ML19332E743

LER 88-037-01:on 881214,one of Two Supply Headers Supplying Fire Suppression Headers in Auxiliary Bldg Isolated.Caused by Lack of Procedural Guidance & Inadequate Procedural Controls.Standing Order G-58 Will Be revised.W/891208 Ltr

ML19332E743
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	12/08/1989
From:	Dante Johnson, Morris K OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-88-037, LER-88-37, LIC-89-1038, NUDOCS 8912120063
Download: ML19332E743 (5)

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.. **', q Omaha Public Power District 1623 Harney Omaha, Nebraska 68102 2247 402/536 4000 l

December 8, 1989 l LIC-89-1038 d

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk l' Mail Station PI-137 L Washington, DC 20555

Reference:

Docket No. 50-285 Gentlemen:

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SUBJECT:

Licensee Event Report 88-037, Revision 1 for the Fort Calhoun.

Station Please find attached Licensee Event Report 88-037, Revision 1 dated December 8, 1989. This report is being submitted per requirements of.10 CFR 50 73(a)(2)(1). This submittal provides additional corrective action to address root cause as requested by NRC Region IV personnel. Revisions to LER 88-037 are indicated by vertical lines in the right hand margin.

l L If you should have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely, L /

K J. Morris

!. Division Manager Nuclear Operations l

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c: R. D. Martin, NRC Regional Administrator l A. Bournia, NRC Project Manager i P. H. Harrell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector j l INP0 Records Center l l American Nuclear Insurers  ;

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DOCKif NURASth (2) PAGE GI 9ACILl1Y hA488 01 Fert Calhoun Statlon Unit No.1 o I6 l 0 l0 I o 1218 I 5 1loFl0l4 TITLL tel Fire Suppression System Inoperability in Compressor Bay Due to Isolation of Supply Header EVENT DAf t 451 LER NUM9th (s) RtPORY DAf f (M OTHER F ACILITit$ INVOLVED (Si F ACILITv hAMES DOCKET NVM9 tnt 31 MONT H DAY YtAR YtAR 'I

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NAME TELEPHONE NUMSSR Amt A COD 6 D. C. Johnson, System Engineer 410 12 513 1 31-16 I 81910 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT F AILURE DSOCRIGED IN TMis REPORT Hal n

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I I I I I l l I I I I I I I l l l 'l l l l 1 l l 1 1 I I SUPPLEMENT AL REPORT E XPECTED 1941 MONTH DAY YEAR 4t$ (19 ven e.monere LMPLCTRO SUO6tISSION OATil NO l l l ASSTR ACT ftper so f edo specer. t.e , espres meset f**seen smre apue typewesena ames! (ISI Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) Technical Specifications require that the compressor room fire protection sprinkler system be operable or a continuous fire watch be established. On December 14, 1988, one of two supply headers supplying fire suppression headers in the Auxiliary Building was isolated. On December 15, 1988, at approximately 1300, OPPD personnel recognized, per an existing engineering analysis, that the header isolation created a hydraulic pressure deficiency in the fire sprinkler system above the air compressors. Upon discovery, the supply header was returned to service. The sprinkler system was unable to fully perform its design function and was inoperable as defined by FCS Technical Specifications. Personnel were unaware of the system design limitation when the header was isolated and consequently did not establish a continuous fire watch. This event is reportable pursuant with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1)(B). The threat to nuclear safety was minimal as the plant was in Refueling Shutdown, an existing hourly fire watch patrol was in effect at that time for the affected area and the fire detectors in that room were operable.

This incident arose out of a lack of procedural guidance in the communication of design basis concerns between Design Engineering and plant staff and inadequate procedural controls with respect to fire protection system impairments. The corrective actions included providing enhanced administrative l controls to improve communications and correct weaknesses in the control of fire protection impairments.

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011 0 12 0F 014 Fort Calhoun Station Technical S)ecification 2.19(5) concerning fire protection sprinkler systems states: " ... tie sprinkler / spray nozzle system in the compressor room...shall be operable except during system testing. If inoperable: Within one hour establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire extinguishing cquipment..." On December 14,.1988, one of two supply headers -

supplying fire suppression headers in the Auxiliary Building was isolated. On December 15, 1988, at approximately 1300, OPPD personnel recognized, per an existing engineering analysis, that the header isolation created a hydraulic pressure deficiency on the fire sprinkler system above the air compressors. Upon discovery, the supply header was returned to service. The sprinkler system was unable to fully perform its design function and was inoperable as defined by FCS Technical Specifications. Personnel were unaware of the deficiency when the header was isolated and consequently did not establish a continuous fire watch.

This constitutes a violation to Technical Specifications and for this reason is reportable pursuant with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1)(B). The plant was in Refueling Shutdown.

A new Radioactive Waste Processing Building is under construction on the west side of the Auxiliary Building. The fire protection system in the Auxiliary Building has two supply headers. The west header is routed through the

-construction area. The installation of an extension to the fire protection system in the new-building requires that the west supply header be removed from service. An engineering analysis of fire water suppression systems affected by the isolation of the west header for flow and pressure was completed prior to construction to assess the impact on the system performance. The compressor bays were determined to have inadequate pressure and flow should the west supply header be isolated. However, the operations staff and the construction project engineer were not specifically informed of the design limitation. A Fire Protection System modification (MR-FC-87-54) was initiated to correct the deficiencies, but had not yet been completed.

On December 14, 1988, the construction project engineer requested oparations to l isolate the west header to prevent a possible rupture of the pressurized supply line while driving the piles for the new building. The action was performed as an additional precaution utilizing Standing Order 0-20, " Equipment Tagging Procedure," since no construction procedure was required for the pile driving work. The construction project engineer responsible for building construction was unaware that the isolation of the header would cause the deficiency to the i fire protection system. Operations, also having no knowledge of the design '

limitation, isolated the header. The supply header remained isolated for approximately one day until the error was recognized by the fire protection I i design engineer at approximately 1300, on December 15, 1988. Upon discovery, the ,

pile driving was terminated and the supply header was returned to service. l l

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o11 013 oF o l4 The threat to nuclear safety was minimal because the plant was in Refueling Shutdown, an existing hourly fire watch patrol was in effect at that time for the affected area, and the fire detectors in that room were operable. Although the residual pressure on the sprinkler nozzles was insufficient to meet the design l requirements of the fire codes, system flow was still available for fire -

suppression.

The incident arose out of a lack of procedural guidance in the communication of design basis concerns between Design Engineering and Plant Staff and inadequate-procedural control of fire protection system impairments. It was known by personnel in the design engineering group that removing the west fire header from service prior to Modification MR-FC-87-54 being completed would result in deficient flow to the sprinkler system in the compressor bay. However, this information was not adequately communicated to the construction project engineer and licensed operators. Additionally, the impairment of the fire protection system was not reviewed by the Fire Protection System Engineer to assess if adequate compensatory measures were being taken.

Corrective actions include:

1) The plant operations staff was briefed on the low flow pressure condition in the compressor bay when supplied by a single header and on modification MR-FC-87-54 which corrected supply loop deficiencies. This was done during the Cycle 12 modification training for operations personnel.

2) A; caution tag was placed on the supply header isolation valves to prevent inadvertent isclation until modification MR-FC-87-54 was completed. After completion, these valves were danger tagged closed to allow construction of the Radioactive Waste Processing Building under MR-FC-80-104,

3) MR-FC-87-54 was completed and accepted. l

4) Production Engineering Division Quality Procedures QP-19, " Evaluation of Potentially Reportable Conditions" and QP-29, " Evaluating, Reconstituting, and Closing Design Basis Document Open Items", have been issued. These procedures contain specific instructions on reporting design deficiencies to the plant staff and to the NRC. This deficiency, while resolved, is l- currently identified as a category 2 open item (#35) in the fire protection L system Design Basis Document (#115).

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5) Standing Order G-58, " Tracking of Fire System Impairments," will be revised to include evaluation of fire system impairments by the Fire Protection L System Engineer to ensure adequate compensatory measures are taken. This revision will be fully implemented by February 16, 1990.

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6) Standing Order 0-20, " Equipment Tagging Procedure," will be revised to ensure potential impairments to the fire protection system are reviewed per the requirements outlined in the revision to Standing Order G-58 described above. This revision will be fully implemented by February 16, 1990.

7) Production Engineering Division General Engineering Instructions GEI-3,

" Preparation of Design Packages" and GEI-28, " Preparation of Installation and Test Procedures" have been issued. These instructions provide guidance for resolving systems interactions concerns during the design and construction of modifications.- This will prevent future recurrence of

! these types of events.

No other similar events have been previously reported by Fort Calhoun Station. I i

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