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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML20046C2121993-07-30030 July 1993 LER 93-004-01:on 930301,confirmed That Channel D Axial Shape Index (Asi) Being Calculated in Reverse Since 921031-930301 Due to Drawing Discrepancies Associated W/Control Channel B. Temporary Mod 92-078 & Standing Order 0-25 Revised ML20046A8691993-07-26026 July 1993 LER 93-011-00:on 930624,experienced Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Load.Caused by Lack of Proper Job Planning,Lack of Formal Decision Making Process & Incomplete Communications.Training Will Be Provided to Operations personnel.W/930726 Ltr ML20045H2561993-07-12012 July 1993 LER 93-010-00:on 930611,1 of 14 Halon Cylinders Did Not Meet Min Pressure Acceptance Criteria Listed in Semiannual Switchgear Rooms Surveillance Test.Caused by Failure of Test to Include Necessary Steps.Cylinder recharged.W/930712 Ltr ML20045D7201993-06-22022 June 1993 LER 93-009-00:on 930524,apparent Spurious Signal from Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Caused Backup Charging Pumps to Automatically Start,Due to Deterioration of Wiring. Instrument Loop Calibration Will Be performed.W/930622 Ltr ML20045D3741993-06-21021 June 1993 LER 93-008-00:on 930520,determined That TS SR Not Satisfied for Stack Flow Indicator,Per Amend 137 Issued on 910307. Caused by Lack of Attention to Detail.Calibr & Functional Test Procedures developed.W/930621 Ltr ML20044H5261993-06-0101 June 1993 LER 93-007-00:on 930430,unplanned Emergency Generator Start & Rt Signal Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail,Labeling of Fuse Drawers,Caution Signs & Training. Labeling & Caution Signs upgraded.W/930601 Ltr ML20044G4941993-05-26026 May 1993 LER 93-006-00:on 930118,Halon Fire Suppression Sys for Switchgear Rooms Disabled to Allow Repair/Replacement of Halon Sys Piping.On 930427,individual Responsible for Fire Watch Not Present.Individual Relieved of Responsibilities ML20044B6711993-02-22022 February 1993 LER 93-002-00:on 930122,determined That Current SG LP Signal Block Reset Values Greater than Allowed Ts.Caused by Improper Design.Test Procedures Will Be Revised by 930917 to Specify Desired Value for Block function.W/930222 Ltr ML20024G6821991-04-19019 April 1991 LER 91-007-00:on 910320,480 Volt Circuit Breaker Coordination Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in Original Sys Design.Breaker/Fuse Coordination Study to Be Completed & Problems Will Be corrected.W/910419 Ltr ML20029C1591991-03-21021 March 1991 LER 91-004-00:on 910212,offsite Power Low Signal Outside Design Basis.Caused by Inadequate Mod Design at Time of Performance of Original Degraded Voltage Analysis. Engineering Analysis EA-FC-91-017 performed.W/910321 Ltr ML20029C1051991-03-18018 March 1991 LER 91-002-00:on 901209,ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal Generated by High Alarm on Process Radiation Monitor RM-062.Caused by Accumulation of Noncondensible Gases in Sample Piping.Valve Packing Leak repaired.W/910318 Ltr ML20029A2981991-02-0808 February 1991 LER 91-001-00:on 910109,determined That Containment Tendon Surveillances Performed in 1981 & 1985 Did Not Reflect Guidance in Tech Specs.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Controls.Testing Program Plan implemented.W/910208 Ltr ML20029A2971991-02-0606 February 1991 LER 90-022-02:on 900907,approx 460 Fire Barrier Penetration seals,60 Fire Dampers & 6 Fire Doors Declared Nonfunctional Per NRC Info Notice 88-004 Due to Lack of Documentation. Plant Outage Required to Implement Repairs/Replacements ML20028G9171990-09-28028 September 1990 LER 90-021-00:on 900829,inadvertent Reactor Protective Sys Actuation Occurred While Operator Changed Power Source. Caused by Operator Not Following Proper Procedures.Operator counseled.W/900928 Ltr ML20044B0131990-07-12012 July 1990 LER 90-018-00:on 900612,reactor Protective Sys (RPS) Trip Units for Axial Power Distribution Determined to Be Inoperable.Caused by Procedural Deficiencies.Procedure Revised & RPS Surveillance Tests reviewed.W/900712 Ltr ML20043F6301990-06-11011 June 1990 LER 90-016-00:on 900511,accident Scenarios Identified by Which Auxiliary Feedwater Piping from Discharge of Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 Can Be Overpressurized.Caused by Design deficiency.W/900611 Ltr ML20043F2441990-06-0707 June 1990 LER 90-015-00:on 900507,PORV Variable Setpoints Used for Low Pressure Overpressure Protection Determined to Be Nonconservative for PORV Opening Time.Caused by Design Deficiency.Tech Spec Amend prepared.W/900607 Ltr ML20043C0991990-05-29029 May 1990 LER 90-014-00:on 900427,investigation Revealed That Component Cooling Water Piping to Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Coolers Could Be Targets of High Energy Line Break.Safety Analysis for Operability completed.W/900529 Ltr ML20042G7211990-05-10010 May 1990 LER 90-011-00:on 900402,inadvertent Actuation of Pressurizer Pressure Low Signal Occurred While Performing Calibr Procedure.Caused by Inappropriate Action by Technician Involved.Validation of Procedures reviewed.W/900510 Ltr ML20042E6871990-04-23023 April 1990 LER 90-007-01:on 900228,determined That Several Supports Would Be Overloaded During Seismic Event on Nonsafety Related & safety-related Main Steam Piping.Caused by Design Deficiency.Piping Supports modified.W/900423 Ltr ML20042E6861990-04-23023 April 1990 LER 90-009-00:on 900316,potential Overpressurization of Auxiliary Feedwater Piping Could Have Occurred During Thermal Expansion of Process Fluid Between Closed Valved. Caused by Design deficiencies.W/900423 Ltr ML20012E7641990-03-26026 March 1990 LER 90-005-00:on 900223,determined That Spent Fuel Pool Area Charcoal Filtration Unit VA-66 Was Outside Design Basis. Caused by Insufficient Airflow Into Unit.Affected Updated SAR Analysis Will Be updated.W/900326 Ltr ML20012D0121990-03-19019 March 1990 LER 90-004-00:on 900217,lift Pressures for 6 of 10 Main Steam Safety Valves Found Outside Acceptance Criteria. Caused by Overly Restrictive Operability Criteria.Valves Recalibr & License Amend Submitted to NRC.W/900319 Ltr ML20012D0101990-03-19019 March 1990 LER 90-003-00:on 900216,determined That Auxiliary Feedwater Piping Outside Normal Stress Limits of ASME Code & Design Basis Specified in Updated Sar.Caused by Design Deficiency.Valve Operators Will Be inspected.W/900319 Ltr ML20012B6361990-03-0909 March 1990 LER 89-017-01:on 890624,internal Valve Component from Check Valve Found Lying on Pump Discharge Vane.Repair or Replacement of Valve Internals Could Not Be Accomplished within Time Requirement of Tech Spec.W/900309 Ltr ML20006E1041990-02-0909 February 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 900108,fire Barrier for Wall Between Auxiliary Bldg Rooms 26 & 34 Breached But Hourly Fire Watch Patrol Not Established.Caused by Lack of Sufficient Training for Shift Supervisors.Standing Order revised.W/900209 Ltr ML20011E2691990-02-0505 February 1990 LER 89-024-00:on 891221,determined That Containment Spray Pumps & Suction Header Piping Not Constructed for Use as Backup to LPSI Sys for Shutdown Cooling.Caused by Inadequate Review of Assumptions.Firewatch established.W/900205 Ltr ML20011E2271990-02-0101 February 1990 LER 89-021-00:on 891010,util Informed by C-E of Potential Nonconservative Setpoint in Reactor Protection Sys Thermal Margin/Low Pressure Trip Unit.Caused by Error in Incorporating Transient Setpoint analyses.W/900201 Ltr ML20005F7151990-01-10010 January 1990 LER 89-023-00:on 891211,hourly Firewatch Patrol Entered Posted High Radiation Area W/O Meeting Entry Requirements for Area.Briefings on High Radiation Entry Requirements Held for Personnel W/Assigned dosimetry.W/900110 Ltr ML19354D6381989-12-20020 December 1989 LER 89-022-00:on 890805,change to Surveillance Procedure ST-CEA-1 Became Effective Which Would Have Made Both Emergency Diesel Generators Simultaneously Inoperable During Portion of Test.Change removed.W/891220 Ltr ML19332E7431989-12-0808 December 1989 LER 88-037-01:on 881214,one of Two Supply Headers Supplying Fire Suppression Headers in Auxiliary Bldg Isolated.Caused by Lack of Procedural Guidance & Inadequate Procedural Controls.Standing Order G-58 Will Be revised.W/891208 Ltr ML19332E2681989-12-0101 December 1989 LER 89-016-02:on 890616,for Unknown Period Since 890614, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 Operated Outside Design Basis for Certain Accident Conditions.Caused by Inoperable Speed Control Loop.Action Plan implemented.W/891201 Ltr ML19351A4541989-11-22022 November 1989 LER 89-020-00:on 891012,determined That Two of Four Component Cooling Water HXs Simultaneously Inoperable for More than 24 H.Caused by Inadequate Controls Re Return of Equipment to Svc.Standing Order revised.W/891122 Ltr ML19327B5481989-10-24024 October 1989 LER 89-019-00:on 890924,indication of High Temp for Reactor Coolant Pump RC-3A Upper Motor Thrust Bearing Received in Control Room.Caused by Damaged Cable for Bearing Resistive Temp Device.Damaged Cable replaced.W/891024 Ltr ML19325D2471989-10-13013 October 1989 LER 89-012-01:on 890502,main Feedwater Isolation Valve to Steam Generator a Found Inoperable Due to Improperly Set Torque Switch.Caused by Inadequate Program for Maint of Motor Operated Valves.Torque Switches reset.W/891013 Ltr ML20028C7711983-01-0606 January 1983 LER 82-020/03L-0:on 821207,during Main Steam Safety Valve Test,Four Main Steam Safety Valves Had Lift Setpoints Out of Tolerance.Caused by Normal Drift of Valves Over Operating Cycle.Valves Readjusted ML20028B5451982-10-28028 October 1982 LER 82-019/03L-0:on 821024,MSIVs HCV-1041A & HCV-1042A Stopped Three to Four Degrees Off Seat When Signaled to Close.Caused by Binding Between Valve Packing & Shaft. Packings Sprayed W/Penetrant Oil ML20052J0631982-04-27027 April 1982 LER 82-009/03L-0:on 820411,while Exchanging Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers,Associated Outlet Valves HCV-490B,HCV-491B & HCV-492B Failed to Open.Cause Not stated.HCV-491B Reassembled & Tested ML20052B2361982-04-0707 April 1982 LER 82-006/03L-0:on 820323,during Surveillance Test ST-ISI- WD-1,F.1,valve HCV-506A Failed to Close Via Control Room Switch.Caused by Solenoid Valve Malfunction.Solenoid Valve Disassembled,Cleaned & Reassembled ML20052D9291982-04-0606 April 1982 LER 82-008/03L-0:on 820330,during Performance of ST-FW-1, F.2(b)(6)per Tech Spec 3.9,steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Failed to Start.Caused by Back Pressure Trip Lever in Tripped Position.Lever Reset ML20041G1291982-02-22022 February 1982 LER 82-005/03L-0:on 820210,at 98% Power,Control Element 24 Inserted Into Core.Emergency Procedure EP-13,CEDM Malfunctions,Implemented & Power Stabilized at 88%.Caused by Erroneous Operating Instruction.Instruction Changed ML20041F7481982-02-17017 February 1982 LER 82-003/03L-0:on 820203,containment Isolation Valve Associated W/Gas Vent Header HCV-507A Failed to Close on Demand.Caused by Solenoid Valve Plunger Sticking in Energized Position.Plunger Freed ML20041F6251982-02-0505 February 1982 LER 82-004/03L-0:on 820203,small Quantity of Radioactive Gas/Particulate Released to Auxiliary Bldg During Routine Operation.Caused by Failure of Stack Gas Monitor RM-062 to Alarm at Appropriate Setpoint Due to Faulty Alarm Module ML20041B1051982-01-28028 January 1982 LER 82-002/03L-0:on 820114,at 99% Power,Lockout Relay 86B1, Containment Radiation High Signal,Failed to Actuate on Demand by Plant Radiation Monitoring Sys.Caused by Burnt Coil on Lockout Relay.Coil Replaced & Tested Satisfactorily ML20041B1171982-01-19019 January 1982 LER 82-001/03L-0:on 820111,during Normal Operation,Two Fire Barrier Penetrations Found Nonfunctional.Shift Supervisor Immediately Notified;However,Fire Watch Not Posted.Insp & Supervisor Personnel Instructed on Proper Actions ML20039B4561981-12-11011 December 1981 LER 81-011/03L-0:on 811113,containment Isolation Valves Opened & Ventilation Process Initiated W/Containment Air Monitor RM-050/051 Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error. Valves Closed ML20010H8581981-08-27027 August 1981 LER 81-008/03L-0:on 810813,86B/CRHS (Containment Radiation High Signal) Lockout Relay Failed to Actuate When RM-062 Was Placed in Alarm,Resulting in Failure of 86B1/CRHS Relay to Actuate.Caused by Dirt in Relay Latching Mechanism ML20041F6291981-08-27027 August 1981 LER 81-008/03L-1:on 810813,containment Radiation High Signal 86B Lockout Relay Failed to Actuate When Radiation Monitor RM-062 Placed in Alarm.Caused by Bound Relay Latching Mechanism Due to Dirt & Grease.Latch Cleaned ML20010C2271981-07-0707 July 1981 LER 81-006/03L-0:on 810624,reactor Protection Sys Nuclear Power Recorder Channel B Trip Setpoints Determined to Be Nonconservative.Caused by Faulty Temp Change Power Calculation Due to Grounded Hot Leg Temp Loop ML20004B1111981-05-0606 May 1981 LER 81-005/03L-0:on 810423,dc Sequencer Timers AC-3A (Component Cooling Water Pump) & AC-102A (Raw Water Pump) Failed to Time Out within Prescribed Limit.Cause Unknown Mechanisms Satisfactorily Inspected 1993-07-30
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML20046C2121993-07-30030 July 1993 LER 93-004-01:on 930301,confirmed That Channel D Axial Shape Index (Asi) Being Calculated in Reverse Since 921031-930301 Due to Drawing Discrepancies Associated W/Control Channel B. Temporary Mod 92-078 & Standing Order 0-25 Revised ML20046A8691993-07-26026 July 1993 LER 93-011-00:on 930624,experienced Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Load.Caused by Lack of Proper Job Planning,Lack of Formal Decision Making Process & Incomplete Communications.Training Will Be Provided to Operations personnel.W/930726 Ltr ML20045H2561993-07-12012 July 1993 LER 93-010-00:on 930611,1 of 14 Halon Cylinders Did Not Meet Min Pressure Acceptance Criteria Listed in Semiannual Switchgear Rooms Surveillance Test.Caused by Failure of Test to Include Necessary Steps.Cylinder recharged.W/930712 Ltr ML20045D7201993-06-22022 June 1993 LER 93-009-00:on 930524,apparent Spurious Signal from Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Caused Backup Charging Pumps to Automatically Start,Due to Deterioration of Wiring. Instrument Loop Calibration Will Be performed.W/930622 Ltr ML20045D3741993-06-21021 June 1993 LER 93-008-00:on 930520,determined That TS SR Not Satisfied for Stack Flow Indicator,Per Amend 137 Issued on 910307. Caused by Lack of Attention to Detail.Calibr & Functional Test Procedures developed.W/930621 Ltr ML20044H5261993-06-0101 June 1993 LER 93-007-00:on 930430,unplanned Emergency Generator Start & Rt Signal Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail,Labeling of Fuse Drawers,Caution Signs & Training. Labeling & Caution Signs upgraded.W/930601 Ltr ML20044G4941993-05-26026 May 1993 LER 93-006-00:on 930118,Halon Fire Suppression Sys for Switchgear Rooms Disabled to Allow Repair/Replacement of Halon Sys Piping.On 930427,individual Responsible for Fire Watch Not Present.Individual Relieved of Responsibilities ML20044B6711993-02-22022 February 1993 LER 93-002-00:on 930122,determined That Current SG LP Signal Block Reset Values Greater than Allowed Ts.Caused by Improper Design.Test Procedures Will Be Revised by 930917 to Specify Desired Value for Block function.W/930222 Ltr ML20024G6821991-04-19019 April 1991 LER 91-007-00:on 910320,480 Volt Circuit Breaker Coordination Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in Original Sys Design.Breaker/Fuse Coordination Study to Be Completed & Problems Will Be corrected.W/910419 Ltr ML20029C1591991-03-21021 March 1991 LER 91-004-00:on 910212,offsite Power Low Signal Outside Design Basis.Caused by Inadequate Mod Design at Time of Performance of Original Degraded Voltage Analysis. Engineering Analysis EA-FC-91-017 performed.W/910321 Ltr ML20029C1051991-03-18018 March 1991 LER 91-002-00:on 901209,ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal Generated by High Alarm on Process Radiation Monitor RM-062.Caused by Accumulation of Noncondensible Gases in Sample Piping.Valve Packing Leak repaired.W/910318 Ltr ML20029A2981991-02-0808 February 1991 LER 91-001-00:on 910109,determined That Containment Tendon Surveillances Performed in 1981 & 1985 Did Not Reflect Guidance in Tech Specs.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Controls.Testing Program Plan implemented.W/910208 Ltr ML20029A2971991-02-0606 February 1991 LER 90-022-02:on 900907,approx 460 Fire Barrier Penetration seals,60 Fire Dampers & 6 Fire Doors Declared Nonfunctional Per NRC Info Notice 88-004 Due to Lack of Documentation. Plant Outage Required to Implement Repairs/Replacements ML20028G9171990-09-28028 September 1990 LER 90-021-00:on 900829,inadvertent Reactor Protective Sys Actuation Occurred While Operator Changed Power Source. Caused by Operator Not Following Proper Procedures.Operator counseled.W/900928 Ltr ML20044B0131990-07-12012 July 1990 LER 90-018-00:on 900612,reactor Protective Sys (RPS) Trip Units for Axial Power Distribution Determined to Be Inoperable.Caused by Procedural Deficiencies.Procedure Revised & RPS Surveillance Tests reviewed.W/900712 Ltr ML20043F6301990-06-11011 June 1990 LER 90-016-00:on 900511,accident Scenarios Identified by Which Auxiliary Feedwater Piping from Discharge of Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 Can Be Overpressurized.Caused by Design deficiency.W/900611 Ltr ML20043F2441990-06-0707 June 1990 LER 90-015-00:on 900507,PORV Variable Setpoints Used for Low Pressure Overpressure Protection Determined to Be Nonconservative for PORV Opening Time.Caused by Design Deficiency.Tech Spec Amend prepared.W/900607 Ltr ML20043C0991990-05-29029 May 1990 LER 90-014-00:on 900427,investigation Revealed That Component Cooling Water Piping to Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Coolers Could Be Targets of High Energy Line Break.Safety Analysis for Operability completed.W/900529 Ltr ML20042G7211990-05-10010 May 1990 LER 90-011-00:on 900402,inadvertent Actuation of Pressurizer Pressure Low Signal Occurred While Performing Calibr Procedure.Caused by Inappropriate Action by Technician Involved.Validation of Procedures reviewed.W/900510 Ltr ML20042E6871990-04-23023 April 1990 LER 90-007-01:on 900228,determined That Several Supports Would Be Overloaded During Seismic Event on Nonsafety Related & safety-related Main Steam Piping.Caused by Design Deficiency.Piping Supports modified.W/900423 Ltr ML20042E6861990-04-23023 April 1990 LER 90-009-00:on 900316,potential Overpressurization of Auxiliary Feedwater Piping Could Have Occurred During Thermal Expansion of Process Fluid Between Closed Valved. Caused by Design deficiencies.W/900423 Ltr ML20012E7641990-03-26026 March 1990 LER 90-005-00:on 900223,determined That Spent Fuel Pool Area Charcoal Filtration Unit VA-66 Was Outside Design Basis. Caused by Insufficient Airflow Into Unit.Affected Updated SAR Analysis Will Be updated.W/900326 Ltr ML20012D0121990-03-19019 March 1990 LER 90-004-00:on 900217,lift Pressures for 6 of 10 Main Steam Safety Valves Found Outside Acceptance Criteria. Caused by Overly Restrictive Operability Criteria.Valves Recalibr & License Amend Submitted to NRC.W/900319 Ltr ML20012D0101990-03-19019 March 1990 LER 90-003-00:on 900216,determined That Auxiliary Feedwater Piping Outside Normal Stress Limits of ASME Code & Design Basis Specified in Updated Sar.Caused by Design Deficiency.Valve Operators Will Be inspected.W/900319 Ltr ML20012B6361990-03-0909 March 1990 LER 89-017-01:on 890624,internal Valve Component from Check Valve Found Lying on Pump Discharge Vane.Repair or Replacement of Valve Internals Could Not Be Accomplished within Time Requirement of Tech Spec.W/900309 Ltr ML20006E1041990-02-0909 February 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 900108,fire Barrier for Wall Between Auxiliary Bldg Rooms 26 & 34 Breached But Hourly Fire Watch Patrol Not Established.Caused by Lack of Sufficient Training for Shift Supervisors.Standing Order revised.W/900209 Ltr ML20011E2691990-02-0505 February 1990 LER 89-024-00:on 891221,determined That Containment Spray Pumps & Suction Header Piping Not Constructed for Use as Backup to LPSI Sys for Shutdown Cooling.Caused by Inadequate Review of Assumptions.Firewatch established.W/900205 Ltr ML20011E2271990-02-0101 February 1990 LER 89-021-00:on 891010,util Informed by C-E of Potential Nonconservative Setpoint in Reactor Protection Sys Thermal Margin/Low Pressure Trip Unit.Caused by Error in Incorporating Transient Setpoint analyses.W/900201 Ltr ML20005F7151990-01-10010 January 1990 LER 89-023-00:on 891211,hourly Firewatch Patrol Entered Posted High Radiation Area W/O Meeting Entry Requirements for Area.Briefings on High Radiation Entry Requirements Held for Personnel W/Assigned dosimetry.W/900110 Ltr ML19354D6381989-12-20020 December 1989 LER 89-022-00:on 890805,change to Surveillance Procedure ST-CEA-1 Became Effective Which Would Have Made Both Emergency Diesel Generators Simultaneously Inoperable During Portion of Test.Change removed.W/891220 Ltr ML19332E7431989-12-0808 December 1989 LER 88-037-01:on 881214,one of Two Supply Headers Supplying Fire Suppression Headers in Auxiliary Bldg Isolated.Caused by Lack of Procedural Guidance & Inadequate Procedural Controls.Standing Order G-58 Will Be revised.W/891208 Ltr ML19332E2681989-12-0101 December 1989 LER 89-016-02:on 890616,for Unknown Period Since 890614, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 Operated Outside Design Basis for Certain Accident Conditions.Caused by Inoperable Speed Control Loop.Action Plan implemented.W/891201 Ltr ML19351A4541989-11-22022 November 1989 LER 89-020-00:on 891012,determined That Two of Four Component Cooling Water HXs Simultaneously Inoperable for More than 24 H.Caused by Inadequate Controls Re Return of Equipment to Svc.Standing Order revised.W/891122 Ltr ML19327B5481989-10-24024 October 1989 LER 89-019-00:on 890924,indication of High Temp for Reactor Coolant Pump RC-3A Upper Motor Thrust Bearing Received in Control Room.Caused by Damaged Cable for Bearing Resistive Temp Device.Damaged Cable replaced.W/891024 Ltr ML19325D2471989-10-13013 October 1989 LER 89-012-01:on 890502,main Feedwater Isolation Valve to Steam Generator a Found Inoperable Due to Improperly Set Torque Switch.Caused by Inadequate Program for Maint of Motor Operated Valves.Torque Switches reset.W/891013 Ltr ML20028C7711983-01-0606 January 1983 LER 82-020/03L-0:on 821207,during Main Steam Safety Valve Test,Four Main Steam Safety Valves Had Lift Setpoints Out of Tolerance.Caused by Normal Drift of Valves Over Operating Cycle.Valves Readjusted ML20028B5451982-10-28028 October 1982 LER 82-019/03L-0:on 821024,MSIVs HCV-1041A & HCV-1042A Stopped Three to Four Degrees Off Seat When Signaled to Close.Caused by Binding Between Valve Packing & Shaft. Packings Sprayed W/Penetrant Oil ML20052J0631982-04-27027 April 1982 LER 82-009/03L-0:on 820411,while Exchanging Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers,Associated Outlet Valves HCV-490B,HCV-491B & HCV-492B Failed to Open.Cause Not stated.HCV-491B Reassembled & Tested ML20052B2361982-04-0707 April 1982 LER 82-006/03L-0:on 820323,during Surveillance Test ST-ISI- WD-1,F.1,valve HCV-506A Failed to Close Via Control Room Switch.Caused by Solenoid Valve Malfunction.Solenoid Valve Disassembled,Cleaned & Reassembled ML20052D9291982-04-0606 April 1982 LER 82-008/03L-0:on 820330,during Performance of ST-FW-1, F.2(b)(6)per Tech Spec 3.9,steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Failed to Start.Caused by Back Pressure Trip Lever in Tripped Position.Lever Reset ML20041G1291982-02-22022 February 1982 LER 82-005/03L-0:on 820210,at 98% Power,Control Element 24 Inserted Into Core.Emergency Procedure EP-13,CEDM Malfunctions,Implemented & Power Stabilized at 88%.Caused by Erroneous Operating Instruction.Instruction Changed ML20041F7481982-02-17017 February 1982 LER 82-003/03L-0:on 820203,containment Isolation Valve Associated W/Gas Vent Header HCV-507A Failed to Close on Demand.Caused by Solenoid Valve Plunger Sticking in Energized Position.Plunger Freed ML20041F6251982-02-0505 February 1982 LER 82-004/03L-0:on 820203,small Quantity of Radioactive Gas/Particulate Released to Auxiliary Bldg During Routine Operation.Caused by Failure of Stack Gas Monitor RM-062 to Alarm at Appropriate Setpoint Due to Faulty Alarm Module ML20041B1051982-01-28028 January 1982 LER 82-002/03L-0:on 820114,at 99% Power,Lockout Relay 86B1, Containment Radiation High Signal,Failed to Actuate on Demand by Plant Radiation Monitoring Sys.Caused by Burnt Coil on Lockout Relay.Coil Replaced & Tested Satisfactorily ML20041B1171982-01-19019 January 1982 LER 82-001/03L-0:on 820111,during Normal Operation,Two Fire Barrier Penetrations Found Nonfunctional.Shift Supervisor Immediately Notified;However,Fire Watch Not Posted.Insp & Supervisor Personnel Instructed on Proper Actions ML20039B4561981-12-11011 December 1981 LER 81-011/03L-0:on 811113,containment Isolation Valves Opened & Ventilation Process Initiated W/Containment Air Monitor RM-050/051 Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error. Valves Closed ML20010H8581981-08-27027 August 1981 LER 81-008/03L-0:on 810813,86B/CRHS (Containment Radiation High Signal) Lockout Relay Failed to Actuate When RM-062 Was Placed in Alarm,Resulting in Failure of 86B1/CRHS Relay to Actuate.Caused by Dirt in Relay Latching Mechanism ML20041F6291981-08-27027 August 1981 LER 81-008/03L-1:on 810813,containment Radiation High Signal 86B Lockout Relay Failed to Actuate When Radiation Monitor RM-062 Placed in Alarm.Caused by Bound Relay Latching Mechanism Due to Dirt & Grease.Latch Cleaned ML20010C2271981-07-0707 July 1981 LER 81-006/03L-0:on 810624,reactor Protection Sys Nuclear Power Recorder Channel B Trip Setpoints Determined to Be Nonconservative.Caused by Faulty Temp Change Power Calculation Due to Grounded Hot Leg Temp Loop ML20004B1111981-05-0606 May 1981 LER 81-005/03L-0:on 810423,dc Sequencer Timers AC-3A (Component Cooling Water Pump) & AC-102A (Raw Water Pump) Failed to Time Out within Prescribed Limit.Cause Unknown Mechanisms Satisfactorily Inspected 1993-07-30
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217B5401999-10-0606 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License DPR-40 ML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data LIC-99-0096, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1.With ML20211J9321999-09-0202 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee Proposed Alternatives Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety. Proposed Alternatives Authorized for Remainder of Third ten- Yr ISI Interval for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1 LIC-99-0084, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station.With ML20216E6431999-08-26026 August 1999 Rev 19 to TDB-VI, COLR for FCS Unit 1 ML20210R1961999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1 ML20210G2181999-07-27027 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-40 ML20210D9951999-07-22022 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 191 to License DPR-40 ML20216E6361999-07-21021 July 1999 Rev 18 to TDB-VI, COLR for FCS Unit 1 ML20210R2081999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1 LIC-99-0065, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML20210P5461999-06-0808 June 1999 Rev 0,Vols 1-5 of Fort Calhoun Station 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual, to Be Conducted on 990810. Pages 2-20 & 2-40 in Vol 2 & Page 4-1 in Vol 4 of Incoming Submittal Not Included ML20195B4581999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to CE NPSD-683, Development of RCS Pressure & Temp Limits Rept for Removal of P-T Limits & LTOP Requirements from Ts ML20207H7401999-05-31031 May 1999 Performance Indicators Rept for May 1999 LIC-99-0053, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 11999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1 ML20195B4521999-05-17017 May 1999 Technical Data Book TDB-IX, RCS Pressure - Temp Limits Rept (Ptlr) ML20206L4241999-05-10010 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Corrective Actions to Ensure That Valves Are Capable of Performing Intended Safety Functions & OPPD Adequately Addressed Requested Actions Discussed in GL 95-07 ML20206M2601999-05-0606 May 1999 SER Concluding That Licensee IPEEE Complete Re Info Requested by Suppl 4 to GL 88-20 & IPEEE Results Reasonable Given FCS Design,Operation & History LIC-99-0047, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.With ML20195E8621999-04-30030 April 1999 Performance Indicators, for Apr 1999 ML20205Q5831999-04-15015 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 190 to License DPR-40 ML20210J4331999-03-31031 March 1999 Changes,Tests, & Experiments Carried Out Without Prior Commission Approval for Period 981101-990331.With USAR Changes Other than Those Resulting from 10CFR50.59 ML20206G2641999-03-31031 March 1999 Performance Indicators Rept for Mar 1999 LIC-99-0034, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1.With ML20205J8181999-02-28028 February 1999 Performance Indicators, for Feb 1999 LIC-99-0025, Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With ML20207F3291999-01-31031 January 1999 FCS Performance Indicators for Jan 1999 ML20203B0991998-12-31031 December 1998 Performance Indicators for Dec 1998 LIC-99-0026, 1998 Omaha Public Power District Annual Rept. with1998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Omaha Public Power District Annual Rept. with LIC-99-0003, Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station.With ML20198S3771998-12-31031 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 189 to License DPR-40 ML20198S4831998-12-31031 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 188 to License DPR-40 ML20196G2251998-12-18018 December 1998 Rev 2 to EA-FC-90-082, Potential Over-Pressurization of Containment Penetration Piping Following Main Steam Line Break in Containment ML20198M3141998-11-30030 November 1998 Performance Indicators Rept for Nov 1998 LIC-98-0172, Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With LIC-98-0160, Special Rept:On 981113,MSL RM RM-064 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage Past Isolation Valve HCV-922.Troubleshooting Has Indicated That Leakage Has Stopped & Cause of Leak Continues to Be Investigated1998-11-25025 November 1998 Special Rept:On 981113,MSL RM RM-064 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage Past Isolation Valve HCV-922.Troubleshooting Has Indicated That Leakage Has Stopped & Cause of Leak Continues to Be Investigated ML20203B0721998-11-16016 November 1998 Rev 6 to HI-92828, Licensing Rept for Spent Fuel Storage Capacity Expansion ML20196E4981998-10-31031 October 1998 Performance Indicators Rept for Oct 1998 ML20196G2441998-10-31031 October 1998 Changes,Tests & Experiments Carried Out Without Prior Commission Approval. with USAR Changes Other than Those Resulting from 10CFR50.59 LIC-98-0154, Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With ML20154M4881998-10-19019 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 186 to License DPR-40 ML20154N2411998-10-19019 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 187 to License DPR-40 LIC-98-0136, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With ML20155G4261998-09-30030 September 1998 Performance Indicators for Sept 1998 ML20154A1251998-08-31031 August 1998 Performance Indicators, Rept for Aug 1998 LIC-98-0122, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.With1998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.With ML20238F7231998-08-17017 August 1998 Owner'S Rept for Isis ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency 1999-09-30
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.1623 Harney Omaha. Nebraska 68102-2247 1 P', 402/536 4000:
4- . February 1, 1990 3 .LIC-89-1155-y 1
~U.S,LNuclear'RegulatoryCommission '
x Attn: Document Control Desk- i Maii Station.P1-137 !
'-Washington,_DC,20555-
Reference:
-- Docket'No. 50-285
[
y Gentlemen:-
Subjects' Licensee. Event Report 89-021 for the Fort Calhoun Station L -Please-find attached Licensee Event Report 89-021 dated February 1, !
H :1990~. This report is being submitted as a voluntary LER.
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L If you-should have any questions, please contact me.
' Sincerely, r n.2k
.W. G. Gates ;
Division Manager y; Nuclear' Operations-WGG/ tem Attachment c: 'R. D.' Martin, NRC Regional Administrator-A.;Bournia, NRC Project Manager ,
.P.'H. Harrell, NRC Ser.ior Resident Inspector s INP0 Records Center 1American Nuclear. Insurers e
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Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1 olsiolotol2i 8l5 i lor l 0,6 717 4: ..i Potential Nonconservative RPS Thermal Margin / Low Pressure Setpoints .
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CombustionEngineering(CE)wasrequestedbyOmahaPubilePowerDistrict(0 PPD) sis for Fort Calhoun to review The Station. the DNB Cycle 12 Excess Limiting Safety Load System Transient Setting Analy(LSSS) Setpoint Analysis was also reviewed. On October 10 1989 OPPD was formally informed of the i
possibility)ofhavinganon-conservativesetpointintheReactorProtective-Thermal System (RPS MargI theincorporationoftheTransientPowerDecalibration(TPD)inthesetpoint analyses. The potential safety impact on the plant was assessed by reviewing the Cycle 12 Excess Load Transient analysis and Departure from Nucleate Boiling Limiting Safety System Setting analysis to verify that the plant has been operating conservatively. The results of the review concluded that the plant had been operating within the design basis and would continue to do so for the remainder of Cycle 12 based on a comparison between predicted and observed core parameters. Corrective actions include development of im) roved administrative controls and training for the reload analysis process. T11s report is submitted as a voluntary LER.
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0l2 l 1 __ 0;O 0l2 or 0j 6 The Thermal Margin / Low Pressure (TM/LP) trip protects the core from violating theallowableDeparturefromNucleateBoilingRatio(DNBR) limit. Technical Specifications recuire that the minimum DNBR be maintained above 1.18. This ensures fuel cladting integrity by maintaining adequate heat transfer from the cladding to the coolant. The TM/LP Trip function provides this protection through the calculation of a variable setpoint using an equation (Pvar) defined in Figure 1-3 of the Technical Specifications. The Pvar equation yields a reactor trip setpoint that is a function of the core power, the core inlet temperature and the Axial Shape Index. The core power used is the greater of thethermal,(delta-T)powerorthenuclear(excoredetector) power. The calculated trip setpoint is compared with the measured pressurizer pressure.
If the measured pressurizer pressure value is less than or equal to the setpoint,thentheTM/LPtripunitintheReactorProtectionSystem(RPS)will initiate a reactor trip.
TheIntegratedRadialPeakingFactor(Fr)istheratioofthepeakpinpowerto theaverageintegratedpinpowerinthecore,excludingthetilt. The Total Integrated Radia, Peaking Factor (Frt) is the radial >eaking factor multiplied by a correction factor that accounts for the tilt. T1e limits on Frt assure that the assum)tions made in the setpoint analysis remain valid during o>eration at t1e various Control Element Assembly (CEA) group insertion limits.
Tie peaking factors assumed in the safety analysis are limiting assumptions chosen to provide the most conservative setpoint analysis, i
The setpoint analysis utilizes inputs from a number of different analyses, including the Thermal Hydraulics, the Transient Safety and the Axial Shape Indexanalyses,andcalculatestheRPStripunitsetpoints. One of the variables that must be included in the reload analysis is the Transient Power Decalibration(TPD) term. The TPD term accounts for the temperature shadowing and rod shadowing effects on the excore detector indicated power level and RTD response time for the delta-T power calculation. Temperature shadowing occurs when changes in the core inlet temperature take place. The result is a change in the reactor vessel downcomer coolant density which produces an increase or decrease in the moderation of the neutrons normally detected by the excore detectors. The result is a mismatch between the actual core power and the excore detectors' indicated power. The rod shadowing effect is caused by CEA movement resulting in shielding of the excore detectors, which also results in a mismatch between actual core power and the indicated power. The setpoint methodology allows the personnel performing the analysis to account for the TPD in either the Excess Load transient analysis or the Limiting Safety System Setting (LSSS)setpointanalyses.
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0l 0 0l 3 or 0[6 rm - . ,,- - =c % = = nn Durin the preparation of the Cycle 10 setpoints, Omaha Public Power District (OPPD used an updated version of the CESEC computer code that contained expli it modeling of the excore detector and RCS temperature responses, which is used in the determination of the core nuclear power and delta-T power levels, respectively. The new modeling allowed a better approximation of the magnitude of the TPD term that must be used in the setpoint analysis. On March 1,1984OPPDcontactedCombustionEngineering(CE)proposingtheremovalofthe nonzero TPD term to take advantage of the new com> uter modeling. On April 17, 1984 CE informed OPPD that the TPD term could eitler be reduced in the Excess Load Transient analysis or removed from the setpoint analysis. However, there was apparently some misunderstanding by 0 PPD personnel as to the intent of the guidance in this correspondence. During the Cycle 10 reload analysis the TPD term was reduced by OPPD in both the transient analysis and the setpoint I analysis. :
Prior to the start of the Cycle 11 reload analysis there was a large turnover of personnel within the OPPD department that performs the analyses. This :
resulted in increased reliance on the assumptions used for the methodology in Cycle 10. The Cycle 11 analysis was the first at OPPD to employ a computer- l aided method to perform the setpoint analysis. The analysis used the Cycle 10 analysis as a guideline. preparation Since the analyst of the Cycle 11 performing the Cycle 11 setpoint analysis was not as experienced as the previous analyst, the TPD term error of Cycle 10 was undetected and propagated ;
into the Cycle 11 analysi.% )
In April of 1988, CE was contracted by OPPD to perform the Cycle 12 setpoint analysis because at that time there were no qualified OPPD personnel available i to complete the analysis. The Cycle 12 setpoint analysis was also to be used '
as a training exercise that would aid OPPD personnel in becoming qualified to perform the analysis. OPPD personnel performed the transient analyses for Cycle 12 that were used as inputs for the setpoint analysis. The TPD error again was undetected and propagated into the Cycle 12 analysis.
During the performance of the Cycle 12 setpoint analysis, errors leading to non-conservative Cycle 11 TM/LP trip setpoints were discovered and reported to NRC as LER 88-16. CE determined that there were no additional errors in the setpoint analysis for Cycle 11. On August 11, 1988, as a result of NRC Violation 88-22-01 and an enforcement conference on the events detailed in LER 88-16, OPPD further committed to have all the Cycle 12 reload analyses reviewed by CE. Prior to the start of Cycle 12, CE was contracted by OPPD to review the Cycle 12 reload application and the supporting analyses. No errors, including the TPD term error, were found by CE during this review. CE also performed a review of the Cycle 10 setpoint analysis which revealed no problems.
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0l2 l 1 0l0 0l4 or 0j 6 The TPD term error was subsequently found during another review performed by CE at the request of OPPD. This review was conducted as part of the follow-up for a delta-T power flow stratification event that occurred at Fort Calhoun Station on September 13, 1989 during Cycle 12. The purpose of this review was to verify that the Excess Load Transient analysis was conservative and to assess the margin in the Departure from Nucleate Boiling Limiting Safety SystemSetting(DNBLSSS)portionofthesetpointanalysis.
On September 29, 1989 OPPD was verbally informed by CE of a potential discrepancy in the Cycle 12 Transient and Setpoint analyses. There was a potential non-conservatism in the RPS TM/LP trip unit setpoint due to an error in the incorporation of the TPD term in the setpoint analysis. OPPD Nuclear Engineering department performed a preliminary assessment which indicated the plant was operating within design basis. It was concluded that further discussions with CE were required.
On October 10, 1989, while the plant was operating in mode 1 at 100 percent power, OPPD was informed by a letter from CE that the Pvar equation used in the TM/LP trip units of the RPS could, under certain conditions, be non-conservative. The Pvar equation would be non-conservative when Frt was greater than 1.77 and core inlet temperature was 543 degrees Fahrenheit. The Technical Specification limit for Frt is 1.80 and for core inlet temperature <
is 543 degrees Fahrenheit. As noted previously, the TPD term is required to be accounted for in either the Excess Load Transient analysis or the setpoint analysis. OPPD set the term to zero in the Excess load Transient analysis and CE also set it to zero in the DNB LSSS setpoint analysis.
On October 10, 1989 it was determined that the existing RPS TM/LP setpoints would be conservative for Frt values below 1.77. A review of the actual full power peaking factors for Cycle 12 showed that Frt had not exceeded the value of 1.65. Also, the predicted values for Frt were not expected to exceed 1,73 for the remainder of Cycle 12. Therefore, the TM/LP trip function had not been and would not be outside of the design basis for the plant during Cycle 12 operation. Furthermore, normal operating practice at Fort Calhoun is to maintain the core inlet temperature a) proximately 2 degrees Fahrenheit below the Technical Specification limit. T11s practice provides additional conservatism. It was concluded that the plant was currently operating in a safe configuration and had been in a safe configuration since Cycle 12 startup. The TM/LP reactor trip )rotects the core from exceeding the DNBR limit. Only if the value of Frt lad been higher than 1.77 during Cycle 12 with the core inlet temperature at the Technical Specification limit of 543 degrees Fahrenheit would it have been possible for the DNBR limit to be violated for an event that required TM/LP protection, such as the Excess Load Event.
This event is reported as a voluntary LER for information.
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_ 0 ; 2l1 _ 0;0 0, 5 or 0l 6 rut n - . , e, ,,,,3. v ii7, The root cause for tM vent was the failure to maintain adequate administrative contron a w rsight to ensure that the reload analysis '
remained conservative overa or the Cycle 10 and subsequent reload analyses. There were several contributing causes: lack of overall design process guidelines for the reload analyses which would have allowed the analysts to verify that all the appropriate variables were included, lack of experience for some personnel involved in the Cycle 11 reload analysis, marginal quality of documentation for previous reload analyses, and inadequate communications between CE and OPPD and within the OPPD Nuclear Engineering Department.
The following corrective actions have been completed:
- 1. The RPS was verified to be operating within the design basis by the Supervisor of Reactor Performance Analysis by reviewing the DNB LSSS and the LHR LSSS setpoint calculations.
- 2. An Operations Memorandum was issued on October 13, 1989 notifying operations personnel of an administrative change in the maximum limit for Frt to a value of 1.75. This Operations Memorandum provided required corrective actions in the event that Frt exceeds 1.75. The Shift Technical Advisors periodically verify the peaking factor limits are not exceeded in accordance with the existing Technical Specifications requirements.
- 3. The procedure governing how the calculations are prepared was changed to require a higher level of documentation and review.
- 4. A formal root cause analysis was completed by the Nuclear Safety Review Group.
- 5. Additional training for appropriate personnel has been completed on setpoint generation.
- 6. The Cycle 10 and 11 peaking factors were reviewed to assure the plant was operating within the design basis for those cycles, j
- 7. To enhance the quality verification process, an overview of the entire reload process, including inputs to the setpoint analyses, has been conducted. This review included the applicable procedures to be followed and the transfer of information between the affected groups.
The following longer term corrective actions are planned:
- 1. A design )rocess document will be im)1emented, by September 30, 1990, to provide t1e necessary instructions tlat will be followed during a reload l
analysis.
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- 2. OPPD will evaluate the feasibility of an oversight comittee to )rovide guidance for the entire reload process for subsequent cycles. T 11s evaluation will be completed prior to initial reactor criticality for Cycle 13.
TherehasbeenonepreviousLER(LER88-016)writtenonerrorsin, generation of RPS setpoints.
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