ML033500224

Slides from December 9, 2003 Regulatory Conference Re April 24, 2003 Alert

ML033500224
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	12/09/2003
From:	FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
EA-03-194, IR-04-003
Download: ML033500224 (17)

Text

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Initiating Conditions Entry riteria HIGH alarmon one or m r e of the following Water level observed to be below top of the @e -

GA2 iadiation mnitors resulting fiom darrage to sill separating an^ of the following containing i t i x h i c d fuel: irradiated fuel:

Major damage to irradiated SPENTFUELPOOL 0 FHl3 Fuel Storage and Preparation Pool A fuel UPPERPOOL 0 FHJ3 Fuel Transfer Pool L FUELPREPPOOL 0 FHB Spent Fuel Storage Pool E FHBVENTGAS 0 FHBcaSkPit R C"ATM0SGAS 0 Fuel Storage Pool T CNTMT Fuel Transfer Pool 1 2 3 4 5 1 )

NOTE I The intent ofthis EAL is to allow observationshmplant personnel to be factored into the declarationdecision and is not intended to dirLxt an entiy into an area solely io observe pool level. The gate sill is the lip between the pools where the bottomofthe gate muld sit if installed.

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e Refueling Outage Activities Refueling Activities

- containment building

- fuel handling building Fuel defect inspection activities e e e e e e e e

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e GNF experience reduced sensitivity to end cap separation

- experienced approx. 10 percent of fuel inspections

- personal experience approx. 100 times

- never experienced alarm

- location of air intake immediately above work area Incomplete communications to the control room

- complications during fuel handling building evacuation Continued implementation of protective actions to ensure safety 0 e 0 e 0 e e e

1nit ia t i n g Conditions Entry riteris I-iIGI-I alarm on one or more of the following Water level observed to be below top o f the gate -

CA2 i.ailiatioii nionitors resulting from damage to sill separating any of the following containing c :\ 2 i m d 1 a t c . d fuel: brradiated fuel:

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!UCl to i I-r adi atecl SPI YT FUEL POOL I P I T R POOL

. FHB Fuel Storage and Preparation Pool FHB Fuel Transfer Pool A

LA 1 L 1 1. PREP POOL E

. riiu VENT GAS C\ I MT ATMOS GAS FHB Spent Fuel Storage Pool FHB CaskPit CNTMT Fuel Storage Pool R

T CNTMT Fuel Transfer Pool 1 2 3 4 5 D The intent of this EAL is to allow obsenSationsfrom plant personnel to be factored into the declaration decision and is intended to direct a11entry into a n area solely to olise~wepool level. The gate sill is the lip between the pools where the bottom of the gate would sit if installtcl.

intended for major damage to irradiated fuel entry condition did not exist after approximately one minute NUREG 1022 - does not require classification e e e

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e Shift manager immediately reviewed emergency plan entry criteria.

Protective actions continued because cause of alarm was unknown NUMARC and Perry Plant EAL focuses on protection of onsite personnel.

Protective actions taken were appropriate.

SDP includes consideration of protective actions e e e e e e e e

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0 Unit 1 Plant Vent - no alarm condition 0

Isotopic sample analysis - no detectable activity 0

FHB radiation surveys immediately after end cap separation- normal 0

Internal or external contaminations - none 0

Offsite organization notification within 15 minutes of classification e e e e e e 0 0

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0 Comprehensive procedure improvements Completed for Inspection of Irradiated Fuel Bundles (FTI -E0036) 0 Shift Manager remediation plan - completed.

0 Event discussed during operator continuing b .

training 0

Lesson learned incorporated into TPTE and instruction currently in use at Perry for Fuel Channel measurement campaign e e e e e e e e

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e Ownership of the issue and reinforcement of timely classification and command and control.

Basis of the emergency action level - focused on protection of onsite personnel.

Appropriate immediate actions taken to protect plant workers.

There was no impact to health and safety of the general public or onsite personnel.

e e e e e e