ML033650376
| ML033650376 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/2003 |
| From: | FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML033650376 (27) | |
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Desired Outcome Ensure a consistent understanding of the issue Present the causes and corrective actions m Discuss further actions Present results from updated safety assessment
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Background===
Emergency Service Water (ESW) Pump "A" coupling failed Enforcement discretion requested and granted (no net increase in risk)
Repairs completed well within the discretionary period
Cause Analysis Tom Lentz Director of Engineering
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Properly Installed Coupling Key - 2 Req'd.
Split Ring r Sleeve t///v//X~i I-Oivy, I
Lock Screw - 2 req'd.
Shaft End - Typ.
As Installed Coupling Coupling Sleeve Split Ring Sleeve Lock Screw Off Set YP
Root Cause Evaluated Evaluated the environment/application Conducted a detailed laboratory analysis Performed a detailed stress analysis Fracture mechanics were evaluated U7Z;T
Root Cause Conclusion Stress corrosion cracking is the root cause Improper installation due to inadequate procedure Susceptible material Environment considered in design/operation Corrective actions address both installation and material
Extent of Condition Examined Safety and non-safety related pumps were included Similarities in configuration, couplings, and maintenance instructions were examined ESW Pump "B" - found to be identical ESW Pump "C" - similar e~::
Corrective Actions Kevin Cimorelli Director of Maintenance
Comprehensive Corrective Actions BE Emergency Service Water Pumps F Maintenance Procedures PP Materials
Corrective Actions ESW Pumps Pump operability has been assured Further actions will be taken to assure continued reliability ESW Pump "A" rebuild in 2004 ESW Pump "B" inspect in 2004, rebuild in 2007 ESW Pump "C" rebuild in 2004 I 11 I
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Corrective Actions Procedures and Material Revision of procedures for ESW pumps Material upgrades for all ESW pumps New requirements for heat treatment, hardness, and documentation 100% NDE of coupling sleeves 1-1----
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Collective Significance Tim Rausch Plant Manager
Collective Significance Review Process Systematic evaluation of a collection of documented events or conditions Multidiscipline Review Team formed November 3, 2003 Scope includes four mitigating system equipment failures over last year
Collective Significance Review - Matrix Matrix used - Categories/Facts m Problem category examples:
Procedure guidance Training Material deficiencies Design deficiencies Problem fact examples:
Event type Organization Cause code
Collective Sig nificance Review - Resu Its Areas for Improvement
- Two collective issues identified during common cause evaluation Electrical/Mechanical maintenance instruction deficiencies Procedure "use" categories not pre-det l
Content of Procedures
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Conclusion:==
Procedures were root or contributing causes
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Actions:
X 75 maintenance instructions will be systematically assessed X Results of assessment will determine need for comprehensive procedure upgrade Interim - Safety related procedures will be reviewed as part of the work planning FA I
Use of Procedures
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Conclusion:==
Procedure use categories not assigned MIW ",
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Actions:
Interim - maintenance instructions will be "In-Field Reference" "Use" category will be identified in maintenance instructions
Collective Significance Review - Summary P
Common causes are understood M Comprehensive actions are being taken p
Systematic assessment will be used to adjust scope and timeliness
Summary - Cause and Corrective Actions I
Root and contributing causes are understood t
Corrective actions are comprehensive
, Extent of condition and extent of cause are being addressed
Safety Assessment Tom Lentz Director of Engineering
Initial Safety Assessment Initial large U
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characterization of incremental core damage and early release probabilities (ICCDP and ICLERP)
ICCDP (including internal events) = 2.03E-6 ICCDP (seismic, fire, and external flooding) = negligible ICLERP = 1.56E-7 I
Safety Assessment Basis for Initial Assessment m Level 1 PSA model used Includes all failure modes Simplified assumptions due to model and computer capabilities (no time dependence between event failures)
No consideration given to the time dimension relative to the ESW Pump "A" coupling failure Basis for Updated Assessment The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> mission time was partitioned Only the applicable scenarios based on this event were considered Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) was performed 19
Results of Updated Safety Assessment Updated characterization of incremental core damage and large early release probabilities (ICCDP and ICLERP) m ICCDP (including internal events) = 8.5E-7 m ICCDP (seismic, fire, and external flooding) = 1.2E-7 ICLERP = <1.OE-7 (qualitatively)
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Conclusion:==
- ICCDP (including external events) = 9.7E-7
- ICLERP <1.OE-7 (qualitatively) i 0-
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