ML20024A928

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Rev 4 Page Changes to Design Assessment Rept
ML20024A928
Person / Time
Site: Limerick  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/30/1983
From:
PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:
Shared Package
ML20024A923 List:
References
NUDOCS 8307010192
Download: ML20024A928 (49)
v • d • e


Text

i O

\I LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 &2 DESIGN ASSESSMENT REPORT REVISION 4 PAGE CHANGES The attached pages, tables, and figures are considered part of a controlled copy of the Limerick Generating Station DAR. This material should be incorporated into the DAR by following the instructions below.

Af ter the revised pages are inserted, p]. ace -the page that follows these instructions in the front of Volume 1. ,

REMOVE INSERT VOLUME 1 Table 1.3-2 (pgs 1 thru 10) Table 1.3-2 (pgs 1 thru 11)

Table 1.4-1 (pg 1) Table 1.4-1 (pg 1)

Page 480.69-1 Page 480.69-1 Page 480.71-1 Page 480.71-1

Page 640.29-1 VOLUME 2 gw

' Page G-i Page G-1 Page H-i Page H-i Page I-i Pages I-i thru Figure I.2-6

j /N

(,_)

83

07010192 a ocx O *888%
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? PDR ._

i

I l0 THIS LAR SET HAS BEEN UPDATED TO INCLUDE REVISIONS THROUGH Y

~

DATEDOk/83 O

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I r s I. l' COMPART a

Load __or-Phenomenon I. LOCA Related Hydrodynamic Loads

~

A. Submerged Boundary Loads During Vent Clearing B. Poolswell Loads

1. Poolswell Analyti-cal Model
a. Air-Bubble Pressure
h. Poolswell Elevation c..Poolswell Velocity 4

Also Available On I'GS DAR Aperture Card TABLE 1.3-2 (Page 1 of 11)  !

SON CF LGS LICENSING BASIS WITH NRC ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA f Criteria LGS NRC Acceptance Criteria Source Position 24 psi overpressure added NUREG-0487 Acceptable to local hydrostatic Supplement 1 pressure below vent exit (walls and basemat) -

linear attenuation to cool surface.

Calculated by the pool- NUREG-0487 Acceptable swell analytical model (PSAM) used in calcula-tion of submerged boun-dary loads.

Use PSAM with polytropic NUREG-0487 Acceptable exponent of 1. 2 to a max- Supplement 1 imum swell height which io the greater of 1.5 x vent submergence or the elevation corresponding to the drywell floor uplift AP=2.5 osid.

Valecity history vs. NUREG-0487 Acceptable pool elevation predic-ted by the PSAM used to compute impact loading on cmall structures and m' w-

"3 drng on gratings between initial pool surface and p 3

]{

maximum pool elevation cnd steady-state draq A' o\ = ' ;' io\

i between vent exit and maximum pool elevation. k- { .} } J Analytical velocity variation is used up 7

to maximum velocity. 3 l

Rev. 04, 06/83 O

hNk _ ._ _

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w

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1 I o

kgad_or Phenomenon-

d. Poolswell Acceleration e Wetwell Air Compression
f. Drywell Pressure
2. Loads on submerged Boundaries
3. Imr.act Loads

}

a. Small Structures

,7~

k )

,,-,a ,- , -....,,,,---.--,-,c--,,.n- , , , . - _ _ _ , - -

Also Available On Aperture Card TABLE 1.3-2 (Continued) (Page 2 of 11) )

Criteria LGS

'NRC-Acceptance Criteria- Source.- Position Maximum velocity applies thereafter up to maximum poolswell. PSAM predic-ted velocities multiplied by a factor of 1.1.

Acceleration predicted NUREG-0487 Acceptable by the PSAM. Pool accDieration is used in the calculation of acceleration loads on cubmerged components during poolswell.

Wetwell air compression NUREG-0487 Acceptable 10 calculated by PSAM Supplement 1 consistent with max-imum poolswell eleva-tion in B.1.b.

Methods of NEDM-10320 NUREG-0487 Acceptable and NEDO-20533 Appendix B. Used in PSAM to cal-culate poolswell loads.

M:ximum bubble pressure NUREG-0487 Acceptable predicted by the PSAM cdded uniformly to local hydrostatic pressure below vent exit (walls and basemat) - linear attenuation to pool surface.

Applied to walls up to max-imum poolswell elev'ation.

1.35 x Pressure-Velocity NUREG-0487 Acceptable

-correlation for pipes and I-beams based on PSTF impulse data and flct pool assumption. r Variable pulse duration.

-) 3\ (T U -.

A 3E R ~~ L R :

4-Iks.CARJ

. Rev. 04, 06/83 i

% W %%% "O e  ;

f--

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\

Lgad- or Phenomenon-

b. Large Structures c Grating 4
4. Wetwell Air Compression
a. Wall Loads
b. Diaphragm Upward Loads
5. Asymmetric LOCA Pool P. Steam Condensation and Chugging Loads
1. Downcomer Lateral l Loads
a. Single-Vent i Loads (24 in.) .

wr'

Also Available On LGS DAR Aperture Card ,

ABLE 1.3-2 (Continued) (Page 3 of 11) l l

Criteria LGS NRC- Acceptance Criteria Source - Position Nona - Plant unique load NUREG-0487 Not Applicable whera applicable. No large structures Poolswell drag vs. grating area NUREG-0487 Acceptable I horralation and pool velocity l vs. clevation. Pool velocity l from the PSAM. Poolswell I drnq multiplied by dynamic l Load factor. l Jir:ct application of NUREG-0487 Acceptable the PSAM -calculated pre ura due to wetwell bomprension.

i.5 prid for diaphragm NUREG-0808 Acceptable. Calculated l Loadings only. diaphragm uplift AP j

= 10.6 osid j (Figs. 4.2-3, 4.2-4). I Design diaphragm uplift i AP = 20 psid. l Ise 20 percent of max- NUREG-0487 Acceptable

.rman bubble pressure Supplement 1 stntically applied to l/2 of the submerged

>oundary.

lynrnde load to end of NUREG-0808 Acceptable rent. Half sine wave rith a duration of 3 to i ma and corresponding ,

J "Ug

{

i '

iaximum amplitudes of

'S to 10 K1bf.

A J T ] ,r + --

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Rev. 04, 06/03 kDDDNkkh'O

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Load or-Phenomenon-

h. Multiple-Vent Loads (24 in.)
c. Single / Multiple vent loads (28 in.)
2. Submerged Boundary Loads
a. High/ Medium Steam Flux Con-densation Oscillation Load
c. Low Steam Flux Chuqqing Load

- Symmetric Load

- Asymmetric Load Case I .. .

Also Avail:bic On Aperture Card TABLE 1. 3- 2 (Continued) (Page 4 of 11) l[

Criteria LGS NRC- Acceptance Criteria- Source - _P_osition Prescribed variation of NUREG-0808 Acceptable load per vent vs. number of vents. Determined from single vent dyna-cic load specification cnd multivent reduc-ticn factor.

Multiply basic vent NUREG-0808 Not Applicable loada by factor f=1.34 Bounding CO pressure NUREG-0808 Acceptable histories observed in 4TCO tests. Inphase coplication.

Con:Orvative set of NUREG-0808 Acceptable 10 sources derived

[ from 4TCO tests.

Applied to plants u ing the INEGS/ MARS ccoustic model.

, source desynchroniza-l tion of 50 ms og alter-nato load using 7 sources derived from the 4TC0 key chugs c:ithout averaging.

All vents use source of cqual strength for cach of the sources.

Source strengths Si = S (1*m) applied 5*" ,n

~) ,

to all vents on + and - side of 1 i contcinment. Sources based on the 3

cyuunetric ' sources. Asymmetric parameter a based on ras moment .6 A  : 1_i U R F--

method of interpreting experimental '

4TCO single-vent and JAERI multivent & C A '1'J data.

I, Rev. 04, 06/83 3%SD DA'

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-~.1 s

i Load- or- Phenomenon II SRV Related Hydrodynamic Loads A. Pool Temperatures Limits i

I l

LGS DAR Aperture Card TABLE 1.3-2 (Continued) (Page 5 of 11) )l

's Criteria LGS NRC Acceptance Criteria - Source - Position i

l For plants using a dis- NUREG-0783 charge device with the exact hole pattern as d::cribed in the SSES DAR Section 4.1, the fellowing limits shall coply:

1. For all plant tran- NUREG-0783 Acceptable cients involving SRV operations dur-ing which steam flux exceeds 94 lb /ft*-sec, the m

local pool tem-perature shall not exceed 200*F.

2. Fcr all plant tran- NUREG-0783 Acceptable cients involving SRV operations during I

' which steam flux is less than 42 lb /ft2-l

, m sec, the local pool 4

temperature shall be ct least 20*F sub-cooled. This is

, equivalent to a temp-

erature of 2100F with quencher submergence of 14 feet.

! 3. Fcr all plant tran- NUREG-0783 Acceptable cients involving SRV cperations during 3Jp

, which steam flux is ff""" \U "m\}

b tween 42 and 94 A 3 -

lb /fta-sec, the ,M

_\I 3 r i i p/,

, ,  ;

lo al pool tempera-ture can be deter-3,, ... CA3J 1 mined by linear Rev. 04, 06/83

\3DODNND Db

(D d

Load- or Phenomenon B. Evaluation of Air Clearing Load Definition Procedures l

('

s_..

liso Avall31a om LGS DAR Aperture Card

TABLE 1.3-2 (Continued) (Page 6 of 11) l I.

Criteria LGS L NRC-Acceptance-Criteria Source - Position-interpolation between the temperatures defined in items 1 and 2 above.

The T-quencher load NUREG-0802 Acceptable l arpecification described I in Section 4.1 of the SSES DAR may be applied for evaluation of SRV containment boundary preocure loads with the follcwing restrictions:

4

1. All valves load case NUREG-0802 Acceptable The DLV and DLWL com-binations must lie be-low the limit line of Fig. A.1 defined in the criteria where:
c. DLV shall'be equal to the arithmetic average of all dis-charge line

, volumes (m3)

b. DLWL shall be ~

equal to the quen-cher submergence at high water level (m)

2. ADS Load Case NUREG-0802 Acceptable The DLV and DLWL com-binations must lie below the limit line $P'6"'"'] 9 n'mmgg i of Fig. A.2 defined y \b in the criteria where:  ;; A 3 -- - , -

7_

i in l i ~~

a. DLV shall be equal 4 to the arithmetic average of all ADS ky.3g h[}.). {

.j l discharge line [

volumes (m3)

Rev. 04, 06/83 l

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<^,

(

o Load or Phenomenon C. T-Quencher Tie Down Loads

S l

liso Ivallabla On  !

LGS DAR Aperture Card  !

1 TABLE 1.3-2 (Continued) (Page 7 of 11) l y '; [

-Ctiteria LGS '

NBC-Acceptance Criteria Ecurce - Position-

b. DLWL shall be equal to the dif-ferences between the plant downcomer l exit elevation and the cuencher center line elevation (m)
3. Frequency Range NUREG-D802 Acceptable For the single valve and (DAR Section 4.1.4.1) asymmetric load cases, the timewise compression of the design pressure cignatures shall be in- 1 creased to provide an  !

overall dominant fre- 1 1

quency range that ex-1 t nds up to 11 Hz. I

4. Vertical Pressure NUREG-0802 Acceptable l Distribution -

The maximum pressure amplitudes shall be applied uniformly to the containment and pedestal walls up to an elevation 2.5 feet above the quencher c:nterline followed by linear attenuation to zero at pool curface.

The T-quencher load speci- NUREG-0802 Acceptable fication described in SSES DAR Section 4.1.2 may be an-plied for evaluation of i g

quencher and quencher sup- gt'rym.

port.

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k % U / i j T LJ tinh /

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Rev. 04, 06/93 r _

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Load or- Phenomenon-P D. SRV Boundary Loads III. LOCA/SRV Submerged Structure Loads A. LOCA Downcomer Jet Load i

1

( B. SRV T-Quencher Jet

}

C. LOCA Air Bubble Draq Loads p--

l l' 'Also Available on LGS DAR Apedum M i

TABLE 1.3-2 (Continued) (Pace 8 of 11) f 4

(

Criteria LGS NBC Acceptance Criteria - Source- Position The acceptance criteria speci- NUREG-0802 Acceptable. l fied in NUREG-0802, Appendix A DAR Section 4.1.1.1 l (A.1.1 through A.1.7) , are demonstrates the  !

recommended for plants following acceptability of I the " alternate" load methodology using the SSES SRV l (i.c. , T-Ouencher load specifi- load specification I cation described in SSES DAR for LGS. I Section 4.1) i Alternate methodology pre- NUREG-0487 Acceptable cented in Zimmer DAR may Supplement 1 be applied.

SRV T quencher jet loads NUREG-0487 Acceptable may be neglected beyond a 5 ft cylindrical zone of influence. Cylinder chould be extended 10 hole diameters on the arm with holes in the end cap Calculate based on NUREG-0487 Applying methods described in plant-unicue NEDE-21471 sub-ject to the methodology following constraints defined in and modifications: LGS DAR Sec-tion 4.2.1.5

1. To account for bubble NUREG-0487 Accept'able asymmetry, accelera-tions and velocities shall be increased 10%.
2. For standard draq NUREG-0487 Acceptable in accelerating flow Supplement 1 fields, use draft co- P " "'~ ~

efficients presented '

J DI\()V " M Q yl 1

in Zimmer FSAR Attach- ' ~'

r-) 7i r-ment .1.k with fol- ,

$ l1 l -l lowing modifications:

rA d v o R U-Rev. 04, 06/83 DSD N\\( ~Dk

l

!t .

.Y f.

u'A Load or-Phenomenon-1 L

--A.

't

's, e

Also Avail:bla on LGS DAR Ayrture M TABLE 1.3-2 (Continued) (Page 9 of 11) l[

Criteria LGS NRC-Acceptance Criteria- Source- Position

a. Use C =C-1 in H m ~

the F formula A

b. For noncylindrical structures, use lift coefficient for appropriate shape or C =1.6 L
c. The standard draq coefficient for poolswell and SRV oscillating bubbles should be based on data for structures with sharp edges.
3. For equivalent uni- NUREG-0487 Acceptable form flow velocity Supplement 1 and acceleration calculations, structures are segmented into small sections such that

^

1.05L/D51.5. The loads are then cpolied to the neo-metric center of each segment. This approach, as presen-ted in Zimmer FSAR Attachment 1.k, may be applied.

4. A detailed metho- NUREG-0487 Acceptable dolcoy on the Supplement 1 coproach for con- '

g1y-cidering inter- 3, p-ference effects as . j presented in Zimmer FSAR Attachment 1.k A3_,< -

, ' 't '

may be applied.

a 0A_U 4 .

Rev. 04, 06/93

$3%D(D bh """

r---------- - - -

p l

.,\a Lgad or Phenomenon-D. SRV Air Bubble Draq Load E. Steam Condensation Draq Loads m

IV. Secondary Loads

1. SoniciWave Load t
2. Compressive Wave Load l 3. Fallback Load on submerged Boundary
4. Thrust Loads
5. Friction Draq Loads on Vents
6. Vent clearing Loads
7. Post Swell Wave Load b

l

/

- , -,, .--- ,en , --m. - , r ,r- r ew~- e - , . , , -. -. --, ,+

. Also Availabla om LGS DAR Aperture Card ,

I TABLE 1 3-2 (Continued) (Page 10 of 11)

If Criteria LGS NRC- Acceptance Criteria Source Position 5 Formula 2-23 of NEDE- NUREG-0487 Acceptable 21730 shall be modi- -

fied by replacing M by p V where H FB A V~ is obtained from A

Tables 2-1 & 2-2.

No criteria specified Applying for T-quencher plant-unique U methodology defined in q' ~ q T LGS DAR M2 Section 4.1.4 No criteria specified Id Applying g g plant-unique

,U methodology

, y defined in LGS DAR k

Section 4.2 Negligible Load NUREG-0487 Acceptable Negligible Load NUREG-0487 Acceptable I

Negligible Load NUREG-0487 Acceptable Momentum balance NUREG-0487 Acceptable Standard friction draq NUREG-0487 Acceptable c:lculations Negligible Load NUREG-0487 Acceptable

' Methodology for establish- NUREG-0487 Load is negligible ing loads resulting when compared to

}

from post swell waves to design basis loads be evaluated on a plant (Section 4.2.3.6) g'/

i unique basis.

Rev. 04, 06/93 D\D\\L*\D-

i 3

Load _or Phenomeno_n

8. Seismic Slosh Load l

V. Confirmatory In-plant Tests of SRV Discharge A. SRV Load Specification B. Pool Temperature Specification (Thermal Mixing)

Also Available On LGS DAR Aperture M

/

ABLE 1.3-2 (Continued) (Page 11 of 11) l

.[

Criteria LGS NRC- Acceptance Criteria Source - Position l

Methodology for establish- NUREG-0487 Load is negligible ling loads resulting from when compared to seismic slosh to be design basis loads bvslutted on a plant unique (Section 4. 2. 3. 7) hasis.

t i

I i

In the event that an applicant NUREG-0802, Acceptable. No l cannot demonstrate, to the staff's Appendix A in-plant test is  !

!saticfcction, equivalence in any required. DAR l lof the areas cited in acceptance Section 4.1.1.1 l l criteria A.1.1 through A 1.7 of demonstrates the l NUREG-0802, Appendix A, in-plant acceptability of using l confirmatory testing may be employed the SSES SRV load l It o d:monstrate the applicability specification for LGS. j bftheacceptancecriteriafor l andividual plants. Such testing. I if proposed, should conform to the l Luid31ines set down in NUREG-0763. l The acceptability of the safety NUREG-0763 Acceptable. The LGS I relief valve in-plant confirmatory pool thermal mixing i test program shall be based on analysis will be l conformance with the guidelines- confirmed by in-plant I specified in Sections 6, 7, and testing and analysis. I 9 of NUREG-0763. If the 1

pplic:nt/ licensee elects not l-to perform the SRV in-plant tests, l the ecceptability of this exception l bhall be determined in conformance I with the guidelines specified in l Section 4 of NJREG-0763. l I

3

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A ? , : .R - 1 R:-- I f

()/\FR J Rev. 04, 06/83 kD%k%M kh~

LGS DAR

() TABLE 1.4-1 CONTAINMENT DESIGN PARAMETERS (Page 1 of 3)

Suppression Drywell Chamber DRYWELL AND SUPPRESSION CHAMBER Interna 1' design pressure, psig 55 55 External to internal design 5 5 differential pressure, psid Drywell deck design differential 30 20 pressure, psid downward upward Design temperature, OF 340 220

Drywell net free volume 248,950 including downcomers, ft3 Suppression chamber free volume, ft3

, Low level 161,350 High level 149,425 l Suppression pool water volume, ft3 Low level 115,903 l

High level 127,756 Suppression pool net surface area, 4974 outside pedestal, ft2 Supression pool depth, ft Low level 22' Normal level 23' High level 24'-3" VENT SYSTEM Number of downcomers 87 Nominal downcomer diameter, ft 2 Total vent area, fta 256.5 (A)

Rev. 4, 06/83

LGS DAR OUESTION 480.69 Provide the pool temperature analysis for the transient involving the actuation of one or more SRV's. For additional guidance, your attention is directed to NUREG-0873, " Pool Temperature Transients for BWR."

j RESPONSE

The requested information is provided in Appendix I.2. The guidance provided in NUREG-0783 has been followed in our analysis

~

l of pool temperature response to SRV discharge.

i i

O 4

. /.

480.69-1 Rev. 4, 06/83 i

- - . - _ .,. -r+-, - - - - - w-..,m -. .--, ,,-

LGS DAR OUESTION 480.71 Concerns regarding the capability of the vacuum breaker to perform its function during the pool swell and chugging phases of :

LOCA have been raised. Provide the design changes, if any, that

. have been implemented to resolve this concern.

RESPONSE

The four downcomers on which the wetwell/drywell vacuum breakers are mounted are being capped, thereby eliminating the adverse effects of the chugging phenomenon on the vacuum breakers.

The vacuum breaker has been redesigned so that it will successfully perform its given task during and after poolswell.

The adequacy of the redesign has been demonstrated by analysis and' test.

The redesign and requalification program that considers the effects of the poolswell and chugging events was initiated and funded by three utilities: Philadelphia Electric Co.,

(N Pennsylvania Power and Light, and Long Island Lighting Co. The i DAR will be updated after the design changes are implemented on

Limerick.

l l

O 480.71-1 Rev. 4, 06/83 i

. _ - _ -= . __ _ .__ -_ _ _ _ _ - --

LGS DAR O OUESTION 640.29 Provids a test description for any Confirmatory Inplant Tests of Safety-Relief Valve Discharges to be performed in compliance with NUREG-0763.

RESPONSE

NUREG-0763 provides guidelines to determine if in-plant tests are required on the basis of plant-unique parameters in order to confirm generically established specifications for SRV loads and maximum suppression pool temperature.

Limerick Specification for SRV Loads Confirmatory in-plant tests of SRV discharges to verify the adequacy of the Limerick SRV hydrodynamic load specification are not required. Limerick uses the generic Mark II T-Quencher load specification developed by Kraftwerk Union (KWU) for Susquehanna (SSES) due to similarities in key operating parameters between SSES and LGS (DAR Table 4.1-1 and Section 4.1.1.1). To verify O this load specification and to further verify the quencher's steam condensing characteristics, full-scale single cell tests were conducted at the KWU laboratories in Karlstein, West Germany. The generic load specification used for Limerick is described in DAR Section 4.1, while the Mark II T-Quencher verification test is described in DAR Chapter 8.

The acceptability of the Limerick SRV load specification conforms with NUREG-0763 and NUREG-0802 acceptance criteria. General NRC acceptance criteria are provided in Section 4 of NUREG-0763, while specific acceptance criteria for plants using the SSES SRV load specification are provided in Appendix A of NUREG-0802.

These specific criteria have been addressed in DAR Section 4.1.1.1 and demonstrate the acceptability of using the SSES SRV hydrodynamic load specification for Limerick, Limerick Specification for Suppression Pool Temperature -

The Limerick suppression pool thermal mixing capability will be assessed through in-plant testing and analysis in conformance with NUREG-0763.

DAR Table 1.3-2, Parts II.D and V, have been added to clarify our position on NUREG-0763 guidelines for in-plant tests of'SRV discharges and NUREG-0802 SRV load acceptance criteria.

640.29-1 Rev. 4, 06/83

LGS DAR O APPENDIX G NSSS DESIGN ASSESSMENT l j DELETED l i

O

'l

i l

l l

G-1 Rev. 4, 06/83

.I LGS DAR l

APPENDIX H BOP EQUIPMENT DESIGN ASSESSMENT I i

.)

i DELETED I i

O H-i Rev. 4, 06/83

LGS DAR O APPENDIX I SUPPRESSION POOL DESIGN ASSESSMENT TABLE OF CONTENTS I.1 Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring System Adequacy Assessment I.1.1 Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring System Design Criteria I.1.1.1 Sensor Locations I.1.1.2 Safety Evaluation I.1.1.3 Equipment Design I.1.1.4 Alarm Setpoints I.1.2 (later)

() I.1.3 References I.2 Suppression Pool Temperature Response to SRV Discharge I.2.1 Introduction I.2.2 Events for the Analysis of Pool Temperature Transients I.2.2.1 Event 1: Stuck-Open SRV (SORV) at Power Operation I.2.2.2 Event 2: SRV Discharge Following Isolation / Scram I.2.2.3 Event 3: SRV Discharge Following a Small Break Accident I.2.3 Assumptions Used in the Analysis I.2.3.1 General Assumptions I.2.3.2 Assumptions for Specific Events I.2.3.2.1 Event 1: SORV at Power

() I.2.3.2.2 Event 2: SRV Discharge Following Isolation / Scram I-i Rev. 4, 06/83

i LGS DAR l I.2.3.2.3 Event 3: SRV Discharge Following SBA 1 I.2.3.2.3.1 SRV Discharge Following SBA: Single Electrical Division Failure l,

I.2.4 Analysis Results and Conclusions i I.2.5 References i

l i

i 4

O i

.I I

l l

j O

I-li Rev. 4, 06/83

__. ._ . _ . . ~

! LGS DAR 4

APPENDIX I d

TABLES Number Title I.2.1 System Characteristics and Input Parameters

I.2-2 Peak Suppression Pool Temperatures

i i

i i

1 1

f f

t i

1 l

l i.

'4 )

, , I-iii Rev. 4, 06/83 '

i ,

_ _ _ _ _ , - . . , - - . - , . . ,, e -- ~ - . , - . - . - . . , . - , , . . . - . , , , . , . . . . .

LGS DAR APPENDIX I FIGURES Number Title I.1-1 Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring System Sensor Locations I.2-1 Suppression Pool Temperature Transient: Case 1.a I.2-2 Suppression Pool Temperature Transient: Case 1.b I.2-3 Suppression Pool Temperature Transient: Case 2.a I.2-4 Suppression Pool Temperature Transient: Case 2.b Suppression Pool Temperature Transient: Case 3.a I.2-5

I.2-6 Suppression Pool Temperature Transient: Case 3.b J

J O

I-iv Rev. 4,.06/83

t LGS DAR O I.1.1 SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE MONITORING SYSTEM DESIGN CRITERIA 4

The suppression pool temperature monitoring system (SPTMS) 1 monitors the suppression pool temperature.during normal plant  ;

operations and after transients or accidents. Operator '

monitoring of pool temperature is required to ensure that the suppression pool is operated within the allowable temperature limits set forth in the Limerick technical specifications.

Operation of the pool within these technical specifications will provide assurance that the suppression pool temperature will be maintained within the limits specified in NUREG-0783.

Section I.1.1.4 describes the Limerick technical specification temperature alarm setpoints for pool operation.

The SPTMS is designed in conformance with the acceptance criteria specified in NUREG-0487 (Ref. I.2-2) and NUREG-0783 (Ref. I.2-4).

I.1.1.1 SENSOR LOCATIONS 1

4

(" The suppression pool temperature is redundantly monitored by two

( divisionalized systems. Eight dual element RTDs are provided for each system and are evenly distributed around the pool to provide

- a reasonable measure of the bulk water temperature. .The eight monitoring locations and. individual RTD identifications are shown

?

in Figure I.1-1.

The sensor are located. at a depth of two feet below- the minimum pool water level. This depth ensures a conservative measurement of bulk temperature because the hottest water will rise to the pool surface. This depth also provides adequate sensor submergence to preclude the possibility of sensor.uncovery.during an accident or-transient.

I.1.1.2 SAFETY EVALUATION The indication of suppression pool temperature in the control room is required to ensure that the plant is.always operating

within the technical specification limits. Manual operator action is required to maintain the plant within the specifications. Suppression pool temperature is also' required j for post accident monitoring. These functions are safety s related.

O i

I.1-1 .Rev. 4, 06/83 m v

  • n m w "-

1 LGS DAR O

The system design conforms to all applicable criteria for physical separation, redundancy and divisionalization. Physical and electrical separation is provided for the safety related instrumentation. The safety related instrumentation is powered from divisionalized Class 1E power sources.

The suppression pool temperature sensors are qualified to seismic Category I and Class 1E criteria and are energized from onsite emergency power supplies.

The hat icopy timeplot of suppression pool temperature is for operating history only and is not safety related.

I.1.1.3 EQUIPMENT DESIGN The signals from the redundant sensors are processed by two independent divisionalized microprocessors located on a main control room cabinet. The microprocessors convert the RTD signals into degrees Fahrenheit and compute the average of the eight temperatures. The average-value is displayed by digital indicators provided on the microprocessors and on remote indicators located at the main control board. Keyboards located on the microprocessor and on the remote indicator allow the operator to display any individual temperature input, i The SPTMS trouble alarm located in the main control room is generated if the calculated average temperature exceeds any of the four distinct high temperature setpoints that are permanently stored in the microprocessors. (Section I.1.1.4 provides details on the temperature alarm setpoints'.) Also, appropriate high temperature status lights are initiated on the associated microprocessor and remote indicator. Electrically isolated outputs interface with the SPTMS trouble alarm located in the main control room.

The SPTMS trouble alarm is also initiated if one of the RTDs fails or if non-1E power to the cabinet cooling fans is lost.

Keyboards allow the operator to remove a failed RTD from the calculated average.

Both elements of each dual element RTD are wired out through containment penetrations. One element of each RTD is connected h Rev. 4, 06/83 I.1-2

l LGS DAR C\ to a microprocessor loop. This design provides the capability to

\

)

easily connect the backup RTD elements in case of a failure.

A digital printer located on the microprocessor periedically prints the average temperature, the individual temperature, and the current date and time. Trending information may also be printed at the operator's request. Alarm. conditions are printed along with the temperature.

Electrically isolated digital and analog signals are provided to interface with other plant information systems including a signal to the emergency response facility data system (ERFDS) computer.

The microprocessor has a sel.f checking diagnostic system that provides an error alarm if a failure is detected in any part of the system.

I.1.1.4 ALARM SETPOINTS The SPTMS provides alarm at four pool temperature setpoints (95, 105, 110, and 1200F) to provide assurance that the suppression pool will be maintained within the temperature limits defined in

()s

\s , NUREG-0783. Appendix I.2 describes these pool temperature limits and provides Limerick's analysis for suppression pool temperature response to SRV discharge. This analysis demonstrates the adequacy of these alarm setpoints with regard to alerting the operato, to maintain the pool temperature below the NUREG-0783 limit. The alarm setpoints are based on Ref. I.1-1 and are defined as follows:

a. 950F: maximim allowable pool temperature for continuous power operation without suppression pool cooling
e. 1050F: maximim allowable pool temperature during testing at power which adds heat to the pool.
c. 1100F: manual reactor scram setpoint
d. 1200F: manual reactor depressurization setpoint.

O I.1-3 Rev. 4, 06/83

LGS DAR I.1.2 (LATER)

I.

1.3 REFERENCES

I.1-1 General Electric Service Information Letter (SIL)

No. 106, October 25, 1974.

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FIGURE L1-1 Rev. 4. 06/83 s l 4- l 3 l 2 l 1

LGS DAR I.2 SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE RESPONSE TO SRV DISCHARGE I.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In late 1974, the NRC alerted the BWR Owners to the potential for severe vibratory loads on the containment structure due to safety / relief valve (SRV) discharge at elevated suppression pool temperature (Ref. I.2-1). This phenomenon, or condensation instability, was associated with certain SRV discharge device '

configurations and occurred above given threshold values of pool temperature and steam mass flux. While the condensation instability phenomenon described above has never been exhibited for quencher devices, even in large scale tests where local temperatures approached saturation, the NRC (Ref. I.2-2) has taken the position that a local pool temperature limit of 2000F "will provide additional. conservatism and will ensure that

, unstable steam condensation will not occur with a quencher l device" and that " applicants will-have to provide plant unique analyses for pool temperature responses to transients involving SRV operations to demonstrate that the plants will operate within the limit of 2000F."

() The Mark II Owners Group subsequently prepared a generic report, the " White Paper" (Ref. I.2-3), which was used by the utilities, including Philadelphia Electric Co., as a guideline for plant-unique analyses. In conjunction with the development of this report, the Mark II Owners Group proposed alternative suppression pool temperature limits. These alternative acceptance criteria were subsequently accepted by the NRC for plants using the

generic Mark II T-Quencher design. The alternative pool temperature limits are defined in NUREG-0783 (Ref. I.2-4) as follows

6

a. For all plant transients involving SRV operations during which the steam flux through the quencher perforations exceeds 94 lbm/fta-sec, the suppression pool local temperature shall not exceed 2000F.

, b. For all plant transients involving SRV operations during which steam flux through the quencher perforations is less than 42 lbm/ft2-sec, the suppression pool local temperature shall be at least 200F_subcooled.. This is equivalent to a local temperature of.2100F with quencher submergence of 14 feet.

O I.2-1 Rev. 4, 06/83

LGS DAR

c. For plant transients involving SRV operations during which the steam flux through the quencher perforations exceeds 42 lbm/ftz-sec but is less than 94 lbm/ftz-sec, the suppression pool local temperature can be established by linearly interpolating the local temperatures established under items a and b above.

The following presentation of the suppression pool temperature analysis for Limerick conforms with NUREG-0783 in terms of the pool temperature limit acceptance criteria, assumptions, and pool heatup events required for analysis.

I.2.2 EVENTS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF POOL TEMPERATURE TRANSIENTS The following events have been analyzed on the basis of mass and energy balance on the suppression pool during SRV blowdown. The results of the pool temperature transients demonstrate the history of the pool bulk temperature for all the events analyzed.

Assumptions for the events are discussed in Section I.2.3. The associated peak pool temperatures calculated for each event are summarized in Table I.2-2.

I.2.2.1 Event 1: Stuck-Open SRV (SORV) at Power Operation O

SORV at power cases are analyzed to demonstrate that the spurious opening of an SRV during normal power operation will not result in high pool temperatures.

Two cases of SORV at power are considered separately:

Case 1.a: Single failure of one RHR heat exchanger

, Case 1.b: Initiation of the main steam isolation valve (MSIV)

! closure signal at the time of scram and subsequent unavailability of main condenser.

1 i

I.2.2 2 Event 2: SRV Discharge Followino Isolation / Scram Isolation / scram cases are analyzed to demonstrate that the loss of the main condenser by the sudden closure of the HSIVs and subsequent scram, SRV openings at set pressure, and manual depressurization will not result in high pool temperature.

Rev. 4, 06/83 I.2-2

. -- ._ . _ . . - - - = .

, LGS DAR i

O Two single failures are considered separately:

l Case 2.a: Single failure of one RHR heat exchanger  !

Case 2.b: Failure of an SRV to reclose (SORV)

(Note: Case 2.b is not required by NUREG-0783 but is presented to maintain consistency with the

" White Paper" cases.) ,

I.2.2.3 Event 3: SRV Discharoe Followina a Small Break Accident SBA cases are analyzed to demonstrate that SRV discharge required to depressurize the reactor coolant system following a small break will not result in high pool temperatures. As a result of continued flow through the break, peak pool temperature is not reached until after SRV discharge has terminated.-

Two cases of SBA are considered separately:

() Case 3.a: Single failure of one RHR heat exchanger Case 3.b: Loss of shutdown cooling (Note: Case 3.b is not required by NUREG-0783 but is presented to maintain consistency with the

" White Paper" cases.)

I.2.3 ASSUMPTIONS USED IN THE ANALYSIS I.2.3.1 General Assumptions 4

The following general assumptions and initial conditions have been used for all transients. Table I.2-1 summarizes the values for important system characteristics and input parameters listed below.

3 a. Power level, decay heat standard, RHR heat exchanger i capability (considering design fouling factors), and suppression pool initial temperature (maximum technical specification temperature for continuous power operation O without pool cooling) are. consistent with.those used for the analysis of containment pressure and temperature I.2-3 .Rev. 4, 06/83

. _ . . - J

i LGS DAR response to a loss-of-coolant accident specified in the FSAR.

b. The service water temperature is characterized as a transient starting at 880F (technical specification limit for average spray pond temperature).
c. The initial water level of the suppression pool is at the minimum level in the technical specification.
d. MSIV closure is complete 3.5 seconds after the isolation signal (t=0) for transients where isolation occurs.
e. The water volume within the reactor vessel pedestal is not included in the calculation of pool temperature response.
f. To maximize heat addition to the pool, feedwater at the temperature in excess of instantaneous pool temperature is assumed to maintain RPV level rather than condensate storage tank inventory via RCIC and HPCI. Feedwater injection is terminated when additional feedwater will ultimately result in cooling the pool. (Note: This requirement is more conservative than the NUREG-0783 assumption that "feedwater pumps supply feedwater to the reactor until the feedpumps trip on an automatic signal.") HPCI (from the suppression pool) and CRD (from the condensate storage tank) systems provide vessel makeup after all the hot feedwater is expended. CRD flow was used for all cases except small break accidents with one RHR.
g. Offsite power is not available for isolation / scram and SBA events or where MSIV closure is assumed, except SBA Case 3.b. Offsite power is available for Case 3.b; however, Case 3.b is conservative due to the conservatism associated with feedwater addition (see assumption "if" above) and the unavailability of the main condenser. Also, Case 3.b is not the controlling event for calculation of peak pool temperature (Table I.2-2).
h. High pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system is terminated at or before a pool temperature of 1700F.

Rev. 4, 06/83 I.2-4

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ ___________a

l LGS DAR

- 1. A single electrical division failure may result in the unavailability of RHR shutdown cooling and one loop of RHR pool cooling. The assessment of this single failure assumption on suppression pool temperature response to SRV discharge is provided in Section I.2.3.2.3.1.

j. The calculation of mass and energy release to the suppression pool due to SRV discharge follows t'he methodology described in Reference I.2-5.
k. There are no heat losses to the containment atmosphere and structures.
1. The RHR operates in the suppression pool cooling mode 10 minutes after the high pool temperature alarm (950F).
m. All transients involving one RHR heat exchanger operation assume a minimum controlled depressurization rate and employ a rapid transfer (16 minutes, without flush) from pool cooling to shutdown cooling using the s available RHR heat exchanger when the reactor pressure reaches the permissive value (89.7 psia). Shutdown cooling is not used in the analyses for those transients having both RHR trains available.
n. In accordance with the Limerick technical specifications, manual depressurization at a rate of 1000F/ hour begins at a pool temperature of 1200F unless the depressurization rate for the event itself (e.g.,

SORV, SBA) exceeds the required rate at that time.

Manual.depressurization is terminated upon initiation of shutdown cooling.

o. SRV flow rate = 122.5 percent of ASME rated.

I.2.3.2 Assumptions for Specific Events This section describes the specific assumptions used for the events described in Section I.2.2. Operator actions are also described for justification of the assumptions.

I I.2-5 -Rev. 4, 06/83

LGS DAR I.2.3.2.1 Event 1: SORV at Power This initating event postulates that an SRV is inadvertently actuated while the plant is operating at power. Following actuation, the SRV fails to reseat and remains open throughout the transient. As a result of this malfunction, steam from the primary system is discharged through the SRV and released to the suppression pool.

Two independent systems will generate alarms and displays in the control room so as to give the operator immediate and unambiguous indications of an SORV. First, the safety relief valve position indication CSRVPI) system (FSAR Section 7.6.1.5.1) provides pcsitive indication and alarm of SRV position through the use of acoustic sensors (two per valve) which detect noise generated by steam flow through an open SRV. Secondly, the safety grade suppression pool temperature monitoring system (SPTMS) will indicate a rise in the suppression pool temperature and alert the operator to initiate corrective action. A control room alarm is generated when the average pool temperature increases to 95, 105, 110, and 1200F. Further details of the SPTMS are provided in Appendix I.1.

In accordance with the Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs), the operator will manually scram the reactor by turning the mode switch to " shutdown" if the SRV cannot be reclosed immediately.

The EPGs will specify the number of attempts that the operator will be allowed to reclose a stuck open SRV.

For analysis purposes, it is conservatively assumed that manual scram does not occur until the technical specification limit on pool temperature for power operation is reached (1100F).

Case 1.a: Single Failure - One RHR Heat Exchanger Unavailable

  • Offsite power is available.
  • One RHR system is placed in pool cooling mode 10 minutes after the SORV.

O Rev. 4, 06/83 I.2-6

t LGS DAR

'

  • The MSIVs remain open because the mode switch has been taken out of the "run" position.
  • Following scram, the reactor steam generation will decrease so that the turbine control valves will
mechanistically close as the RPV pressure drops, thus
isolating the turbine from the reactor. The turbine bypass valves are also mechanistically closed. The steam 3et air ejectors will continue to maintain vacuum in the main condenser.
  • The operator manually depressurizes the reactor by i

reestablishing the main condenser as a heat sink through the main turbine bypass system.- It is assumed that the operator will manually open the turbine bypass valve 20 minutes after scram.

()

. transfer to shutdown cooling. -

Case 1.b: Single Failure - Spurious Main Steam Line Isolation 4

at Scram t

  • Loss of offsite power.
  • Two RHR systems are placed in the pool cooling mode 10 minutes after the SORV.
  • When the pool temperature = 1200F, the operator begins manual depressurization-to maintain 1000F/ hour cooldown I

( rate by opening additional SRVs as needed. I

)

I.2-7 Rev. 4, O'6/83 . ,

, , .m, _ .__ _ ,, .,

l LGS DAR

(

l

I.2.3.2.2 Event 2: SRV Discharge Following Isolation / Scram Case 2.a: Single Failure - One RHR Heat Exchanger Unavailable

  • Loss of offsite power.
  • One RHR system placed in pool cooling mode 10 minutes after the event.
  • When the pool temperature = 1200F, the operator begins manual depressurization at a rate of 1000F/ hour by opening SRVs as needed.

Case 2.b: Single Failure - SORV

  • SORV occurs at t=0 e Loss of offsite power.
  • Two RHR systems are placed in the pool cooling mode 10 minutes after the event.

e 'When the pool temperature = 1200F, the operator begins manual depressurization to maintain 1000F/ hour cooldown rate by opening additional SRVs as needed.

O Rev. 4, 06/83 I.2-8

s LGS DAR e RHR shutdown cooling is not initiated.

I.2.3.2.3 Event 3: SRV Discharge Following SBA Case 3.a: Single Failure - One RHR Heat Exchanger Unavailable

  • Loss of offsite power.
  • One RHR system is placed in the pool cooling mode 10 minutes after event.
  • When the pool temperature = 1200F, the operator begins manual depressurization at a rate of 1000F/ hour by opening SRVs as needed.

(LPCI signal occurs at (a) low reactor level or (b) high drywell pressure combined with low reactor pressure.)

The operator manually converts back to the pool cooling mode in 10 minutes.

Case 3.b: Single Failure - Shutdown Cooling Unavailable

  • Offsite power is available.

O O

I.2-9 Rev. 4, 06/83

LGS DAR

  • Two RHR systems are placed in the pool cooling mode 10 minutes after event.
  • When the pool temperature = 1200F, the operator begins manual depressurization at a rate of 1000F/ hour by opening SRVs as needed.

The operator manually converts back to the pool cooling mode in 10 minutes.

)

1.2.3.2.3.1 SRV Discharge Following SBA: Single Electrical Division Failure In response to NUREG-0783, sections 5.7.1(8) and 5.7.2.3(2),

Limerick has evaluated the effect of a most limiting single failure on the suppression pool peak temperature. It was concluded that a worst case single failure of an electrical division power source may result in the unavailability of RHR shutdown cooling and one loop of RHR pool cooling. However, the peak pool temperature resulting from this single failure will be bounded by the peak temperature calculated from limiting SBA I

Case 3.a when taking credit for manual operator action to regain l

the lost loop of pool cooling.

Approximately 2-1/2 hours are available to the operator for manual realignment of affected valves to obtain additional pool cooling capability from the second RHR heat exchanger. This available time is conservatively derived from the pressure-temperature-time history for comparable Case 3.a (Figure I.2-5).

Limiting Case 3.a is similar to the single electrical division failure case because only one loop of RHR pool cooling is available during the depressurization phase of the event.

The time is based on the conservative assumption that loss of offsite power (and subsequent operator awareness of loss of both RHR shutdown cooling and one loop of pool cooling) occurs at a pool temperature of 1200F (technical specification limit for manual depressurization). From Figure I.2-5 (Case 3.a), the pool Rev. 4, 06/83 I.2-10

LGS DAR O temperature reaches 1200F at approximately 1000 seconds. The time available for manual operator action after t=1000 seconds

without the pool exceeding the peak calculated temperature is limited to the same point in time in Case 3.a where shutdown cooling was initiated (89.7 psia), i.e., approximately 10,000 seconds. Therefore, the total time available based on limiting Case 3.a is approximately 9,000 seconds or 2-1/2 hours.

i A study of required manual operator actions has concluded that a

second RHR heat exchanger could be available in the pool cooling mode in less than 2-1/2 hours (the time when Case 3.a peak pool i

temperature is reached). The pool temperature will decrease following the initiation of the second RHR loop in the pool cooling mode because the heat removal rate of both RHR exchangers will exceed the heat addition rate to the pool at this time in 3

the event.

I

Because the RHR shutdown cooling mode is not initiated, the
operator will ultimately reach cold shutdown by establishing the ,

alternate shutdown cooling path as outlined in FSAR Section '

15.2.9. The heat addition rate to the pool resulting from this

, alternate path of shutdown cooling will be controlled to preclude the possibility of additional pool heatup.

O If manual operator actions are required in case of a worst case.

single electrical division failure, the plant operator could actually reduce the blowdown rate to extend the time before the peak pool temperature is reached. This scenario allows additional time for operator actions and would result in a peak pool temperature which is lower than Case 3.a.

I.2.4 ANALYSIS RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 3

Table I.2-2 lists the peak bulk suppression pool temperatures that were calculated-using the General Electric computer code HEX 1

for the scenarios described in Sections I.2.2 and I.2.3.

Figures I.2-1 through I.2-6 provide plots of the suppression pool temperature and the respective reactor pressure versus time.

1

] As stated earlier, the pool temperatures summarized in 4

Table I.2-2 represent " bulk" temperatures,.i.<e., they were calculated assuming a homogeneously mixed suppression pool. In-reality,. pool mixing will not be perfect and differences will exist between the " local" temperature of the water in the immediate vicinity of the quencher and the calculated " bulk"

'T temperature. However, because of the special design features of

~

quenchers and their predominantly radial orientation in the i I.2-11 Rev. 4, 06/83 i

LGS DAR suppression pool to optimize pool thermal mixing (Figure 1.4-3),

the local-to-bulk AT is expected to be small and not exceed the value that was previously derived for ramshead discharge devices in Mark I plants (100F, Ref. I.2-2). This number will be verified using in-plant tests and analysis (Appendix I.1).

The suppression pool temperature limits defined in NUREG-0783 and listed in Section 1.2.1 are specified in terms of " local" pool temperature and quencher mass flux criteria. Because Figures I.2-1 through I.2-6 specify the Limerick time histories in terms of " bulk" pool temperature and reactor pressure, it is necessary to convert the NUREG-0783 local pool temperature limit criteria to bulk pool temperature and reactor pressure criteria. Applying a local-to-bulk AT of 100F as described above and calculating the Limerick reactor pressures corresponding to steam fluxes of 42 and 94 lbm/ft2 sec, respectively, a bulk suppression pool temperature limit curve is developed. These curves are shown on Figures I.2-1 through I.2-6 and demonstrate that the Limerick suppression pool temperatures due to SRV discharge comply with the temperature limits defined in NUREG-0783.

I.

2.5 REFERENCES

I.2-1 RO Bulletin 74-14, "BWR Relief Valve Discharge to Suppression Pool," November 15, 1974.

I.2-2 NUREG-0487, " Mark II Containment Lead Plant Program -

Load Evaluation and Acceptance Criteria," October 1978.

I.2-3 Mark II Owners Group, " Assumptions for Use in Analyzing Mark II BWR Suppression Pool Temperature Response to Plant Transients Involving Safety / Relief Valve Discharge," March 24, 1980.

I.2-4 NUREG-0783, " Suppression Pool Temperature Limits for BWR Containments," November 1981.

I.2-5 Letter report, R. H. Bucholz to Karl Kniel dated March 12, 1981, " Mark II Containment Program Method for Calculating Mass and Energy Release for Suppression Pool Temperature Response to Safety Relief Valve Discharaes."

O Rev. 4, 06/83 I.2-12

j LGS DAR i

l \ TABLE I.2-1 (Page 1 of 2)

SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS AND INPUT PARAMETERS REACTOR 4

Initial core power (105% Rated) 3.26 x 10* Btu /sec Initial RPV liquid mass 608,142 lbm Initial RPV steam mass 24,669 lbm RPV and internals mass 2.772 x 10* lbm Initial vessel pressure 1025 psia Initial steam flow (105% Rated) 4129 lbm/sec

REACTOR MAKEUP Initial CRD flow 8.89 lbm/sec CRD flow after scram (P = 0 psig) 23.6 lbm/sec RPV CRD enthalpy-(from condensate storage 108 Btu /lbm tank)

Feedwater flow rate as required to maintain RPV level Feedwater mass /enthalpy Mass (Iba) Enthalpy (Btu /lbm) 165,385 402 256,919 342 370,885 235 359,442 156 235,746 126 HPCI "on" volume (RPV level 2) 12,675 ft3 HPCI "off" volume (RPV level 8) 15,281 ft3 VALVES Main steam line isolation valve 3.5 sec (MSIV) closure time l SRV flow rate (122.5% ASME) 390 lbm/sec at 1500 psia i SRV setpoints See DAR Table 1.4-1 l

l l Rev. 4, 06/83 O

-- , - w -

l l

l

! LGS DAR i

TABLE I.2-1 (Cont'd) (Page 2 of 2)

RHR SYSTEM RHR heat exchanger effectiveness, K 288.9 Btu /sec 0F (shutdown cooling)

! RHR heat exchanger effectiveness', K 288.9 Btu /sec 0F (pool. cooling)

RHR flow rate in pool cooling 1390 lbm/sec RHR flow rate in shutdown cooling 1390 lbm/sec

, RHR pump horsepower -

1250 hp/ pump RHR service water temperature 880F at time = 0 sec

91.20F at time = 18,000 sec i _

92.50F at time = 36,000 see t l RHR service water flow rate 9000 gpm Maximum reactor pressure for switch-over from RHR pool cooling to

shutdown cooling ,

89.7 psia l

l 1

WETWELL/ SUPPRESSION POOL /'

t t Wetwell airspace pressure -15.45 psia Initial suppression pool water mass 7.194 x 10* lbm-(at low water level, without s_/ water mass inside pedestal)

Initial suppression pool temp'erature 950F Suppression pool temperature technical ,

specification limits for: I l

a) Continuous operation without 950F l suppression pool cooling b) Continuous testing at power _ 1050F

! c) Power operat~ ion (Scram tech; spec. temperature) -

1100F d) Hot standby (Eepressuri- 1200F zation tech, spec. tem- 7

perature) ,
Quencher submergence (at low water 18.5 feet' ' 1 level) ~,

1 /

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-

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Rev. 4, 06/83

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LGS DAR TABLE I.2-2 PEAK SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURES l EVENT TEMPERATURE j

1. SORV at Power Case 1.a 1690F Case 1.b 1870F
2. Isolation / Scram Case 2.a 2010F Case 2.b 1830F
3. SBA Case 3.a 2020F 4 Case 3.b 1820F

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