ML16336A557

2016-10 Draft Operating Test

ML16336A557
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	10/20/2016
From:	Vincent Gaddy Operations Branch IV
To:	Pacific Gas & Electric Co
References
Download: ML16336A557 (268)

Text

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-A5

Title:

REVIEW SHIFT STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments: Designed for SRO candidates in a classroom setting.

References:

• OP1.DC37, Plant Logs, Rev. 53

• DCPP Form 69-20533, Operations Shift Log

• Qualification Matrix Report Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 2.3, 4.2, 5.1 Job Designation: SRO Rev Comments MODIFIED FROM NRCL081LJA_SROA1 Gen KA # G2.1.5 - Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such 3.9 as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 08/11/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 08/11/16 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: REVIEW SHIFT STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed.

After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the step at which to begin.

Required Materials:

• OP1.DC37, Plant Logs, Rev. 53

• DCPP Form 69-20533, Operations Shift Log

• Qualification Matrix Report Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Both Units are operating at 100% power

• The Unit 2 Work Control Lead has completed the Watch List for the upcoming day shift based on the following:

o The watch will be primarily covered by B Crew.

o The U2 Shift Foreman originally scheduled has called in sick. The watch will be covered by a SRO from E Crew who is currently on his 7 off.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager has directed you to review the proposed Watch List and associated Qualification Matrix Report for the on-coming shifts management personnel to ensure all SRO level staffing requirements can be met.

Document the results of your review in the area provided below before reporting out.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: Identified the following SRO Level Shift Staffing Deficiencies in the proposed Watch List:

• E-Plan Minimum Crew Composition NOT met:

o Unit 2 Shift Foreman does not have the respirator qual.

• Tech Spec Minimum Crew Composition NOT met:

o Unit 2 Shift Foreman does not have the respirator qual.

• TS 5.2.2.f requirement to identify STA qualified individual to provide engineering expertise on shift is NOT met o Requires both Unit Shift Foreman to be STA qualified; Unit 2 Shift Foreman does not have the required OSTA WATCH qual.

NRCL161-A5 rev PAGE 2 OF 10 REV. 0 0c.docx

JPM TITLE: REVIEW SHIFT STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: REVIEW SHIFT STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Step 5.5.5 - Verify each listed 1.1 Reviews qualification matrix report and individual is qualified for the assigned verifies on-coming management watch using provided reports. personnel have appropriate qualification for assigned watch.

• Determines both Unit Shift Foremen have required OSHIFT F qual.

• Determines Work Control Shift Foreman has required OSHIFT F qual.

• Determines Shift Manager has required OSHIFT M qual.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

2.** Step 5.5.7.b - Check E-Plan minimum 2.1 Checks management portion of E-Plan crew composition for current minimum crew composition for current respirator qualification. respirator qualification.

2.2 Reviews associated Qualification Matrix Report for individuals filling E-Plan minimum crew positions.

2.3 Determines Unit 2 Shift Foreman does NOT have a current respirator qualification. **

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: REVIEW SHIFT STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: REVIEW SHIFT STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

3. Step 5.5.7.c - The individual(s) 3.1 Reviews Qualification Matrix Report for assigned the STA function shall have a individual assigned the STA function.

respirator qualification.

• Determines Unit 1 Shift Foreman DOES have a current respirator qualification.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

4.** Step 5.5.8 - Check E-Plan boxes for 4.1 Checks for Tech Spec minimum crew each required position. composition (step 5.5.8.a.1):

• Determines Tech Spec minimum for SRO level staffing requirement is met o 2 SROs (SM and Unit 2 SFM) 4.2 Checks for E-Plan required positions (step 5.5.8.f):

• 1 Shift Manager (ISEC)

• Work Control Shift Foreman

• 2 Shift Foremen o Affected Unit - IEOC o Other Unit - Communicator #1

• Determines E-Plan required management positions is NOT met o Unit 2 Shift Foreman does NOT have the required Respirator Qual and may NOT be able to fulfill the required E-Plan role during an emergency.**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: REVIEW SHIFT STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Comments:

Step Expected Operator Actions 5.** Step 5.5.9 - Check the appropriate 5.1 Checks for designated STA. (step 5.5.9.a):

box to designate the STA.

• Identifies Unit 1 Shift Foreman designated as STA.

• Notes Unit 2 Shift Foreman is NOT designated as STA.

• Reviewed Qualification Report Summary for OSTA WAT:

o Determines Unit 2 Shift Foreman is NOT STA qualified.

• Determines TS 5.2.2.f requirement to identify STA qualified individual is NOT met since both units Shift Foreman need to be STA qualified. **

5.2 Verifies Work Control Shift Foreman is Incident Accessor (IA) qualified.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: REVIEW SHIFT STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: REVIEW SHIFT STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow-up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

NRCL161-A5 REV PAGE 9 OF 10 REV. 0 0C.DOCX

JPM TITLE: REVIEW SHIFT STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A5 EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Both Units are operating at 100% power

• The Unit 2 Work Control Lead has completed the Watch List for the upcoming day shift based on the following:

o The watch will be primarily covered by B Crew.

o The U2 Shift Foreman originally scheduled has called in sick. The watch will be covered by a SRO from E Crew who is currently on his 7 off.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager has directed you to review the proposed Watch List and associated Qualification Matrix Report for the on-coming shifts management personnel to ensure all SRO level staffing requirements can be met.

Document the results of your review in the area provided below before reporting out.

EXAMINEE RESPONSE NRCL161-A5 REV PAGE 10 OF 10 REV. 0 0C.DOCX

Date TODAY Qualification Matrix Report Time: NOW Page: 1 of 2 ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT: DCPP Crew B Shift Manager LAST NAME FIRST NAME MI USERID ACT Karl KRA7 Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N David DJAG Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Martin MCAC Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Michael M9BO Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N Bryan BNB4 Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Y Y N Y Michael MDBP Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N Mario MNBE Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N Kristian K1DZ Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N Brian BNE2 Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Y N Y N Wesley FWL1 Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y James JYHP Y N N N Y Y Y N N N N N N Y N N N Raymond RDK1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N Brian BXL1 Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y N N N N Michael M8HM Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Remzi RXMM Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Y N Y N Kelly K5M3 Y N N N Y Y Y Y N Y N N N N N N N Terence TMNA Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Darren DMND Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N Cameron CBR3 Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Brian BLSF Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Y N Y N Bryan BWS6 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N Marc MATR Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N

Date TODAY Qualification Matrix Report Time: NOW Page: 2 of 2 ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT: DCPP Crew B Shift Manager ORES EP-9 CLEW RESP SCBA- SGI OTUR OAUX OINT OCND RO S SRO OSHI OSHI OSTA OIA POND CQ IRAT FHA BBLD BLDG AKE POL CO/C SCO/ FT F FT M WAT LAST NAME FIRST NAME MI USERID ACT Michael MRN7 Y N Y Y N Y Y N N N N N N Y N N Y Type EXPANDED QUALS ORESPONDER DC-OPS RESPONDER WATCH EP-9 DC-CONTROL COMMUNICATOR #2 CLEWCQ DC-ESOMS WORK CONTROL RESPIRATOR DC-AUTHORIZED FOR USE OF RESPIRATORS SCBA-FHAWK DC-AUTHORIZED FOR USE OF MSA FIREHAWK SGI DC-SEC - SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION OTURBBLDG DC-NO - TURBINE BLDG WATCHSTATION QUAL OAUXBLDG DC-NO - AUX BLDG WATCHSTATION QUAL OINTAKE DC-NO - INTAKE/OUTSIDE SVCS WATCHSTATION OCNDPOL DC-NO - COND POL WATCHSTATION QUAL RO SCO/CO/BO DC-RO - SCO/CO/BOP WATCH SRO SCO/CO/BO DC-SRO - SCO/CO/BOP WATCH OSHIFT FRM DC-SRO - OPS SHIFT FOREMAN OSHIFT MGR DC-SM - OPS SHIFT MANAGER OSTA WATCH DC-STA - STA WATCH STATION OIA DC-INCIDENT ASSESSOR QUALIFICATION

DCPP Form 69-20533 (10/19/15) OP1.DC37 Attachment 1 Operations Shift Log Page 5 of 6 Position Name E-Plan R OR PT STA COMM #2 Shift Manager X X Work Control Shift Foreman X X SFM Extra (Optional)

SFM Extra (Optional)

U1 Shift Foreman X X X U1 Work Control Lead X X X U1 Balance of Plant CO X X U1 CO X X U1 Turbine Building X X U1 Aux Building X U1 Polisher X X Intake and Outside X U2 Shift Foreman X X U2 Work Control Lead X X X U2 Balance of Plant CO X X U2 CO X X U2 Turbine Building X X U2 Aux Building X X U2 Polisher X X WC Extra License (Optional) X X WC Extra (Optional)

WC Extra (Optional)

WC Extra (Optional)

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-A6

Title:

Evaluate Fire Zone Operability Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments: Designed for SRO candidates in a classroom setting.

References:

• ECG 18.7 - Fire Rated Assemblies

• Fire Protection Drawings 111906-02, 21

• DCPP Operational Requirements for Doors, Drawing 515221-2 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 1.3, 3.4 Job Designation: SRO Rev Comments New Gen KA # G2.1.25 - Ability to interpret reference materials, such as 4.2 graphs, curves, tables, etc.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 08/11/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 08/11/16 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Fire Zone Operability JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed.

After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the step at which to begin.

Required Materials:

• ECG 18.7 - Fire Rated Assemblies

• Fire Protection Drawings 111906-02, 21

• DCPP Operational Requirements for Doors, Drawing 515221-2 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Todays date is July 1, 2016. The current time is 15:00.

• Unit 1 and Unit 2 are both at 100% power

• Maintenance has just reported that the closing mechanism on Door 326 (Battery Room 115 Elevation) has failed and the door cannot be closed automatically or manually.

Initiating Cue:

• The Shift Manager has directed you to determine the required course of action. Document your results on the attachment below before reporting out.

Task Standard: DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE

• Determined ECG 18.7.1, Condition A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the inoperable assembly within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is the only applicable TS/ECG action.

o Use of an hourly fire watch patrol is not permitted due to the non-functional Fire Zone detection equipment documented on the TS Summary Report (1-TS-16-0389, Smoke Detectors EFD09-02 and EFD09-03 Inop).

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JPM TITLE: Evaluate Fire Zone Operability JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions 1.** Determine Operational requirements 1.1 Locates door 326 on drawing 515221-2.

of door 326 from DCPP drawing 515221-2.

1.2 Identifies 326 as a fire door.

1.3 Identifies ECG 18.7.1 as applicable.**

1.4 Determines no other safety functions apply:

• NOT HVAC

• NOT HELB

• NOT FLOOD Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

2. Review associated fire zone on Fire 2.1 Locates door 326 as door into Battery Protection drawing 111906-21. Charger Room 12.

2.2 Identifies door as being located within Fire Detector Zone A9 2.3 Identifies smoke detection equipment associated with Fire Detector Zone A9 Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: Evaluate Fire Zone Operability JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 3.** Determine required action 3.1 Reviews Tech Spec Summary Support for statements. active Tech Spec / ECGs associated with Fire Zone A9.

3.2 Identifies 1-TS-16-0389 for smoke detectors EFD09-02 and EFD09-03 inoperable.

3.3 Determines Action Statement A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an automatic fire suppression system on at least one side of the inoperable fire related system could not be met.

3.4 Determines Action Statement A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the inoperable assembly is the appropriate action to enter.**

3.5 Note: If question is asked regarding support organization availability for implementing compensatory measures (Condition A.3), provide the following cue:

No support organizations are available at this time.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: Evaluate Fire Zone Operability JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow-up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

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JPM TITLE: Evaluate Fire Zone Operability JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A6 EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Todays date is July 1, 2016. The current time is 15:00.

• Unit 1 and Unit 2 are both at 100% power Maintenance has just reported that the closing mechanism on Door 326 (Battery Room 115 Elevation) has failed and the door cannot be closed automatically or manually.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager has directed you to determine the required course of action. Document your results on the attachment below before reporting out.

EXAMINEE RESPONSE NRCL161-A6 REV 0A.DOCX PAGE 6 OF 6 REV. 0

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TECH SPEC

SUMMARY

REPORT UNIT 1 ACTIVE TECH SPEC & ECG LCO'S SECTION DESCRIPTION INOP DATE DUE DATE FIRE ZONE TLS NO.

ECG Action 1-TS-16-0315 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN MONITOR CHANNEL 82 INOPERABLE DURING CALIBRATION STP I-23-A82.A 7.8 F.2 Restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE staus 15Jun16 8:26 15Jul16 8:26 NA NONE ACTIVE RISK SECTION DESCRIPTION INOP DATE TLS NO.

None ACTIVE TECH SPEC & ECG LCO'S WITH ACTION MET SECTION DESCRIPTION INOP DATE ACTIONS MET FIRE ZONE TLS NO.

ECG Action 1-TS-12-0039 ECG 18.7.1 APPENDIX R FIRE BARRIERS - LOSS OF RCP SEAL COOLING / MSI FAILURE 18.7.1 A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an automatic 26Jan12 18:00 26Jan12 19:00 See Instructions for multi NONE fire suppression system on at least one side of the zone 18.7.1 A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol. 26Jan12 18:00 26Jan12 19:00 See Instructions for multi NONE zone 1-TS-13-0081 18.7.2 Fire Barriers inop that have evaluation complete [A3 action ONLY, NO ROVES]

18.7.2 A.3 Perform an ECG 18.7.2 Fire Rated Assembly Impairment 25Feb13 9:09 25Feb13 10:09 See Instructions for multi Evaluation zone 18.7.2 A.4 Perform an ECG 18.7.2 Fire Rated Assembly Impairment 25Feb13 9:09 25Feb13 10:09 See Instructions for multi Evaluation zone 1-TS-14-0367 Fire dampers SD-26/27 and FD-26/27 inaccessible for surveillance 18.7.1 A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an automatic 07Apr14 10:05 7Apr14 11:05 B14 PPC/SSPS/SFM NONE fire suppression system on at least one side of the 18.7.1 A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol. 07Apr14 10:05 7Apr14 11:05 B14 PPC/SSPS/SFM NONE Friday, July 1, 2016 1:24:04PM Page: 3

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TECH SPEC

SUMMARY

REPORT UNIT 1 ACTIVE TECH SPEC & ECG LCO'S WITH ACTION MET SECTION DESCRIPTION INOP DATE ACTIONS MET FIRE ZONE TLS NO.

ECG Action 1-TS-15-0437 Missed Fire Damper Inspections (VAC-1-FD-4/5) 18.7.1 A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an automatic 23Jun15 15:31 23Jun15 16:31 A9 Reactor Trip Bkr NONE fire suppression system on at least one side of the 18.7.1 A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol. 23Jun15 15:31 23Jun15 16:31 A9 Reactor Trip Bkr NONE SR 0.3 Perform risk assessment in accordance with SR 0.3 23Jun15 15:04 24Jun15 15:04 A9 Reactor Trip Bkr NONE 1-TS-16-0389 Fire Damper 84 has broken louver and would not pass acceptance criteria of STP M-70B 18.7.1 A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an automatic 30Jun16 22:30 30Jun16 23:30 A10 480 Volt Bus NONE fire suppression system on at least one side of the inoperable fire 18.7.1 A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol. 30Jun16 22:30 30Jun16 23:30 A10 480 Volt Bus NONE INOPERABLE TECH SPEC or ECG EQUIPMENT (LCO'S not required to be entered)

SECTION DESCRIPTION INOP DATE FIRE ZONE TLS NO.

TECH SPEC 1-TS-08-0038 INCORE THERMOCOUPLES - TRAIN A: TT-17 (III) / TRAIN B: TT-36 (II), TT-28 (III), TT-54 (III) 3.3.3 A.1 Restore required channel to OPERABLE status. 27Sep08 10:07 NA None ECG Action 1-TS-14-0367 Fire dampers SD-26/27 and FD-26/27 inaccessible for surveillance 18.7.1 A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of 07Apr14 10:05 B14 PPC/SSPS/SFM NONE the INOPERABLE assembly.

1-TS-14-0901 Hosereel FW-A25-1 replace 18.2 A.1 Fire Brigade route fire hose from an OPERABLE* fire 21Jan15 9:56 B5 Auxiliary Feedwater NONE hose station up to the entrance of fire area(s) protected by 1-TS-15-0199 Info only FS-11 Fails to Reset (fire areas 11D and 13E) 18.7.1 A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an 27Mar15 4:25 See Instructions for multi NONE automatic fire suppression system on at least one side of zone 18.7.1 A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol. 27Mar15 4:25 See Instructions for multi NONE zone Friday, July 1, 2016 1:24:04PM Page: 4

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TECH SPEC

SUMMARY

REPORT UNIT 1 INOPERABLE TECH SPEC or ECG EQUIPMENT (LCO'S not required to be entered)

SECTION DESCRIPTION INOP DATE FIRE ZONE TLS NO.

ECG Action 1-TS-15-0437 Missed Fire Damper Inspections (VAC-1-FD-4/5) 18.7.1 A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of 23Jun15 15:04 A9 Reactor Trip Bkr NONE the INOPERABLE assembly.

1-TS-16-0389 Smoke Detectors EFD09-02 and EFD09-03 Inop (Fire Zone A-9) 18.3 A.1 Establish hourly fire watch patrol to inspect the zone(s) with the 30Jun16 22:30 A9 Reactor Trip Bkr NONE inoperable instruments.

TS SHEETS EXITED W/IN LAST 12 HOURS LCO DESCRIPTION DATE SHEET CLOSED 1-TS-16-0344 Fire Zone A-7, STP I-34A Functional Test 18.3 A. With less than the minimum number of required 01Jul16 11:24 instruments operable per Table 18.0 3, for one or more Friday, July 1, 2016 1:24:04PM Page: 5

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-A7

Title:

Evaluate Valve Stroke Surveillance Test Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments: Designed for SRO candidates in a classroom setting.

References:

• TS 3.6.3 - Containment Isolation Valves and Bases

• AD13.DC1, Control of the Surveillance Testing Program

• RCS OVID 107707, Sheet 4 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 2.2, 2.4, 2.5 Job Designation: SRO Rev Comments New Gen KA # G2.2.12 - Knowledge of surveillance procedures. 4.1 AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 08/05/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 08/11/16 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Valve Stroke Surveillance Test JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: This is a two part JPM. The Examinee should be given the Initial Cue Sheet (page 6) along with Handout 1. Once he/she identifies the problem with the STP (failed stroke time requiring retest), he/she should be provided with Examinee Cue Sheet (Part 2) along with Handout 2.

Required Materials:

• TS 3.6.3 - Containment Isolation Valves and Bases

• AD13.DC1, Control of the Surveillance Testing Program

• STP V-3S7 Markups (Handouts #1 & #3)

• RCS OVID 107707, Sheet 4 (Handout #2)

Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Unit 2 is at 100% power

• The Unit 2 BOPCO has just completed Section 12 of STP V-3S7, Exercising Phase A Containment Isolation Valve RCS-2-8029 and provided you the completed paperwork for review.

Initiating Cue:

• You are directed to complete Section 13, Primary Review.

o M&TE usage was entered into SAP by the STP performer.

o Test was performed as a quarterly STP and is NOT associated with any Post Maintenance Testing activity.

• Document your findings below before reporting out. This should include any necessary corrections, comments, and the identification of applicable TS/ECG and associated actions if appropriate.

Secondary Cue:

• The valve was re-tested and the data recorded on step 12.9.

(Provided once

• Review the data and determine the required course of action. This determines retest should include any necessary corrections, comments, and required) identification of applicable TS/ECG and associated actions if appropriate.

Task Standard: DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE

• Determined Original Acceptance Criteria NOT met:

o U2 stroke time erroneously entered into U1 data section.

o Initial stroke time of 9.20 sec was greater than Action High Value of 9.178 sec but less than Limiting Stroke Time of 10 sec.

o Determined retest should be performed.

• Determined Acceptance Criteria NOT met on Retest:

o Re-stroke time of 10.10 sec was greater than Limiting Stroke Time of 10 sec.

o Tech Spec 3.6.3.A Entry Applies (1 CIV) , with the required actions:

A.1: Isolate the affected penetration flow path (4 hrs)

A.2: Verify isolation once every 31 days.

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JPM TITLE: Evaluate Valve Stroke Surveillance Test JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions 1.** Review initial performance steps and 1.1 Checked all steps performed.

recorded data from STP V-3S7, steps 12.1-12.8, pg 4-5 (Handout 1).

Note: If Examinee reports stroke time recorded under incorrect Unit, but does not update the STP by entering the value under the correct Unit, direct the Examinee to make the correction.

1.2 Identified data for measured stroke time erroneously recorded under step 12.8.1 (Unit 1) rather than step 12.8.2 (Unit 2).**

1.3 Determined valve stroke time is ABOVE Action High Value, but less than Limiting Stroke Time.**

1.4 Determined valve should be retested.**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: Evaluate Valve Stroke Surveillance Test JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 2.** Review performance steps and 2.1 Note: Steps below apply once the recorded data for retest (Steps 12.9.1- secondary prompt has been given to the 12.9.8, pg 5-6) (Handout 2). examinee.

2.2 Determined valve stroke time is ABOVE Limiting Stroke Time of 10 sec.**

2.3 Reviewed NOTE regarding Operability implications if the valve exceed the limiting stroke time (immediately declared INOPERABLE).

Note: The Examinee may request copy of Administrative Procedure with listing of all Containment Isolation Valves for reference (233 pgs). Provide a copy of AD13.DC1, Control of the Surveillance Testing Program 2.4 Determined Tech Spec 3.6.3, Condition A, One or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable. **

2.5 Determined Action Statement A.1 and A.2 Apply:

• A.1: Isolate the affected penetration flow path (4 hrs)**

• A.2: Verify isolation once every 31 days.**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

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JPM TITLE: Evaluate Valve Stroke Surveillance Test JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow-up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

NRCL161-A7 REV 0.DOCX PAGE 5 OF 7 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Valve Stroke Surveillance Test JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A7 EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Unit 2 is at 100% power The Unit 2 BOPCO has just completed Section 12 of STP V-3S7, Exercising Phase A Containment Isolation Valve RCS-2-8029 and provided you the completed paperwork for review.

Initiating Cue:

• You are directed to complete Section 13, Primary Review.

o M&TE usage was entered into SAP by the STP performer.

o Test was performed as a quarterly STP and is NOT associated with any Post Maintenance Testing activity.

• Document your findings below before reporting out. This should include any necessary corrections, comments, and the identification of applicable TS/ECG and associated actions if appropriate.

EXAMINEE RESPONSE NRCL161-A7 REV 0.DOCX PAGE 6 OF 7 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Valve Stroke Surveillance Test JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A7 EXAMINEE CUE SHEET (PART 2)

Initiating Cue:

• The valve was re-tested and the data recorded on step 12.9.

• Review the data and determine the required course of action. This should include any necessary corrections, comments, and identification of applicable TS/ECG and associated actions if appropriate.

EXAMINEE RESPONSE NRCL161-A7 REV 0.DOCX PAGE 7 OF 7 REV. 0

AO 10/18/16

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-A8

Title:

Authorize Emergency Exposure Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments: Designed for SRO candidates in a classroom setting.

References:

• EP RB-2 Emergency Exposure Guidelines Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 1.2, 2.2, 3.2 Job Designation: SRO Rev Comments New Gen KA # G2.3.4 - Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal 3.7 or emergency conditions.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 08/10/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 08/12/16 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Authorize Emergency Exposure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A8 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed.

After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the step at which to begin.

Required Materials:

• EP RB-2 Emergency Exposure Guidelines Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Both Units were operating at 100% power when a large seismic event occurred resulting in a faulted/ruptured steam generator (S/G 1-3) on Unit 1.

• There is evidence of fuel damage. MSIV FCV-43 has failed open and an upstream break is causing S/G 1-3 to blow down in the 115 pen area.

• The Shift Manager has declared a general emergency, FG1.1, for the loss of all three fission product barriers.

• Volunteers have been found to undertake three high priority emergency field activities and the Site Radiation Protection Coordinator has forwarded their associated Emergency Exposure Permits for SEC approval.

Initiating Cue:

• The Shift Manager directs you to review each field activity described on the associated Emergency Exposure Permit and determine if it should be approved as an Emergency Exposure. If the activity should be approved, determine the AUTHORIZED LIMIT that should be specified on the permit.

• Document your recommendations as well as their basis in the space provided below before reporting out.

Task Standard: DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE

• Gordon permit should NOT be authorized - permit request is for 10 REM, but maximum for allowable for sampling is 5 REM.

• Rogers permit should be authorized for 25 REM since isolation of FCV-43 is related to dose saving to population.

• Banner permit be NOT be authorized for NO LIMIT since permit is missing the required voluntary consent signature.

NRCL161-A8 rev 0.docx PAGE 2 OF 7 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Authorize Emergency Exposure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A8 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions 1.** Evaluates proposed activity to 1.1 Reviews anticipated TEDE for job:

perform sampling of all steam

• 9.5 REM generators.

1.2 Reviews job description.

• Determines job is for Sampling Under Emergency Conditions.

• Determines anticipated TEDE is above EP RB-2 Emergency Exposure Guideline Limit allowable limit of 5 REM TEDE for radiological assessment sampling.

• Recommends Gordon permit NOT be authorized.**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL161-A8 rev 0.docx PAGE 3 OF 7 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Authorize Emergency Exposure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A8 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 2.** Evaluates proposed activity to 2.1 Reviews anticipated TEDE for job:

manually isolate FCV-43.

• 15 REM 2.2 Reviews job description.

• Determines job is for potential Dose Saving to Population.

• Determines anticipated TEDE is within EP RB-2 Emergency Exposure Guideline Limit allowable limit of 25 REM TEDE for Corrective Actions to Stop/Reduce a Release.

• Recommends authorization of Rogers permit.**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL161-A8 rev 0.docx PAGE 4 OF 7 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Authorize Emergency Exposure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A8 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 3.** Evaluates proposed activity to rescue 3.1 Reviews anticipated TEDE for job:

unconscious Operator in 100 pipe

• 26 REM rack.

3.2 Reviews job description.

• Determines job is for potential lifesaving activity.

• Determines anticipated TEDE is above EP RB-2 Emergency Exposure Guideline Limit allowable limit of 25 REM TEDE for Lifesaving Actions, 1st Aid, Search and Rescue.

• Notes situation may be classifiable as Extreme.

• Identifies required Voluntary Consent signature for emergency exposure with NO LIMITS has NOT been obtained.

• Recommends Banner permit NOT be authorized.**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL161-A8 rev 0.docx PAGE 5 OF 7 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Authorize Emergency Exposure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A8 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow-up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

NRCL161-A8 REV 0.DOCX PAGE 6 OF 7 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Authorize Emergency Exposure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A8 EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Both Units were operating at 100% power when a large seismic event occurred resulting in a faulted/ruptured steam generator (S/G 1-3) on Unit 1.

• There is evidence of fuel damage. MSIV FCV-43 has failed open and an upstream break is causing S/G 1-3 to blow down in the 115 pen area.

• The Shift Manager has declared a general emergency, FG1.1, for the loss of all three fission product barriers.

• Volunteers have been found to undertake three high priority emergency field activities and the Site Radiation Protection Coordinator has forwarded their associated Emergency Exposure Permits for SEC approval.

Initiating Cue:

• The Shift Manager directs you to review each field activity described on the associated Emergency Exposure Permit and determine if it should be approved as an Emergency Exposure. If the activity should be approved, determine the AUTHORIZED LIMIT that should be specified on the permit.

• Document your recommendations as well as their basis in the space provided below before reporting out.

EXAMINEE RESPONSE NRCL161-A8 REV 0.DOCX PAGE 7 OF 7 REV. 0

69-10554 05/06/09 Page 1 of 1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TITLE: Emergency Exposure Permit EP RB-2 ATTACHMENT 9.7 1 2 AND Date: TODAY Time: 08:36 Permit #: 16-090A Responder(s): Barbara Gordon (Print)

RP Support: S. Witt Description of Activity: Perform sampling of all steam generators per CAP AP-1 as called for by EOP E-3, Appendix FF, step 9.

Special Hazards: Condition of sampling system unknown. Structural damage in area.

Special Instructions: Contact Control Room at when prepared to commence sampling.

Anticipated TEDE Rate: 9.5 (rem/hr) AUTHORIZED LIMIT: [ ] 5 rem TEDE (Check One) [X] 10 rem TEDE Anticipated Stay Time: 1.0 (hr) [ ] 25 rem TEDE

[ ] NO LIMIT Anticipated TEDE: 9.5 (rem)

• Voluntary Consent (For potential exposures of > 25 rem TEDE): I hereby volunteer to perform the activity described above and I acknowledge having received a radiological briefing. I am fully aware of the health risks associated with the anticipated exposure. (Sign Below.)

Authorization of SM or SEC or Emergency Director: Time:

LNT5_EP_RB-2u3r08.DOC 03B 0607.1519

69-10554 05/06/09 Page 1 of 1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TITLE: Emergency Exposure Permit EP RB-2 ATTACHMENT 9.7 1 2 AND Date: TODAY Time: 09:13 Permit #: 16-090C Responder(s): Steve Rogers (Print)

RP Support: S. Witt Description of Activity: Manually isloate Unit 1 FCV-43 (MSIV) per EOP E-2, Appendix L.

Special Hazards: Contaminated airborne steam environment.

Special Instructions: SCBA required.

Anticipated TEDE Rate: 30 (rem/hr) AUTHORIZED LIMIT: [ ] 5 rem TEDE (Check One) [ ] 10 rem TEDE Anticipated Stay Time: 0.5 (hr) [X] 25 rem TEDE

[ ] NO LIMIT Anticipated TEDE: 15 (rem)

• Voluntary Consent (For potential exposures of > 25 rem TEDE): I hereby volunteer to perform the activity described above and I acknowledge having received a radiological briefing. I am fully aware of the health risks associated with the anticipated exposure. (Sign Below.)

Authorization of SM or SEC or Emergency Director: Time:

LNT5_EP_RB-2u3r08.DOC 03B 0607.1519

69-10554 05/06/09 Page 1 of 1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TITLE: Emergency Exposure Permit EP RB-2 ATTACHMENT 9.7 1 2 AND Date: TODAY Time: 09:00 Permit #: 16-090B Responder(s): Bruce Banner (Print)

RP Support: D. Libby Description of Activity: Operator with fractured leg and head contusion trapped within 100' pipe nest SCA. The individual appears to be having significant difficulty breathing. Volunteer has EMT background; will move Operator to low dose area for further evaluation.

Special Hazards: Exposed Electical Special Instructions: SCA Boundaries will be relocated as needed to support rescue efforts. Second volunteer on standby.

Anticipated TEDE Rate: 20 (rem/hr) AUTHORIZED LIMIT: [ ] 5 rem TEDE (Check One) [ ] 10 rem TEDE Anticipated Stay Time: 1.3 (hr) [ ] 25 rem TEDE

[X] NO LIMIT Anticipated TEDE: 26.0 (rem)

• Voluntary Consent (For potential exposures of > 25 rem TEDE): I hereby volunteer to perform the activity described above and I acknowledge having received a radiological briefing. I am fully aware of the health risks associated with the anticipated exposure. (Sign Below.)

Authorization of SM or SEC or Emergency Director: Time:

LNT5_EP_RB-2u3r08.DOC 03B 0607.1519

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-A9

Title:

Classify Hostile Action Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments: Designed for SRO candidates in a classroom setting.

References:

EP G-1, Accident Classification and Emer Plan Activation, Rev.44 Forms 69-21608, 69-21609, 69-21610 (06/19/12, 07/24/13, 12/5/11)

Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes X No Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 2.1, 3.1 Job Designation: SRO Rev Comments New Gen KA # / Rating: GEN.2.4.41, Knowledge of the emergency action level 4.6 (SRO) thresholds and classifications AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 08/10/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 08/12/16 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Classify Hostile Action JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A9 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed.

After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the step at which to begin.

Required Materials:

• EP G-1, and EAL Wall Charts.

• Vol 11, Emergency Plan, App D (classification bases), should be available to the examinee.

Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Prior to T0, both Units are at 100% and stable.

• At T0:

o Power is lost to all Unit 2 Annunicators due to an equipment malfunction (VB1 thru VB5);

o An instrument air compressor discharge line explodes catastrophically resulting in multiple broken instrument air lines in the Turbine Building.

Unit 1 Condenser Vacuum is lost resulting in an Automatic Turbine Trip.

Unit 1 Reactor Auto Trip Fails, Breakers 13D/13E opened from the Control Room, resulting in a successful trip of the Unit 1 Reactor.

• 1 min past T0:

o Unit 2 is manually tripped due to loss of feedwater.

o OST reports power loss to Unit 2 Annunciators will take several hours to resolve.

o DCPP Watch Commander reports the air compressor failure was the result of a shaped-charge which detonated. The perpetrator has been apprehended and is being interrogated to determine if there are others involved in the plot. The Watch Commander reports the Annunciator malfunction is NOT related.

Initiating Cue: Classify the event. Fully document the basis of your answer in the space provided below.

This JPM is time critical. The start time of this JPM will function as T0.

NRCL161-A9 rev 0.docx PAGE 2 OF 7 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Classify Hostile Action JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A9 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: In < 15 minutes classifies the event as:

SITE AREA EMERGENCY HS4.1 A hostile action is occurring or has occurred within the Protected Area as reported by the Security Watch Commander.

NRCL161-A9 rev 0.docx PAGE 3 OF 7 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Classify Hostile Action JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A9 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure 1.1 References EP G all pages of wall chart provided Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Note: If asked about specific language used by the Security Watch Commander, it is permissible to confirm hostile action reported.

2. ** Accurately classify the event. 2.1 Classified the event as Site Area Emergency, HS4.1 **

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

3.** Classification time < 15 minutes 3.1 Classified the event < 15 min. of the Event Initiation Time. **

Classification Time: _____________

Event Initiation Time: _____________

(Event initiation time is JPM Start Time)

Difference: ____________ min**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

NRCL161-A9 rev 0.docx PAGE 4 OF 7 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Classify Hostile Action JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A9 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL161-A9 rev 0.docx PAGE 5 OF 7 REV. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A9 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Prior to T0, both Units are at 100% and stable.

• At T0:

o Power is lost to all Unit 2 Annunicators due to an equipment malfunction (VB1 thru VB5);

o An instrument air compressor discharge line explodes catastrophically resulting in multiple broken instrument air lines in the Turbine Building.

Unit 1 Condenser Vacuum is lost resulting in an Automatic Turbine Trip.

Unit 1 Reactor Auto Trip Fails, Breakers 13D/13E opened from the Control Room, resulting in a successful trip of the Unit 1 Reactor.

• 1 min past T0:

o Unit 2 is manually tripped due to loss of feedwater.

o OST reports power loss to Unit 2 Annunciators will take several hours to resolve.

o DCPP Watch Commander reports the air compressor failure was the result of a shaped-charge which detonated. The perpetrator has been apprehended and is being interrogated to determine if there are others involved in the plot. The Watch Commander reports the Annunciator malfunction is NOT related.

Initiating Cue: Classify the event. Fully document the basis of your answer in the space provided below.

This JPM is time critical. The start time of this JPM will function as T0.

Classification: _________________________________________________________________

Justification: ___________________________________________________________________

NRCL161-A9 rev 0.docx PAGE 6 OF 7 REV. 0

EVALUATOR ANSWER KEY JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A9 Correct Classification: SITE AREA EMERGENCY HS4.1 A hostile action is occurring or has occurred within the Protected Area as reported by the Security Watch Commander.

Lower Level Classifications:

ALERT SA2.1 on Unit 1 for an automatic trip that failed to shut down the reactor AND Manual actions taken at the reactor control console successfully shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power < 5%

ALERT SA 4.1 on Unit 2 for an unplanned loss of greater than approximately 75%

of the annunciators or indicators associated with safety systems on Vertical Boards 1 through 5, and Control Consoles 1, 2 and 3 for > 15 min.

AND EITHER:

A significant transient is in progress OR Compensatory non-alarming indications (PPC, SPDS) are unavailable ALERT HA2.1 on both Units for a Fire or explosion resulting in EITHER:

- Visible damage to any Table H-1 plant structures containing safety systems or components.

- Control Room indication of degraded performance of systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown.

NRCL161-A9 rev 0.docx PAGE 7 OF 7 REV. 0

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-P1

Title:

Close an MSIV and MSIV Bypass Locally Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate X Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ TCOA Time __________

Comments:

This is a Unit 1 JPM

References:

EOP E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Appendix L, Rev 23 OP1.ID2, TCOAs, Rev 8A (& TCOA database); TCOA item 57 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes X No Time Allotment: 30 minutes Critical Steps: 1.1, 2.1, 3.1 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: Bank LJP-212 DCPP Task # / Rating: N18700 3.8 (RO) 040.AA1.03 - Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as Gen KA # / Rating: they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: Isolation of one steam line 4.3 / 4.3 (RO/SRO) from header.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 08/09/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 08/11/16 REV.0

JPM TITLE: NRCL161-P1 JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-P1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue.

The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee should be given the required materials shown below, and access to other plant references as appropriate.

Equipment operation Cues are contingent on proper operation by the examinee and should be adjusted should equipment operation differ from expected.

Required Materials: Procedure EOP E-2, Appendix L.

Initial Conditions: Given:

• A main steam line rupture occurred on Unit 1 outside containment and downstream of the MSIVs.

• Automatic isolation from ESF actuation and manual attempts to close MSIV FCV-41 from VB-3 were unsuccessful.

• FCV-41 bypass valve, FCV-25, is also open.

• This task is time critical.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to locally close MSIV FCV-41 and FCV-25 in accordance with Appendix L of EOP E-2. You are given an eight inch crescent wrench and diagonal cutters. You have permission to break seals during this task (another operator will complete the paperwork).

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: Unit 1 MSIV FCV-41 and FCV-25 are closed in accordance with Appendix L by placing the following air supply and drain valves in the required position:

• Common Air Supply Valve AIR-I-1-3302 - CLOSED

• FCV-41 Accum Drain Valve AIR-I-1-1207 - OPEN (after drain cap removed)

• FCV-25 Accum Drain Valve AIR-I-1-1208 - OPEN (after drain cap removed)

Time Critical This JPM was evaluated against TCOA # 57, "Locally isolate failed MSIV or MSIV bypass valves Operator Action within 30 minutes".

(TCOA): This TCOA:

• is applicable to this JPM. TCOA start time is when the operator is directed to perform the task. TCOA stop time is when AIR-I-1-1207 and 1208 are simulated to be opened.

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 6 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: NRCL161-P1 JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-P1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time: (Also start for TCOA)

Step Expected Operator Actions

• • 1. Step 3 - Locally close MSIV air supply or ***************************************

common air supply valves (West side pipe rack, Cue: The valve is positioned AS-SEEN.

outside containment).

• • 1.1 Locates and closes common air supply valve AIR-I-1-3302.

• Simulates turning the valve handle 90o to the air supply line.

Note: The valve is open when the handle points with the piping, and closed when perpendicular to the piping.

Cue: The valve handle is now perpendicular to the pipe.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 2. Step 4 - Remove accumulator 3/4 inch drain ** 2.1 Locates and removes 3/4 accumulator drain caps. caps.

• Simulates removing the drain cap by turning it several turns in the CCW direction.

Cue: Each pipe cap rotated several turns CCW and came off the pipe.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 6 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: NRCL161-P1 JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-P1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

• • 3. Open MSIV air accumulator drain valves. ***************************************

Cue: The valves are positioned AS-SEEN.

• • 3.1 Locates and opens drain valves AIR-I-1-1207 and 1208.

• Simulates opening the valve handle 90o so that it is parallel to the air supply line.

• Performs simulation on both valves.

TCOA Stop Time ________.

Note: The valves are open when the handle points with the piping, and closed when perpendicular to the piping.

Cue: The valve handles are now parallel (in line) to the pipe and air flow is heard coming from the pipes.

3.2 Cue: Two loud noises were heard from FCV-41 and FCV-25. The control room has called you on the radio and informed you FCV-41 and FCV-25 are closed.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 6 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: NRCL161-P1 JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-P1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET TCOA Stop Time:

TCOA Total Time: (Enter TCOA time on front page)

TCOA: SAT UNSAT (TCOA time must be < 30 minutes)

Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: _____________________________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 6 Rev.0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-P1 Initial Conditions: Given:

• A main steam line rupture occurred on Unit 1 outside containment and downstream of the MSIVs.

• Automatic isolation from ESF actuation and manual attempts to close MSIV FCV-41 from VB-3 were unsuccessful.

• FCV-41 bypass valve, FCV-25, is also open.

• This task is time critical.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to locally close MSIV FCV-41 and FCV-25 in accordance with Appendix L of EOP E-2. You are given an eight inch crescent wrench and diagonal cutters. You have permission to break seals during this task (another operator will complete the paperwork).

Page 6 of 6 Rev.0

Faulted Steam Generator Isolation EOP E-2 R23 Page 8 of 10 UNIT 1 APPENDIX L Locally Closing Main Steam Isolation Valves

1. Complete tailboard with Shift Foreman or his delegate.

2. Obtain the following:

• Crescent wrench for drain caps

• Diagonal cutters for valve seals

• Flashlight NOTE 1: If the MSIV BYPASS valve is already closed, it is acceptable to close either the MSIV Air Supply Vlv OR the Common Air Supply Vlv.

NOTE 2: If the MSIV BYPASS valve is open, close ONLY the Common Air Supply valve.

3. Close MSIV and MSIV bypass valve air supply valves as noted above:

MSIV and MSIV BYPASS Common Air MSIV Air Supply Supply Vlv Vlv FCV-41/FCV-25 AIR-I-1-3302 AIR-I-1-4061 FCV-42/FCV-24 AIR-I-1-3303 AIR-I-1-4060 FCV-43/FCV-23 AIR-I-1-1044 AIR-I-1-4054 FCV-44/FCV-22 AIR-I-1-1042 AIR-I-1-4058

4. Remove both Accumulator drain caps.

5. Open both MSIV air accumulator drain valves.

MSIV and MSIV BYPASS Accum Drn Vlvs FCV-41/FCV-25 AIR-I-1-1207,1208 FCV-42/FCV-24 AIR-I-1-1210,1211 FCV-43/FCV-23 AIR-I-1-1547,1548 FCV-44/FCV-22 AIR-I-1-1543,1544

6. When MSIV and MSIV Bypass valves close, report to Control Operator.

Appendix L, Page 1 of 1 EOP_E-2u1r23.DOC 0609.1201

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-P2

Title:

Isolate the Spray Additive Tank Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate X Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

This is a Unit 2 JPM

References:

Unit 2 EOP FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, Rev. 9 Alternate Path: Yes X No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 4.5, 4.6 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments: Bank LJP-224 DCPP Task # / Rating: 47016 (Check if containment spray is required) 3.0 Gen KA # / Rating: E14.EA1.1 - Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to High Containment Pressure Components, and functions of 3.7/3.7 control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 08/09/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 08/11/16 REV.0

JPM TITLE: Isolate the Spray Additive Tank JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-P2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue.

The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee should be given the required materials shown below, and access to other plant references as appropriate.

Equipment operation Cues are contingent on proper operation by the examinee and should be adjusted should equipment operation differ from expected.

Required Materials: Copy of Unit 2 EOP FR-Z.1, Step 4.

Initial Conditions: Given: An earthquake and LOCA has occurred on Unit 2. The following conditions exist:

• 4KV Bus H is de-energized.

• High containment pressure has caused an entry into EOP FR-Z.1.

• Spray Additive Tank level is 15% and lowering.

• Both trains of Containment Spray have been reset.

• When remotely closing 8994A, the valve stopped in the mid position.

Initiating Cue: The Unit 2 Shift Foreman directs you to perform the local actions of EOP FR-Z.1, Step 4.b RNO to isolate the spray additive tank.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: Spray Additive Tank flow is secured by locally closing Spray Additive Tank Outlet Valves 8994A and 8994B.

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 7 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Isolate the Spray Additive Tank JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-P2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. RNO Step 4.b.b) - Close supply breaker for 1.1 Locates 52-2F-35.

8992 (100 Elev., Bus Section 2F).

1.2 Closes 52-2F-35.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

2. RNO Step 4.b.c) - Close 8992. 2.1 Calls control room to request closure of 8992 or inform them of breaker closure.

Cue: (On breaker cubicle 52-2F-35) The blue light is ON.

Cue: SFM informs you that when attempting to close 8992 a 480V Bus 2F thermal overload annunciator alarm came in on PK18-22 and valve motion stopped. The SFM has opted to not reset the TOL trip.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 7 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Isolate the Spray Additive Tank JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-P2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

3. RNO Step 4.b.d) - Re-open supply breaker 52- 3.1 Note: If examinee asks for direction, provide 2F-35. the cue below, otherwise they continue in the procedure.

Cue: Continue with the procedure.

3.2 Opens 52-2F-35.

Cue: Blue light on 52-2F-35 is out and the control room reports that the alarm cleared on PK18-22.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 4. Step 4.b RNO -Check to ensure flowpath is 4.1 Contacts control room to verify flowpath is isolated. isolated.

Cue: SFM informs you that there is still indicated Spray Additive Tank flow.

<< Alternate Path Begins Here >>

Step 4.b RNO - 4.2 Locates 8992.

Locally close:

• 8992 (Elev. 73, Unit 2 Auxiliary Building) or,

• 8994A and 8994B (Elev. 73, Unit 2 Auxiliary Building).

Note: Examinee may go directly to Step 4.3.

This is acceptable.

Continued on next page

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 7 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Isolate the Spray Additive Tank JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-P2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

4. 4.3 Attempts to locally close 8992.

Cont Cue: The valve handwheel will not move in clockwise direction.

4.4 Locates 8994A and 8994B.

Cue: (If needed) Another operator has opened the supply breakers for 8994A and 8994B.

• • 4.5 Locally closes 8994A.

• • 4.6 Locally closes 8994B.

4.7 Contacts control room to verify flowpath is isolated Cue: When examinee calls the control room, SFM informs you that there is NO indicated Spray Additive Tank flow.

<< Alternate Path Ends Here >>

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 7 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Isolate the Spray Additive Tank JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-P2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: _____________________________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 6 of 7 Rev.0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-P2 Initial Conditions: Given: An earthquake and LOCA has occurred on Unit 2. The following conditions exist:

• 4KV Bus H is de-energized.

• High containment pressure has caused an entry into EOP FR-Z.1.

• Spray Additive Tank level is 15% and lowering.

• Both trains of Containment Spray have been reset.

• When remotely closing 8994A, the valve stopped in the mid position.

Initiating Cue: The Unit 2 Shift Foreman directs you to perform the local actions of EOP FR-Z.1, Step 4.b RNO to isolate the spray additive tank.

Page 7 of 7 Rev.0

Response to High Containment Pressure EOP FR-Z.1 R9 Page 2 of 8 UNIT 2 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

1. CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:

a. Phase A portion of Monitor Light IF The flowpath is NOT required, Box B:

THEN Close the non-essential Phase A

• Red Activated Light - ON valves.

• White status Lights - OFF

2. ENSURE Containment Vent Isol: Manually close the CVI Vlvs with White Status Lights - ON.

a. Containment Vent Isol portion of Monitor Light Box B:

• Red Activated Light - ON

• White Status Lights - OFF

3. CHECK If Containment Spray Is Required:

a. Check IF EOP ECA-1.1, LOSS OF a. GO TO step 3.c.

EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION is the procedure in effect.

b. Operate Containment Spray as directed by EOP ECA-1.1, LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION, step 6 AND GO TO step 5 (Page 4)

c. Containment pressure - GREATER c. RETURN TO Procedure and Step in effect.

THAN 22 PSIG

d. Ensure Containment Spray Pps - d. Start Containment Spray Pps.

RUNNING

- THIS STEP CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE -

EOP_FR-Z!1u2r09.DOC 1208.1246

Response to High Containment Pressure EOP FR-Z.1 R9 Page 3 of 8 UNIT 2 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

3. CHECK If Containment Spray Is Required: (Continued)

e. Check Containment Spray System e. Manually align valves for proper Valve alignment - PROPER Emergency Alignment.

EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT

• Injection Phase

• 9001A & B - OPEN

• 8992 - OPEN (unless previously closed to isolate the Spray Additive Tank)

• 8994A & B - OPEN (unless previously closed to isolate the Spray Additive Tank)

OR

• Recirculation Phase:

• 8809A - CLOSED

• 9003A - OPEN

• 9001A & B - CLOSED

f. Check Containment Isolation Phase B f. Manually close the Phase B Isol Vlvs with valves - CLOSED Status Lights - ON.

Phase B portion of monitor light Box D:

• Red activated light - ON

• White status lights - OFF

g. Perform the following:

• Stop CCP 2-3

• Maintain RCP Seal Injection between 8 GPM and 13 GPM by throttling FCV-128

• Stop ALL RCPs EOP_FR-Z!1u2r09.DOC 1208.1246

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-P3

Title:

Transfer the TSC to Vital Power Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate X Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

This is a Unit 1 JPM

References:

EOP ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, Appendix J, Rev. 27 OP J-6B:VI, U1&U2, Manual Operation of DG 1-3 & 2-3, Rev. 35 & 31 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 1.3, 2.3, 3.1, 6.1, 8.1 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: Modified Bank LJP-058A DCPP Task # / Rating: 896600 3/3/1 Gen KA # / Rating: 062.A2.11 3.7/4.1 AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 08/11/2016 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 08/11/2016 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-P3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue.

The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee should be given the required materials shown below, and access to other plant references as appropriate.

Equipment operation Cues are contingent on proper operation by the examinee and should be adjusted should equipment operation differ from expected.

Required Materials: Copy of ECA-2.1, Appendix J.

Copy of OP J-6B:VI for D/G 1-3 and 2-3. (only once asked for them)

Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 1 experienced a steam break and uncontrolled depressurization of all steam generators.

• Offsite power was lost to both units.

• The SEC has given permission to place the TSC on vital power, and the TSC is manned and requires vital power.

• Diesel generator 1-3 is supplying 4 kV F and is carrying 2.52 MW load @ a 0.8 pf.

Initiating Cue: The Unit 1 Shift Foreman directs you to place the TSC on U-1 vital power, per ECA-2.1, Appendix J, starting with step 3.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: TSC is being provided power from Unit 2 D/G 2-3 via:

• Switch EPTSN to BACKUP power.

• Switch EPTSC to the NORMAL (U-2) position.

• Breaker 52-2F-47 in the ON position.

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-P3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

• • 1. Step 3 - Checks D/G 1-3 loaded and able to 1.1 References D/G 1-3 load in initial conditions.

support additional loading.

1.2 References OP J-6 B:VI for D/G 1-3.

Note: Supply copy of procedure OP J-6B:VI P&Ls to student when they indicate they will refer to a procedure for D/G load limits.

• • 1.3 Determines that D/G 1-3 cannot support additional 106.2 Kw loading. (2.6 Mw - 2.52 MW = .08 MW or 80 Kw)

Contacts SFM to report that D/G 1-3 cannot support the additional load.

Note: If asked for guidance, provide the following cue:

Cue: Shift Foreman directs you to align the TSC power to Unit 2 if possible.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-P3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

2. Step 4 - Checks D/G 2-3 loaded and able to Note: When asked for current status and load support additional loading. on D/G 2-3, provide the following cue:

2.1 **************************************

Cue: Diesel generator 2-3 is supplying 4 kV Bus F and is carrying 2.2 MW load @ a 0.8 pf.

2.2 References OP J-6B:VI for D/G 2-3.

• • 2.3 Determines that DG 2-3 has room for an additional 106.2 KW of load and proceeds in App J.

Note: Examinee may notify C/R of ability to align to U-2.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-P3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

• • 3. Step 5 - Open breaker 52-22J-40. Note: JPM steps 3, 4 and 5 may be done in any order (bulletized in the procedure).

• • 3.1 Places breaker 52-22J-40 (EPTSN TSC PWR TRANSF SW NORMAL SOURCE) in the OFF position.

Cue: An audible "clunk" is heard, and the breaker is in the down position with the word OFF showing on the lower breaker handle.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

4. Step 5 - Open breaker 52-2F-47. 4.1 Notes that breaker 52-2F-47 (ON SITE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER 480V POWER TO EPTSC) is in the OFF position.

Cue: The breaker is in the down position with the word OFF showing on the lower breaker handle.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-P3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

5. Step 5 - Open breaker 52-1F-67. 5.1 Notes that breaker 52-1F-67 (TSC TRANSFER SWITCH) is in the OFF position.

Cue: The breaker is in the down position with the word OFF showing on the lower breaker handle.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 6. Step 6 - Switch EPTSN to BACKUP power. Note: Switch is on west wall of 2F 480VAC switchgear room.

• • 6.1 Places switch EPTSN in the BACKUP position.

Cue: The sealed component change form needs will be addressed by another operator.

Cue: The switch is in the BACKUP position.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 6 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-P3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

7. Step 8.a - Switch EPTSC to the NORMAL (U-2) Note: Switch is also on west wall of 2F 480VAC position. switchgear room, next to EPTSN switch.

Unit 2 is the NORMAL position 7.1 Breaks the seal (only if needed).

7.2 Notes switch EPTSC in the NORMAL position.

Cue: The switch is in the NORMAL position.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 8. Step 8.b - Close 52-2F-47. ** 8.1 Places breaker 52-2F-47 in the ON position.

Cue: An audible clunk is heard, and the breaker is in the up position with the word ON showing on the upper breaker handle.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 7 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-P3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: _____________________________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 8 of 9 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-P3 Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 1 experienced a steam break and uncontrolled depressurization of all steam generators.

• Offsite power was lost to both units.

• The SEC has given permission to place the TSC on vital power, and the TSC is manned and requires vital power.

• Diesel generator 1-3 is supplying 4 kV F and is carrying 2.52 MW load @ a 0.8 pf.

Initiating Cue: The Unit 1 Shift Foreman directs you to place the TSC on U-1 vital power, per ECA-2.1, Appendix J, starting with step 3.

Page 9 of 9 Rev. 0

Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam EOP ECA-2.1 R27 Generators page 34 of 38 UNIT 1 APPENDIX J TSC ELECTRICAL POWER

1. Check that the TSC is being manned and that vital power is required.

NOTE: Aligning TSC power supply to a vital bus renders the D/G associated with that bus inoperable due to the addition of 106.2 KW of load to the bus.

2. Obtain the SEC's permission prior to placing the TSC on vital power.

3. Check D/G 1-3 OR 2-3 loaded AND able to support an additional 106.2 KW loading.

4. IF one of the D/Gs is unable to support the additional loading, THEN supply power from the other unit.

5. Open the following breakers:

• 52-22J-40 TSC XFER SW

• 52-2F-47 TSC 480V POWER TO EPTSC

• 52-1F-67 TSC TRANSFER SWITCH

6. In the 2F MCC Room, switch EPTSN, TSC Power Transfer Switch, to BACKUP.

7. To supply power from Unit 1:

a. Switch EPTSC, TSC Power Transfer Unit Selector Switch, to BACKUP.

b. Close 52-1F-67

8. To supply power from Unit 2:

a. Switch EPTSC, TSC Power Transfer Unit Selector Switch, to NORMAL.

b. Close 52-2F-47.

Appendix J, Page 1 of 1 EOP_ECA-2!1u1r27.DOC 1208.1459

Diesel Generators - Manual Operation of DG 1-3 OP J-6B:VI R35 Page 3 of 20 UNIT 1

5. PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 5.1 Paralleling the DG to startup power defeats both second level UV relays. REFER TO TS 3.3.5.

5.2 REFER TO the following for DG 1-3 operability requirements:

• TS 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating"

• TS 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown"

• TS 3.8.3, "Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, Starting Air, and Turbocharger Air Assist"

• STP M-9A3, "Diesel Engine Generator 1-3 Routine Surveillance Test" 5.3 When ANY of the following conditions exists, DG 1-3 is declared INOPERABLE and the appropriate TS actions are performed:

• Paralleling DG 1-3 to any off-site power source

• DG 1-3 Mode Sel switch is in "MANUAL" AND DG 1-3 is NOT running NOTE: Extended operation of DG 1-3 below 0.65 MW can expose the engine to undesirable conditions that may be detrimental to engine performance and component life.

5.4 DG 1-3 should not be operated for extended periods (one hour or longer) below 0.65 MW:

• If DG 1-3 is operated below 0.65 MW for at least one hour but less than ten hours, then the DG should be operated at or above 1.30 MW for at least one hour.

• If DG 1-3 is to be operated for more than ten hours at or below 0.65 MW, the DG should be loaded to at least 1.3 MW for more than one hour at the end of each 10-hour period.

5.5 Do not operate DG 1-3 below rated speed with the field energized. Excessive field currents and rotor temperatures may occur.

5.6 When paralleling DG 1-3, pick up load (0.50 MW) as soon as possible (less than 15 seconds) after the breaker is closed. This will prevent the DG breaker from tripping on directional power (DIR PWR).

5.7 There should be fuel oil in the priming tank. If not, it should be filled using the magnetic pump, and the problem documented in a notification.

5.8 The fuel oil pressure should increase to above 40 psig within 60 seconds of engine start.

Gauge response is about 15 seconds.

5.9 Normal shutdown of DG 1-3 requires DC control power. If shutting down DG 1-3 without control power becomes necessary, manually operate the trip lever on the northwest corner of the engine, forward of the fuel oil filters.

OP_J-6B~VIu1r35.DOC 1008.1606

Diesel Generators - Manual Operation of DG 1-3 OP J-6B:VI R35 Page 4 of 20 UNIT 1 5.10 Do not violate the following limits during normal steady-state operation:

• Maximum continuous generator current: 451 amperes

• Maximum stator temperature: 240°F

• Minimum lube oil pressure: 60 psig

• Maximum lube oil temperature: 195°F

• Maximum jacket water temperature: 185°F

• Power factor: 1.0 to 0.8 lag

• Load: 2.60 MW at 0.8 power factor 5.11 Do not operate more than one DG at a time paralleled to any transformer (startup or unit auxiliary) in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. REFER TO SR 3.8.1.3, Note 3.

5.12 DGs are highly responsive to the starting of large motor loads, such as a 12kV pump, a condensate and booster pump set, or the No. 2 Heater Drain Pump. If the MVAR output is not reduced prior to starting such loads, a DG could exceed its kVA rating. If, while a DG is paralleled and at full load, a large motor load is to be started, first reduce MVAR output to 0.5 MVAR or less until after the load has been started.Ref 7.2 5.13 Prior to paralleling DG 1-3 to the bus, the DG 1-3 Mode Sel switch on VB4 shall be verified in "MANUAL".

5.14 Control power selection (EQD Panel):

• In MODES 1-4: DG 1-3 shall have its normal DC source energized and selected. If the backup source is selected, DG 1-3 is considered INOPERABLE and either DG 1-3 or 1-1 must be selected to MANUAL to prevent making Battery 1-3 INOPERABLE.

• In MODES 5, 6, and DEFUELED: Preferred alignment is for DG 1-3 to have its normal DC source energized and selected. If cross-tie capability exists (i.e., capability of supplying power to the battery charger aligned to DG 1-3 DC source), DG 1-3 and Battery 1-3 can still be considered OPERABLE with the backup source selected.

5.15 Day tank level columns respond very slowly to a level change. When manually filling the tank, use caution to avoid overflowing the day tank.

5.16 Crankcase exhausters should be operating while the engine is running. If not, DG 1-3 is still OPERABLE, but a notification shall be initiated and repairs made in a timely fashion. If crankcase exhausters are not running, DG 1-3 may experience more oil leakage from the block than normal.

5.17 If the lubricating oil temperature is below 90°F, DG 1-3 should not be started unless engineering has evaluated the condition.

5.18 Starting air header and turbo air header pressures should be monitored:

• Starting air: 140-160 psig

• Turbo air: Above 210 psig OP_J-6B~VIu1r35.DOC 1008.1606

Diesel Generators - Manual Operation of DG 2-3 OP J-6B:VI R31 Page 3 of 20 UNIT 2

5. PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 5.1 Paralleling the DG to startup power defeats both second level UV relays. REFER TO TS 3.3.5.

5.2 REFER TO the following for DG 2-3 operability requirements:

• TS 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating"

• TS 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown"

• TS 3.8.3, "Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, Starting Air, and Turbocharger Air Assist"

• STP M-9A3, "Diesel Engine Generator 2-3 Routine Surveillance Test" 5.3 When ANY of the following conditions exists, DG 2-3 is declared INOPERABLE and the appropriate TS actions are performed:

• Paralleling DG 2-3 to any off-site power source

• DG 2-3 Mode Sel switch is in "MANUAL" AND DG 2-3 is NOT running NOTE: Extended operation of DG 2-3 below 0.65 MW can expose the engine to undesirable conditions that may be detrimental to engine performance and component life.

5.4 DG 2-3 should not be operated for extended periods (one hour or longer) below 0.65 MW:

• If DG 2-3 is operated below 0.65 MW for at least one hour but less than ten hours, then the DG should be operated at or above 1.30 MW for at least one hour.

• If DG 2-3 is to be operated for more than ten hours at or below 0.65 MW, the DG should be loaded to at least 1.3 MW for more than one hour at the end of each 10-hour period.

5.5 Do not operate DG 2-3 below rated speed with the field energized. Excessive field currents and rotor temperatures may occur.

5.6 When paralleling DG 2-3, pick up load (0.50 MW) as soon as possible (less than 15 seconds) after the breaker is closed. This will prevent the DG breaker from tripping on directional power (DIR PWR).

5.7 There should be fuel oil in the priming tank. If not, it should be filled using the magnetic pump, and the problem documented in a notification.

5.8 The fuel oil pressure should increase to above 40 psig within 60 seconds of engine start.

Gauge response is about 15 seconds.

5.9 Normal shutdown of DG 2-3 requires DC control power. If shutting down DG 2-3 without control power becomes necessary, manually operate the trip lever on the northwest corner of the engine, forward of the fuel oil filters.

OP_J-6B~VIu2r31.DOC 1008.1609

Diesel Generators - Manual Operation of DG 2-3 OP J-6B:VI R31 Page 4 of 20 UNIT 2 5.10 Do not violate the following limits during normal steady-state operation:

• Maximum continuous generator current: 451 amperes

• Maximum stator temperature: 240°F

• Minimum lube oil pressure: 60 psig

• Maximum lube oil temperature: 195°F

• Maximum jacket water temperature: 185°F

• Power factor: 1.0 to 0.8 lag

• Load: 2.60 MW at 0.8 power factor 5.11 Do not operate more than one DG at a time paralleled to any transformer (startup or unit auxiliary) in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. REFER TO SR 3.8.1.3, Note 3.

5.12 DGs are highly responsive to the starting of large motor loads, such as a 12kV pump, a condensate and booster pump set, or the No. 2 Heater Drain Pump. If the MVAR output is not reduced prior to starting such loads, a DG could exceed its kVA rating. If, while a DG is paralleled and at full load, a large motor load is to be started, first reduce MVAR output to 0.5 MVAR or less until after the load has been started.Ref 7.2 5.13 Prior to paralleling DG 2-3 to the bus, the DG 2-3 Mode Sel switch on VB4 shall be verified in "MANUAL".

5.14 Control power selection (EQD Panel):

• In MODES 1-4: DG 2-3 shall have its normal DC source energized and selected. If the backup source is selected, DG 2-3 is considered INOPERABLE and either DG 2-3 or 2-2 must be selected to MANUAL to prevent making Battery 2-3 INOPERABLE.

• In MODES 5, 6, and DEFUELED: Preferred alignment is for DG 2-3 to have its normal DC source energized and selected. If cross-tie capability exists (i.e., capability of supplying power to the battery charger aligned to DG 2-3 DC source), DG 2-3 and Battery 2-3 can still be considered OPERABLE with the backup source selected.

5.15 Day tank level columns respond very slowly to a level change. When manually filling the tank, use caution to avoid overflowing the day tank.

5.16 Crankcase exhausters should be operating while the engine is running. If not, DG 2-3 is still OPERABLE, but a notification shall be initiated and repairs made in a timely fashion. If crankcase exhausters are not running, DG 2-3 may experience more oil leakage from the block than normal.

5.17 If the lubricating oil temperature is below 90°F, DG 2-3 should not be started unless engineering has evaluated the condition.

5.18 Starting air header and turbo air header pressures should be monitored:

• Starting air: 140-160 psig

• Turbo air: Above 210 psig OP_J-6B~VIu2r31.DOC 1008.1609

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-LJCS1

Title:

Respond to Unexpected Rod Motion during Routine Dilution Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat _____ Unsat _____ Total Time: _____ minutes Comments:

References:

OP B-1A:VII, CVCS - Makeup Control System Operation, Rev. 57 Alternate Path: Yes ______ X _ No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 2.1, 3.2, 4.2, 7.1, 8.1, 9.3, 10.2 Job Designation: RO or SRO Rev Comments: Modified Bank LJC-075 Gen KA / Rating: 001.A2.11 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following 4.4/ 4.7 malfunctions or operations on the CRDS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Situations requiring a reactor trip.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 08/10/2016 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 08/11/2016 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond TO UNEXPECTED ROD JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The student will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials: None Initial Conditions GIVEN:

• Unit 1 has been stable at 75% power for an extended period.

• The shift is about to commence a load ramp to 90% power at 3 MW/min Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform a batch dilution of 100 gallons at 50 gpm, per OP B-1A:VII, Attachment 1. All precautions and limitations are complete; prerequisites have also been completed.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard:

• A 100 gallon dilution has been commenced at 50 gpm.

• Reactor is manually tripped before Control Bank D reaches the All Rods Out (ARO) position of 230 steps, in accordance with OP AP-12A, Continuous Withdrawal or Insertion of a Control Rod Bank, after an attempt to stop the continuous rod withdrawal in manual, fails.

NRCL161-LJCS1 PAGE 2 OF 9 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond TO UNEXPECTED ROD JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 References OP B-1A:VII, Attachment 1.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

2.** Step 3 - Press STOP on Makeup 2.1 Presses STOP on Makeup Control screen Control screen. (CC-2).**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

3.** Step 4 - Press DILUTE on Makeup 3.1 Reads NOTE regarding ALT DILUTE and Control screen. impact on RCP seals. Note does not apply

- ALT DILUTE not being used.

3.2 Presses DILUTE on Makeup Control screen.**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL161-LJCS1 PAGE 3 OF 9 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond TO UNEXPECTED ROD JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 4.** Step 5-Set TARGET BATCH to desired 4.1 Reads two NOTES regarding maximum gallons of water to add. flow rate. NOTE 2 applies and was met with flow rate specified in cue.

4.2 Sets TARGET BATCH to 100 gallons of water.**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

5. Step 6 -Ensure BATCHED GALLONS 5.1 Ensures BATCHED GALLONS reset.

reset.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

6. Step 7 - IF primary water flow to the 6.1 Reads NOTE on primary water pumps blender will be set for less than 80 (back down at lower flow rates).

gpm AND the flow rate will be Determines note is applicable, but pump is maintained for more than an hour, not at risk of dead-heading due to short THEN place the Primary Water Pump time duration for dilution.

currently in "AUTO" to the "OFF" position.

6.2 Determines flowrate is less than 80 gpm, but will NOT be maintained for more than an hour. Leaves Primary Water Pump 1-2 in AUTO (VB-2).

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL161-LJCS1 PAGE 4 OF 9 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond TO UNEXPECTED ROD JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 7.** Step 8 - Ensure PRI-WATER FLOW SP 7.1 Sets PRI-WATER FLOW SP to 50 gpm. **

set to desired flow rate.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

8.** Step 9 - Press START. 8.1 Presses START. **

Check expected primary water flow 8.2 Verifies flow, flowrate, and audible and audible beeping. beeping:

• FI-111 (VB-2)

• FCV-110A/B, FCV-111A/B (VB-2)

• FR-110, Blue Pen (CC-2)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL161-LJCS1 PAGE 5 OF 9 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond TO UNEXPECTED ROD JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

<< ALTERNATE PATH START POINT >>

9.** Observes outward rod motion on 9.1 Observes outward step of control bank D Control Bank D and enters OP AP- (CC1, DRPI) 12A, Continuous Withdrawal or Insertion of a Control Rod Bank.

9.2 Evaluates plant parameter to determine if rod motion is warranted.

• Checks for Tave-Tref mismatch > 1.5 oF (CC1). (It is not)

• May check PCS Control Screen (CC4).

• Determines Auto Rod motion is NOT warranted.

Step 1 - Place Rods in Manual. 9.3

• Places Rod Mode Selector switch in MANUAL (CC1).**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

10.** Step 2 - Checks Rod Motion Stopped. 10.1 Determines continuous rod motion has NOT stopped based on DRPI indication and rod step counters (CC1).

Step 2 RNO - Manually trip reactor. 10.2 Performs Manual Reactor Trip. (CC1)**

<< ALTERNATE PATH END POINT >>

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL161-LJCS1 PAGE 6 OF 9 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond TO UNEXPECTED ROD JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: __________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL161-LJCS1 PAGE 7 OF 9 REV. 0

JPM

Title:

Respond to Unexpected Rod JPM Number: NRCL161-LJCS1 Attachment 1, Simulator Setup Restore the simulator to IC-11 (45%, MOL).

Perform the following:

1. Go to RUN.

2. Simulate preparation for a load ramp to 90% by:

• Placing MW IN feedback in on the DEHC panel.

• Setting in a 3 MW/min ramp rate to a TARGET of 1080 MW.

3. Leave ramp on HOLD.

4. Go to FREEZE.

Run Lesson NRCL161-LJCS1.lsn Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

NRCL161-LJCS1 PAGE 8 OF 9 REV. 0 00

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS1 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Unit 1 has been stable at 75% power for an extended period.

• The shift is about to commence a load ramp to 90% power at 3 MW/min Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform a batch dilution of 100 gallons at 50 gpm, per OP B-1A:VII, Attachment 1. All precautions and limitations are complete; prerequisites have also been completed.

NRCL161-LJCS1 PAGE 9 OF 9 REV. 0 00

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-LJCS2

Title:

SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: _______

minutes Comments:

References:

EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Rev 44 Alternate Path: Yes ______ X _ No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 4.3, 9.5 Job Designation: RO or SRO Rev Comments: New Gen KA / Rating: 013.A4.01 - Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in 4.5 / 4.8 the control room ESFAS-initiated equipment which fails to actuate:

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 08/07/2016 OPERATIONS CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 08/11/2016 REPRESENTATIVE:

REV. 0

JPM TITLE: SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The student will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials: EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix E.

Initial Conditions GIVEN:

• Unit 1 has experience a reactor trip due to a due to a large seismic event.

• The crew has completed their immediate actions and entered E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

• No personnel are in containment at this time.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform EOP E-0, Appendix E.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: EOP E-0, Appendix E, ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status is completed through step 8.

Manual actions are taken to address EFAS actuation failures:

• Accum N2 Fill Isolation Valve 8880 is closed.

• Main Steam Isolation Valves FCV-43 and FCV-44 are closed.

• S/G Blowdown System Isolation Valves FCV-762 and FCV-763 (inside containment side) are closed.

By the completion of EOP E-0, Appendix E, step 9 NRCL161-LJCS2 PAGE 2 OF 12 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 References EOP E-0, Appendix E Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

2. Step 1 - NOTIFY Plant Personnel. Note: No personnel inside containment given as initial condition.

2.1 Checks no personnel inside containment.

2.2 Announces Reactor Trip/SI on PA system.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

3. Step 2 - CHECK Main Generator 3.1 Checks PK14-01, Unit Trip - ON Tripped.

3.2 Checks 500KV bkrs - Both Open 3.3 Checks Exciter Field Breaker - Open Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL161-LJCS2 PAGE 3 OF 12 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 4.** Step 3 - ENSURE Containment 4.1 Observes the following on the Isolation Phase A actuated. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PHASE A portion of Monitor Light Box B:

• Train A red activate light - ON

• Train B red activate light - ON

• White Status Lights - ON (one) 4.2 Turns CONTMT ISOL PHASE A to actuation switch to ACTUATE. (VB1)

<< ALTERNATE PATH #1 - START POINT >>

4.3 Identifies 8880, ACCUM N2 ISOL FILL VLV, OPEN and manually closes the valve (VB-1).**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

<< ALTERNATE PATH #1 - END POINT >>

5. Step 4 - ENSURE Containment Vent 5.1 Observes the following on the CONTMT Isolation actuated. VENT ISOL portion of Monitor Light Box B:

• Train A red activate light - ON

• Train B red activate light - ON

• White Status Lights - OFF Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL161-LJCS2 PAGE 4 OF 12 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET NRCL161-LJCS2 PAGE 5 OF 12 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

6. Step 5 - ENSURE SI Status. 6.1 Observes the following on the SAFETY INJECTION portion of Monitor Light Box C:

• Red activate light - ON

• White Status Lights - ON (numerous) 6.2 May attempt manual Safety Injection actuation by turning switch to ACTUATE.

(VB1) 6.3 Identifies components that failed to actuate/reposition due to Bus G differential trip (4kV and 480V de-energized)

Equipment with no power (VB-1)

• ASW 1-2

• CCP 1-2

• CFCU 1-3

• CCW 1-2

• CFCU 1-5

• RHRP 1-1 Valves with no power (VB-2)

• LCV-112C - CHG PP SUCT FROM VCT (failed OPEN)

• 8108 - CHG TO REGEN HX (failed OPEN)

• 8805B - CHG PP SUCT FROM RWST (failed CLOSED)

Note: May direct Aux Watch to close valves locally.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL161-LJCS2 PAGE 6 OF 12 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

7. Step 6 - ENSURE Feedwater Isolation. 7.1 Observes the following on the F.W. ISOL portion of Monitor Light Box C:

• Red activate light - ON

• White Status Lights - OFF 7.2 Observes the following on the S.G. LVL portion of Monitor Light Box C:

• Red activate light - ON

• White Status Lights - ON 7.3 Identifies valve that failed to reposition due to Bus G differential trip (480V de-energized)

Valves with no power (VB-3)

• FCV-439 - MN FDWTR ISOL VLVS (failed OPEN)

Note: May Turbine Watch to close valve locally.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

8. Step 7 - CHECK Containment Spray 8.1 Observes the following on the CONTMT and Phase B Isol - NOT REQUIRED VENT ISOL PHASE B portion of Monitor Light Box D:

• Train A red activate light - OFF

• Train B red activate light - OFF

• White Status Lights - OFF 8.2 Observes that containment spray has NOT initiated.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL161-LJCS2 PAGE 7 OF 12 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET NRCL161-LJCS2 PAGE 8 OF 12 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 9.** Step 8 - CHECK Main Steamline 9.1 Observes the following on the MSI portion Isolation not required. of monitor light box D:

• Red activate light - ON

<< ALTERNATE PATH #2 - START POINT >>

9.2 Observes the following on the MSI portion of monitor light box D:

• White Status Light - ON (numerous) 9.3 Identifies the following isolation valves in the OPEN position (VB-3):

Main Steam Iso S/G Blowdown FCV-43 FCV-762 FCV-44 FCV-763 9.4 Determines Main Steam Isolation should have actuated based on plant conditions:

• S/G pressure less than 600 psig.

• Trend on S/G press drop > -2 psig/sec 9.5 Closes Isolation Valves:

• FCV-43**

• FCV-762**

• FCV-44**

• FCV-763**

<< ALTERNATE PATH #2 - END POINT >>

CUE: Another operator will continue with Appendix E.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL161-LJCS2 PAGE 9 OF 12 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: __________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

NRCL161-LJCS2 PAGE 10 OF 12 REV. 0

JPM

Title:

SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure JPM Number: NRCL161-LJCS2 Attachment 1, Simulator Setup Restore the simulator to IC-10 (100%, MOL).

Run Lesson NRCL161-LJCS2.lsn Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

NRCL161-LJCS2 PAGE 11 OF 12 REV. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS2 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Unit 1 has experience a reactor trip due to a due to a large seismic event.

• The crew has completed their immediate actions and entered E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

• No personnel are in containment at this time.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform EOP E-0, Appendix E.

NRCL161-LJCS2 PAGE 12 OF 12 REV. 0

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-LJCS3

Title:

Prepare for RCS Depressurization during a Steam Generator Tube Rupture Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: _______

minutes Comments:

References:

EOP E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Rev 39 Alternate Path: Yes ______ X _ No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 11.5 Job Designation: RO or SRO Rev Comments: New Gen KA / Rating: 010.A2.03 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR PCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or 3.3 / 3.7 mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: PORV failures.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 08/07/2016 OPERATIONS CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 08/11/2016 REPRESENTATIVE:

REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Prepare for RCS Depressurization during a Steam JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS3 Generator Tube Rupture EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The student will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials: EOP E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Rev 39 Initial Conditions Given:

• A SGTR occurred on the 1-2 S/G, causing an SI.

• EOP E-0 was completed, and EOP E-3 is in progress.

• Progress in EOP E-3 is now to the point where a cooldown is in progress, per step 9, using condenser steam dumps.

Initiating Cue: The SFM directs you to perform steps 11-16 of EOP E-3 while the cooldown continues per step 9 instructions, and then report back to the SFM.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard:

• The failed open PZR PORV PCV-474 is isolated by closing Block Valve 8000A before Pressurizer Level rises above 74%.

NRCL161-LJCS3 PAGE 2 OF 9 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Prepare for RCS Depressurization during a Steam JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS3 Generator Tube Rupture EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 References EOP E-3.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

2. Step 11.a - Check intact S/G levels > 2.1 Observes that ALL S/G levels are > 15%

15%. (VB-3).

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Note: Levels are within specified band.

Examinee may leave LCVs in AUTO for MDAFP, or throttle in MAN, as desired.

3. Step 11.b - Control feedflow to 3.1 Maintains S/G levels 20-65%.

maintain S/G NR Level between 20%

and 65%.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Note: TDAFW pump is not required if both MDAFW pumps are providing adequate feed flow.

4. Step 11.c - Check TDAFW required for 4.1 Determines TDAFW is NOT required for heat removal. heat removal (VB-3).

4.2 Observes that ALL S/G levels are > 16%.

4.3 Secures TDAFW (closed FCV-95, VB-3).

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL161-LJCS3 PAGE 3 OF 9 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Prepare for RCS Depressurization during a Steam JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS3 Generator Tube Rupture EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Note: TDAFW pump LCVs are CLOSED from previous steps in the event flow path.

Examinee may elect to OPEN valves not associated with S/G 1-2 since pump is no longer running.

5. Step 11.d - Throttle TD AFW LCVs as 5.1 Throttles TDAFP LCVs as desired (VB-3).

necessary to maintain S/G Level.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

6. Step 12.a - Check Power to Block 6.1 Observes that power is available to ALL Valves - AVAILABLE Pressurizer PORV Block Valves (VB-2).

Step 12.b - Check PRZ PORVS - 6.2 Observes that PCV-455C, PCV-456, and CLOSED. PCV-474 are closed.

Step 12.c - Check Block Valves - 6.3 Observes that 8000A, 8000B, and 8000C CLOSED. are closed.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Note: SI was reset in a previous step in the event flow path. Examinee may elect to re-preform reset step.

7. Step 13 - RESET Sl. 7.1 Observes SI is reset based on the following:

• Red Light (SI) above Monitor Light Box C is OFF (VB-1).

• PK08-21 is OFF (VB-3)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL161-LJCS3 PAGE 4 OF 9 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Prepare for RCS Depressurization during a Steam JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS3 Generator Tube Rupture EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Note: Containment Isolation, Phase A was reset in a previous step. Examinee may elect to re-preform reset step. Phase B was never active.

8. Step 14 -RESET Both Trains Of 8.1 Observes Phase A is reset based on the Containment Isolation Phase A AND following:

Phase B.

• Both Red Lights (PH A) above Monitor Light Box B are OFF (VB-1).

• AR PK02-01 is OFF (VB-1)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Note: FCV-584 (Instrument Air Control Valve) was opened in a previous step.

9. Step 15.a,b - ESTABLISH Instrument 9.1 Observes that FCV-584 is already OPEN Air To Containment: (VB-4).

9.2 Observes that Instrument Air Header pressure is > 90 psig (VB-4).

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

10. Step 16.a,b,c - CHECK Status of RHR 10.1 Observes both RHR pumps are running, Pumps: with suction aligned to the RWST (VB-1).

Observes that RCS pressure is well above 10.2 300 psig (VB-2).

10.3 Stops both RHR pumps.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL161-LJCS3 PAGE 5 OF 9 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Prepare for RCS Depressurization during a Steam JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS3 Generator Tube Rupture EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

<< ALTERNATE PATH - START POINT >>

Note: PCV-474 fails 2% open when first RHR pump is secured in the previous step.

It can be isolated via the block valve. The effect on pressure is minimal. Step 12.b, Check PRZ PORVS - CLOSED, is a Continuous Action Step, which may be returned to for place-keeping purposes.

11.** Step 12.b - Check PRZ PORVS - 11.1 Observes PCV-474 indicated mid-position CLOSED (Continuous Action Step) (OPEN). Entered Response Not Obtained (RNO) column.

11.2 Checks RCS Pressure LESS THAN 2335 psig (PORV open setpoint) (VB2).

11.3 Turns PCV-474 control switch to CLOSE.

11.4 Observes no change in PCV-474 position indication light.

11.5 Closes 8000A PORV Block Valve **

<< ALTERNATE PATH - END POINT >>

CUE: Other operators will continue with EOP E-3 actions Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL161-LJCS3 PAGE 6 OF 9 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Prepare for RCS Depressurization during a Steam JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS3 Generator Tube Rupture EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: __________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

NRCL161-LJCS3 PAGE 7 OF 9 REV. 0

JPM

Title:

Prepare for RCS Depressurization during a JPM Number: NRCL161-LJCS3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Attachment 1, Simulator Setup Restore the simulator to IC-210. The simulator is setup at the end of the cooldown in EOP E-3, and is ready for RCS depressurization.

Run Lesson NRCL161-LJCS3.lsn Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

NRCL161-LJCS3 PAGE 8 OF 9 REV. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS3 Initial Conditions: Given:

• A SGTR occurred on the 1-2 S/G, causing an SI.

• EOP E-0 was completed, and EOP E-3 is in progress.

• Progress in EOP E-3 is now to the point where a cooldown is in progress, per step 9, using condenser steam dumps.

Initiating Cue: The SFM directs you to perform steps 11-16 of EOP E-3 while the cooldown continues per step 9 instructions, and then report back to the SFM.

NRCL161-LJCS3 PAGE 9 OF 9 REV. 0

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-LJCS4

Title:

Initiate Bleed and Feed for a Loss of Heat Sink Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

References:

EOP FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Rev.30 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 10 minutes Critical Steps: 2.1, 7.3 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: Bank LJC-116 DCPP Task # / Rating: 196800, 889200, 317800, 875800, 169600 3.3 / 3.5 / 3.3 / 3.7 / 3.0 Gen KA # / Rating: E05.EA1.1 4.1 / 4.0 AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 08/10/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 08/11/16 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Bleed and Feed for a Loss of Heat Sink JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue.

The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the steps with which to begin.

Required Materials: Provide a copy of the reference procedure (partial procedure allowed), if the task is being done in the plant or lab.

Initial Conditions: Given:

Unit 1 has experienced a loss of secondary heat sink. EOP FR-H.1 has been implemented and all efforts to establish AFW, MFW, and condensate flow have failed Initiating Cue: At least 3 steam generator wide range levels are less than 18% and the SFM directs you to establish and verify RCS bleed and feed per EOP FR-H.1, FOP Item #5.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: RCS bleed and feed has been established and verified as required by EOP FR H.1, Steps 12-18 such that the following conditions are satisfied:

• At least 1 ECCS High or Intermediate Head Pump is running:

CCP1-1 CCP1-2 SIP1-1 SIP1-2

• At least 2 Pressurizer PORVs are OPEN:

PCV-455C PCV-474 PCV-456

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Bleed and Feed for a Loss of Heat Sink JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 References EOP FR-H.1.

1.2 Reads CAUTION prior to Step 12.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 2. Step 12 - Actuate Safety Injection. ** 2.1 Positions the SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATE switch on CC-2 or VB-1 to ACTUATE.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

3. Step 13 - Verify RCS feed paths. 3.1 Observes that at least one CCP or one SI pump is running.

3.2 Observes that ECCS valves are in their proper emergency alignment on the VB1 and VB2 mimic.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Bleed and Feed for a Loss of Heat Sink JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

4. Step 14 - Reset Safety Injection. Note: The 60 second SI timer will have to time out before SI can be reset.

4.1 Depresses the SAFETY INJECTION RESET TRAIN A and TRAIN B pushbuttons.

4.2 Verifies that SI is reset by observing PK08- 22 ON and/or SI Monitor Box red status light OFF.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

5. Step 15 - Reset Containment Isolation Phase A 5.1 Depresses the CONTMT ISOL PHASE A RESET and Phase B. pushbutton.

5.2 Verifies Phase A red lights are OFF or PK02-01 is OFF.

5.3 Observes that Phase B is NOT actuated or depresses the Phase B RESET pushbuttons.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Bleed and Feed for a Loss of Heat Sink JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

6. Step 16 - Establish instrument air to 6.1 Opens FCV-584 (VB4) containment.

6.2 Verifies that FCV-584 has opened.

6.3 Observes that instrument air header pressure is

> 90 psig on PI-380.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 7. Step 17 - Establish RCS bleed path. 7.1 Observes that power is available to the PORV block valves (VB2):

o 8000A o 8000B o 8000C 7.2 Observes that PORV block valves are already open as indicated by illuminated RED position light (VB2).

o 8000A o 8000B o 8000C

• • 7.3 Opens all PORVs by taking switches to the OPEN position.

o PCV-474 o PCV-455C o PCV-456 7.4 Verifies all PORVs have opened as indicated by Red lights ON / Green Lights OFF.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Bleed and Feed for a Loss of Heat Sink JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

8. Step 18 - Verify adequate RCS bleed path. 8.1 Observes that at least two PZR PORVs and associated block valves have opened.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 6 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Bleed and Feed for a Loss of Heat Sink JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 7 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Bleed and Feed for a Loss of Heat Sink JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS4 ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP INIT to IC 223. (ONLY IF no IC available, you can create conditions as follows; DON'T use if IC 223 works):

• IC-10, then run lesson drl_1053

• When drill complete, use 10%ers to B/D 3 S/Gs to < 18% (use max chrg during depress)

• 10%ers to normal and FRZ once stable (takes about 20 min)

This SNAP allows entry into EOP FR-H.1 at Step 12. Three (3) steam generator wide range levels are < 18% and steam generator 10% steam dumps are in AUTO at 8.38 turns.

Perform the following:

1. Display the E-0 screen on SPDS panel A.

2. Display the CSF-3 screen on SPDS panel B.

Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

Page 8 of 9 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS4 Initial Conditions: Given:

Unit 1 has experienced a loss of secondary heat sink. EOP FR-H.1 has been implemented and all efforts to establish AFW, MFW, and condensate flow have failed Initiating Cue: At least 3 steam generator wide range levels are less than 18% and the SFM directs you to establish and verify RCS bleed and feed per EOP FR-H.1, FOP Item #5.

Page 9 of 9 Rev. 0

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-LJCS5

Title:

Initiate Containment Spray Manually Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

References:

EOP FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, Rev. 12 Alternate Path: Yes _____ _ No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 10 minutes Critical Steps: 3.1, 4.2 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: Bank LJC-010 DCPP Task # / Rating: 849200, 835600 3.7 / 3.6 Gen KA # / Rating: E14.EA1.1 3.7 / 3.7 AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 08/10/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 08/11/16 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Containment Spray Manually JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue.

The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. If the task is being done in the plant or lab, and after identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told what step to begin the task at.

Required Materials: Provide a copy of the reference procedure (partial procedure allowed), if the task is being done in the plant or lab.

Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 1 experienced a LOCA

• EOP E-1 is in progress and Safety Injection is reset

• Containment pressure is > 25 psig

• A MAGENTA path on the Containment Critical Safety Function Status Tree has been confirmed

• All higher priority critical safety functions have been addressed Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to manually initiate containment spray in accordance with EOP FR-Z.1 DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: Containment spray is manually initiated and aligned for injection phase in accordance with EOP FR-Z.1, Step 3 such that:

• Containment Spray Pumps 1-1 and 1-2 are both running

• Containment Spray Pump Discharge Valves 9001A and 9001B are OPEN Prior to the completion of FR-Z.1.

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 7 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Containment Spray Manually JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 References EOP FR Z.1.

Cue: Start with Step 3.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

2. Step 3 - Check if containment spray is required. 2.1 Checks if EOP ECA-1.1 is the procedure in effect.

Cue: EOP ECA-1.1 is not in effect.

2.2 Determines Containment Spray IS required -

containment pressure is greater than 22 psig (PI-934, PI-935, PI-936, PI-937 on VB1)

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 3. Step 3.d - RNO Start the containment spray ** 3.1 Turns control switches to the START position for pumps. containment spray pumps 1-1 and 1-2 (VB1)

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 7 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Containment Spray Manually JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

• • 4. Step 3.e - Checks containment spray system for 4.1 Determines that ECCS is NOT aligned for proper valve alignment. injection flow based on Containment Spray Pump Discharge Valves 9001A and 9001B position indication lights (VB1):

• Red lights OFF / Green Lights ON

• • 4.2 Takes control switch for 9001A and B to OPEN position and verifies valve position lights indicate OPEN (VB1):

• Red lights ON / Green Lights OFF 4.3 Verifies 8992 open.

4.4 Verifies 8994A&B open.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 7 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Containment Spray Manually JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 7 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Containment Spray Manually JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS5 ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize the simulator to IC-10 (100%, MOL).

Enter Lesson File drl_1010.lsn.

Perform the following:

1. Place FCV-53 and 54 in RECIRC.

2. Shut down condensate booster pump set 13, if running.

3. Select CSF-5 on SPDS.

After the simulator goes to FREEZE, Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet and has verified containment pressure greater than 22 psig (containment pressure lowers quickly from CFCU cooling once the simulator is taken to RUN).

Page 6 of 7 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS5 Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 1 experienced a LOCA

• EOP E-1 is in progress and Safety Injection is reset

• Containment pressure is > 25 psig

• A MAGENTA path on the Containment Critical Safety Function Status Tree has been confirmed

• All higher priority critical safety functions have been addressed Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to manually initiate containment spray in accordance with EOP FR-Z.1 Page 7 of 7 Rev. 0

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-LJCS6

Title:

Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

References:

EOP ECA-0.3, Restore 4kV Buses, Appendix X and Appendix Q, Rev. 18 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 2.1, 3.1, 5.2, 6.1, 7.2, 9.2, 10.1, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 13.1, 13.2, 13.3, 17.1 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: Bank LJC-032 DCPP Task # / Rating: 573800 3.5 Gen KA # / Rating: 064.A4.06 3.9 / 3.9 AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 08/10/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 08/11/16 REV.0

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue.

The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the steps with which to begin.

Required Materials: Provide a copy of the reference procedure (partial procedure allowed), if the task is being done in the plant or lab.

Initial Conditions: Given:

• U-1 was operating at 100%.

• A reactor trip and safety injection has occurred concurrent with a loss of all off-site power.

• Diesel generator 11 and diesel generator 13 have failed due to lube oil pressure problems.

• Diesel generator 12 is supplying 4kV bus G.

• CCW Pp 12 has failed resulting in a complete loss of CCW flow.

• Steps 4.a and 4.b of ECA-0.3, Appendix X have been completed.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to crosstie 4kV bus G to energize 4kV and 480V bus H per EOP ECA-0.3, Appendix X, commencing at step 4.c. The Shift Manager has concurred with this implementation.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: 4KV and 480 V bus H are energized from DG 1-2 in accordance with ECA-0.3, appendix X as indicated by the following:

• Vital 4kV Startup Feeder Breaker OPEN: 52-HG-15

• 4kV Startup Feeder Breakers CLOSED: 52-HH-14 and 52-HG-14

• 4kV to 480V bus Feeder Breaker CLOSED: 52-HH-10

• White Power Indicator Lights Illuminated for 480V bus H and 4kV bus H

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 12 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 References ECA-0.3, Appendix X, step 4.c.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 2. Step 4.c - Verify OPEN the 4kV to 480 VAC bus ** 2.1 Opens 52-HH-10 (VB4).

feeder breaker for the de-energized bus to be reenergized 2.2 Verifies that 52-HH-10 has opened (VB4).

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

3. Step 4.d - On the de-energized 480V bus to be ** 3.1 Calls the operator in the field to open all 480V reenergized, open all 480V breakers. Bus H breakers.

Note: 480V Bus H breakers are in the correct OPEN position for this JPM. Inform the Examinee that Time Compression is being used.

Cue: (using time compression) An Operator has opened all the 480V breakers on bus 1H.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 12 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

4. Step 4.e - Cut in the DIR PWR, LOSS OF FIELD, & 4.1 Places D/G DIR PWR, LOSS OF FLD & BKR OC BKR OC PROT RLYS for diesel generator 12. PROT RLYS C/O SW to CUT-IN (VB4).

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 5. Step 4.f - Reset SI. 5.1 Checks PK08-21 Safety Injection Actuation status (VB3).

• • 5.2 Manually depresses both pushbuttons.

5.3 Checks at least one of the following:

Monitor Light Box B Safety Injection red light OFF (VB1).

OR PK08-21, Safety Injection Actuation not ON (VB3).

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 6. Step 4.g - Cutout the auto transfer FCOs for ** 6.1 Places all Xfer to S/U PWR C/O toggle switch to 4kV and 12kV buses. CUT-OUT (VB4, VB5).

Vital 4kV Non-Vital 4kV 12 kV Bus F ** Bus D Bus D Bus G ** Bus E Bus E Bus H **

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 12 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

• • 7. Step 4.h - Depress all auto transfer reset ** 7.1 Depresses all AUTO XFER RESET pushbuttons, if pushbuttons. required (VB4, VB5).

Vital 4kV Non-Vital 4kV 12 kV Bus F ** Bus D Bus D Bus G ** Bus E Bus E Bus H **

7.2 Verifies that all Auto Xfer indicating blue lights are off. (VB4, VB5).

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

8. Step 4.i - Verify OPEN all vital 4kV bus auxiliary 8.1 Observes that all vital 4kV bus aux feeder feeder breakers. breakers are OPEN (VB4):

• 52-HH-13 OPEN

• 52-HG-13 OPEN

• 52-HF-13 OPEN Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 9. Step 4.j - Verify OPEN all vital 4kV bus startup 9.1 Observes 52-HG-14 is OPEN (VB4).

feeder breakers.

• • 9.2 Opens Startup Feeder Breakers (VB4)

• 52-HF-14

• 52-HH-14 Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 12 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

• • 10. Step 4.k - Verify OPEN the 4kV startup feeder ** 10.1 Opens 52-HG-15 (VB4).

breaker 52-HG-15.

10.2 Verifies that 52-HG-15 has opened Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

11. Step 4.l - Verify that Steps 4.b and 4.c of this 11.1 Reads CAUTION and NOTE.

appendix are complete.

Cue: Steps 4.b and 4.c of this appendix are complete.

Cue: Another operator will monitor the stability of the DG, and open the S/U feeder breaker if needed.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 6 of 12 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

• • 12. Step 4.m - Close 4kV startup feeder breaker for ** 12.1 Inserts sync key for 4kV bus H startup feeder the de-energized bus being reenergized. breaker 52-HH-14 (VB4).

• • 12.2 Turns sync switch to ON.

• • 12.3 Closes 52-HH-14.

12.4 Verifies that 52-HH-14 has closed.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 13. Step 4.n - Close the 4kV startup feeder breaker ** 13.1 Inserts sync key for 4kV bus G startup feeder for the bus that will be supplying power to the breaker 52-HG-14 (VB4).

de-energized bus

• • 13.2 Turns sync switch to ON.

• • 13.3 Closes 52-HG-14.

13.4 Verifies that 52-HG-14 has closed.

13.5 Verifies running diesel generator remains stable.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 7 of 12 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

14. Step 4.o - Monitors for an SI 14.1 **********************************

Cue: Another operator will monitor for an SI, and open the bus G S/U feeder if required.

Cue: An operator has been stationed at VB4 with Appendix Q and is monitoring the diesel generator.

15. Step 4.p - IMPLEMENT Appendix Q to start 4kV 15.1 Cue: The SFM will coordinate the starting loads as needed on the reenergized bus of any 4KV loads that are required.

Please continue with Appendix X.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

16. Step 4.q - Verify that Step 4.d of this Appendix 16.1 Verifies that Step 4.d of this Appendix is is complete PRIOR to performing the next step. complete.

Cue: Steps 4.d of this appendix is complete.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 17. Step 4.r - Close the 4kV to 480V bus feeder ** 17.1 Closes 52-HH-10.

breaker for the reenergized bus.

Verifies that 52-HH-10 has closed.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 8 of 12 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

18. Step 4.s - Implement Appendix Q for starting 18.1 Implements Appendix Q for starting 480V bus 480V loads as needed. loads as needed.

Cue: The SFM will coordinate the starting of 480 vac loads that are required.

Another operator will monitor and implement App Q.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 9 of 12 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 10 of 12 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS6 ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP Restore the simulator to the IC-10 (100%, MOL).

Enter lesson file drl_1032 or manually insert the following:

Command Description Insert loa_sis3 OPEN delay=60 Strips vital 4KV Bus H Insert loa_rhr10 OPEN delay=60 Insert loa_css8 OPEN delay=60 Insert loa_ccw31 OPEN delay=60 Insert loa_afw14 OPEN delay=60 Insert dsc_ven14 OPEN delay=60 Insert mal_deg1a 2 Fails DGs 1-1 and 1-3 Insert mal_deg1c 2 Insert mal_syd1 1 Loss of Offsite Power Insert mal_syd1_btw 1 Insert mal_ppl2a 1 Inadvertant SI delIA mal_ppl2a 2 delay=2 insert mal_ppl2b 1 delIA mal_ppl2b 2 delay=2 Insert pmp_ccw2 4 delay=4 OC trip on CCW PP 1-2 RUN Runs simulator Run lesson drl_0063 (Strips 480v bus H). Manual insert is not practical due to large number of actions.

Freeze simulator Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

Page 11 of 12 Rev.0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS6 Initial Conditions: Given:

• U-1 was operating at 100%.

• A reactor trip and safety injection has occurred concurrent with a loss of all off-site power.

• Diesel generator 11 and diesel generator 13 have failed due to lube oil pressure problems.

• Diesel generator 12 is supplying 4kV bus G.

• CCW Pp 12 has failed resulting in a complete loss of CCW flow.

• Steps 4.a and 4.b of ECA-0.3, Appendix X have been completed.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to crosstie 4kV bus G to energize 4kV and 480V bus H per EOP ECA-0.3, Appendix X, commencing at step 4.c. The Shift Manager has concurred with this implementation.

Page 12 of 12 Rev.0

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-LJCS7

Title:

Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

References:

OP AP-8A, Control Room Inaccessibility - Establishing Hot Stby, Rev. 41 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 2.2, 6.1, 7.2, 7.4, 8.1, 9.2, 10.1, 11.2 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: Bank LJC-021 DCPP Task # / Rating: 805200 4.2 Gen KA # / Rating: 068.AA1.23 4.3 / 4.4 AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 08/10/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 08/11/16 REV.0

JPM TITLE: Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue.

The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the steps with which to begin.

Required Materials: Provide a copy of the reference procedure (partial procedure allowed), if the task is being done in the plant or lab.

Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 1 is at 100% power.

• The Security Shift Supervisor has informed the Shift Foreman that a credible bomb threat has been received and that he recommends evacuation of the control room.

• Conditions in the control room are not extreme.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform the actions required in OP AP-8A prior to evacuation of the control room.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: The Control Room actions for OP AP-8A, Control Room Inaccessibility - Establishing Hot Standby have been performed such that:

• Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers are OPEN

• MSIVs FCV-41, 42, 43, 44 and MSIV Bypass Valves FCV-25, 24, 23, 22 are CLOSED

• Charging is aligned to the RWST (8805A or B are OPEN, LCV-112B or 112C are CLOSED)

• All Four Reactor Coolant Pumps are Tripped

• Letdown is isolated (8149A, B, and C are CLOSED)

• Auto Transfer Relays for Vital 4kV Buses F, G, and H are reset

• Only 1 Condensate Booster Pump Set is running by the completion of OP AP-8A, step 10.

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 10 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 References OP AP-8A.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 2. Step 1 - Manually trip the reactor. 2.1 Reads Note.

• • 2.2 Trips the reactor using the reactor trip switch (CC1).

2.3 Checks reactor trip and bypass breakers open (VB2).

2.4 Checks rod bottom lights ON (VB2).

2.5 Checks reactor power decreasing (CC1).

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

3. Step 2 - Determine immediate evacuation is 3.1 Reads CAUTION.

not required.

3.2 Determines immediate evacuation is not required.

Cue: Immediate evacuation is not required.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 10 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

4. Step 3 - Ensure turbine tripped. 4.1 Determines all 4 stop valves closed by checking

• SSPS Bi-Stable Status Lights, directly beneath PK4 Annunciator Panel (VB2).

OR

• Stop Valve Position on Triconex Graphical User Interface (CC3).

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

5. Step 4 - Manually initiate a Unit trip and verify 5.1 Trips the Unit using the Unit trip switch (CC3).

bus transfers.

5.2 Checks all 4kV and 12kV buses transfer to startup power by checking

• white power status lights (VB4, VB5) 5.3 Checks all vital 4kV buses are energized by checking:

• white power status lights (VB4, VB5)

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 6. Step 5 - Manually close MSIVs and bypass ** 6.1 Closes ALL MSIVs (VB3).

valves.

• FCV-42

• FCV-41

• FCV-43

• FCV-44 6.2 Checks MSIVs position indication lights:

• Red lights OFF / Green Lights ON (VB3) 6.3 Checks all bypass valves closed as indicated by Red lights OFF / Green Lights ON for:

• FCV-25

• FCV-24

• FCV-23

• FCV-22 Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 10 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

• • 7. Step 6 - Transfer charging suction to the RWST. 7.1 Reads Note.

• • 7.2 Opens 8805A OR 8805B (VB2).

7.3 Checks valve(s) are open (VB2)

• Red lights ON / Green Lights OFF Note: Step 7.4 is NOT required if VCT pressure is less than 28 psig.

• • 7.4 Closes LCV-112B OR 112C (VB2).

7.5 Checks valve closed (VB2)

• Red lights OFF / Green Lights ON Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 8. Step 7 - Trip all reactor coolant pumps. ** 8.1 Trips ALL reactor coolant pumps (VB2).

8.2 Checks pumps tripped based on the following (VB2):

• RED power light OFF

• Lowering Amps Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 9. Step 8 - Isolate letdown. 9.1 Verifies CLOSED 8149A, 8149B (VB2)

• Red lights OFF / Green Lights ON

• • 9.2 Closes 8149 C

• Red lights OFF / Green Lights ON Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 10 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

• • 10. Step 9.a - Reset 4kV Vital auto transfer relays. ** 10.1 Resets 4kV Vital bus auto transfer relays (VB4).

10.2 Checks relays reset by verifying:

• Blue Status Light for associated bus: OFF

• Associated 4kV Auto Transfer Annunciator goes out (AR PK16-19, PK17-19, PK18-19)

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 11. Step 9.b - Shutdown all but one running 11.1 Checks MAN/AUTO selector switch in MAN for condensate/booster pump sets. pump set(s) to be secured (VB3).

• • 11.2 Stops all but one condensate/booster pump set.

11.3 Checks pump(s) shutdown:

• RED power light OFF

• Amps lowering to Zero Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

12. Step 9.c - Open or check open RCS hot leg and 12.1 Checks open NSS-9356A and 9356B (VB1):

pressurizer liquid space sample valves.

• Red lights ON / Green Lights OFF 12.2 Checks open NSS-9355A and 9355B (VB1):

• Red lights ON / Green Lights OFF Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 6 of 10 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

13. Step 10 - Collect equipment needed from the 13.1 Collects the fire brigade, security key rings, and control room. radios.

Cue: The Shift Foreman will transport the Fire Brigade, security key rings, and radios to the hot shutdown panel.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 7 of 10 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 8 of 10 Rev.0

JPM TITLE: Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS7 ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP Restore the simulator to the IC-10 (100%, MOL).

Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

Page 9 of 10 Rev.0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS7 Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 1 is at 100% power.

• The Security Shift Supervisor has informed the Shift Foreman that a credible bomb threat has been received and that he recommends evacuation of the control room.

• Conditions in the control room are not extreme.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform the actions required in OP AP-8A prior to evacuation of the control room.

Page 10 of 10 Rev.0

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 1 Op-Test No: L161 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 2% with AFW in service, backfeeding from 500 kV, BOL, 1609 ppm boron Turnover: At start of OP L-3, preparing MFPs to place in service.

Event Malf Event Event Description No No. Type* (See Summary for Narrative Detail) 1 XMT_CVC19_3 0.0 delay=0 I (ATC, LT-112 Fails Low (auto make-up) (AP-19) ramp=120 SRO) 2 DSC_VEN12 BREAKER_OPEN TS only Loss of Power to S-31 (PK15-17; T.S. 3.7.12.B)

(SRO) 3 XMT_MSS1_3 1215 delay=0 I (ATC, PT-507 Fails High (AP-5) ramp=300 SRO) 4 AS01ASW_ASP11_MTFSEIZUR 1 C (BOP, ASW Pp 1-1 Seizes; Pp 1-2 SF6 Breaker Pressure Fault (AP-10, SRO) T.S. 3.0.3)

AS02E03V00_52HG6TF_SF6 2 5 MAL_RCS3G .75 delay=0 ramp=300 M (ALL) 750 gpm LOCA on Loop 4 Hot Leg due to earthquake 6 MAL_PPL3B BOTH C (BOP) Safety Injection, Train B fails to actuate 7 VLV_SIS1_1 1 C (ATC) 8803 A Fails closed on SI (S1CT-1) 8 MAL_SEI1 0.1500000 ramp=10 C (ALL) RWST drains to 4% due to seismic damage (S1CT-2)

ASISRWST 1.53e6 delay=10 ramp=300

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L161 NRC ES-D-1-01 r1.docx Page 1 of 3 Rev 1

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 1,3,4,5,6,7,8) 7

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) (Events 6,7,8) 3

3. Abnormal events (1-4) (Events 1,3,4) 3

4. Major transients (1-2) (Event 5) 1

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E-1.3) 1

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) (ECA-1.1) 1

7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See description below) 2 Critical Task Justification Reference (S1CT-1) Manually align at least one train of FSAR analysis predicates acceptable results on the

• WCAP-17711-NP, CT-2 SIS actuated safeguards before transition assumption that, at the very least, one train of

• WOG Background out of EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety safeguards has actuated and is providing flow to HE0BG_R2 Injection. the core. Failure to manually align the minimum required safeguards equipment results in the persistence of degraded emergency core cooling system capacity.

(S1CT-2) Stop all running ECCS pumps with Damage to the RWST in this scenario results in a

• WCAP-17711-NP, CT-28 suction aligned to the RWST before continuous loss of level and eventual inability to

• WOG Background insufficient RWST level results in ECCS meet the minimum NPSH requirements for the HECA11BG_R2 pump cavitation as indicated by rapid running ECCS pumps. Failure to stop the pumps swings in pump amperage. before cavitation occurs can lead to pump damage sufficient to render the pumps unavailable for use once an alternate make-up supply is aligned to the RCS.

L161 NRC ES-D-1-01 r1.docx Page 2 of 3 Rev 1

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #1

1. Volume Control Tank (VCT) level channel LT-112 fails low, causing a continuous (and erroneous) makeup signal. The crew diagnoses the level channel failure by comparing other VCT parameters, and by using OP AP-19, Malfunction of the Reactor Makeup Control System. The makeup system is secured, and makeup is accomplished (if needed) using manual mode (or enabling the auto mode for short periods).

2. Auxiliary Building Supply Fan S-31 loses power and crew responds per AR PK15-17, AUX & FHB VENT PWR FAILURE. Auxiliary Building Ventilation System, ABVS, which was operating in Buildings and Safeguards, swaps to Safeguards only. Crew verifies automatic shutdown of Supply E-1 as well as auto-swap to Safeguards only alignment for the ABVS. Shift Foreman enters TS 3.7.12.B, Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (ABVS) for one ABVS train inoperable.

3. Steam Generator Header Pressure Transmitter, PT-507, fails high over 5 minutes causing actual temperature to lower. Crew identifies malfunction noting increase in steam flow and lowering Tcold, and takes manual control of HC-507. OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel is used to address the failure and return primary and secondary plant parameters to normal bands.

4. ASW Pump 1-1 trips due to a seized shaft. Standby ASW Pump 1-2 fails to start as the result of a fault at the breaker (SF6 pressure fault). The Shift Foreman implements OP AP-10, Loss of Auxiliary Salt Water and cross-ties to the Unit 2 ASW system via the ASW cross-tie valve FCV-601. Shift Foreman enters T.S.

3.0.3 for two trains of ASW inoperable on Unit 1.

5. An earthquake occurs, causing a 750 gpm leak to ramp in on loop 4 hot leg. The crew determines the leak is substantial in size based on a rapid drop in pressurizer level. The Shift Foreman directs a reactor and safety injection.

6. The crew enters EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Train B of Safety Injection fails to actuate, requiring the crew to perform numerous manual alignments and pump starts as part of Appendix E.

7. Charging Injection Supply Valve, CVCS-1-8803A fails to open on SI as well. The crew must open 8803A or its parallel equivalent, CVCS-1-8803B in order to meet the requirements of S1CT-1, Manually actuate at least one train of SIS actuated safeguards before transition out of EOP E-0.***

8. The seismic event damages the RWST, resulting in a large fissure that terminates close to the bottom of the tank. The crew briefly enters E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant prior to transitioning to E-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation when RWST level reaches 33%, which happens quickly due to the leaking RWST. With the Containment Recirc Sump Level less than 92%, the crew is forced into EOP ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation. The fissure location causes the RWST to continue to drain, requiring the crew to perform the second critical task S1CT2 - Stop ECCS pumps aligned to the RWST before insufficient level results in ECCS pump cavitation.***

The scenario is terminated once the crew has implemented Appendix W, RCS Makeup from VCT.

• • • CT / TCOA note:

L161 NRC ES-D-1-01 r1.docx Page 3 of 3 Rev 1

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 21 Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel LT-112 Fails Low (causes auto makeup)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Procedure step numbers are included at the front of each action/comment in parenthesis, where applicable.

ALL Diagnosis of makeup control failure is made by one or more of the following:

• Automatic makeup is running, but VCT level shows normal (LT-114) (PPC as L0112A, HSDP)

• LT-112 shows low level (0%), but VCT pressure shows normal, and CCP operation (suction) is normal (all on VB2)

• Yokogawa recorder (L0112A) (VB2 upper left)

ATC Makeup Control is taken to STOP (on the makeup control HMI, CC2) (may be done before or during OP AP-19 use)

SRO Implements OP AP-19, Malfunction of the Reactor Makeup Control System (OP AP-19, Malfunction of the Reactor Makeup Control System)

ATC * (1) Ensures M/U set to correct mode (either AUTO and running, or AUTO and stopped if action taken above)

ATC * (1) Ensures system is selected to start (will probably be selected to STOP [now or later] due to unneeded makeup operation); may select STOP before or during OP AP-19 use BOP * (2) Checks makeup system pumps and valves lineup up, and in AUTO (VB2, lower center; they are all normal)

ATC/BOP * (3) Verifies VCT level channels OPERABLE:

o Observes discrepancy between LT-112 (0%), and LT-114 (normal level); may use VCT pressure and/or normal CCP operation to diagnose that LT-112 has failed (probably diagnosed prior to procedure entry); note: may use operator information manual (OIM) as a diagnostic tool.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 1 of 25 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 21 Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel LT-112 Fails Low (causes auto makeup) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-19, Malfunction of the Reactor Makeup Control System, cont)

ALL * (3 RNO) Goes to App A (1.b.1), and determines what effect the failed LT-112 will have on makeup system operation ATC * (App A, 1b) If not already done, places makeup system in STOP ATC/BOP * (4) Verifies CCP suction parameters are normal (CCP flow/amps/ pressure, VCT level/pressure; VB2 and CC2 meters) (as time permits).

SRO * (5) Notifies Tech Maintenance to troubleshoot and repair (as time permits).

Proceed to the next event once Make-up control system in STOP, per the lead examiner.

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 21 Event

Description:

Loss of Power to S-31 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Fan status icons on the Aux/Fuel Handleing Building Ventilation System Monitor (AFHBVS Monitor) panel on VB4 will not immediately reflect the fan failure. Alarms indicating the loss of power register immediately, and can be viewed by navigating to the associated alarm screen. Fan running status icons are based on airflow and lag the actual fan power loss.

ATC Responds to AR PK15-17 (AUX & FHB VENT PWR FAILURE) alarm and identifies input 109 for Aux Building Supply Fan S-31 UV or Lo Flo on POV1.

BOP Checks AFHBVS Monitor panel on VB4

• Determines both S-31 and E-1 have tripped off.

• Notes Aux Building Ventilation has switched to Safeguards Only mode.

SRO Implements AR PK15-17, AUX & FHB VENT PWR FAILURE (AR PK15-17, AUX & FHB VENT PWR FAILURE)

SRO * (1) Enters Section 2.2, Fan Low Flow or Fan UV, based on alarm input.

• (2.2.1) Determines Aux Building ventilation train has failed

• (2.2.1.a) Notes redundant train was already in service since Aux Building Ventilation was running in Buildings and Safeguards mode prior to the fan trip.

o Verifies ventilation has swapped to Safeguards only (if not previously reported by BOP).

BOP * (2.2.1.b) Checks AFHBVS Monitor panel to verify dampers have aligned properly for Safeguards Only mode (VB4).

SRO/BOP * (2.2.1.c) Dispatches a Nuclear Operator to investigate and determine the cause of the fan failure.

• (2.2.1.d) Notifies RP that the primary sample sink hood will not exhaust properly, which results in a buildup of noble gas in the Auxiliary Building.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 21 Event

Description:

Loss of Power to S-31 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (AR PK15-17, AUX & FHB VENT PWR FAILURE, cont)

SRO * (2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.4) N/A

• (2.2.5) Implements Tech Spec TS 3.7.12.B, Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (ABVS) for one ABVS train inoperable; 7 days to restore the ABVS train to OPERABLE status.

Proceed to the next event once Tech Specs addressed, per the lead examiner.

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 21 Event

Description:

PT-507 Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses PT-507 failed HIGH from one or more of the following:

CC-2 Indications:

• Tave, Pressurizer level, Pressurizer pressure - lowering CC-3 Indications:

• HC-507 demand increasing towards 100%

VB-3 Indications:

• Dump Demand (UI-500) rising to 100%.

SRO/ATC Takes manual control of HC-507 and adjusts Group I steam dump valves in the closed direction to stabilize plant.

SRO Enters OP AP-5, "Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel" (OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel)

SRO/ATC * (1) Confirms that Steam Generator pressure was NOT controlling properly in Auto and has been taken to manual (CC3, HC-507). Directs Tave be returned to previous steady-state value.

SRO/BOP * (2) Determines that the failure is not Eagle-21 related (PK06-01 and PK06-03 are OFF)

SRO/ATC * (3) Determines failure is not associated with a T channel (VB2)

SRO * (4) Determines Steam Dump valves are NOT controlling properly. (Dumps SHOULD be open to maintain temperature for current 2% power conditions). Goes to step 8 per RNO.

• (8.a,b) Refs to Attachment 4.1 for applicable TS/ECGs - none apply.

• (8.c) Contacts I&C to investigate.

Proceed to the next event when crew has stabilized temperature, per the lead examiner.

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 5 of 25 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 6 of 21 Event

Description:

ASW Pp 1-1 Seizes; Pp 1-2 SF6 Breaker Pressure Fault Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Observes PK01-03 (ASW Pp OC trip) and PK01-01 (three low press / low dP inputs) alarming, and informs the Shift Foreman.

ATC/BOP Observes that 1-1 ASW Pp has a blue OC light (VB1, far left), and reports condition to the Shift Foreman.

Note: Actions to start the stand-by pump may be performed prior to AR PK01-03 or OP AP-10 entry (due to it being an automatic action that did not occur), or may be performed when procedurally directed.

BOP Observes that 1-2 ASW Pp did not start, and attempts to start the pump by taking the pump Auto/Manual switch to Manual, and attempting to start the pump (all at far left of VB-1 vertical section).

Note: The Shift Foreman (SFM) may enter OP AP-10 (Loss of ASW), either directly, or after implementing AR PK01-

03. AR PK01-01 may be entered briefly, but it is not expected.

(ONLY if AR PK01-01 is entered; otherwise, section is N/A)

SRO * (1.0) Goes to section 2.1 due to multiple low pressure inputs.

• (2.1.1) Determines that a loss of ASW has occurred, and goes to OP AP-10, Loss of ASW.

(ONLY if AR PK01-03 is entered; otherwise, section is N/A)

SRO * (1.0) Goes to section 2.1, due to OC trip inputs.

SRO/BOP * (2.1.1) Determines that the standby ASW pump is NOT running with normal current (did not start); takes 1-2 ASW pp to MAN, and attempts to start it.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 6 of 25 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 7 of 21 Event

Description:

ASW Pp 1-1 Seizes; Pp 1-2 SF6 Breaker Pressure Fault (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (AR PK01-03, cont) (if used)

SRO * (2.1.2) Determines ASW flow has NOT been restored; goes to OP AP-10, Loss of ASW.

(OP AP-10, Loss of Auxiliary Salt Water)

Note: The Shift Foreman may direct the Reactor Operator to implement cross-tie actions of OP AP-10 while he continues on to address Tech Specs.

SRO/BOP * (1) Determines neither ASW pump is running.

• (1.a RNO) Determines Unit 2 ASW Pump 2-2 is available for cross-tie.

• (1.a.1 RNO) Directs Unit 2 to start stand-by ASW Pump 2-2.

• (1.a.1.a RNO) Directs Unit 2 to CLOSE 2-FCV-496 and OPEN 2-FCV-495.

BOP * (1.a.1.b RNO) Opens FCV-601 (VB1, lower far left skirt)

SRO * (1.b RNO) Implement Tech Spec 3.0.3 for two trains of ASW inoperable.

SRO/BOP * (1.c RNO) Contacts Aux Watch to stop any radwaste discharge in progress.

Proceed to the next event once Tech Specs addressed, per the lead examiner.

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 7 of 25 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 8 of 21 Event

Description:

750 gpm LOCA on Loop 3 Hot Leg due to Earthquake Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Earthquake is diagnosed from one or more of the following:

• PK15-24, Seismic Instrument System (actuated on triggers).

• Physical shaking and noise from the earthquake.

• Various tank alarms going in and out (due to water shifting from earthquake, programmed into simulator modeling).

SRO

• Directs Reactor Operators to walks down their boards and report any abnormalities.

ALL Diagnoses RCS leak from one or more of the following:

• Pzr pressure and level lowering (PPC, CC2 recorder, VB2 meters)

• Containment parameters rising (temp, press) (PPC, VB1 recorder, PAMS panels)

• Sump levels rising (PAMS panel)

• Annunciators:

o AR PK01-17, CFCU DRAIN LEVEL HI o AR PK05-16, PZR PRESSURE HI/LO o AR PK05-21, PZR LEVEL HI/LO o AR PK11-21, HIGH RADIATION o AR PK15-01, CONTMT/TB SUMP/DSL FO VAULT LVL/ DSL FO FLTR DP Note: Seismic event complicates pressurizer level drop diagnostics, and Shift Foreman may initially attempt to address the leak using OP AP-1, Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage.

SFM/ATC Directs/performs manual Reactor Trip followed by manual Safety Injection once Reactor Trip has been verified.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 8 of 25 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5,6,7 Page 9 of 21 Event

Description:

750 gpm LOCA on Loop 3 Hot Leg due to Earthquake (cont)

Safety Injection, Train B fails to actuate 8803 A Fails closed on SI (S1CT-1)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Implements EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

SRO/ATC * (1) Verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open (VB2 upper left), rods on bottom (VB2 upper left DRPI panel), NIs decreasing (CC1 left).

SRO/ATC * (2) Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps).

SRO/BOP * (3) Checks vital 4kv busses (VB4, vital busses F/G/H have white lights on mimic busses).

SRO/ATC * (4) Checks if SI actuated (PK08-21 ON, also checks VB1 red train lights and/or train equipment to verify both trains actuated); may actuate manual SI (VB1 upper right, or CC2 right) due to various SI failures.

Note: Critical Task S1CT-1 may be completed during immediate actions, or as part of Appendix E.

ATC/BOP * (4) Notes and corrects Auto SI failure (may be done following immediate actions, or during App E actions, pg 18) o Actuates manual Phase A containment isolation (optional), and/or manually aligns SI train B pumps and valves (VB1 and VB2; makes white status lights go out on VB1 upper left side under ESF and Phase A areas).

o Opens Charging Injection Supply Valve, CVCS-1-8803A (VB-2, center skirt) **

• • (Critical Task) (S1CT-1, Manually actuate at least one train of SIS actuated safeguards before transition out of EOP E-0).

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 10 of 21 Event

Description:

750 gpm LOCA on Loop 3 Hot Leg due to Earthquake (cont)

Safety Injection, Train B fails to actuate Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, cont)

SRO * (5) Directs App E implemented (usually to BOP)(see page 18)

SRO/ATC * (6) Checks RCS temperature stable or lowering to 547oF o AFW Pp 1-2 and 1-3 both running, but with throttling in Auto due to initial power level at trip (level high); TDAFW not running nor required.

SRO/ATC * (7) Checks Pzr PORVs and Pzr Safeties and Spray Valves o Safeties closed (closed); no sonic flow, tailpipe temperature is elevated, but consistent with containment environment (VB2 - upper panel, far right) o PORVs closed and associated block valves open (VB2 - upper panel, far right) o Pzr Sprays closed (green lights on) (CC2)

SRO/ATC * (8) Checks RCP trip criteria; o RCS WR Pressure is greater than 1300 PSIG, trip criteria is not met (VB2).

SRO/ATC * (9) Determines S/G are NOT faulted o No S/G lowering in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized.

SRO/ATC * (10) Determines S/G are NOT ruptured o Checks RE-71/72/73/74 and RE-15/19 recorders onVB2 (and PPC); (all normal) o PK11-06/17/18 (all OFF).

o May request samples.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 10 of 25 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 11 of 21 Event

Description:

750 gpm LOCA on Loop 3 Hot Leg due to Earthquake (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, cont)

Note: Cross-tie of ASW causes low dP across the CCW HX. Placing a 2nd ASW/CCW HX in service by opening FCV-603 and FCV-431 (VB1 far left) will cause PK01-01, ASW SYS HX DELTA P/ HDR PRESS to come into alarm.

DP is adequate to keep CCW Hx outlet temperature within normal limits with the 2nd HX in service.

SRO/ALL * (11) Checks RCS intact (it is not) (note: only one valid abnormal reading needed to transition from E-0) o (11a) Determines containment pressure is NOT normal (VB1 meters, PPC) o (11b) Determines containment sump levels NOT normal (VB1 meters, PAMS) o (11c) Determines containment radiation is NOT normal (RM-11, 02, 07 are all in alarm) o (11 RNO) Places 2nd ASW/CCW HX in service by opening FCV-603 and FCV-413 (VB1), and transitions to EOP E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant" SRO Transitions to EOP E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 12 of 21 Event

Description:

750 gpm LOCA on Loop 3 Hot Leg due to Earthquake (cont)

EOP E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant)

Note: With the size of the RCS leak/SBLOCA, it is expected that the RWST will reach 33% level (the auto-stop point for the RHR pumps, as well as the required transition point for the cold leg recirc procedure, EOP E-1.3) in just a few minutes after entering EOP E-0. The crew will not complete the procedure prior to transition to EOP E-1.3 (may get a step or two into EOP E-1, LOCA; this is non-consequential).

SRO/ATC * (1) Checks if RCPs should be stopped o WR RCS pressure is still above 1300 psig, pumps are left running.

ALL * (2 & 3) Checks for faulted/ruptured S/Gs o Faulted - checks all S/G pressures on VB3 (not uncontrolled drop/depressurized; all are dropping slowly) - not faulted.

o Ruptured - checks RE-71/72/73/74 and RE-15/19 recorders on VB2 (and PPC; no upward trends or spikes), and PK11-06/17/18 (alarms not in); requests chemistry to sample S/Gs for activity (as follows, if done):

Verifies phase A containment isolation reset (VB1).

Opens FCV-584 (air to containment) (VB4, lower left).

Checks open blowdown isolation valves inside containment (FCV-760, 761, 762, 763) if requested for sampling.

SRO/BOP * (4) Maintains S/G levels 25-65%

SRO/ATC * (5) Re-verifies PORVs closed and associated block valves open (VB2 - upper, far right)

SRO/ATC * (6,7) Determines Containment Spray did not actuate and is not required

• (8) Determines ECCS flow should NOT be reduced o (a) RCS subcooling is less than 20oF (SCMM YI-31, lower center VB2)

Note: Scenario will have progressed to EOP E-1.3 Transition due to RWST Level less than 33% by this time.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 12 of 25 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 13 of 21 Event

Description:

RWST drains to 4% due to seismic damage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation)

Note: Only a single train of RHR Cold Leg Recirc would be aligned due to the loss of ASW earlier in the scenario.

The SFM may direct either RHR HX to be placed in service.

BOP * (1) App EE assigned/performed:

• (App EE, 1) All (6) series contactor switches are cut in (VB2, upper panel)

• (App EE, 2, 3) Verifies reset of SI and both trains of CI Phase A and Phase B (VB1, upper panel)

• (App EE, 4) Determines ASW/CCW is aligned to only 1 ASW Pump via Unit 2 (1 CCW HX in service, VB1, far left) o Notifies SFM that only one RHR pump and HX should be placed in service due to limited ASW/CCW capacity.

o Places one RHR HX in service per SFM direction(VB1, far left)

If RHR HX 1-1 specified, opens outlet valve, FCV-365 (VB1, far right)

If RHR HX 1-2 is specified, operator will open FCV-364 (VB1, far right) o Continues to step 7

• (App EE, 7 & 8) Verifies CCP 1-3 stopped (VB2); makes PA announcement concerning Cold Leg Recirc

• (App EE, 9) Dispatches operators to rack in breakers for 8980 and 8976.

SRO/ATC * (2, 3) Verifies RHR Pp 1-2 stopped and closes 8700B (VB1, lower right).

• (4, 5) Verifies RHR Pp 1-1 stopped and closes 8700A (VB1, lower right).

ATC * (6) Closes RHR crosstie valves 8716 A/B (VB1, lower center).

• (7) Isolates ECCS Pp recirc paths by closing 8974 A/B, and closing 8105 / 8106 (VB2).

SRO/ATC * (8 RNO) Determines recirc sump level is NOT > 92 ft, and transitions to EOP ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 14 of 21 Event

Description:

RWST drains to 4% due to seismic damage (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP ECA -1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

Note: Lower fissure is sized to drain RWST from 33% to 4% over a 20 minute period.

SRO * (1) Determines recirc failure is caused by lack of RWST level (not by sump blockage).

SRO/ATC * (2a) Notes power available to both RHR pps (VB2, lower right).

• (2b) Notes recirc sump level (VB2, vertical, right side) is still low (expected for these conditions); goes to step 3.

ATC * (3) Resets both trains of SI (VB2) (should already be reset).

• (4) Verifies fan coolers (CFCUs, VB1 vertical center area) in low speed (ie, yellow lights).

Note: Monitoring RWST for 4% level is a continuous action. When reached, the procedure directs the crew to perform step 30, which corresponds with Critical Task S1CT-2, Stop all running ECCS pumps with suction aligned to the RWST before insufficient RWST level results in ECCS pump cavitation.**

SRO/ATC * (5) Checks RWST level (VB2, far upper left) < 4%.

• (6) Determines Containment Spray Requirements (N/A, not running/activated) (VB1 vertical left of center).

• (7) Determines isolation of Spray Additive Tank is not required since Containment Spray is not running.

Note: Fissure location will make Appendix M ineffective as a long term strategy. Procedural guidance is to add makeup to the RWST as necessary. The Shift Foreman may elect to move on in the procedure, without implementing Appendix M, recognizing that any makeup will be lost through the crack.

SRO * (8) Directs implementation of Appendix M to add makeup to the RWST.

o Reads notes prior to steps, and selects section A for makeup (makeup from SFP is preferred method).

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 14 of 25 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 15 of 21 Event

Description:

RWST drains to 4% due to seismic damage (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP ECA -1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, cont)

Note: Monitoring RWST for 4% level is a continuous action. When reached, the procedure directs the crew to perform step 30, which corresponds with Critical Task S1CT-2, Stop all running ECCS pumps with suction aligned to the RWST before insufficient RWST level results in ECCS pump cavitation.**

SRO/BOP * (9) Checks S/G levels, controls 20-65% (levels already being controlled, TDAFP not running) (all on VB3).

• (10) Determines Condenser is NOT available due to Condenser loss of vacuum (VB3)(vacuum leak developed during seismic).

• (11) Initiates cooldown (< 100°F/hr) using 10% steam dumps (PCVs 19, 20, 21, & 22 on VB3 lower middle panel area).

ALL * (12) Checks ECCS is in service, and determines that CCPs and SI pumps are still delivering flow to the RCS (VB1 and VB2).

• (13) Establishes one train of SI flow.

o Depresses vital 4KV auto-transfer reset PBs, and verifies blue lights OFF (VB4)

(BOP) o Stops one ECCS CCP (since two are running) (VB2) (ATC) o Stops one SI PP (since both are running) (VB1) (ATC) o Determines that RHR PPs are not running; goes to next step (ATC/SRO)

SRO/ATC * (14) Verifies recirc sump isolation valves 8982A/B closed (they are) (VB1)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 15 of 25 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 16 of 21 Event

Description:

RWST drains to 4% due to seismic damage (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP ECA -1.1, Loss of Emergnecy Coolant Recirculation, cont)

Note: Monitoring RWST for 4% level is a continuous action. When reached, the procedure directs the crew to perform step 30, which corresponds with Critical Task S1CT-2, Stop all running ECCS pumps with suction aligned to the RWST before insufficient RWST level results in ECCS pump cavitation.**

Note: Depending on crew speed through the procedure flow path, RCPs may or may not have been tripped prior to this step. Both procedure flowpaths are covered below.

(For RCPs stopped, else N/A)

SRO/BOP * (15.a) Checks RCPs stopped - they are (VB2).

• (15.b) Checks RCS subcooling (will not be > 20oF) (VB2) o Continues to step 16.

(For RCPs running, else N/A)

SRO/BOP * (15.a) Checks RCPs stopped - they arent (VB2).

• (15.a,b RNO) Stops RCP 1, 3, and 4 (VB2)

• (15.c RNO) Continues to step 16.

Note: The App G required minimum flow should be between 410-490 gpm, depending on how long the crew took to get here. The remaining CCP or the remaining SI pump will most probably not be capable of this flowrate (alone), so no pumps are expected to be shut down per step 16 RNO.

ALL * (16) Checks if SI can be terminated.

o (16.a) Checks RVLIS level and determines it is adequate based on number of running RCPs (SPDS screen).

o (16.b) Checks subcooled margin and determines it is NOT adequate; goes to RNO to reduce ECCS.

o (16.b RNO) Determines App G minimum flow requirement, based on time since trip (see above; most likely, can't shut down a pump).

o (15B RNO) Determines that stopping either the last CCP or SI PP will go below that minimum, and does not stop any pumps.

o Proceeds to step 23 to check RVLIS level.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 16 of 25 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 17 of 21 Event

Description:

RWST drains to 4% due to seismic damage (cont)(CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP ECA -1.1, Loss of Emergnecy Coolant Recirculation, cont)

Note: Monitoring RWST for 4% level is a continuous action. When reached, the procedure directs the crew to perform step 30, which corresponds with Critical Task S1CT-2, Stop all running ECCS pumps with suction aligned to the RWST before insufficient RWST level results in ECCS pump cavitation.**

SRO/ATC * (23.a) Checks RVLIS Level adequate (SPDS or PAMS).

• (23.b) Checks Core exit T/Cs - stable or lowering (SPDS or PAMS).

SRO/ATC * (24.a) Checks Subcooling greater than 30oF -its not (VB2).

SRO/ATC * (25) Checks if RHR should be placed in service o (25.a) RCS temperature less than 350oF (VB2).

o (25.b) WR RCS pressure less than 390 psig (VB2).

Note: Scenario will have progressed to point of RWST Level less than 4% by this time.

SRO/ATC * (30.b) Stops all pumps taking suction from the RWST:

o Running SI Pump(s) **

o Running CCP(s) **

(Critical Task) (S1CT-2, Stop all running ECCS pumps with suction aligned to the RWST before insufficient RWST level results in ECCS pump cavitation).

SRO/BOP * (30.b) Dispatches Nuclear Operator to locally open DC knife switches at the breaker cubicle for pumps with suction aligned to the RWST:

RHR Pp 1-1 and 1-2 SIP Pp 1-1 and 1-2 CCP 1-1 and 1-2 CSP 1-1 and 1-2 SRO/ATC * (31) Implements Appendix W to makeup to the rCS from the VCT via Normal Charging.

Scenario may be terminated any time after a running CCPs and SIPs have been tripped (completion of S1CT-2).

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 17 of 25 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 18 of 21 Event

Description:

EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix E, ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E)

BOP Implements App E (ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status):

• (1a) Checks no personnel in Containment (part of turnover; may not voice)

• (1b) Announces trip/SI on PA system

• (2) Checks main generator - tripped (PK14-01 OFF, output bkrs CLOSED due to backfeed, CC3 right side)

• (3 & 4) Verifies Phase A and Containment Vent Isolation complete (VB1, ESF status lights, red lights ON, white lights OFF); manual Phase A and/or manual alignment of Train B components will be required due to Train B failure of SI.

• (5) Verify ESF (SI) actuation complete; manual alignment of Train B pumps and valves will be required.

BOP * (6) Verifies Feedwater isolation complete (F.W. Isolation and S.G. Level Portions of Monitor Light Box C: red lights ON, white light OFF.

BOP * (7) Determines Containment Spray and Phase B Isolation is NOT required (Contmt Isol, Phase B portion of Monitor Light Box D: red lights are OFF)

BOP * (8) Checks Main Steamline Isolation complete (Main Steam Isolation portion of Monitor Light Box D: red light OFF, white light are OFF)

BOP * (9) Checks AFW status o AFW Pp 1-2 and 1-3 both running, but throttling due to initial power level at trip (level high) o TDAFW not running nor required.

o Verifies min of 435 gpm flow (VB3 center) or S/G level > 15%

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 18 of 25 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 19 of 21 Event

Description:

EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix E, ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E)

BOP * (10) Checks ECCS flows (charging injection (VB2 upper panel left), SI, RHR (both on VB1 upper panel)

• (11) Reports ESF and AFW status to the Shift Foreman (Shift Foreman may direct operator to continue on in Appendix E, or redirect to higher priority tasks)

BOP * (12) Checks excess letdown; notes NOT in service prior to trip

• (13) Checks secondary systems (MFPs tripped (VB2, green lights ON), stops all but one CB Pp set, takes LCV-12 control switch to CONT ONLY.

• (14) Verifies proper operation of Aux Bldg and Control Rm vent systems (VB4 vent status light panel white lights); turns on aux bldg vent charcoal filter preheater (VB4 lower panel, left side) and verifies containment iodine fans secured (VB4, lower panel),

BOP * (15) Verifies available DGs running normally (VB4, freq (60), volts (120), speed (900))

• (16) Verifies vital batteries supplied by chargers (charger and bus volts on VB5, upper panel middle/lower area);

• (17) Verifies MSRs reset (CC3 Triconex HMI)

• (18) Throttles RCP seal injection flows to normal if needed (FCV-128, to 8-13 gpm each, CC2)

• (19) Checks PK11-04 NOT IN (SFP alarm)

• (20) Notifies Shift Foreman of completion.

(Board Operator will rejoin crew upon completion of Appendix or when called upon by Shift Foreman)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 19 of 25 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 20 of 21 Event

Description:

EOP ECA-1.1, Appendix W, RCS Makeup from VCT Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP ECA -1.1, Appendix W, RCS Makeup from VCT)

ATC * (1) Aligns VCT Makeup System.

o (1.a) Presses MANUAL on Makeup Control screen (CC2).

BOP * (1) Aligns VCT Makeup System.

o (1.b) Directs Nuclear Operators to locally close the following valves:

• CVCS-8466 (Blender to LHUT and RWST, 100ft, Blender Room)

• CVCS-8467 (Blender to RWST, 100ft, Blender Room)

• CVCS-8258 (Blender to LHUTS, 100ft, outside LHUT Rm) o (1.c) Ensures control switches in AUTO for:

• FCV-110B (VB2)

• FCV-111B (VB2)

• FCV-110A (VB2)

• FCV-111A (VB2)

• Primary M/U Water Pumps (VB2)

• Boric Acid Transfer Pumps (VB2)

• (2) Aligns Charging Pump Suction to VCT:

o (2.a) Opens LCV-112B and LCV-112C o (2.b) Closes 8805A and 8805B.

ATC * (3,4) Calculates target batch and enters gallons determined into Makeup Controller (CC2).

• (5) Aligns Charging Pump Discharge To RCS:

o (5.a) Throttles HCV-142 to 20% demand.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 20 of 25 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 21 of 21 Event

Description:

EOP ECA-1.1, Appendix W, RCS Makeup from VCT (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP ECA -1.1, Appendix W, RCS Makeup from VCT, cont)

BOP * (5) Aligns Charging Pump Discharge To RCS:

o (5.b) Opens 8146 and 8147 Normal and Alt Charging Vlvs.

o (5.c)Opens 8105 and 8106, CCP Recirculation Vlvs.

o (5.d)Closes 8145 and 8148, Chg Line to PZR Aux Spray Vlv and Bypass.

o (5.e)Opens 8108 and 8107, Normal Chg to Regen Hx Stop Vlvs.

ATC * (5) Aligns Charging Pump Discharge To RCS:

o (5.f) Throttle open FCV-128 to establish charging flow..

BOP * (5) Aligns Charging Pump Discharge To RCS:

o (5.g) Closes 8803A and 8803B, Charging Injection Inlet Vlvs ATC * (5) Aligns Charging Pump Discharge To RCS:

o (5.h) Ensures BAST PPM is set to value from latest Chemistry Daily Report.

o (5.i,j) Sets BLEND PPM to 2000 and presses START.

BOP * (5) Aligns Charging Pump Discharge To RCS:

o (5.k) Ensures OPEN FCV-110B, Blender to Charging Pumps Suction.

ATC * (5) Aligns Charging Pump Discharge To RCS:

o (5.h) Ensures BLENDED PPM on Makeup Control screen is equal to or greater than 2000 ppm.

BOP * (6.a) Starts an ECCS CCP BOP * (6.c) Adjust Charging and HCV-142 to maintain VCT Level

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 21 of 25 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 - Scenario Set-up & Booth Actions X = manual entry required TIME LINE CONSOLE ENTRY SYMPTOMS/CUES/DESCRIPTION X IC RESTORE 150 2% power BOL, CB - 1609 X Setup The Plant Abnormal Status Board for Excess letdown Boron concentration 890 ppm, Surveillance Requirements Date = 2 days prior to today's date Air/Oil Relay Status FWPs on Long Recirc Copies of Procedures, Attachments; Appendixes; PK15-17, AP-5, AP-10, AP-19, EOP E-0, E-1, E-1.3, ECA-1.1 Foldout Pages; Annunciator Response Procedures and commonly used forms are in binders and NOT Marked up A 0 min Tools > Simple SBT Before crew takes the watch.

Use Simple SBT, Data Recorder File: sbt_sim.drb, 960 iterations (30 sec).

A 0 min Lesson L161 NRC-S1.lsn After SFM reports the crew has taken the watch, load session MALS, OVRs, etc. by FILE or MANUALLY (below) 3 min LT-112 Fails Low 10 min Loss of Power to S-31 20 min PT-507 Fails High 35 min ASW Pp 1-1 Seizes; Pp 1-2 SF6 Breaker Pressure Fault 50 min 750 gpm LOCA on Loop 4 Hot Leg due to earthquake 70 min RWST drains to 33% due to seismic damage A 85 min RWST continues to drain to 4% due to smaller fissure (cont on next page)

L161 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 22 of 25 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 - Scenario Set-up & Booth Actions (cont)

X = manual entry required A = activate from EVENT file TIME LINE CONSOLE ENTRY SYMPTOMS/CUES/DESCRIPTION Post-Trip SI, Train B FAILS TO ACTUATE (post-EOP entry) 8803 A Fails to Open on SI (post-EOP entry)

Condenser Vacuum Leak on Seismic L161 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 23 of 25 Rev 0

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log Unit 1 Unit 1 Days at Power: 0 Days Operating Mode: 2 Gross Generation: 0 MWe Power Level: 2% Net Generation: 0 MWe Today - Dayshift Shift Manager Turnover:

PRA RISK STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Green GRID STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Normal AVERAGE RCS CALCULATED LEAKRATE: 0.01 gpm CONDENSER INLEAKAGE: < 0.01 gpd CONDENSER D/Ps: NW 5.9 SW 6.4 NE 6.3 SE 6.1 PSID MAIN GENERATOR H2 USAGE: 325 scfd / 327 scfd 5 day ave SPENT FUEL POOL: Temp = 80oF; Time to 200oF = 30 hrs using actual temp (F-ID-7A)

NEW PRIORITY WORK:

• None SHUTDOWN TECH SPECS / ECGS:

• None ECG ACTIONS THAT IF COMPLETION TIME NOT MET ECG 0.3 IS ENTERED:

• None TURNOVER ITEMS:

• Reactor trip occurred 7 days ago.

• The reactor was declared critical and power stabilized at 2% power late last shift.

• The unit is currently backfeeding.

• 120 gpm letdown in service for chemistry cleanup.

• Aux Building Ventilation currently in Buildings and Safeguards

• No one is in Containment.

PRIORITY ITEMS FOR NEXT SHIFT:

• Prepare to place Main Feed pumps in service per OP L-3, step 6.1.

Shift Foreman Turnover ANNUNCIATORS IN ALARM:

• There are no unexpected alarms - all current alarms are consistent with current mode and power level.

TURNOVER ITEMS:

• U-1: 2% and preparing to place MFPs in service.

• U-2: 100% power REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT:

• Time in core life: _BOL_.

• Power History: Previously at 100% for 17 days. Currently power level is approximately 2% following a reactor trip a week ago (MFP trip during maintenance).

• Boron concentration is _1609ppm_ from a sample taken 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago.

• Control Rod Height: 134 steps on CBD.

CONDITIONAL SURVEILLANCES & INCREASED MONITORING:

• None OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT STATUS

• None

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 15 Event

Description:

SI-8923A fails closed during STP V-3L10A Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Procedure step numbers are included at the front of each action/comment in parenthesis, where applicable.

Note: Crew is expected to have reviewed the partially completed STP and completed their tailboard prior to taking the watch.

BOP * (12.4.3) Ensures SIP 1-1 suction valve SI-8923A OPEN (it is) (VB1 skirt).

• (12.4.4) Obtains calibrated stop watch (provided as part of pre-job prep).

• (12.4.5) Takes SI-8923A control switch to CLOSE and records time.

• (12.4.6) Attempts to reopen SI-8923A.

o Valve remains in closed position.

o Advises Shift Foreman that valve will not open.

SFM

• Determines valve has failed stroke test and is INOPERABLE.

• Notes Tech Spec 3.5.2.A, ECCS - Operating is already in effect for CCP 1-1 out of service. The check for a redundant train was also checked as part of the prerequisite section of the STP, so no further Tech Spec actions are required.

• Contacts Work Control to investigate.

Proceed to the next event once Tech Spec discussed, per the lead examiner.

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 1 of 19 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 15 Event

Description:

FT-128 Fails Low High Charging Flow Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses charging flow problem from one or more of the following:

• Indicated charging flow (FE-128) indicates low or 0 (CC2 meter, PPC)

• RCP seal flows indicate high and rising (due to controller perceived need for more flow) (VB2 meters, PPC)

• Pzr level rising slowly (due to rising charging flow) (VB2 meters, PPC, CC2 recorder)

• VCT level dropping slowly (due to rising charging flow) (VB2 recorder, PPC)

ATC

• Takes manual control of charging (using charging controller FCV-128 or HC-459D), and lowers charging flow to normal (uses alternate indications to control flow (ie, RCP seal flows, VCT level, Pzr level, etc) (CC2, PPC)

Note: The corrective action for this failure may be taken using OP AP-5 or OP AP-17, section B, may also be referenced (only has general, obvious guidance).

(OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel (if used, otherwise N/A ))

SRO/ATC

• Implements OP AP-5, "Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel"

• (1) Confirms charging was NOT controlling properly in Auto and has been taken to manual (CC2, FCV-128 (HC-459D). Directs that PZR level be returned to normal bands.

• (2) Determines that the failure is not Eagle-21 related (PK06-01 and PK06-03 are OFF).

• (3) Determines failure is not associated with a dT channel (VB2)

SRO/BOP * (4) Verifies steam dumps are controlling properly in AUTO (VB2 and CC3).

• (5) Notifies I&C of FT-128 failure, as time permits.

• (6) Notes requirements to take channel OOS prior to maintenance.

• (7) Places Out-of-Service (OOS) stickers on affected indicators:

o May review Attachment 4.2 for FT-128 control functions and indications.

• (8) Enters TS 3.3.4.A, Remote Shutdown System for Function 12, Charging Flow (30 days to restore).

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 2 of 19 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 15 Event

Description:

FT-128 Fails Low Causing Auto Makeup (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-17, Loss of Charging, Sec B, cont (if used, otherwise N/A ))

SRO Implements OP AP-17, Loss of Charging, Section B

• (1) Notes no load changes are currently in process.

ATC/BOP * (2) Checks letdown flow normal (it is) (VB2 meter, PPC)

ALL * (3.a) Determines charging amps are rising, charging flow (indicated) is at zero, and charging pressure has also risen o (determines that RNO actions are N/A, since charging pump is stable) (VB2 meters, CC2 meters, PPC)

• (3.b) Determines that VCT level is lowering slowly (due to rising charging flow) (CC2, PPC)

ATC/BOP * (4a) Determines that Pzr level is stable/rising (rising slowly) (VB2 meters, CC2 rcdr, PPC)

• (4b) Determines that RCP seal flows are high (contradicts indicated charging flow); ATC may or may not adjust FCV-128 or HCV-142 at this time to return charging flow and seal flows to normal. (CC2)

SRO/ATC * (5a) Determines that charging flow is NOT responding properly to Pzr level changes (unless manual control already taken) (ie, flow high with level high, with indicated flow low) (CC2, VB2, PPC); goes to step 5d.

• (5d) Determines charging control not responding normally due to flow indicator failure; takes manual control of charging (HC-459D or FCV-128), and returns charging flow to normal (or below normal, to return level to setpoint) (CC2)

SRO * (6, 7) Notifies maintenance of failed transmitter, and operates with Pzr level in manual.

Proceed to the next event once makeup control re-established and Tech Spec addressed, per the lead examiner.

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 3 of 19 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 4 of 15 Event

Description:

Accumulator 1-3 100 gpm Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Observes PK02-10, Accumulator Level Hi-Lo alarming, and informs the Shift Foreman.

All Identifies both position indication lights (RED and GREEN) for SI-1-8876C, Accumulator 3 drain to RCDT illuminated (VB1)

SRO Enters PK02-10, Accumulator Level Hi-Lo (AR PK02-03, Accumulator Level Hi-Lo)

SRO/BOP * (2.1.1) Checks both level indicators on the affected accumulator to confirm the alarm and low level condition (VB1).

SRO * (2.1.2) Refers to TS 3.5.1.B to for accumulator OPERABILITY implications.

o Enters Tech Spec when level falls below 52%, with action to return to normal level within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

BOP * (2.1.3) Verifies the following valves closed:

o (2.1.3.a) NSS-1-9357A, Accumulator Sample Line Inside Containment.

o (2.1.3.b) NSS-1-9357B, Accumulator Sample Line Outside Containment.

o (2.1.3.c) SI-1-8876C, Accumulator Drains To RCDT.

Valve indicates mid-position and with control switch in the CLOSE position.

May call Aux Watch to check RCDT status which will show increasing level.

o May skip ahead through remaining valve checks since leak has been located.

SRO * (2.1.6) Identifies level is low, but will NOT attempt to raise affected Accumulator level until the leak can be isolated.

Proceed to the next event once Tech Spec discussed, per the lead examine.

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 4 of 19 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 5 of 15 Event

Description:

120 gpm RCS Leak - Loop 1 Cold Leg Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses RCS leak from one or more of the following:

• Drain and/or Sump high level alarms (PK01-17, PK15-01)

• Pzr level lowering (PPC, CC2 recorder, VB2 meters)

• Pzr level high/low; charging flow demand and/or low level deviation alarms (PK05-21)

• Containment parameters slowly rising (temp, press) (PPC, VB1 recorder, PAMS panels)

Note: Leak ramps in over 3 minutes. The crew may raise charging by opening FCV-128 and adjusting HCV-142 (CC2) in order to maintain pressurizer level prior to entering OP AP-1, "Excess RCS Leakage".

SRO Enters OP AP-1, "Excess RCS Leakage" (OP AP-1, Excess RCS Leakage)

SRO/ATC * (1) Determines charging flow and/or pressurizer level NOT normal o Charging flow is elevated and pressurizer level is slowly lowering (CC2)

• (1) Adjusts charging and seal flow to maintain pressurizer level o Adjusts seal flows using HCV-142 (CC2) to maintain 8-13 gpm o May raise charging in manual using master level controller (HC-459D)(CC2) or flow controller (FCV-128)(CC2)

Note: Monitoring Pressurizer level and charging flow - NORMAL is a Continuous Action. Associated RNO steps are performed when crew reports applicable conditions exist (i.e. unable to maintain pressurizer level).

SRO/ATC * (1) Determines pressurizer level is still lowering (Continuous Action to Monitor)

SRO/BOP * (1 RNO) Starts second charging pump (VB2, Lower middle skirt)

• (1 RNO) Isolates letdown as pressurizer level continues to drop o Closes 8149C, and closes LCV-459/460 (VB2, upper middle skirt)

(continued on next page)

L161 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 5 of 19 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 6 of 15 Event

Description:

120 gpm RCS Leak - Loop 1 Cold Leg (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-1, Excess RCS Leakage, cont)

ATC * (1 RNO) Checks for continuing decrease in pressurizer level o Readjusts charging and seal flow (CC1) o Determines pressurizer level is stable (PPC, VB2, CC2) (Continuous Action to Monitor)

SRO/ATC * (2) Checks RCS pressure greater than 2210 psig and stable or rising (VB2) ( 2220-2250 psig)

SRO/ATC * (3) Determines CVCS Makeup can keep up with leak o Makeup Control is in AUTO (CC2) o VCT Level is being maintained within the control band (PPC, VB2 RCDR-4 just below DRPI) o Continuous Action to Monitor VCT Level Determines VCT level cannot be maintained and reactor shutdown is necessary.

Proceed to the next event once crew determines shutdown is required, per the lead examine.

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 6 of 19 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 7 of 15 Event

Description:

CCP 1-2 OC Trip Requiring Reactor Trip/Safety Injection Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL CCP OC Trip is diagnosed from one or more of the following:

• PK05-01, 02, 03, 04 RCP No 1 (1,2,3,4 respectively) (due to low seal injection flow).

• Pzr level lowering (PPC, CC2 recorder, VB2 meters)

• Pzr level high/low; charging flow demand and/or low level deviation alarms (PK05-21)

• Blue OC light on CCP 1-2 control switch Note: Crew is still in OP AP-1, Excess RCS Leakage and may return to the step 1 check for Pzr Level stable.

SRO/ATC

• Determines Pressurizer level cannot be maintained.

• Directs/performs manual Reactor Trip followed by manual Safety Injection once Reactor Trip has been verified.

SRO Implements EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

SRO/ATC * (1) Verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open (VB2 upper left), rods on bottom (VB2 upper left DRPI panel), NIs decreasing (CC1 left).

SRO/ATC * (2) Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps).

SRO/BOP * (3) Checks vital 4kv busses (VB4, vital busses F/G have white lights on mimic busses; bus H has no power due to bus differential trip).

SRO/ATC * (4) Checks if SI actuated (PK08-21 ON, also checks VB1 red train lights and/or train equipment to verify both trains actuated) (VB1 upper right, or CC2 right) o May note loss of pumps due to bus H failure.

SRO * (5) Directs App E implemented (usually to BOP)(see page 14)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 7 of 19 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 Page 8 of 15 Event

Description:

4.5 sq in SBLOCA on Loop 3 MDAFW Pp 1-3 Autostart Failure (S2CT-1)

SIP 1-2 Lost on Bus H Differential CCP 1-3 cavitates and trips following SI Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, cont)

Note: AFW Pump 1-3 autostart failure will most likely be addressed earlier as an automatic action that should have occurred during the first few steps of EOP E-0. It is procedurally addressed as part of E-0, Appendix E. See page 14 for CT details.**

SRO/ATC * (6) Checks RCS temperature stable or lowering to 547oF .

• (7) Checks Pzr PORVs and Pzr Safeties and Spray Valves o Safeties closed (closed); no sonic flow, tailpipe temperature is elevated, but consistent with containment environment (VB2 - upper panel, far right) o PORVs closed and associated block valves open (VB2 - upper panel, far right) o Pzr Sprays closed (green lights on) (CC2)

SRO/ATC * (8) Checks RCP trip criteria; o RCS WR Pressure is LESS than 1300 PSIG, but there are NO ECCS CCPs or SIPs running (VB2).

o Trip criteria is NOT met.

SRO/ATC * (9) Determines S/G are NOT faulted o No S/G lowering in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized.

SRO/ATC * (10) Determines S/G are NOT ruptured o Checks RE-71/72/73/74 and RE-15/19 recorders onVB2 (and PPC); (all normal) o PK11-06/17/18 (all OFF).

o May request samples.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 8 of 19 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5,7 Page 9 of 15 Event

Description:

4.5 sq in SBLOCA on Loop 3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, cont)

SRO/ALL * (11) Checks RCS intact (it is not) (note: only one valid abnormal reading needed to transition from E-0) o (11a) Determines containment pressure is NOT normal (VB1 meters, PPC) o (11b) Determines containment sump levels NOT normal (VB1 meters, PAMS) o (11c) Determines containment radiation is NOT normal (RM-11, 02, 07 are all in alarm) o (11 RNO) Places 2nd ASW/CCW HX in service (opens FCV-603 and FCV-431, VB1 far left)

SRO

• Checks Critical Safety Function Status Trees and transitions to EOP E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 9 of 19 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 10 of 15 Event

Description:

4.5 sq in SBLOCA on Loop 3 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant")

Note: The ICC conditions should cause enough degradation in core conditions that transition to FR-C.2 occurs within approximately 10 minutes of the SBLOCA initiation.

SRO/ATC * (1) Re-checks RCP trip criteria and notes still do not have ECCS CCP or SIP (VB2)

SRO/ALL * (2 & 3) Checks for faulted/ruptured S/Gs o Faulted - checks all S/G pressures on VB3 (not uncontrolled drop/depressurized) o Ruptured - checks RE-71/72/73/74 and RE-15/19 recorders on VB2 (and PPC; no upward trends or spikes), and PK11-06/17/18 (alarms not in); requests chemistry to sample S/Gs for activity (as follows, if done):

o Verifies phase A containment isolation reset (VB1) o Opens FCV-584 (air to containment) (VB4, lower left) o Opens blowdown isolation valves inside containment (FCV-760, 761, 762, 763)

BOP * (4) Maintains S/G 1-3 and 1-4 levels 20% [25%] - 65% (no feedflow to S/G 1-1 and 1-2)

(VB3, AFW controls)

SRO/ATC * (5) Check Pzr PORVs (closed) / blocks (open/powered) (VB2 - upper panel, far right)

SRO/ATC * (6,7) Determines Containment Spray did not actuate and is not required

• (8) Determines ECCS flow should NOT be reduced o (a) RCS subcooling is less than 20oF (SCMM YI-31, lower center VB2)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 10 of 19 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 11 of 15 Event

Description:

4.5 sq in SBLOCA on Loop 3 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP FR-C.2, "Response to Degraded Core Cooling")

SRO/ATC * (1) Resets Safety Injection (VB1)

• (2) Checks ECCS alignment (notes alignment correct; problem is still with lack of CCPs and SI PPs) (VB1, VB2)

• (3) Checks ECCS flow o (3.a) Confirms charging injection remains at 0 gpm (FI-917 on VB2).

o (3.b) Confirms SI pump flow remains at 0 gpm (FI-918/922 on VB1).

o (3.c) Checks RCS WR Pressure less than 300 psig (it is currently slightly above 1000 psig); goes to step 4. (VB2)

• May send operators to the field to re-verify lineups (won't help).

SRO/BOP * (4) Checks Pzr PORVs and RCS head vents - closed (they are) VB2 far right, PAM1 for head vents) (Far right side VB2, PAM1 for head vents).

SRO/ATC * (5) Checks RCP status o (5.a) Notes all four RCPs running (VB2).

o (5.b) Determines not all RCP support conditions for are being maintained (no seal injection flow) (VB2).

SRO/BOP * (6) CHECKs RVLIS Dynamic Head Indication (SPDS or PAMS 3/4) o (6.a) Determines dynamic head for 4 RCPs running is less than the required minimum (typically between 30% - 40%, depending on crew timeline).

o (6.a RNO) Determines level is decreasing and continues to step 7.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 11 of 19 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 12 of 15 Event

Description:

4.5 sq in SBLOCA on Loop 3 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP FR-C.2, "Response to Degraded Core Cooling, cont")

SRO/ATC * (7) Checks if one RCP should be stopped o (7.a) Confirms all RCPs running (VB2) o (7.b) Stops RCP No. 2 (VB2) o (7.b) Closes associated Pressurizer Spray Valve, PCV-455B (CC2) o (7.c) Continues to step 9.

Note: 8808C is powered from 480V bus H which is currently de-energized due to 4kV bus differential earlier in the scenario. Crew may decide to leave associated breakers open.

SRO/BOP * (9) CHECKS Accumulator Isolation Valve Status o (9.a) Dispatches Nuclear Operator to close breakers for 8808A, B, C, and D.

o (9.b) Checks Accumulator Discharge Isolation valves OPEN (they are) (VB1).

SRO/BOP * (10) Maintains S/G 3 & 4 levels 15 [25] - 65% (VB3, AFW controls)

SRO/ATC

• Reads two CAUTIONS regarding Main Steam Line Isolation

• (11) Blocks Low Steamline Pressure SI o (8.a) Checks RCS Pressure - LESS THAN 1915 PSIG (it is) o (8.b) Checks PK08-06, PZR SI PERMISSIVE P ON (it is) o (8.c) Blocks LO Steamline Pressure SI, Train A and B, verifies PK08-17 ON (CC2)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 12 of 19 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 13 of 15 Event

Description:

4.5 sq in SBLOCA on Loop 3 (cont) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP FR-C.2, "Response to Degraded Core Cooling, cont")

Note: Accumulator injection, which initiates at approximately 625 psig, may cause crew to temporarily exceed the 100oF/hr cooldown rate prior to reaching 250 psig target, but will provide sufficient volume to re-flood the core and clear the MAGENTA path for CORE COOLING.**

• • (S2CT-2) Depressurize Steam Generators to inject SI Accumulators to re-flood the core before a RED path develops on Core Cooling Critical Safety Function.

ALL

• Reads CAUTION regarding potential for RED path on RCS INTEGRITY and informs crew FR-C.2 should be completed before transition is made to FR-P.1.

• (12) Depressurizes 40% Steam Dumps to inject Accumulators o (12.a,b) Maintains 100oF/hr cooldown rate based on RCS Cold Leg Temperature (PPC, VB2) o (12.c,d) Stops RCS depressurization if RCS pressure reaches less than 250 psig (VB2).

Scenario may be terminated once Accumulators have injected enough volume to clear the MAGENTA path on CORE COOLING (completion of S2CT-2).

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 13 of 19 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5,6 Page 14 of 15 Event

Description:

EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix E, ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E)

BOP Implements App E (ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status):

• (1a) Checks no personnel in Containment (part of turnover; may not voice)

• (1b) Announces trip/SI on PA system

• (2) Checks main generator - tripped (PK14-01 ON , CC3 right side)

• (3 & 4) Verifies Phase A and Containment Vent Isolation complete (VB1, ESF status lights, red lights ON, white lights OFF); all misalignments are due to loss of bus H or previous scenario events.

• (5) Verify ESF (SI) actuation complete; all misalignments are due to loss of bus H or previous scenario events.

BOP * (6) Verifies Feedwater isolation complete (F.W. Isolation and S.G. Level Portions of Monitor Light Box C: red lights ON, white light OFF.

o Dispatches Nuclear Operator to close FCV-440, Feedwater Iso Valve (VB3)

BOP * (7) Determines Containment Spray and Phase B Isolation is NOT required (Contmt Isol, Phase B portion of Monitor Light Box D: red lights are OFF)

BOP * (8) Checks Main Steamline Isolation complete (Main Steam Isolation portion of Monitor Light Box D: red light OFF, white light are OFF)

BOP * (9) Checks AFW status o AFW Pp 1-2 has no power (bus H) and TDAFW OOS from setup (VB3) o AFW 1-3 failed to start and is started manually (S2CT-1)**

o Verifies min of 435 gpm flow (VB3 center) or S/G level > 15%

• • (Critical Task) (S2CT-1, Establish at least 435 gpm AFW flow to the steam generators prior to exiting EOP E-0).**

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 14 of 19 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 15 of 15 Event

Description:

EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix E, ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E)

BOP * (10) Checks ECCS flows (charging injection (VB2 upper panel left), SI, RHR (both on VB1 upper panel) o Notes zero flow for all pumps.

• (11) Reports ESF and AFW status to the Shift Foreman (Shift Foreman may direct operator to continue on in Appendix E, or redirect to higher priority tasks)

BOP * (12) Checks excess letdown; notes NOT in service prior to trip

• (13) Checks secondary systems (MFPs tripped (VB2, green lights ON), stops all but one CB Pp set, takes LCV-12 control switch to CONT ONLY. Determines Condenser is NOT available (MSIVs are closed) and directs field operators to break vacuum when turbine is less than 200 rpm

• (14) Verifies proper operation of Aux Bldg and Control Rm vent systems (VB4 vent status light panel white lights); turns on aux bldg vent charcoal filter preheater (VB4 lower panel, left side) and verifies containment iodine fans secured (VB4, lower panel),

BOP * (15) Verifies available DGs running normally (VB4, freq (60), volts (120), speed (900))

• (16) Verifies vital batteries supplied by chargers (charger and bus volts on VB5, upper panel middle/lower area);

• (17) Verifies MSRs reset (CC3 Triconex HMI)

• (18) Notes no running CCPs - unable to throttle RCP seal injection flows (CC2)

• (19) Checks PK11-04 NOT IN (SFP alarm)

• (20) Notifies Shift Foreman of completion.

(Board Operator will rejoin crew upon completion of Appendix or when called upon by Shift Foreman)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 15 of 19 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 - Scenario Set-up & Booth Actions X = manual entry required TIME LINE CONSOLE ENTRY SYMPTOMS/CUES/DESCRIPTION X IC RESTORE 151 100% power MOL, CB - 878 X Setup Clears TDAFW Caution Tag AFW 1-1 (FCV-95,FCV-37, FCV-38)

Makeup Controller to Target Blend The Plant Abnormal Status Board for Surveillance Requirements Copies of Procedures, Attachments; Appendixes; PK02-10, AP-1, AP-5, AP-17, E-0, E-1, FR-C.2 Foldout Pages; Annunciator Response Procedures and commonly used forms are in binders and NOT Marked up A 0 min Tools > Simple SBT Before crew takes the watch.

Use Simple SBT, Data Recorder File: sbt_sim.drb, 960 iterations (30 sec).

A 0 min Lesson L161 NRC-S2.lsn After SFM reports the crew has taken the watch, load session MALS, OVRs, etc. by FILE or MANUALLY (below)

X 0 min SI-8923A fails closed X 5 min FT-128 Fails low X 20 min Accumulator 1-3 100 gpm leak X 30 min 120 gpm RCS leak on Loop 3 X 45 min CCP 1-2 OC Trip requiring crew to trip/SI plant X 45 min 4.5 sq in SBLOCA on Loop 3 A

(cont on next page)

L161 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 16 of 19 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 - Scenario Set-up & Booth Actions (cont)

X = manual entry required A = activate from EVENT file TIME LINE CONSOLE ENTRY SYMPTOMS/CUES/DESCRIPTION On Reactor trip SIP 1-2 Lost on Bus H Differential MDAFW Pp 1-3 Autostart Failure CCP 1-3 cavitates and trips L161 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 17 of 19 Rev 0

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log Unit 1 Unit 1 Days at Power: 111 Days Operating Mode: 1 Gross Generation: 1197 MWe Power Level: 99.6% Net Generation: 1174 MWe Today - Dayshift Shift Manager Turnover:

PRA RISK STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Green GRID STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Normal AVERAGE RCS CALCULATED LEAKRATE: 0.01 gpm CONDENSER INLEAKAGE: < 0.01 gpd CONDENSER D/Ps: NW 5.9 SW 6.4 NE 6.3 SE 6.1 PSID MAIN GENERATOR H2 USAGE: 325 scfd / 327 scfd 5 day ave SPENT FUEL POOL: Temp = 80oF; Time to 200oF = 30 hrs using actual temp (F-ID-7A)

NEW PRIORITY WORK:

• CCP 1-1 emergent motor bearing oil leak identified end of last shift.

SHUTDOWN TECH SPECS / ECGS:

• TS 3.7.5.B TDAFW OOS for routine maintenance; expected back next shift.

• TS 3.5.2.A CCP 1-1 ECG ACTIONS THAT IF COMPLETION TIME NOT MET ECG 0.3 IS ENTERED:

• None TURNOVER ITEMS:

• STP V-3L10A in progress for SI- 8923A.

PRIORITY ITEMS FOR NEXT SHIFT:

• Complete STP V-3L10A.

• Repair CCP 1-1 and perform STP P-CCP 1-1 Surveillance Test.

Shift Foreman Turnover ANNUNCIATORS IN ALARM:

• AR PK09-18, TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FW PP

• AR PK18-18, 4KV BUS F DC CONTROL UV/TROUBLE TURNOVER ITEMS:

• U-1: maintain 100% - no one in containment.

• U-2: 100% power REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT:

• Time in core life: _MOL_.

• Power History: Steady State at 100% for past 111 days.

• Boron concentration is _878 ppm_ from a sample taken 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago.

• Control Rod Height: 230 steps on CBD.

• Diluting the RCS approximately 25 gallons every 1.5 hrs.

• The last dilution was completed _15_ min ago.

CONDITIONAL SURVEILLANCES & INCREASED MONITORING:

• None OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT STATUS

• None

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 2 Op-Test No: L161 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% MOL, 878 ppm boron Turnover: TDAFW OOS for repair; Emergent issue on CCP 1-1 (OOS)

Event Malf Event Event Description No No. Type* (See Summary for Narrative Detail) 1 VLV_SIS7_2 0 cd='h_v1_144g_1 C (BOP, SI-8923A fails closed during STP V-3L10A AND V1_144 S_2' SRO) 2 XMT_CVC4_3 0.0 delay=0 ramp=30 I (ATC, FT-128 Fails low causing high charging flow (OP AP-5; OP AP-SRO) 17, T.S. 3.3.4.A) 3 MAL_SIS1C 100 delay=0 r amp=180 TS only Accumulator 1-3 100 gpm leak (PK02-10; T.S. 3.5.1.B)

(SRO) 4 MAL_RCS3C .12 delay=0 ramp=180 C (ALL) 120 gpm RCS leak on Loop 3 (OP AP-1, T.S. 3.4.13.A) 5 PMP_CVC2_2 OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL M (ALL) CCP 1-2 OC Trip requiring crew to trip/SI plant 6 MAL_RCS3C 11 cd='jpplsia' del ay=0 M (ALL) 4.5 sq in SBLOCA on Loop 3 ramp=120 7 pmp_afw2_1 open delay=0 C (ATC) MDAFW Pp 1-3 Autostart Failure (Requires manual start; cd='fnispr lt 5' (S2CT-1)

(Occurs w/Loss of MDAFW Pp 1-2 on Bus H Differential) 8 MAL_EPS4E_2 DIFFERENTIAL cd='h_ C (ALL) SIP 1-2 Lost on Bus H Differential v4_218r_1' CCP 1-3 cavitates and trips.

CV09CVC_932TASTEM 0 Loss of all high and intermediate head injection; CT to PMP_CVC3_2 OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL depressurize to inject accumulators (S2CT-2).

cd='jpplsia and H_V2_266R_1' delay=120

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L161 NRC ES-D-1-02 r1.docx Page 1 of 3 Rev 1

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 1,2,4,5,6,7,8) 7

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) (Events 7,8) 2

3. Abnormal events (2-4) (Events 1,2,4) 3

4. Major transients (1-2) (Event 5,6) 2

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E-1) 1

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (FR-C.2) 1

7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See description below) 2 Critical Task Justification Reference (S2CT-1) Establish at least 435 gpm AFW Failure to manually establish the minimum

• WCAP-17711-NP, CT-4 flow to the steam generators prior to required AFW flow rate (when it is possible to do

• WOG Background exiting EOP E-0. so) results in a challenge to the Heat Sink critical HFRH1BG_R2 safety function. In this scenario, adequate S/G level is also required to effectively depressurize the RCS to inject accumulators in the absence of both high and intermediate head injection pumps.

(S2CT-2) Depressurize Steam Generators to Failure to depressurize the SGs results in the

• WCAP-17711-NP, CT-42 inject SI Accumulators to re-flood the core avoidable continuation of the degraded of core

• WOG Background as indicated by RVLIS level returning above cooling condition. Depressurizing the S/Gs provides HFRC2BG_R2 the minimal required level shown below immediate benefit by condensing steam on the before a RED path develops on Core primary side of the U-tubes. Once pressure RCS Cooling Critical Safety Function. falls below approximately 625 psig, Accumulators will inject, flooding the core and clearing the RVLIS Dynamic Range magenta path on Core Cooling. Continuing the Indication - GREATER THAN: o 100 F/hr cooldown after Accumulators have injected ultimately results in RCS pressure lowering RCPs RVLIS RVLIS below RHR shutoff head and the core cooling CSF Running Level Range status returning to normal.

1 14% Dyn 2 20% Dyn 3 30% Dyn 4 44% Dyn L161 NRC ES-D-1-02 r1.docx Page 2 of 3 Rev 1

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #2

1. Crew performs timed stroke test of SI Pump 1-1 suction valve 8923A per STP V-3L10A, Exercising Valve SI-8923A, Safety Injection Pump 1 Suction Valve. The valve strokes closed, but does not respond when the crew attempts to re-open it per the test procedure. The Shift Foreman notes already in Tech Spec for CCP 1-1 out of service. May contact Maintenance for assistance.

2. FT-128 (charging flow) fails low, causing actual charging flow to rise. The crew responds per OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel. FCV-128 and HC-459D are taken to manual, and charging flow is monitored using alternate indications (RCP seals, Pzr level, VCT level, etc) for the remainder of the scenario. OP AP-17, Loss of Charging, Section B (Charging System Equipment Malfunctions), may also be used to respond to the failure. TS 3.3.4.A, Remote Shutdown Systems, is implemented.

3. Accumulator 1-3 develops a 100 gpm leak, bringing in AR PK02-10, ACUM LEVEL HI-LO for level below 60.8%. Shift Foreman enters TS 3.5.1.B, Accumulators, when level falls below 52%.

4. A 120 gpm RCS leak on loop 3 ramps in over the next 3 minutes, requiring entry in OP AP-1, Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage. Pressure and level are stabilized once CCP 1-2 is started and letdown isolated. VCT level cannot be maintained at the current leak rate, however, and the crew determines a plant shutdown is required. Shift Foreman enters TS 3.4.13.A, RCS Operational Leakage.

5. CCP 1-2 trips and charging is no longer able to keep up with the leak. Shift Foreman directs a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection. The crew enters EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and performs their immediate actions.

6. Loop 3 ruptures on the Safety Injection, with a 4.5 inch SBLOCA ramping in over the next 2 minutes.

7. Bus H is lost on a differential trip during the transfer to Startup and MDAFW Pp 1-3 fails to Autostart, leading to the critical task of starting MDAFW Pp 1-3 (S2CT-1) Establish at least 435 gpm AFW flow to the steam generators prior to exiting EOP E-0.***

8. SIP 1-2 is lost with the loss of bus H. Non-ECCS Charging Pump CCP 1-3 begins to cavitate and eventually trips, resulting in a total loss of all high and intermediate head injection. The crew proceeds through E-0, noting that RCPs must remaining running when pressure falls below 1300 psig due to a lack of running ECCS CCPs and SIPs. The crew determines the RCS is not intact and transitions to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. A loss of subcooling and lowering RVLIS level eventually results in a magenta path on the core cooling critical safety function, and the crew transitions to FR-C.2, Response to Degraded Core Cooling. Following the guidance of FR-C.2, the crew will perform the critical task of temporarily recovering the core:

(S2CT-2) Depressurize Steam Generators to inject SI Accumulators to re-flood the core before a RED path develops on Core Cooling Critical Safety Function.***

The scenario is terminated once Accumulators have injected enough volume to clear the MAGENTA path on CORE COOLING

• • • CT / TCOA note:

L161 NRC ES-D-1-02 r1.docx Page 3 of 3 Rev 1

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 3 Op-Test No: L161 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% MOL, 878 ppm boron Turnover: OOS Equipment: PT-403 Event Malf Event Event Description No No. Type* (See Summary for Narrative Detail) 1 CC01CCW_CCP11_MTFSHEAR 1 C (BOP, CCW Pp 11 Shaft Shear (AR PK01-11, AR PK01-09, AR PK01-SRO) 08; TS 3.7.7.A) 2 EECIX5213D5_51TF_ACT 1 C (ATC, Pressurizer Heater Group #1 Over Current Trip (AR PK05-19, SRO) OP A-4A:I) 3 MAL_PPL7J 1 I (BOP, Eagle 21 DFP-1 Halt in Rack 10 (AP-5; T.S. 3.3.1.D,E,M; SRO) 3.3.2.D, L; 3.4.11 )

4 LOA_TUR28 0 C (ALL) Main Turbine Stop Valve #2 Closes (PK04-06, PK 08-12) 5 CNV_MFW6_2 1 delay=0 ramp=30 M (ALL) Loop 4 FW Reg Fails to 100%

6 MAL_MFW5D 2e+007 cd='fnispr lt M (ALL) Feedline Header Break Inside Containment on S/G 1-4 5' delay =0 ramp=10 7 MAL_EPS4D_2 DIFFERENTIAL C (ATC) 4kV Bus G Bus Transfer Failure; Isolate feedflow from TDAFW cd='fnispr lt 5' as part of Critical Task (S3CT-1, partial) 8 VLV_MFW4_2 1 C (BOP) FCV-441 fails open; Isolate feedflow as part of Critical Task (S3CT-1, partial) delIA VLV_MFW4_2 2 cd=V3_193S_1

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L161 NRC ES-D-1-03 r1.docx Page 1 of 4 Rev 1

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8) 8

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) (Events 7,8) 2

3. Abnormal events (1-4) (Events 1,2,3,4) 4

4. Major transients (1-2) (Event 5,6) 2

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E-2, E-1.1) 2

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0

7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See description below) 2 Critical Task Justification Reference (S3CT-1) Manually isolate feedline break Failure to isolate feed flow into containment leads

• WOG Background before containment wide range sump level to an unnecessary and avoidable severe challenge HFRZ2BG_R2 reaches 94 feet (LI-940 & LI-941), resulting to the containment integrity safety function as a in a magenta path on the Containment result of flooding.

safety function status tree.

(S3CT-2) Terminate ECCS flow before The feedline rupture introduced in this scenario

• DCPP Design Criteria overfill of the RCS results in a rupturing of results in a Safety Injection due to shrinkage and a Memorandum S-7: Reactor the pressurizer relief tank (PRT) as slightly overcooled condition in the RCS. Once Coolant System indicated by a PRT pressure drop and isolated, RCS pressure rises quickly as the result of

• FSAR Chapter 15, subsequent equalization with wide range ongoing injection flow. Eventually the RCS goes Containment Pressure. solid, with the excess inventory passing water through the Pressure Operated Relief Valves to the PRT. Failure to terminate ECCS flow when it is possible to do so results in a rupture of the PRT and constitutes an avoidable degradation of a fission product barrier.

L161 NRC ES-D-1-03 r1.docx Page 2 of 4 Rev 1

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #3

1. AR PK01-11, CCW Pp 1-1 Recirc comes into alarm for FCV-606, CCW Pump 1-1 Recirc Valve, open. Crew identifies low pump amps on VB-1 and dispatches Nuclear Operator to investigate. Field reports no audible flow sound in spite of clear indications motor is running. Also notes motor shaft turning but pump shaft appears frozen. CCW Pump 1-3 is started manually and CCW Pump 1-1 shutdown. T.S.

3.7.7.A, Vital Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, is entered for one loop of CCW inoperable.

2. Pressurizer Heater Group #1 trips on over current, bringing in AR PK05-19, PZR HTRS OC TRIP/FAN FLO LO. Crew places additional backup heater group in service per OP A-4A:I, Pressurizer - Make Available, Section 6.6.

3. Eagle 21 experiences a Digital Filter Processor (DFP) halt on rack 10. Associated indicators PI-456, LI-460A, FI-415, FI-425, FI-435, FI-445 (VB2), and PR-445, LR-459 (CC2) fail as-is as well as control channels for PORV 456 (PT-456) and Pressurizer Level Control (LT-460). Crew responds per OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel. Shift Foreman reviews Tech Specs, entering:

• TS 3.3.1.D, PC 456D Low Press SI (72 hrs)

• TS 3.3.1.E, PC-456A High Press Trip (72 hrs)

• TS 3.3.1.M, PC 456C Low Press Trip (72 hrs)

• TS 3.3.1.M, PC 460A High Level Trip (72 hrs)

• TS 3.3.1.M, FC-415(425,435,445) RCS Loop 1 (2,3,4) Flow (72 hrs)

• TS 3.3.2.L, PC-456 B, P-11 (1 hr)

• TS 3.4.11.B1, B2, & B3 PC-456 B, to close & remove power from associated block valve (1 hr) and restore to operable (72 hrs)

4. Main Turbine Stop Valve #2 closes, causing a secondary transient, bringing PK 08-12, TURB LOAD REJECTION C-7A into alarm. Power lowers approximately 10%. Crew may perform a diagnostic brief to identify the cause of the excursion. The crew identifies various indications that the stop valve is fully closed such as deviations in steam flow, temperature, Triconex display, as well as activation of PK04-06, PROTECTION CHANNEL ACTIVATED for 1 out of 4 Turb Stm Stop Vlvs Clsd. Power is stabilized per Shift Foremans direction.

5. Loop 4 Feedwater Reg Valve, FCV-540, fails full open. The crew identifies the malfunction and attempts to take manual control, but is unsuccessful. Shift Foreman directs manual reactor trip before S/G 1-4 level reaches the auto trip point of 90%.

6. On the trip, the feedline header to S/G 1-4 fails catastrophically, causing S/G 1-4 to depressurize into containment.

7. Bus G fails to transfer to startup resulting in a loss of power to the TDAFW LCVs and an inability to throttle flow. Feed flow from the pump is isolated during recovery actions as part of critical task S3CT-1 (see page 4, below).

8. Feedwater Isolation Valve FCV-441 fails open, requiring manual isolation at VB-3. (Part of critical task S3CT-1, see page 4, below).

L161 NRC ES-D-1-03 r1.docx Page 3 of 4 Rev 1

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #3 Crew enters EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and performs their immediate actions. E-0 diagnostic steps direct the crew to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to perform the critical task of isolating the feedline break. (S3CT-1) Manually isolate feedline break before Containment wide range level reaches 94 feet, resulting in a magenta path on the Containment safety function status tree. ***

Once isolated, the Shift Foreman verifies SI termination criteria has been met and transitions to E-1.1, SI Termination, performing the critical task of sequentially reducing ECCS flow and realigning the plant to a pre-SI configuration. (S3CT-2) Terminate ECCS flow before overfill of the RCS results in a rupture of the pressurizer relief tank (PRT). ***

The scenario is terminated once normal charging/letdown is aligned in E-1.1, ready to perform step 15.

L161 NRC ES-D-1-03 r1.docx Page 4 of 4 Rev 1

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 18 Event

Description:

CCW Pp 11 Shaft Shear Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Procedure step numbers are included at the front of each action/comment in parenthesis, where applicable.

Note: Three AR PKs come into alarm, any one of which may be used to diagnose and address the malfunction.

Starting stand-by CCW Pp 1-3 will cause PK01-08 and PK01-09 to clear. Shutting down CCW Pp 1-1 causes PK01-11 to clear.

ATC

• Observes the following Annunciators alarming and informs the Shift Foreman:

o PK01-08, CCW HEADER C - RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Flo Lo (less than 140 gpm).

o Pk01-09, CCW PUMPS - CCW Pump 1-1 Lube Oil Pressure Low with pump running.

o PK01-11, CCW PP 1-1 RECIRC - CCW Pp 1-1 Recirc Open (pump amps < 44 ).

(AR PK01-11, CCW PP 1-1, RECIRC) (if entered, else N/A)

SRO * (2.1) Reads note describing alarm behavior - alarm is enabled 10-30 seconds after pump is started and disabled when the pump is shut down.

o Notes alarm is active when CCW Pp 1-1 amps fall below 44 amps.

BOP * (2.1.1) Reports pump is running; motor current reading is approx 16 amps (VB1).

o May report CCW Header flow lower on all three headers (~ 1000 gpm on each)(VB1).

SRO/BOP * (2.1.2) Dispatches Nuclear Operator to investigate.

o May evaluate other PK alarms while awaiting report back from field (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 18 Event

Description:

CCW Pp 11 Shaft Shear (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (AR PK01-11, CCW PP 1-1, RECIRC, cont)

Note: Nuclear Operator in the field will report the following: Recirc valve FCV-606 is open, but there is no sound of flow in the adjacent piping. The pump is running, but sounds unusually high pitched. Motor shaft is clearly turning, but pump shaft doesnt appear to be moving.

SRO/BOP * (2.1.3) Determines alarm is valid and low flow (less than 1100 gpm) condition exists (VB1).

• (2.1.3.a,b) Starts stand-by CCW Pp and shuts down CCW Pp 1-1 (if not already done)(VB1).

• (2.1.3.c) N/A SRO * (2.1.3.d) Shift Foreman enters T.S. 3.7.7.A, Vital Component Cooling Water (CCW)

System for one loop of CCW inoperable.

(AR PK01-09, CCW PUMPS) (if entered, else N/A)

SRO * (1) Determines input is for low lube oil pressure.

SRO/BOP * (2.2.1,2) Starts stand-by CCW Pp 1-3 and shuts down CCW Pp 1-1 (if not already done) (VB1).

• (2.1.3.c) N/A

• (2.2.4) Dispatches Nuclear Operator to check CCW P 1-1 lube oil level.

Note: Nuclear Operator in the field will report the following: Pump lube oil level appears normal in the sight glass. The pump is running, but sounds unusually high pitched. Motor shaft is clearly turning, but pump shaft doesnt appear to be moving.

SRO * (2.2.5) Shift Foreman enters T.S. 3.7.7.A, Vital Component Cooling Water (CCW)

System for one loop of CCW inoperable.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 3 of 18 Event

Description:

CCW Pp 11 Shaft Shear (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (AR PK01-08, CCW HEADER C) (if entered, else N/A)

SRO * (1) Determines input is for RCP Thermal Barrier CCW flow low (less than 140 gpm).

SRO/BOP

• Reads CAUTION regarding FCV-357 and NOTE regarding Containment Isolation -

determines neither applies at this time.

• (2.2.1) Ensures two CCW pumps running.

o May elect to start standby pump and shutdown CCW Pp 1-1 based on low amp reading (VB1).

• (2.2.2) Checks RED (Open) indicating lights on the following valves:

o FCV-355, Header C Supply (VB1, skirt).

o FCV-356, Supply to RCP and Rx Vessel Support Coolers (VB1, skirt).

SRO/ATC * (2.2.3) Checks RCP lower radial bearing temperatures; determines they are normal (all in the green band) (PPC, VB2).

• (2.2.4) Ensures RCP seal injection flow remains between 8-13 gpm (seal injection flow is normal) (PPC, VB2).

SRO * (2.2.5) Informs the crew that the Thermal Barrier low flow condition coincident with a loss of RCP seal injection is Reactor Trip criteria (in MODE 1).

• (2.2.6) Notes alarm is due to Thermal Barrier low flow only, but recognizes problem is due to a problem with CCW Pp 1-1, not leakage.

Proceed to the next event once Tech Spec addressed, per the lead examiner

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 18 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Heater Group #1 Over Current Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC

• Observes PK05-19, PZR HTRS OC TRIP / FAN FLO LO, alarming and informs Shift Foreman.

SRO

• Enters PK05-19, PZR HTRS OC TRIP / FAN FLO LO.

(AR PK05-19, PZR HTRS OC TRIP / FAN FLO LO)

SRO

• Notes input in for low Pzr SCR cabinet flow and PZR Htr Bkr OC Trip. Goes to step 2.2 for OC Trip (cause of the low flow)

• (2.2) Heater Breaker Trip (Input 538) o (2.2.1) Determines Pzr proportional heater breaker 52-13D-05 relayed on OC.

Directs Reactor Operator to place one backup heater group in service per OP A-4A:I, Section 6.6, "Placing Backup Heaters in Service and Shutdown Proportional Heaters.

o (2.2.2) Dispatches Nuclear operator to perform visual and "smell" inspection of 52-13D-05 and the affected heater groups Heater Distribution Panel (PNPH).

o (2.2.4) Refers to T.S. 3.4.9 RCS-Pressurizer; determines T.S. doesnt apply (T.S. is only applicable to the heater groups with vital backup supply power).

(OP A-4A:I, Section 6.6 , "Placing Backup Heaters in Service and Shutdown Proportional Heaters)

Note: The Shift Foreman may direct either available Pzr Heater Group (1-2 or 1-3) to be placed in service.

ATC

• Reads two notes regarding normal use of the proportional heaters.

• (6.6.1) Places selected back-up heater group in service by taking control switch ON and then returning the switch to AUTO (CC1).

• (6.6.2, 6.6.3) Place HC-455K, PZR Press Control, in MANUAL and raises demand to approximately 45% (CC2).

• (6.6.4) Monitors PCV-455A and PCV-455B, PZR Spray valves to ensure they modulation open (CC2).

• (6.6.5) Returns HC-455K to AUTO (CC2).

• (6.6.6) Places Pzr Heater Group 1-1 control switch in "NEUTRAL" after "OFF".

• (6.6.7) Monitors RCS to ensure pressure is maintained at approx. 2235 psig (VB2).

Proceed to the next event once backup heater placed in service, per the lead examiner

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 18 Event

Description:

Eagle 21 Digital Filter Processor Halt in Rack 10 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC

• Observes PK06-01 (PPS CHANNEL SET FAILURE) and PK06-04 (PPS TROUBLE) alarming and informs the SFM.

SRO

• Enters OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel (OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel)

SRO/ATC * (1) Ensures Primary and Secondary Control Systems Controlling Properly in AUTO (they are).

SRO o Reads notes prior to Step 2 o (2) Determines extent of Eagle 21 Instrument Failure o Identifies Protection Set 2 affected by PK06-01 & PK06-04 inputs o Dispatches operator to locally identify affected rack per Attachment 4.3 o Identifies instruments affected by Rack 10 Digital Filter Processor (DFP) Halt per Attachment 4.1 PT-456, Pressurizer Pressure (PI-456 - VB2)(PR-455 - CC2)

LT-460, Pressurizer Level (LI-460A - VB2)(LR-459 - CC2)

FT-415, RCS Loop 1 Flow (FI-415 - VB2)

FT-425, RCS Loop 2 Flow (FI-425- VB2)

FT-435, RCS Loop 3 Flow (FI-435 - VB2)

FT-445, RCS Loop 4 Flow (FI-445 - VB2) o (3) Notes failure is not associated with a failed deltaT channel.

SRO/BOP o (4) Checks steam dumps NOT actuated o Steam dumps are closed, UI-500 demand is zero, Dump Arming and Trip Signal lights are all out (VB3)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 18 Event

Description:

Eagle 21 Digital Filter Processor Halt in Rack 10 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel) (cont)

SRO o (5) Notifies I&C to investigate o (6) Notes the need to ensure affected channels are removed from service prior to maintenance.

BOP o (7) Places Out-of-Service stickers on affected indicators SRO o (8) Shift Foreman review Tech Specs and enters the following:

o TS 3.3.1.D, PC 456D Low Press SI (72 hrs) o TS 3.3.1.E, PC 456A High Press Trip (72 hrs) o TS 3.3.1.M, PC 456C Low Press Trip (72 hrs) o TS 3.3.1.M, PC 460A High Level Trip (72 hrs) o TS 3.3.1.M, FC-415(425,435,445) RCS Loop 1 (2,3,4) Flow (72 hrs) o TS 3.3.2.L, PC-456 B, P-11 (1 hr) o TS 3.4.11.B1, B2, & B3 PC-456 B, to close & remove power from associated block valve (1 hr) and restore to operable (72 hrs)

SRO/BOP o (8) Closes 8000C and dispatches Nuclear Operator to remove power.

Proceed to the next event once Tech Specs addressed, per the lead examiner

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 7 of 18 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Stop Valve #2 Closes, Causing Secondary Transient Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses steam flow problem from one or more of the following:

• Control Rods stepping in (CC1, DRPI)

• MW lowering (Triconex, PPC, CC3)

• Secondary Steam Flow/Feed Flow mismatch (VB3)

• Loop 2 deltaT (as indication of % power) drop of approximately 10% (CC1, VB2)

• Steam Dump arming signal in (VB3)

• PK04-06, PROTECTION CHANNEL ACTIVATED for 1 out of 4 Turbine Stop Valves Closed

• PK08-12, TURB LOAD REJECTION C-7A SRO

• Enters PK08-12, TURB LOAD REJECTION C-7A (PK08-12, TURB LOAD REJECTION C-7A)

SRO * (1) Determines input is for a 10% load loss in less than 140 seconds).

• (2.1.1) Transitions to OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown (OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown)

SRO * (1.a) Notes no runback/programmed ramp in progress o Notes plant did, however, experience a transient that was not intentionally initiated.

SRO/ATC * (2) Verifies that control rods are inserted properly in AUTO (CC1)

• (3) Turns Pressurizer Backup heaters on (CC1)

• (4) Checks charging adequate to prevent flashing in the letdown system; (it is) (CC2)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 8 of 18 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Stop Valve #2 Drops Into Flow Stream (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown) (cont)

SRO/BOP o (5) Ensures DFWCS is controlling S/G levels in AUTO (MFW control/bypass valves; MFPs all in AUTO) (CC2)(VB3)

Note: Boration values described below are representative of the conditions given, but will vary based on the actual ramp rate and target specified by SRO.

SRO/ATC * (6) Performs boration (the following guidance is on the boration checklist in the reactivity handbook) o Presses STOP on M/U Ctrl HMI (CC2) o Presses BORATE on HMI o Sets target gallons for boration verifies batch is reset o Sets boric acid flowrate o Presses START, and monitors boration o Once stopped, either returns to AUTO (presses AUTO, then START), or performs additional boration per the Shift Foreman(CC2)

SRO/BOP * (7) Checks MFP suction pressure greater than 260 psig (VB3)(it is)

SRO/ATC * (8) Checks Tavg trending to Tref (PPC, CC1)

• (9) Checks Pressurizer pressure and level trending to programmed band (PPC, CC2)

SRO * (10) N/A

• (11) Determines the Unit can remain at power.

Proceed to the next event once plant has been stabilized, per the lead examiner

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 9 of 18 Event

Description:

Loop 4 Feedwater Reg Valve, FCV-540, Fails Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses feedflow problem from one or more of the following:

• Rising Feedflow on S/G 1-4 only (VB3, DFWCS screen (CC3))

• FCV-540 Valve Actual Position (DFWCS screen (CC3)

• PK09-04, SG 1-4 PRESS, LVL FLOW (steam flow less than feed flow)

SRO/ATC

• Attempts to take manual control of FCV-540, but valve is unresponsive.

• Recognizes level rise will cause automatic turbine trip when level reaches 90% in S/G 1-4 (P-14).

SRO

• Directs manual reactor trip

• Implements EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

SRO/ATC * (1) Verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open (VB2 upper left), rods on bottom (VB2 upper left DRPI panel), NIs decreasing (CC1 left).

• (2) Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps).

SRO/BOP * (3) Checks vital 4kv busses (VB4, vital busses F/H have white lights on mimic busses; bus G has no power due to bus differential trip).

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5,6 Page 10 of 18 Event

Description:

Feedline Header to S/G 1-4 Fails Catastrophically Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) (cont)

SRO/ATC * (4) Checks if SI actuated o PK08-21 is OFF and coincidence is not made up to require a safety injection.

Note: Evidence of the feedline break becomes apparent shortly after the trip.

ALL Main feedline break inside containment is diagnosed from one or more of the following:

• Lowering Pressurizer Pressure and Level (VB2, CC2)

• Containment Sump Levels High (PAMS1)

• Rising Containment Pressure and Temperature (VB1)

SRO/ATC Directs/performs manual Safety Injection (CC1)

SRO * (5) Directs App E implemented (usually to BOP)(see page 15)

SRO/ATC * (6) Checks RCS temperature stable or lowering to 547oF o (temperature may be dropping due to feedline break/ECCS flows; AFW may be throttled back (VB2 meters, upper panel lower area).

• (7) Checks Pzr PORVs and Pzr Safeties and Spray Valves o Safeties closed (closed); no sonic flow, tailpipe temperature is elevated, but consistent with containment environment (VB2 - upper panel, far right) o PORVs closed and associated block valves open, except 8000C (closed in event

1. 3) (VB2 - upper panel, far right) o Pzr Sprays closed (green lights on) (CC2)

SRO/ATC * (8) Checks RCP trip criteria:

o RCS WR Pressure is GREATER than 1300 PSIG; Trip Criteria is NOT met (VB2)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 11 of 18 Event

Description:

Feedline Header to S/G 1-4 Fails - Entry into E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISO Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) (cont)

SRO/ATC * (9) Checks S/Gs NOT FAULTED:

o Identifies S/G 1-4 depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner (VB3) o Directs transition to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

(EOP E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation")

SRO/ATC * (1) Ensures all MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves closed (VB3)

• (2) Checks any S/G intact o Checks pressures in S/Gs 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3 stable (VB3).

• (3) Confirms S/G 1-4 as faulted o S/G 1-4 depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner (VB3)

SRO * (4) Directs BOP to implement Appendix HH to isolate faulted S/G 1-4. (see page 18)**

SRO/ATC * (5) Checks Condensate Storage Tank level greater than 10% (VB3 center).

• (6) Checks Secondary System Radiation Normal.

• (6.a, b) No valid alarms and no upward trends on Air Ejector RM-15/15R (PK11-06),

S/G Blowdown RM-19 (PK11-17), Main Steam Line RM-71, 72, 73, 74 (PK11-18).

• (6.c) Contacts Chemistry to sample S/Gs. Ensures sample path open (Containment Isolation Phase A RESET (VB1), Open Instrument Air to Containment FCV-584 (VB4 bottom), Open Inside Containment S/G Blowdown Valves FCV-760-763 (VB3 skirt bottom left)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 12 of 18 Event

Description:

Feedline Header to S/G 1-4 Fails - E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISO (S3CT-2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation") (cont)

SRO/ATC * (7) Check if ECCS Flow Should Be Reduced o (7.a) Checks RCS Subcooled based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 20°F (Subcooled Margin Monitor, YI 31 or Appendix C) o (7.b) Secondary heat sink: Total AFW flow GREATER THAN 435 GPM, OR NR Level in at least one S/G GREATER THAN 15% (25% if adverse containment conditions still exist).

o (7.c) WR RCS Pressure STABLE OR RISING o (7.d) PZR Level GREATER THAN 12% (40% if adverse containment conditions still exist).

o (7.e) Determines SI Termination Criteria has been met.

Transitions to EOP E-1.1, SI Termination (EOP E-1.1, SI Termination)

SRO/BOP * (1) Checks SI Reset (already done in E-0, App E)

• (2) Aligns Charging o (2.a) Checks only one ECCS CCP running (CCP 1-1 is the only one running) (VB2) o (2.b) Depresses Vital 4kV Auto Transfer Relay Resets: Blue Light - OFF

• (3) Checks RCS pressure stable or rising - (its stable)(VB2)

• (4) (S3CT-2, partial) Closes 8803A & B OR 8801A & B to isolate charging injection (VB2)**

• • (Critical Task) (S3CT-2, Terminate ECCS flow before overfill of the RCS results in a rupture of the pressurizer relief tank (PRT)).

SRO/ATC * (5) Establishes normal charging flow o (5.a) Closes HCV-142 (CC2)

SRO/ BOP o (5.b) Opens 8107 and 8108, Norm Charging to Regen Hx Stop Valves (VB2).

o (5.c) Ensures 8146 OR 8147 - OPEN (VB2) o (5.d) Ensures 8145 AND 8148 - CLOSED (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 12 of 22 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 13 of 18 Event

Description:

Feedline Header to S/G 1-4 Fails -E-1.1, SI Termination (cont) (S3CT-2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-1.1, SI Termination) (cont)

SRO/ATC * (5) Establishes normal charging flow (cont) o (5.e) Throttles open FCV-128 to establish charging flow.

• (6) Controls Charging Flow to Maintain PZR Level o (6.a) Adjusts FCV-128 charging flow and HCV-142 to maintain:

PZR Level - Stable, between 17% [50%] and 60%.

Seal injection to each RCP between 8 and 13 gpm.

SRO/BOP * (7) Checks if SI pumps should be stopped o (7.a) Checks RCS Pressure -

Stable or rising (its stable)

Greater than 1650 psig (it over 1800 psig)

No SI flow indications (there is none) o (7.b) (S3CT-2, partial) Stops both SI Pumps **

• (8) Checks if RHR pumps should be stopped o (8.a) Checks RHR pumps running with suction aligned to the RWST o (8.b) (S3CT-2, partial) Shuts down RHR Pp 1-2 (RHR 1-1 not running due to bus G)

• (9) Ensures ECCS Flow Not Required o (9.a) Subcooling greater than 20oF (its over 100; must use SPDS or PAMs to check (PT-403 OOS in initial setup) o (9.b) PZR Level GREATER THAN 12% [40%] (it is)

• **(Critical Task)(S3CT-2, Terminate ECCS flow before overfill of the RCS results in a rupture of the pressurizer relief tank (PRT)).

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 13 of 22 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 14 of 18 Event

Description:

Feedline Header to S/G 1-4 Fails -E-1.1, SI Termination (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-1.1, SI Termination) (cont)

SRO/BOP * (10) Checks both trains of Containment Isolation, Phase A and B reset (they are) (11)

Checks Instrument Air to Containment - already established.

• (12) Checks if Containment Spray should be stopped (its not running)

• (13) Checks Pressurizer Level greater than 17% (it is)

• (14) Establishes RCS Letdown and No Load Pressurizer Level using Appendix R.

The scenario is terminated once ECCS Normal charging and letdown are re-established, per lead examiner

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 14 of 22 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5,6,7 Page 15 of 18 Event

Description:

EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix E, ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E)

BOP Implements App E (ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status):

• (1a) Checks no personnel in Containment (part of turnover; may not voice)

• (1b) Announces trip/SI on PA system

• (2) Checks main generator - tripped (PK14-01 ON), CC3 right side)

• (3 & 4) Verifies Phase A and Containment Vent Isolation complete (VB1, ESF status lights, red lights ON, white lights OFF); all misalignments are due to loss of bus G or previous scenario events.

• (5) Verify ESF (SI) actuation complete; all misalignments are due to loss of bus G or previous scenario events.

BOP * (6) Verifies Feedwater isolation complete (F.W. Isolation and S.G. Level Portions of Monitor Light Box C: red lights ON, white light OFF.

o Dispatches Nuclear Operator to close FCV-439, Feedwater Iso Valve (VB3)

BOP * (7) Determines Containment Spray and Phase B Isolation is NOT required (Contmt Isol, Phase B portion of Monitor Light Box D: red lights are OFF)

BOP * (8) Checks Main Steamline Isolation complete (Main Steam Isolation portion of Monitor Light Box D: red light OFF, white light are OFF)

BOP * (9) Checks AFW status o Both MDAFW Pumps are running (VB3) o TDAFW is running, but not required. LCVs are failed full open due to loss of bus G.

If directed by Shift Foreman, may stop TDAFW pump (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 15 of 22 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 16 of 18 Event

Description:

EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix E, ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E)

BOP * (10) Verifies ECCS flows (charging injection (VB2 upper panel left), SI, RHR (both on VB1 upper panel

• (11) Reports ESF and AFW status to the Shift Foreman (Shift Foreman may direct operator to continue on in Appendix E, or redirect to higher priority tasks)

BOP * (12) Checks excess letdown; notes NOT in service prior to trip

• (13) Checks secondary systems (MFPs tripped (VB2, green lights ON), stops all but one CB Pp set, takes LCV-12 control switch to CONT ONLY. Determines Condenser is NOT available (MSIVs are closed) and directs field operators to break vacuum when turbine is less than 200 rpm

• (14) Verifies proper operation of Aux Bldg and Control Rm vent systems (VB4 vent status light panel white lights); turns on aux bldg vent charcoal filter preheater (VB4 lower panel, left side) and verifies containment iodine fans secured (VB4, lower panel),

BOP * (15) Verifies available DGs running normally (VB4, freq (60), volts (120), speed (900))

• (16) Verifies vital batteries supplied by chargers (charger and bus volts on VB5, upper panel middle/lower area);

• (17) Verifies MSRs reset (CC3 Triconex HMI)

• (18) Notes no running CCPs - unable to throttle RCP seal injection flows (CC2)

• (19) Checks PK11-04 NOT IN (SFP alarm)

• (20) Notifies Shift Foreman of completion.

(Board Operator will rejoin crew upon completion of Appendix or when called upon by Shift Foreman)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 16 of 22 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6,7,8 Page 17 of 18 Event

Description:

Faulted Steam Generator Isolation (S3CT-1) **

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-2, Appendix HH Isolate Faulted Steam Generator")

BOP * (1) Isolate faulted S/G.

o (1a) Ensures closed Main Feedwater Isolation Valve (VB3 lower left side)

(MFWI may have been addressed as part of E-0, Appendix E)

(S3CT-1, partial) Closes FCV-441, S/G 1-4 Feedwater Isolation Valve** (if not isolated earlier in the scenario). (VB3) o (1b) Ensures Blowdown Isolation Valves Closed (Inside, outside, sample isolation)

(VB3 skirt bottom) o (1c) Ensures S/G 1-2 10% dump valve closed (VB3 center bottom) o (1f) Determines AFW is available to S/Gs 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3) (flow indicators VB3 center, controllers VB3 skirt bottom) o (1g) Informs SFM of status Note: Shift Foreman may have directed the TDAFW shut down earlier in the scenario. Isolation of the LCV-109 and FCV-38 is still required as part of the Critical Task, regardless of TDAFW pump running status.

BOP o (1d) Ensures closed S/G 1-4 AFW flow control valves closed (VB3 skirt bottom)

(S3CT-1, partial) Closes LCV-113, MDAFW Level Control Valve (VB3 skirt)**

(S3CT-1, partial) Dispatches a Nuclear Operator to locally close LCV-109 **

o (1e) (S3CT-1, partial) Ensures closed steam supply to TD AFW Pump from S/G 1 FCV-38 (VB3 skirt)**

• • (S3CT-1) Manually isolate feedline break before Containment wide range level reaches 94 feet, resulting in a magenta path on the Containment safety function status tree.

BOP o (1f) Determines AFW is available to S/Gs 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3) (flow indicators VB3 center, controllers VB3 skirt bottom) o (1g) Informs SFM of status (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 17 of 22 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 18 of 18 Event

Description:

Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-2, Appendix HH Isolate Faulted Steam Generator")

BOP (2) Remove Subcooled Margin Monitor input from S/G 1-2 o (2.a.1) Goes to PAM4 panel (in hallway behind VB3) o (2.a.2) Presses CONFIGURATION

SUMMARY

o (2.a.3) Presses FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR o (2.a.4) Presses THOT2 o (2.a.5) Presses DISABLE LOOP (Board Operator will rejoin crew upon completion of Appendix)

L161 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 18 of 22 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 - Scenario Set-up & Booth Actions X = manual entry required TIME LINE CONSOLE ENTRY SYMPTOMS/CUES/DESCRIPTION X IC RESTORE 152 100% power MOL, CB - 878 X Setup Clear PT-403 The Plant Abnormal Status Board for None Surveillance Requirements Copies of Procedures, Attachments; Appendixes; PK01-08, PK01-09, PK01-11, PK05-19, PK04-06, PK08-12, Foldout Pages; Annunciator Response OP A-4A:I, OP AP-5, AP-25, EOP E-0, E-2, E-1.1, F-0 Procedures and commonly used forms are in binders and NOT Marked up A 0 min Tools > Simple SBT Before crew takes the watch.

Use Simple SBT, Data Recorder File: sbt_sim.drb, 960 iterations (30 sec).

A 0 min LESSON NRCL161-S3 After SFM reports the crew has taken the watch, load session MALS, OVRs, etc. by FILE or MANUALLY (below)

X 3 min CCW Pp 11 Shaft Shear X 10 min Pressurizer Heater Group #1 Over Current Trip X 20 min Eagle 21 DFP-1 Halt in Rack 10 X 35 min Main Turbine Stop Valve #2 closes X 45 min Loop 4 FW Reg Fails to 100%

(cont on next page)

L161 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 19 of 22 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 - Scenario Set-up & Booth Actions (cont)

X = manual entry required A = activate from EVENT file TIME LINE CONSOLE ENTRY SYMPTOMS/CUES/DESCRIPTION On Reactor trip Feedline Header Break Inside Containment on S/G 1-4 4kV Bus G Bus Transfer Failure FCV-441 fails open L161 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 20 of 22 Rev 0

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log Unit 1 Unit 1 Days at Power: 111 Days Operating Mode: 1 Gross Generation: 1197 MWe Power Level: 99.6% Net Generation: 1147 MWe Today - Dayshift Shift Manager Turnover:

PRA RISK STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Green GRID STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Normal AVERAGE RCS CALCULATED LEAKRATE: 0.01 gpm CONDENSER INLEAKAGE: < 0.01 gpd CONDENSER D/Ps: NW 5.9 SW 6.4 NE 6.3 SE 6.1 PSID MAIN GENERATOR H2 USAGE: 325 scfd / 327 scfd 5 day ave SPENT FUEL POOL: Temp = 80oF; Time to 200oF = 30 hrs using actual temp (F-ID-7A)

NEW PRIORITY WORK:

• None SHUTDOWN TECH SPECS / ECGS:

• TS 3.3.3.A PT-403 ECG ACTIONS THAT IF COMPLETION TIME NOT MET ECG 0.3 IS ENTERED:

• None TURNOVER ITEMS:

• PT-403 OOS for Calibration; RTS next shift PRIORITY ITEMS FOR NEXT SHIFT:

• None

Shift Foreman Turnover ANNUNCIATORS IN ALARM:

• None TURNOVER ITEMS:

• U-1: maintain 100% - no one in containment.

• U-2: 100% power REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT:

• Time in core life: _MOL_.

• Power History: Steady State at 100% for past 111 days.

• Boron concentration is _878 ppm_ from a sample taken 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago.

• Control Rod Height: 230 steps on CBD.

• Diluting the RCS approximately 25 gallons every 1.5 hrs.

• The last dilution was completed _15_ min ago.

CONDITIONAL SURVEILLANCES & INCREASED MONITORING:

• None OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT STATUS

• None

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 4 Op-Test No: L161 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% MOL, 878 ppm boron Turnover: OOS Equipment: CCP 1-2 Event Malf Event Event Description No No. Type* (See Summary for Narrative Detail) 1 MAL_DEG6B FAULT C (BOP, Low Lube Oil Temp/Fail to Start on D/G 1-2 (AR PK17-06, SRO) PK17-01; TS 3.8.1.B)

MAL_DEG2B FAULT cd='h_v4_101m_1 gt 680' 2 VLV_CVC22_2 0.2 delay=0 ramp=15 I (ALL) Regen Hx Isolation Valve, LCV-459, Fails to mid-position (AP-18)

RLY_PPL63 CLOSED (TRUE) 3 I (ALL) Inadvertent start of TDAFW pump (AR PK04-03; TS 3.7.5.B) 4 PK1421_0829 1 C (ALL) Loss of Main X-former Cooling (PK14-21) 5 MAL_GEN1_3 TRUE M (ALL) Main Transformer Unit Trips causing a Turbine trip; SDR Failure on D/G 1-1 and 1-3; Buses transfer to Start-Up Power (PK14-01, PK12-11) 6 MAL_PPL5A 3, MAL_PPL5B 3 C (ALL) ATWS; rod control malfunction; CT to add negative reactivity V5_245S_1 0, V5_239S_1 0 (S4CT-1).

7 BKR_EPS20 OPEN cd='h_v5_230r_1' C (ALL) 12kV Start-Up Feeder Breaker to Start-Up Trip in E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response; Critical Task to start D/G to restore MAL_DEG1C_2 NO_RESET 4kV vital bus (S4CT-2).

cd='H_V4_224R_1'

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L161 NRC ES-D-1-04 r1.docx Page 1 of 3 Rev 1

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 1,2,3,4,5,6,7) 7

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) (Events 6,7) 2

3. Abnormal events (1-4) (Events 1,2,3,4) 4

4. Major transients (1-2) (Event 5) 1

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E-0.1) 1

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) (FR-S.1, ECA-0.0 ) 2

7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See description below) 2 Critical Task Justification Reference (S4CT-1) Insert negative reactivity into the Failure to insert negative reactivity as procedurally

• WCAP-17711-NP, CT-52 core following per EOP FR-S.1 guidance so directed constitutes a failure to provide

• FR-S.1 Background that power is reduced to less than 5% by appropriate reactivity control and represents an Document, Rev. 3.

the completion of step 19. unnecessary and avoidable challenge to the criticality safety function.

(S4CT-2) Energize at least one vital AC bus Failure to restore vital AC power when it is

• WCAP-17711-NP, CT-24 and restore RCP seal cooling prior RCP shut available represents an unnecessary continuation

• ECA-0.0 Background down seal activation which is identifiable of a degraded emergency power condition and Document, Rev. 3.

by seal no. 1 return flow dropping from a presents a potential challenge to the RCS fission

• DCM No. S-7, Rev 29 normal value of greater than 2 gpm to less product barrier due to a loss of cooling to the RCP than 1 gpm. (occurs when seal outlet seals.

o temperatures exceed 260 F)

L161 NRC ES-D-1-04 r1.docx Page 2 of 3 Rev 1

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #4

1. AR PK17-06, DIESEL 12 LUBE OIL SYSTEM alarms due to low lube oil temperature on D/G 1-2. When dispatched, the Turbine Watch confirms the input on a local annunciator alarm panel and reports current lube oil temperature = 91oF. Annunciator guidance and Maintenance recommendations are followed to start the diesel to increase lube oil temperature, but the diesel fails to start (over crank condition) bringing in AR PK17-01, DEISEL 12 FAIL TO START. Shift Foreman enters TS 3.8.1.B, AC Sources - Operating, for one D/G inoperable.

2. Regen Hx Isolation Valve, LCV-459, drifts to mid-position causing letdown orifice valve 8149C to close.

Shift Foreman enters OP AP-18, Letdown Line Failure. Excess Letdown is established per OP B-1A:IV CVCS - Excess Letdown - Place In Service and Remove From Service.

3. SSPS failure results in Turbine Driven AFW (TDAFW) Pump Steam Supply Isolation Valve, FCV-95, failing open causing the TDAFW Pump to start. S/G levels rise and RCS temperature lowers, causing control rods to step out in response. FCV-95 cannot be closed and the crew must isolate the TDAFW Pump by either closing the LCVs to the individual S/Gs or by closing steam supply valves FCV-37 and FCV-38 to leads 1 and 2 respectively. Shift Foreman implements TS 3.7.5.B, AFW System for one AFW train inoperable.

4. Crew responds to AR PK14-21, MAIN TRANSF. A nuclear operator is dispatched to investigate local alarms and reports back that NO cooling fans or oil pumps are running on Main Bank C Transformer.

Shift Foreman enters OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown and directs a 50 MW/min power reduction while Maintenance and field Operators attempt to restore transformer cooling.

5. At approximately 60% power, the plant experiences a Main Transformer Unit Trip due to a fault in the main transformer. D/G 1-1 (no reset) and 1-3 (resettable from Control Room) fail as a result of their associated shutdown relays activating, however all buses successfully transfer to Start-up power. The Turbine trips as expected, but the reactor trip breakers remain closed. (AR PK14-01, UNIT TRIP; AR PK12-11 TURBINE TRIP, AR PK04-11 REACTOR TRIP INITIATE)

6. Reactor power is still greater than 50% and the crew identifies the ATWS condition. EOP FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS, is entered, either directly or from the step 1, response not obtained column of EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Attempts to trip the reactor from the Control Room are unsuccessful and Auto-rod motion has failed. The crew performs the critical task of adding negative reactivity by manually driving rods (S4CT-1) Insert negative reactivity into the core so that power is less than 5%.*** The crew continues working through FR-S.1 until field operators are able to locally open the reactor trip breakers.

7. The reactor is verified subcritical and the crew transitions to EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

EOP E-0.1 Reactor Trip Response is entered once the need for a Safety Injection has been ruled out.

Shortly after verifying primary and secondary parameters are stable, Startup Feeder Breaker 52VU12 trips open and cannot be closed. The crew transitions to EOP ECA-0.0, Loss of All Vital AC Power and performs the critical task of starting D/G 1-3 (S4CT-4) Energize at least one vital AC bus and restore RCP seal cooling before RCP shut down seals activate.***

The scenario is terminated once RCP seal cooling has been re-established.

• • • CT / TCOA note:

L161 NRC ES-D-1-04 r1.docx Page 3 of 3 Rev 1

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 17 Event

Description:

Low Lube Oil Temp on D/G 1-2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Procedure step numbers are included at the front of each action/comment in parenthesis, where applicable.

ATC

• Observes PK17-06, Diesel 12 Lube Oil System alarming, and informs the Shift Foreman.

SRO

• Enters PK17-06, Diesel 12 Lube Oil System (AR PK17-06, Diesel 12 Lube Oil System)

SRO * (2.1.1) Dispatch Nuclear Operator to Diesel Generator 12 to evaluate and respond to local annunciators.

Note: Time compression will be used for field report back with the following information:

Lube oil pump and heater appear to have power available, but the heater is not ON. RESET did not clear the problem. Local lube oil temperature reading is 91oF.

SRO * (2.1.2) Goes to section 2.4, Low Lube Oil Temperature, based on field report.

SRO

• Reads NOTE regarding D/G considered INOPERABLE with lube oil temperature less than 90°F.

• (2.4.1) Evaluates data received from the local Operator; notes within 1°F of Tech Spec Limit.

Note: If Shift Foreman does not direct starting of D/G 1-2 to increase lube oil temperature, Shift Manager will provide the following prompt: Engineering and I recommend running the D/G for 30 minutes every 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> until Lube Oil Heater is repaired.

Note: Once Shift Foreman has determined D/G start is prudent, Shift Manager will provide him an issued for use copy of OP J-6B:V, Diesel Generators - Manual Operation of D/G 1-2. The copy will have all precautions and limitations and necessary field actions marked as complete. The Shift Manager will inform the Shift Foreman that all field actions have been completed using time compression and field Operators are on station, standing by. The crew is to continue with the D/G 1-2 start expeditiously. The Work Control Lead will perform STP M-9I tracking for D/G 1-2.

SRO * (2.4.2) Determines D/G 1-2 should be run to raise lube oil temperature.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 1 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 17 Event

Description:

Low Lube Oil Temp on D/G 1-2 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Shift Foreman may elect to assign OP J-6B:V actions to Reactor Operators while he reviews/addresses applicable Tech Specs.

(OP J-6B:V, Diesel Generators - Manual Operation of DG 1-2)

SRO/BOP

• May review applicable Precautions and Limitations.

BOP * (6.1.5.a) Places D/G 1-2 Mode Sel switch in MANUAL (VB4)

SRO

• Shift Foreman enters T.S. 3.8.1.B (diesel INOPERABLE when mode select switch in MANUAL and diesel not running).

BOP * (6.1.5.b) Cuts in D/G protective relays (VB4)

• (6.1.5.c) Places D/G 1-2 Start/Stop switch to "START"

• (6.1.5.d) Checks that D/G 1-2 starts and monitors for steady state conditions

• (6.1.5.e) Notes frequency fails to reach 60 Hz and begins to fall ATC

• Observes PK17-01, Diesel 12 Fail to Start alarming, and informs the Shift Foreman.

SRO

• Enters PK17-01, Diesel 12 Fail to Start (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 2 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page 3 of 17 Event

Description:

Low Lube Oil Temp on D/G 1-2 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (AR PK17-01, Diesel 12 Lube Oil System)

SRO * (2.1.1) Notes D/G is not needed for an emergency o Contacts Nuclear Operator in the field to Diesel Generator 12 to evaluate and respond to new local annunciators (not associated with low lube oil temperature).

• Notes already in T.S. 3.8.1.B as previously noted.

o Informs crew need to perform STP I-1C to verify OPERABILITY of offsite circuit (now, and then once every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />) o Will need to declare any required feature(s) supported by D/G 1-2 inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable, (there are none at this time).

o Will also need to determine no common cause exists on the other D/Gs o Need to restore D/G 1-2 to OPERABLE status in 14 days.

• Updates Shift Manager of D/G 1-2 status and requests Maintenance support.

Proceed to the next event once Tech Spec discussed, per the lead examiner.

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 3 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 17 Event

Description:

Regen Hx Isolation Valve, LCV-459, Fails to mid-position Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses charging flow problem from:

• RCP seal flows lowering (due to controller throttling back) (VB2 meters, PPC)

• Pzr level rising slowly (due to charging/letdown mismatch) (VB2 meters, PPC, CC2 recorder)

• VCT level dropping slowly (VB2 recorder, PPC)

• Dual position indication lights illuminated on mimic board for LCV-459 (VB2)

SRO

• Implements OP AP-18, Letdown Line Failure (OP AP-18, Letdown Line Failure)

SRO/ATC * (1) Ensures no load changes are in progress (they arent)

SRO/BOP * (2) Isolates letdown o Closes Letdown Orifice Stop Valve, 8149C (VB2) o Closes other Regen Heat Exchanger Inlet Valve, LCV-460 (VB2) o Verifies RHR to Letdown Flow Control Valve, HCV-133 (RHR Ltdn) closed (VB2)

SRO/ATC * (3) Checks for RCS Leakage - verifies that Pzr level and RCS press are both stable/rising (there was never an indication of leakage) (VB2, CC2, PPC)

ATC * (4) Reduces charging to minimum (RCP seals only), using FCV-128 (or HC-459D) and HCV-142 (approx. 8 gpm on RCP seals, with HCV-142 closed (or near closed) (CC2).

SRO/BOP * (5) Establish Excess Letdown (see next page), per OP B-1A:IV BOP * (6) Contacts RP and Chemistry regarding Excess Letdown being placed in service.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 4 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Page 5 of 17 Event

Description:

Regen Hx Isolation Valve, LCV-459, Fails to mid-position (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP B-1A:IV, Place Excess Letdown in Service)

ALL * (6.1.1) Verifies charging at minimum (seals only) (done, per above step, or do now) o Reduces charging to minimum (RCP seals only), using FCV-128 and HCV-142 (approx. 8 gpm on RCP seals, with HCV-142 closed (or near closed)

BOP * (6.1.2) Contacts RP for rad conditions/posting Note: If Shift Manager asked in regard to flushing or crew attempts to perform flush, provide the following cue:

CUE: Excess letdown line flushing is NOT needed.

BOP * (6.1.3) Skips line flush, moves on to next step BOP * (6.1.4) Opens FCV-361, CCW to Excess Ltdn HX (VB1)

BOP * (6.1.5) Verifies pot for HCV-123, Excess Letdown Pressure Control, is CLOSED (at 0)

(VB2)

• (6.1.6) Opens 8166/8167, Excess Letdown isolation valves (VB2)

• (6.1.7) is N/A

• (6.1.8) Slowly opens HCV-123 to establish excess letdown (VB2)

• (6.1.9) Adjusts HCV-123 to provide 40 gpm letdown at NOP ATC/BOP * (to end of scenario) HCV-123 and FCV-128 (or HC-459D) are now used to control Pzr Level Proceed to the next event once Excess Letdown established, per the lead examiner.

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 5 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 17 Event

Description:

Inadvertent TDAFW Pump Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses TDAFW Pump Start from one or more of the following:

• RCS Temperature lowers (secondary cooldown) (CC2, VB2 meters, PPC)

• Lowering MW (Triconex CC3, PPC)

• Feedflow / Steamflow rates diverging (CC3, VB3)

• Outward Rod Motion (CC1)

• RED light on FCV-95 illuminated indicating OPEN w/Tach reading ~ 4500 RPM (VB3)

• TDAFW Discharge Pressure ~ 1200 psig, AFW Flow to S/Gs all reading top of scale (VB3)

Note: Crew should perform a Diagnostic Brief utilizing the STAR-T Operations Diagnostic Model described in Attachment 10 of OP1.DC10, Conduct of Operations, to diagnose/address the malfunction and mitigate the transient.

ALL

• Identifies something has changed as part of initial diagnostics.

• Reviews primary and secondary side parameters and determines plant is not stable(i.e.

in a transient) based on the following indications:

o RCS Temperature lowers (secondary cooldown) (CC2, VB2 meters, PPC) o Lowering MW (Triconex CC3, PPC) o Outward Rod Motion (CC1)

• Reviews primary side for changed conditions/actions taken in the RCS o boration/dilution - possible given recent realignment of charging letdown system o rod motion - notes rods moved IN RESPONSE to a temperature change (i.e. not causal)

• Reviews secondary side for changed conditions affecting secondary load/efficiency o Secondary power - notes lowering MW output vs demand - possible efficiency change o Further review of secondary side indications identifies Feedflow / Steamflow mismatch due to excess supply from the TDAFW pump along numerous pressure, flow, and level gauges confirming the pump is actively feeding forward.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 7 of 17 Event

Description:

Inadvertent TDAFW Pump Start (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO

• Determines prompt action is warranted to stabilize the plant.

• Directs isolation of the TDAFW Pump and restoration of primary side parameters to pre-transient conditions (as time permits).

Note: Isolation of the TDAFW may be accomplished by any of the methods described below.

BOP

• Isolates TDAFW Pump o Takes manual control of level control valves and closes LCV-106, 107, 108, 109 (VB-3)

OR o Closes Steam Supply Valves FCV-37/38 (VB-3)

OR o Locally closing FCV-95 ATC

• Controls TAVG as necessary with manual rods using 3 step pull and wait (CC-1)

SRO

• Shift Foreman implements TS 3.7.5.B, AFW System for one AFW train inoperable (72 hr).

Proceed to the next event once Tech Spec addressed, per the lead examiner.

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 8 of 17 Event

Description:

Loss of Main Transformer Cooling Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC

• Observes PK14-21, MAIN TRANSF, and informs the Shift Foreman.

SRO Enters PK14-21, MAIN TRANSF (PK14-21, MAIN TRANSF)

SRO/ATC * (1) Identifies input 827-Mn Bk Xfmr Annun and UV for >90°C AND only 1 fan group running SRO/ATC * (2.1.1, 2.1.2) Updates crew that AR PK contains the Reactor Trip and Turbine Trip criteria

• (2.1.3) Dispatches Nuclear Operator to investigate and report any local alarms o Nuclear Operator will report back there are no local alarms in, but Main Bank C has no fans running and winding temperature is currently 95oC.

SRO/BOP * (2.1.4.a,b,c) When Nuclear Operator is directed to manually start the fans, reports fans did not start, and there are no oil pumps running.

• (2.1.4.d) Contacts Maintenance to investigate.

SRO * (2.1.6) Directs Shift Manager to contact GCC to report alarm is in due to cooling problem on Main Bank C (GCC receives local annunciator alarm when PK14-21 goes into alarm).

• (2.1.7) Determines alarm condition will not clear o (2.1.7.a) Notes alarm IS due to Main transformer bank high winding temperature and forced cooling cannot be restored.

Notes Reactor must be tripped, and E-0 entered if winding temperature reaches 115oC and forced cooling has not been restored.

• Updates crew that Unit will be ramped at 50 MW/min per OP AP-25, "Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown," until the Unit is off line or forced cooling is restored.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 9 of 17 Event

Description:

Loss of Main Transformer Cooling (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Implements OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction (OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction)

SRO Enters OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction

• (1.a) Notes runback/programmed ramp is not in progress (may not vocalize, since this ramp is initiated by the crew)

SRO/BOP

• Commences ramp (guidance is also on lamicoid pegboard on CC3 or Shift Foreman will hand off Step 1 sheet to BOP):

o (1.b) MW and IMP feedbacks are placed in service (all on Triconex turbine HMI, CC3) o (1.c) 60 MWe load target is entered into Triconex HMI o (1.d) Sets ramp rate to 50 mw/min o (1.e) Pushes GO SRO/BOP o (1.f) Determines downpower is greater than 15%. May contact chemistry in advance or wait until 15% power change is complete.

ATC * (2) Verifies that control rods are inserting properly in AUTO (CC1)

• (3) Turns Pressurizer Backup heaters on (CC1)

• (4) Checks charging adequate to prevent flashing in the letdown system; may take manual control to ensure adequate flow (CC2)

SRO/BOP * (5) Ensures DFWCS is controlling S/G levels in AUTO (MFW control/bypass valves; MFPs all in AUTO) (CC2)(VB3)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 10 of 17 Event

Description:

Loss of Main Transformer Cooling (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-25, "Rapid Load Reduction", cont)

Note: Boration values described below are representative of the conditions given, but will vary based on the actual ramp rate and target specified by SRO.

SRO/ATC * (6) Performs boration (the following guidance is on the boration checklist in the reactivity handbook) o Presses STOP on M/U Ctrl HMI (CC2) o Presses BORATE on HMI o Sets target gallons for boration verifies batch is reset o Sets boric acid flowrate o Presses START, and monitors boration o Once stopped, either returns to AUTO (presses AUTO, then START), or performs additional boration per the Shift Foreman(CC2)

SRO/BOP * (7) Checks MFP suction pressure greater than 260 psig (VB3)

SRO/ATC * (8) Checks Tavg trending to Tref (PPC, CC1)

• (9) Checks Pressurizer pressure and level trending to programmed band (PPC, CC2)

Next event triggered as soon as ramp commenced, per Lead Examiner

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5, 6 Page 11 of 17 Event

Description:

Main Transformer Failure / Unit Trip Causes Turbine Trip ATWS; Rod Control Malfunction (S4CT-1)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Unit Trip/ATWS is diagnosed from one or more of the following:

• AR PK14-01, UNIT TRIP

• AR PK12-11 TURBINE TRIP

• AR PK04-11 REACTOR TRIP INITIATE SRO Implements EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

Note: Attempts to manually trip the reactor may be done prior to entry into EOP E-0 or as part of E-0, step 1 RNO.

ALL Performs immediate actions:

• (1) Ensure reactor trip:

o Identifies reactor is NOT tripped based on the following:

Rx Trip breakers did NOT open (VB2)

NIs are NOT lowering (CC1)

Rod bottom lights are NOT lit(VB2); moves to step 1 RNO ATC

• Attempts trip using manual switch (CC1 or VB2)

BOP

• Notes that manual trip already attempted (or may re-try manual reactor trip VB2)

• Observes that reactor is still critical (same indications as when trip attempted)

• Opens breakers for busses 13D and 13E (VB5, lower panel 480V bus breakers) to de-energize the rod drive MGs; breakers will not open

• May dispatch operator to open reactor trip breakers locally SRO

• Notes reactor is still not tripped. Verifies that attempt to manually open 13D/E was unsuccessful and transitions to EOP FR-S.1 (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5, 6 Page 12 of 17 Event

Description:

Main Transformer Failure / Unit Trip Causes Turbine Trip ATWS; Rod Control Malfunction (S4CT-1)**

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP FR-S1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS")

SRO/ATC * (1) Manually inserts control rods (CC1)**

• SRO directs local opening of RTA/RTB.

• • (S4CT-1) Insert negative reactivity into the core following the guidance provided in EOP FR-S.1 so that power is reduced to less than 5% by the completion of step 19.

SRO/BOP * (2) Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

• (3) Checks AFW status o Both MDAFWs running (VB3, left skirt) o TDAFW is isolated and may be started ( VB3, center skirt)

SRO/BOP

• Reads CAUTION prior to step 4.a regarding Main Feed Pumps tripping on SI

• (4) Initiates Emergency Boration of the RCS a.1) OPENS 8805A or 8805B (VB2, left skirt )

a.2) CLOSES LCV-112B OR LCV-112C (VB2, left skirt) a.3) Verifies AT LEAST 90 GPM charging (VB2) b) Checks PZR Pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG (VB2)

• (5) Manually closes Containment Vent Isolation (VB4, skirt)

• (6) Announces ATWS on PA system

• (7) Checks SI NOT actuated (PK08-21, SAFETY INJECTION is OFF)

• (8.a) Checks if Reactor Trip Breakers are OPEN (not yet; waiting until past first 5% check)

• (8.b) Checks Turbine Stop valves closed (they are)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5,6 Page 13 of 17 Event

Description:

Main Transformer Failure / Unit Trip Causes Turbine Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP FR-S1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS")

SRO/ATC * (9) Checks if Reactor is Subcritcal o Checks power range channels - LESS THAN 5% recorders on VB2 (and PPC); (will be by now) o Intermediate Range Channel - Negative Startup Rate (will be).

o Continues to Step 19 Note: Shutdown Margin calculation will be aligned through the Shift Manager to other support personnel.

SRO * (19) Verifies Adequate Shutdown Margin a) Contacts Chemistry Dept to Sample RCS for Boron Concentration.

b) Requests STP R-19 Shutdown Margin Calc c) Directs boration of RCS to desired SDM concentration.

• Returns to E-0.

SRO Implements EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

SRO/ATC * (1) Re-verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open (VB2 upper left), rods on bottom (VB2 upper left DRPI panel), NIs decreasing (CC1 left).

• (2) Re-verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

SRO/BOP * (3) Re-checks vital 4kv busses (VB4, all vital busses have white lights on mimic busses)

SRO/BOP * (4) Checks if SI actuated (PK08-21 OFF, also checks SSPS ESF status lights on VB1 and PK02-02 to verify SI is NOT required)

• (4 RNO) Checks AFW status (VB3, AFW Pp 1-2 & 1-3 may be running, but S/Gs will likely still be on scale), and exits E-0 for E-0.1 (If TDAFW running, may throttle AFW LCVs on VB3 lower left to limit RCS cooldown; note that AFW will not be running if S/G levels adequate, but may choose to start them.

(continued on next page)

• Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 13 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5,7 Page 14 of 17 Event

Description:

Main Transformer Failure / Unit Trip Causes Turbine Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response)

Note: EOP E-0.1 actions will be performed until the loss of all AC which occurs when crew is adjusting pressurizer level.

All * (1) Checks Tave stable or trending towards Tref (if should be); no actions expected here other than continued throttling of AFW flow may be done (AFW LCVs on VB3 lower left), to control RCS temperature.

• (2) Checks Feedwater Isolation (FWI) complete

• Checks Tave < 554°F (expected, or soon will be)

• Checks FWI MLB (monitor light box) (VB1, upper center), RED light ON, WHITE lights OFF (they are, if actuated; this actuation will occur when < 554°F)

• Checks AFW flow > 435 gpm (the flow will be adequate, and/or S/G levels will still be on-scale) (VB3)

SRO/ATC * (3) Checks all control rods - fully inserted) (VB2 upper left, for DRPI panel)

BOP * (4) Checks Pzr level control o Checks Pzr level > 17% (it is) (VB2 meter, CC2 recorder, PPC) o Checks charging and letdown in service (they both are) (CC2 and VB2 CVCS mimic) o Checks Pzr level trending to 22%; operates FCV-128 (HC-459D) and HCV-142 (CC2) to control Pzr level 22% - 60% (RNO) o Operates Pzr heaters as needed (auto/manual) to maintain normal pressure (normal auto operation expected at this point, with pressure returning to normal or normal already)

Next event may be triggered as soon at any point in E-0.1 per Lead Examiner

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 14 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7 Page 15 of 17 Event

Description:

12kV Start-Up Feeder Breaker Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: The Loss of ALL AC develops when the 12kV Start-Up Feeder Breaker trips open. Bus G is de-energized due to event 1 rendering D/G 1-2 inoperable. Shutdown relays activated on D/G 1-1 (no reset) and 1-3 (resettable from the Control Room) during the transfer to Startup earlier in the scenario. Bus F and both diesels failed to start.

ALL Diagnosis of the Loss of AC is made using one or more of the following:

• Many alarms occur, mostly associated with equipment power problems

• All of the vital and non-vital bus white power available lights are out (VB4 and VB5, lower panel, near each mimic bus)

• DG 1-3 shutdown relay tripped alarm (PK18-15) is noted (and/or the DG is noted not to be running)

• DG 1-1 shutdown relay tripped alarm (PK16-15) is noted (and/or the DG is noted not to be running)

SRO

• Implements ECA-0.0, Loss of All Vital AC Power (ECA-0.0, Loss of All Vital AC Power)

SRO/ATC * (1) Re-verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open (VB2 upper left), rods on bottom (VB2 upper left DRPI panel), NIs decreasing (CC1 left).

• (2) Re-verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

SRO/ATC * (3) Performs RCS isolation steps o (3a) Verifies letdown isolated 8149 A/B/C close OR LCV-459/460 closed (all but 459 were closed during Event 2; 459 remains stuck in mid-position (VB2 lower left) o (3b) Checks Pzr PORVs closed (they are) o (3c) Isolates Excess Letdown (8166/8167, VB2 lower far right) (both were opened during Event 2) o (3d) Verifies NSSS sample valves closed (VB1 lower left) (some are still open, and must be taken to close position)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7 Page 16 of 17 Event

Description:

12kV Start-Up Feeder Breaker Trip (cont) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (ECA-0.0, Loss of All Vital AC Power, cont)

Note: TDAFW may have been restored earlier in the scenario (FR-S.1, step 3). If not, Nuclear Operators will need to be dispatched un-isolate TDAFW pump due to Event 3. Once the TDAFP is running, local operators will be stationed to control the TDAFP LCVs.

SRO/BOP * (4) Verifies AFW status o AFW flow > 435 gpm (VB3 upper center meters, SPDS)

Note: Shift Foreman (SFM) may authorize an attempted reset of the shutdown relay and DG start for D/G 1-1 and 1-3, or will dispatch Nuclear Operators to walk down the diesels prior to attempting restoration. D/G 1-1 cannot be reset. D/G 1-3 will reset and can then be started. An additional failure prevents the diesel from automatically loading on the bus, and requires the crew to manually shut output breaker 52-HF-7.)

SRO/BOP * (5) Attempts to restore power to any vital bus o (5.a) Attempts to start D/Gs Depresses D/G Shutdown Relay & Alarm Reset for D/G 1-1 (yellow lamacoid, just below associated diesel tachometer, VB4)

Notes PK16-15 does not clear (D/G 1-1)

Depresses D/G Shutdown Relay & Alarm Reset for 1-3 (yellow lamacoid, just below associated diesel tachometer, VB4)**

Notes PK18-15 clears (D/G 1-3)

Checks that D/G 1-3 starts and monitors for steady state conditions

• • (Critical Task, partial) (S4CT-2, Energize at least one vital AC bus and restore RCP seal cooling prior RCP shut down seal activation).

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L161-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7 Page 17 of 17 Event

Description:

12kV Start-Up Feeder Breaker Trip (cont) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (ECA-0.0, Loss of All Vital AC Power, cont)

Note: Providing power to vital 4kV bus F fulfills the minimum requirements needed to complete Critical Task S4CT-2 by providing CCW flow through the RCP Thermal Barriers when CCW Pp 1-1 starts and seal injection when CCP Pp 1-1 starts.

SRO/BOP * (5) Attempts to restore power to any vital bus (cont) o (5.b) Checks ANY 4kV vital bus automatically energized.

Determines 4kV bus F did NOT automatically energize.

o (5.b RNO) Manually energizes vital 4kV bus F Places D/G 1-3 Feeder Sync Switch in ON position.**

Places control switch for 52-HF-7, D/G 1-3 Output Breaker in the CLOSE position.**

Verifies Vital 4kV Bus H energized by checking white bus status light illuminated and bus H loads receiving power.

• • (Critical Task, partial) (S4CT-2, Energize at least one vital AC bus and restore RCP seal cooling prior RCP shut down seal activation).

ALL * (5) Attempts to restore power to any vital bus (cont) o (5.c,d) Checks ANY/ALL 4kV vital busses energized.

May implement EOP ECA-0.3, Restore 4kV Buses o (5.e) Returns to procedure and step in effect - EOP E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response)

Scenario may be terminated once vital 4kV bus F has been restored and RCP seal cooling is restored via RCP Thermal Barrier cooling and/or RCP seal injection flow (completion of S4CT-2).

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 17 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 - Scenario Set-up & Booth Actions X = manual entry required TIME LINE CONSOLE ENTRY SYMPTOMS/CUES/DESCRIPTION X IC RESTORE 153 75% power MOL, CB - 920 X Setup Clears CCP 1-2 Caution Tag CCP 1-2 Makeup Controller to Target Blend Board marked up such that letdown is within a couple ppm of current charging.

The Plant Abnormal Status Board for Surveillance Requirements Copies of Procedures, Attachments; Appendixes; OP B-1A:IV, OP J-6B:V, PK14-21, 17-01, 17-06, AP-18, AP-Foldout Pages; Annunciator Response 25, E-0, E-0.1, ECA-0.0, FR-S.1 Procedures and commonly used forms are in binders and NOT Marked up A 0 min Tools > Simple SBT Before crew takes the watch.

Use Simple SBT, Data Recorder File: sbt_sim.drb, 960 iterations (30 sec).

A 0 min Lesson L161 NRC-S4.lsn After SFM reports the crew has taken the watch, load session MALS, OVRs, etc. by FILE or MANUALLY (below) 0 min Low Lube Oil Temp/Fail to Start on D/G 1-2 15 min LCV-459, Fails to mid-position 30 min Inadvertent start of TDAFW pump 40 min Loss of Main X-former Cooling 50 min Main Transformer Unit Trip 50 min SDR Failure on D/G 1-1 and 1-3 (cont on next page)

L161 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 18 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 - Scenario Set-up & Booth Actions (cont)

X = manual entry required A = activate from EVENT file TIME LINE CONSOLE ENTRY SYMPTOMS/CUES/DESCRIPTION On Reactor trip ATWS; rod control malfunction L161 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 19 of 21 Rev 0

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log Unit 1 Unit 1 Days at Power: 111 Days Operating Mode: 1 Gross Generation: 882 MWe Power Level: 71.2% Net Generation: 832 MWe Today - Dayshift Shift Manager Turnover:

PRA RISK STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Green GRID STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Normal AVERAGE RCS CALCULATED LEAKRATE: 0.01 gpm CONDENSER INLEAKAGE: < 0.01 gpd CONDENSER D/Ps: NW 5.9 SW 6.4 NE 6.3 SE 6.1 PSID MAIN GENERATOR H2 USAGE: 325 scfd / 327 scfd 5 day ave SPENT FUEL POOL: Temp = 80oF; Time to 200oF = 30 hrs using actual temp (F-ID-7A)

NEW PRIORITY WORK:

• CCP 1-2 emergent motor bearing oil leak identified end of last shift.

SHUTDOWN TECH SPECS / ECGS:

• TS 3.5.2.A CCP 1-2 ECG ACTIONS THAT IF COMPLETION TIME NOT MET ECG 0.3 IS ENTERED:

• None TURNOVER ITEMS:

• Unit was ramped to 70% yesterday due to a grid disturbance. Management is reviewing expected timeline for return to 100% power.

PRIORITY ITEMS FOR NEXT SHIFT:

• Maintain plant stable at current power level.

Shift Foreman Turnover ANNUNCIATORS IN ALARM:

• None TURNOVER ITEMS:

• U-1: maintain 72% - no one in containment.

• U-2: maintain 72% - no one in containment.

REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT:

• Time in core life: _MOL_.

• Power History: Steady State at 100% for past 111 days.

• Boron concentration is _920 ppm_ from a sample taken 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago.

• Control Rod Height: 192 steps on CBD.

• Diluting the RCS approximately 25 gallons every 1.5 hrs.

• The last dilution was completed _15_ min ago.

CONDITIONAL SURVEILLANCES & INCREASED MONITORING:

• None OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT STATUS

• None