABLE. Closure of )
a single door in each air lock is sufficient to provide a ieak l tight barrier following postulated events. Nevertheless, both '
doors are kept closed when the air lock is not being used for normal entry into and exit from containment. l (continued)
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.6-6 Amendment No. 4 %
J
l l
Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES i
s SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2 d (continued) 4 REQUIREMENTS 10 CFR 50, Appendix JM0p~t'ioriKB as modified by
, approved Rig 61at(Ref. 1),oFFGsidei Q171'63iddstb
, exemptions SeptembefM~1995. ~ahdH^Fefledt's'thf^1sikip's"Fita^tVstind This*SR
, requirements with regard to air lock leakage (Type B leakage t tests). The acceptance criteria were established during initial air lock and containment OPERABILITY testing. The
.' periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall containment leakage rate. The Frequency 'is required by ,
Appendix J K0pti6nfB, as modified by approved exemptions ind !
.RegUlaf6FRGuidejyl63Qs;thdjSgtbinb'E M19p5. Thus, SR 3.072 (which illows Frequency extensions) does not' apply. '
4-
] The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that an j inoperable air lock- door does not invalidate the ' previous *
- successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.
This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is
{ capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event of l a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR requiring the results ,
to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1.
. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accounted for e
in determining the overall containment leakage rate.
i SR 3.6.2.2 The air lock interlock is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in a single air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident containment pressure,- l closure of either door will support containment OPERABILITY.
Thus, the door interlock feature supports containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used. for personnel transit into and out of containment. Periodic testing of this ,
interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as I designed and that' simultaneous opening of the inner and outer doors will not inadvertently occur. Due to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is only challenged when containment is entered, Note 1 specifies that this test is only required to be performed upon entering containment but is not required more frequently than every 184 days. The (continued)
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 8 3.6-11 Amendment No. -1%
i l
Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES l
SURVEILLANCE SR 3'.6.2.2 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS ,
second note states that SR 3.0.4 is not applicable. The !
184 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of other indications of door and interlock mechanism status available to operations personnel.
REFERENCES _ 1. 10CFR50,AppendixJjj0ppf6Q.
- 2. UFSAR, Section 15.1, 15.4.
- 3. UFSAR, Section 6.2.
l M y pp@}jj Q[y(@ {))J6] Rdati QS gtimbi Q 9gj. '
l l I
I I
1 SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.6-11 Amendment No. 446
l Containment isolation Values B 3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.5 l REQUIREMENTS l
' (continued) Verifying that the isolation time of each power operated and !
' automatic containment isolation valve is within limits is l required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that as(umed in the safety analysis. The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. j l
SR 3.6.3.6 For containment purge valves with resilient seals, additional leakage rate testing beyond the test requirements of l 10 CFR 50, is required to Appendix ensure OPERABILITY. JM0ptf6KEB (Ref. 5),"OpersPii@~ experien i that this type of seal has the potential to degrade in a shorter time period than do other seal types.
l l Based on this observation and the importance of maintaining this penetration leak tight (due to the direct path between t
containment and the environment), a Frequency of 184 days was established as part of the NRC resolution of Generic Issue B-20, " Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration" !
(Ref. 3).
! Additionally, this SR must be performed within 92 days after opening the valve. The 92 day Frequency was chosen i recognizing that cycling the valve could introduce additional '
seal degradation (beyond that occurring to a valve that has l not been opened). Thus, decreasing the interval (from i l 184 days) is a prudent measure after a valve has been opened.
! A Note to this SR requires the results to be evaluated against l the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1. This ensures that excessive containment purge valve leakage is properly accounted for in determining the overall containment leakage l rate to verify containment OPERABILITY.
l l
l 2
(continued)
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 8 3.6-25 Amendment No. 4 %
Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.7 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The containment isolation valves covered by this SR are required to be demonstrated OPERABLE at the indicated frequency.This SR is modified by two notes. Note 1 specifies that the provisions of the Inservice Testing Program are not applicable when the valves are secured open. The second note indicates that SR 3.0.4 is not applicable.
SR 3.6.3.8 Automatic containment isolation valves close on a containment isolation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment following a DBA. This SR ensures each
, automatic containment isolation valve will actuate to its isolation position on a containment isolation actuation signal. The 24 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this SR be performed only during a unit outage, since isolation of penetrations would eliminate cooling water flow and disrupt normal operation of many critical components. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this SR when performed on the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
1 REFERENCES 1. SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Section 6.2.
1
- 3. Generic Issue B-20.
- 4. Generic Issue B-24.
- 5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix Jy0;itioiijB.
- 6. Rej sl at o Fy;Gn i dQjl63))d a ted ! Sept embeFjy 995.
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.6-26 Amendment No. 146
, Containment Isolation Valves B 3.9.3 l
B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations BASES l
BACKGROUND During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of fuel assemblies within containment with irradiated fuel in containment, a release of fission product radioactivity within the containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment when the LC0 requirements are met. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, this is accomplished by maintaining containment OPERABLE as described in LC0 3.6.1, " Containment." In MODE 6, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an accident is not likely; therefore, requirements to isolate the containment 1 from the outside atmosphere can be less stringent. The LC0 !
requirements are referred to as " containment closure" rather l than " containment OPERABILITY." Containment closure means I that all potential escape paths are closed or capable of being '
closed. Since there is no for containment pressurization, the Appendix Jg0$potentiali6{B, leakage crite tests are not required.
t The containment serves to contain fission product I radioactivity that may be released from the reactor core following an accident, such that offsite radiation exposures are maintained well within the requirements of 10 CFR 100.
Additionally, the containment structure provides radiation shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.
The containment equipment' hatch, which is part of the containment pressure boundary, provides a means for moving large equipment and components into and out of containment.
During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel ;
assemblies within containment, the equipment hatch must be !
held in place by at least four bolts. Good engineering practice dictates that the bolts required by this LCO' be approximately equally spaced. ;
The containment air locks, which are also part of the l containment pressure boundary, provide a means for personnel l
l (continued) j i
SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 8 3.9-9 Amendment No. 4+6 i
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