ML20041B153

Interim Significant Const Deficiency Rept 44 Re C-E & Ebasco Pressure Safety Injection Pump Suction Valves Not Designed for High Differential Pressure During Shutdown Cooling Mode.Check Valves Will Be Installed by 820816

ML20041B153
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	02/15/1982
From:	Mclendon G LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Jay Collins NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, W3K-82-0090, W3K-82-90, NUDOCS 8202230332
Download: ML20041B153 (4)

Text

'

LOUISIANA / 24a ouAnoNoe S1 seer POWE R & LIGH T/ P O BOX 6008

• NEW ORLEANS. LOUISIANA 70174 * (504) 366-2345

$II0NSYSE February 15, 1982 G. D. McLENDON Senior Vice President W3K 0090 Q-3-A33.07.44 Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV p co U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission c) rli g n T xa 012 RECGwgo p S- '

SUBJECT:

Waterford SES Unit No. 3 -

FEB *o Docket No. 50-382

-~

g N2b if Interim Report of Significant Constr uction Deficiency No. 44 h rak Igp ISC "LPSI Pump Suction Valves" g U s

Reference:

Telecon - L. Bass (LP&L) to L. Martin (NRC) on 1/1 i

Dear Mr. Collins:

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 44, "LPSI Pump Suction Valves."

If you have any q'testions, please advise.

Very truly yours, a e GDMcL/LLB/grf Attachment cc: 1) Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 (with 15 copies of report)

2) Director Office of Management Information and Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4 Washington, D. C. 20555 g a (with 1 copy of report) y h\\

6202230332 9g9g3g

{DRADOCK 05000382 PDR

O .

LOUISIANA POWER.& LIGHT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3' Interim Report of- '

Significant Construction Deficiency No. 44 LPSI PUMP SUCTION ~ VALVES Reviewed by / )Y v~' ) /2 _

R. J. MilliiWer - Site Manager / Date Reviewed by ]

J./ L.' Wills - Project Superintendent D6te

{b

/

Reviewed by __c ,_. j _ . Of s /g/,3 L ,

J Bruin - ESSE 15 roject Engineer / D' ate Reviewed by (2 .. . bdTbCL M ro' ject Licencing Eifgineer h # '

/ 8&

'Date 7 J. H Reviewed by h4 Z Vl_.

J.G6tierre:{-Q.A.SiteSupervisor ' Da te February 12, 1982 r

l l

l l

l t

L .

I I

t

.g.

INTERIM REPORT OF . .

SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY No. 44 "LPSI PUMP SUCTION VALVES" INTRODUCTION

, . This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) . It describes a deficiency in l the Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump Suction Valves. The existing valves are not designed for the high dif ferential pressure they would be subjected to during '

shutdown cooling mode o f operation. .This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). To the best of our knowledge, this ' problem has not been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION As a result of the TMI-2 accident, the NRC requ'res.that i the shutdown cooling. system (SDCS) be designed for complete remote operation (the use of the manual TMI-2 system

( .was hampered by high radiation level). To accomplish remote manual operation, a number of SDCS valves were to be backfitted with motor opera

• ors, including the sub-ject two valves. While quoting the motor operators, Fisher Controls Co., the manu-f acturer, revealed that in the closed position, these ~ valves are capable of taking .

only 150 PSI differential pressure. -(LPSI pump suction valves C E Tag No. SI-431

- and 444, Ebasco Tag No. 2SI-B301A and 2SI-B302B).

l This condition is unacceptable since the LPSI pump is lined up for shutdown cooling i mode when the primary system pressure is about 370 PSIG at which time the LPSI pump suction valve is part of the primary coolant system pressure boundary. The ASME code requires double isolation of piping connecting to the primary system. The suction .

valve together with one check valve in series is to serve this purpose.

1 In ' order to be able to' put the SDCS in service at around 370 PSIG system pressure,

as required by CE's operating instructions, the LPSI pump suction valves must be capable of withstanding 415 PSIA system pressure with only a few PSI pressure on' the

other side. For this, the present butterfly valves will have to be replaced with. '

i 300 lb. class motor operated gate. valves.

l l SAFETY IMPLICATIONS Failure of the subject valves allows only singic valve isolation of primary. coolant (approximately 400 PSIG) during shutdown cooling mode. Failure of a correspondent check valve subjects the balance of safety injection system piping to conditions beyond their design rating. This condition could Itad to loss of primary coolant and loss of inventory in the refueling water storage pool (RWSP). A primary coolant leak would result in a significant radioactivity release; while the . loss of the RWSP would jeopatdize the ability to safely shut down the plant. There fore, the present design of the LPSI pump suction valves, if lef t uncorrected, presents a safety hazard to the plant.

CORRECTIVE ACTION The following corrective action will be taken:

t l

. o

1. Check Valves will be located on line 2SI20-4A and 2SI20-4B between RWSP/ SIS suction line and existing Check Valves (2SI-V331A and V332B).

2. The originally proposed Ibtor Operators on the Butterfly Valves 2SI-B301A and 2SI-B302B will be deleted and the valves will be locked open for normal operation and used only for maintenance isolation of the pump.

3. The 300 lb. pressure class rating will be extended back to and will include the added Check Valves on the suction line.

Ebasco Site Nonconformance Report W3-3441 was issued on February 4,1982, to pro-vide tracking for the deficiency. Corrective action shall be accomplished and a Final Report submitted to the USNRC on or before August 16, 1982.

LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT No. 3 Interim Report of #

Significant Construction Deficiency No. 44 LPSI PUMP SUCTION VALVES Reviewed by / 2 ,d / 2 j?c.

R . J . Milli 1Te r - - Site Manage.r / . Dale Reviewed by b J./ L.' Wills - Project Superintendent / Dfite Revieued by u n /~ . j_ Cf,'.

s 1 lp.}A t-.,. ,

'J./D/ Bruin - ESSE 15 roject Engineer / Ifa te (J

Reviewed by 4 /Of M , h f M e @ M ichut, /cA!MA rz,J . H t /-Gro'jectLicensingEifgineer

'a5 D

Reviewed by M Z 7L_

' Da te J.G6tierrez{-Q.A.SiteSupervisor Febrt.ary 12, 1982 i

Dafn I . . .

I INTERIM REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 44 "LPSI PUMP SUCTION VALVES" INTRODUCTION

. This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes a deficiency in the -Low Pressure _ Safety Injection Pump Suction Valves. The existing valves are not designed for the high dif ferential pressure they would be subjected to during shutdown cooling mode of operation. This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION As a result of the TMI-2 accident, the NRC requires that the shutdown cooling system (SDCS) be designed for complete remote operation (the use of the manual TMI-2 system was hampered by high radiation level). To accomplish remote manual operation, a number of SDCS valves were to be backfitted with motor operators, including the sub-ject two valves. While quoting the motor operators, Fisher Controls Co. , the manu-facturer, revealed that in the closed position, these valves' are capable of taking only 150 PSI differential pressure. (LPSI pump suction valves C E Tag No. SI-431 and 444, Ebasco Tag No. 2SI-B301A and 2SI-B302B).

This condition is unacceptable since the LPSI pump is lined up for shutdown cooling mode when the primary system pressure is about 370 PSIG at which time the LPSI pump suction valve is part of the primary coolant systeg pressure boundary. The ASME code requires double isolation of piping connecting to the primary systen. - The suction valve together with one cbeck valve in series 'io to serve this purpose.

In order to be able to put the SDCS in service at around 370 PSIC system pressure, as required by CE's operating instructions, the LPS1 pump suction valves must be capable of withstanding 415 PSIA system pressure with only a few PSI pressure on the other side. For this, the present butterfly valves will have to be replaced with 300 lb. class motor operated gate valves.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS l

[ Failure of the subject valves allows only single valve isolation of primary coolant (approximately 400 PSIG) during shutdown cooling mode. Failure of a correspondent check valve subjects the balance of safety injection system piping to conditions beyond their design rating. This condition could lead to loss of. primary coolant and loss of inventory in the refueling water storage pool (RWSP). A primary coolant leak would result in a significant radioactivity release; while the loss of the RWSP would jeopardize the ability to safely shut down the plant. Therefore, the present l

design of the LPSI pump suction valves, if lef t uncorrected, presents a safety hazard to the plant.

CORRECTIVE ACTION The following corrective action will be taken:

(

..v,. , , - , ~ _ . . - . - . , _ , - - - - ,-. - . - _ . , - - - -

7 - - - - ..

9 0

. - 6

1. Check Valves will be located on line 2SI20-4A and 2SI20-4B between RRSP/ SIS suction line and existing Check Valves (2SI-V331A and V332B).

2. The originally proposed Itotor Operators on the Butterfly Valves 2SI-B301A and 2SI-B302B will be deleted and the valves will be locked open for normal operation and used only for maintenance isolation of the pump.

3. The 300 lb. pressure class rating will be extended back to and will include the added Check Valves on the suction line.

Ebasco Site Nonconformance Report W3-3441 was issued on February 4, 1982, to pro-vide tracking for the de ficiency. Corrective action shall be accomplished and a Final Report submitted to the USNRC on or before August 16, 1982.

.