ML19344E461

Final Deficiency Rept Re post-LOCA Hydrogen Analyzers. During Functional Testing,Pump Failed Due to Panel Outlet Valves Being Closed When Pump Started.Relief Bypass Valve Installed Across Pump to Stabilize Temp.Analyzer Mods Made

ML19344E461
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	08/26/1980
From:	Davidson D CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO.
To:
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8009020067
Download: ML19344E461 (4)

Text

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i Cbf,iFF.i.7 ILLUMINATING 8 LOG. s PUBUC SQUARE e CLEVELAND oHlo 44101 m TELEPHONE (216) 6231350 e MAIL ADDRESS: P. O. BOX 5000 Serving The Best Location in the Nation Dalwyn R. Davidson v'CE PAESIDENT SYSTE M ENGINEERING ANO CoNSTRUClioN Augus t 26, 1980 Mr. James G. Keppler Director Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 Re: Perry Nuclear Power Plant Final Report on

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Post-LOCA H 2 Analyzers This letter is the final report on the deficiency concerning Post-LOCA H 2

Analyzers required by 10CFR50.55(e). This problem was first identified to Mr. Jack Hughes of the NRC Region III, Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement on April 22, 1980, by Mr. M. R. Edelman of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company. Additionally, an interim report dated May 22, 1980, was sent to you documenting the problem and the course of action to be taken.

Description of Deficiency The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company aw n ded a contract to Comsip Incorporated for the design, f abrication, assembly, testing, inspection and delivery of the hydrogen analyzer systems for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant-Units 1 and 2. During a functional testing of one of the units, a pump failed because one of the panel outlet valves was closed when the pump was started.

This design did not consider that excessive outlet pressure of the sample pump could cause mechanical separation of the connecting rud and crank shaft, which in turn, could rupture the pump diaphragm.

Analysis of Safety Implication 1

In our interim report, dated May 22, 1980, we identified two (2) potential l

safety hazards:

l

l. Up te one (1) liter of containment gas could be released into the outside atmosphere, should the failure as defined above occur; and/or

2. If the input / outlet valve is closed while the pump is in operation or if the containment isolation valve inside the containment is closed, there is a risk in damaging the system, thereby rendering the sys tem l inoperable.

l foI9 THis DOCUMENT CONTAINS giO POOR QUAUTY PAGES {,

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Mr. Kepplcr Augus t 26, 1980 Based on further analysis, we now feel that Item 2. is not a potential safety hazard.

In the unlikely event that the redundant hydrogen analyzer woild be rendered inoperable, the other components of the Combustible Gas Control System, Hydrogen Recombiners and Back-Up Purge Systems can be started. This will allow suf-ficient time for repairs or to manually analyze for hydrogen.

Corrective Action In order to rectify this potential safety hazard, a relief bypass valve was installed across the pume to protect the pump against the possible closing of the isolation valves and over pressurizing the pump outlet. When activated at approximately 100 psig, this valve routes the pressure back to the pump inlet, maintaining a closed sys tem. The relief action of this valve will reduce the flow through the analyzers and activate the low flow alarm. Engineering's review and acceptance of this design is documented in the attached letter. In addition to the design review, we requested Comsip to do an operational test of this new design. This test was witnessed by The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company personnel. This basic operational test consisted of a blocked pump output with a pressure gauge and a temperature gauge secured to the output head on the pump. The relief valve allowed a maximum pump pressure of 108 psig. Af ter 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, the temperature stabilized at 110*F.

Wh Lle the tests proved that the new design would be adequate to prevent the release of contaminated gas to the atmosphere, an additional problem was ,

encountered when the shaft on the motor driving the pump broke in two (2) pieces during the test. While this motor failure would not cause any con-taminated gas leakara, this problem is presently being evaluated.

Summary nued on the Engineering analysis perfonned by Comsip and Gilbert Associate Engineers and by the success f the operational test performed on the new design, it is our position that the modifications made to the Post-LOCA H 9 Analyzers will rectify the deficiency defined earlier in this report.

Very truly yours, n (

/ t, 4t y i l .: ~~ G t l

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Dalw R. Davidson Vice President System Engineering and Construction l

l DRD:pb T13/A/2 cc: Mr. Victer Stello, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc==ission Washingten, D.C. 20555

P.'E. Kelly - CEI/QAn -

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- P. O. Box 97 \.J V Parry, Ohio Gilbert / Commonwealth engineers and consstants

[Q- GILEERT ASSOCIATES, INC., P. O. Bcx 1498. Peading. PA 1SS03/Tel 215 775-2600/Ccble Gdasoc/Teler 936-431

- August 12, 1980 PY-GAI/CEI-lll'11 INFORMATION

, The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Nucle?r Engineering Department Post Office Box 97 Perry, Ohio 44081 Attention: Mr. E. A. Adams Re: Perry Nuclear Power P1' ant, Units 1 & 2 SP-611, SR Hydrogen Analyzers Comsip-Delphi, Incorporated Acceptance Testing, PY-GAI/CEl-11106 Gen tlemen :

In reference to subject letter, please add the following to the end of

, the second paragraph:

Engineering review of the des'ign ' change and results of the test demonstrated that the check / relief valve fix adequately overcame the April 2 failure above. -

Very truly yours,

~ #

. RECEIVED RECEfVED A. Bruno I&C Engineer 601 1980 AUG 141980 U. 4 r-t ~ w , ..

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Quuu[E/Eo;ract 'Y S. M. Gresdo Project ISC Engineer

.. u-i P. B. Gudikunst Project Manager Name: _

AB/SMG/PBG/dob File Code: S 2- 6N Toss cc: S0/DC - Attn. SP-611 (2)

CEI/NED - Att. SP-611 (2) g H,'/

P. B. Gudikunst (2) Reviewed: r i/ A A _ u - .>$

P. E. Kelly - CEI/QA '

J., Furness , QUAllTY ASSURAbCE DEPARTMENT C. M. Reynolds szs tweee. n. ara ans.n on unrz.,un cmn mc um en::s ns:sx M IMt W,***7.** Aet [s-l!3a. Mi st? 75P MV $3 ree St+ . ';e Vt NY .92 tr 94

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Tcss Gilbert / Commonwealth engineers and consultants gg{g.g,g Glilithi ASSGCAlfS. INC., P. O. Gon W.S. Redng. PA tsCO3/M 2;5 //5-2000/CatJe Ghwc/kle 63ggILITY ASS 8ECE1VED DEPARTMENT August 8, 1980 1 3 1930 c.* PY-GAI/CEI-11106 cocyuCNT CQHTROL INFORMATION no Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co:apany RECEIVED Nuclear Engineering Department Post Office Box 97 AUG 181980 Perry, Ohio 44081 ,,,,,,,o,,c, QueUff teciettaang Attention: Mr. E. A. Adams Re: Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2 SP-611, Safety-Related Hydrogen Analyzers Comsip-Delphi, Incorporated Acceptance Testing Centlemen: .

On April 2,1980, during the acceptance test, the sainpling pump in the subji et system failed when the outlet was closed and the pump became over-pressurin d.

Wis failure was reported to CEI and the USNRC under 10CFR21.

In order to correct chis malfunction a clwek/ relief valve was added to bypass the pump when the pressure rose to about 100 psi. A test was set up to witness this fix on July 29, 1980. The pump operated smoothly at a maximum pressure of 100 + 5 psi and its ;;emperature stabilized at about 105 F after about three hours of operation.

The test was allowed to run for about another hour, when the Reliance lE pump motor had a shaf t failure at the point where it necked down to fit the pump coupling. Reliance Motor Division has been crintacted by Comsip and the pump motors will be replaced with units built with higher strength shaf ts.

When the analyzers are reassembled with the new motors, it is suggested that the acceptance test be repeated for ecch unit.

A3/SMG/PSG/ deb Very truly yours, cc: S0/DC, Att: SP-611 (2)

CEI/NED, Attn: SP-611 (2)

M A. Bruno

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P. B. Gudikunst (2) I6C Engineer P. E. Kelly - CEI/QA y J. Futne ss ' Ivt.

C. M. Reynolds S. M. Cresdo Project I6C Engineer Q3dAJ

. B. Gudikunst Project Manager m t.uw A.y.  :.,m rtvr..%.am.cm % m..:,; pan 7:3ac M f eu w wf.an A.ew Jeasa u 10 T& ink K F.ra 5;nr. % in, NY M Cha