ML033500224

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Slides from December 9, 2003 Regulatory Conference Re April 24, 2003 Alert
ML033500224
Person / Time
Site: Perry FirstEnergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/09/2003
From:
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
EA-03-194, IR-04-003
Download: ML033500224 (17)


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Initiating Conditions 1

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Major damage to irradiated fuel Entry HIGH alarm on one or m r e of the following iadiation mnitors resulting fiom darrage to itixhicd fuel:

SPENTFUELPOOL UPPERPOOL FUELPREPPOOL FHBVENTGAS C"ATM0SGAS riteria Water level observed to be below top of the @e sill separating an^ of the following containing irradiated fuel:

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FHJ3 Fuel Transfer Pool 0

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Fuel Storage Pool CNTMT Fuel Transfer Pool FHl3 Fuel Storage and Preparation Pool FHB Spent Fuel Storage Pool GA2 A

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The intent ofthis EAL is to allow observations hmplant personnel to be factored into the declaration decision and is not intended to dirLxt an entiy into an area solely io observe pool level. The gate sill is the lip between the pools where the bottomofthe gate muld sit if installed.

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e Refueling Outage Activities Refueling Activities

- containment building

- fuel handling building Fuel defect inspection activities e

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e GNF experience reduced sensitivity to end cap separation

- experienced approx. 10 percent of fuel inspections

- personal experience approx. 100 times

- never experienced alarm

- location of air intake immediately above work area Incomplete communications to the control room

- complications during fuel handling building evacuation Continued implementation of protective actions to ensure safety e

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1 nit ia t i ng Conditions 1

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!UCl Entry I-iIGI-I alarm on one or more of the following i.ailiatioii nionitors resulting from damage to imd1atc.d fuel:

SPI YT FUEL POOL I PITR POOL 1 L 1 1. PREP POOL C\\ I MT ATMOS GAS

. riiu VENT GAS riteris Water level observed to be below top of the gate sill separating any of the following containing brradiated fuel:

FHB Fuel Transfer Pool FHB CaskPit CNTMT Fuel Storage Pool CNTMT Fuel Transfer Pool FHB Fuel Storage and Preparation Pool FHB Spent Fuel Storage Pool The intent of this EAL is to allow obsenSations from plant personnel to be factored into the declaration decision and is direct a11 entry into an area solely to olise~we pool level. The gate sill is the lip between the pools where the bottom of the gate would sit if installtcl.

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intended for major damage to irradiated fuel entry condition did not exist after approximately one minute NUREG 1022 - does not require classification e

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e Shift manager immediately reviewed emergency plan entry criteria.

Protective actions continued because cause of alarm was unknown NUMARC and Perry Plant EAL focuses on protection of onsite personnel.

Protective actions taken were appropriate.

SDP includes consideration of protective actions e

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0 Unit 1 Plant Vent - no alarm condition Isotopic sample analysis - no detectable activity FHB radiation surveys immediately after end cap separation-normal Internal or external contaminations - none Offsite organization notification within 15 minutes of classification e

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Comprehensive procedure improvements Completed for Inspection of Irradiated Fuel Bundles (FTI -E0036)

Shift Manager remediation plan - completed.

Event discussed during operator continuing b

training Lesson learned incorporated into TPTE and instruction currently in use at Perry for Fuel Channel measurement campaign e

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e Ownership of the issue and reinforcement of timely classification and command and control.

Basis of the emergency action level - focused on protection of onsite personnel.

Appropriate immediate actions taken to protect plant workers.

There was no impact to health and safety of the general public or onsite personnel.

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