ML20062J169

Interim Significant Const Deficiency 61 Re Linear Crack in Stainless Steel Tubing.Initially Reported on 820625. Metallurgical Analysis Indicates Defect Due to Hot Tear Traced to Tube Hollows.Final Rept Expected by 820831

ML20062J169
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	08/05/1982
From:	Mclendon G LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Jay Collins NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, W3K82-0474, W3K82-474, NUDOCS 8208160283
Download: ML20062J169 (4)

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• NEW ORLEANS. LOUISIANA 70174 * (504) 366 2345 sa NONsysyp; August 5, 1982 G D. McLENDON Senior Vice President W3K82-0474 Q-3-A35.07.61 Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission '

611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 I -

Arlington, Texas 76012 ,

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SUBJECT:

Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-382 y/ /

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<l Significant Construction Deficiency No. 61

" Linear Crack in Stainless Steel Tubing"

Reference:

Telecon - L. L. Bass (LP&L) to L. Martin (NRC) on June 25, 1982

Dear Mr. Collins:

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 61,

" Linear Crack in Stainless Steel Tubing."

If you have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours, GDMcL/LLB/ncd Gns- y G.D. McLendon

! Attachment cc: 1) Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 (with 15 copies of report)

2) Director Office of Management Information and Program Control / -

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,

Washington, D. C. 20555 . f' (with I copy of report) e- h,q 8208160283 820805 PDR ADOCK 05000382 S PDR L.

s. .

LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT No. 3 Significant Construction Deficiency No. 61 Linear Crack in Stainless Steel Tubing ,

Reviewed by R. J. MillfiserWe Manager 7 ld//O Date Reviewed by 8 2--

J{ Lf Wills - Project Superintendent 'Date Reviewed by '

, /N E 7 WM 7- $8-[*

Hart - Project)ricensing Eng'ine'er 0

Reviewed by J}&s -

730f8 L JfjDeBruin - ESSE P oject Engineer / Dat(e Reviewed by 24%/ [- [d" [C-J Gutierre( - Q. A. S'p'e Supervisor

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o INTERIM REPORT SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 61

" LINEAR CRACK IN STAINLESS STEEL TUBING" INTRODUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). This proelem is con-sidered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).

This report describes a linear defect in 1/2" diameter stainless steel tubing SA213 Type 316. This tubing has been installed in the instrumentation lines at Louisiana Power & Light Company Waterford Unit No. 3.

To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION Mercury Company of Norwood Incorporated learned of this defect during attempts to pressure the line to instrument PT-RC-0173 for Hydrostatic Test M-262 on the reactor vessel and loops instrument lines. A linear crack was found in the 1/2" diameter stainless steel tubing line, manufactured by Sandvik Corpora-tion of Scranton, Pennsylvania. This defect was reported to Ebasco Services on NCR W3-3919 June 4, 1982. The section of tubing containing the defect has been cut out and replaced with acceptable material.

The defective tube section was macroscopically examined and the liquid pene-trant examined by Ebasco.

The defect appeared to be manufacturing related and because of the safety class of the material Sandvik's manufacturing personnel were informed of the problem.

Based upon the examinations conducted, the following conclusions were reached by Sandvik personnel and the Ebasco materials applications Engineer:

The tube defect was severe enough to be detected by both hydrostatic testing and eddy current testing.

The production documentation for Heat 466023 Lot 41952, which contained the defective tube, showed no rejects for hydrostatic testing (2500 psi on 5/9/81) or eddy current testing (performed on 5/11/81).

l l The defect has been traced to a hot tear of the tube hollows, which occurred during the extrusion operation. The cause of this defect was due to over-heating of the billet prior to extrusion and is considered to be a localized and isolated case.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS Tubing from Heat No. 466023 has been installed in the Reactor Coolant, Safety Injection and Emergency Diesel Generator Systems. These systems do have

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G Class lE instrument installations. Failure of a tube from this heat installed in a Class lE instrument loop will result in an inability of the loop to per-form its safety function. Therefore, until the corrective action described herein is completed, we must consider this reportable.

CORRECTIVE ACTION A complete and thorough investigation of the inspection results for hydro and eddy c'urrent testing over the past 18 months was initiated by Sandvik.

The incidence of this type of defect over this period was found to be extremely low.

Sandvik, Scranton, operates under a quality program in accordance with ASME Code Section III, para. NCA3800. As a part of this program, test procedures are reviewed on routine basis. Statistical data on rejects are e:eviewed monthly by the Quality Assurance and Production Departments, and changes for improvement are an ongoing process.

Further improvements are instituted as a result of semi-annual internal audits, as well as suggestions obtained from customer audits.

As a result of this incident, Sandvik's quality program at Scranton, Pennsylvania will be further strengthened to guard against a possible recurrence by the imple-mentation of an action plan, developed from this internal investigation.

The Scranton facility has been operating for over ten years and has produced some 45 million feet of tube and pipe. This is the only such incident in a ten-year period where material tested in this manner was delivered with such a defect. This record, plus the defect analysis report and the statistics, indicates that this is an isolated case.

Sandvik has performed a metallurgical analysis of the tube defect. The analysis indicates that the defect is attributed to a hot tear traced to the tube hollows which occurred during the extrusion process. The analysis, coupled with a statistical review of the NDE failure rate at Sandvik's facilities, is being reviewed by Ebasco Engineering and Quality Assurance, with the intent of establishing that the defect is isolated in nature and not prevalent through-out the tubing fabricated from this heat.

The review and evaluation is anticipated to be completed on or by August 16, 1982 and the Final Report submitted on or before August 31, 1982.