ML16321A260

2016-10 Final Operating Test

ML16321A260
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	10/20/2016
From:	Vincent Gaddy Operations Branch IV
To:
References
Download: ML16321A260 (242)

Text

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 10/14/2016 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: L161 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (See Note) Code*

Evaluate Shift Staffing Assignments Conduct of Operations 2.1.5 Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such M, R as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.

(NRCL161-A5) (3.9)

(modified from NRCL081LJA_SROA1)

Evaluate Fire Zone Operability Conduct of Operations 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, N, R curves, tables, etc.

(NRCL161-A6) (4.2)

Evaluate Valve Stroke Surveillance Test Equipment Control 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

N, R (4.1)

(NRCL161-A7)

Authorize Emergency Exposure Radiation Control 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or N, R emergency conditions.

(NRCL161-A8) (3.7)

Classify Hostile Action Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds N, R and classifications.

(NRCL161-A9) (4.6)

NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; < 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)

(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected)

ES 301, Page 22 of 27 Rev 0 Rev 0: rev follows initial submittal

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-A5

Title:

REVIEW SHIFT STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments: Designed for SRO candidates in a classroom setting.

References:

• OP1.DC37, Plant Logs, Rev. 53

• OM14.ID1, Fatigue Rule, Rev. 25A Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 1.3, 4.2, 9.6, 9.7 Job Designation: SRO Rev Comments MODIFIED FROM NRCL081LJA_SROA1 Gen KA # G2.1.5 - Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such 3.9 as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.

AUTHOR : LISA TORIBIO DATE: 09/29/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 09/29/16 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: REVIEW SHIFT STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed.

After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the step at which to begin.

Required Materials: OP1.DC37, Plant Logs, Rev. 53 (Reference #1), OM14.ID1, Fatigue Rule, Rev. 25A (Reference #2), DCPP Form 69-20533, Operations Shift Log (Handout #2), Partial Qualification Matrix Report (Handout #1)

Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Unit 1 and 2 are both at 100% power.

• The time is 23:00; Crew B is the current on-shift crew.

• The Unit 2 Shift Foreman must leave the site within the next 30 minutes to attend to a family emergency.

• An immediate call out has been made for a replacement Shift Foreman. The following individuals are willing to relieve the Unit 2 Shift Foreman and can be on site in 30 minutes or less:

o (C - Crew, supporting a Self-Assessment on dayshift.

The Self-Assessment started today at 0700 and finished at 17:00.)

o (A - Crew, on the 3rd day of a 7 day vacation).

o (E - Crew, on 5th day of 7-off schedule).

Initiating Cue:

• The Shift Manager directs you to evaluate the status and qualifications of the available Shift Foremen to determine if the minimum operations staffing requirements of OP1.DC37, Plant Logs, can be met using one or more of the available callouts.

• Mark-up the current Operations Shift Log (form 69-20533) as needed to reflect the revised Watchbill. Provide justification for using/not using each potential replacement in the space provided at the bottom of the Shift Log before reporting out.

Task Standard: DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE

• Cannot be used without exceeding Fatigue Rule Limits.

(OM14.ID1, Fatigue Management Rule Program, section 5.1.7 -

- No more than 16 work hours in any 24-hour period.

- At least a 10-hour break between successive work periods or an 8-hour break when a break of less than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> is necessary to accommodate a crew's scheduled transition between work schedules or shifts.)

(continued on next page)

NRCL161-A5 rev 2.docx PAGE 2 OF 10 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: REVIEW SHIFT STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Task Standard (cont): DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE

• Cannot be used because his respirator qualification is not current.

(OP1.DC37, Plant Logs, section 5.5.7.b - To comply with E Plan minimum crew composition, the following individuals shall have a respirator qualification:

• 2 - Shift Foreman (affected Unit-IEOC, other Unit-Communicator #1)

• 1 - Work Control Shift Foreman

• Can be used in the Unit Shift Foreman position. It will also be necessary to make the following rotation since is the only STA qualified individual on the watchbill:

o to Work Control Shift Foreman o to Unit Shift Foreman not covered by (Per OP1.DC37, Plant Logs, section 5.5.9 - An STA qualified individual shall be identified to provide engineering expertise on shift per TS 5.2.2f in order of preference:

1. Shift Manager

2. Work Control Shift Foreman

3. Unit Shift Foreman a) If assigned to one of the unit Shift Foreman, both units' Shift Foreman shall be STA qualified. In this case, check the STA boxes for both unit Shift Foreman.)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL161-A5 rev 2.docx PAGE 3 OF 10 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: REVIEW SHIFT STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions Note: It is not necessary to check qualifications for this individual since he can be disqualified solely on Fatigue Rule requirements.

1.** Reviews current work 1.1 From initial conditions, recognizes status. individual worked dayshift and would be returning same night.

1.2 Notes maximum rest period possible is less than required 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> minimum.

1.3 Determines cannot be used to meet the minimum operations staffing requirements due to OM14.ID1, Fatigue Rule, limitations.**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL161-A5 rev 2.docx PAGE 4 OF 10 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: REVIEW SHIFT STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

2. Reviews current work 2.1 From initial conditions, notes individual is status. coming in off vacation and determines OM14.ID1, Fatigue Rule, is not an issue.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

3. Checks qualification 3.1 Reviews qualification matrix; notes against proposed watch station(s) individual has the required Shift Foreman (step 5.5.5) qualification.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

4.** Checks qualification 4.1 Reviews qualification matrix; notes against proposed E-Plan requirement individual does NOT have the required for all three Shift Foreman positions respirator qualification.

to be respirator qualified (step 5.5.7.b) 4.2 Determines cannot be used to meet the minimum operations staffing requirements because respirator qualification is not met.**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL161-A5 rev 2.docx PAGE 5 OF 10 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: REVIEW SHIFT STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

5. Reviews current work status. 5.1 Notes individual is currently midway through 7-off and determines OM14.ID1, Fatigue Rule, is not an issue.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

6. Checks qualification against 6.1 Reviews qualification matrix; notes proposed watch station(s) (step 5.5.5) individual has the required Shift Foreman qualification.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

7. Checks qualification against 7.1 Reviews qualification matrix; notes proposed E-Plan requirement for all individual has the required respirator three Shift Foreman positions to be qualification.

respirator qualified (step 5.5.7.b)

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

8. Reviews overall Watch Bill for all E- 8.1 Reviews overall Watch Bill and Plan required positions (step 5.5.8) determines all E-Plan required positions can be filled if is used in one of the SRO positions.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL161-A5 rev 2.docx PAGE 6 OF 10 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: REVIEW SHIFT STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 9.** Reviews Watch Bill for STA 9.1 Notes Shift Manager designated on Watch designation in order of preference Bill does NOT have an STA qualification.

(step 5.5.9) 9.2 Notes Work Control Shift Foreman designated on Watch Bill does NOT have an STA qualification.

9.3 Reviews qualification matrix; notes does NOT have a STA qualification.

9.4 Notes Unit 1 Shift Foreman designated on Watch Bill DOES have an STA qualification.

9.5 Notes Work Control Shift Foreman can be either STA or Incident Assessor qualified.

9.6 Determines the Unit 1 Shift Foreman will be the only STA qualified individual on the Watch Bill once the Unit 2 Shift Foreman is relieved and assigns STA qualified individual (Unit 1 Shift Foreman) to the Work Control Shift Foreman position.**

Note: Specific Unit assignment is not critical. Either IA qualified Shift Foreman can be assigned. See KEY for details.

9.7 Assigns IA qualified Shift Foremen

( and to Unit 1 and 2 Shift Foreman positions.**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL161-A5 rev 2.docx PAGE 7 OF 10 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: REVIEW SHIFT STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow-up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

NRCL161-A5 REV 2.DOCX PAGE 8 OF 10 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: REVIEW SHIFT STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A5 ANSWER KEY Position Name Shift Manager X X Work Control Shift Foreman X X X SFM Extra (Optional)

SFM Extra (Optional)

U1 Shift Foreman X X U1 Work Control Lead X X X U1 Balance of Plant CO X X U1 CO X X U1 Turbine Building X X U1 Aux Building X U1 Polisher X X Intake and Outside X U2 Shift Foreman X X U2 Work Control Lead X X X U2 Balance of Plant CO X X U2 CO X X U2 Turbine Building X X U2 Aux Building X X U2 Polisher X X X WC Extra License (Optional) X WC Extra (Optional)

WC Extra (Optional)

WC Extra (Optional)

Name Yes/No Justification No Cannot be used without exceeding Fatigue Rule Limits (two potential conflicts, need only identify one)

• No more than 16 work hours in any 24-hour period

• At least a 10-hour b reak b etween successive work periods or an 8-hour b reak when a b reak of less than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> is necessary to accommodate a crew's scheduled transition b etween work schedules or shifts No Cannot be used because his respirator qualification is not current.

Yes Can be used, but is not a direct substitution for since he does NOT have the STA qualification (OSTA).

• It will b e necessary to move (Unit 1 SFM) to the Work Control Shift Foreman position to fulfill the designated STA requirement (OP1.DC37, step 5.5.9) and designate and as the Unit Shift Foremen.

NRCL161-A5 REV 2.DOCX PAGE 9 OF 10 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: REVIEW SHIFT STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A5 EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Unit 1 and 2 are both at 100% power.

• The time is 23:00; Crew B is the current on-shift crew.

The Unit 2 Shift Foreman must leave the site within the next 30 minutes to attend to a family emergency.

An immediate call out has been made for a replacement Shift Foreman. The following individuals are willing to relieve the Unit 2 Shift Foreman and can be on site in 30 minutes or less:

o (C - Crew, supporting a Self-Assessment on dayshift.

The Self-Assessment started today at 0700 and finished at 17:00.)

o (A - Crew, on the 3rd day of a 7 day vacation).

o (E - Crew, on 5th day of 7-off schedule).

Initiating Cue:

• The Shift Manager directs you to evaluate the status and qualifications of the available Shift Foremen to determine if the minimum operations staffing requirements of OP1.DC37, Plant Logs, can be met using one or more of the available callouts.

• Mark-up the current Operations Shift Log (form 69-20533) as needed to reflect the revised Watchbill. Provide justification for using/not using each potential replacement in the space provided at the bottom of the Shift Log before reporting out.

NRCL161-A5 REV 2.DOCX PAGE 10 OF 10 REV. 2

Date Today Qualification Matrix Report Time: Earlier Karl KRA7 Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N David DJAG Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Martin MCAC Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Michael M9BO Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N Bryan BNB4 Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Y N N Y Michael MDBP Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N Mario MNBE Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N Kristian K1DZ Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N Brian BNE2 Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Y N Y N Wesley FWL1 Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y James JYHP Y N N N Y Y Y N N N N N N Y N N N Raymond RDK1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N Brian BXL1 Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y N N N N Michael M8HM Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Remzi RXMM Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Y N Y N Kelly K5M3 Y N N N Y Y Y Y N Y N N N N N N N Terence TMNA Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Darren DMND Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N Michael MRN7 Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Y N N Y Cameron CBR3 Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Brian BLSF Y N Y Y N Y Y N N N N N N Y N Y N Bryan BWS6 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N Marc MATR Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Samuel SZW1 Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y

DCPP Form 69-20533 (10/19/15) OP1.DC37 Attachment 1 Operations Shift Log Page 5 of 6 Position Name Shift Manager X X Work Control Shift Foreman X X SFM Extra (Optional)

SFM Extra (Optional)

U1 Shift Foreman X X X U1 Work Control Lead X X X U1 Balance of Plant CO X X U1 CO X X U1 Turbine Building X X U1 Aux Building X U1 Polisher X X Intake and Outside X U2 Shift Foreman X X X U2 Work Control Lead X X X U2 Balance of Plant CO X X U2 CO X X U2 Turbine Building X X U2 Aux Building X X U2 Polisher X X X WC Extra License (Optional) X WC Extra (Optional)

WC Extra (Optional)

WC Extra (Optional)

Name Yes/No Justification

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-A6

Title:

Evaluate Fire Zone Operability Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments: Designed for SRO candidates in a classroom setting.

References:

• ECG 18.7 - Fire Rated Assemblies

• Fire Protection Drawings 111906-02, 21

• DCPP Operational Requirements for Doors, Drawing 515221-2 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 1.3, 3.2, 3.4 Job Designation: SRO Rev Comments New Gen KA # G2.1.25 - Ability to interpret reference materials, such as 4.2 graphs, curves, tables, etc.

AUTHOR : LISA TORIBIO DATE: 09/15/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 09/15/16 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Fire Zone Operability JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed.

After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the step at which to begin.

Required Materials:

• ECG 18.7 - Fire Rated Assemblies

• Fire Protection Drawings 111906-02, 21

• DCPP Operational Requirements for Doors, Drawing 515221-2 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Todays date is July 1, 2016. The current time is 15:00.

• Unit 1 and Unit 2 are both at 100% power

• Maintenance has just reported that the closing mechanism on Door 326 (Battery Room 115 Elevation) has failed and the door cannot be closed automatically or manually.

Initiating Cue:

• The Shift Manager has directed you to determine the required course of action. Document your results and the basis of your decision in the space below before reporting out.

Task Standard: DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE

• Determined ECG 18.7.1, Condition A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the inoperable assembly within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is the only applicable TS/ECG action.

o Use of an hourly fire watch patrol is not permitted due to the non-functional fire detection equipment within the same fire zone as the non-functional door.

NRCL161-A6 rev 1 .docx PAGE 2 OF 7 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Fire Zone Operability JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions 1.** Determine Operational requirements 1.1 Locates door 326 on drawing 515221-2.

of door 326 from DCPP drawing 515221-2.

1.2 Identifies 326 as a fire door.

1.3 Identifies ECG 18.7.1 as applicable.**

1.4 Determines no other safety functions apply:

• NOT HVAC

• NOT HELB

• NOT FLOOD Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

2. Review associated fire zone on Fire 2.1 Locates door 326 as door into Battery Protection drawing 111906-21. Charger Room 12.

2.2 Identifies door as being located within Fire Detector Zone A9 2.3 Identifies smoke detection equipment associated with Fire Detector Zone A9 Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL161-A6 rev 1 .docx PAGE 3 OF 7 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Fire Zone Operability JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 3.** Determine required action 3.1 Reviews Tech Spec Summary Support for statements. active Tech Spec / ECGs associated with Fire Zone A9.

3.2 Identifies smoke detectors EFD09-02 and EFD09-03 inoperable.**

3.3 Determines Action Statement A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection or an automatic fire suppression system on at least one side of the inoperable fire related system could not be met.

3.4 Determines Action Statement A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the inoperable assembly is the appropriate action to enter.**

3.5 Note: If question is asked regarding support organization availability for implementing compensatory measures (Condition A.3), provide the following cue:

No support organizations are available at this time.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL161-A6 rev 1 .docx PAGE 4 OF 7 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Fire Zone Operability JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow-up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

NRCL161-A6 REV 1 .docx PAGE 5 OF 7 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Fire Zone Operability JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A6 ANSWER KEY EXAMINEE RESPONSE

• Required Action: Establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the inoperable assembly within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

• Basis: Use of an hourly fire watch patrol is not permitted due to the non-functional fire detection equipment within the same fire zone as the non-functional door.

NRCL161-A6 REV 1 .docx PAGE 6 OF 7 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Fire Zone Operability JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A6 EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Todays date is July 1, 2016. The current time is 15:00.

• Unit 1 and Unit 2 are both at 100% power Maintenance has just reported that the closing mechanism on Door 326 (Battery Room 115 Elevation) has failed and the door cannot be closed automatically or manually.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager has directed you to determine the required course of action. Document your results and the basis of your decision in the space below before reporting out.

EXAMINEE RESPONSE NRCL161-A6 REV 1 .docx PAGE 7 OF 7 REV. 1

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-A7

Title:

Evaluate Valve Stroke Surveillance Test Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments: Designed for SRO candidates in a classroom setting.

References:

• TS 3.6.3 - Containment Isolation Valves and Bases

• AD13.DC1, Control of the Surveillance Testing Program

• RCS OVID 107707, Sheet 4 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 2.2, 2.4, 2.5 Job Designation: SRO Rev Comments New Gen KA # G2.2.12 - Knowledge of surveillance procedures. 4.1 AUTHOR : LISA TORIBIO DATE: 09/29/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 09/29/16 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Valve Stroke Surveillance Test JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: This is a two part JPM. The Examinee should be given the Initial Cue Sheet (page 6) along with Handout 1. Once he/she identifies the problem with the STP (failed stroke time requiring retest), he/she should be provided with Examinee Cue Sheet (Part 2) along with Handout 2.

Required Materials:

• STP V-3S7 Markups (Handouts #1 & #2)

• AD13.DC1, Control of the Surveillance Testing Program (Reference #1)

• RCS OVID 107707, Sheet 4 (Reference #2)

Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Unit 2 is at 100% power.

• The Unit 2 BOPCO has just completed Section 12 of STP V-3S7, Exercising Phase A Containment Isolation Valve RCS-8029 on Unit 2 and provided you the completed paperwork for review.

Initiating Cue:

• You are directed to complete Section 13, Primary Review.

o M&TE usage was entered into SAP by the STP performer.

o Test was performed as a quarterly STP and is NOT associated with any Post Maintenance Testing activity.

• Document your findings below before reporting out. This should include any necessary corrections, comments, and the identification of applicable TS/ECG and associated actions if appropriate.

Secondary Cue:

• The valve was re-tested and the data recorded on step 12.9.4.

(Provided once

• Review the data and determine the required course of action. This determines retest should include any necessary corrections, comments, and/or required) identification of applicable TS/ECG and associated actions if appropriate.

Task Standard: DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE

• Determined Original Acceptance Criteria NOT met:

o U2 stroke time erroneously entered into U1 data section.

o Initial stroke time of 9.20 sec was greater than Action High Value of 9.178 sec but less than Limiting Stroke Time of 10 sec.

o Determined retest should be performed.

• Determined Acceptance Criteria NOT met on Retest - Valve is INOPERABLE:

o Re-stroke time of 10.10 sec was greater than Limiting Stroke Time of 10 sec.

o Tech Spec 3.6.3.A Entry Applies (1 CIV) , with the required actions:

A.1: Isolate the affected penetration flow path (4 hrs)

A.2: Verify isolation once every 31 days.

NRCL161-A7 rev 2.docx PAGE 2 OF 8 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Valve Stroke Surveillance Test JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions 1.** Review initial performance steps and 1.1 Checked all steps performed.

recorded data from STP V-3S7, steps 12.1-12.8, pg 4-5 (Handout 1).

Note: If Examinee reports stroke time recorded under incorrect Unit, but does not update the STP by entering the value under the correct Unit, direct the Examinee to make the correction.

1.2 Identified data for measured stroke time erroneously recorded under step 12.8.1 (Unit 1) rather than step 12.8.2 (Unit 2).**

1.3 Determined valve stroke time is ABOVE Action High Value, but less than Limiting Stroke Time.**

1.4 Determined valve should be retested.**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL161-A7 rev 2.docx PAGE 3 OF 8 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Valve Stroke Surveillance Test JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 2.** Review performance steps and 2.1 Note: Steps below apply once the recorded data for retest (Steps 12.9.1- secondary prompt has been given to the 12.9.8, pg 5-6) (Handout 2). examinee.

2.2 Determined valve stroke time is ABOVE Limiting Stroke Time of 10 sec.**

2.3 Reviewed NOTE regarding Operability implications if the valve exceed the limiting stroke time (immediately declared INOPERABLE).

2.4 Determined Tech Spec 3.6.3, Condition A, One or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable. **

2.5 Determined Action Statement A.1 and A.2 Apply:

• A.1: Isolate the affected penetration flow path (4 hrs)**

• A.2: Verify isolation once every 31 days.**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL161-A7 rev 2.docx PAGE 4 OF 8 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Valve Stroke Surveillance Test JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow-up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

NRCL161-A7 REV 2.DOCX PAGE 5 OF 8 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Valve Stroke Surveillance Test JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A7 ANSWER KEY PART 1 - EXAMINEE RESPONSE

• Determined Valve Retest is Required:

o U2 stroke time erroneously entered into U1 data section.

o Initial stroke time of 9.20 sec was greater than Action High Value of 9.178 sec but less than Limiting Stroke Time of 10 sec.

o Retest should be performed.

PART 2 - EXAMINEE RESPONSE

• Determined Acceptance Criteria NOT met on Retest - Valve is INOPERABLE:

o Re-stroke time of 10.10 sec was greater than Limiting Stroke Time of 10 sec.

o Tech Spec 3.6.3.A Entry Applies (1 CIV) , with the required actions:

A.1: Isolate the affected penetration flow path (4 hrs)

A.2: Verify isolation once every 31 days.

NRCL161-A7 REV 2.DOCX PAGE 6 OF 8 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Evaluate Valve Stroke Surveillance Test JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A7 EXAMINEE CUE SHEET (PART 1)

Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Unit 2 is at 100% power.

The Unit 2 BOPCO has just completed Section 12 of STP V-3S7, Exercising Phase A Containment Isolation Valve RCS-8029 on Unit 2 and provided you the completed paperwork for review.

Initiating Cue:

• You are directed to complete Section 13, Primary Review.

o M&TE usage was entered into SAP by the STP performer.

o Test was performed as a quarterly STP and is NOT associated with any Post Maintenance Testing activity.

• Document your findings below before reporting out. This should include any necessary corrections, comments, and the identification of applicable TS/ECG and associated actions if appropriate.

EXAMINEE RESPONSE NRCL161-A7 REV 2.DOCX PAGE 7 OF 8 REV. 2

NRCL161-A7 HANDOUT 2 - PART 2 JPM TITLE: Evaluate Valve Stroke Surveillance Test JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A7 EXAMINEE CUE SHEET (PART 2)

Initiating Cue:

• The valve was re-tested and the data recorded on step 12.9.4.

• Review the data and determine the required course of action. This should include any necessary corrections, comments, and/or identification of applicable TS/ECG and associated actions if appropriate.

EXAMINEE RESPONSE NRCL161-A7 REV 2.DOCX PAGE 8 OF 8 REV. 2

NRCL161-A7 HANDOUT 2 - PART 2 NRCL161-A7 HANDOUT 2 - PART 2 NRCL161-A7 HANDOUT 2 - PART 2 NRCL161-A7 HANDOUT 2 - PART 2 AO 10/18/16

NRCL161-A7 HANDOUT 2 - PART 2 NRCL161-A7 HANDOUT 2 - PART 2 NRCL161-A7 HANDOUT 2 - PART 2 NRCL161-A7 HANDOUT 2 - PART 2 NRCL161-A7 HANDOUT 2 - PART 2 NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-A8

Title:

Authorize Emergency Exposure Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments: Designed for SRO candidates in a classroom setting.

References:

• EP RB-2 Emergency Exposure Guidelines, Rev 8.

Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 1.2, 2.2, 3.2 Job Designation: SRO Rev Comments New Gen KA # G2.3.4 - Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal 3.7 or emergency conditions.

AUTHOR : LISA TORIBIO DATE: 09/29/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 09/29/16 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Authorize Emergency Exposure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A8 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed.

After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the step at which to begin.

Required Materials:

• EP RB-2 Emergency Exposure Guidelines, Rev 8.

• Completed Emergency Exposure Permits for volunteers (Handout 1)

Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Both Units were operating at 100% power when a large seismic event occurred resulting in a faulted/ruptured steam generator (S/G 1-3) on Unit 1.

• There is evidence of fuel damage. MSIV FCV-43 has failed open and an upstream break is causing S/G 1-3 to blow down in the 115 pen area.

• The Shift Manager has declared a general emergency, FG1.1, for the loss of all three fission product barriers.

• Volunteers have been found to undertake three high priority emergency field activities and the Site Radiation Protection Coordinator has forwarded their associated Emergency Exposure Permits for SEC approval.

Initiating Cue:

• The Shift Manager directs you to review each completed permit and determine whether or not it should be approved.

• Document your recommendations as well as their basis in the space provided below before reporting out.

Task Standard: DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE

• Gordon permit should NOT be authorized - permit request is for 10 REM, but maximum for allowable for sampling is 5 REM.

• Rogers permit should be authorized for 25 REM since isolation of FCV-43 is related to dose saving to population.

• Banner permit should NOT be authorized - Voluntary consent signature line is marked N/A. Voluntary consent signature IS required for a NO LIMIT exposure authorization.

NRCL161-A8 rev 2.docx PAGE 2 OF 8 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Authorize Emergency Exposure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A8 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions 1.** Evaluates proposed activity to 1.1 Reviews anticipated TEDE for job:

perform sampling of all steam

• 9.5 REM generators.

1.2 Reviews job description.

• Determines job is for Sampling Under Emergency Conditions.

• Determines anticipated TEDE is above EP RB-2 Emergency Exposure Guideline Limit allowable limit of 5 REM TEDE for radiological assessment sampling.**

• Recommends Gordon permit NOT be authorized.**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL161-A8 rev 2.docx PAGE 3 OF 8 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Authorize Emergency Exposure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A8 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 2.** Evaluates proposed activity to 2.1 Reviews anticipated TEDE for job:

manually isolate FCV-43.

• 15 REM 2.2 Reviews job description.

• Determines job is for potential Dose Saving to Population.**

• Determines anticipated TEDE is within EP RB-2 Emergency Exposure Guideline Limit allowable limit of 25 REM TEDE for Corrective Actions to Stop/Reduce a Release.**

• Recommends authorization of Rogers permit.**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL161-A8 rev 2.docx PAGE 4 OF 8 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Authorize Emergency Exposure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A8 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 3.** Evaluates proposed activity to rescue 3.1 Reviews anticipated TEDE for job:

unconscious Operator in 100 pipe

• 26 REM rack.

3.2 Reviews job description.

• Determines job is for potential lifesaving activity.

• Determines anticipated TEDE is above EP RB-2 Emergency Exposure Guideline Limit allowable limit of 25 REM TEDE for Lifesaving Actions, 1st Aid, Search and Rescue.

• Notes situation may be classifiable as Extreme.

• Notes required Voluntary Consent signature for emergency exposure is incorrectly marked N/A

• Identifies required Voluntary Consent signature for emergency exposure with NO LIMITS has NOT been obtained.**

• Recommends Banner permit NOT be authorized.**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL161-A8 rev 2.docx PAGE 5 OF 8 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Authorize Emergency Exposure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A8 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

Follow-up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL161-A8 rev 2.docx PAGE 6 OF 8 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Authorize Emergency Exposure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A8 ANSWER KEY ANSWER KEY Volunteer Approve? Basis for Approval or Rejection Requested permit limit is above the allowable limit for the Gordon NO associated activity type. (Permit request is for 10 REM, but maximum for allowable for sampling is 5 REM).

Requested permit limit is within the allowable range of the Rogers YES associated activity type. (Permit request is for 25 REM, which is within the limits allowable for dose savings to the public).

Requested NO LIMIT exposure is allowable for the associated Banner NO activity type, but the volunteers signature line is incorrectly marked N/A. Volunteer signature is required to acknowledge he/she is fully aware of the risks. (Permit request is for a life-saving activity, but is missing the volunteers signature).

NRCL161-A8 REV 2.DOCX PAGE 7 OF 8 REV. 2

JPM TITLE: Authorize Emergency Exposure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A8 EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Both Units were operating at 100% power when a large seismic event occurred resulting in a faulted/ruptured steam generator (S/G 1-3) on Unit 1.

• There is evidence of fuel damage. MSIV FCV-43 has failed open and an upstream break is causing S/G 1-3 to blow down in the 115 pen area.

• The Shift Manager has declared a general emergency, FG1.1, for the loss of all three fission product barriers.

• Volunteers have been found to undertake three high priority emergency field activities and the Site Radiation Protection Coordinator has forwarded their associated Emergency Exposure Permits for SEC approval.

Initiating Cue:

• The Shift Manager directs you to review each completed permit and determine whether or not it should be approved.

• Document your recommendations as well as their basis in the space provided below before reporting out.

EXAMINEE RESPONSE Volunteer Approve? Basis for Approval or Rejection Gordon Rogers Banner NRCL161-A8 REV 2.DOCX PAGE 8 OF 8 REV. 2

69-10554 05/06/09 Page 1 of 1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TITLE: Emergency Exposure Permit EP RB-2 ATTACHMENT 9.7 1 2 AND Date: TODAY Time: 08:36 Permit #: 16-090A Responder(s): Barbara Gordon (Print)

RP Support: S. Witt Description of Activity: Perform sampling of all steam generators per CAP AP-1 as called for by EOP E-3, Appendix FF, step 9.

Special Hazards: Condition of sampling system unknown. Structural damage in area.

Special Instructions: Contact Control Room at when prepared to commence sampling.

Anticipated TEDE Rate: 9.5 (rem/hr) AUTHORIZED LIMIT: [ ] 5 rem TEDE (Check One) [X] 10 rem TEDE Anticipated Stay Time: 1.0 (hr) [ ] 25 rem TEDE

[ ] NO LIMIT Anticipated TEDE: 9.5 (rem)

• Voluntary Consent (For potential exposures of > 25 rem TEDE): I hereby volunteer to perform the activity described above and I acknowledge having received a radiological briefing. I am fully aware of the health risks associated with the anticipated exposure. (Sign Below.)

N/A Authorization of SM or SEC or Emergency Director: Time:

LNT5_EP_RB-2u3r08.DOC 03B 0607.1519

69-10554 05/06/09 Page 1 of 1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TITLE: Emergency Exposure Permit EP RB-2 ATTACHMENT 9.7 1 2 AND Date: TODAY Time: 09:13 Permit #: 16-090C Responder(s): Steve Rogers (Print)

RP Support: S. Witt Description of Activity: Manually isloate Unit 1 FCV-43 (MSIV) per EOP E-2, Appendix L.

Special Hazards: Contaminated airborne steam environment.

Special Instructions: SCBA required.

Anticipated TEDE Rate: 30 (rem/hr) AUTHORIZED LIMIT: [ ] 5 rem TEDE (Check One) [ ] 10 rem TEDE Anticipated Stay Time: 0.5 (hr) [X] 25 rem TEDE

[ ] NO LIMIT Anticipated TEDE: 15 (rem)

• Voluntary Consent (For potential exposures of > 25 rem TEDE): I hereby volunteer to perform the activity described above and I acknowledge having received a radiological briefing. I am fully aware of the health risks associated with the anticipated exposure. (Sign Below.)

N/A Authorization of SM or SEC or Emergency Director: Time:

LNT5_EP_RB-2u3r08.DOC 03B 0607.1519

69-10554 05/06/09 Page 1 of 1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TITLE: Emergency Exposure Permit EP RB-2 ATTACHMENT 9.7 1 2 AND Date: TODAY Time: 09:00 Permit #: 16-090B Responder(s): Bruce Banner (Print)

RP Support: D. Libby Description of Activity: Operator with fractured leg and head contusion trapped within 100' pipe nest SCA. The individual appears to be having significant difficulty breathing. Volunteer has EMT background; will move Operator to low dose area for further evaluation.

Special Hazards: Exposed Electical Special Instructions: SCA Boundaries will be relocated as needed to support rescue efforts. Second volunteer on standby.

Anticipated TEDE Rate: 20 (rem/hr) AUTHORIZED LIMIT: [ ] 5 rem TEDE (Check One) [ ] 10 rem TEDE Anticipated Stay Time: 1.3 (hr) [ ] 25 rem TEDE

[X] NO LIMIT Anticipated TEDE: 26.0 (rem)

• Voluntary Consent (For potential exposures of > 25 rem TEDE): I hereby volunteer to perform the activity described above and I acknowledge having received a radiological briefing. I am fully aware of the health risks associated with the anticipated exposure. (Sign Below.)

N/A Authorization of SM or SEC or Emergency Director: Time:

LNT5_EP_RB-2u3r08.DOC 03B 0607.1519

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-A9

Title:

Classify Hostile Action Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments: Designed for SRO candidates in a classroom setting.

References:

EP G-1, Accident Classification and Emer Plan Activation, Rev.44 Forms 69-21608, 69-21609, 69-21610 (06/19/12, 07/24/13, 12/5/11)

Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes X No Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 2.1, 3.1 Job Designation: SRO Rev Comments New Gen KA # / Rating: GEN.2.4.41, Knowledge of the emergency action level 4.6 (SRO) thresholds and classifications AUTHOR : LISA TORIBIO DATE: 08/10/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 08/12/16 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Classify Hostile Action JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A9 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed.

After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the step at which to begin.

Required Materials:

• EP G-1, and EAL Wall Charts.

• Vol 11, Emergency Plan, App D (classification bases), should be available to the examinee.

Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Prior to T0, both Units are at 100% and stable.

• At T0:

o Power is lost to all Unit 2 Annunicators due to an equipment malfunction (VB1 thru VB5);

o An instrument air compressor discharge line explodes catastrophically resulting in multiple broken instrument air lines in the Turbine Building.

Unit 1 Condenser Vacuum is lost resulting in an Automatic Turbine Trip.

Unit 1 Reactor Auto Trip Fails, Breakers 13D/13E opened from the Control Room, resulting in a successful trip of the Unit 1 Reactor.

• 1 min past T0:

o Unit 2 is manually tripped due to loss of feedwater.

o OST reports power loss to Unit 2 Annunciators will take several hours to resolve.

o DCPP Watch Commander reports the air compressor failure was the result of a shaped-charge which detonated. The perpetrator has been apprehended and is being interrogated to determine if there are others involved in the plot. The Watch Commander reports the Annunciator malfunction is NOT related.

Initiating Cue: Classify the event. Fully document the basis of your answer in the space provided below.

This JPM is time critical. The start time of this JPM will function as T0.

NRCL161-A9 rev 0d.docx PAGE 2 OF 7 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Classify Hostile Action JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A9 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: In < 15 minutes classifies the event as:

SITE AREA EMERGENCY HS4.1 A hostile action is occurring or has occurred within the Protected Area as reported by the Security Watch Commander.

NRCL161-A9 rev 0d.docx PAGE 3 OF 7 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Classify Hostile Action JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A9 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure 1.1 References EP G all pages of wall chart provided Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Note: If asked about specific language used by the Security Watch Commander, it is permissible to confirm hostile action reported.

2. ** Accurately classify the event. 2.1 Classified the event as Site Area Emergency, HS4.1 **

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

3.** Classification time < 15 minutes 3.1 Classified the event < 15 min. of the Event Initiation Time. **

Classification Time: _____________

Event Initiation Time: _____________

(Event initiation time is JPM Start Time)

Difference: ____________ min**

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

NRCL161-A9 rev 0d.docx PAGE 4 OF 7 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Classify Hostile Action JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A9 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: ____________________________________________________________________

Response: ____________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

NRCL161-A9 rev 0d.docx PAGE 5 OF 7 REV. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-A9 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Prior to T0, both Units are at 100% and stable.

• At T0:

o Power is lost to all Unit 2 Annunicators due to an equipment malfunction (VB1 thru VB5);

o An instrument air compressor discharge line explodes catastrophically resulting in multiple broken instrument air lines in the Turbine Building.

Unit 1 Condenser Vacuum is lost resulting in an Automatic Turbine Trip.

Unit 1 Reactor Auto Trip Fails, Breakers 13D/13E opened from the Control Room, resulting in a successful trip of the Unit 1 Reactor.

• 1 min past T0:

o Unit 2 is manually tripped due to loss of feedwater.

o OST reports power loss to Unit 2 Annunciators will take several hours to resolve.

o DCPP Watch Commander reports the air compressor failure was the result of a shaped-charge which detonated. The perpetrator has been apprehended and is being interrogated to determine if there are others involved in the plot. The Watch Commander reports the Annunciator malfunction is NOT related.

Initiating Cue: Classify the event. Fully document the basis of your answer in the space provided below.

This JPM is time critical. The start time of this JPM will function as T0.

Classification: _________________________________________________________________

Justification: ___________________________________________________________________

NRCL161-A9 rev 0d.docx PAGE 6 OF 7 REV. 0

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 10/14/2016 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: L161 Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U)

Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*

Function

a. (LJC-S1) (001.A2.11) Respond to Unexpected Rod Motion during Routine A,E,M,S 1 Dilution

b. (LJC-S2) (013.A4.01) SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure A,E,EN,L,N,S 2 c.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. (P1) (040.AA1.03) Close MSIV and Bypass Locally - LJP-212 D,E,EN,L 4S

j. (P2) (E14.EA1.1) Isolate the Spray Additive Tank - LJP-224 A,E,L,R 5

k. (P3) (062.A2.11) Transfer the TSC to Vital Power - modified LJP-058A A,M,E,L 6

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank <9 / <8 / <4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant >1 / >1 / >1 (EN)gineered safety feature >1 / > 1 / > 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown >1 / >1 / >1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) >2 / >2 / >1 (P)revious 2 exams <3 / < 3 / < 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA >1 / >1 / >1 (S)imulator ES-301, Page 23 of 27 Rev 2

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 10/14/2016 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: L161 Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U)

Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*

Function

a. (LJC-S1) (001.A2.11) Respond to Unexpected Rod Motion during Routine A,E,M,S 1 Dilution

b. (LJC-S2) (013.A4.01) SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure A,E,EN,L,N,S 2

c. (LJC-S3) (010.A2.03) Prepare for RCS Depressurization during a SGTR A,E,L,N,S 3

d. (LJC-S4) (E05.EA1.1) Initiate Feed and Bleed for a Loss of Heat Sink (LJC-116) D,E,L,S 4S

e. (LJC-S5) (E14.EA1.1) Initiate Containment Spray Manually (LJC-010) D,E,L,S 5

f. (LJC-S6) (064.A4.06) Crosstie of Vital Bus G to H (LJC-032) A,D,E,L,S 6 g.

h. (LJC-S7) (068.AA1.23) Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation (LJC- D,E,S 8 21)

In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. (P1) (040.AA1.03) Close MSIV and Bypass Locally - LJP-212 D,E,EN,L 4S

j. (P2) (E14.EA1.1) Isolate the Spray Additive Tank - LJP-224 A,E,L,R 5

k. (P3) (062.A2.11) Transfer the TSC to Vital Power - modified LJP-058A A,M,E,L 6

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank <9 / <8 / <4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant >1 / >1 / >1 (EN)gineered safety feature >1 / > 1 / > 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown >1 / >1 / >1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) >2 / >2 / >1 (P)revious 2 exams <3 / < 3 / < 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA >1 / >1 / >1 (S)imulator ES-301, Page 23 of 27 Rev 2

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-P1

Title:

Close an MSIV and MSIV Bypass Locally Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate X Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ TCOA Time __________

Comments:

This is a Unit 1 JPM

References:

EOP E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Appendix L, Rev 23 OP1.ID2, TCOAs, Rev 8A (& TCOA database); TCOA item 57 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes X No Time Allotment: 30 minutes Critical Steps: 1.2, 2.1, 3.2 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: Bank LJP-212 DCPP Task # / Rating: N18700 3.8 (RO) 040.AA1.03 - Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as Gen KA # / Rating: they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: Isolation of one steam line 4.3 / 4.3 (RO/SRO) from header.

AUTHOR : LISA TORIBIO DATE: 09/29/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 09/29/16 REV.2

JPM TITLE: NRCL161-P1 JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue.

The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee should be given the required materials shown below, and access to other plant references as appropriate.

Equipment operation Cues are contingent on proper operation by the examinee and should be adjusted should equipment operation differ from expected.

Required Materials: Procedure EOP E-2, Appendix L.

Initial Conditions: Given:

• A main steam line rupture occurred on Unit 1 outside containment and downstream of the MSIVs.

• Automatic isolation from ESF actuation and manual attempts to close MSIV FCV-41 from VB-3 were unsuccessful.

• FCV-41 bypass valve, FCV-25, is also open.

• This task is time critical.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to locally close MSIV FCV-41 and FCV-25 in accordance with Appendix L of EOP E-2. You are given an eight inch crescent wrench and diagonal cutters. You have permission to break seals during this task (another operator will complete the paperwork).

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: Unit 1 MSIV FCV-41 and FCV-25 are closed in accordance with Appendix L by placing the following air supply and drain valves in the required position:

• Common Air Supply Valve AIR-I-1-3302 - CLOSED

• FCV-41 Accum Drain Valve AIR-I-1-1207 - OPEN (after drain cap removed)

• FCV-25 Accum Drain Valve AIR-I-1-1208 - OPEN (after drain cap removed)

Time Critical This JPM was evaluated against TCOA # 57, "Locally isolate failed MSIV or MSIV bypass valves Operator Action within 30 minutes".

(TCOA): This TCOA:

• is applicable to this JPM. TCOA start time is when the operator is directed to perform the task. TCOA stop time is when AIR-I-1-1207 and 1208 are simulated to be opened.

Start location for this JPM is 119 Work Control.

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 6 Rev.2

JPM TITLE: NRCL161-P1 JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time: (Also start for TCOA)

Step Expected Operator Actions

• • 1. Step 3 - Locally close MSIV air supply or 1.1 Locates common air supply valve AIR-I-1-3302.

common air supply valves (West side pipe rack, outside containment).

Cue: The valve is positioned AS-SEEN.

• • 1.2 Closes common air supply valve AIR-I-1-3302.

Note: The valve is open when the handle points with the piping, and closed when perpendicular to the piping.

Cue: The valve handle is now perpendicular to the pipe.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 2. Step 4 - Remove accumulator 3/4 inch drain ** 2.1 Locates and removes (2) 3/4 accumulator drain caps. caps.

• Simulates removing the drain cap by turning it several turns in the CCW direction.

Cue: Each pipe cap rotated several turns CCW and came off the pipe.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 6 Rev.2

JPM TITLE: NRCL161-P1 JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

• • 3. Open MSIV air accumulator drain valves. 3.1 Locates drain valves AIR-I-1-1207 and 1208.

Cue: The valves are positioned AS-SEEN.

Note: The drain valves are needle valves.

• • 3.2 Opens drain valves AIR-I-1-1207 and 1208 (CCW direction)

TCOA Stop Time ________.

Cue: The valves handles rotate CCW until they stop. A rush of air is heard.

Cue: Two loud noises were heard from FCV-41 and FCV-25. The control room has called you on the radio and informed you FCV-41 and FCV-25 are closed.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

TCOA Stop Time:

TCOA Total Time: (Enter TCOA time on front page)

TCOA: SAT UNSAT (TCOA time must be < 30 minutes)

Follow up Question Documentation:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 6 Rev.2

JPM TITLE: NRCL161-P1 JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: _____________________________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 6 Rev.2

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P1 Initial Conditions: Given:

• A main steam line rupture occurred on Unit 1 outside containment and downstream of the MSIVs.

• Automatic isolation from ESF actuation and manual attempts to close MSIV FCV-41 from VB-3 were unsuccessful.

• FCV-41 bypass valve, FCV-25, is also open.

• This task is time critical.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to locally close MSIV FCV-41 and FCV-25 in accordance with Appendix L of EOP E-2. You are given an eight inch crescent wrench and diagonal cutters. You have permission to break seals during this task (another operator will complete the paperwork).

Page 6 of 6 Rev.2

Faulted Steam Generator Isolation EOP E-2 R23 Page 8 of 10 UNIT 1 APPENDIX L Locally Closing Main Steam Isolation Valves

1. Complete tailboard with Shift Foreman or his delegate.

2. Obtain the following:

• Crescent wrench for drain caps

• Diagonal cutters for valve seals

• Flashlight NOTE 1: If the MSIV BYPASS valve is already closed, it is acceptable to close either the MSIV Air Supply Vlv OR the Common Air Supply Vlv.

NOTE 2: If the MSIV BYPASS valve is open, close ONLY the Common Air Supply valve.

3. Close MSIV and MSIV bypass valve air supply valves as noted above:

MSIV and MSIV BYPASS Common Air MSIV Air Supply Supply Vlv Vlv FCV-41/FCV-25 AIR-I-1-3302 AIR-I-1-4061 FCV-42/FCV-24 AIR-I-1-3303 AIR-I-1-4060 FCV-43/FCV-23 AIR-I-1-1044 AIR-I-1-4054 FCV-44/FCV-22 AIR-I-1-1042 AIR-I-1-4058

4. Remove both Accumulator drain caps.

5. Open both MSIV air accumulator drain valves.

MSIV and MSIV BYPASS Accum Drn Vlvs FCV-41/FCV-25 AIR-I-1-1207,1208 FCV-42/FCV-24 AIR-I-1-1210,1211 FCV-43/FCV-23 AIR-I-1-1547,1548 FCV-44/FCV-22 AIR-I-1-1543,1544

6. When MSIV and MSIV Bypass valves close, report to Control Operator.

Appendix L, Page 1 of 1 EOP_E-2u1r23.DOC 0609.1201

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-P2

Title:

Isolate the Spray Additive Tank Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate X Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

This is a Unit 2 JPM

References:

Unit 2 EOP FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, Rev. 9 Alternate Path: Yes X No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 4.6, 4.7 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments: Bank LJP-224 DCPP Task # / Rating: 47016 (Check if containment spray is required) 3.0 Gen KA # / Rating: E14.EA1.1 - Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to High Containment Pressure Components, and functions of 3.7/3.7 control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

AUTHOR : LISA TORIBIO DATE: 09/29/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 09/29/16 REV.2

JPM TITLE: Isolate the Spray Additive Tank JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue.

The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee should be given the required materials shown below, and access to other plant references as appropriate.

Equipment operation Cues are contingent on proper operation by the examinee and should be adjusted should equipment operation differ from expected.

Required Materials: Copy of Unit 2 EOP FR-Z.1, Step 4.

Initial Conditions: Given: An earthquake and LOCA has occurred on Unit 2. The following conditions exist:

• 4KV Bus H is de-energized.

• High containment pressure has caused an entry into EOP FR-Z.1.

• Spray Additive Tank level is 15% and lowering.

• Both trains of Containment Spray have been reset.

• When remotely closing 8994A, the valve stopped in the mid position.

Initiating Cue: The Unit 2 Shift Foreman directs you to perform the local actions of EOP FR-Z.1, Step 4.b RNO to isolate the spray additive tank.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: Spray Additive Tank flow is secured by locally closing Spray Additive Tank Outlet Valves 8994A and 8994B.

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 11 Rev.2

JPM TITLE: Isolate the Spray Additive Tank JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. RNO Step 4.b.b) - Close supply breaker for 1.1 Locates 52-2F-35.

8992 (100 Elev., Bus Section 2F).

1.2 Closes 52-2F-35.

Cue: You hear a clunk sound and the breaker handle is in the up position Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

2. RNO Step 4.b.c) - Close 8992. 2.1 Calls control room to request closure of 8992 or inform them of breaker closure.

Cue: (On breaker cubicle 52-2F-35) The blue light is ON.

Cue: SFM informs you that when attempting to close 8992 a 480V Bus 2F thermal overload annunciator alarm came in on PK18-22 and valve motion stopped. The SFM has opted to not reset the TOL trip.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 11 Rev.2

JPM TITLE: Isolate the Spray Additive Tank JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

3. RNO Step 4.b.d) - Re-open supply breaker 52- 3.1 Note: If examinee asks for direction, provide 2F-35. the cue below, otherwise they continue in the procedure.

Cue: Continue with the procedure.

3.2 Re-opens 52-2F-35.

Cue: Blue light on 52-2F-35 is out and the control room reports that the alarm cleared on PK18-22.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 11 Rev.2

JPM TITLE: Isolate the Spray Additive Tank JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

• • 4. Step 4.b RNO -Check to ensure flowpath is 4.1 May contact control room to check if flowpath isolated. is isolated.

<< Alternate Path Begins Here >>

Cue: If asked to verify flowpath is isolated, provide Examinee with Attachment 1 -

Control Room Indications for Spray Add Tank 4.2 Determines flowpath is NOT isolated Note: Examinee may go directly to Expected Operator Action Step 4.5. This is acceptable.

Step 4.b RNO - ***************************************

Locally close: Cue: (If needed) Another operator has

• 8992 (Elev. 73, Unit 2 Auxiliary opened the supply breakers for 8994A Building) or, and 8994B.

4.3 Locates 8992.

4.4 Attempts to locally close 8992.

Cue: The valve handwheel will not move in clockwise direction.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 11 Rev.2

JPM TITLE: Isolate the Spray Additive Tank JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Step 4.b RNO (cont) - 4.5 Locates 8994A and 8994B.

Locally close:

• or, 8994A and 8994B (Elev. 73, Unit 2 Auxiliary Building).

Cue: As found stem is mid-position.

• • 4.6 Locally closes 8994A.

Cue: The valve handwheel moved in the clockwise direction. Stem moved fully in and handwheel stopped Cue: As found stem is full up.

• • 4.7 Locally closes 8994B.

Cue: The valve handwheel moved in the clockwise direction. Stem moved fully in and handwheel stopped Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 6 of 11 Rev.2

JPM TITLE: Isolate the Spray Additive Tank JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 4.(cont) Step 4.b RNO -Check to ensure flowpath is 4.8 Contacts control room to verify flowpath is isolated (continued) isolated Cue: When asked to verify flowpath is isolated, provide Examinee with Attachment 2 - Control Room Indications for Spray Add Tank

<< Alternate Path Ends Here >>

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 7 of 11 Rev.2

JPM TITLE: Isolate the Spray Additive Tank JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: _____________________________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 8 of 11 Rev.2

JPM TITLE: Isolate the Spray Additive Tank JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P2 ATTACHMENT 1 - CONTROL ROOM INDICATIONS FOR SPRAY ADD TANK

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 9 of 11 Rev.2

JPM TITLE: Isolate the Spray Additive Tank JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P2 ATTACHMENT 2 - CONTROL ROOM INDICATIONS FOR SPRAY ADD TANK

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 10 of 11 Rev.2

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P2 Initial Conditions: Given: An earthquake and LOCA has occurred on Unit 2. The following conditions exist:

• 4KV Bus H is de-energized.

• High containment pressure has caused an entry into EOP FR-Z.1.

• Spray Additive Tank level is 15% and lowering.

• Both trains of Containment Spray have been reset.

• When remotely closing 8994A, the valve stopped in the mid position.

Initiating Cue: The Unit 2 Shift Foreman directs you to perform the local actions of EOP FR-Z.1, Step 4.b RNO to isolate the spray additive tank.

Page 11 of 11 Rev.2

Response to High Containment Pressure EOP FR-Z.1 R9 Page 4 of 8 UNIT 2 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

4. CHECK If Containment Spray Additive Tank Should be Isolated:

a. Check Spray Additive Tank level - a. PERFORM the following:

LESS THAN 16%

1) WHEN Spray Additive Tank level LESS THAN 16%,

THEN Isolate the Spray Add Tank PER step 4.b.

2) CONTINUE with step 5.

b. Isolate Spray Additive Tank as follows: b. Perform the following:

1) Reset both trains of Containment a) Reset both trains of Containment Spray Spray.

2) Close 8994A AND 8994B b) Dispatch Operator to close supply breaker for 8992, 52-2F-35.

3) Dispatch operator to open supply breakers for 8994A AND 8994B: c) Close 8992.

• 52-2G OPEN d) Re-open supply breaker 52-2F-35.

• 52-2H OPEN IF Flowpath is NOT isolated, THEN Dispatch Operator to locally close either:

• 8992 OR

• 8994A AND 8994B

5. ENSURE Containment Fan Cooler Units - RUNNING IN LOW SPEED

6. ENSURE MSIV and MSIV Bypass Valves IMPLEMENT Appendix L to manually CLOSE

- CLOSED MSIV AND MSIV Bypass valves.

EOP_FR-Z!1u2r09.DOC 1208.1246

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-P3

Title:

Transfer the TSC to Vital Power Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate X Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

This is a Unit 1 JPM

References:

EOP ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, Appendix J, Rev. 27 OP J-6B:VI, U1&U2, Manual Operation of DG 1-3 & 2-3, Rev. 35 & 31 Alternate Path: Yes X No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 3.1,4.1,7.1,7.2 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: Modified Bank LJP-058A DCPP Task # / Rating: 896600 3/3/1 Gen KA # / Rating: 062.A2.11 3.7/4.1 AUTHOR : LISA TORIBIO DATE: 08/24/2016 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 08/25/2016 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue.

The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee should be given the required materials shown below, and access to other plant references as appropriate.

Equipment operation Cues are contingent on proper operation by the examinee and should be adjusted should equipment operation differ from expected.

Required Copy of ECA-2.1, Appendix J.

Materials: Copy of OP J-6B:VI for D/G 1-3 and 2-3. (only once asked for)

Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 1 experienced a steam break and uncontrolled depressurization of all steam generators.

• Offsite power was lost to both units.

• The SEC has given permission to place the TSC on vital power.

• The TSC is manned and requires vital power.

• Diesel generator 1-3 is supplying Unit 1 4 kV F and is carrying 2.12 MW load @ a 0.8 pf.

• Diesel generator 2-3 is supplying Unit 2 4 kV F and is carrying 2.26 MW load @ a 0.8 pf.

Initiating Cue: The Unit 1 Shift Foreman directs you to place the TSC on U-1 vital power, per ECA-2.1, Appendix J, starting with step 3.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: TSC Transfer Switch Normal Power:

• Breaker 52-22J-40 in the OFF position.

TSC is being provided power from Unit 2 D/G 2-3 via:

• Switch EPTSN to BACKUP power.

• Switch EPTSC to the NORMAL (U-2) position.

• Breaker 52-2F-47 in the ON position.

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 11 Rev. 1

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Step 3 - Check D/G 1-3 loaded and able to 1.1 References D/G 1-3 load in initial conditions.

support additional loading.

1.2 References OP J-6B:VI, Precautions and Limitations step 5.10 for D/G 1-3 load limits.

Note: Supply copy of procedure OP J-6B:VI P&Ls to student when they indicate they will refer to a procedure for D/G load limits.

1.3 Determines that D/G 1-3 can support additional 106.2 KW loading. (2.6 Mw - 2.12 MW = .48 MW or 480 KW)

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 11 Rev. 1

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Note: Examinee may elect to evaluate support capability of D/G 2-3 at this time, but is expected to align the TSC to D/G 1-3 per Shift Foreman directions given in cue.

Mark step N/A if evaluation of D/G 2-3 not performed at this time.

2. Step 4 - Check D/G 2-3 loaded and able to 2.1 May reference OP J-6 B:VI, Precautions and support additional loading (Optional step since Limitations step 5.10 for D/G 2-3 load limits.

D/G 1-3 is capable of carrying load).

2.2 May determine DG 2-3 has room for an additional 106.2 KW of load (2.6 Mw - 2.26 MW

= .34 MW or 340 KW)

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 11 Rev. 1

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Note: JPM steps 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 may be done in any order (bulleted steps in the procedure).

• • 3. Step 5 - Open the following breakers: ** 3.1 Places breaker 52-22J-40 (EPTSN TSC PWR

• Open breaker 52-22J-40 (TSC XFER SW) TRANSF SW NORMAL SOURCE) in the OFF position.

Cue: An audible "clunk" is heard, and the breaker is in the down position with the word OFF showing on the lower breaker handle.

3.2 Notes that breaker 52-2F-47 (ON SITE

• Open breaker 52-2F-47 (TSC 480V POWER TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER 480V POWER TO TO EPTSC)

EPTSC) is in the OFF position.

Cue: The breaker is in the down position with the word OFF showing on the lower breaker handle.

• Open breaker 52-1F-67 (TSC TRANSFER 3.3 Notes that breaker 52-1F-67 (TSC TRANSFER SWITCH) SWITCH) is in the OFF position.

Cue: The breaker is in the down position with the word OFF showing on the lower breaker handle.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 11 Rev. 1

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Note: Switch is on west wall of 2F 480 VAC switchgear room.

• • 4. Step 6 - Switch EPTSN to BACKUP power. ** 4.1 Places switch EPTSN in the BACKUP position.

Cue: The sealed component change form needs will be addressed by another operator.

Cue: The switch is in the BACKUP position.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 6 of 11 Rev. 1

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

5. Step 7 - Supply Power from Unit 1: 5.1 Places EPTSC switch (TSC Power Transfer Unit a) Switch EPTSC, Power Transfer Unit Selector Selector Switch) to the BACKUP position Switch to BACKUP.

Cue: The sealed component change form needs will be addressed by another operator.

Cue: The switch is in the BACKUP position.

Note: When the Examinee attempts to close the breaker to align power from Unit 1, the breaker WILL NOT CLOSE. The Examinee should recognize aligning TSC to Unit 2 as a viable alternative.

b) Close 52-1F-67, TSC Transfer Switch 5.2 Attempts to place breaker 52-1F-67 in the ON position.

Cue: The breaker REMAINS AS IS with the word OFF showing on the lower breaker handle.

5.3 Determines Unit 1 is not capable of supplying power to TSC.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 7 of 11 Rev. 1

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

<< Alternate Path Starts Here >>

Note: If Examinee requests direction from Control Room due to original field alignment becoming unavailable, provide the following cue:

Cue: What do you recommend Note: Mark step N/A if evaluation of D/G 2-3 load support was performed earlier.

6. Step 4 - Check D/G 2-3 loaded AND able to 6.1 References OP J-6B:VI, Precautions and support and additional 106.2 KW loading. Limitations step 5.10 for D/G 2-3 load limits.

6.2 Determines that DG 2-3 has room for an additional 106.2 KW of load (2.6 Mw - 2.26 MW

= .34 MW or 340 KW)

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 8 of 11 Rev. 1

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

• • 7. Step 8 - Supply Power from Unit 2: Note: Switch is also on west wall of 2F 480VAC switchgear room, next to EPTSN switch.

a) Switch EPTSC, Power Transfer Unit Selector Unit 2 is the NORMAL position Switch to NORMAL.

• • 7.1 Places EPTSC switch (TSC Power Transfer Unit Selector Switch) to the NORMAL position.

Cue: The switch is in the NORMAL position.

b) Close 52-2F-47, TSC 480V Power to EPTSC ** 7.2 Places breaker 52-2F-47 in the ON position.

Cue: An audible clunk is heard, and the breaker is in the up position with the word ON showing on the upper breaker handle.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

<< Alternate Path Ends Here >>

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 9 of 11 Rev. 1

JPM TITLE: Transfer the TSC to Vital Power JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: _____________________________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 10 of 11 Rev. 1

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-P3 Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 1 experienced a steam break and uncontrolled depressurization of all steam generators.

• Offsite power was lost to both units.

• The SEC has given permission to place the TSC on vital power.

• The TSC is manned and requires vital power.

• Diesel generator 1-3 is supplying Unit 1 4 kV F and is carrying 2.12 MW load @ a 0.8 pf.

• Diesel generator 2-3 is supplying Unit 2 4 kV F and is carrying 2.26 MW load @ a 0.8 pf.

Initiating Cue: The Unit 1 Shift Foreman directs you to place the TSC on U-1 vital power, per ECA-2.1, Appendix J, starting with step 3.

Page 11 of 11 Rev. 1

Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam EOP ECA-2.1 R27 Generators page 34 of 38 UNIT 1 APPENDIX J TSC ELECTRICAL POWER

1. Check that the TSC is being manned and that vital power is required.

NOTE: Aligning TSC power supply to a vital bus renders the D/G associated with that bus inoperable due to the addition of 106.2 KW of load to the bus.

2. Obtain the SEC's permission prior to placing the TSC on vital power.

3. Check D/G 1-3 OR 2-3 loaded AND able to support an additional 106.2 KW loading.

4. IF one of the D/Gs is unable to support the additional loading, THEN supply power from the other unit.

5. Open the following breakers:

• 52-22J-40 TSC XFER SW

• 52-2F-47 TSC 480V POWER TO EPTSC

• 52-1F-67 TSC TRANSFER SWITCH

6. In the 2F MCC Room, switch EPTSN, TSC Power Transfer Switch, to BACKUP.

7. To supply power from Unit 1:

a. Switch EPTSC, TSC Power Transfer Unit Selector Switch, to BACKUP.

b. Close 52-1F-67

8. To supply power from Unit 2:

a. Switch EPTSC, TSC Power Transfer Unit Selector Switch, to NORMAL.

b. Close 52-2F-47.

Appendix J, Page 1 of 1 EOP_ECA-2!1u1r27.DOC 1208.1459

Diesel Generators - Manual Operation of DG 1-3 OP J-6B:VI R35 Page 3 of 20 UNIT 1

5. PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 5.1 Paralleling the DG to startup power defeats both second level UV relays. REFER TO TS 3.3.5.

5.2 REFER TO the following for DG 1-3 operability requirements:

• TS 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating"

• TS 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown"

• TS 3.8.3, "Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, Starting Air, and Turbocharger Air Assist"

• STP M-9A3, "Diesel Engine Generator 1-3 Routine Surveillance Test" 5.3 When ANY of the following conditions exists, DG 1-3 is declared INOPERABLE and the appropriate TS actions are performed:

• Paralleling DG 1-3 to any off-site power source

• DG 1-3 Mode Sel switch is in "MANUAL" AND DG 1-3 is NOT running NOTE: Extended operation of DG 1-3 below 0.65 MW can expose the engine to undesirable conditions that may be detrimental to engine performance and component life.

5.4 DG 1-3 should not be operated for extended periods (one hour or longer) below 0.65 MW:

• If DG 1-3 is operated below 0.65 MW for at least one hour but less than ten hours, then the DG should be operated at or above 1.30 MW for at least one hour.

• If DG 1-3 is to be operated for more than ten hours at or below 0.65 MW, the DG should be loaded to at least 1.3 MW for more than one hour at the end of each 10-hour period.

5.5 Do not operate DG 1-3 below rated speed with the field energized. Excessive field currents and rotor temperatures may occur.

5.6 When paralleling DG 1-3, pick up load (0.50 MW) as soon as possible (less than 15 seconds) after the breaker is closed. This will prevent the DG breaker from tripping on directional power (DIR PWR).

5.7 There should be fuel oil in the priming tank. If not, it should be filled using the magnetic pump, and the problem documented in a notification.

5.8 The fuel oil pressure should increase to above 40 psig within 60 seconds of engine start.

Gauge response is about 15 seconds.

5.9 Normal shutdown of DG 1-3 requires DC control power. If shutting down DG 1-3 without control power becomes necessary, manually operate the trip lever on the northwest corner of the engine, forward of the fuel oil filters.

OP_J-6B~VIu1r35.DOC 1008.1606

Diesel Generators - Manual Operation of DG 1-3 OP J-6B:VI R35 Page 4 of 20 UNIT 1 5.10 Do not violate the following limits during normal steady-state operation:

• Maximum continuous generator current: 451 amperes

• Maximum stator temperature: 240°F

• Minimum lube oil pressure: 60 psig

• Maximum lube oil temperature: 195°F

• Maximum jacket water temperature: 185°F

• Power factor: 1.0 to 0.8 lag

• Load: 2.60 MW at 0.8 power factor 5.11 Do not operate more than one DG at a time paralleled to any transformer (startup or unit auxiliary) in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. REFER TO SR 3.8.1.3, Note 3.

5.12 DGs are highly responsive to the starting of large motor loads, such as a 12kV pump, a condensate and booster pump set, or the No. 2 Heater Drain Pump. If the MVAR output is not reduced prior to starting such loads, a DG could exceed its kVA rating. If, while a DG is paralleled and at full load, a large motor load is to be started, first reduce MVAR output to 0.5 MVAR or less until after the load has been started.Ref 7.2 5.13 Prior to paralleling DG 1-3 to the bus, the DG 1-3 Mode Sel switch on VB4 shall be verified in "MANUAL".

5.14 Control power selection (EQD Panel):

• In MODES 1-4: DG 1-3 shall have its normal DC source energized and selected. If the backup source is selected, DG 1-3 is considered INOPERABLE and either DG 1-3 or 1-1 must be selected to MANUAL to prevent making Battery 1-3 INOPERABLE.

• In MODES 5, 6, and DEFUELED: Preferred alignment is for DG 1-3 to have its normal DC source energized and selected. If cross-tie capability exists (i.e., capability of supplying power to the battery charger aligned to DG 1-3 DC source), DG 1-3 and Battery 1-3 can still be considered OPERABLE with the backup source selected.

5.15 Day tank level columns respond very slowly to a level change. When manually filling the tank, use caution to avoid overflowing the day tank.

5.16 Crankcase exhausters should be operating while the engine is running. If not, DG 1-3 is still OPERABLE, but a notification shall be initiated and repairs made in a timely fashion. If crankcase exhausters are not running, DG 1-3 may experience more oil leakage from the block than normal.

5.17 If the lubricating oil temperature is below 90°F, DG 1-3 should not be started unless engineering has evaluated the condition.

5.18 Starting air header and turbo air header pressures should be monitored:

• Starting air: 140-160 psig

• Turbo air: Above 210 psig OP_J-6B~VIu1r35.DOC 1008.1606

Diesel Generators - Manual Operation of DG 2-3 OP J-6B:VI R31 Page 3 of 20 UNIT 2

5. PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 5.1 Paralleling the DG to startup power defeats both second level UV relays. REFER TO TS 3.3.5.

5.2 REFER TO the following for DG 2-3 operability requirements:

• TS 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating"

• TS 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown"

• TS 3.8.3, "Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, Starting Air, and Turbocharger Air Assist"

• STP M-9A3, "Diesel Engine Generator 2-3 Routine Surveillance Test" 5.3 When ANY of the following conditions exists, DG 2-3 is declared INOPERABLE and the appropriate TS actions are performed:

• Paralleling DG 2-3 to any off-site power source

• DG 2-3 Mode Sel switch is in "MANUAL" AND DG 2-3 is NOT running NOTE: Extended operation of DG 2-3 below 0.65 MW can expose the engine to undesirable conditions that may be detrimental to engine performance and component life.

5.4 DG 2-3 should not be operated for extended periods (one hour or longer) below 0.65 MW:

• If DG 2-3 is operated below 0.65 MW for at least one hour but less than ten hours, then the DG should be operated at or above 1.30 MW for at least one hour.

• If DG 2-3 is to be operated for more than ten hours at or below 0.65 MW, the DG should be loaded to at least 1.3 MW for more than one hour at the end of each 10-hour period.

5.5 Do not operate DG 2-3 below rated speed with the field energized. Excessive field currents and rotor temperatures may occur.

5.6 When paralleling DG 2-3, pick up load (0.50 MW) as soon as possible (less than 15 seconds) after the breaker is closed. This will prevent the DG breaker from tripping on directional power (DIR PWR).

5.7 There should be fuel oil in the priming tank. If not, it should be filled using the magnetic pump, and the problem documented in a notification.

5.8 The fuel oil pressure should increase to above 40 psig within 60 seconds of engine start.

Gauge response is about 15 seconds.

5.9 Normal shutdown of DG 2-3 requires DC control power. If shutting down DG 2-3 without control power becomes necessary, manually operate the trip lever on the northwest corner of the engine, forward of the fuel oil filters.

OP_J-6B~VIu2r31.DOC 1008.1609

Diesel Generators - Manual Operation of DG 2-3 OP J-6B:VI R31 Page 4 of 20 UNIT 2 5.10 Do not violate the following limits during normal steady-state operation:

• Maximum continuous generator current: 451 amperes

• Maximum stator temperature: 240°F

• Minimum lube oil pressure: 60 psig

• Maximum lube oil temperature: 195°F

• Maximum jacket water temperature: 185°F

• Power factor: 1.0 to 0.8 lag

• Load: 2.60 MW at 0.8 power factor 5.11 Do not operate more than one DG at a time paralleled to any transformer (startup or unit auxiliary) in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. REFER TO SR 3.8.1.3, Note 3.

5.12 DGs are highly responsive to the starting of large motor loads, such as a 12kV pump, a condensate and booster pump set, or the No. 2 Heater Drain Pump. If the MVAR output is not reduced prior to starting such loads, a DG could exceed its kVA rating. If, while a DG is paralleled and at full load, a large motor load is to be started, first reduce MVAR output to 0.5 MVAR or less until after the load has been started.Ref 7.2 5.13 Prior to paralleling DG 2-3 to the bus, the DG 2-3 Mode Sel switch on VB4 shall be verified in "MANUAL".

5.14 Control power selection (EQD Panel):

• In MODES 1-4: DG 2-3 shall have its normal DC source energized and selected. If the backup source is selected, DG 2-3 is considered INOPERABLE and either DG 2-3 or 2-2 must be selected to MANUAL to prevent making Battery 2-3 INOPERABLE.

• In MODES 5, 6, and DEFUELED: Preferred alignment is for DG 2-3 to have its normal DC source energized and selected. If cross-tie capability exists (i.e., capability of supplying power to the battery charger aligned to DG 2-3 DC source), DG 2-3 and Battery 2-3 can still be considered OPERABLE with the backup source selected.

5.15 Day tank level columns respond very slowly to a level change. When manually filling the tank, use caution to avoid overflowing the day tank.

5.16 Crankcase exhausters should be operating while the engine is running. If not, DG 2-3 is still OPERABLE, but a notification shall be initiated and repairs made in a timely fashion. If crankcase exhausters are not running, DG 2-3 may experience more oil leakage from the block than normal.

5.17 If the lubricating oil temperature is below 90°F, DG 2-3 should not be started unless engineering has evaluated the condition.

5.18 Starting air header and turbo air header pressures should be monitored:

• Starting air: 140-160 psig

• Turbo air: Above 210 psig OP_J-6B~VIu2r31.DOC 1008.1609

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-LJCS1

Title:

Respond to Unexpected Rod Motion during Routine Dilution Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat _____ Unsat _____ Total Time: _____ minutes Comments:

References:

OP B-1A:VII, CVCS - Makeup Control System Operation, Rev. 57 Alternate Path: Yes ______ X _ No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 2.1, 3.2, 4.2, 7.1, 8.1, 9.3, 10.2 Job Designation: RO or SRO Rev Comments: Modified Bank LJC-075 Gen KA / Rating: 001.A2.11 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following 4.4/ 4.7 malfunctions or operations on the CRDS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Situations requiring a reactor trip.

AUTHOR : LISA TORIBIO DATE: 09/11/2016 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 09/11/2016 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: Respond TO UNEXPECTED ROD JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The student will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials: None Initial Conditions GIVEN:

• Unit 1 has been stable at 75% power for an extended period.

• The shift is about to commence a load ramp to 90% power at 3 MW/min Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform a batch dilution of 100 gallons at 50 gpm, per OP B-1A:VII, Attachment 1. All precautions and limitations are complete; prerequisites have also been completed.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard:

• A 100 gallon dilution has been commenced at 50 gpm.

• Reactor is manually tripped before Control Bank D reaches the All Rods Out (ARO) position of 230 steps, in accordance with OP AP-12A, Continuous Withdrawal or Insertion of a Control Rod Bank.

NRCL161-LJCS1 PAGE 2 OF 9 REV . 1

JPM TITLE: Respond TO UNEXPECTED ROD JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 References OP B-1A:VII, Attachment 1.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

2.** Step 3 - Press STOP on Makeup 2.1 Presses STOP on Makeup Control screen Control screen. (CC-2).**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

3.** Step 4 - Press DILUTE on Makeup 3.1 Reads NOTE regarding ALT DILUTE and Control screen. impact on RCP seals. Note does not apply

- ALT DILUTE not being used.

3.2 Presses DILUTE on Makeup Control screen.**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL161-LJCS1 PAGE 3 OF 9 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: Respond TO UNEXPECTED ROD JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 4.** Step 5-Set TARGET BATCH to desired 4.1 Reads two NOTES regarding maximum gallons of water to add. flow rate. NOTE 2 applies and was met with flow rate specified in cue.

4.2 Sets TARGET BATCH to 100 gallons of water.**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

5. Step 6 -Ensure BATCHED GALLONS 5.1 Ensures BATCHED GALLONS reset.

reset.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

6. Step 7 - IF primary water flow to the 6.1 Reads NOTE on primary water pumps blender will be set for less than 80 (back down at lower flow rates).

gpm AND the flow rate will be Determines note is applicable, but pump is maintained for more than an hour, not at risk of dead-heading due to short THEN place the Primary Water Pump time duration for dilution.

currently in "AUTO" to the "OFF" position.

6.2 Determines flowrate is less than 80 gpm, but will NOT be maintained for more than an hour. Leaves Primary Water Pump 1-2 in AUTO (VB-2).

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL161-LJCS1 PAGE 4 OF 9 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: Respond TO UNEXPECTED ROD JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 7.** Step 8 - Ensure PRI-WATER FLOW SP 7.1 Sets PRI-WATER FLOW SP to 50 gpm. **

set to desired flow rate.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

8.** Step 9 - Press START. 8.1 Presses START. **

Check expected primary water flow 8.2 Verifies flow, flowrate, and audible and audible beeping. beeping:

• FI-111 (VB-2)

• FCV-110A/B, FCV-111A/B (VB-2)

• FR-110, Blue Pen (CC-2)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL161-LJCS1 PAGE 5 OF 9 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: Respond TO UNEXPECTED ROD JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

<< ALTERNATE PATH START POINT >>

9.** Observes outward rod motion on 9.1 Observes outward step of control bank D Control Bank D and enters OP AP- (CC1, DRPI) 12A, Continuous Withdrawal or Insertion of a Control Rod Bank.

9.2 Evaluates plant parameter to determine if rod motion is warranted.

• Checks for Tave-Tref mismatch > 1.5 oF (CC1). (It is not)

• May check PCS Control Screen (CC4).

• Determines Auto Rod motion is NOT warranted.

Step 1 - Place Rods in Manual. 9.3

• Places Rod Mode Selector switch in MANUAL (CC1).

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

10.** Step 2 - Checks Rod Motion Stopped. 10.1 Determines continuous rod motion has NOT stopped based on DRPI indication and rod step counters (CC1).

Step 2 RNO - Manually trip reactor. 10.2 Performs Manual Reactor Trip. (CC1)**

<< ALTERNATE PATH END POINT >>

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL161-LJCS1 PAGE 6 OF 9 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: Respond TO UNEXPECTED ROD JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS1 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: __________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL161-LJCS1 PAGE 7 OF 9 REV. 1

JPM

Title:

Respond to Unexpected Rod JPM Number: NRCL161-LJCS1 Attachment 1, Simulator Setup Restore the simulator to IC-11 (75%, MOL).

Perform the following:

1. Go to RUN.

2. Simulate preparation for a load ramp to 90% by:

• Placing MW IN feedback in on the DEHC panel.

• Setting in a 3 MW/min ramp rate to a TARGET of 1080 MW.

3. Leave ramp on HOLD.

4. Go to FREEZE.

Run Lesson NRCL161-LJCS1.lsn Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

NRCL161-LJCS1 PAGE 8 OF 9 REV. 1

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS1 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Unit 1 has been stable at 75% power for an extended period.

• The shift is about to commence a load ramp to 90% power at 3 MW/min Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform a batch dilution of 100 gallons at 50 gpm, per OP B-1A:VII, Attachment 1. All precautions and limitations are complete; prerequisites have also been completed.

NRCL161-LJCS1 PAGE 9 OF 9 REV. 1

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-LJCS2

Title:

SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: _______

minutes Comments:

References:

EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Rev 44 Alternate Path: Yes ______ X _ No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 4.3, 9.5 Job Designation: RO or SRO Rev Comments: New Gen KA / Rating: 013.A4.01 - Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in 4.5 / 4.8 the control room ESFAS-initiated equipment which fails to actuate:

AUTHOR : LISA TORIBIO DATE: 09/11/2016 OPERATIONS CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 09/11/2016 REPRESENTATIVE:

REV. 1

JPM TITLE: SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS2 EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The student will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials: EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix E.

Initial Conditions GIVEN:

• Unit 1 has experience a reactor trip due to a due to a large seismic event.

• The crew has completed their immediate actions and entered E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

• No personnel are in containment at this time.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform EOP E-0, Appendix E.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: EOP E-0, Appendix E, ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status is completed through step 8.

Manual actions are taken to address ESFAS actuation failures:

• Accum N2 Fill Isolation Valve 8880 is closed.

• Main Steam Isolation Valves FCV-43 and FCV-44 are closed.

• S/G Blowdown System Isolation Valves FCV-762 and FCV-763 (inside containment side) are closed.

By the completion of EOP E-0, Appendix E, step 9 NRCL161-LJCS2 PAGE 2 OF 10 REV . 1

JPM TITLE: SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS2 EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 References EOP E-0, Appendix E Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

2. Step 1 - NOTIFY Plant Personnel. Note: No personnel inside containment given as initial condition.

2.1 Checks no personnel inside containment.

2.2 Announces Reactor Trip/SI on PA system.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

3. Step 2 - CHECK Main Generator 3.1 Checks PK14-01, Unit Trip - ON Tripped.

3.2 Checks 500KV bkrs - Both Open 3.3 Checks Exciter Field Breaker - Open Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL161-LJCS2 PAGE 3 OF 10 REV . 1

JPM TITLE: SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS2 EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 4.** Step 3 - ENSURE Containment 4.1 Observes the following on the Isolation Phase A actuated. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PHASE A portion of Monitor Light Box B:

• Train A red activate light - ON

• Train B red activate light - ON

• White Status Lights - ON (one) 4.2 Turns CONTMT ISOL PHASE A to actuation switch to ACTUATE. (VB1)

<< ALTERNATE PATH #1 - START POINT >>

4.3 Identifies 8880, ACCUM N2 ISOL FILL VLV, OPEN and manually closes the valve (VB-1).**

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

<< ALTERNATE PATH #1 - END POINT >>

5. Step 4 - ENSURE Containment Vent 5.1 Observes the following on the CONTMT Isolation actuated. VENT ISOL portion of Monitor Light Box B:

• Train A red activate light - ON

• Train B red activate light - ON

• White Status Lights - OFF Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL161-LJCS2 PAGE 4 OF 10 REV . 1

JPM TITLE: SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS2 EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

6. Step 5 - ENSURE SI Status. 6.1 Observes the following on the SAFETY INJECTION portion of Monitor Light Box C:

• Red activate light - ON

• White Status Lights - ON (numerous) 6.2 May attempt manual Safety Injection actuation by turning switch to ACTUATE.

(VB1) 6.3 Identifies components that failed to actuate/reposition due to Bus G differential trip (4kV and 480V de-energized)

Equipment with no power (VB-1)

• ASW 1-2

• CCP 1-2

• CFCU 1-3

• CCW 1-2

• CFCU 1-5

• RHRP 1-1 Valves with no power (VB-2)

• LCV-112C - CHG PP SUCT FROM VCT (failed OPEN)

• 8108 - CHG TO REGEN HX (failed OPEN)

• 8805B - CHG PP SUCT FROM RWST (failed CLOSED)

Note: May direct Aux Watch to close valves locally.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL161-LJCS2 PAGE 5 OF 10 REV . 1

JPM TITLE: SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS2 EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

7. Step 6 - ENSURE Feedwater Isolation. 7.1 Observes the following on the F.W. ISOL portion of Monitor Light Box C:

• Red activate light - ON

• White Status Lights - OFF 7.2 Observes the following on the S.G. LVL portion of Monitor Light Box C:

• Red activate light - ON

• White Status Lights - ON 7.3 Identifies valve that failed to reposition due to Bus G differential trip (480V de-energized)

Valves with no power (VB-3)

• FCV-439 - MN FDWTR ISOL VLVS (failed OPEN)

Note: May dispatch Turbine Watch to close valve locally.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

8. Step 7 - CHECK Containment Spray 8.1 Observes the following on the CONTMT and Phase B Isol - NOT REQUIRED VENT ISOL PHASE B portion of Monitor Light Box D:

• Train A red activate light - OFF

• Train B red activate light - OFF

• White Status Lights - OFF 8.2 Observes that containment spray has NOT initiated.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL161-LJCS2 PAGE 6 OF 10 REV . 1

JPM TITLE: SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS2 EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 9.** Step 8 - CHECK Main Steamline 9.1 Observes the following on the MSI portion Isolation not required. of monitor light box D:

• Red activate light - ON

<< ALTERNATE PATH #2 - START POINT >>

9.2 Observes the following on the MSI portion of monitor light box D:

• White Status Light - ON (numerous) 9.3 Identifies the following isolation valves in the OPEN position (VB-3):

Main Steam Iso S/G Blowdown FCV-43 FCV-762 FCV-44 FCV-763 9.4 Determines Main Steam Isolation should have actuated based on plant conditions:

• S/G pressure less than 600 psig.

• Trend on S/G press drop > -2 psig/sec 9.5 Closes Isolation Valves:

• FCV-43**

• FCV-762**

• FCV-44**

• FCV-763**

<< ALTERNATE PATH #2 - END POINT >>

CUE: Another operator will continue with Appendix E.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL161-LJCS2 PAGE 7 OF 10 REV . 1

JPM TITLE: SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS2 EVALUATOR W ORKSHEET Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: __________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

NRCL161-LJCS2 PAGE 8 OF 10 REV . 1

JPM

Title:

SSPS Main Steam Line Actuation Failure JPM Number: NRCL161-LJCS2 Attachment 1, Simulator Setup Restore the simulator to IC-10 (100%, MOL).

Run Lesson NRCL161-LJCS2.lsn Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

NRCL161-LJCS2 PAGE 9 OF 10 REV . 1

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL161-LJCS2 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

• Unit 1 has experience a reactor trip due to a due to a large seismic event.

• The crew has completed their immediate actions and entered E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

• No personnel are in containment at this time.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform EOP E-0, Appendix E.

NRCL161-LJCS2 PAGE 10 OF 10 REV . 1

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161LJCS3

Title:

Prepare for RCS Depressurization during a Steam Generator Tube Rupture Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: _______

minutes Comments:

References:

EOP E3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Rev 39 Alternate Path: Yes ______ X _ No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 11.5 Job Designation: RO or SRO Rev Comments: New Gen KA / Rating: 010.A2.03 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR PCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or 3.3 / 3.7 mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: PORV failures.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 08/07/2016 OPERATIONS CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 08/11/2016 REPRESENTATIVE:

REV. 1

JPM TITLE: Prepare for RCS Depressurization during a Steam JPM NUMBER: NRCL161LJCS3 Generator Tube Rupture EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The student will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials: EOP E3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Rev 39 Initial Conditions Given:

A SGTR occurred on the 12 S/G, causing an SI.

EOP E0 was completed, and EOP E3 is in progress.

Progress in EOP E3 is now to the point where a cooldown is in progress, per step 9, using condenser steam dumps.

Initiating Cue: The SFM directs you to perform steps 1116 of EOP E3 while the cooldown continues per step 9 instructions, and then report back to the SFM.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: The failed open PZR PORV PCV474 is isolated by closing Block Valve 8000A before Pressurizer Level rises above 74%.

NRCL161LJCS3 PAGE 2 OF 9 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: Prepare for RCS Depressurization during a Steam JPM NUMBER: NRCL161LJCS3 Generator Tube Rupture EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 References EOP E3.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

2. Step 11.a - Check intact S/G levels > 2.1 Observes that ALL S/G levels are > 15%

15%. (VB3).

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Note: Levels are within specified band.

Examinee may leave LCVs in AUTO for MDAFP, or throttle in MAN, as desired.

3. Step 11.b Control feedflow to 3.1 Maintains S/G levels 2065%.

maintain S/G NR Level between 20%

and 65%.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Note: TDAFW pump is not required if both MDAFW pumps are providing adequate feed flow.

4. Step 11.c - Check TDAFW required for 4.1 Determines TDAFW is NOT required for heat removal. heat removal (VB3).

4.2 Observes that ALL S/G levels are > 16%.

4.3 Secures TDAFW (closed FCV95, VB3).

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL161LJCS3 PAGE 3 OF 9 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: Prepare for RCS Depressurization during a Steam JPM NUMBER: NRCL161LJCS3 Generator Tube Rupture EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Note: TDAFW pump LCVs are CLOSED from previous steps in the event flow path.

Examinee may elect to OPEN valves not associated with S/G 12 since pump is no longer running.

5. Step 11.d - Throttle TD AFW LCVs as 5.1 Throttles TDAFP LCVs as desired (VB3).

necessary to maintain S/G Level.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

6. Step 12.a - Check Power to Block 6.1 Observes that power is available to ALL Valves AVAILABLE Pressurizer PORV Block Valves (VB2).

Step 12.b - Check PRZ PORVS - 6.2 Observes that PCV455C, PCV456, and CLOSED. PCV474 are closed.

Step 12.c - Check Block Valves - 6.3 Observes that 8000A, 8000B, and 8000C OPEN. are open.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Note: SI was reset in a previous step in the event flow path. Examinee may elect to repreform reset step.

7. Step 13 - RESET Sl. 7.1 Observes SI is reset based on the following:

Red Light (SI) above Monitor Light Box C is OFF (VB1).

PK0821 is OFF (VB3)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL161LJCS3 PAGE 4 OF 9 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: Prepare for RCS Depressurization during a Steam JPM NUMBER: NRCL161LJCS3 Generator Tube Rupture EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Note: Containment Isolation, Phase A was reset in a previous step. Examinee may elect to repreform reset step. Phase B was never active.

8. Step 14 -RESET Both Trains Of 8.1 Observes Phase A is reset based on the Containment Isolation Phase A AND following:

Phase B. Both Red Lights (PH A) above Monitor Light Box B are OFF (VB1).

AR PK0201 is OFF (VB1)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Note: FCV584 (Instrument Air Control Valve) was opened in a previous step.

9. Step 15.a,b - ESTABLISH Instrument 9.1 Observes that FCV584 is already OPEN Air To Containment: (VB4).

9.2 Observes that Instrument Air Header pressure is > 90 psig (VB4).

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

10. Step 16.a,b,c - CHECK Status of RHR 10.1 Observes both RHR pumps are running, Pumps: with suction aligned to the RWST (VB1).

Observes that RCS pressure is well above 10.2 300 psig (VB2).

10.3 Stops both RHR pumps.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL161LJCS3 PAGE 5 OF 9 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: Prepare for RCS Depressurization during a Steam JPM NUMBER: NRCL161LJCS3 Generator Tube Rupture EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

<< ALTERNATE PATH START POINT >>

Note: PCV474 fails 2% open when first RHR pump is secured in the previous step.

It can be isolated via the block valve. The effect on pressure is minimal. Step 12.b, Check PRZ PORVS - CLOSED, is a Continuous Action Step, which may be returned to for placekeeping purposes.

11.** Step 12.b - Check PRZ PORVS - 11.1 Observes PCV474 indicated midposition CLOSED (Continuous Action Step) (OPEN). Entered Response Not Obtained (RNO) column.

11.2 Checks RCS Pressure LESS THAN 2335 psig (PORV open setpoint) (VB2).

11.3 Turns PCV474 control switch to CLOSE.

11.4 Observes no change in PCV474 position indication light.

11.5 Closes 8000A PORV Block Valve **

<< ALTERNATE PATH END POINT >>

CUE: Other operators will continue with EOP E3 actions Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

NRCL161LJCS3 PAGE 6 OF 9 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: Prepare for RCS Depressurization during a Steam JPM NUMBER: NRCL161LJCS3 Generator Tube Rupture EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: __________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

NRCL161LJCS3 PAGE 7 OF 9 REV. 1

JPM

Title:

Prepare for RCS Depressurization during a JPM Number: NRCL161LJCS3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Attachment 1, Simulator Setup Restore the simulator to IC210. The simulator is setup at the end of the cooldown in EOP E3, and is ready for RCS depressurization.

Run Lesson NRCL161LJCS3.lsn Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

NRCL161LJCS3 PAGE 8 OF 9 REV. 1

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL161LJCS3 Initial Conditions: Given:

A SGTR occurred on the 12 S/G, causing an SI.

EOP E0 was completed, and EOP E3 is in progress.

Progress in EOP E3 is now to the point where a cooldown is in progress, per step 9, using condenser steam dumps.

Initiating Cue: The SFM directs you to perform steps 1116 of EOP E3 while the cooldown continues per step 9 instructions, and then report back to the SFM.

NRCL161LJCS3 PAGE 9 OF 9 REV. 1

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-LJCS4

Title:

Initiate Bleed and Feed for a Loss of Heat Sink Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

References:

EOP FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Rev.30 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 10 minutes Critical Steps: 2.1, 7.3 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: Bank LJC-116 DCPP Task # / Rating: 196800, 889200, 317800, 875800, 169600 3.3 / 3.5 / 3.3 / 3.7 / 3.0 Gen KA # / Rating: E05.EA1.1 4.1 / 4.0 AUTHOR : LISA TORIBIO DATE: 08/10/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 08/11/16 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Bleed and Feed for a Loss of Heat Sink JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue.

The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the steps with which to begin.

Required Materials: Provide a copy of the reference procedure (partial procedure allowed), if the task is being done in the plant or lab.

Initial Conditions: Given:

Unit 1 has experienced a loss of secondary heat sink. EOP FR-H.1 has been implemented and all efforts to establish AFW, MFW, and condensate flow have failed Initiating Cue: At least 3 steam generator wide range levels are less than 18% and the SFM directs you to establish and verify RCS bleed and feed per EOP FR-H.1, FOP Item #5.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: RCS bleed and feed has been established and verified as required by EOP FR H.1, Steps 12-18 such that the following conditions are satisfied:

• At least 1 ECCS High or Intermediate Head Pump is running:

CCP1-1 CCP1-2 SIP1-1 SIP1-2

• At least 2 Pressurizer PORVs are OPEN:

PCV-455C PCV-474 PCV-456

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Bleed and Feed for a Loss of Heat Sink JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 References EOP FR-H.1.

1.2 Reads CAUTION prior to Step 12.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 2. Step 12 - Actuate Safety Injection. ** 2.1 Positions the SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATE switch on CC-2 or VB-1 to ACTUATE.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

3. Step 13 - Verify RCS feed paths. 3.1 Observes that at least one CCP or one SI pump is running.

3.2 Observes that ECCS valves are in their proper emergency alignment on the VB1 and VB2 mimic.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Bleed and Feed for a Loss of Heat Sink JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

4. Step 14 - Reset Safety Injection. Note: The 60 second SI timer will have to time out before SI can be reset.

4.1 Depresses the SAFETY INJECTION RESET TRAIN A and TRAIN B pushbuttons.

4.2 Verifies that SI is reset by observing PK08- 22 ON and/or SI Monitor Box red status light OFF.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

5. Step 15 - Reset Containment Isolation Phase A 5.1 Depresses the CONTMT ISOL PHASE A RESET and Phase B. pushbutton.

5.2 Verifies Phase A red lights are OFF or PK02-01 is OFF.

5.3 Observes that Phase B is NOT actuated or depresses the Phase B RESET pushbuttons.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Bleed and Feed for a Loss of Heat Sink JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

6. Step 16 - Establish instrument air to 6.1 Opens FCV-584 (VB4) containment.

6.2 Verifies that FCV-584 has opened.

6.3 Observes that instrument air header pressure is

> 90 psig on PI-380.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 7. Step 17 - Establish RCS bleed path. 7.1 Observes that power is available to the PORV block valves (VB2):

o 8000A o 8000B o 8000C 7.2 Observes that PORV block valves are already open as indicated by illuminated RED position light (VB2).

o 8000A o 8000B o 8000C Note: Min of two PORVs OPEN to meet critical step.

• • 7.3 Opens all PORVs by taking switches to the OPEN position.

o PCV-474 o PCV-455C o PCV-456 7.4 Verifies all PORVs have opened as indicated by Red lights ON / Green Lights OFF.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Bleed and Feed for a Loss of Heat Sink JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

8. Step 18 - Verify adequate RCS bleed path. 8.1 Observes that at least two PZR PORVs and associated block valves have opened.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 6 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Bleed and Feed for a Loss of Heat Sink JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 7 of 9 Rev. 0

JPM TITLE: Initiate Bleed and Feed for a Loss of Heat Sink JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS4 ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP INIT to IC 223. (ONLY IF no IC available, you can create conditions as follows; DON'T use if IC 223 works):

• IC-10, then run lesson drl_1053

• When drill complete, use 10%ers to B/D 3 S/Gs to < 18% (use max chrg during depress)

• 10%ers to normal and FRZ once stable (takes about 20 min)

This SNAP allows entry into EOP FR-H.1 at Step 12. Three (3) steam generator wide range levels are < 18% and steam generator 10% steam dumps are in AUTO at 8.38 turns.

Perform the following:

1. Display the E-0 screen on SPDS panel A.

2. Display the CSF-3 screen on SPDS panel B.

Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

Page 8 of 9 Rev. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS4 Initial Conditions: Given:

Unit 1 has experienced a loss of secondary heat sink. EOP FR-H.1 has been implemented and all efforts to establish AFW, MFW, and condensate flow have failed Initiating Cue: At least 3 steam generator wide range levels are less than 18% and the SFM directs you to establish and verify RCS bleed and feed per EOP FR-H.1, FOP Item #5.

Page 9 of 9 Rev. 0

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-LJCS5

Title:

Initiate Containment Spray Manually Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

References:

EOP FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, Rev. 12 Alternate Path: Yes _____ _ No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 10 minutes Critical Steps: 3.1, 4.2 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: Bank LJC-010 DCPP Task # / Rating: 849200, 835600 3.7 / 3.6 Gen KA # / Rating: E14.EA1.1 3.7 / 3.7 AUTHOR : LISA TORIBIO DATE: 09/11/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 09/11/16 REV. 1

JPM TITLE: Initiate Containment Spray Manually JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue.

The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. If the task is being done in the plant or lab, and after identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told what step to begin the task at.

Required Materials: Provide a copy of the reference procedure (partial procedure allowed), if the task is being done in the plant or lab.

Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 1 experienced a LOCA

• EOP E-1 is in progress and Safety Injection is reset

• Containment pressure is > 25 psig

• A MAGENTA path on the Containment Critical Safety Function Status Tree has been confirmed

• All higher priority critical safety functions have been addressed Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to manually initiate containment spray in accordance with EOP FR-Z.1 DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: Containment spray is manually initiated and aligned for injection phase in accordance with EOP FR-Z.1, Step 3 such that:

• Containment Spray Pumps 1-1 and 1-2 are both running

• Containment Spray Pump Discharge Valves 9001A and 9001B are OPEN Prior to the completion of FR-Z.1.

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 7 Rev. 1

JPM TITLE: Initiate Containment Spray Manually JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 References EOP FR Z.1.

Cue: Start with Step 3.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

2. Step 3 - Check if containment spray is required. 2.1 Checks if EOP ECA-1.1 is the procedure in effect.

If asked about ECA-1.1, provide the following:

Cue: Refer to Initial Conditions.

2.2 Determines Containment Spray IS required -

containment pressure is greater than 22 psig (PI-934, PI-935, PI-936, PI-937 on VB1)

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 3. Step 3.d - RNO Start the containment spray ** 3.1 Turns control switches to the START position for pumps. containment spray pumps 1-1 and 1-2 (VB1)

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 7 Rev. 1

JPM TITLE: Initiate Containment Spray Manually JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

• • 4. Step 3.e - Checks containment spray system for 4.1 Determines that ECCS is NOT aligned for proper valve alignment. injection flow based on Containment Spray Pump Discharge Valves 9001A and 9001B position indication lights (VB1):

• Red lights OFF / Green Lights ON

• • 4.2 Takes control switch for 9001A and B to OPEN position and verifies valve position lights indicate OPEN (VB1):

• Red lights ON / Green Lights OFF 4.3 Verifies 8992 open.

4.4 Verifies 8994A&B open.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 7 Rev. 1

JPM TITLE: Initiate Containment Spray Manually JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS5 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes Critical Step and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 7 Rev. 1

JPM TITLE: Initiate Containment Spray Manually JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS5 ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize the simulator to IC-10 (100%, MOL).

Enter Lesson File drl_1010.lsn.

Perform the following:

1. Place FCV-53 and 54 in RECIRC.

2. Shut down condensate booster pump set 13, if running.

3. Select CSF-5 on SPDS.

After the simulator goes to FREEZE, Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet and has verified containment pressure greater than 22 psig (containment pressure lowers quickly from CFCU cooling once the simulator is taken to RUN).

Page 6 of 7 Rev. 1

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS5 Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 1 experienced a LOCA

• EOP E-1 is in progress and Safety Injection is reset

• Containment pressure is > 25 psig

• A MAGENTA path on the Containment Critical Safety Function Status Tree has been confirmed

• All higher priority critical safety functions have been addressed Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to manually initiate containment spray in accordance with EOP FR-Z.1 Page 7 of 7 Rev. 1

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-LJCS6

Title:

Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

References:

EOP ECA-0.3, Restore 4kV Buses, Appendix X and Appendix Q, Rev. 18 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 2.1, 3.1, 5.2, 6.1, 7.1, 9.2, 10.1, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 13.1, 13.2, 13.3, 17.1 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: Bank LJC-032 DCPP Task # / Rating: 573800 3.5 Gen KA # / Rating: 064.A4.06 3.9 / 3.9 AUTHOR : LISA TORIBIO DATE: 09/11/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 09/11/16 REV.1

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue.

The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the steps with which to begin.

Required Materials: Provide a copy of the reference procedure (partial procedure allowed), if the task is being done in the plant or lab.

Initial Conditions: Given:

• U-1 was operating at 100%.

• A reactor trip and safety injection has occurred concurrent with a loss of all off-site power.

• Diesel generator 11 and diesel generator 13 have failed due to lube oil pressure problems.

• Diesel generator 12 is supplying 4kV bus G.

• CCW Pp 12 has failed resulting in a complete loss of CCW flow.

• Steps 4.a and 4.b of ECA-0.3, Appendix X have been completed.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to crosstie 4kV bus G to energize 4kV and 480V bus H per EOP ECA-0.3, Appendix X, commencing at step 4.c. The Shift Manager has concurred with this implementation.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: 4KV and 480 V bus H are energized from DG 1-2 in accordance with ECA-0.3, appendix X as indicated by the following:

• Vital 4kV Startup Feeder Breaker OPEN: 52-HG-15

• 4kV Startup Feeder Breakers CLOSED: 52-HH-14 and 52-HG-14

• 4kV to 480V bus Feeder Breaker CLOSED: 52-HH-10

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 12 Rev.1

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 References ECA-0.3, Appendix X, step 4.c.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 2. Step 4.c - Verify OPEN the 4kV to 480 VAC bus ** 2.1 Opens 52-HH-10 (VB4).

feeder breaker for the de-energized bus to be reenergized 2.2 Verifies that 52-HH-10 has opened (VB4).

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

3. Step 4.d - On the de-energized 480V bus to be ** 3.1 Calls the operator in the field to open all 480V reenergized, open all 480V breakers. Bus H breakers.

Note: 480V Bus H breakers are in the correct OPEN position for this JPM. Inform the Examinee that Time Compression is being used.

Cue: (using time compression) An Operator has opened all the 480V breakers on bus 1H.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 12 Rev.1

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

4. Step 4.e - Cut in the DIR PWR, LOSS OF FIELD, & 4.1 Places D/G DIR PWR, LOSS OF FLD & BKR OC BKR OC PROT RLYS for diesel generator 12. PROT RLYS C/O SW to CUT-IN (VB4).

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 5. Step 4.f - Reset SI. 5.1 Checks PK08-21 Safety Injection Actuation status (VB3).

• • 5.2 Manually depresses both pushbuttons.

5.3 Checks at least one of the following:

Monitor Light Box B Safety Injection red light OFF (VB1).

OR PK08-21, Safety Injection Actuation not ON (VB3).

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 6. Step 4.g - Cutout the auto transfer FCOs for ** 6.1 Places all Xfer to S/U PWR C/O toggle switch to 4kV and 12kV buses. CUT-OUT (VB4, VB5).

Vital 4kV Non-Vital 4kV 12 kV Bus F ** Bus D Bus D Bus G ** Bus E Bus E Bus H **

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 12 Rev.1

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

• • 7. Step 4.h - Depress all auto transfer reset ** 7.1 Depresses all AUTO XFER RESET pushbuttons, if pushbuttons. required (VB4, VB5).

Vital 4kV Non-Vital 4kV 12 kV Bus F ** Bus D Bus D Bus G ** Bus E Bus E Bus H **

7.2 Verifies that all Auto Xfer indicating blue lights are off. (VB4, VB5).

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

8. Step 4.i - Verify OPEN all vital 4kV bus auxiliary 8.1 Observes that all vital 4kV bus aux feeder feeder breakers. breakers are OPEN (VB4):

• 52-HH-13 OPEN

• 52-HG-13 OPEN

• 52-HF-13 OPEN Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 9. Step 4.j - Verify OPEN all vital 4kV bus startup 9.1 Observes 52-HG-14 is OPEN (VB4).

feeder breakers.

• • 9.2 Opens Startup Feeder Breakers (VB4)

• 52-HF-14

• 52-HH-14 Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 12 Rev.1

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

• • 10. Step 4.k - Verify OPEN the 4kV startup feeder ** 10.1 Opens 52-HG-15 (VB4).

breaker 52-HG-15.

10.2 Verifies that 52-HG-15 has opened Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

11. Step 4.l - Verify that Steps 4.b and 4.c of this 11.1 Reads CAUTION and NOTE.

appendix are complete.

Cue: Another operator will monitor the stability of the DG, and open the S/U feeder breaker if needed.

If requests status of steps 4.b and 4.c, provide the following cue:

Cue: Refer to your initial conditions Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 6 of 12 Rev.1

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

• • 12. Step 4.m - Close 4kV startup feeder breaker for ** 12.1 Inserts sync key for 4kV bus H startup feeder the de-energized bus being reenergized. breaker 52-HH-14 (VB4).

• • 12.2 Turns sync switch to ON.

• • 12.3 Closes 52-HH-14.

12.4 Verifies that 52-HH-14 has closed.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 13. Step 4.n - Close the 4kV startup feeder breaker ** 13.1 Inserts sync key for 4kV bus G startup feeder for the bus that will be supplying power to the breaker 52-HG-14 (VB4).

de-energized bus

• • 13.2 Turns sync switch to ON.

• • 13.3 Closes 52-HG-14.

13.4 Verifies that 52-HG-14 has closed.

13.5 Verifies running diesel generator remains stable.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 7 of 12 Rev.1

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

14. Step 4.o - Monitors for an SI 14.1 **********************************

Cue: Another operator will monitor for an SI, and open the bus G S/U feeder if required.

15. Step 4.p - IMPLEMENT Appendix Q to start 4kV 15.1 **************************************

loads as needed on the reenergized bus Cue: An operator has been stationed at VB4 with Appendix Q and is monitoring the diesel generator.

Cue: The SFM will coordinate the starting of any 4KV loads that are required.

Please continue with Appendix X.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

16. Step 4.q - Verify that Step 4.d of this Appendix 16.1 Verifies that Step 4.d of this Appendix is is complete PRIOR to performing the next step. complete.

Cue: Steps 4.d of this appendix is complete.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 17. Step 4.r - Close the 4kV to 480V bus feeder ** 17.1 Closes 52-HH-10.

breaker for the reenergized bus.

Verifies that 52-HH-10 has closed.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 8 of 12 Rev.1

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

18. Step 4.s - Implement Appendix Q for starting 18.1 Implements Appendix Q for starting 480V bus 480V loads as needed. loads as needed.

Cue: The SFM will coordinate the starting of 480 vac loads that are required.

Another operator will monitor and implement App Q.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 9 of 12 Rev.1

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS6 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 10 of 12 Rev.1

JPM TITLE: Crosstie of Vital BUS G to H JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS6 ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP Restore the simulator to the IC-10 (100%, MOL).

Enter lesson file drl_1032 or manually insert the following:

Command Description Insert loa_sis3 OPEN delay=60 Strips vital 4KV Bus H Insert loa_rhr10 OPEN delay=60 Insert loa_css8 OPEN delay=60 Insert loa_ccw31 OPEN delay=60 Insert loa_afw14 OPEN delay=60 Insert dsc_ven14 OPEN delay=60 Insert mal_deg1a 2 Fails DGs 1-1 and 1-3 Insert mal_deg1c 2 Insert mal_syd1 1 Loss of Offsite Power Insert mal_syd1_btw 1 Insert mal_ppl2a 1 Inadvertant SI delIA mal_ppl2a 2 delay=2 insert mal_ppl2b 1 delIA mal_ppl2b 2 delay=2 Insert pmp_ccw2 4 delay=4 OC trip on CCW PP 1-2 RUN Runs simulator Run lesson drl_0063 (Strips 480v bus H). Manual insert is not practical due to large number of actions.

Freeze simulator Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

Page 11 of 12 Rev.1

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS6 Initial Conditions: Given:

• U-1 was operating at 100%.

• A reactor trip and safety injection has occurred concurrent with a loss of all off-site power.

• Diesel generator 11 and diesel generator 13 have failed due to lube oil pressure problems.

• Diesel generator 12 is supplying 4kV bus G.

• CCW Pp 12 has failed resulting in a complete loss of CCW flow.

• Steps 4.a and 4.b of ECA-0.3, Appendix X have been completed.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to crosstie 4kV bus G to energize 4kV and 480V bus H per EOP ECA-0.3, Appendix X, commencing at step 4.c. The Shift Manager has concurred with this implementation.

Page 12 of 12 Rev.1

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL161-LJCS7

Title:

Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation Examinee: ____________________________________________

Evaluator: ______________________________ ________________________________ __________________

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat __________ Unsat __________ Total Time: __________ minutes Comments:

References:

OP AP-8A, Control Room Inaccessibility - Establishing Hot Stby, Rev. 41 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 2.2, 6.1, 7.2, 7.4, 8.1, 9.2, 10.1, 11.2 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/LRN TIPS: Bank LJC-021 DCPP Task # / Rating: 805200 4.2 Gen KA # / Rating: 068.AA1.23 4.3 / 4.4 AUTHOR : LISA TORIBIO DATE: 09/11/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 09/11/16 REV.1

JPM TITLE: Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue.

The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the steps with which to begin.

Required Materials: Provide a copy of the reference procedure (partial procedure allowed), if the task is being done in the plant or lab.

Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 1 is at 100% power.

• The Security Shift Supervisor has informed the Shift Foreman that a credible bomb threat has been received and that he recommends evacuation of the control room.

• Conditions in the control room are not extreme.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform the actions required in OP AP-8A prior to evacuation of the control room.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: The Control Room actions for OP AP-8A, Control Room Inaccessibility - Establishing Hot Standby have been performed such that:

• Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers are OPEN

• MSIVs FCV-41, 42, 43, 44 and MSIV Bypass Valves FCV-25, 24, 23, 22 are CLOSED

• Charging is aligned to the RWST (8805A or B are OPEN, LCV-112B or 112C are CLOSED)

• All Four Reactor Coolant Pumps are Tripped

• Letdown is isolated (8149A, B, and C are CLOSED)

• Auto Transfer Relays for Vital 4kV Buses F, G, and H are reset

• Only 1 Condensate Booster Pump Set is running by the completion of OP AP-8A, step 10.

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 2 of 10 Rev.1

JPM TITLE: Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 References OP AP-8A.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 2. Step 1 - Manually trip the reactor. 2.1 Reads Note.

• • 2.2 Trips the reactor using the reactor trip switch (CC1).

2.3 Checks reactor trip and bypass breakers open (VB2).

2.4 Checks rod bottom lights ON (VB2).

2.5 Checks reactor power decreasing (CC1).

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

3. Step 2 - Determine immediate evacuation is 3.1 Reads CAUTION.

not required.

3.2 Determines immediate evacuation is not required.

Cue: Immediate evacuation is not required.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 3 of 10 Rev.1

JPM TITLE: Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

4. Step 3 - Ensure turbine tripped. 4.1 Determines all 4 stop valves closed by checking

• SSPS Bi-Stable Status Lights, directly beneath PK4 Annunciator Panel (VB2).

OR

• Stop Valve Position on Triconex Graphical User Interface (CC3).

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

5. Step 4 - Manually initiate a Unit trip and verify 5.1 Trips the Unit using the Unit trip switch (CC3).

bus transfers.

5.2 Checks all 4kV and 12kV buses transfer to startup power by checking

• white power status lights (VB4, VB5) 5.3 Checks all vital 4kV buses are energized by checking:

• white power status lights (VB4, VB5)

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 6. Step 5 - Manually close MSIVs and bypass ** 6.1 Closes ALL MSIVs (VB3).

valves.

• FCV-42

• FCV-41

• FCV-43

• FCV-44 6.2 Checks MSIVs position indication lights:

• Red lights OFF / Green Lights ON (VB3) 6.3 Checks all bypass valves closed as indicated by Red lights OFF / Green Lights ON for:

• FCV-25

• FCV-24

• FCV-23

• FCV-22 Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 4 of 10 Rev.1

JPM TITLE: Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

• • 7. Step 6 - Transfer charging suction to the RWST. 7.1 Reads Note.

• • 7.2 Opens 8805A OR 8805B (VB2).

7.3 Checks valve(s) are open (VB2)

• Red lights ON / Green Lights OFF Note: Step 7.4 is NOT required if VCT pressure is less than 28 psig.

VCT Pressure:____________ (VB2, YR-763)

• • 7.4 Closes LCV-112B OR 112C (VB2).

7.5 Checks valve closed (VB2)

• Red lights OFF / Green Lights ON Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 8. Step 7 - Trip all reactor coolant pumps. ** 8.1 Trips ALL reactor coolant pumps (VB2).

8.2 Checks pumps tripped based on the following (VB2):

• RED power light OFF

• Lowering Amps Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 9. Step 8 - Isolate letdown. 9.1 Verifies CLOSED 8149A, 8149B (VB2)

• Red lights OFF / Green Lights ON

• • 9.2 Closes 8149 C

• Red lights OFF / Green Lights ON Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 5 of 10 Rev.1

JPM TITLE: Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

• • 10. Step 9.a - Reset 4kV Vital auto transfer relays. ** 10.1 Resets 4kV Vital bus auto transfer relays (VB4).

10.2 Checks relays reset by verifying:

• Blue Status Light for associated bus: OFF

• Associated 4kV Auto Transfer Annunciator goes out (AR PK16-19, PK17-19, PK18-19)

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • 11. Step 9.b - Shutdown all but one running 11.1 Checks MAN/AUTO selector switch in MAN for condensate/booster pump sets. pump set(s) to be secured (VB3).

• • 11.2 Stops all but one condensate/booster pump set.

11.3 Checks pump(s) shutdown:

• RED power light OFF

• Amps lowering to Zero Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

12. Step 9.c - Open or check open RCS hot leg and 12.1 Checks open NSS-9356A and 9356B (VB1):

pressurizer liquid space sample valves.

• Red lights ON / Green Lights OFF 12.2 Checks open NSS-9355A and 9355B (VB1):

• Red lights ON / Green Lights OFF Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 6 of 10 Rev.1

JPM TITLE: Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

13. Step 10 - Collect equipment needed from the 13.1 Collects the fire brigade, security key rings, and control room. radios.

Cue: The Shift Foreman will transport the Fire Brigade, security key rings, and radios to the hot shutdown panel.

Step was: Sat __________ Unsat __________

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 7 of 10 Rev.1

JPM TITLE: Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS7 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

• • Denotes Critical Steps and Sub-Steps Page 8 of 10 Rev.1

JPM TITLE: Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS7 ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP Restore the simulator to the IC-10 (100%, MOL).

Set up for trend recording of VCT Pressure.

Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

Page 9 of 10 Rev.1

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER : NRCL161-LJCS7 Initial Conditions: Given:

• Unit 1 is at 100% power.

• The Security Shift Supervisor has informed the Shift Foreman that a credible bomb threat has been received and that he recommends evacuation of the control room.

• Conditions in the control room are not extreme.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform the actions required in OP AP-8A prior to evacuation of the control room.

Page 10 of 10 Rev.1

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 1 OpTest No: L161 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 2% with AFW in service, backfeeding from 500 kV, BOL, 1609 ppm boron Turnover: At start of OP L3, preparing MFPs to place in service.

Event Malf Event Event Description No No. Type* (See Summary for Narrative Detail) 1 XMT_CVC19_3 0.0 delay=0 I (ATC, LT112 Fails Low (auto makeup) (AP19, AP5) ramp=120 SRO) 2 DSC_VEN12 BREAKER_OPEN TS only Loss of Power to S31 (PK1517; T.S. 3.7.12.B)

(SRO) 3 AS01ASW_ASP11_MTFSEIZUR 1 TS, C ASW Pp 11 Seizes; Pp 12 SF6 Breaker Pressure Fault (AP10, (BOP, T.S. 3.0.3)

AS02E03V00_52HG6TF_SF6 2 SRO) 4 XMT_MSS1_3 1215 delay=0 I (ATC, PT507 Fails High (AP5) ramp=300 SRO) 5 MAL_RCS3G .75 delay=0 ramp=300 M (ALL) 750 gpm LOCA on Loop 4 Hot Leg due to earthquake 6 MAL_PPL3B BOTH C (BOP) Safety Injection, Train B fails to actuate 7 VLV_SIS1_1 1 C (ATC) 8803 A Fails closed on SI (S1CT1) 8 MAL_SEI1 0.1500000 ramp=10 C (ALL) RWST drains to less than 4% due to seismic damage (S1CT2)

ASISRWST 1.53e6 delay=10 ramp=300

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L161 NRC ESD101 r4.docx Page 1 of 3 Rev 4

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES3014) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 1,3,4,5,6,7,8) 7

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (12) (Events 6,7,8) 3

3. Abnormal events (1-4) (Events 1,3,4) 3

4. Major transients (12) (Event 5) 1

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E1.3) 1

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) (ECA1.1) 1

7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See description below) 2 Critical Task Justification Reference (S1CT1) Manually align at least one train of FSAR analysis predicates acceptable results on the WCAP17711NP, CT2 SIS actuated safeguards before transition assumption that, at the very least, one train of WOG Background out of EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety safeguards has actuated and is providing flow to HE0BG_R2 Injection. the core. Failure to manually align the minimum required safeguards equipment results in the persistence of degraded emergency core cooling system capacity.

(S1CT2) Stop all running ECCS pumps with Damage to the RWST in this scenario results in a WCAP17711NP, CT28 suction aligned to the RWST before continuous loss of level and eventual inability to WOG Background insufficient RWST level results in ECCS meet the minimum NPSH requirements for the HECA11BG_R2 pump cavitation as indicated by rapid running ECCS pumps. Failure to stop the pumps swings in pump amperage. before cavitation occurs can lead to pump damage sufficient to render the pumps unavailable for use once an alternate makeup supply is aligned to the RCS.

Per NUREG1021, Appendix D, if an operator or crew significantly deviates from or fails to follow procedures that affect the maintenance of basic safety functions, those actions may form the basis of a CT identified in the postscenario review.

L161 NRC ESD101 r4.docx Page 2 of 3 Rev 4

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #1

1. Volume Control Tank (VCT) level channel LT112 fails low, causing a continuous (and erroneous) makeup signal. The crew diagnoses the level channel failure by comparing other VCT parameters, and by using OP AP19, Malfunction of the Reactor Makeup Control System. The makeup system is secured, and makeup is accomplished (if needed) using manual mode (or enabling the auto mode for short periods).

May elect to use OP AP5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel to take manual control of Makeup Control System.

2. Auxiliary Building Supply Fan S31 loses power and crew responds per AR PK1517, AUX & FHB VENT PWR FAILURE. Auxiliary Building Ventilation System, ABVS, which was operating in Buildings and Safeguards, swaps to Safeguards only. Crew verifies automatic shutdown of Supply E2 as well as auto swap to Safeguards only alignment for the ABVS. Shift Foreman enters TS 3.7.12.B, Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (ABVS) for one ABVS train inoperable.

3. ASW Pump 11 trips due to a seized shaft. Standby ASW Pump 12 fails to start as the result of a fault at the breaker (SF6 pressure fault). The Shift Foreman implements OP AP10, Loss of Auxiliary Salt Water and crossties to the Unit 2 ASW system via the ASW crosstie valve FCV601. Shift Foreman enters T.S.

3.0.3 for two trains of ASW inoperable on Unit 1.

4. Steam Generator Header Pressure Transmitter, PT507, fails high over 5 minutes causing actual temperature to lower. Crew identifies malfunction noting increase in steam flow and lowering Tcold, and takes manual control of HC507. OP AP5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel is used to address the failure and return primary and secondary plant parameters to normal bands.

5. An earthquake occurs, causing a 750 gpm leak to ramp in on loop 4 hot leg. The crew determines the leak is substantial in size based on a rapid drop in pressurizer level. The Shift Foreman directs a reactor trip and safety injection.

6. The crew enters EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Train B of Safety Injection fails to actuate, requiring the crew to perform numerous manual alignments and pump starts as part of Appendix E.

7. Charging Injection Supply Valve, CVCS18803A fails to open on SI as well. The crew must open 8803A or its parallel equivalent, CVCS18803B in order to meet the requirements of S1CT1, Manually actuate at least one train of SIS actuated safeguards before transition out of EOP E0.***

8. The seismic event damages the RWST, resulting in a large fissure that terminates close to the bottom of the tank. The crew briefly enters E1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant prior to transitioning to E 1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation when RWST level reaches 33%, which happens quickly due to the leaking RWST. With the Containment Recirc Sump Level less than 92%, the crew is forced into EOP ECA 1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation. The fissure location causes the RWST to continue to drain, requiring the crew to perform the second critical task S1CT2 - Stop ECCS pumps aligned to the RWST before insufficient level results in ECCS pump cavitation.***

The scenario is terminated once the crew has implemented Appendix W, RCS Makeup from VCT.

• • • CT / TCOA note:

L161 NRC ESD101 r4.docx Page 3 of 3 Rev 4

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 3 OpTest No: L161 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% MOL, 878 ppm boron Turnover: OOS Equipment: PT403 Event Malf Event Event Description No No. Type* (See Summary for Narrative Detail) 1 CC01CCW_CCP11_MTFSHEAR 1 TS, C CCW Pp 11 Shaft Shear (AR PK0111, AR PK0109, AR PK01 (BOP, 08, AP11; TS 3.7.7.A)

SRO) 2 EECIX5213D5_51TF_ACT 1 C (ATC, Pressurizer Heater Group #1 Over Current Trip (AR PK0519, SRO) OP A4A:I) 3 MAL_PPL7J 1 TS, I Eagle 21 DFP1 Halt in Rack 10 (AP5; T.S. 3.3.1.D,E,M; (BOP, 3.3.2.D, L; 3.4.11 )

SRO) 4 LOA_TUR28 0 C (ALL) Main Turbine Stop Valve #2 (Loop 1) Closes (PK0406, PK 08 12) 5 CNV_MFW6_2 1 delay=0 ramp=30 M (ALL) Loop 4 FW Reg Fails to 100%, P14 (High S/G Level Trip)

Failure (S3CT3) 6 MAL_MFW5D 2e+007 cd='fnispr lt M (ALL) Feedline Header Break Inside Containment on S/G 14 5' delay =0 ramp=10 (S3CT2) 7 MAL_EPS4D_2 DIFFERENTIAL C (ATC) 4kV Bus G Bus Transfer Failure; Isolate feedflow from TDAFW cd='fnispr lt 5' as part of Critical Task (S3CT1, partial) 8 VLV_MFW4_2 1 C (BOP) FCV441 fails open; Isolate feedflow as part of Critical Task (S3CT1, partial) delIA VLV_MFW4_2 2 cd=V3_193S_1

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L161 NRC ESD103 r3.docx Page 1 of 4 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES3014) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8) 8

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (12) (Events 7,8) 2

3. Abnormal events (1-4) (Events 1,2,3,4) 4

4. Major transients (12) (Event 5,6) 2

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E2, E1.1) 2

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0

7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See description below) 3 Critical Task Justification Reference (S3CT1) Manually isolate feedline break Failure to isolate feed flow into containment leads WOG Background before containment wide range sump level to an unnecessary and avoidable severe challenge HFRZ2BG_R2 reaches 94 feet (LI940 & LI941), resulting to the containment integrity safety function as a in a magenta path on the Containment result of flooding.

safety function status tree.

(S3CT2) Terminate ECCS flow before The feedline rupture introduced in this scenario DCPP Design Criteria overfill of the RCS results in a rupturing of results in a Safety Injection due to shrinkage and a Memorandum S7: Reactor the pressurizer relief tank (PRT) as slightly overcooled condition in the RCS. Once Coolant System indicated by a PRT pressure drop and isolated, RCS pressure rises quickly as the result of FSAR Chapter 15, subsequent equalization with wide range ongoing injection flow. Eventually the RCS goes Containment Pressure. solid, with the excess inventory passing water through the Pressure Operated Relief Valves to the PRT. Failure to terminate ECCS flow when it is possible to do so results in a rupture of the PRT and constitutes an avoidable degradation of a fission product barrier.

(S3CT3) Manually trips the reactor before Steam Generator Level above the High High Generic Letter 8128 S/G 14 reaches 92% narrow range. setpoint (P14) normally generates a turbine trip WOG Background signal to protect against high feedwater flow and HFRH3BG_R2 carryover into the steam lines when one out of four S/G has reached a narrow range level greater than 90%. Carryover into the steam lines can result in damage to downstream piping, valves, placing the secondary heat sink at risk.

Per NUREG1021, Appendix D, if an operator or crew significantly deviates from or fails to follow procedures that affect the maintenance of basic safety functions, those actions may form the basis of a CT identified in the postscenario review.

L161 NRC ESD103 r3.docx Page 2 of 4 Rev 3

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #3

1. AR PK0111, CCW Pp 11 Recirc comes into alarm for FCV606, CCW Pump 11 Recirc Valve, open. Crew identifies low pump amps on VB1 and dispatches Nuclear Operator to investigate. Field reports no audible flow sound in spite of indications motor is running. CCW Pump 13 is started manually and CCW Pump 11 shutdown. T.S. 3.7.7.A, Vital Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, is entered for one loop of CCW inoperable.

2. Pressurizer Heater Group #1 trips on over current, bringing in AR PK0519, PZR HTRS OC TRIP/FAN FLO LO. Crew places additional backup heater group in service per OP A4A:I, Pressurizer - Make Available, Section 6.6.

3. Eagle 21 experiences a Digital Filter Processor (DFP) halt on rack 10. Associated indicators PI456, LI 460A, FI415, FI425, FI435, FI445 (VB2), and PR445, LR459 (CC2) fail asis as well as control channels for PORV 456 (PT456) and Pressurizer Level Control (LT460). Crew responds per OP AP5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel. Shift Foreman reviews Tech Specs, entering:

TS 3.3.2.D, PC 456D Low Press SI (72 hrs)

TS 3.3.1.E, PC456A High Press Trip (72 hrs)

TS 3.3.1.M, PC 456C Low Press Trip (72 hrs)

TS 3.3.1.M, LC 460A High Level Trip (72 hrs)

TS 3.3.1.M, FC415(425,435,445) RCS Loop 1 (2,3,4) Flow (72 hrs)

TS 3.3.2.L, PC456 B, P11 (1 hr)

TS 3.4.11.B1, B2, & B3 PC456 E, to close & remove power from associated block valve (1 hr) and restore to operable (72 hrs)

4. Main Turbine Stop Valve #2 (Loop 1) closes, causing a secondary transient, bringing PK 0812, TURB LOAD REJECTION C7A into alarm. Power lowers approximately 10%. Crew may perform a diagnostic brief to identify the cause of the excursion. The crew identifies various indications that the stop valve is fully closed such as deviations in steam flow, temperature, Triconex display, as well as activation of PK0406, PROTECTION CHANNEL ACTIVATED for 1 out of 4 Turb Stm Stop Vlvs Clsd. Power is stabilized per Shift Foremans direction.

5. Loop 4 Feedwater Reg Valve, FCV540, fails full open. The crew identifies the malfunction and attempts to take manual control, but is unsuccessful. Shift Foreman directs manual reactor trip before S/G 14 level reaches the auto trip point of 90%. (S3CT3) Manually trips the reactor before S/G 14 reaches 92% narrow range.

6. On the trip, the feedline header to S/G 14 fails catastrophically, causing S/G 14 to depressurize into containment.

7. Bus G fails to transfer to startup resulting in a loss of power to the TDAFW LCVs and an inability to throttle flow. Feed flow from the pump is isolated during recovery actions as part of critical task S3CT1 (see page 4, below).

8. Feedwater Isolation Valve FCV441 fails open, requiring manual isolation at VB3. (Part of critical task S3CT1, see page 4, below).

L161 NRC ESD103 r3.docx Page 3 of 4 Rev 3

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #3 Crew enters EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and performs their immediate actions. E0 diagnostic steps direct the crew to E2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to perform the critical task of isolating the feedline break. (S3CT1) Manually isolate feedline break before Containment wide range level reaches 94 feet, resulting in a magenta path on the Containment safety function status tree. ***

Once isolated, the Shift Foreman verifies SI termination criteria has been met and transitions to E1.1, SI Termination, performing the critical task of sequentially reducing ECCS flow and realigning the plant to a preSI configuration. (S3CT2) Terminate ECCS flow before overfill of the RCS results in a rupture of the pressurizer relief tank (PRT). ***

The scenario is terminated once normal charging/letdown is aligned in E1.1, ready to perform step 15.

L161 NRC ESD103 r3.docx Page 4 of 4 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 4 Op-Test No: L161 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 71% MOL, 919 ppm boron Turnover: OOS Equipment: CCP 1-2 Event Malf Event Event Description No No. Type* (See Summary for Narrative Detail) 1 MAL_DEG2B FAULT TS, C Fail on D/G 1-2 Manual Start (AR PK17-01; TS 3.8.1.B) cd='h_v4_101m_1 gt 680' (BOP, SRO) 2 VLV_CVC22_2 0.2 delay=0 ramp=15 I (ALL) Regen Hx Isolation Valve, LCV-459, Fails to mid-position (AP-18)

RLY_PPL63 CLOSED (TRUE) 3 TS, I SSPS relay actuation causes inadvertent start of TDAFW (ALL) pump and blowdown sample isolation valves to close (AR PK04-03, OP1.DC10; TS 3.7.5.B) 4 PK1421_0829 1 C (ALL) Loss of Main Transformer Cooling (PK14-21) (**)

5 MAL_GEN1_3 TRUE M (ALL) Main Transformer Unit Trips causing a Turbine trip; Buses transfer to Start-Up Power (PK14-01, PK12-11, AP-25) 6 MAL_PPL5A 3, MAL_PPL5B 3 M (ALL) ATWS; rod control malfunction; CT to add negative reactivity V5_245S_1 0, V5_239S_1 0 (S4CT-1).

7 BKR_EPS20 OPEN cd='h_v5_230r_1' C (ALL) 12kV Start-Up Feeder Breaker to Start-Up Trip, SDR Failure on D/G 1-1 and 1-3; Critical Task to start D/G 1-3 to restore MAL_DEG1C_2 NO_RESET 4kV vital bus (S4CT-2).

cd='H_V4_224R_1'

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

(**) Event 4 was not performed for Group 3 applicants due to a simulator booth error.

L161 NRC ES-D-1-04 r4.docx Page 1 of 3 Rev 4

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 1,2,3,4,5,6,7) 7

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) (Event 7) 1

3. Abnormal events (1-4) (Events 1,2,3,4) 4

4. Major transients (1-2) (Events 5,6) 2

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E-0.1) 1

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) (FR-S.1, ECA-0.0 ) 2

7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See description below) 2 Critical Task Justification Reference (S4CT-1) Insert negative reactivity into the Failure to insert negative reactivity as procedurally WCAP-17711-NP, CT-52 core following per EOP FR-S.1 guidance so directed constitutes a failure to provide FR-S.1 Background that power is reduced to less than 5% by appropriate reactivity control and represents an Document, Rev. 3.

the completion of step 19. unnecessary and avoidable challenge to the criticality safety function.

(S4CT-2) Energize at least one vital AC bus Failure to restore vital AC power from its intended WCAP-17711-NP, CT-24 from an emergency diesel generator prior emergency backup source when available ECA-0.0 Background to implementation of FLEX strategies (ECA- represents an unnecessary continuation of a Document (HECA00BG),

0.0, step 10 RNO) associated with entry degraded electrical condition and unnecessarily Rev. 3.

into Extended Loss of AC Power Event complicates the mitigation strategy.

(ELAP) conditions.

Per NUREG-1021, Appendix D, if an operator or crew significantly deviates from or fails to follow procedures that affect the maintenance of basic safety functions, those actions may form the basis of a CT identified in the post-scenario review.

L161 NRC ES-D-1-04 r4.docx Page 2 of 3 Rev 4

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #4

1. Maintenance requests manual start and loading of D/G 1-2 per OP J-6B:V, Diesel Generators - Manual Operation of DG 1-2, to take thermography readings inside the SED panel due to loose terminations discovered during most recent routine MOW. The diesel fails to start (over crank condition) bringing in AR PK17-01, DEISEL 12 FAIL TO START. Shift Foreman enters TS 3.8.1.B, AC Sources - Operating, for one D/G inoperable.

2. Regen Hx Isolation Valve, LCV-459, drifts to mid-position causing letdown orifice valve 8149C to close.

Shift Foreman enters OP AP-18, Letdown Line Failure. Excess Letdown is established per OP B-1A:IV CVCS - Excess Letdown - Place In Service and Remove From Service.

3. SSPS relay actuation results in Turbine Driven AFW (TDAFW) Pump Steam Supply Isolation Valve, FCV-95, failing open and isolation of blowdown sample valves inside and outside containment. S/G levels rise and RCS temperature lowers, causing control rods to step out in response. FCV-95 cannot be closed and the crew must isolate the TDAFW Pump by either closing the LCVs to the individual S/Gs or by closing steam supply valves FCV-37 and FCV-38 to leads 1 and 2 respectively. Shift Foreman implements TS 3.7.5.B, AFW System for one AFW train inoperable.

4. Crew responds to AR PK14-21, MAIN TRANSF. A nuclear operator is dispatched to investigate local alarms and reports back that NO cooling fans or oil pumps are running on Main Bank C Transformer.

Shift Foreman enters OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown and directs a 50 MW/min power reduction while Maintenance and field Operators attempt to restore transformer cooling.

5. At approximately 60% power, the plant experiences a Main Transformer Unit Trip due to a fault in the main transformer and all buses successfully transfer to Start-up power. The Turbine trips as expected, but the reactor trip breakers remain closed. (AR PK14-01, UNIT TRIP; AR PK12-11 TURBINE TRIP, AR PK04-11 REACTOR TRIP INITIATE)

6. Reactor power is still greater than 50% and the crew identifies the ATWS condition. EOP FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS, is entered, either directly or from the step 1, response not obtained column of EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Attempts to trip the reactor from the Control Room are unsuccessful and Auto-rod motion has failed. The crew performs the critical task of adding negative reactivity by manually driving rods (S4CT-1) Insert negative reactivity into the core so that power is less than 5%.*** The crew continues working through FR-S.1 until field operators are able to locally open the reactor trip breakers.

7. The reactor is verified subcritical and the crew transitions to EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

EOP E-0.1 Reactor Trip Response is entered once the need for a Safety Injection has been ruled out.

Shortly after verifying primary and secondary parameters are stable, Startup Feeder Breaker 52VU12 trips open and cannot be closed. D/G 1-1 (no reset) and 1-3 (resettable from Control Room) fail as a result of their associated shutdown relays activating. The crew transitions to EOP ECA-0.0, Loss of All Vital AC Power and performs the critical task of starting D/G 1-3 (S4CT-2) Energize at least one vital AC bus from an emergency diesel generator prior to implementation of FLEX strategies (ECA-0.0, step 10 RNO)***

The scenario is terminated once a vital 4kV bus has been re-energized .

• • • CT / TCOA note:

L161 NRC ES-D-1-04 r4.docx Page 3 of 3 Rev 4

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 21 Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel LT112 Fails Low (causes auto makeup)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Procedure step numbers are included at the front of each action/comment in parenthesis, where applicable.

ALL Diagnosis of makeup control failure is made by one or more of the following:

Automatic makeup is running, but VCT level shows normal (LT114) (PPC as L0112A, HSDP)

LT112 shows low level (0%), but VCT pressure shows normal, and CCP operation (suction) is normal (all on VB2)

Yokogawa recorder (L0112A) (VB2 upper left)

ATC Makeup Control is taken to STOP (on the makeup control HMI, CC2) (may be done before or during entry into AP)

SRO Implements OP AP19, Malfunction of the Reactor Makeup Control System or OP AP5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel (For OP AP19, Malfunction of the Reactor Makeup Control System, else N/A)

ATC (1) Ensures M/U set to correct mode (either AUTO and running, or AUTO and stopped if action taken above)

ATC (1) Ensures system is selected to start (will probably be selected to STOP [now or later] due to unneeded makeup operation); may select STOP before or during OP AP 19 use BOP (2) Checks makeup system pumps and valves lineup up, and in AUTO (VB2, lower center)

ATC/BOP (3) Verifies VCT level channels OPERABLE:

o Observes discrepancy between LT112 (0%), and LT114 (normal level); may use VCT pressure and/or normal CCP operation to diagnose that LT112 has failed (probably diagnosed prior to procedure entry); note: may use operator information manual (OIM) as a diagnostic tool.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 1 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 21 Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel LT112 Fails Low (causes auto makeup) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP19, Malfunction of the Reactor Makeup Control System, cont)

ALL (3 RNO) Goes to App A (1.b.1), and determines what effect the failed LT112 will have on makeup system operation ATC (App A, 1b) If not already done, places makeup system in STOP ATC/BOP (4) Verifies CCP suction parameters are normal (CCP flow/amps/ pressure, VCT level/pressure; VB2 and CC2 meters) (as time permits).

SRO (5) Notifies Tech Maintenance to troubleshoot and repair (as time permits).

(For OP AP5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel, else N/A)

SRO/ATC (1) Confirms that Makeup Controller was NOT controlling properly in Auto and has been taken to manual (CC2, HC459 and/or FCV128). Directs Pressurizer level to be returned to previous steadystate value.

SRO/BOP (2) Determines that the failure is not Eagle21 related (PK0601 and PK0603 are OFF)

SRO/ATC (3) Determines failure is not associated with a T channel (VB2)

(4) Determines Steam Dump valves are controlling properly. (Dumps SHOULD be open to maintain temperature for current 2% power conditions).

SRO (5) Contacts I&C to investigate.

(6) Ensure affected channel is removed from service prior to performing maintenance.

(7) Uses Attachments 4.1 and 4.2 to determine affected indicators and evaluate TS/ECGs. Determines no TS impact.

Proceed to the next event once Makeup control system in STOP, per the lead examiner.

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 2 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 21 Event

Description:

Loss of Power to S31 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Fan status icons on the Aux/Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System Monitor (AFHBVS Monitor) panel on VB4 will not immediately reflect the fan failure. Alarms indicating the loss of power register immediately, and can be viewed by navigating to the associated alarm screen. Fan running status icons are based on airflow and lag the actual fan power loss.

ATC Responds to AR PK1517 (AUX & FHB VENT PWR FAILURE) alarm and identifies input 109 for Aux Building Supply Fan S31 UV or Lo Flo on POV1.

BOP Checks AFHBVS Monitor panel on VB4 Determines both S31 and E1 have tripped off.

Notes Aux Building Ventilation has switched to Safeguards Only mode.

SRO Implements AR PK1517, AUX & FHB VENT PWR FAILURE (AR PK1517, AUX & FHB VENT PWR FAILURE)

SRO (1) Enters Section 2.2, Fan Low Flow or Fan UV, based on alarm input.

(2.2.1) Determines Aux Building ventilation train has failed (2.2.1.a) Notes redundant train was already in service since Aux Building Ventilation was running in Buildings and Safeguards mode prior to the fan trip.

o Verifies ventilation has swapped to Safeguards only (if not previously reported by BOP).

BOP (2.2.1.b) Checks AFHBVS Monitor panel to verify dampers have aligned properly for Safeguards Only mode (VB4).

SRO/BOP (2.2.1.c) Dispatches a Nuclear Operator to investigate and determine the cause of the fan failure.

(2.2.1.d) Notifies RP that the primary sample sink hood will not exhaust properly, which results in a buildup of noble gas in the Auxiliary Building.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 3 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 21 Event

Description:

Loss of Power to S31 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (AR PK1517, AUX & FHB VENT PWR FAILURE, cont)

SRO (2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.4) N/A (2.2.5) Implements Tech Spec TS 3.7.12.B, Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (ABVS) for one ABVS train inoperable; 7 days to restore the ABVS train to OPERABLE status.

Proceed to the next event once Tech Specs addressed, per the lead examiner.

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 4 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 21 Event

Description:

ASW Pp 11 Seizes; Pp 12 SF6 Breaker Pressure Fault Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Observes PK0103 (ASW Pp OC trip) and PK0101 (three low press / low dP inputs) alarming, and informs the Shift Foreman.

ATC/BOP Observes that 11 ASW Pp has a blue OC light (VB1, far left), and reports condition to the Shift Foreman.

Note: Actions to start the standby pump may be performed prior to AR PK0103 or OP AP10 entry (due to it being an automatic action that did not occur), or may be performed when procedurally directed.

BOP Observes that 12 ASW Pp did not start, and attempts to start the pump by taking the pump Auto/Manual switch to Manual, and attempting to start the pump (all at far left of VB1 vertical section).

Note: The Shift Foreman (SFM) may enter OP AP10 (Loss of ASW), either directly, or after implementing AR PK01

03. AR PK0101 may be entered briefly, but it is not expected.

(ONLY if AR PK0101 is entered; otherwise, section is N/A)

SRO (1.0) Goes to section 2.1 due to multiple low pressure inputs.

(2.1.1) Determines that a loss of ASW has occurred, and goes to OP AP10, Loss of ASW.

(ONLY if AR PK0103 is entered; otherwise, section is N/A)

SRO (1.0) Goes to section 2.1, due to OC trip inputs.

SRO/BOP (2.1.1) Determines that the standby ASW pump is NOT running with normal current (did not start); takes 12 ASW pp to MAN, and attempts to start it.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 5 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 21 Event

Description:

ASW Pp 11 Seizes; Pp 12 SF6 Breaker Pressure Fault (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (AR PK0103, cont) (if used)

SRO * (2.1.2) Determines ASW flow has NOT been restored; goes to OP AP10, Loss of ASW.

(OP AP10, Loss of Auxiliary Salt Water)

Note: The Shift Foreman may direct the Reactor Operator to implement crosstie actions of OP AP10 while he continues on to address Tech Specs.

SRO/BOP (1) Determines neither ASW pump is running.

(1.a RNO) Determines Unit 2 ASW Pump 22 is available for crosstie.

(1.a.1 RNO) Directs Unit 2 to start standby ASW Pump 22.

(1.a.1.a RNO) Directs Unit 2 to CLOSE 2FCV496 and OPEN 2FCV495.

BOP (1.a.1.b RNO) Opens FCV601 (VB1, lower far left skirt)

SRO (1.b RNO) Implement Tech Spec 3.0.3 for two trains of ASW inoperable.

SRO/BOP (1.c RNO) Contacts Aux Watch to stop any radwaste discharge in progress.

Proceed to the next event once Tech Specs addressed, per the lead examiner.

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 6 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 7 of 21 Event

Description:

PT507 Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: If the crew manually trips the reactor in response to this failure, the scenario major event (seismically induced 750 gpm LOCA) will be initiated and the scenario continued. A manual reactor trip would be considered a postscenario Critical Task.

ALL Diagnoses PT507 failed HIGH from one or more of the following:

CC2 Indications:

• Tave, Pressurizer level, Pressurizer pressure lowering CC3 Indications:

• HC507 demand increasing towards 100%

VB3 Indications:

• Dump Demand (UI500) rising to 100%.

SRO/ATC Takes manual control of HC507 and adjusts Group I steam dump valves in the closed direction to stabilize plant.

SRO Enters OP AP5, "Malfunction of Eagle21 Protection or Control Channel" (OP AP5, Malfunction of Eagle21 Protection or Control Channel)

SRO/ATC (1) Confirms that Steam Generator pressure was NOT controlling properly in Auto and has been taken to manual (CC3, HC507). Directs Tave be returned to previous steady state value.

SRO/BOP (2) Determines that the failure is not Eagle21 related (PK0601 and PK0603 are OFF)

SRO/ATC (3) Determines failure is not associated with a T channel (VB2)

Note: Shift Foreman may utilize Attachment 4.2, Process Control System Racks, to aid in failure impact diagnostics.

SRO (4) Determines Steam Dump valves are NOT controlling properly. (Dumps SHOULD be open to maintain temp for current 2% power conditions). Goes to step 8 per RNO.

(8.a,b) Refs to Attachment 4.1 for applicable TS/ECGs - none apply.

(8.c) Contacts I&C to investigate.

Proceed to the next event when crew has stabilized temperature, per the lead examiner.

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 7 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 8 of 21 Event

Description:

750 gpm LOCA on Loop 4 Hot Leg due to Earthquake Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Earthquake is diagnosed from one or more of the following:

PK1524, Seismic Instrument System (actuated on triggers).

Physical shaking and noise from the earthquake.

Various tank alarms going in and out (due to water shifting from earthquake, programmed into simulator modeling).

SRO Directs Reactor Operators to walks down their boards and report any abnormalities.

ALL Diagnoses RCS leak from one or more of the following:

Pzr pressure and level lowering (PPC, CC2 recorder, VB2 meters)

Containment parameters rising (temp, press) (PPC, VB1 recorder, PAMS panels)

Sump levels rising (PAMS panel)

Annunciators:

o AR PK0117, CFCU DRAIN LEVEL HI o AR PK0516, PZR PRESSURE HI/LO o AR PK0521, PZR LEVEL HI/LO o AR PK1121, HIGH RADIATION o AR PK1501, CONTMT/TB SUMP/DSL FO VAULT LVL/ DSL FO FLTR DP Note: Seismic event complicates pressurizer level drop diagnostics, and Shift Foreman may initially attempt to address the leak using OP AP1, Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage.

SFM/ATC Directs/performs manual Reactor Trip followed by manual Safety Injection once Reactor Trip has been verified.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 8 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5,6,7 Page 9 of 21 Event

Description:

750 gpm LOCA on Loop 4 Hot Leg due to Earthquake (cont)

Safety Injection, Train B fails to actuate 8803A Fails closed on SI (S1CT1)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Implements EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

SRO/ATC (1) Verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open (VB2 upper left), rods on bottom (VB2 upper left DRPI panel), NIs decreasing (CC1 left).

SRO/ATC (2) Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps).

SRO/BOP (3) Checks vital 4kv busses (VB4, vital busses F/G/H have white lights on mimic busses).

SRO/ATC (4) Checks if SI actuated (PK0821 ON, also checks VB1 red train lights and/or train equipment to verify both trains actuated); may actuate manual SI (VB1 upper right, or CC2 right) due to various SI failures.

Note: Critical Task S1CT1 may be completed during immediate actions, or as part of Appendix E. CT may also be satisfied by opening SI Valve CVCS18803B which failed to open due to SI Train B failure.

ATC/BOP (4) Notes and corrects Auto SI failure (may be done following immediate actions, or during App E actions, pg 18) o Actuates manual Phase A containment isolation (optional), and/or manually aligns SI train B pumps and valves (VB1 and VB2; makes white status lights go out on VB1 upper left side under ESF and Phase A areas).

o Opens Charging Injection Supply Valve, CVCS18803A (VB2, center skirt) **

• • (Critical Task) (S1CT1, Manually actuate at least one train of SIS actuated safeguards before transition out of EOP E0).

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 9 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 10 of 21 Event

Description:

750 gpm LOCA on Loop 4 Hot Leg due to Earthquake (cont)

Safety Injection, Train B fails to actuate Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, cont)

SRO (5) Directs App E implemented (usually to BOP)(see page 18)

SRO/ATC (6) Checks RCS temperature stable or lowering to 547oF o AFW Pp 12 and 13 both running, but with throttling in Auto due to initial power level at trip (level high); TDAFW not running nor required.

SRO/ATC (7) Checks Pzr PORVs and Pzr Safeties and Spray Valves o Safeties closed; no sonic flow, tailpipe temperature is elevated, but consistent with containment environment (VB2 - upper panel, far right) o PORVs closed and associated block valves open (VB2 - upper panel, far right) o Pzr Sprays closed (green lights on) (CC2)

SRO/ATC (8) Checks RCP trip criteria; o RCS WR Pressure is greater than 1300 PSIG, trip criteria is not met (VB2).

SRO/ATC (9) Determines S/G are NOT faulted o No S/G lowering in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized.

SRO/ATC (10) Determines S/G are NOT ruptured o Checks RE71/72/73/74 and RE15/19 recorders on VB2 (and PPC); (all normal) o PK1106/17/18 (all OFF).

o May request samples.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 10 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 11 of 21 Event

Description:

750 gpm LOCA on Loop 4 Hot Leg due to Earthquake (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, cont)

Note: Crosstie of ASW causes low dP across the CCW HX. Placing a 2nd ASW/CCW HX in service by opening FCV 603 and FCV431 (VB1 far left) will cause PK0101, ASW SYS HX DELTA P/ HDR PRESS to come into alarm.

DP is adequate to keep CCW Hx outlet temperature within normal limits with the 2nd HX in service.

SRO/ALL (11) Checks RCS intact (it is not) (note: only one valid abnormal reading needed to transition from E0) o (11a) Determines containment pressure is NOT normal (VB1 meters, PPC) o (11b) Determines containment sump levels NOT normal (VB1 meters, PAMS) o (11c) Determines containment radiation is NOT normal (RM11, 02, 07 are all in alarm) o (11 RNO) Places 2nd ASW/CCW HX in service by opening FCV603 and FCV431 (VB1), and transitions to EOP E1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant" SRO Transitions to EOP E1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 11 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 12 of 21 Event

Description:

750 gpm LOCA on Loop 4 Hot Leg due to Earthquake (cont)

EOP E1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant)

Note: With the size of the RCS leak/SBLOCA, it is expected that the RWST will reach 33% level (the autostop point for the RHR pumps, as well as the required transition point for the cold leg recirc procedure, EOP E 1.3) in just a few minutes after entering EOP E0. The crew will not complete the procedure prior to transition to EOP E1.3 (may get a step or two into EOP E1, LOCA; this is nonconsequential).

SRO/ATC (1) Checks if RCPs should be stopped o WR RCS pressure is still above 1300 psig, pumps are left running.

ALL (2 & 3) Checks for faulted/ruptured S/Gs o Faulted - checks all S/G pressures on VB3 (not uncontrolled drop/depressurized; all are dropping slowly) - not faulted.

o Ruptured - checks RE71/72/73/74 and RE15/19 recorders on VB2 (and PPC; no upward trends or spikes), and PK1106/17/18 (alarms not in); requests chemistry to sample S/Gs for activity (as follows, if done):

Verifies phase A containment isolation reset (VB1).

Opens FCV584 (air to containment) (VB4, lower left).

Checks open blowdown isolation valves inside containment (FCV760, 761, 762, 763) if requested for sampling.

SRO/BOP (4) Maintains S/G levels 20[25]65%

SRO/ATC (5) Reverifies PORVs closed and associated block valves open (VB2 - upper, far right)

SRO/ATC (6,7) Determines Containment Spray did not actuate and is not required (8) Determines ECCS flow should NOT be reduced o (a) RCS subcooling is less than 20oF (SCMM YI31, lower center VB2)

Note: Scenario will have progressed to EOP E1.3 Transition due to RWST Level less than 33% by this time.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 12 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page 13 of 21 Event

Description:

RWST drains to 4% due to seismic damage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation)

Note: Only a single train of RHR Cold Leg Recirc would be aligned due to the loss of ASW earlier in the scenario.

The SFM may direct either RHR HX to be placed in service.

BOP (1) App EE assigned/performed:

(App EE, 1) All (6) series contactor switches are cut in (VB2, upper panel)

(App EE, 2, 3) Verifies reset of SI and both trains of CI Phase A and Phase B (VB1, upper panel)

(App EE, 4) Determines ASW/CCW is aligned to only 1 ASW Pump via Unit 2 (1 CCW HX in service, VB1, far left) o Notifies SFM that only one RHR pump and HX should be placed in service due to limited ASW/CCW capacity.

o Places one RHR HX in service per SFM direction(VB1, far left)

If RHR HX 11 specified, opens outlet valve, FCV365 (VB1, far right)

If RHR HX 12 is specified, operator will open FCV364 (VB1, far right) o Continues to step 7 (App EE, 7 & 8) Verifies CCP 13 stopped (VB2); makes PA announcement concerning Cold Leg Recirc (App EE, 9) Dispatches operators to rack in breakers for 8980 and 8976.

SRO/ATC (2, 3) Verifies RHR Pp 12 stopped and closes 8700B (VB1, lower right).

(4, 5) Verifies RHR Pp 11 stopped and closes 8700A (VB1, lower right).

ATC (6) Closes RHR crosstie valves 8716 A/B (VB1, lower center).

(7) Isolates ECCS Pp recirc paths by closing 8974 A/B, and closing 8105 / 8106 (VB2).

SRO/ATC (8 RNO) Determines recirc sump level is NOT > 92 ft, and transitions to EOP ECA1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 13 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page 14 of 21 Event

Description:

RWST drains to 4% due to seismic damage (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP ECA 1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

Note: Lower fissure is sized to drain RWST from 33% to 4% over a 20 minute period.

SRO (1) Determines recirc failure is caused by lack of RWST level (not by sump blockage).

SRO/ATC (2a) Notes power available to both RHR pps (VB2, lower right).

(2b) Notes recirc sump level (VB2, vertical, right side) is still low (expected for these conditions); goes to step 3.

ATC (3) Resets both trains of SI (VB2) (should already be reset).

(4) Verifies fan coolers (CFCUs, VB1 vertical center area) in low speed (ie, yellow lights).

Note: Monitoring RWST for 4% level is a continuous action. When reached, the procedure directs the crew to perform step 30, which corresponds with Critical Task S1CT2, Stop all running ECCS pumps with suction aligned to the RWST before insufficient RWST level results in ECCS pump cavitation.**

SRO/ATC (5) Checks RWST level (VB2, far upper left) > 4%.

(6) Determines Containment Spray Requirements (N/A, not running/activated) (VB1 vertical left of center).

(7) Determines isolation of Spray Additive Tank is not required since Containment Spray is not running.

Note: Fissure location will make Appendix M ineffective as a long term strategy. Procedural guidance is to add makeup to the RWST as necessary. The Shift Foreman may elect to move on in the procedure, without implementing Appendix M, recognizing that any makeup will be lost through the crack.

SRO (8) Directs implementation of Appendix M to add makeup to the RWST.

o Reads notes prior to steps, and selects section A for makeup (makeup from SFP is preferred method).

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 14 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page 15 of 21 Event

Description:

RWST drains to 4% due to seismic damage (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP ECA 1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, cont)

Note: Monitoring RWST for 4% level is a continuous action. When reached, the procedure directs the crew to perform step 30, which corresponds with Critical Task S1CT2, Stop all running ECCS pumps with suction aligned to the RWST before insufficient RWST level results in ECCS pump cavitation.**

SRO/BOP (9) Checks S/G levels, controls 20[25]65% (levels already being controlled, TDAFP not running) (all on VB3).

(10) Determines Condenser is NOT available due to Condenser loss of vacuum (VB3)(vacuum leak developed during seismic).

(11) Initiates cooldown (< 100F/hr) using 10% steam dumps (PCVs 19, 20, 21, & 22 on VB3 lower middle panel area).

ALL (12) Checks ECCS is in service, and determines that CCPs and SI pumps are still delivering flow to the RCS (VB1 and VB2).

(13) Establishes one train of SI flow.

o Depresses vital 4KV autotransfer reset PBs, and verifies blue lights OFF (VB4)

(BOP) o Stops one ECCS CCP (since two are running) (VB2) (ATC) o Stops one SI PP (since both are running) (VB1) (ATC) o Determines that RHR PPs are not running; goes to next step (ATC/SRO)

SRO/ATC (14) Verifies recirc sump isolation valves 8982A/B closed (VB1)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 15 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page 16 of 21 Event

Description:

RWST drains to 4% due to seismic damage (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP ECA 1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, cont)

Note: Monitoring RWST for 4% level is a continuous action. When reached, the procedure directs the crew to perform step 30, which corresponds with Critical Task S1CT2, Stop all running ECCS pumps with suction aligned to the RWST before insufficient RWST level results in ECCS pump cavitation.**

Note: Depending on crew speed through the procedure flow path, RCPs may or may not have been tripped prior to this step. Both procedure flowpaths are covered below.

(For RCPs stopped, else N/A)

SRO/BOP (15.a) Checks RCPs stopped (VB2).

(15.b) Checks RCS subcooling (will not be > 20oF) (VB2) o Continues to step 16.

(For RCPs running, else N/A)

SRO/BOP (15.a) Checks RCPs stopped (VB2).

(15.a.1,.2 RNO) Stops RCP 1, 3, and 4 (VB2)

(15.a.3 RNO) Continues to step 16.

Note: The App G required minimum flow should be between 410490 gpm, depending on how long the crew took to get here. The remaining CCP or the remaining SI pump will most probably not be capable of this flowrate (alone), so no pumps are expected to be shut down per step 16 RNO.

ALL (16) Checks if SI can be terminated.

o (16.a) Checks RVLIS level and determines it is adequate based on number of running RCPs (SPDS screen).

o (16.b) Checks subcooled margin and determines it is NOT adequate; goes to RNO to reduce ECCS.

o (16.b RNO) Determines App G minimum flow requirement, based on time since trip (see above; most likely, can't shut down a pump).

o (16.b RNO) Determines that stopping either the last CCP or SI PP will go below that minimum, and does not stop any pumps.

o Proceeds to step 23 to check RVLIS level.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 16 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page 17 of 21 Event

Description:

RWST drains to 4% due to seismic damage (cont)(CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP ECA 1.1, Loss of Emergnecy Coolant Recirculation, cont)

Note: Monitoring RWST for 4% level is a continuous action. When reached, the procedure directs the crew to perform step 30, which corresponds with Critical Task S1CT2, Stop all running ECCS pumps with suction aligned to the RWST before insufficient RWST level results in ECCS pump cavitation.**

SRO/ATC (23.a) Checks RVLIS Level adequate (SPDS or PAMS).

(23.b) Checks Core exit T/Cs - stable or lowering (SPDS or PAMS).

SRO/ATC (24.a) Checks Subcooling greater than 30oF (VB2).

SRO/ATC (25) Checks if RHR should be placed in service o (25.a) RCS temperature less than 350oF (VB2).

o (25.b) WR RCS pressure less than 390 psig (VB2).

Note: Scenario will have progressed to point of RWST Level less than 4% by this time.

SRO/ATC (30.a) Stops all pumps taking suction from the RWST:

o Running SI Pump(s) **

o Running CCP(s) **

(Critical Task) (S1CT2, Stop all running ECCS pumps with suction aligned to the RWST before insufficient RWST level results in ECCS pump cavitation).

SRO/BOP (30.b) Dispatches Nuclear Operator to locally open DC knife switches at the breaker cubicle for pumps with suction aligned to the RWST:

RHR Pp 11 and 12 SIP Pp 11 and 12 CCP 11 and 12 CSP 11 and 12 SRO/ATC (31) Implements Appendix W to makeup to the RCS from the VCT via Normal Charging.

Scenario may be terminated any time after running CCPs and SIPs have been tripped (completion of S1CT2).

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 17 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5,6,7 Page 18 of 21 Event

Description:

EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix E, ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status Safety Injection, Train B fails to actuate, 8803A Fails closed on SI (S1CT1)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E0, Appendix E)

BOP Implements App E (ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status):

(1a) Checks no personnel in Containment (part of turnover; may not voice)

(1b) Announces trip/SI on PA system (2) Checks main generator - tripped (PK1401 OFF, output bkrs CLOSED due to backfeed, CC3 right side)

(3 & 4) Verifies Phase A and Containment Vent Isolation complete (VB1, ESF status lights, red lights ON, white lights OFF); manual Phase A and/or manual alignment of Train B components will be required due to Train B failure of SI.

(5) Verify ESF (SI) actuation complete; manual alignment of Train B pumps and valves will be required.(S1CT1)**

• • (Critical Task) (S1CT1, Manually actuate at least one train of SIS actuated safeguards before transition out of EOP E0). May have been completed outside of Appendix E.

BOP (6) Verifies Feedwater isolation complete (F.W. Isolation and S.G. Level Portions of Monitor Light Box C: red lights ON, white light OFF.

BOP (7) Determines Containment Spray and Phase B Isolation is NOT required (Contmt Isol, Phase B portion of Monitor Light Box D: red lights are OFF)

BOP (8) Checks Main Steamline Isolation complete (Main Steam Isolation portion of Monitor Light Box D: red light OFF, white light are OFF)

BOP (9) Checks AFW status o AFW Pp 12 and 13 both running, but throttling due to initial power level at trip (level high) o TDAFW not running nor required.

o Verifies min of 435 gpm flow (VB3 center) or S/G level > 15%

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 18 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5,6,7 Page 19 of 21 Event

Description:

EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix E, ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status (cont)

Safety Injection, Train B fails to actuate, 8803A Fails closed on SI Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E0, Appendix E)

BOP (10) Checks ECCS flows (charging injection (VB2 upper panel left), SI, RHR (both on VB1 upper panel)

(11) Reports ESF and AFW status to the Shift Foreman (Shift Foreman may direct operator to continue on in Appendix E, or redirect to higher priority tasks)

BOP (12) Checks excess letdown; notes NOT in service prior to trip (13) Checks secondary systems (MFPs tripped (VB2, green lights ON), stops all but one CB Pp set, takes LCV12 control switch to CONT ONLY.

(14) Verifies proper operation of Aux Bldg and Control Rm vent systems (VB4 vent status light panel white lights); turns on aux bldg vent charcoal filter preheater (VB4 lower panel, left side) and verifies containment iodine fans secured (VB4, lower panel),

BOP (15) Verifies available DGs running normally (VB4, freq (60), volts (120), speed (900))

(16) Verifies vital batteries supplied by chargers (charger and bus volts on VB5, upper panel middle/lower area);

(17) Verifies MSRs reset (CC3 Triconex HMI)

(18) Throttles RCP seal injection flows to normal if needed (FCV128, to 813 gpm each, CC2)

(19) Checks PK1104 NOT IN (SFP alarm)

(20) Notifies Shift Foreman of completion.

(Board Operator will rejoin crew upon completion of Appendix or when called upon by Shift Foreman)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 19 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page 20 of 21 Event

Description:

EOP ECA1.1, Appendix W, RCS Makeup from VCT Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP ECA 1.1, Appendix W, RCS Makeup from VCT)

ATC (1) Aligns VCT Makeup System.

o (1.a) Presses MANUAL on Makeup Control screen (CC2).

BOP (1) Aligns VCT Makeup System.

o (1.b) Directs Nuclear Operators to locally close the following valves:

• CVCS8466 (Blender to LHUT and RWST, 100ft, Blender Room)

• CVCS8467 (Blender to RWST, 100ft, Blender Room)

• CVCS8258 (Blender to LHUTS, 100ft, outside LHUT Rm) o (1.c) Ensures control switches in AUTO for:

• FCV110B (VB2)

• FCV111B (VB2)

• FCV110A (VB2)

• FCV111A (VB2)

• Primary M/U Water Pumps (VB2)

• Boric Acid Transfer Pumps (VB2)

(2) Aligns Charging Pump Suction to VCT:

o (2.a) Opens LCV112B and LCV112C o (2.b) Closes 8805A and 8805B.

ATC (3,4) Calculates target batch and enters gallons determined into Makeup Controller (CC2).

(5) Aligns Charging Pump Discharge To RCS:

o (5.a) Throttles HCV142 to 20% demand.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 20 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page 21 of 21 Event

Description:

EOP ECA1.1, Appendix W, RCS Makeup from VCT (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP ECA 1.1, Appendix W, RCS Makeup from VCT, cont)

BOP (5) Aligns Charging Pump Discharge To RCS:

o (5.b) Opens 8146 and 8147 Normal and Alt Charging Vlvs.

o (5.c)Opens 8105 and 8106, CCP Recirculation Vlvs.

o (5.d)Closes 8145 and 8148, Chg Line to PZR Aux Spray Vlv and Bypass.

o (5.e)Opens 8108 and 8107, Normal Chg to Regen Hx Stop Vlvs.

ATC (5) Aligns Charging Pump Discharge To RCS:

o (5.f) Throttle open FCV128 to establish charging flow.

BOP (5) Aligns Charging Pump Discharge To RCS:

o (5.g) Closes 8803A and 8803B, Charging Injection Inlet Vlvs ATC (5) Aligns Charging Pump Discharge To RCS:

o (5.h) Ensures BAST PPM is set to value from latest Chemistry Daily Report.

o (5.i,j) Sets BLEND PPM to 2000 and presses START.

BOP (5) Aligns Charging Pump Discharge To RCS:

o (5.k) Ensures OPEN FCV110B, Blender to Charging Pumps Suction.

ATC (5) Aligns Charging Pump Discharge To RCS:

o (5.h) Ensures BLENDED PPM on Makeup Control screen is equal to or greater than 2000 ppm.

BOP (6.a) Starts an ECCS CCP BOP (6.c) Adjust Charging and HCV142 to maintain VCT Level

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD201 r3.docx Page 21 of 25 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 19 Event

Description:

CCW Pp 11 Shaft Shear Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Procedure step numbers are included at the front of each action/comment in parenthesis, where applicable.

Note: Three AR PKs come into alarm, any one of which may be used to diagnose and address the malfunction.

Starting standby CCW Pp 13 will cause PK0108 and PK0109 to clear. Shutting down CCW Pp 11 causes PK0111 to clear. OP AP11, Malfunction of Component Cooling Water System may also be referenced for guidance on starting the standby CCW Pump, however, adequate guidance is provided in the AR PKs.

ATC Observes the following Annunciators alarming and informs the Shift Foreman:

o PK0108, CCW HEADER C - RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Flo Lo (less than 140 gpm).

o Pk0109, CCW PUMPS - CCW Pump 11 Lube Oil Pressure Low with pump running.

o PK0111, CCW PP 11 RECIRC CCW Pp 11 Recirc Open (pump amps < 44 ).

(AR PK0111, CCW PP 11, RECIRC) (if entered, else N/A)

SRO (2.1) Reads note describing alarm behavior alarm is enabled 1030 seconds after pump is started and disabled when the pump is shut down.

o Notes alarm is active when CCW Pp 11 amps fall below 44 amps.

BOP (2.1.1) Reports pump is running; motor current reading is approx 16 amps (VB1).

o May report CCW Header flow lower on all three headers (~ 1000 gpm on each)(VB1).

SRO/BOP (2.1.2) Dispatches Nuclear Operator to investigate.

o May evaluate other PK alarms while awaiting report back from field (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD203 r2.docx Page 1 of 23 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 19 Event

Description:

CCW Pp 11 Shaft Shear (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (AR PK0111, CCW PP 11, RECIRC, cont)

Note: Nuclear Operator in the field will report the following: Recirc valve FCV606 is open, but there is no sound of flow in the adjacent piping. The pump is running, but sounds unusually high pitched.

SRO/BOP (2.1.3) Determines alarm is valid and low flow (less than 1100 gpm) condition exists (VB1).

(2.1.3.a,b) Starts standby CCW Pp and shuts down CCW Pp 11 (if not already done)(VB1).

(2.1.3.c) N/A SRO (2.1.3.d) Shift Foreman enters T.S. 3.7.7.A, Vital Component Cooling Water (CCW)

System for one loop of CCW inoperable.

(AR PK0109, CCW PUMPS) (if entered, else N/A)

SRO (1) Determines input is for low lube oil pressure.

SRO/BOP (2.2.1,2) Starts standby CCW Pp 13 and shuts down CCW Pp 11 (if not already done) (VB1).

(2.1.3.c) N/A (2.2.4) Dispatches Nuclear Operator to check CCW P 11 lube oil level.

Note: Nuclear Operator in the field will report the following: Pump lube oil level appears normal in the sight glass. The pump is running, but sounds unusually high pitched.

SRO (2.2.5) Shift Foreman enters T.S. 3.7.7.A, Vital Component Cooling Water (CCW)

System for one loop of CCW inoperable.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD203 r2.docx Page 2 of 23 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 3 of 19 Event

Description:

CCW Pp 11 Shaft Shear (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (AR PK0108, CCW HEADER C) (if entered, else N/A)

SRO (1) Determines input is for RCP Thermal Barrier CCW flow low (less than 140 gpm).

SRO/BOP Reads CAUTION regarding FCV357 and NOTE regarding Containment Isolation -

determines neither applies at this time.

(2.2.1) Ensures two CCW pumps running.

o May elect to start standby pump and shutdown CCW Pp 11 based on low amp reading (VB1).

(2.2.2) Checks RED (Open) indicating lights on the following valves:

o FCV355, Header C Supply (VB1, skirt).

o FCV356, Supply to RCP and Rx Vessel Support Coolers (VB1, skirt).

SRO/ATC (2.2.3) Checks RCP lower radial bearing temperatures; determines they are normal (all in the green band) (PPC, VB2).

(2.2.4) Ensures RCP seal injection flow remains between 813 gpm (seal injection flow is normal) (PPC, VB2).

SRO (2.2.5) Informs the crew that the Thermal Barrier low flow condition coincident with a loss of RCP seal injection is Reactor Trip criteria (in MODE 1).

(2.2.6) Notes alarm is due to Thermal Barrier low flow only, but recognizes problem is due to a problem with CCW Pp 11, not leakage.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD203 r2.docx Page 3 of 23 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 4 of 19 Event

Description:

CCW Pp 11 Shaft Shear (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP11, Malfunction of Component Cooling Water System, Section A - Loss of a CCW Pump/High CCW System Temp) (if entered, else N/A)

Note: Guidance to start the standby CCW Pump is applicable once CCW Pump 11 has been shutdown.

SRO (1) Notes only (1) CCW pump is running, goes to RNO.

SRO/BOP (1 RNO) Starts CCW Pump 13 o Places STANDBY SELECT switch in MAN (VB1) o Takes CCW Pump 13 START/STOP switch to START o Goes to Step 4 (4) Ensures ASW is supplying the inservice CCW Hx o Checks ASW Pp 11 inservice with normal amps (VB1).

Proceed to the next event once Tech Spec addressed, per the lead examiner

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD203 r2.docx Page 4 of 23 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 5 of 19 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Heater Group #1 Over Current Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Observes PK0519, PZR HTRS OC TRIP / FAN FLO LO, alarming and informs Shift Foreman.

SRO Enters PK0519, PZR HTRS OC TRIP / FAN FLO LO.

(AR PK0519, PZR HTRS OC TRIP / FAN FLO LO)

SRO Notes input in for low Pzr SCR cabinet flow and PZR Htr Bkr OC Trip. Goes to step 2.2 for OC Trip (cause of the low flow)

(2.2) Heater Breaker Trip (Input 538) o (2.2.1) Determines Pzr proportional heater breaker 5213D05 relayed on OC.

Directs Reactor Operator to place one backup heater group in service per OP A4A:I, Section 6.6, "Placing Backup Heaters in Service and Shutdown Proportional Heaters.

o (2.2.2) Dispatches Nuclear operator to perform visual and "smell" inspection of 5213D05 and the affected heater groups Heater Distribution Panel (PNPH).

o (2.2.4) Refers to T.S. 3.4.9 RCSPressurizer; determines T.S. doesnt apply (T.S. is only applicable to the heater groups with vital backup supply power).

(OP A4A:I, Section 6.6 , "Placing Backup Heaters in Service and Shutdown Proportional Heaters)

Note: The Shift Foreman may direct either available Pzr Heater Group (12 or 13) to be placed in service.

ATC Reads two notes regarding normal use of the proportional heaters.

(6.6.1) Places selected backup heater group in service by taking control switch ON and then returning the switch to AUTO (CC1).

(6.6.2, 6.6.3) Place HC455K, PZR Press Control, in MANUAL and raises demand to approximately 45% (CC2).

(6.6.4) Monitors PCV455A and PCV455B, PZR Spray valves to ensure they modulation open (CC2).

(6.6.5) Returns HC455K to AUTO (CC2).

(6.6.6) Places Pzr Heater Group 11 control switch in "NEUTRAL" after "OFF".

(6.6.7) Monitors RCS to ensure pressure is maintained at approx. 2235 psig (VB2).

Proceed to the next event once backup heater placed in service, per the lead examiner

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD203 r2.docx Page 5 of 23 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 19 Event

Description:

Eagle 21 Digital Filter Processor Halt in Rack 10 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Observes PK0601 (PPS CHANNEL SET FAILURE) and PK0604 (PPS TROUBLE) alarming and informs the SFM.

SRO Enters OP AP5, Malfunction of Eagle21 Protection or Control Channel (OP AP5, Malfunction of Eagle21 Protection or Control Channel)

SRO/ATC (1) Ensures Primary and Secondary Control Systems Controlling Properly in AUTO.

SRO o Reads notes prior to Step 2 o (2) Determines extent of Eagle 21 Instrument Failure o Identifies Protection Set 2 affected by PK0601 & PK0604 inputs o Dispatches operator to locally identify affected rack per Attachment 4.3 o Identifies instruments affected by Rack 10 Digital Filter Processor (DFP) Halt per Attachment 4.1 PT456, Pressurizer Pressure (PI456 - VB2)(PR455 CC2)

LT460, Pressurizer Level (LI460A - VB2)(LR459 - CC2)

FT415, RCS Loop 1 Flow (FI415 - VB2)

FT425, RCS Loop 2 Flow (FI425- VB2)

FT435, RCS Loop 3 Flow (FI435 - VB2)

FT445, RCS Loop 4 Flow (FI445 - VB2) o (3) Notes failure is not associated with a failed deltaT channel.

SRO/BOP o (4) Checks steam dumps NOT actuated o Steam dumps are closed, UI500 demand is zero, Dump Arming and Trip Signal lights are all out (VB3)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD203 r2.docx Page 6 of 23 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 7 of 19 Event

Description:

Eagle 21 Digital Filter Processor Halt in Rack 10 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP5, Malfunction of Eagle21 Protection or Control Channel) (cont)

SRO o (5) Notifies I&C to investigate o (6) Notes the need to ensure affected channels are removed from service prior to maintenance.

BOP o (7) Places OutofService stickers on affected indicators SRO o (8) Shift Foreman review Tech Specs and enters the following:

o TS 3.3.2.D, PC 456D Low Press SI (72 hrs) o TS 3.3.1.E, PC 456A High Press Trip (72 hrs) o TS 3.3.1.M, PC 456C Low Press Trip (72 hrs) o TS 3.3.1.M, LC 460A High Level Trip (72 hrs) o TS 3.3.1.M, FC415(425,435,445) RCS Loop 1 (2,3,4) Flow (72 hrs) o TS 3.3.2.L, PC456B, P11 (1 hr) o TS 3.4.11.B1, B2, & B3 PC456 E, to close & remove power from associated block valve (1 hr) and restore to operable (72 hrs)

SRO/BOP o (8) Closes 8000C and dispatches Nuclear Operator to remove power.

Proceed to the next event once Tech Specs addressed, per the lead examiner

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD203 r2.docx Page 7 of 23 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 8 of 19 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Stop Valve #2 (Loop 1) Closes, Causing Secondary Transient Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses steam flow problem from one or more of the following:

Control Rods stepping in (CC1, DRPI)

MW lowering (Triconex, PPC, CC3)

Secondary Steam Flow/Feed Flow mismatch (VB3)

Loop 2 deltaT (as indication of % power) drop of approximately 10% (CC1, VB2)

Steam Dump arming signal in (VB3)

PK0406, PROTECTION CHANNEL ACTIVATED for 1 out of 4 Turbine Stop Valves Closed PK0812, TURB LOAD REJECTION C7A SRO Enters PK0812, TURB LOAD REJECTION C7A (PK0812, TURB LOAD REJECTION C7A)

SRO (1) Determines input is for a 10% load loss in less than 140 seconds.

(2.1.1) Transitions to OP AP25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown (OP AP25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown)

SRO (1.a) Notes no runback/programmed ramp in progress o Notes plant did, however, experience a transient that was not intentionally initiated.

SRO/ATC (2) Verifies that control rods are inserted properly in AUTO (CC1)

(3) Turns Pressurizer Backup heaters on (CC1)

(4) Checks charging adequate to prevent flashing in the letdown system; (CC2)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD203 r2.docx Page 8 of 23 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 9 of 19 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Stop Valve #2 (Loop 1) Drops Into Flow Stream (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown) (cont)

SRO/BOP o (5) Ensures DFWCS is controlling S/G levels in AUTO (MFW control/bypass valves; MFPs all in AUTO) (CC2)(VB3)

Note: Boration values described below are representative of the conditions given, but will vary based on the actual ramp rate and target specified by SRO.

SRO/ATC (6) Performs boration (the following guidance is on the boration checklist in the reactivity handbook) o Presses STOP on M/U Ctrl HMI (CC2) o Presses BORATE on HMI o Sets target gallons for boration verifies batch is reset o Sets boric acid flowrate o Presses START, and monitors boration o Once stopped, either returns to AUTO (presses AUTO, then START), or performs additional boration per the Shift Foreman(CC2)

SRO/BOP (7) Checks MFP suction pressure greater than 260 psig (VB3)

SRO/ATC (8) Checks Tavg trending to Tref (PPC, CC1)

(9) Checks Pressurizer pressure and level trending to programmed band (PPC, CC2)

SRO (10) N/A (11) Determines the Unit can remain at power.

Proceed to the next event once plant has been stabilized, per the lead examiner

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD203 r2.docx Page 9 of 23 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 10 of 19 Event

Description:

Loop 4 Feedwater Reg Valve, FCV540, Fails Open (S3CT3)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses feedflow problem from one or more of the following:

Rising Feedflow on S/G 14 only (VB3, DFWCS screen (CC3))

FCV540 Valve Actual Position (DFWCS screen (CC3)

PK0904, SG 14 PRESS, LVL FLOW (steam flow less than feed flow)

SRO/ATC Attempts to take manual control of FCV540, but valve is unresponsive.

Recognizes level rise should cause automatic turbine trip when level reaches 90% in S/G 14 (P14).

Note: Automatic Turbine Trip at P14 (S/G level > 90%) has been defeated which also defeats associated Reactor Trip signal. Manual trips remain available.

SRO Directs manual reactor trip (S3CT3)**

Implements EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection

• • (Critical Task) (S3CT3) Manually trip reactor before S/G 14 narrow range level exceeds 92%.

(EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

SRO/ATC (1) Verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open (VB2 upper left), rods on bottom (VB2 upper left DRPI panel), NIs decreasing (CC1 left).

(2) Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps).

SRO/BOP (3) Checks vital 4kv busses (VB4, vital busses F/H have white lights on mimic busses; bus G has no power due to bus differential trip).

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD203 r2.docx Page 10 of 23 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5,6 Page 11 of 19 Event

Description:

Feedline Header to S/G 14 Fails Catastrophically Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) (cont)

SRO/ATC (4) Checks if SI actuated o PK0821 is OFF and coincidence is not made up to require a safety injection.

Note: Evidence of the feedline break becomes apparent shortly after the trip.

ALL Main feedline break inside containment is diagnosed from one or more of the following:

Lowering Pressurizer Pressure and Level (VB2, CC2)

Containment Sump Levels High (PAMS1)

Rising Containment Pressure and Temperature (VB1)

SRO/ATC Directs/performs manual Safety Injection (CC1)

SRO (5) Directs App E implemented (usually to BOP)(see page 15)

SRO/ATC (6) Checks RCS temperature stable or lowering to 547oF o (temperature may be dropping due to feedline break/ECCS flows; AFW may be throttled back (VB2 meters, upper panel lower area).

(7) Checks Pzr PORVs and Pzr Safeties and Spray Valves o Safeties closed (closed); no sonic flow, tailpipe temperature is elevated, but consistent with containment environment (VB2 - upper panel, far right) o PORVs closed. Block valve 8000C closed in event #3; 8000B is open, but without power (VB2 - upper panel, far right) o Pzr Sprays closed (green lights on) (CC2)

SRO/ATC (8) Checks RCP trip criteria:

o RCS WR Pressure is GREATER than 1300 PSIG; Trip Criteria is NOT met (VB2)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD203 r2.docx Page 11 of 23 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 12 of 19 Event

Description:

Feedline Header to S/G 14 Fails - Entry into E2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISO Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) (cont)

SRO/ATC (9) Checks S/Gs NOT FAULTED:

o Identifies S/G 14 depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner (VB3) o Directs transition to E2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

(EOP E2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation")

SRO/ATC (1) Ensures all MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves closed (VB3)

(2) Checks any S/G intact o Checks pressures in S/Gs 11, 12 and 13 stable (VB3).

(3) Confirms S/G 14 as faulted o S/G 14 depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner (VB3)

SRO (4) Directs BOP to implement Appendix HH to isolate faulted S/G 14. (see page 18)**

SRO/ATC (5) Checks Condensate Storage Tank level greater than 10% (VB3 center).

(6) Checks Secondary System Radiation Normal.

(6.a, b) No valid alarms and no upward trends on Air Ejector RM15/15R (PK1106),

S/G Blowdown RM19 (PK1117), Main Steam Line RM71, 72, 73, 74 (PK1118).

(6.c) Contacts Chemistry to sample S/Gs. Ensures sample path open (Containment Isolation Phase A RESET (VB1), Open Instrument Air to Containment FCV584 (VB4 bottom), Open Inside Containment S/G Blowdown Valves FCV760763 (VB3 skirt bottom left)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD203 r2.docx Page 12 of 23 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 13 of 19 Event

Description:

Feedline Header to S/G 14 Fails - E2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISO (S3CT2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation") (cont)

SRO/ATC (7) Check if ECCS Flow Should Be Reduced o (7.a) Checks RCS Subcooled based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 20°F (Subcooled Margin Monitor, YI 31 or Appendix C) o (7.b) Secondary heat sink: Total AFW flow GREATER THAN 435 GPM, OR NR Level in at least one S/G GREATER THAN 15% (25% if adverse containment conditions still exist).

o (7.c) WR RCS Pressure STABLE OR RISING o (7.d) PZR Level GREATER THAN 12% (40% if adverse containment conditions still exist).

o (7.e) Determines SI Termination Criteria has been met.

Transitions to EOP E1.1, SI Termination (EOP E1.1, SI Termination)

SRO/BOP (1) Checks SI Reset (already done in E0, App E)

(2) Aligns Charging o (2.a) Checks only one ECCS CCP running (CCP 11 is the only one running) (VB2) o (2.b) Depresses Vital 4kV Auto Transfer Relay Resets: Blue Light OFF (3) Checks RCS pressure stable or rising - (its stable)(VB2)

(4) (S3CT2) Closes 8803A & B OR 8801A & B to isolate charging injection (VB2)**

• • (Critical Task) (S3CT2, Terminate ECCS flow before overfill of the RCS results in a rupture of the pressurizer relief tank (PRT)).

SRO/ATC (5) Establishes normal charging flow o (5.a) Closes HCV142 (CC2)

SRO/ BOP o (5.b) Opens 8107 and 8108, Norm Charging to Regen Hx Stop Valves (VB2).

o (5.c) Ensures 8146 OR 8147 - OPEN (VB2) o (5.d) Ensures 8145 AND 8148 CLOSED (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD203 r2.docx Page 13 of 23 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 14 of 19 Event

Description:

Feedline Header to S/G 14 Fails -E1.1, SI Termination (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E1.1, SI Termination) (cont)

SRO/ATC (5) Establishes normal charging flow (cont) o (5.e) Throttles open FCV128 to establish charging flow.

(6) Controls Charging Flow to Maintain PZR Level o (6.a) Adjusts FCV128 charging flow and HCV142 to maintain:

PZR Level Stable, between 17% [50%] and 60%.

Seal injection to each RCP between 8 and 13 gpm.

SRO/BOP (7) Checks if SI pumps should be stopped o (7.a) Checks RCS Pressure -

Stable or rising (its stable)

Greater than 1650 psig (it over 1800 psig)

No SI flow indications (there is none) o (7.b) Stops both SI Pumps (8) Checks if RHR pumps should be stopped o (8.a) Checks RHR pumps running with suction aligned to the RWST o (8.b) Shuts down RHR Pp 12 (RHR 11 not running due to bus G)

(9) Ensures ECCS Flow Not Required o (9.a) Subcooling greater than 20oF (its over 100; must use SPDS or PAMs to check (PT403 OOS in initial setup) o (9.b) PZR Level GREATER THAN 12% [40%]

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD203 r2.docx Page 14 of 23 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 15 of 19 Event

Description:

Feedline Header to S/G 14 Fails -E1.1, SI Termination (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E1.1, SI Termination) (cont)

SRO/BOP (10) Checks both trains of Containment Isolation, Phase A and B reset.

(11) Checks Instrument Air to Containment (12) Checks if Containment Spray should be stopped (13) Checks Pressurizer Level greater than 17 [50]%.

(14) Establishes RCS Letdown and No Load Pressurizer Level using Appendix R.

The scenario is terminated once ECCS Normal charging and letdown are reestablished, per lead examiner

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD203 r2.docx Page 15 of 23 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5,6,7 Page 16 of 19 Event

Description:

EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix E, ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status (S3CT1, partial)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E0, Appendix E)

BOP Implements App E (ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status):

(1a) Checks no personnel in Containment (part of turnover; may not voice)

(1b) Announces trip/SI on PA system (2) Checks main generator - tripped (PK1401 ON), CC3 right side)

(3 & 4) Verifies Phase A and Containment Vent Isolation complete (VB1, ESF status lights, red lights ON, white lights OFF); all misalignments are due to loss of bus G or previous scenario events.

(5) Verify ESF (SI) actuation complete; all misalignments are due to loss of bus G or previous scenario events.

BOP (6) Verifies Feedwater isolation complete (F.W. Isolation and S.G. Level Portions of Monitor Light Box C: red lights ON, white light OFF.

o (S3CT1, partial) Closes FCV441, S/G 14 Feedwater Isolation Valve** (if not isolated earlier in the scenario). (VB3) o Dispatches Nuclear Operator to close FCV439, Feedwater Iso Valve (VB3)

BOP (7) Determines Containment Spray and Phase B Isolation is NOT required (Contmt Isol, Phase B portion of Monitor Light Box D: red lights are OFF)

BOP (8) Checks Main Steamline Isolation complete (Main Steam Isolation portion of Monitor Light Box D: red light OFF, white light are OFF)

BOP (9) Checks AFW status o Both MDAFW Pumps are running (VB3) o TDAFW is running, but not required. LCVs are failed full open due to loss of bus G.

If directed by Shift Foreman, may stop TDAFW pump (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD203 r2.docx Page 16 of 23 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 17 of 19 Event

Description:

EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix E, ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E0, Appendix E)

BOP (10) Verifies ECCS flows (charging injection (VB2 upper panel left), SI, RHR (both on VB1 upper panel (11) Reports ESF and AFW status to the Shift Foreman (Shift Foreman may direct operator to continue on in Appendix E, or redirect to higher priority tasks)

BOP (12) Checks excess letdown; notes NOT in service prior to trip (13) Checks secondary systems (MFPs tripped (VB2, green lights ON), stops all but one CB Pp set, takes LCV12 control switch to CONT ONLY. Determines Condenser is NOT available (MSIVs are closed) and directs field operators to break vacuum when turbine is less than 200 rpm (14) Verifies proper operation of Aux Bldg and Control Rm vent systems (VB4 vent status light panel white lights); turns on aux bldg vent charcoal filter preheater (VB4 lower panel, left side) and verifies containment iodine fans secured (VB4, lower panel),

BOP (15) Verifies available DGs running normally (VB4, freq (60), volts (120), speed (900))

(16) Verifies vital batteries supplied by chargers (charger and bus volts on VB5, upper panel middle/lower area);

(17) Verifies MSRs reset (CC3 Triconex HMI)

(18) Throttles RCP seal injection flows (CC2)

(19) Checks PK1104 NOT IN (SFP alarm)

(20) Notifies Shift Foreman of completion.

(Board Operator will rejoin crew upon completion of Appendix or when called upon by Shift Foreman)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD203 r2.docx Page 17 of 23 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6,7,8 Page 18 of 19 Event

Description:

Faulted Steam Generator Isolation (S3CT1) **

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E2, Appendix HH Isolate Faulted Steam Generator")

BOP (1) Isolate faulted S/G.

o (1a) Ensures closed Main Feedwater Isolation Valve (VB3 lower left side)

(MFWI may have been addressed as part of E0, Appendix E)

(S3CT1, partial) Closes FCV441, S/G 14 Feedwater Isolation Valve** (if not isolated earlier in the scenario). (VB3) o (1b) Ensures Blowdown Isolation Valves Closed (FCV763, FCV160, FCV244) (VB3 skirt bottom) o (1c) Ensures S/G 14 10% dump valve closed (PCV22) (VB3 center bottom)

Note: Shift Foreman may have directed the TDAFW shut down earlier in the scenario due to an inability to throttle flow from the Control Room. Isolation of the LCV109 and FCV38 is still required as part of the Critical Task, regardless of TDAFW pump running status.

BOP o (1d) Ensures closed S/G 14 AFW flow control valves closed (VB3 skirt bottom)

(S3CT1, partial) Closes LCV113, MDAFW Level Control Valve (VB3 skirt)**

(S3CT1, partial) Dispatches a Nuclear Operator to locally close LCV109 **

• • (S3CT1) Manually isolate feedline break before Containment wide range level reaches 94 feet, resulting in a magenta path on the Containment safety function status tree.

BOP o (1f) Determines AFW is available to S/Gs 11, 12, and 13) (flow indicators VB3 center, controllers VB3 skirt bottom) o (1g) Informs SFM of status (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD203 r2.docx Page 18 of 23 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 19 of 19 Event

Description:

Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E2, Appendix HH Isolate Faulted Steam Generator")

BOP (2) Remove Subcooled Margin Monitor input from S/G 12 o (2.a.1) Goes to PAM4 panel (in hallway behind VB3) o (2.a.2) Presses CONFIGURATION

SUMMARY

o (2.a.3) Presses FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR o (2.a.4) Presses THOT2 o (2.a.5) Presses DISABLE LOOP (Board Operator will rejoin crew upon completion of Appendix)

L161 NRC ESD203 r2.docx Page 19 of 23 Rev 2

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 18 Event

Description:

Manual Operation of D/G 12 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Procedure step numbers are included at the front of each action/comment in parenthesis, where applicable.

Note: Time compression will be used for field report back prestart instructions have been completed.

(OP J6B:V, Diesel Generators - Manual Operation of DG 12)

SRO/BOP May review applicable Precautions and Limitations.

BOP (6.1.5.a) Places D/G 12 Mode Sel switch in MANUAL (VB4)

SRO Shift Foreman enters T.S. 3.8.1.B (diesel INOPERABLE when mode select switch in MANUAL and diesel not running).

BOP (6.1.5.b) Cuts in D/G protective relays (VB4)

(6.1.5.c) Places D/G 12 Start/Stop switch to "START" (6.1.5.d) Checks that D/G 12 starts and monitors for steady state conditions (6.1.5.e) Notes frequency fails to reach 60 Hz and begins to fall ATC Observes PK1701, Diesel 12 Fail to Start alarming, and informs the Shift Foreman.

SRO Enters PK1701, Diesel 12 Fail to Start (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD204 r3.docx Page 1 of 22 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 18 Event

Description:

Manual Operation of D/G 12 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (AR PK1701, Diesel 12 Lube Oil System)

SRO (2.1.1) Notes D/G is not needed for an emergency o Contacts Nuclear Operator in the field to Diesel Generator 12 to evaluate and respond to new local annunciators.

Addresses action of T.S. 3.8.1.B, AC Sources - Operating o Informs crew need to perform STP I1C to verify OPERABILITY of offsite circuit (now, and then once every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />) o Will need to declare any required feature(s) supported by D/G 12 inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable, (there are none at this time).

o Will also need to determine no common cause exists on the other D/Gs o Need to restore D/G 12 to OPERABLE status in 14 days.

Updates Shift Manager of D/G 12 status and requests Maintenance support.

Proceed to the next event once Tech Spec discussed, per the lead examiner.

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD204 r3.docx Page 2 of 22 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 18 Event

Description:

Regen Hx Isolation Valve, LCV459, Fails to midposition Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses charging flow problem from:

• RCP seal flows lowering (due to controller throttling back) (VB2 meters, PPC)

• Pzr level rising slowly (due to charging/letdown mismatch) (VB2 meters, PPC, CC2 recorder)

• VCT level dropping slowly (VB2 recorder, PPC)

• Dual position indication lights illuminated on mimic board for LCV459 (VB2)

SRO Implements OP AP18, Letdown Line Failure (OP AP18, Letdown Line Failure)

SRO/ATC (1) Ensures no load changes are in progress.

SRO/BOP (2) Isolates letdown o Ensures Letdown Orifice Stop Valve, 8149C Closed (VB2) o Closes other Regen Heat Exchanger Inlet Valve, LCV460 (VB2) o Verifies RHR to Letdown Flow Control Valve, HCV133 (RHR Ltdn) closed (VB2)

SRO/ATC (3) Checks for RCS Leakage - verifies that Pzr level and RCS press are both stable/rising (there was never an indication of leakage) (VB2, CC2, PPC)

ATC (4) Reduces charging to minimum (RCP seals only), using FCV128 (or HC459D) and HCV142 (approx. 8 gpm on RCP seals, with HCV142 closed (or near closed) (CC2).

SRO/BOP (5) Establish Excess Letdown (see next page), per OP B1A:IV BOP (6) Contacts RP and Chemistry regarding Excess Letdown being placed in service.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD204 r3.docx Page 3 of 22 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 18 Event

Description:

Regen Hx Isolation Valve, LCV459, Fails to midposition (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP B1A:IV, Place Excess Letdown in Service)

ALL * (6.1.1) Verifies charging at minimum (seals only) (done, per above step, or do now) o Reduces charging to minimum (RCP seals only), using FCV128 and HCV142 (approx. 8 gpm on RCP seals, with HCV142 closed (or near closed)

BOP (6.1.2) Contacts RP for rad conditions/posting Note: If Shift Manager asked in regard to flushing or crew attempts to perform flush, provide the following cue:

CUE: Excess letdown line flushing is NOT needed.

BOP (6.1.3) Skips line flush, moves on to next step BOP (6.1.4) Opens FCV361, CCW to Excess Ltdn HX (VB1)

BOP (6.1.5) Verifies pot for HCV123, Excess Letdown Pressure Control, is CLOSED (at 0)

(VB2)

(6.1.6) Opens 8166/8167, Excess Letdown isolation valves (VB2)

(6.1.7) is N/A (6.1.8) Slowly opens HCV123 to establish excess letdown (VB2)

(6.1.9) Adjusts HCV123 to provide 40 gpm letdown at NOP ATC/BOP (to end of scenario) HCV123 and FCV128 (or HC459D) are now used to control Pzr Level Proceed to the next event once Excess Letdown established, per the lead examiner.

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD204 r3.docx Page 4 of 22 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 18 Event

Description:

SSPS relay actuation causes Inadvertent TDAFW Pump Start and Blowdown Sample Line Isolation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses TDAFW Pump Start from one or more of the following:

RCS Temperature lowers (secondary cooldown) (CC2, VB2 meters, PPC)

Lowering MW (Triconex CC3, PPC)

Feedflow / Steamflow rates diverging (CC3, VB3)

Outward Rod Motion (CC1)

RED light on FCV95 illuminated indicating OPEN w/Tach reading ~ 4500 RPM (VB3)

TDAFW Discharge Pressure ~ 1200 psig, AFW Flow to S/Gs all reading top of scale (VB3)

Diagnoses Blowdown Sample Line Isolation from blowdown valve position indicator lights for FCV151, 154, 157, 160, 244, 246, 248, and 250 (VB3)

Note: Crew should perform a Diagnostic Brief utilizing the START Operations Diagnostic Model described in Attachment 10 of OP1.DC10, Conduct of Operations, to diagnose the malfunction and mitigate the transient. Power change is primary concern (vice sample line isolation).

ALL Identifies something has changed as part of initial diagnostics.

Reviews primary and secondary side parameters and determines plant is not stable(i.e.

in a transient) based on the following indications:

o RCS Temperature lowers (secondary cooldown) (CC2, VB2 meters, PPC) o Lowering MW (Triconex CC3, PPC) o Outward Rod Motion (CC1)

Reviews primary side for changed conditions/actions taken in the RCS o boration/dilution - possible given recent realignment of charging letdown system o rod motion - notes rods moved IN RESPONSE to temperature change (i.e. not causal)

Reviews secondary side for changed conditions affecting secondary load/efficiency o Secondary power - notes lowering MW output vs demand possible efficiency change o Further review of secondary side indications identifies Feedflow / Steamflow mismatch due to excess supply from the TDAFW pump. Numerous pressure, flow, and level gauges confirm the pump is actively feeding forward.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD204 r3.docx Page 5 of 22 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 18 Event

Description:

SSPS relay actuation causes Inadvertent TDAFW Pump Start and Blowdown Sample Line Isolation (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Determines prompt action is warranted to stabilize the plant.

Directs isolation of the TDAFW Pump and restoration of primary side parameters to pretransient conditions (as time permits).

Note: Isolation of the TDAFW may be accomplished by any of the methods described below.

BOP Isolates TDAFW Pump o Takes manual control of level control valves and closes LCV106, 107, 108, 109 (VB3)

OR o Closes Steam Supply Valves FCV37/38 (VB3)

OR o Locally closing FCV95 ATC Controls TAVG as necessary with manual rods using 3 step pull and wait (CC1)

SRO Shift Foreman implements TS 3.7.5.B, AFW System for one AFW train inoperable (72 hr).

Proceed to the next event once Tech Spec addressed, per the lead examiner.

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD204 r3.docx Page 6 of 22 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 7 of 18 Event

Description:

Loss of Main Transformer Cooling Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Observes PK1421, MAIN TRANSF, and informs the Shift Foreman.

SRO Enters PK1421, MAIN TRANSF (PK1421, MAIN TRANSF)

SRO/ATC (1) Identifies input 829Mn Bk Xfmr Annun and UV for >90°C AND only 1 fan group running SRO/ATC (2.1.1, 2.1.2) Updates crew that AR PK contains the Rx Trip and Turbine Trip criteria (2.1.3) Dispatches Nuclear Operator to investigate and report any local alarms o Checks blue breaker trip lights OFF in each TQMxCx panel (6 panels total).

o Nuclear Operator will report back there are no local alarms in, but Main Bank C has no fans running and winding temperature is currently 95oC.

SRO/BOP (2.1.4.a,b,c) When Nuclear Operator is directed to manually start the fans, reports fans did not start, and there are no oil pumps running.

(2.1.4.d) Contacts Maintenance to investigate.

SRO (2.1.6) Directs Shift Manager to contact GCC to report alarm is in due to cooling problem on Main Bank C (GCC receives local annunciator alarm when PK1421 goes into alarm).

(2.1.7) Determines alarm condition will not clear o (2.1.7.a) Notes alarm IS due to Main transformer bank high winding temperature and forced cooling cannot be restored.

Notes Reactor must be tripped, and E0 entered if winding temperature reaches 115oC and forced cooling has not been restored.

Updates crew that Unit will be ramped at 50 MW/min per OP AP25, "Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown," until the Unit is off line or forced cooling is restored.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD204 r3.docx Page 7 of 22 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 8 of 18 Event

Description:

Loss of Main Transformer Cooling (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Implements OP AP25, Rapid Load Reduction (OP AP25, Rapid Load Reduction)

SRO Enters OP AP25, Rapid Load Reduction (1.a) Notes runback/programmed ramp is not in progress (may not vocalize, since this ramp is initiated by the crew)

SRO/BOP Commences ramp (guidance is also on lamacoid pegboard on CC3 or Shift Foreman will hand off Step 1 sheet to BOP):

o (1.b) MW and IMP feedbacks are placed in service (all on Triconex turbine HMI, CC3) o (1.c) 60 MWe load target is entered into Triconex HMI o (1.d) Sets ramp rate to 50 mw/min o (1.e) Pushes GO SRO/BOP o (1.f) Determines downpower is greater than 15%. May contact chemistry in advance or wait until 15% power change is complete.

ATC (2) Verifies that control rods are inserting properly in AUTO (CC1)

(3) Turns Pressurizer Backup heaters on (CC1)

(4) Checks charging adequate to prevent flashing in the letdown system; may take manual control to ensure adequate flow (CC2)

SRO/BOP (5) Ensures DFWCS is controlling S/G levels in AUTO (MFW control/bypass valves; MFPs all in AUTO) (CC2)(VB3)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD204 r3.docx Page 8 of 22 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 9 of 18 Event

Description:

Loss of Main Transformer Cooling (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP25, "Rapid Load Reduction", cont)

Note: Boration values described below are representative of the conditions given, but will vary based on the actual ramp rate and target specified by SRO.

SRO/ATC (6) Performs boration (the following guidance is on the boration checklist in the reactivity handbook) o Presses STOP on M/U Ctrl HMI (CC2) o Presses BORATE on HMI o Sets target gallons for boration verifies batch is reset o Sets boric acid flowrate o Presses START, and monitors boration o Once stopped, either returns to AUTO (presses AUTO, then START), or performs additional boration per the Shift Foreman(CC2)

SRO/BOP (7) Checks MFP suction pressure greater than 260 psig (VB3)

SRO/ATC (8) Checks Tavg trending to Tref (PPC, CC1)

(9) Checks Pressurizer pressure and level trending to programmed band (PPC, CC2)

Next event triggered as soon as ramp commenced, per Lead Examiner

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD204 r3.docx Page 9 of 22 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5, 6 Page 10 of 18 Event

Description:

Main Transformer Failure / Unit Trip Causes Turbine Trip ATWS; Rod Control Malfunction (S4CT1)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Unit Trip/ATWS is diagnosed from one or more of the following:

AR PK1401, UNIT TRIP AR PK1211 TURBINE TRIP AR PK0411 REACTOR TRIP INITIATE SRO Implements EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

Note: Attempts to manually trip the reactor may be done prior to entry into EOP E0 or as part of E0, step 1 RNO.

ALL Performs immediate actions:

(1) Ensure reactor trip:

o Identifies reactor is NOT tripped based on the following:

Rx Trip breakers did NOT open (VB2)

NIs are NOT lowering (CC1)

Rod bottom lights are NOT lit(VB2); moves to step 1 RNO ATC Attempts trip using manual switch (CC1 or VB2)

BOP Notes that manual trip already attempted (or may retry manual reactor trip VB2)

Observes that reactor is still critical (same indications as when trip attempted)

Opens breakers for busses 13D and 13E (VB5, lower panel 480V bus breakers) to de energize the rod drive MGs; breakers will not open May dispatch operator to open reactor trip breakers locally SRO Notes reactor is still not tripped. Verifies that attempt to manually open 13D/E was unsuccessful and transitions to EOP FRS.1 (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD204 r3.docx Page 10 of 22 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5, 6 Page 11 of 18 Event

Description:

Main Transformer Failure / Unit Trip Causes Turbine Trip ATWS; Rod Control Malfunction (S4CT1)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP FRS1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS")

SRO/ATC (1) Manually inserts control rods (CC1)**

SRO directs local opening of RTA/RTB.

• • (S4CT1) Insert negative reactivity into the core following the guidance provided in EOP FRS.1 so that power is reduced to less than 5% by the completion of step 19.

SRO/BOP (2) Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

(3) Checks AFW status o Both MDAFWs running (VB3, left skirt) o TDAFW is isolated and may be started ( VB3, center skirt)

SRO/BOP Reads CAUTION prior to step 4.a regarding Main Feed Pumps tripping on SI (4) Initiates Emergency Boration of the RCS a.1) OPENS 8805A or 8805B (VB2, left skirt )

a.2) CLOSES LCV112B OR LCV112C (VB2, left skirt) a.3) Verifies AT LEAST 90 GPM charging (VB2) b) Checks PZR Pressure LESS THAN 2335 PSIG (VB2)

(5) Manually closes Containment Vent Isolation (VB4, skirt)

(6) Announces ATWS on PA system (7) Checks SI NOT actuated (PK0821, SAFETY INJECTION is OFF)

(8.a) Checks if Reactor Trip Breakers are OPEN (not yet; waiting until past first 5% check)

(8.b) Checks Turbine Stop valves closed.

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD204 r3.docx Page 11 of 22 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5,6 Page 12 of 18 Event

Description:

Main Transformer Failure / Unit Trip Causes Turbine Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP FRS1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS")

SRO/ATC (9) Checks if Reactor is Subcritical o Checks power range channels - LESS THAN 5% recorders on VB2 (and PPC); (will be by now) o Intermediate Range Channel - Negative Startup Rate (will be).

o Continues to Step 19 Note: Shutdown Margin calculation will be aligned through the Shift Manager to other support personnel.

SRO (19) Verifies Adequate Shutdown Margin a) Contacts Chemistry Dept to Sample RCS for Boron Concentration.

b) Requests STP R19 Shutdown Margin Calc c) Directs boration of RCS to desired SDM concentration.

Returns to E0.

SRO Implements EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

SRO/ATC (1) Reverifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open (VB2 upper left), rods on bottom (VB2 upper left DRPI panel), NIs decreasing (CC1 left).

(2) Reverifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

SRO/BOP (3) Rechecks vital 4kv buses (VB4, all vital busses have white lights on mimic busses)

SRO/BOP (4) Checks if SI actuated (PK0821 OFF, also checks SSPS ESF status lights on VB1 and PK0202 to verify SI is NOT required)

(4 RNO) Checks AFW status (VB3, AFW Pp 12 & 13 may be running, but S/Gs will likely still be on scale), and exits E0 for E0.1 (If TDAFW running, may throttle AFW LCVs on VB3 lower left to limit RCS cooldown; note that AFW will not be running if S/G levels adequate, but may choose to start them.

(continued on next page)

• Critical Task L161 NRC ESD204 r3.docx Page 12 of 22 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5,7 Page 13 of 18 Event

Description:

Main Transformer Failure / Unit Trip Causes Turbine Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E0.1, Reactor Trip Response)

Note: EOP E0.1 actions will be performed until the loss of all AC which occurs when crew is adjusting pressurizer level.

All (1) Checks Tave stable or trending towards Tref (if should be); no actions expected here other than continued throttling of AFW flow may be done (AFW LCVs on VB3 lower left), to control RCS temperature.

(2) Checks Feedwater Isolation (FWI) complete Checks Tave < 554F (expected, or soon will be)

Checks FWI MLB (monitor light box) (VB1, upper center), RED light ON, WHITE lights OFF (if actuated; this actuation will occur when < 554F)

Checks AFW flow > 435 gpm (the flow will be adequate, and/or S/G levels will still be onscale) (VB3)

SRO/ATC (3) Checks all control rods - fully inserted) (VB2 upper left, for DRPI panel)

BOP (4) Checks Pzr level control o Checks Pzr level > 17% (VB2 meter, CC2 recorder, PPC) o Checks charging and letdown in service (they both are) (CC2 and VB2 CVCS mimic) o Checks Pzr level trending to 22%; operates FCV128 (HC459D) and HCV142 (CC2) to control Pzr level 22% 60% (RNO) o Operates Pzr heaters as needed (auto/manual) to maintain normal pressure (normal auto operation expected at this point, with pressure returning to normal or normal already)

Next event may be triggered as soon at any point in E0.1 per Lead Examiner

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD204 r3.docx Page 13 of 22 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7 Page 14 of 18 Event

Description:

12kV StartUp Feeder Breaker Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: The Loss of ALL AC develops when the 12kV StartUp Feeder Breaker trips open. Bus G is deenergized due to event 1 rendering D/G 12 inoperable. Shutdown relays will activate on D/G 11 (no reset) and 13 (resettable from the Control Room) when Startup is lost. Bus F and H diesels fail to start.

ALL Diagnosis of the Loss of AC is made using one or more of the following:

Many alarms occur, mostly associated with equipment power problems All of the vital and nonvital bus white power available lights are out (VB4 and VB5, lower panel, near each mimic bus)

DG 13 shutdown relay tripped alarm (PK1815) is noted (and/or the DG is noted not to be running)

DG 11 shutdown relay tripped alarm (PK1615) is noted (and/or the DG is noted not to be running)

SRO Implements ECA0.0, Loss of All Vital AC Power (ECA0.0, Loss of All Vital AC Power)

SRO/ATC (1) Reverifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open (VB2 upper left), rods on bottom (VB2 upper left DRPI panel), NIs decreasing (CC1 left).

(2) Reverifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

SRO/ATC (3) Performs RCS isolation steps o (3a) Verifies letdown isolated 8149 A/B/C close OR LCV459/460 closed (all but 459 were closed during Event 2; 459 remains stuck in midposition (VB2 lower left) o (3b) Checks Pzr PORVs closed.

o (3c) Isolates Excess Letdown (8166/8167, VB2 lower far right) (both were opened during Event 2) o (3d) Verifies NSSS sample valves closed (VB1 lower left) (some are still open, and must be taken to close position)

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD204 r3.docx Page 14 of 22 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7 Page 15 of 18 Event

Description:

12kV StartUp Feeder Breaker Trip (cont) (S4CT2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (ECA0.0, Loss of All Vital AC Power, cont)

Note: TDAFW may have been restored earlier in the scenario (FRS.1, step 3). If not, Nuclear Operators will need to be dispatched unisolate TDAFW pump due to Event 3. Once the TDAFP is running, local operators will be stationed to control the TDAFP LCVs.

SRO/BOP (4) Verifies AFW status o AFW flow > 435 gpm (VB3 upper center meters, SPDS)

Note: Shift Foreman (SFM) may authorize an attempted reset of the shutdown relay and DG start for D/G 11 and 13, or will dispatch Nuclear Operators to walk down the diesels prior to attempting restoration. D/G 11 cannot be reset. D/G 13 will reset and can then be started. An additional failure prevents the diesel from automatically loading on the bus, and requires the crew to manually shut output breaker 52HF7.)

Note: Shift Foreman (SFM) may continue on in main body of ECA0.0 while awaiting field status reports on D/G 1 1 and 13. See page 17 for the continuation of ECA0.0 (steps 6 - 10).

SRO/BOP (5) Attempts to restore power to any vital bus o (5.a) Attempts to start D/Gs Depresses D/G Shutdown Relay & Alarm Reset for D/G 11 (yellow lamacoid, just below associated diesel tachometer, VB4)

Notes PK1615 does not clear (D/G 11)

Depresses D/G Shutdown Relay & Alarm Reset for 13 (yellow lamacoid, just below associated diesel tachometer, VB4)**

Notes PK1815 clears (D/G 13)

Checks that D/G 13 starts and monitors for steady state conditions

• • (Critical Task, partial) (S4CT2, Energize at least one vital AC bus from an emergency diesel generator prior to implementation of FLEX strategies (ECA0.0, step 10 RNO)).

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD204 r3.docx Page 15 of 22 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7 Page 16 of 18 Event

Description:

12kV StartUp Feeder Breaker Trip (cont) (S4CT2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (ECA0.0, Loss of All Vital AC Power, cont)

Note: Providing power to vital 4kV bus F fulfills the minimum requirements needed to complete Critical Task S4CT2 by providing CCW flow through the RCP Thermal Barriers when CCW Pp 11 starts and seal injection when CCP Pp 11 starts.

SRO/BOP (5) Attempts to restore power to any vital bus (cont) o (5.b) Checks ANY 4kV vital bus automatically energized.

Determines 4kV Bus F did NOT automatically energize.

o (5.b RNO) Manually energizes vital 4kV Bus F Places D/G 13 Feeder Sync Switch in ON position.**

Places control switch for 52HF7, D/G 13 Output Breaker in the CLOSE position.**

Verifies Vital 4kV Bus F energized by checking white bus status light illuminated and Bus F loads receiving power.

• • (Critical Task, partial) (S4CT2, Energize at least one vital AC bus from an emergency diesel generator prior to implementation of FLEX strategies (ECA0.0, step 10 RNO)).

Note: 500 kV is unavailable for backfeed due to damage from Main Bank Transformer failure.

ALL (5) Attempts to restore power to any vital bus (cont) o (5.c,d) Checks ANY/ALL 4kV vital busses energized.

May implement EOP ECA0.3, Restore 4kV Buses o (5.e) Returns to procedure and step in effect EOP E0.1, Reactor Trip Response)

Scenario may be terminated once vital 4kV bus F has been restored (completion of S4CT2).

(continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD204 r3.docx Page 16 of 22 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7 Page 17 of 18 Event

Description:

12kV StartUp Feeder Breaker Trip (cont) (S4CT2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (ECA0.0, Loss of All Vital AC Power, cont)

SRO (6) Checks ANY 4kV vital bus energized o Determines no 4kV vital buses energizes.

o (6 RNO) Goes to Step 7 SRO/ATC (7) ISOLATES RCP Seal Cooling:

o (7.a) Dispatches Nuclear Operator to locally isolate RCP Seal Injection at the supply filters: (CVCS8382A, CVCS8382B, CVCS8387A) o (7.b) Dispatches Nuclear Operator to CLOSE CVCS8396A, Seal Return Filter Inlet Isol.

o (7.c) Dispatches Nuclear Operator to CLOSE FCV357, RCP Therm Bar CCW Return Isol SRO/ATC (8) CONTROL AFW Flow to Limit Cooldown:

o (8.a) Determines S/G Levels are greater than 15% in at least one S/G.

o (8.b,c) Dispatches Nuclear Operator to locally control TDAFW feedflow to limit cooldown and maintain NR level between 20%65%

Note: Mechanical interlocks are installed on the control switches of the following safeguards loads, holding them in the OFF position.

SRO/ATC (9) ISOLATE Safeguards Loads From DEENERGIZED Vital Buses:

4KV Vital Bus F 4KV Vital Bus G 4KV Vital Bus H ASW Pump 11 ASW Pump 12 CCW Pump 13 CCW Pump 11 CCW Pump 12 CS Pump 12 SI Pump 11 CS Pump 11 SI Pump 12 CCP 11 RHR Pump 11 RHR Pump 12 AFW Pump 13 CCP 12 AFW Pump 12 (continued on next page)

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD204 r3.docx Page 17 of 22 Rev 3

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ESD2 OpTest No.: L161NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7 Page 18 of 18 Event

Description:

12kV StartUp Feeder Breaker Trip (cont) (S4CT2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (ECA0.0, Loss of All Vital AC Power, cont)

SRO/ATC (9) ISOLATE Safeguards Loads From DEENERGIZED Vital Buses (cont):

o Ensure Standby Select switches are in MANUAL ASW Pump 11 and 12 CCW Pump 11, 12, and 13 o Place all CFCU Speed Select switches in LOW AND Dispatch operators to open all CFCU breakers CFCU No. 11 521F02 CFCU No. 12 521F01 CFCU No. 13 521G01 CFCU No. 14 521H01 CFCU No. 15 521G02 Note: Second CAUTION before this step identifies intent of Step 10 (continuous action) is to begin implementation of FLEX (FSGs) as soon as it is recognized that power WILL NOT be restored within one hour. Shift Manager will provide the following cue as needed to ensure SFM understands Offsite Power (500 kV and 230kV) are not viable success paths:

500 kV CUE: Report back from the switch yard indicates that the transformer failure at DCPP damaged the 500 kV distribution system. It will be several hours before it is restored.

230 kV CUE: Maintenance reports damage to StartUp Transformer 11. It will be at least half a shift before they have it back in service.

SRO/ATC (10) Restore Power to 4KV Vital Buses o (10.a) IMPLEMENTS ECA0.3, RESTORE 4kV BUSES (may already be in progress).

o (10.b) Determines power cannot be restored within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.**

IMPLEMENTS FSG 04, ELAP DC BUS LOAD SHED AND MANAGEMENT AND FSG 05, INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND FLEX EQUIPMENT STAGING.

(**FSG 04 and FSG 05 are associated with the bounding conditions of S4CT2).

• • Critical Task L161 NRC ESD204 r3.docx Page 18 of 22 Rev 3

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: Oct 14, 2016 Operating Test No.: L161 GROUP 1 APPLICANTS RO RO RO RO SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I1 SRO-I Competencies SRO-U1 SRO-U2 SRO-U SRO-U SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/ Diagnose 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 1,3,4,5, 5,6,7 5,6,7 8 1,3,4,5, 6,8 1,4,5,7, 8

1,2,3,4, 2,3,5,6, 5,6 7 Events and Conditions Comply With and Use 2,4,5,6, 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 7 5,6,7 5,8 1,3,4,5, 6,8 5,7,8 1,2,3,4, 2,4,5,6, 5,6,7,8 7 Procedures (1)

Operate Control 2,4,5,6, 7 1,3,6,8 1,4,5,7, 8

2,3,4,6, 7

Boards (2)

Communicate 2,3,4,5, 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 6,7 5,6,7 5,6,7,8 1,3,4,5, 6,7,8 1,4,5,7, 8

1,2,3,4, 2,3,4,5, 5,6,7,8 6,7 and Interact Demonstrate 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7 5,6,7,8 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7 Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and 1,3 2,3 1,3 Use Tech Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

ES-301, Page 27 of 27 Rev 1

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: Oct 14, 2016 Operating Test No.: L161 GROUP 2 APPLICANTS RO RO RO RO SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I Competencies SRO-U3 SRO-U4 SRO-U SRO-U SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/ Diagnose 1,4,5,7, 8

1,2,3,4, 1,3,4,5, 5,6,7 8 2,3,5,6, 7

Events and Conditions Comply With and Use 5,7,8 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7 5,8 2,4,5,6, 7

Procedures (1)

Operate Control 1,4,5,7, 8

2,3,4,6, 7

Boards (2)

Communicate 1,4,5,7, 8

1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7 5,6,7,8 2,3,4,5, 6,7 and Interact Demonstrate 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7 5,6,7,8 Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and 1,3 2,3 Use Tech Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

ES-301, Page 27 of 27 Rev 1

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: Oct 14, 2016 Operating Test No.: L161 GROUP 3 APPLICANTS RO RO RO RO SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I Competencies SRO-U5 SRO-U6 SRO-U SRO-U SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/ Diagnose 1,4,5,7, 8

1,2,3,5, 1,3,4,5, 6,7 8 2,3,5,6, 7

Events and Conditions Comply With and Use 5,7,8 1,2,3,5, 1,2,3,4, 6,7 5,8 2,5,6,7 Procedures (1)

Operate Control 1,4,5,7, 8 2,3,6,7 Boards (2)

Communicate 1,4,5,7, 8

1,2,3,5, 1,2,3,4, 6,7 5,6,7,8 2,3,5,6, 7

and Interact Demonstrate 1,2,3,5, 1,2,3,4, 6,7 5,6,7,8 Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and 1,3 2,3 Use Tech Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

ES-301, Page 27 of 27 Rev 2

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: Oct 14, 2016 Operating Test No.: L161 GROUP 4 APPLICANTS RO RO RO RO SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I Competencies SRO-U7 SRO-U8 SRO-U SRO-U SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/ Diagnose 1,4,5,7, 8

1,2,3,4, 1,3,4,5, 5,6,7 8 2,3,5,6, 7

Events and Conditions Comply With and Use 5,7,8 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7 5,8 2,4,5,6, 7

Procedures (1)

Operate Control 1,4,5,7, 8

2,3,4,6, 7

Boards (2)

Communicate 1,4,5,7, 8

1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7 5,6,7,8 2,3,4,5, 6,7 and Interact Demonstrate 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7 5,6,7,8 Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and 1,3 2,3 Use Tech Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

ES-301, Page 27 of 27 Rev 1

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group 1 (U1, U2, I1,Sur)

Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: October 14, 2016 Operating Test Number: L161 A E Scenarios P V Scenario-1 Scenario-2 P E (Spare) Scenario-3 (Thu) Scenario-4 (Tue) T M (Wed)

L N O I CREW CREW CREW CREW T N I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION C A I A T S A S A B S A B S A L M S S N Y R T R T O R T O R T U U U T P O C O C P O C P O C M(*)

R R E R I U RO RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 0 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 2,4,7 1,2,3,4,7 8 4 4 2 SRO-U1 MAJ 5,6 5,6 4 2 2 1 TS 1,3 2 0 2 2 RO RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 0 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 1,3,4,8 1,3,8 7 4 4 2 SRO-U2 MAJ 5 5,6 3 2 2 1 TS 2,3 2 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 RO NOR 0 1 1 1 SRO-I1 I/C 1,4,7,8 1,2,3,4 2,3,4,7 12 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 5 5,6 5,6 5 2 2 1 TS 1,3 2 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301, Page 26 of 27 Rev 2

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group 2 (U3, U4, Sur)

Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: October 14, 2016 Operating Test Number: L161 A E Scenarios P V Scenario-1 Scenario-2 P E (Spare) Scenario-3 (Thu) Scenario-4 (Tue) T M (Wed)

L N O I CREW CREW CREW CREW T N I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION C A I A T S A S A B S A B S A L M S S N Y R T R T O R T O R T U U U T P O C O C P O C P O C M(*)

R R E R I U RO RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 0 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 1,4,7,8 1,2,3,4,7 9 4 4 2 SRO-U3 MAJ 5 5,6 3 2 2 1 TS 1,3 2 0 2 2 RO RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 0 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 1,3,4,8 2,3,4,7 8 4 4 2 SRO-U4 MAJ 5 5,6 3 2 2 1 TS 2,3 2 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301, Page 26 of 27 Rev 2

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group 3 (U5, U6, Sur)

Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: October 14, 2016 Operating Test Number: L161 A E Scenarios P V Scenario-1 Scenario-2 P E (Spare) Scenario-3 (Thu) Scenario-4 (Tue)* T M (Wed)

L N O I CREW CREW CREW CREW T N I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION C A I A T S A S A B S A B S A L M S S N Y R T R T O R T O R T U U U T P O C O C P O C P O C M(*)

R R E R I U RO RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 0 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 1,4,7,8 1,2,3,7 8 4 4 2 SRO-U5 MAJ 5 5,6 3 2 2 1 TS 1,3 2 0 2 2 RO RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 0 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 1,3,4,8 2,3,7 7 4 4 2 SRO-U6 MAJ 5 5,6 3 2 2 1 TS 2,3 2 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

• Scenario 4, Event 4 was not performed during the administration of this scenario due to a simulator booth operator error.

ES-301, Page 26 of 27 Rev 3

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group 4 (U7, U8, Sur)

Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: October 14, 2016 Operating Test Number: L161 A E Scenarios P V Scenario-1 Scenario-2 P E (Spare) Scenario-3 (Thu) Scenario-4 (Tue) T M (Wed)

L N O I CREW CREW CREW CREW T N I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION C A I A T S A S A B S A B S A L M S S N Y R T R T O R T O R T U U U T P O C O C P O C P O C M(*)

R R E R I U RO RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 0 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 1,4,7,8 1,2,3,4,7 9 4 4 2 SRO-U7 MAJ 5 5,6 3 2 2 1 TS 1,3 2 0 2 2 RO RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 0 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 1,3,4,8 2,3,4,7 8 4 4 2 SRO-U8 MAJ 5 5,6 3 2 2 1 TS 2,3 2 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

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