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Category:DEFICIENCY REPORTS (PER 10CFR50.55E & PART 21)
MONTHYEARML18016A9011999-04-12012 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Component of DSRV-16-4,Enterprise DG Sys.Caused by Potential Problem with Connecting Rod Assemblies Built Since 1986,that Have Been Converted to Use Prestressed Fasteners.Affected Rods Should Be Inspected ML20207M9231999-03-12012 March 1999 Amended Part 21 Rept Re Cooper-Bessemer Ksv EDG Power Piston Failure.Total of 198 or More Pistons Have Been Measured at Seven Different Sites.All Potentially Defective Pistons Have Been Removed from Svc Based on Encl Results ML20140G4481997-05-0101 May 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Component of Dsrv & Dsr Enterprise Standby Diesel Generator Sys.Recommends That Springs Be Inspected on Periodic Basis,Such as During Refueling Outages ML20133E8001997-01-0808 January 1997 Deficiency Rept Re Nonconformance Related to Masterflow 713 Grout,Which Master Builders,Inc Has Supplied as Nuclear SR Product to 18 Npps.Cause Unknown.Requests That Listed Info Be Provided to Gain Insight as to Scope & Possible Cause ML20115D2001996-07-0909 July 1996 Part 21 Rept Re Mfg Defect of Enterprise DSR-4 & DSRV-4 Edgs,Originally Mfg by Calcon Corp.Amot Control Corp Purchased Calcon Product Line & Maintains Design & Production.Valves Returned to Cooper Energy Svcs on 960131 ML20117G4641996-05-14014 May 1996 Part 21 Rept Re Cooper Bessemer Reciprocating Products,Div of Cooper Cameron Corp,Issued Ltr to Define Utils/Plants Containing Similar Equipment as Supplied on Cooper Bessemer Ksv & Enterprise Dsr EDGs ML20085J6591995-06-15015 June 1995 Potential Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Air Cylinder Mfg by Bellofram Corp at Ggns.Failure Discussed W/Mfg & Judged to Be Isolated Incident W/No Further C/A Required at Affected Utils or Cooper-Bessemer ML18038A8971994-09-0707 September 1994 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Latching Mechanism of Potter & Brumfield Relay on C&D High Voltage Shut Down Alarm Assembly Printed Circuit Boards.Pull Test on Relay Reset Button Incorporated Into Receiving Insp Procedures ML20058K3841993-12-0909 December 1993 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Component of Dsrv & Dsr Enterprise Standby DG Sys,Regarding Potential Problem W/ Subcover Assembled Atop Power Head ML20127H2301993-01-15015 January 1993 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defeat in Component of Dsrv & Dsr Enterprise Standby DG Sys.Starting Air Distributor Housing Assemblies Installed as Replacement Parts at Listed Sites ML20125C7161992-12-0707 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Possibility for Malfunction of Declutching Mechanisms in SMB/SB-000 & SMB/SB/SBD-00 Actuators. Malfunction Only Occurs During Seismic Event.Balanced Levers May Be Purchased from Vendor.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20127P5861992-11-23023 November 1992 Followup to 921005 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in SB/SBD-1 Housing Cover Screws.Procedure Re Replacement of SBD-1 Spring Cover Bolts Encl.All Fasteners Should Be Loosened & Removed.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20118B4391992-09-11011 September 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Degradation in Abb Type 27N Undervoltage Relays Used in Electrical Switchgear.Recommends That Users Review Applications Requiring Exposures Greater than 1E03 Rads TID W/Time Delay Function Option ML17289A6971992-06-26026 June 1992 Amend 1 to Part 21 Rept 158 Re gear-wear Induced Failures in engine-driven Jacket Water Pump in DSRV-16-4 Standby DG Sys. Initially Reported on 911029.Grand Gulf Station Observed Wear Characteristics in as Little as 500 Operating Hours ML20101G9211992-06-19019 June 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Rotated Fuel Assemblies Sometimes Inappropriate for Modern Type Fuel Designs.Reevaluation Concluded That Inadvertently Rotated Fuel Assembly for BWR 4/5 C-lattice Plant Could Not Exceed TS Safety Limit MCPR ML20090L8801992-03-18018 March 1992 Part 21 Re Cracked Piston Castings Received from Acme Foundry,Fairbanks Morse & General Casting.Magnetic Particle Insp of All Pistons Will Be Performed.List of Affected Plants Encl AECM-90-0196, Final Part 21 Rept Re Automatic Switch Co MSIVs Failing to Close Upon Demand from Automatic & Remote Manual Actuation Signals.Initially Reported on 890914.Dual Solenoid Valves Replaced W/Two Single Solenoid Valves1990-11-21021 November 1990 Final Part 21 Rept Re Automatic Switch Co MSIVs Failing to Close Upon Demand from Automatic & Remote Manual Actuation Signals.Initially Reported on 890914.Dual Solenoid Valves Replaced W/Two Single Solenoid Valves ML20043F3431990-06-0808 June 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Circumferential Grove of Varying Depth Up to 0.200 Inches on Inside Surface of Journal Above Attachment Weld to Impeller.Failure of Journal Could Result in Major Damage to Pump.Disassembly Scheduled Over Next 18 Months ML20043G7641990-05-22022 May 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect W/Speed Transmitter in Diesel Engine Control Panel of Dsrv Standby Diesel Generator.Estimate of Completion of Corrective Actions Not Possible,Since Correction Made by Other Companies ML20005G6831990-01-0505 January 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Installation Instructions for Grommet Use Range for Patel Conduit Seal P/N 841206.Conduit Seals in Environ Qualification Applications Inspected for Proper Wire Use Range & Grommets Replaced ML19332E2971989-11-22022 November 1989 Revised Part 21 Rept Re MSIV Failure to Close Due to Disk Matl for Dual Solenoid Valve Extruding Into Exhaust Port of Valve.Initially Reported on 890914.Dual Solenoid Valve Replaced or Refurbished Prior to Restart AECM-89-175, Part 21 Rept Re Failure of MSIV to Close Due to Malfunction of Valve.Initially Reported on 890914.Dual Solenoid Valves on All MSIVs Replaced or Refurbished Prior to Restart.Update to Be Submitted by Startup from Fourth Refueling Outage1989-09-18018 September 1989 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of MSIV to Close Due to Malfunction of Valve.Initially Reported on 890914.Dual Solenoid Valves on All MSIVs Replaced or Refurbished Prior to Restart.Update to Be Submitted by Startup from Fourth Refueling Outage AECM-89-0175, Part 21 Rept Re Failure of MSIV to Close Due to Malfunction of Valve.Initially Reported on 890914.Dual Solenoid Valves on All MSIVs Replaced or Refurbished Prior to Restart.Update to Be Submitted by Startup from Fourth Refueling Outage1989-09-18018 September 1989 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of MSIV to Close Due to Malfunction of Valve.Initially Reported on 890914.Dual Solenoid Valves on All MSIVs Replaced or Refurbished Prior to Restart.Update to Be Submitted by Startup from Fourth Refueling Outage ML20248E0121989-09-13013 September 1989 Supplemental Part 21 Rept Re Potential Problem W/Six Specific Engine Control Devices in Air Start,Lube Oil, Jacket Water & Crankcase Sys.Initially Reported on 890429. California Controls Co Will Redesign Valve Seating ML20207P0451988-10-0505 October 1988 Part 21 Rept 146 Re Defect in Left Intercooler Inlet Adapter on Standby Diesel Engine Generator.Recommends Utils Inspect Left Intake Manifold Drain as Part of Operating Plan.Addl Info Expected by 881015 AECM-88-0190, Part 21 Rept Re Diesel Generator Left Bank Intercooler Tubes,Mfg by Imo Delaval.Leaks Initiated When Tubes Ruptured by Diffuser Plate in Inlet Adaptor.Initially Reported on 880930.Intercooler Replaced1988-09-30030 September 1988 Part 21 Rept Re Diesel Generator Left Bank Intercooler Tubes,Mfg by Imo Delaval.Leaks Initiated When Tubes Ruptured by Diffuser Plate in Inlet Adaptor.Initially Reported on 880930.Intercooler Replaced ML20154J4101988-05-12012 May 1988 Addendum 1 to Supplemental Part 21 Rept 145 Re Potential Problem w/F-573-156 Pressure Sensor/Lube Oil Trip.Initially Reported on 880429.Addl 1-1/8-inch Diameter W/Deep Counterbone in Pressure Head Added to Activate Valve ML20153B6191988-04-29029 April 1988 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Component of Dsr or Dsrv Standby Diesel Generators Supplied to Utils.Recommends Return of Subj Components in Onsite Warehouse Storage & Suggests Surveillance of Devices Already Installed ML20215G2441987-06-16016 June 1987 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Load Sequencing Equipment Supplied in Aug 1977 During Scheduled Testing.Caused by Open Electrical Connection on One Crimp Lug.Since 1978,insulated Lugs Used on All Equipment ML20216E4721987-05-28028 May 1987 Part 21 Rept 140 Re Potential Defect in Air Pressure Regulators Mfg by Bellofram.Dripwell Gasket May Fail Due to Mismachining of Gasket Seating Surface Causing Loss of Control Air & Starting Air Pressure AECM-86-0409, Informs That Testing Program for Final Reportability Determination on as-found Conditions of Sealed Splices Delayed Until Feb 1987,per 861212 Telcon.Program Includes Raychem Tube Configurations Found in BWR & PWR Applications1986-12-19019 December 1986 Informs That Testing Program for Final Reportability Determination on as-found Conditions of Sealed Splices Delayed Until Feb 1987,per 861212 Telcon.Program Includes Raychem Tube Configurations Found in BWR & PWR Applications AECM-86-0400, Deficiency Rept Re Wiring in Environmentally Qualified Actuators on air-operated Valves.Initially Reported on 861117.Matl Analysis of Wiring Samples Underway. Reportability Determination Will Be Completed in Jan 19871986-12-18018 December 1986 Deficiency Rept Re Wiring in Environmentally Qualified Actuators on air-operated Valves.Initially Reported on 861117.Matl Analysis of Wiring Samples Underway. Reportability Determination Will Be Completed in Jan 1987 AECM-86-0376, Final Deficiency & Part 21 Rept 4 Re Low Flow Condition Through Standby Svc Water (SSW) Pump A.Initially Reported on 820415.Procedures to Ensure That Min Pump Flow Provided When SSW Sys Automatically Started,Issued1986-11-25025 November 1986 Final Deficiency & Part 21 Rept 4 Re Low Flow Condition Through Standby Svc Water (SSW) Pump A.Initially Reported on 820415.Procedures to Ensure That Min Pump Flow Provided When SSW Sys Automatically Started,Issued ML20206S0841986-06-30030 June 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Cut Wires in Wire Harness of Bbc Brown Boveri K600/K800 Circuit Breakers.Initially Reported on 860509.Safety Implications Listed.Gear Guard Designed to Prevent Cut Wires ML20195D2171986-05-27027 May 1986 Rev 1 to Part 21 Rept Re Dowel Displacement on Connecting Rod Bearings Purchased During Nov 1985 - Apr 1986.Initially Reported on 860421.Rod Bearings Will Be Inspected Dimensionally.Further Info Forthcoming ML20203A0431986-04-0707 April 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Problem Which May Affect Operation of Model C Deluge Valve for Fire Protection Sys.Ie Info Notice 84-16 Issued on 840302 to Describe Failure of Valves to Operate. All Shipments of Model C Valves Stopped ML20154Q3141986-03-10010 March 1986 Final Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect on Inflatable Door Seals for Personnel Air Locks Used in Plant Reactor Containment Sys.Program to Supply Environmentally Qualified Inflatable Seals Should Be Completed by mid-1986 ML20154N4361986-03-10010 March 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Defect on Inflatable Door Seals for Personnel Air Locks Used in Reactor Containment Sys of Nuclear Power Plants.Initially Reported on 830919.Environ Qualification Testing of New Seal Design Completed ML20154N3431986-03-10010 March 1986 Initial Part 21 Rept 135 Re Potential Problem W/Lube Oil Sump Tank Foot Valve of Dsrv Standby Diesel Generator for Facilities.Cause Not Determined.Recommends Utils Inspect Condition of Foot Valve Liners & Notify Tdi of Findings ML20153D8861986-02-17017 February 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Penetration & Conduit Seal Configurations During Fire Tests.Initially Reported on 860214.Evaluation of Number & Location of Defective Seals in Progress.Nrc Assistance Requested AECM-86-0050, Final Part 21 & Deficiency Rept RD-85/04 Re Inadequate Cooling in Tdi Diesel Generator Control Panels.Initially Reported on 850429.Linear Reactors on Panels Replaced & Cooling Air Supply Installed1986-02-14014 February 1986 Final Part 21 & Deficiency Rept RD-85/04 Re Inadequate Cooling in Tdi Diesel Generator Control Panels.Initially Reported on 850429.Linear Reactors on Panels Replaced & Cooling Air Supply Installed ML20138A7391985-11-27027 November 1985 Interim Deficiency Rept PRD-83/12 Re Failure of Agastat GP Series Relays to Switch.Initially Reported on 830906. Requests Further Update Be Delayed Until Const Restart ML20198C4981985-11-0606 November 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Dsr or Dsrv Standby Diesel Generator Intake & Exhaust Valve Springs Mfg by Betts Spring Co.Users Recommended to Inspect Engines for Broken Springs & Identify Original Mfg ML20135H7751985-09-17017 September 1985 Part 21 Rept,Correcting Final Deviation Disposition Request Status Re Unqualified Test Switch.No Changes Planned Since Emergency Buses Found to Have Adequate Separation ML20132B0261985-09-0303 September 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Possibility of Engine Ingestion of Unwelded Part in American Air Filter Standby Diesel Generator Intake Silencer.Immediate Hold Should Be Placed on Diesel Engines/Intake Silencers Not Yet in Svc ML20127E6261985-06-17017 June 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Failure to Follow Design Control Procedures Resulting in Misapplication of Switch CR2940 on Standby Liquid Control Sys Which May Cause Failure of Class 1E Equipment.Design Drawing Change in Progress ML20140G0901985-06-13013 June 1985 Part 21 & Final Deficiency Rept PRD-84/04 Re Failure of Automatic Sprinkler Corp of America Deluge Valves to Open. Condition Not Reportable Under 10CFR50.55(e) or Part 21 ML20127H5411985-05-17017 May 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Engine Generator Control Panels of Dsr or DSRV-16 Standby Diesel Generator.Review of Generator Control Panel Installation by Each Facility Recommended AECM-85-0142, Part 21 & Second Interim Deficiency Rept RD-85/03 Re MSIV Failure to Remain Closed Due to Failure of Automatic Switch Co Dual Solenoid to Transfer When Deenergized.Initially Reported on 850321.Next Rept by 8506301985-04-30030 April 1985 Part 21 & Second Interim Deficiency Rept RD-85/03 Re MSIV Failure to Remain Closed Due to Failure of Automatic Switch Co Dual Solenoid to Transfer When Deenergized.Initially Reported on 850321.Next Rept by 850630 AECM-85-0133, Part 21 & Final Deficiency Rept 85-02 Re Tdi Diesel Generator Air Start Header Check Valve Failure.Design Change Initiated to Replace Eight Existing Check Valves on Div I & II W/Appropriate Check Valves Suitable for Design1985-04-26026 April 1985 Part 21 & Final Deficiency Rept 85-02 Re Tdi Diesel Generator Air Start Header Check Valve Failure.Design Change Initiated to Replace Eight Existing Check Valves on Div I & II W/Appropriate Check Valves Suitable for Design 1999-04-12
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217F9921999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20212F5641999-09-23023 September 1999 SER Concluding That All of ampacity-related Concerns Have Been Resolved & Licensee Provided Adequate Technical Basis to Assure That All of Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Encl Cables Operating within Acceptable Ampacity Limits ML20211Q3171999-09-0909 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting BWROG Rept, Prediction of Onset of Fission Gas Release from Fuel in Generic BWR, Dtd July 1996 ML20216E4881999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.With ML20211A6921999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20209J1961999-07-12012 July 1999 Special Rept 99-001:on 990528,smoke Detectors Failed to Alarm During Performance of Routine Channel Functional Testing.Applicable TRM Interim Compensatory Measure of Establishing Roving Hourly Fire Patrol Was Implemented ML20196K4981999-07-0101 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing PRR-E12-01,PRR-E21-01, PRR-P75-01,PRR-P81-01,VRR-B21-01,VRR-B21-02,VRR-E38-01 & VRR-E51-01.Concludes That Alternatives Proposed by EOI Acceptable ML20209G0691999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20196A1161999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.With ML20206Q4831999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1.With ML20206J1201999-04-30030 April 1999 Redacted ME-98-001-00, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding Test Program on Two Gate Valves with Limitorque Actuators ML18016A9011999-04-12012 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Component of DSRV-16-4,Enterprise DG Sys.Caused by Potential Problem with Connecting Rod Assemblies Built Since 1986,that Have Been Converted to Use Prestressed Fasteners.Affected Rods Should Be Inspected ML20205P8771999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20207M9231999-03-12012 March 1999 Amended Part 21 Rept Re Cooper-Bessemer Ksv EDG Power Piston Failure.Total of 198 or More Pistons Have Been Measured at Seven Different Sites.All Potentially Defective Pistons Have Been Removed from Svc Based on Encl Results ML20207K5141999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20206T7991999-01-31031 January 1999 Iodine Revolatizitation in Grand Gulf Loca ML20207A8301998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Operating Rept for Ggns,Unit 1 ML20206R9501998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20206D7721998-12-31031 December 1998 South Mississippi Electric Power Association 1998 Annual Rept ML20198E2481998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20195F4121998-11-13013 November 1998 Rev 16 to GGNS-TOP-1A, Operational QA Manual (Oqam) ML20195C4841998-11-0606 November 1998 SER Accepting QA Program Change to Consolidate Four Existing QA Programs for Arkansas Nuclear One,Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,River Bend Station & Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station Into Single QA Program ML20195C2791998-11-0505 November 1998 BWR Feedwater Nozzle Inservice Insp Summary Rept for GGNS, NUREG-0619-00006 ML20195F4801998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20155C1351998-10-26026 October 1998 Rev B to Entergy QA Program Manual ML20154K2391998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1.With ML20155F1961998-09-0101 September 1998 Engineering Rept for Evaluation of BWR CR Drive Mounting Flange Cap Screw ML20153B2161998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20237B6661998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1998 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML20236R0231998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML20155J0811998-05-31031 May 1998 10CFR50.59 SE for Period Jan 1997 - May 1998 ML20249B1251998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML20248B6261998-05-11011 May 1998 Rev 6 to Grand Gulf Nuclear Station COLR Safety-Related ML20217Q6701998-05-0606 May 1998 SER Approving Proposed Postponement of Beginning Augmented Exam Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A)(2) at Grand Gulf for Circumferential Shell Welds for Two Operating Cycles ML20206J1271998-04-30030 April 1998 Pressure Locking Thrust Evaluation Methodology for Flexible Wedge Gate Valves ML20247F3591998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant,Unit 1 ML20217M8951998-04-30030 April 1998 QA Program Manual ML20217P8281998-04-0707 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Relief Authorization for Alternative to Requirements of ASME Section Xi,Subarticle IWA-5250 Bolting Exam for Plants,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20217P0381998-04-0606 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 135 to License NPF-29 ML20217A0291998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Sation,Unit 1 ML20216J4211998-03-18018 March 1998 SER Approving Alternative to Insp of Reactor Pressure Vessel Circumferential Welds for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station ML20216J2021998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML20203A2891998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station ML20247B4111997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 Annual Financial Rept for South Mississippi Electric Power Association ML20203H9741997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 Annual Operating Rept, for Ggns,Unit 1 ML20198P1121997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML20203B5581997-12-0404 December 1997 Special Rept 97-003:on 971111,valid Failure of Div 2 EDG Occurred,Due to Jacket Water Leak.Failure Reported,Per Plant Technical Requirements Manual Section 7.7.2.2 ML20203K4031997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1997 for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML20199H3711997-11-19019 November 1997 SER Accepting Approving Request Relief from Requirements of Section XI, Rule for Inservice Insp of NPP Components, of ASME for Current or New 10-year Inservice Insp Interval IAW 50.55(a)(3)(i) of 10CFR50 ML20199F3431997-11-18018 November 1997 SER Accepting Rev 15 of Operational Quality Assurance Manual for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,Unit 1 1999-09-09
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,/j j MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY J) Helping Build Mississippi -
adMiddidds P. O. B O X 1840. J ACK S O N, MIS SIS SIP PI 3 9 2 05 Y,UfMd,f," May 29, 1981 ,X y
-8 1
[y Office of Inspection & Enforcement c : 2 ~, yl3 --
g U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ( y, t . .a aE -
Region 11 L , e j[
101 Marietta Street, N.W. g c 'C d a S Suite 3100 '
Atlanta, Georgia 30303 -
Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
SUBJECT:
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-416/417 File 0260/15525/15526 PRD-80/28, Final Report, NSSS l Radiograph Noncompliance to Code Requirements AECM-81/157
References:
- 1) AECM-80/134, 6/20/80
- 2) AECM-80/261, 10/20/80 On Mr.y 22, 1980, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. M. Hunt, of your office, of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site. The deficiency concerns the failure of radiographs, supplied by subcontractors to our NSSS vendor, to meet ASME Code requirements. This report. was originally due on May 7, 1981, but exten-sions 'ere obtained until May 29, 1981, during telephone conversations with l your Mr. P. Taylor on May 7,1981, and Mr. "ajac on May 22, 1981.
Our investigation of th.(9 deficiency has been completed. We have deter-mined that, although certain radiographs do not meet the ASME Code require-
! ments, there would be no adverse ef fects on safety. Thus, the deficiency is not reportable within the meaning of 10CFR50.55(e). Our final report is submitted as Attachment A to this report.
Additionally, during a meeting in Atlanta, MP&L committed to provide information with respect to the NRC open item pertaining to Dikkers Radio-graphs. This information is submitted as Attachment B to this letter. '
Yours truly, yJ. P. McGaughy, Jr.
30/7 3
ATR/JMK:st Attachment A: Review of NSSS Radiographic Film except Dikkers B: Review of Dikkers Radiographic Film
!f Member Middle South Utilities System 6 m
~
w AECM-81/157 ?
. O'Reilly Page 2
. N. L. Stampley
. R. B. McGehee .
. T. B. Conner
. Victer Stello, Director fica of Inspection & Enforcement S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission . . , .
shingeca, D.C. 20555
. G. B. Taylor
.uth Mics. Electric Power Association
- 0. Box 1589 icticeburg, MS 39401 l
1 1 i
l l
l
, . i O !
- bec -Dr. D. C. Gibbs Mr. D. C. Lutken Mr. J. N. Ward Mr. W. A. Braun Mr. R. Trickovie Mr. J. W. Yelverton Mr. L. F. Dale Mr. C. K. McCoy Mr. T. H. Cloninger i Mr. R. A. Ambrosino Mr. R. C. Fron Mr. G. B. Rogers Mr. M. R. Williams Mr. L. E. Ruhland Mr. D. L. Hunt Mr. A. G. Wagner Mr. P. A. Taylor PRD File File l
e i
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O I
l i
l l
l Attachment A to AECM-81/157 .
Page 1 of 4 FINAL REPORT FOR PRD-80/28 (Review of NSSS Radiographic Film except Dikkers)
I. Description of the Deficiency Two (2) NRC inspections (416/79-23 and 416/79-34) identified various radiographic technique discrepancies with respect to non-destructive examination of components provided by two (2) sub-suppliers (Dikkers Valves and Associated Pipe) of NSSS equipment /co'aponents. As a result, MP&L commissioned Bechtel to review, for radiographic technique, ten percent (10%) of the radiographs provided by all NSSS sub-suppliers except for the two aforementioned sub-suppliers previously cited. This review included 14 additional sub-suppliers who had provided a total of 7,961 radiographic films as of February 13, 1980. Information relative to Associated Pipe was previously submitted by AECM-80/67, April 4,1980 in response to NRC Infraction Item 79-34-01.
The review was performed to the applicable edition and addenda of the ASME Code as noted on the Code Data Report. It encompassed radiographic density, selection of penetrameters, penetrameter sensitivity, number of penetrameters and completeness of coverage.
The review resulted in the identification of nine (9) sub-suppliers whose radiographs failed to meet ASME Code requirements.
II. Analysis of Safety Impl! ations Due to the nature of the discrepancies, a review of 100% of onsite radiographic film provided by NSSS sub-suppliers for Unit 1, with the exception of Dikkers Valves, was conducted. This film represented pipe spools, pumps, valves, and associated components. The review consisted of approximately 10,276 film locations, which includes,those provided by Associated Pipe, and revealed approximately 1,424 deficiencies. These deficiencies can be categorized as follows:
Catego ry Total Deficiency Deficiency Density 821 Densities eaceed limitations specified by code.
Documentation 72 Material thickness mis-stated and/or radiographic technique I indicated on reader sheet is
! dif ferent from technique l used.
Fenetramete rs 97 Incorrect size, inadequate sensitivity, or shim in the l area of interest.
l l
t
, , - - e
1 Attachment A to AECM-81/157 Page 2 of 4 C4tegory Total Deficiency l Deficiency Penetrameter/ 434 Combination'of the Documentation deficiencies as noted above for the separate category but
! not readily discernible.
The 821 film locations with deficiencies in density have been determined readable. Even though the radiographs do not meet code requirements, by varying the lighting intensity, in and out . movement of radiographs, composite or triple viewing of film, overlapping film, performance of ultrasonic examination or viewing component end prep areas on installa-tion welds, we have verified defect free components.
Documentation errors were identified on 72 film locations. These resulted because the radiographic technique indicated on the radio-graphic reader sheet was dif ferent than the technique actually used or incorrect material thickness was recorded. Through measurement of penetrameter images on the film and ultrasonic thickness examinations, we are confident that acceptable techniques were employed and incorrect documentation related to radiographic technique will not affect material quality.
The 531 deficiencies categorized as either penetrameter (97) or pene-trameter/ documentation (434) errors have been determined to be satis-f acto ry. Information supplied by the vendor confirms that minimum wall thickness was recorded on the radiographic reader sheet in lieu of the actual material thickness and that the penetrameter selection was based on actual material thickness plus clad thickness at the time of radio-graphy. We believe that correct penetrameters were used and that the material thickness was incorrectly recorded on reader sheets. To con-firm this assumption, MP&L calculated the equivraint penetrameter sensi-tivity as specified in ASME V, Article 22. 4!niem wall thickness, and required penetrameter/"T"-hole versus actual p4aetrameter/"T"-hole were used in the computations. All discrepant film has sensitivity that exceeds code requirement. The clad pipe ends also received a 100%
ultrasonic examination and a liquid penetrant examination of each wold layer at the time of cladding. Satisfactory equivalent penetrameter sensitivity calculations were also performed on other systems where utilization of incorrect penetrameter was indicated.
The chain of events which lead to HPSL final acceptance of the above items are as follows:
o MP&L contracted Nondestructive Testing Engineering Division, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection, to perform a 100% review of all on site G.E. supplied film for Unit I. The review was conducted by a team of four reviewers, one certified Level III and three certi-fied Level II interpreters.
1
Attachment A to AECM-81/157 Paga 3 of 4 -
o Each radiograph was reviewed and the results documented on data I sheets. This team documented every noncompliance, no matter how minct. An example of this level of documentation ist densities.
were recorded as 1.98 where the required minimum is 2.0, and densi- -
ties of 4.01, where the maximum requi ed is 4.0. MP&L believes that these radiographs have been reviewed more striagently than any radiographs at existing nuclear sites. i o On completion of this review, MP&L acquibed the services of two recognized consultants in the field of radiography: Mr. Sam Wank, Institute Engineer with Southwest Research Institute and Mr.
Charles Hellier, General Manager of the Nondestructive Test Engineering of Hartford Boiler Inspection. MP&L Quality Assurance assigned Mr. James Kelley, from our QA Staf f, to coordinate the effort. Mr. Kelley has extensive experience in radiography.
o These individuals reviewed each potential problem that had been identified by the review team and recommended a disposition to each concern. Many of the recommended dispositions were based on the premise that certain radiographs, although not meeting each requirement of the code, were interpretable and could be used to assure the integrity of the component. When the variety of the components is considered, the dif ficulty of this task is evident.
The manufacturer who originally reviewed the radiographs was familiar with the configuration of the component and also had the component in an unassembled state to visually inspect. This would have allowed the immediate visual verification of any questionable indications found by the reader. For* example, Main Steam Isolation Valve film revealed what appeared to be linear anomalies which proved to be only " mold marks" when the valves were physically inspected by our team. In the majority of cases,' the manufac-turer's interpretations were substantiated af ter reviewing drawings and visually inspecting the items. This is why " lack of adequate information on the reader sheet" was identified as a category of deficiency. In many instances, the original reviewer was satisfied as to the identification of an indication and accepted the radio-graphy, without documenting the rationale for accepting the film.
o As MP&L attempted to clarify the limits of acceptability for densi-ties, a review of alternate codes revealed quite a variance as to
, the limits industry has determined to be acceptable. For instance,
! for piping, whereas ASME Section III requires a density range between 2.0 and 4.0, ANSI B31.1 allows a range from 1.3 to 4.0, and older editions of Navships 250-1500-1 allowed a range from 1.5 to 3.3. Again, we reiterate that the review of radiographs is subjec-tive and dependent upon the experience and knowledge of the pro-cess, and of the reviewer. MP&L did not set acceptable or reject-able limits for density. The team reviewed each radiograph which was noted to be outside the code limit and judged its accept-ability. The recommended resolution to each problem was then j documented and dispositioned.
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Atttchment A to AECM-81/157 Page 4 of 4 MP&L is not trying to infer that there should not be adherence to the ASME Code; rather, we are postulating that radiographs of 'c ertain com-ponents, such as pump and valve castings, are many times impractical, if not impossible, to radiograph and meet all aspects or the code due to the configuration of the component. The ASME Code, Figure NX2573.1-1, allows discretion in these areas, but for many of the components instal-led at Grand Gulf, radiographs were provided covering the total area of
~the components. In these areas some discerning judgement must be exer-cised in determining acceptability.
Detailed documentation is available to justify MP&L's acceptance of the radiographs in question.
III. Corrective Actions Taken In addition to the actions noted above pertaining to Unit 1, MP&L intends to provide an additional confidence level in the adequacy of radiography for Grand Gulf, by subjecting a sampling of Unit 2 film to a similar review. The review of Unit 2 Film will include any new sup-pliers who had not previously supplied components for Unit 1.
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Attachrant B to AECM-81/157 Page 1 of 2 Inspection Item 79-23-01 (Review Dikkers Valves Radiographic Film)
Corrective Steps Taken and Results Achieved
- 1. G.E. contracted the Nuclear Engineering Service Company to perform a 100 percent review of GCNS Unit I and Unit 11 safety relief valves (SRVs) manufactured by Dikkers Valve Company. The 100 percent film review con-firmed that the radiogrepsic quality level was adequate for film inter-pretation and, in many instances, exceeded code requirements. The radio-graphs did not reveal any unacceptable discontinuities and all film was readable for defect evaluation.
- 2. To satisfy questions relating to the dark density area of the inlet flange, re-radiography was performed on areas (3-4-5) and (10-x-y) for each Unit 1 SRV valve. This re-radiography was perfoemed for information only to provide an additional level of confidence and did not reveal any unacceptable discontinuities. This re-radiography substantiated GE's statement that the valves were sound in the heavy banded area.
- 3. As part of the original GE procurement documents, all valves were sub-jected to a 1.5X design pressure hydrostatic test and performance verifi-cation test under full steam and flow conditions. Each valve was deter-
' mined operable and structural integrity was sound.
- 4. The raised adjusting bolt pads on approximately 80. valve bodies, similar to those used at GGNS, were re-radiographed by the Dikkers Valve Company. This re-radiography did not reveal any unacceptable discontinu-ities and confirmed that the material casting process is ' sound. This leads to the conclusion that the valves supplied for use at GGNS are also sound.
- 5. Stress was calculated for CGNS Unit I, II and spare safety relief valves. There was no indication of any region with excessive stress or inadequate thickness. In general, the stresses are well below the pre-scribed code limits. For example, the calculated body wall thickness is 0.63 inch, whereas the actual minimum wall thickness is 1.1 inches. The primary stress at the crotch between inlet and outlet is 3,493 PSI, com-paring to a code allowable of 18,900 PSI. The primary stress at the crotch between bonnet and outlet is 4,524 PSI comparing to a code allow-able of 18,900 PSI. This demonstrates that there is significant excess margin in the valve design.
- 6. Where radiographs display density variations out of specification limits, the location on the casting is that of substantial extra thickness or of rapidly changing cross sectioa.
- 7. HP&L contracted Mr. Sam Wenk (Southwest Research Institute) to review a sampling of Dikker Valve radiographs. Mr. Wenk is a certified ASNT Level l III Radiographic examiner. Mr. Wenk and an MP&L representative previously l certified as an ASNT Level III Radiographic examiner, reviewed 100% of the l
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radiographs on nine SRVs. Additionally, they reviewed all the areas of the valves cited in NRC inspection report number 416/79-23. From this review, they concluded that all the reviewed radiographs were readable fuc defect evaluation and all components reviewed were defect free.
- 8. Two NRC Inspectors, Mr. S. A. Wenk, and an MP&L representative reviewed 100 percent of the radiographs for one Dikkers SRY. They concluded that the radiographs were readable for defect evaluation and in some instances had a quality level of 2-1T sensitivity. The samplings listed in para-graphs 7 and 8 represent more than 20 percent of all GGNS Unit I, II and spare Dikker SRV radiographs.
- 9. MP&L acknowledges that the Dikkers valves do not meet all code require-ments relating to radiography, particularly in areas where the casting is of substantial txtra thickness or rapidly changing cross sections.
Investigations made and actions taken clearly establish that no rejectable material discontinuities exist in the GGNS Dikkers safety relief valves.
The anomalies existing in the radiographic film will not af fect safety.
Actiona Taken to Prevent Recurrence All Dikkers radiographs for GGNS Unit 1 & 2 valves have been received on site. Should additional radiographs be received from Dikkers in the future, MP&L intends to review a sampling of the item. GE has reported the following corrective actions to MP&L:
- 1. Dikkers Valve Co any has upgraded its QA and radiographic progria to the satisfaction of 7
NRC vendor compliance inspector.
- 2. GE held a training seminar and instructed 45 GE quality assurance field representatives on the QC requirements, including the interpretation of radiographs and code requirements. Also, GE imposed densitometer scanning requirements for radiography density upon GE's vendors on new purchase o rde rs .
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