ML20079J321

Final Rept of Significant Const Deficiency 52 Re Bimetallic Penetration Welds W/O Stress relief/post-weld Heat Treatment on Containment Penetration Assemblies.Replacement Penetrations W/Correct post-weld Heat Treatment Installed

ML20079J321
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	12/15/1982
From:	Maurin L LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Jay Collins NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, W3I82-0126, W3I82-126, NUDOCS 8212280169
Download: ML20079J321 (3)

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u$20NsrsYN3 December 15, 1982 t. v uAuntN Voce Presklent Nucle <1r Operatoons W3182-0126 Q-3-A35.07.52 Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV U. S. Nucicar Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76012

SUBJECT:

Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-382 Significant Construction Deficiency No. 52 "Bi-Metallic Penetration Welds, No Stress Relief" Final Report

REFERENCE:

LP&L Letter W3182-0084 dated November 5, 1982

Dear Mr. Collins:

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Final Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 52, "Bi-Metallic Penetration Welds, No Stress Relief."

If you have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours, T kt(t's v

L. V. Maurin LVM/WAC:keh Attachment cc: 1) Director 3) E. Blake office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 (with 15 copies of report)

2) Director 4) W. Stevenson Office of Management Information and Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 (with I copy of report)

F212280169 821215 PDR ADOCK 05000382 [

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FINAL REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 52 "BI-METALLIC PENETRATION WELDS, NO STRESS RELIEF" INTRODUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes a defect with Reactor Containment Penetration Assemblies 40 and 41. The problem includes omission of stress relief /postweld heat treatment for Shop Weld No. 2 -

on each assembly. This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).

To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION Shop Weld No. 2 was performed by Associated Piping and Engineering Corporation personnel using their Welding Procedure SWP-836. Rev. 6, to join a 24-inch diameter schedule 120 ASME SA106 Grade B Guard Pipe to an ASME SA182 Grade -

F304 Flued Head Forging on Reactor Containment Penetration Numbers 40 and 41.

The nominal wall thickness of this weld joint is 1.812 inches. Based upon the requ' aaients of ASME Section III Subsection NE 1971 Edition including Addenda through Winter 1973 Subparagraph NE-4623.1(d), the SA 106 Grade B, Guard pipe requires postweld heat treatment since it c eeds lh inches in thickness. The subject joints were welded by buttering the SA106 Grade B material with 309 stainless steel filler metal. Postweld heat treatment of this pipe prior to welding to the stainless steel flued head forging was not accomplished. The welding procedure utilized by Associated Piping &

Engineering Corporation was qualified for use with 309 stainless steel filler metal but not for subassembly postweld heat treatment.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS l Failure of Shop Weld No. 2 on Containment Penetrations Numbers 40 and 41 could lead to degradation of containment integrity. This condition does not ensure that radiological exposure to the public resulting from a loss-of- _

coolant accident (LOCA) is below 10CFR100 guidelines. Therefore, the present welds, if left uncorrected, are a safety hazard.

CORRFCTIVE ACTION TAKEN The original corrective action for this significant construction deficiency was to perform the Post Weld Heat Treatment of subject shop weld at the L jobsite. In performing this corrective action, the maximum temperature -

specified for the PWHT was exceeded due te malfunctions of the stress relieving equipment. This required a revision to the initial corrective action.

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SCD 52 Page 2 CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN (cont'd)

The revised corrective action was to. replace the penetration assemblies -

(consisting of the flued head, guard pipe and process pipe) for both penetrations P40 and P41.

Replacement Penetrations were obtained from the original vendor, Associated

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Piping and Engineering Corp., on Purchase Order NY-403422. The new assemblies were fabricated with the correct PWHT performed by the vendor and have been installed.

Nonconformance Report W3-3647 was issued to identify, disposition and track the corrective action to resolve this significant construction deficiency.

The corrective action per the NCR has been completed.

This report is submitted as the Final Report.

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