ML17309A452

Annual Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments Conducted W/O Prior Commission Approval, Covering Aug 1989 to Jul 1990. W/901217 Ltr

ML17309A452
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	07/31/1990
From:	Mecredy R ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9101020002
Download: ML17309A452 (902)

Text

>ACQELERATED DIS. RIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9101020002 DOC.DATE: 90/07/31 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MECREDY,R.C. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION R

SUBJECT:

"Annual Rept of Facility Changes, Tests & Experiments I Conducted W/0 Prior Commission Approval," covering Aug 1989 to Jul 1990." W/901217 ltr. D DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE47D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.59 AnnUal Report of Changes, Tests or xperiments Made W/out Approv NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). 05000244

~A RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL D PD1-3 LA 1 0 PD1-3 PD 5 5 JOHNSON,A 1 0 D INTERNAL: AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DS P/TPAB 1 1 LHFBll 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB11 1 1 REG FILE 02 1 1 RGN1 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC 1 1 D

D D

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 15 ENCL 13

a -~ .

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ~ 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER N. Y. 14649-0001 ROBERT C MECREDY TELEPHONE Vice President AREA CODE Tie 646'2700 Ginna Nuclear Production December 17, 1990 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Annual Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Conducted Without Prior Commission Approval R.E. Gi.nna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244 Gentlemen:

The subject report i.s hereby submitted as required by 10 CFR 50.59(b). Enclosed are the original and one copy of the report containing descriptions and summaries of the safety evaluations conducted in support of changes to the facility and procedures described i.n the UFSAR and speci.al tests, from August 1989 through July 1990.

Very truly yours, Robert C. Mecredy Vice President, Ginna Nuclear Production RES/jdw Enc.

xc: USNRC Region I Office USNRC Resident Xnspector 9101020002 900731 PDR ADOCK 05000244 R PDR 1

1990 REPORT OF FAC ILITY CHANGES g TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS CONDUCTED WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL FOR AUGUST 1989 THROUGH JULY 1990 SECTION A COMPLETED ENGINEERING WORK REQUESTS (EWR) AND TECHNICAL STAFF REQUESTS (TSR)

SECTION B COMPLETED STATION MODIFICATIONS (SM)

SECTION C TECHNICAL STAFF ENGINEERING EVALUA-TIONS (TSEE)

SECTION D TEMPORARY BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION, STRUCTURE FEATURES'HIELDING'ND FLUID SYSTEM FEATURES SECTION E PROCEDURE CHANGES SECTION F COMPLETED SPECIAL TESTS (ST) AND EXPERIMENTS R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. '50-244 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION DATED DECEMBER , 1990 CLOS LOZOOOp

/

SECTION A - COMPLETED ENGINEERING WORK REQUESTS (EWRs)

AND TECHNICAL STAFF REQUESTS (TSRs)

This section contains a description of modifications in the facility as described in the safety analysis report, and a summary of the safety evaluation for those changes, pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(b).

The basis for inclusion of 'an EWR or TSR in this section is closure of the completed modification package in the Document Control Department.

EWR-1483 STEAM GENERATOR SNUBBER REPLACEMENT THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE REPLACEMENT OF SZX OF THE EIGHT HYDRAULIC SNUBBER PER STEAM GENERATOR.

REVISION 1 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCORPORATES CHANGES FROM REVISION 0 TO CORRECT THE FOLLOWING:

1) TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS

2) ADD ADDITIONAL REFERENCE - ANSI B31 1 ~

3) PIPING ANALYSIS AND PRIMARY EQUIPMENT SUPPORTS WILL BE EVALUATED PER TABLES 1,2 & 3 (ATTACHMENTS TO D.C.) AND NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH EWR-2512.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG.

GUIDE 1.70 EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1~ POSTULATED PIPING FAILURE IN FLUID SYSTEMS INSIDE CONTAINMENT.

2 ~ DECREASE IN HEAT REMOVAL BY SECONDARY SYSTEM.

3 ~ DECREASE ZN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM FLOW RATE.

4 ~ DECREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY.

5 ~ INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS SUCH AS MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES'LOODS'TORMS'R EARTHQUAKES'HE INSTALLATION OF MECHANICAL BUMPERS WILL NOT CHANGE THE EFFECT OF A SEISMIC EVENT ON THE FUNCTION AND DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OF EXISTING STEAM GENERATOR RING GIRDER, REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS'AIN STEAM LINES'EEDWATER AND SECONDARY SHIELD WALL.

'ZHZS MODIFICATION NEITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES, NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR THE FOLLOWING EVENTS:

1~ LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLOW 2 ~ FEEDWATER SYSTEM PIPE BREAKS 3 ~ RCS FLOW COASTDOWN ACCIDENTS 4 ~ STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE

5. PRIMARY SYSTEM PIPE RUPTURE 6 ~ MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES 7 ~ FLOODS/ STORMS'ND EARTHQUAKES THIS MODIFICATION NEITHER EFFECTS NOR ZS EFFECTED BY ANY FLOOD OR STORM PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED.

THE MATERIALS UTILIZED IN THIS MODIFICATION WILL MEET APPENDIX iiRit REQUIREMENTS BASED UPON 10CFR50 APPENDIX R AND ENGINEERING PROCEDURE AND WILL NOT INCREASE AT THE PROBABILITY OF MAJOR OR MINOR FIRE.

MODIFICATION OF ADDITION OF SUPPORTS WILL NOT DEGRADE PERFORMANCE OR FUNCTION OF ANY PLANT EQUIPMENT OR SYSTEM.

BASED UPON THE ABOVE ANALYSIS:

1) STRUCTURES i SYSTEMS g AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE ADEQUATE.

2) MARGIN OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATING AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GINNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATZONSi ZT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT'ONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURESi SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-1832A CIRCUIT SEPARATIONS ANALYSIS ELECTRICAL MODIFICATIONS THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL IMPROVE THE ELECTRICAL SEPARATION BETWEEN REDUNDANT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT.

REVISION 1 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WAS PRESENTED AND APPROVED BY PORC ON 2/27/85 ITEM NUMBER 6.1.0-85-021-001.

THE CHANGES TO THE DESIGN CRITERIA FOR REVISION 2 ARE DESCRIBED BELOW:

SECTION DESCRIPTION ADDED TO SPECIAL NOTE). iiDC FUSE COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS ARE DELETED FROM REVISION 2 OF THIS DESIGN CRITERIA. DC FUSE COORDINATION ZS ZN THE SCOPE OF EWR 3341."

1~ 1.3 DELETED FUSE COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.

SECTION DESCRIPTION 2 ' ' DELETED ANALYSIS 51 (FUSE COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS).

2. 1.4 DELETED ANALYSIS: 113 (FUSE COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS) .

16. 1~2 DELETED FUSE TYPE REQUIREMENT. THIS IS ZN THE SCOPE. OF EWR 3341.

16.2.1 DELETED FUSE COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.

SECTION DESCRIPTION 16.2.2 DELETED FUSE COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY THE USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES AND SEISMIC EVENTS.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE UNCHANGED'HE ADEQUACIES OF STRUCTURESJ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED 'FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE UNCHANGED.

EWR-1832B FIRE SIGNALING SYSTEM THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL UPGRADE THE FIRE SIGNALING SYSTEM.

REVISION 6 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WERE PRESENTED AND APPROVED BY PORC ON 12-12-84 ITEM NUMBER 6.1.0-84-144-003.

THE CHANGES TO THE DESIGN CRITERIA FOR REVISION 7 ARE DESCRIBED BELOW:

SECTION DESCRIPTION 11.4 ADD >>INSTALLING UL APPROVED RELEASE MODULES FOR THE HALON SYSTEMS IN THE RELAY AND COMPUTER (MUX) ROOMS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED UNDER EWR 4064 22 ' ' CHANGE >>ENGINEER>> TO >>ENGINEERING 23 ' ADD: >>A NUMBER OF ELECTRICAL MODULES WILL BE CHANGED OUT UNDER EWR 4064 TO FACILITATE MAINTENANCE. THIS IS NECESSITATED BY THE FACT THAT CERTAIN ELECTRICAL MODULES WERE FURTHER DEVELOPED BY GAMEWELL AFTER THE INSTALLATION OF THE INITIAL-DESIGN MODULES.

MODULES OF CURRENT-DESIGN WERE USED WHEN NEEDED FOR MAINTENANCE REPLACEMENT RESULTING IN A MIXTURE OF OLD AND NEW MODULE DESIGNS.

THIS ZN TURN CREATED A MAINTENANCE PROBLEM, SINCE THE LATEST WIRING DIAGRAM ZS NOT APPLICABLE TO OLDER MODULES" ~

26.2 '3 CHANGE >>ALOW>> TO <<ALLOW

'1 A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF THE EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE THE FIRES ANALYZED IN G.A.Z. REPORT 41936 AND THE SEISMIC EVENT.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE UNCHANGED'HE ADEQUACIES'F STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE UNCHANGED.

EWR-2606 POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THIS DESIGN MODIFICATION.

AS A RESULT OF THE INABILITYAT THREE MILE ISLAND TO RAPIDLY OBTAIN REACTOR COOLANT SAMPLES TO ASCERTAIN THE EXTENT OF CORE DAMAGE, THE NRC IS REQUIRING THAT ALL LICENSEES EVALUATE ANDi IF REQUIREDi UPGRADE THEIR PLANTS TO ENABLE ACQUISITION OF APPROPRIATE EXPEDITIOUS SAMPLES AFTER AN ACCIDENT. ABILITY TO ASSESS THE CONDITIONS OF THE CORE EARLY IN AN ACCIDENT CAN RESULT IN TAKING REMEDIAL ACTIONS WHICH COULD LIMIT OR EVEN PRECLUDE CORE DAMAGE THE SAMPLING SYSTEM AT GINNA HAS BEEN EVALUATED TO BE MARGINALLY ADEQUATE FOR POST-ACCIDENT CONDITIONS AND CONSEQUENTLY REMEDIAL MODIFICATIONS ARE PLANNED.

SAMPLERS A NEW POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM (PASS) WILL BE INSTALLED WHICH WILL ENABLE THE STATION TO OBTAIN AND ANALYZE REACTOR COOLANT,, CONTAINMENT AIR, AND CONTAINMENT SUMP SAMPLES WITHIN 3 HOURS OF THE DECISION TO THE PASS WILL ALSO ENABLE SAMPLING OF THESE STREAMS DURING NORMAL OPERATION.

IN-L1NE CHEMICAL ZNSTRUMENTATZON WILL BE PROVIDED IN A NEW LIQUID AND GAS SAMPLE PANEL (LGSP) WHICH WILL REMOTELY DETERMINE IMPORTANT CHEMICAL PARAMETERS OF REACTOR COOLANT, CONTAINMENT AIR, AND CONTAINMENT SUMP.

THE LGSP WILL ENABLE ACQUISITION OF DILUTED AND UNDILUTED GRAB SAMPLES OF BOTH REACTOR COOLANT AND CONTAINMENT AZR FOR ZOPZC ANALYSIS IN THE EXISTING,COUNTING LAB.

THE LGSP WILL BE CONTROLLED FROM A NEW ELECTRIC CONTROL PANEL (ECP) AND INSTRUMENT PANEL (IP) TO BE LOCATED IN THE HOT SHOP. REMOTELY OPERATED VALVES AND INSTRUMENTS EXTERNAL TO THE LGSP WILL ALSO BE CONTROLLED FROM THE ECP. THE LGSP WILL BE LOCATED ON THE 253'>> ELEVATION OF THE CONTROLLED PORTION OF THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING.

FL THE PASS IS DESIGNED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF NUREG 0578 AND NUREG 0737 (SECTION ZI.B.3). FURTHERMORE, THE PASS INSTALLATION AT GZNNA IS TO HAVE ADEQUATE PROVISIONS TO ALLOW COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONTAINMENT SUMP SAMPLING'H AND OXYGEN ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS NOW INVOKED BY REGULATORY GUIDE 1 '7 (REV. 2) DATED DECEMBER 1980 LINES ASSOCIATED WITH THE PASS WILL BE INSTALLED ZN

'AMPLE SUCH A MANNER THAT THE POST ACCIDENT DOSE CRITERIA WILL BE MET FOR SAMPLING AND ACCESS TO VITAL AREAS.

THE NECESSARY MODIFICATIONS ARE SHOWN SCHEMATICALLY ON THE ATTACHED FIGURE 1. THE GENERAL AEGVQTGEMENT OF EQUIPMENT IS SHOWN ON FIGURE 2.

STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SAMPLE LINES FROM CONTAINMENT PENETRATZONS 206 AND 207 TO THE EXISTING SAMPLE ROOM ARE TO BE REROUTED (FOR ALARA CONSIDERATIONS) USING THE SAME DESIGN CRITERIA DISCUSSED HEREIN. THESE TWO LINES ARE BEING REROUTED TO REDUCE OPERATOR EXPOSURE FOR ROUTINE SAMPLING AND ARE NOT REQUIRED AS A PART OF NUREG-0737 OR REG. GUIDE 1.97 (REV. 2).

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY NRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70 AND THE GINNA STATION FSAR.

THE EVENTS RELATING TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE:

(1) EARTHQUAKE AND (2) RADIOACTIVE RELEASE FROM A SUBSYSTEM OR COMPONENT I

ALL EQUI PMENT AND PIP NG SUPPORTS IN THE CONTAINMENT g AUXILIARY AND INTERMEDIATE BUILDINGS ARE SEISMIC CATEGORY Z. THEIR DESIGN WILL ASSURE OTHER EQUIPMENT WILL NOT BE STRUCTURALLY DAMAGED AS A RESULT OF FAILURE DURING AN EARTHQUAKE. THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN EARTHQUAKE ARE NOT CHANGED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICA'TION.

FAILURE OF ANY PASS COMPONENT AFTER AN ACCIDENT SHALL NOT RESULT IN 10CFR PART 100 DOSES TO BE EXCEEDED AND ON THIS BASIS THE SYSTEM ZS CLASSIFIED AS NON-SAFETY RELATED. THIS HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY ANALYSIS.

IN THE EVENT OF A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT THE NEW PASS WILL PROVIDE A MEANS TO OBTAIN AND ANALYZE REACTOR COOLANT, CONTAINMENT AIR, AND CONTAINMENT SUMP SAMPLES. THE PASS WILL HAVE PROVISIONS TO BE PRESSURIZED WITH NITROGEN OR AIR PRIOR TO POST ACCIDENT OPERATION TO ASSURE LEAKTIGHTNESS.

THE MAJOR SYSTEM VALVES AND INSTRUMENTS ARE CONTAINED ZN AN ENCLOSED, SEALED PANEL WHICH IS CONNECTED TO A CHARCOAL FILTERED STATION HVAC SYSTEM. THUS COMPONENT LEAKAGE WILL BE PREVENTED FROM UNCONTROLLED AREAS.

THEREFOREi THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED'HE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

~EWR-279 REACTOR LEVEL MONITORING SYSTEM THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL PROVIDE A REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL MONITORING SYSTEM.

THE SYSTEM WILL CONSIST OF TWO REDUNDANT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TRENDING CHANNELS. EACH CHANNEL WILL DRIVE A SEPARATE INDICATOR IN THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM SHOWING REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL TO THE PLANT OPERATORS UNDER ALL PLANT CONDITIONS.

REVISION 2 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND REVISION 1 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS WERE PRESENTED AND APPROVED BY PORC ON MARCH 20, 1985, PORC NUMBER 6.1.0-85-037-002.

UNDER REVISION 3 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND REVISION 2 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ARE AFFECTED:

DESIGN CRXTERIA STEP 4.1 REVISED FROM:

THE ATTACHMENT TO THE EXISTING HEAD VENT SYSTEM INCLUDING THE RESTRICTING DEVICE SHALL BE QUALITY GROUP A. REMAINING FLUID SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS SHALL BE QUALITY GROUP B.

TO READ THE ATTACHMENTS TO THE GUIDE TUBE AND THE HEAD VENT SYSTEMi INCLUDING THE RESTRICTING DEVICE, SHALL BE QUALITY GROUP A.

REMAINING FLUID SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS SHALL BE QUALITY GROUP B.

STEP 5.1 REVISED FROM:

THE ATTACHMENT TO THE EXISTING HEAD VENT SYSTEM SHALL CONSIST OF A RESTRICTING DEVICE AND SHALL BE ASME CODE CLASS l.

CONSISTENT WITH REFERENCE 6.2.2.7 THE COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE RESTRICTING DEVICE SHALL BE ASME CODE CLASS 2. THE COUPLING THAT ATTACHES TO THE REACTOR INSTRUMENTATION GUIDE TUBE SHALL BE ASME CODE CLASS 2 ~

TO READ:

THE ATTACHMENTS TO THE EXISTING HEAD VENT SYSTEM AND GUIDE TUBE SHALL CONSIST OF A RESTRICTING DEVICE AND SHALL BE ASME CODE CLASS 1. CONSISTENT WITH REFERENCES 6.2.2.7 THE COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE RESTRXCTING DEVICE SHALL BE A'SME CODE CLASS 2.

STEP 7. 1 REVISED FROM:

THE SYSTEM MECHANICAL DESIGN CONDITIONS WILL BE OVER A RANGE OF 0 TO 3000 PSI, AND 50 TO 697 F. THE SYSTEM SHALL A/SO PROVIDE INVENTORY ZNDZCATXONS FOR TEMPERATURE OQER 697 F, ASSUMING SATURATED FLUID CONDITIONS'P TO 2200 Fg ZN THE CORE.

TO READ:

TH) SYSTEM MECHANICAL DESIGN CONDITIONS ARE 0 TO 2500 PSIG AND 50 TO 680 F. THE MOST SEVERE ACCIDENT CONDITION ZS 3015 PSZG AT 697 F. THE SYSTEM SHALL A/SO PROVIDE INVENTORY INDICATIONS FOR TEMPERATURE OVEQ 69 7 F g AS SUMING I SATURATED FLU D CONDITIONS g UP TO 22 00 F g IN THE CORE ~

STEP 7 ~ 6 HAS BEEN ADDED THE ADDITION OF THE ATTACHMENT TO THE GUIDE TUBE SHALL NOT CAUSE THE GUIDE TUBE TO EXCEED WESTINGHOUSE ALLOWABLE LOADS FOR THE ATTACHMENT TO THE REACTOR VESSEL OR SEAL TABLE.

STEP 8.1 REVISED FROM:

THE INSTRUMENT TUBING SHALL BE SUPPORTED SUCH THAT IT REMAINS FUNCTIONAL FOLLOWING AN SSE EVENT AS WELL AS DURING NORMAL OPERATION.

TO READ:

THE INSTRUMENT TUBING SHALL BE SUPPORTED SUCH THAT IT REMAINS FUNCTIONAL FOLLOWING AN SSE EVENT AS WELL AS DURING NORMAL OPERATION AND ALL POSTULATED ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.

STEP 8.3 REVISED FROM:

THE MOST SEVERE OPERATING CONDITIONS CONSXDERED FOR THE CONNECTION TO THE HEAD VENT SYSTEM IS THE CONTROL ROD EJECTION AND THE CORRESPONDING PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE IS 3015 PSIG AND 697 F.

TO READ:

THE MOST SEVERE ACCIDENT CONDITION CONSIDERED FOR THE CONNECTIONS TO THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM XS THE CONTROL ROD EJECTION. THE CORRESPONDING PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE ARE 3015 PSIG AND 697 F.

STEP 10.1 REVISED FROM:

3.) PRIMARY REACTOR COOLANT LOOP, INCLUDING THE REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENT SYSTEM.

TO READ:

3.) PRIMARY REACTOR COOLANT LOOP, INCLUDING THE REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENT SYSTEM AND THE REACTOR VESSEL BOTTOM MOUNTED INSTRUMENTATION.

STEP 31.0 REVISED FROM:

nNOT APPLICABLE TO READ:

CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURES FOR ATTACHMENT TO THIS GUIDE TUBE WILL BE DEVELOPED THAT ENSURE THAT NO FOREIGN MATERIAL ENTER THE GUIDE TUBE.

ATTACHED FIGURE 1 TO THE DESIGN CRITERIA HAS BEEN REVISED STATING THAT INPUTS TO THE FOXBORO RACK ARE 3 INSTEAD OF 4 LINE THERMOCOUPLES.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION . ARE: 1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES, 2) SEISMIC EVENTS AND 3) THE SPECTRUM OF LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENTS INSIDE OF CONTAINMENT.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4 '

OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS THEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. ZT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-2846B BLOCK WALL MODIFICATION RESTRAINTS E UIPMENT PROTECTION INTERMEDIATE BUILDING THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATIONS TO PROVIDE PROTECTION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER CHECK VALVES, A AND B MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE (MSZV)

OPERATORS AND A AND B MSZV SOLENOID VALVES.

\

THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION ZS TO PROVIDE 1) UPGRADED PROTECTION FOR THE A AND B MSIV OPERATORS AND AIR SOLENOID VALVES SUCH THAT MSIV CLOSURE IS ENSURED FOR SCENARIOS INVOLVING SSE (SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE), TORNADO MISSILES/WIND LOADS AND HELB (H1GH ENERGY LINE BREAKS)

OUTSIDE CONTAINMENTi 2 ) PROTECTION FOR THE iiAii AND ii B AUXILIARY FEEDWATER CHECK VALVES FOR SCENARIOS INVOLVING TORNADO WIND LOADS AND SSE SEISMIC EVENTS.

REVISION 1 TO THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WILL ALLOW REMOVAL OF VENT VALVE 3516A. THIS VALVE, AND ASSOCIATED PIPING'ILL BE REMOVED FROM THE "B" MSIV AND NOT REPLACED.

THE SCOPE OF THE PIPING MODIFICATION WILL BE TO PLACE A PLUG IN THE EXISTING COVER FOR THE "B" MSIV.

PRE-PORC COMMENTS ARE ADDRESSED ZN INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE 13N1-RR-L2275 AND WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO THE NEXT REVISION.

THESE CHANGES INCLUDE TYPOGRAPHICAL CORRECTIONS TO THE DESIGN CRITERIA, PARAGRAPHS 1.2 AND 23.0. TO FURTHER CLARIFY THE TEST REQUIREMENTSi A SENTENCE WILL BE ADDED TO THE DESIGN CRITERIA PARAGRAPH 23.0 STATING "IN LIEU OF A HYDROSTATIC TEST, A LEAK CHECK MAY BE PERFORMED AT NORMAL OPERATING CONDZTZONSit ~

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GZNNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE EARTHQUAKESi PIPE BREAKS OUTSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDINGi TORNADOES'IRES'ND TORNADO MISSILES'LL PROPOSED PROTECTIVE DEVICES ARE TO BE MOUNTED AS SEISMIC CATEGORY .I IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STRUCTURAL RE-ANALYSIS PROGRAM (SRP). REMOVABLE PANELS WILL BE UTILIZED TO PROVIDE MAINTENANCE/TESTING ACCESS AS REQUIRED.

PLACEMENT OF PASSIVE PROTECTIVE DEVICES AROUND THE MSIV OPERATORS/SOLENOID VALVES AND "B" AFW CHECK VALVES ENSURES FUNCTIONAL OPERATION DURING AND FOLLOWING HELB SCENARIOS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT.

FIRE SYSTEMS AND FIRE BARRIERS DISCUSSED IN THE UFSAR ARE COVERED UNDER PLANT ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS, ENSURING THAT DEGRADATION OF PROTECTION/DETECTION FEATURES NECESSARY TO COMPLY WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX R WILL NOT OCCUR.

TORNADO LOADS i SUCH AS DIRECT WIND i DIFFERENTZAL PRES SURE i AND TORNADO MISSILES HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED IN THE UFSAR UNDER 'SEP RE-EVALUATION DESIGN AND ANALYSIS.

I I THUS i TH S MODIF CATION NEITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES i NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR:

1) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING AND FOLLOWING SSE AND TORNADO EVENTS.

2) OPERATION DURING A HELB SCENARIO OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT.

3) FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE STRUCTURAL RE-ANALYSIS PLAN (SRP), IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCXDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-3072 RCP 1 SEAL LEAKOFF THIS EWR (ENGXNEERZNG WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL INSTALL CHECK VALVES ON THE NUMBER ONE SEAL LEAKOFF LINES FROM THE REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS (RCP) A AND B. THE NEW CHECK VALVES WILL BE ASME N-STAMPED SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED.

THE NEW CHECK VALVES WILL BE LOCATED IN CONTAINMENT INSIDE THE RCP SHIELD WALLS. THE MODIFIED PIPE SYSTEM, INCLUDING SUPPORTS, WILL BE SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED. THIS MODIFICATION IS SCHEDULED FOR INSTALLATION DURING THE 1987 REFUELING OUTAGE.

REVISION 0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WAS PRESENTED AND APPROVED BY PORC ON JUNE 16, 1986 PORC NUMBER 6.1.0-86-081-001.

THE PURPOSE OF REVISION 1 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS XS TO INCLUDE REFERENCE TO THE ASME ZZI CLASS 2 STANDARDS' REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GZNNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODZFXCA-TION ARE 1) PRIMARY SYSTEM PIPE RUPTUREg 2) INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS'IRES'LOOD~ STORM OR EARTHQUAKE~ AND 3)

LOSS OF A REACTOR COOLANT .PUMP.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS THEREFORE~ BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

10

EWR-3092 BORIC ACID PIPING THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE UPGRADE OF BORIC ACID PIPING FROM SCHEDULE 10 TO SCHEDULE 40 PIPE.

INCLUDED IN THIS MODIFICATION IS THE RE-ROUTING OF THE PIPE TO AVOID HIGH RADIATION AREAS'NSTALLATION OF A NEW HEAT TRACING SYSTEM, UPGRADING OF PIPE SUPPORTS AND ADDITION OF A ONE INCH (ln) ISOLATION VALVE ZN THE MOV 825A/B BYPASS LINE A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GZNNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. REVISION 0 IDENTIFIED THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION AS FIRE~ SEISMIC'OSS OF OFFSZTE POWERS CVCS CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS'TEAM LINE BREAK AND LOCA.

ALL EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES REQUIRED TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50~ APPENDIX RJ OR TO MAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELS OF PROTECTION FROM FIRES WILL BE MAINTAINED DURING

'AND FOLLOWING THIS MODIFICATION.

SEISMIC EVENTS HAVE BEEN ANALYZED UNDER THE SEP RE-EVALUATION DESIGN ANALYSIS. PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORT ANALYSES SHALL'E PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EWR-2512 DESIGN CRITERIA USING ANSI B31.1 AND ASME SECTION ZIZ. SUBSECTION NF AS A BASIS.

STRUCTURAL WORK REQUIRED SHALL BE BASED UPON THE AISC CODE, EIGHTH EDITION.

THE DESIGN AND OPERATING CONDITIONS TO WHICH THE PIPING SYSTEMS WILL BE ANALYZED ARE DEFINED IN THE OPERATING TRANSIENTS DOCUMENT GENERATED FOR EWR 2512. SYSTEM THERMAL ANALYSES SHALL EVALUATE THE NORMAL 100% POWER CONDITION, AS WELL AS OTHER ABNORMAL OPERATING TRANSIENT CONDITIONS. THE LOADING COMBINATIONS AND STRESS LIMITS OF THE EWR 2512 DESIGN CRITERIA SHALL BE MET FOR ALL NORMAL AND ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.

ALL MODIFICATIONS OR ADDITIONS TO THE EXISTING PIPING OR PIPE SUPPORTS WILL BE REQUIRED TO INTERFACE WITH THE EXISTING PIPE, PIPE SUPPORTS, AND/OR STRUCTURES AND SHALL NOT DEGRADE THE ABILITY OF THESE ITEMS TO FUNCTION ACCORDING TO THEIR ORIGINAL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS.

THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT DEGRADE PLANT SYSTEMS ON A LOSS OF OFFSZTE POWER. THE HEAT TRACE CIRCUITS SHALL NOT DEGRADE THE PLANT NORMAL OR EMERGENCY POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.

REDUNDANT POWER TRAINS SHALL BE MAINTAINED AND STRUCTURES AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS WORK SHALL REMAIN FUNCTIONAL FOLLOWING A SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE (SSE).

THE HEAT TRACING SYSTEM SHALL BE SUPPLIED WITH POWER FROM THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS FOLLOWING A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER. THE EFFECT OF THE NEW SYSTEM ON THE DIESEL GENERATOR LOADS SHALL BE EVALUATED.

THE MODIFICATION PERFORMED SHALL NOT INHIBIT THE AFFECTED SYSTEMS FROM PERFORMING THEIR FUNCTIONS DURING ALL NORMAL AND POSTULATED ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. THE BORIC ACID SYSTEM SHALL BE OPERABLE DURING ALL NORMAL'ESIGN TRANSIENTS UPSET AND FAULTED CONDITIONS. THE BORIC ACID PIPING CHANGES SHALL NOT AFFECT, THE CONTROL OF ANY PLANT SYSTEM.

IN REVISION 1 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA THE SOLUBILITY TEMPERATURE LIMIT FOR 12-13 WEIGHT PERCENT BORIC ACID SOLUTION IS REVISED FROM 140 F TO 145 F TO COMPLY WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ESTABLISHED AT GINNA STATION.

THUS g THIS MODIFICATION NEITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES g NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR:

1) FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES

2) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING AND FOLLOWING SEISMIC AND TORNADO EVENTS.

3) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION FOLLOWING A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER, STEAM BREAK OR LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA).

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. ZT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-3199 VITAL BATTERY LOAD FLOW MONITOR THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE DESIGN MODIFICATION WHICH WILL PROVIDE A MEANS TO MONITOR CURRENT MAGNITUDES AND DIRECTION OF BOTH SAFEGUARDS D.C. BATTERY SYSTEMS AS WELL AS THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC)

BATTERY. THE SYSTEM WILL CONSIST OF THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT TO DISPLAY THE. DIRECTION AND MAGNITUDE OF CURRENT GOING INTO OR OUT OF EACH BATTERY. THE SYSTEM WILL ALSO BE CAPABLE OF ANNUNCIATING ABNORMAL BATTERY CONDITIONS AND LOSS OF CONTINUITY OF BATTERY CIRCUITS'HE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION WILL SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF SEP TOPIC VIII-3.B.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS ADDITION ARE (1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES, AND (2) SEISMIC EVENT.

IT HAS g THEREFORE J BEEN DETERMINED THAT 'THE MARG NS OF I SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT .CONDZTZONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

12

EWR-3272 SAS PPCS COMPUTER SYSTEM THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE INSTALLATION OF A SAFETY ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (SAS) AND THE REPLACEMENT OF THE P-250 PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM (PPCS). DEDICATED CRTs AND LINE PRINTERS WILL BE CONNECTED TO THE SAS AND PPCS CPUs. THE SAS SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE AN INTEGRATED DISPLAY OF CRITICAL PLANT SAFETY P2QV&IETERS AND PERFORM REFERENCE DIAGNOSTICS DURING EMERGENCIES. THE (SAS) SYSTEM WILL PROVIDE THE OPERATORS IN THE CONTROL ROOM, AND PERSONNEL IN THE TSC~ THE EOF AND THE ENGINEERING CENTER WITH 1) AN INDICATION OF THE SAFETY STATUS OF THE PLANT, 2) ACCIDENT DIAGNOSTIC DISPLAYS'ND 3) POST ACCIDENT MONITORING'HE NEW PPCS WILL INITIALLYPERFORM THE SAME FUNCTIONS THAT THE P-250 PRESENTLY PERFORMS.

REVISION 0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WAS PRESENTED AND APPROVED BY PORC ON 5/23/84'ORC NUMBER 6.1.0-84-082-002.

UNDER REVISION 1 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA, PARAGRAPH 3.2 FIRST SENTENCE STATING, "THE REMAINING EQUIPMENT" HAS BEEN CHANGED TO READ itTHE EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATEDn.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GZNNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE 1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES') SEISMIC EVENTS BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS THEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES~ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-3296A STRUCTURAL UPGRADE PROGRAM THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE GZNNA STATION STRUCTURAL UPGRADE PROGRAM WHICH IS IN RESPONSE TO THE SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM (SEP) BEGUN BY THE USNRC IN 1977. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO UPGRADE THOSE MEMBERS, CONNECTIONS AND ANCHORAGES FOUND TO BE OVERSTRESSED WHEN SUBJECTED TO THE DESIGN LOADS SET FORTH ZN THE VARIOUS SEP TOPICS.

13

REVISION 0 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA/SAFETY ANALYSIS COVERED MODIFICATIONS INCLUDED ZN THE SEP TOPICS LOCATED IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING, CONTROL BUILDING, INTERMEDIATE BUILDING, TURBINE BUILDINGS AND THE FACADE STRUCTURE REVISION 1 OF THIS DESIGN CRITERIA/SAFETY ANALYSIS:

1. ADDRESSES THE DESIGN AND INSTALLATION'F BACKDRAFT DAMPERS REQUIRED ONLY ZN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING. THESE DAMPERSg WHEN INSTALLED'ILLELIMZNATEg THE EFFECTS OF THE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES ASSOCIATED WITH THE DESIGN BASIS TORNADOS

2. INCORPORATES CHANGES IN, FORMAT AND CONTENT OF VARIOUS SUB-SECTIONS OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GZNNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG GUIDE 1.70. EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE: WIND AND= TORNADO LOADING, FIRES AND THE SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE (SEISMIC EVENTS).

THE DESIGN FOR WIND AND TORNADO LOADINGS HAVE BEEN ANALYZED UNDER THE SEP RE-EVALUATION DESIGN ANALYSIS. MODIFICATIONS TO STRUCTURAL MEMBERS AND ATTACHMENTS WILL NOT ALTER EITHER THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF EXISTING STRUCTURES OR SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT LOCATED WITHIN THESE STRUCTURES. THE INCLUSION OF BACKDRAFT DAMPERS UNDER THIS MODIFICATION INSURES THAT THE AUXILIARY BUILDING WILL NOT BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY TORNADO WINDS.

ALL EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES REQUIRED TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50g APPENDIX Rg OR TO MAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELS OF PROTECTION FROM FIRES WILL BE MAINTAINED DURING AND FOLLOWING THE STRUCTURAL UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS.

THUS, THIS MODIFICATION NEITHER INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES, NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR:

1) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING AND FOLLOWING SSE, WIND AND TORNADO EVENTS

2) FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE STRUCTURAL RE-ANAL-YSIS PLANT (SRP)g IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. ZT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVEN-TION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

14

EWR-3595 CONTROL ROOM HAB1TABILITY THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION OF THE CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY SYSTEM. IN ORDER, TO IMPROVE RELIABILITYAND MAINTAINABILITYOF THE RADIATION AND TOXIC GAS MONITORS EWR-3595 PHASE B WAS ESTABLISHED.

REVISION 5 OF THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCORPORATES THE FOLLOWING CHANGES FROM REVIEW OF DC AND SA REVISION 4 PREVIOUSLY NOT PORC APPROVED., MODIFICATIONS APPLICABLE TO EWR-3595 PHASE B ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1) REPLACE 2 EXISTING TOXIC GAS SAMPLE PUMPS WITH TWO PUMPS, EACH WITH 1004 CAPACITY. ONE PUMP WILL BE IN OPERATING MODE, THE OTHER WILL BE IN STANDBY MODE.

THREE POSITION TOXIC GAS SAMPLE PUMP SWITCH SHALL ALSO BE INSTALLED.

2) REPLACE EXISTING RADIATION MONITOR FLOW SWITCH.

3) ADDITION OF CONTROL ROOM DAMPERS MANUAL ACTUATION SWITCH AT THE HVAC PANEL.

4) ADDITION OF RADIATION f AMMONIAg AND CHLORINE LOW SAMPLE AIR FLOW SIGNALS FOR CONTROL ROOM DAMPERS ISOLATION AND INDICATION TO THE PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER.

5) REPLACE EXISTING CHLORINE FLOW METER WITH ONE THAT HAS CFM.UNIT INDICATION.

6) INSTALL CLEAR POLYCARBONATE "LEXAN" COVER FOR CHECKING PARTICULATE MONITOR PAPER ON THE RADIATION MONITOR CABINET.

7) REPLACE RADIATION MONITOR PUMP MOTOR FUSE WITH A MOTOR STARTER.

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR)

IS NOT INCREASED. THERE ZS NO REDUCTION IN SYSTEM RELIABILITY OR PERFORMANCE. THE CONTROL ROOM TOXIC GAS AND RADIATION MONITORS WILL REMAIN WITHIN REMAIN WITHIN THEIR DESIGN LIMITS AND WILL HAVE NO IMPACT ON PLANT ABILITY TO WITHSTAND FIRE.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE UFSAR ARE NOT INCREASED. THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT IMPACT OR INCREASE THE CALCULATED RADIOLOGICAL DOSE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC FOR ANY EVENT EVALUATED IN THE UFSAR. THE FUNCTION AND CAPABIL1TY OF THE TOXIC GAS AND RADIATION MONITORS REMAIN THE SAME, AND NO FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS ARE AFFECTED.

15

'I THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY. EVALUATED ZN THE UFSAR IS NOT INCREASED. THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT DEGRADE THE PERFORMANCE OF ANY SYSTEM FUNCTIONS~ AND IN FACT~ UPGRADES THE INSTRUMENTATZON AND CONTROL OF THE MONITORS.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZN THE UFSAR ARE NOT INCREASED.

THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT IMPACT OR INCREASE THE CALCULATED RADIOLOGICAL DOES TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC FOR ANY EVENT EVALUATED IN THE UFSAR. THE FUNCTION AND CAPABILITY OF THE MONITORS TO DETECT AND ALARM/ISOLATION REMAINS THE SAMEg AND NO FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS ARE AFFECTED.

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZN THE UFSAR IS NOT CREATED. NO OTHER SYSTEMS ARE AFFECTED, NOR ANY NEW FAILURE MODE INDUCED.

THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIFFERENT TYPE OF MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY THAN ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZN THE UFSAR IS NOT CREATED. THE ADDITION OF THE SWITCHES, REMOTE INDICATION, AND CLEAR LEXAN COVER DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SUBJECT SYSTEM.

THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED ZN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ZS NOT REDUCED. THE FUNCTIONS AND PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MONITORS (ED G ~ ~ DETECTION~ ZSOLATIONSg ETC.) REMAIN UNCHANGED.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GINNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ZT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES~ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-3 64 5A GINNA STATION GROUND WATER LEVELS THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES AN ANALYSES OF BELOW GRADE STRUCTURES AT GINNA TO EVALUATE THE EFFECTS OF THE INCREASED GROUND WATER LEVEL (GWL).

THIS EWR COVERS ONLY THE EVALUATION OF EFFECTS OF THE NEW DESIGN BASIS GROUND WATER LEVEL (DBGWL) ON SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES BELOW GRADE. THE NEW DBGWL IS DEFINED AS 265.0 FT MSL. THIS EVALUATION COMPRISES A PORTION OF A CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO THE USNRC RELATIVE TO SEP TOPIC ZII-3.A, IIEFFECTS OF HIGH WATER LEVEL ON STRUCTURES R.E. GZNNA".

16

PRE-PORC COMMENTS LISTED BELOW WERE FORWARDED TO THE RESPON-SIBLE ENGINEER (RE) VZA LETTER 13Nl-RR-L50391. ANSWERS ARE PROVIDED FOR CLARIFICATION (SEE LETTER 13Nl-RR-L1650).

Q. DO THE RESULTS OF THIS EVALUATION HAVE ANY POTENTIAL TO IMPACT ANY ASSUMPTIONS MADE IN OUR PAST ANALYSIS OF THE CONTAINMENT VESSEL TENDONS OR THEIR ROCK ANCHORS?

A. ENGINEERING REVIEW HAS ASCERTAINED THAT EVALUATION OF GROUND WATER LEVEL WILL HAVE NO POTENTIAL TO IMPACT ANY ASSUMPTIONS PREVIOUSLY MADE CONCERNING CONTAINMENT VESSEL TENDONS OR ROCK ANCHORS.

Q. 1) THE UFSAR IS NOT REFERENCED IN SECTION 2.0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA BUT IS SPECIFICALLY CALLED OUT ZN PARAGRAPH 7 '

2) ANALYSIS STEP

'AFETY 3.2 DOES NOT ADDRESS OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKES (OBE'S).

A. ENGINEERING 'WILL INCORPORATE THESE COMMENTS AS CHANGES AT THE NEXT REVISION OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA/SAFETY ANALYSIS' REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GZNNA STATION UFSAR AND ,THE EVENTS REQUIRING 'ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. EVENTS RELATED TO THIS ANALYSIS ARE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS SUCH AS FZREg FLOODSJ STORMS'ND EARTHQUAKES, INCORPORATING BOTH OPERATING BASIS AND SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKES'HIS ANALYSIS WILL NOT DEGRADE ANY EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS'HEREFORE'LL EXISTING FIRE PROTEC TZON FEATURES REQUIRED TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX R, OR TO MAINTAIN EQUIVALENT LEVELS OF PROTECTION WILL BE MAINTAINED DURING AND FOLLOWING THIS ANALYSIS.

THE PRESENT DES IGN FOR FLOODING g 'TORMS g OPERATING BAS S I EARTHQUAKE AND SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE (SEISMIC EVENTS) HAS BEEN ANALYZED .UNDER THE SEP RE-EVALUATION DESIGN ANALYSES.

EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF INCREASED GROUND WATER LEVEL ON SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES BELOW GRADE WILL INSURE THAT THESE STRUCTURES ARE ADEQUATE TO RESIST LOAD COMBINATIONS REFERENCED IN THE DESIGN CRITERIA (BASED UPON USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN GUIDELINES).

I THUS g THIS ANALYS S WILL NE ITHER INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES g NOR REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS INVOLVING:

1) EQUIPMENT REQU IRED TO FUNCTION DURING AND FOLLOWING OBE ~

I SSE g FLOOD NG AND STORMS g INCLUDING TORNADO EVENTS ~

2) FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES 17

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND,THE REQUIREMENTS OF GINNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ZT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT WILL NOT BE REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVEN-TION OF ACCXDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THIS ANALYSIS.

EWR-3 698 DIVERSE TRIP MODIFICATION ON REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH MODIFIED THE CONTROL CIRCUITRY ON THE SHUNT TRIP ATTACHMENT (STA) TO THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS. PRESENTLY, THE 'STA IS ENERGIZED THROUGH TWO MANUAL REACTOR TRIP SWITCHES. ONLY THE UNDERVOLTAGE COXL (UVTA) AUTOMATICALLY CAUSES A REACTOR TRIP WHEN A SCRAM IS REQUIRED. THE UVTA WOULD ALSO CAUSE A REACTOR TRIP ON LOSS OF D.C. CONTROL POWER. THIS MODIFICATION ZS REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH USNRC 83-28. 854 OF THIS MODIFICATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED UNDER THE PREVIOUS REVISIONS. THIS PROJECT IS SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION DURXNG THE 1987 OUTAGE.

REVISION 1 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WAS PRESENTED AND APPROVED BY PORC ON FEBRUARY 5, 1986 PORC NUMBER 6 1.0-86-015-001.

THE PURPOSE OF REVISION 2 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS IS TO INCLUDE:

A) NEW INDICATOR LIGHT TO VERIFY THAT THE STA IS OPERATIONAL. (PARAGRAPH 7.3.1)

B) NEW TRIP TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR BOTH UVTA AND STA.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GZNNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE:

1) ALL POSTULATED ACCIDENTS REQUIRING A REACTOR TRIP.

2) LOSS OF D.C. CONTROL POWER.

3) NATURAL EVENT/FIRE, AND EARTHQUAKE.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS QHEREFORE~ BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. ZT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS/ AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

18

i 4

EWR-3755 PORV BLOCK VALVE S REPLACEMENT THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE REPLACEMENT OF PRESSURIZER MOTOR-OPERATED BLOCK VALVES 515 AND 516 WITH NEW SEISMICALLY AND ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED GATE VALVES.

THE REPLACEMENT ZS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE EXZST1NG BLOCK VALVE SEAT RINGS ARE APPROACHING THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE LIMITS FOR REMACHINING.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDES 1.29 AND 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1) INCREASE ZN HEAT REMOVAL BY SECONDARY SYSTEM.

2) DECREASE ZN HEAT REMOVAL BY SECONDARY SYSTEM.

3) DECREASE ZN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM FLOW RATE.

4) REACTIVITY AND POWER DISTRIBUTION ANOMALIES.

5) INCREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY.

6) DECREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY.

7) INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS SUCH AS MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES~ FLOODSJ STORMS'R EARTHQUAKES'HE FOLLOWING ACCIDENTS APPLICABLE TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

INCREASE ZN HEAT REMOVAL BY SECONDARY SYSTEM THE FOLLOWING ACCIDENTS, APPLICABLE TO THIS EVENT, WERE ANALYZED:

A) DECREASE IN FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE B) INCREASE ZN FEEDWATER FLOW C) EXCESSIVE LOAD INCREASE INCIDENT D) ZNADVERTANT OPENING OF A STEAM GENERATOR RELIEF/S-AFETY VALVE E) SPECTRUM OF STEAM SYSTEM PIPING FAILURES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF CONTAINMENT 2 ~ DECREASE IN HEAT REMOVAL BY SECONDARY SYSTEM THE FOLLOWING ACCIDENTS, APPLICABLE TO THIS EVENT, WERE ANALYZED:

A) STEAM PRESSURE REGULATOR MALFUNCTION OR FAILURE THAT RESULTS IN DECREASING STEAM FLOW B) LOSS OF EXTERNAL ELECTRICAL LOAD C) TURBINE TRIP D) LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM E) LOSS OF OFFSZTE ALTERNATING CURRENT POWER TO THE STATION'UXILIARIES F) LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLOW G) FEEDWATER SYSTEM PIPE BREAKS 19

3. REACTIVITY AND POWER DISTRIBUTION ANOMALIES THE FOLLOWING ACCIDENTS i APPLI CABLE TO THIS EVENT i WERE ANALYZED:

A) UNCONTROLLED ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY WITHDRAWAL FROM A SUBCRITZCAL CONDITION B) UNCONTROLLED ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY WITHDRAWAL AT POWER C) STARTUP OF AN INACTIVE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP D) CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION E) RUPTURE OF A CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM HOUSING F) ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY DROP

4. INCREASE ZN REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY

5. DECREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM FLOW RATE THE FOLLOWING ACCIDENTS g APPLI CABLE TO THIS EVENT i WER ANALYZED:

A) FLOW COASTDOWN ACCIDENTS B) LOCKED ROTOR ACCIDENTS

6. DECREASE.ZN REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY THE FOLLOWING ACCIDENTS i APPLI CABLE TO THIS EVENT i WERE ANALYZED:

A) ZNADVERTANT OPENING OF A PRESSURIZER SAFETY OR RELIEF VALVE B) PRIMARY SYSTEM PIPE RUPTURES THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT DEGRADE THE DESIGN, CAPABILITY OR PERFORMANCE OF THE EXISTING PRESSURIZER RELIEF SYSTEM ANDi THEREFORE, THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ABOVE EVENTS WILL NOT BE INCREASED BY THE MODIFICATION.

THIS MODIFICATION AND THE MATERIALS UTILIZED WILL MEET APPENDIX R 10CFR50 CRITERIA AS DEFINED IN ENGINEERING PROCEDURE QE-326.

THE MODIFICATION NEITHER AFFECTS, NOR ZS AFFECTED BY ANY FLOOD OR STORM PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED.

THE MODIFICATION ZS DECLARED AS HAVING TO MEET SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 CRITERIA OF USNRC'REG. GUIDE 1.29 AND CONDITIONS SPECIFIED IN THE UFSAR SECTION 3.11.3 TITLED "IDENTIFICATION OF LIMITING ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 20

BASED UPON ALL THE ABOVE ANALYSES:

1) STRUCTURES p SYSTEMS g AND COMPONENTS PROVI DED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE ADEQUATE.

2) MARGIN OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATING AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF. THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GINNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES~ SYSTEMS~ AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-3768 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION COOLING THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE UPGRADE OF THE PENETRATION COOLING SYSTEM TO ENSURE THAT THE UNMONZTORED PATH FOR AIRBORNE RADIATION FROM THE AUXILIARY BUILDING TO UNCONTROLLED AREAS WILL BE ELIMINATED.

REVISION 1 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCORPORATED COMMENTS TO REVISION 0, AND INCLUDED INSTALLING NEW DUCTWORK TO AN OUTSIDE AZR SOURCES A BACKDRAFT DAMPER OR OTHER MEANS OF BACKFLOW PREVENTION, TO PREVENT UNMONITORED RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVITY, CHANGES TO THE EXISTING PENETRATION COOLING FAN SYSTEM INLET AEGRNGEMENT BOX TO ACCEPT THE NEW DUCTWORK, INSTALLING A NEW STEAM HEATING COIL, INSTALLING

'ASSOCIATED STEAM SUPPLY AND STEAM CONDENSATE RETURN PIPING, INSTALLING A NEW CONDENSATE DRAIN PAN AND PIPING, AND INSTALLING NEW PNEUMATIC AND/OR ELECTRIC TEMPERATURE CONTROL DEVICES IN THE MODIFIED SYSTEM.

ZN ADDITION TO THE 'ESIGN WORK REQUIRED TO MODIFY" THE EXISTING CONTAINMENT PENETRATION COOLING SYSTEM AN ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED TO DETERMINE THE ACTUAL BULK CONCRETE TEMPERATURES OF THE PENETRATIONS WITHOUT THE OPERATION OF THE CONTAINMENT PENETRATION COOLING SYSTEM. BULK CONCRETE TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS HAVE BEEN RELAXED ZN RECENT YEARS FROM THE ORIGINAL DESIGN LIMIT OF 150oF TO 200oF PER ASME BOILER AND PRESSURE VESSEL CODE~ SECTION III/DIVISION 2~

1986 EDITION. THE ANALYSIS DEMONSTRATES THAT THE BULK CONCRETE TEMPERATURES DURING THE WORST CASE SCENARIO COULD EXCEED 200oF THEREFORE THIS SYSTEM WILL BE MAINTAINED OPERABLE ABOVE A PRIMARY SYSTEM TEMPERATURE OF 200 F.

21

REVISION 2 OF THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS UPDATES THE REFERENCE SECTIONS OF BOTH THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS AND INCORPORATES 1) A VERIFICATION THAT A STEAM COIL FAILURE (LOSS OF STEAM HEATING) WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION DURING COLD WEATHERS AND

2) A PUSH TO TEST SWITCH ON THE EQUIPMENT HATCH TEMPERATURE ALARM PANEL TO GIVE POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF LAMP FUNCTION DURING OPERATION.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE PI PING FAILURES I I N FLUID SYSTEMS OUTS DE CONTAINMENT g SEISMIC EVENTS g FIRES J AND PLANT BUILDING SECURITY ~

SEISMIC EVENTS HAVE BEEN ANALYZED UNDER THE SEP RE-EVALUATION DESIGN ANALYSES. MODIFICATION OF THE PENETRATION COOLING SYSTEM REQUIRES SEISMIC DESIGN FOR SUPPORTS TO ENSURE THAT MODIFIED PIPING/DUCTWORK WILL NOT COLLAPSE DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT ALTER EITHER THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF EXISTING STRUCTURES OR SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT LOCATED WITHIN THE EXISTING AUXILIARY BUILDING STRUCTURE ALL EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES REQUIRED TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50g APPENDIX Rg OR TO MAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELS OF PROTECTION FROM FIRES WILL BE MAINTAINED DURING AND FOLLOWING THIS MODIFICATION.

A BREAK ZN THE HOUSE HEATING STEAM LINE TO BE INSTALLED UNDER THIS MODIFICATION (PIPE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT)

WILL NOT HAVE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT.

THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ASSURES DELIVERY OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO THE STEAM GENERATORS TO MAINTAIN SAFE SHUTDOWN. INVENTORY FOR THE PRIMARY SYSTEM ZS ASSURED VZA CHARGING PUMPS LOCATED ZN A ROOM SEPARATED FROM THE AUXILIARYBUILDING BY CONCRETE WALLS AND SEALED FIRE BARRIERS.

APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS WILL BE INSTALLED TO PRECLUDE.,

UNMONZTORED ACCESS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING VZA THE NEW INLET PENETRATION ZN ACCORDANCE WITH GINNA STATION SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

I THUS / THIS MODZF CATION NEITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES g NOR DOES ZT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR!

1) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING AND FOLLOWING SEISMIC EVENTS INCLUDING PIPE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT.

2) FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES

3) PLANT SECURITY 22

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE STRUCTURAL RE-ANALYSIS PLAN (SRP), ZT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTZCZPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES g SYSTEMS g AND COMPONENTS PROVI DED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-38 17 CATALYTIC OXYGEN REMOVAL SYSTEM THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL PROVIDE A MEANS OF REDUCING OXYGEN CONCENTRATIONS TO LESS THAN 100 PPB IN THE CONDENSATE STORAGE SYSTEM. A WESTINGHOUSE CATALYTIC OXYGEN REMOVAL SYSTEM (CORS) HAS BEEN EVALUATED TO BE THE BEST METHOD AVAILABLETO REDUCE DISSOLVED OXYGEN TO ACCEPTABLE LEVELS. THE PRINCIPLE IS TO MIX HYDROGEN WITH THE CONDENSATE AND REDUCE THE FREE OXYGEN TO WATER THROUGH EXPOSURE OF THE MIXTURE TO A METAL CATALYST SURFACE.

REVISION 0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WAS PRESENTED AND APPROVED BY PORC ON NOVEMBER 6g 1985 PORC NUMBER 6.1.0-85-114-002.

DUE TO PRE-PORC COMMENTS, REVISION 1 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS, WERE NOT PRESENTED TO PORC.

THE PURPOSE OF REVISION 2 OF THE DESIGN. CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS IS TO INCLUDE COMMENTS .AS A RESULT OF PRE-PORC OF REVISION l.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GZNNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE A LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER AND FIRES.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS THEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

23

EWR-4037 CT-1 TERMINAL REPLACEMENT THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION OF THE EXISTING EBERLZNE CT-1 EFFLUENT MONITOR CONTROL TERMINALS AT GZNNA STATION WITH UPGRADED '>>Bn VERSION EQUIPMENT. THE PURPOSE OF THE nBn VERSION UPGRADE ZS TO IMPROVE THE OPERABILITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE EXISTING CONTROL TERMINALS IN THE CONTROL ROOM AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER. ALSO PROPOSED IS THE INSTALLATION OF A REPORT GENERATOR INTERFACE (RGZF) WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE CT-1 ZN THE TSC TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE NEW PLANT COMPUTER PLANNED FOR INSTALLATION IN 1986. IF THE CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS HAVE ACCESS TO DATA FROM THE EFFLUENT MONITORS VIA THE PLANT COMPUTER, THE CT-1 ZN THE CONTROL ROOM WOULD NO LONGER BE REQUIRED, AND COULD BE REMOVED TO DECREASE SOME OF THE CONGESTION ZN THE CONTROL ROOM AND ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR DUPLICATING AT CT-1 FOR THE GINNA SIMULATOR PROJECT. IT IS PROPOSED THAT BOTH THE CONTROL ROOM AND THE TSC CONTROL TERMINALS BE UPGRADED WITH THE nB" VERSION EQUIPMENT ZN 1985. WHEN THE NEW PLANT COMPUTER IS OPERATIONAL, THE RGIF WOULD BE INSTALLED BETWEEN THE TSC CT-1 AND THE PLANT COMPUTERS AND THE CONTROL ROOM CT 1 WOULD BE REMOVED' REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE (1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES, (2) A SEISMIC EVENT.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSIS DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE, SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY, PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE INCREASED BY THE PROPOSED ADDITION.

EWR-4070 NO. 1 AND 2 FEEDWATER HEATER REPLACEMENT THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE REPLACEMENT OF NUMBER 1 AND 2 FEEDWATER HEATER.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO SPECIFY, "PROCURE, AND INSTALL NEW FEEDWATER HEATER TUBE BUNDLES AND SHELL MODIFICATIONS AT THE FIRST AND SECOND EXTRACTION POINTS.

THE PRIMARY GOAL IS TO ELIMINATE THE COPPER ALLOY TUBES.

STAINLESS STEEL TUBES ARE RECOMMENDED.

REVISION 1 TO THE SAFETY AN/LYSIS INCORPORATES A CHANGE RESULTING FROM PRE-PORC COMMENT OF REVISION 0 TO CLARIFY A STEP TO STATE THAT THE PROBABILITY OF UNINTENDED OPENING OF THE CONDENSATE BYPASS VALVE WILL NOT INCREASE DUE TO THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIREMENT TO LIMIT.TUBESZDE PRESSURE DROP TO 45 PSI.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN PERFORMED OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE 24

GINNA STATION UFSAR, THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70'ND A lOCFR50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE A DECREASE ZN FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE AND A LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLOW.

THE DECREASE ZN FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE EVENT IS ANALYZED IN THE UFSAR AS AN ACCIDENTAL OPENING OF THE CONDENSATE BYPASS VALVE, WHICH RESULTED IN A SUDDEN REDUCTION INLET FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE TO THE STEAM GENERATORS.

THIS MODIFICATION HAS NO BEARING ON CONDENSATE BYPASS VALVE OPERATION OR PLANT RESPONSE TO THIS EVENT. A REDUCTION IN FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE WHICH RESULTED FROM A LOSS OF ONE FEEDWATER HEATER HAS BEEN ANALYZED IN UFSAR. THE ANALYSIS SHOWED THAT FOR A FEEDWATER ENTHALPY DECREASE CORRESPONDING TO THE LOSS OF ONE FEEDWATER HEATER AT FULL POWER MINIMUM DNBR DOES NOT FALL BELOW THE LIMIT VALUE. AT ZERO POWER THE RESULTS ARE LESS LIMITING THAN THOSE PRESENTED IN UFSAR SECTION 15.4.1, UNCONTROLLED ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY WITHDRAWAL FROM A SUBCRITICAL CONDITION.

THE LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLOW ZS ANALYZED IN THE UFSAR AS A DISRUPTION OF SECONDARY SYSTEM HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY.

THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF THE DISRUPTION AS A RESULT OF CONDENSATE LINE BREAK SINCE THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES PROPER INSPECTION AND TESTING OF NEW WELDS.

THIS MODIFICATION IS NON-SEISMIC SINCE IT DOES NOT EFFECT THE SAFE. SHUTDOWN OF THE REACTOR.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT INCREASE THE FIRE LOADING IN FIRE AREAS CONTAINING SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT OR DEGRADE EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION BECAUSE OF REQUIREMENTS IN SECTION 27.0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GZNNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

25

EWR-4075 TSC HVAC MODIFICATIONS THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION OF THE GZNNA STATION TSC HVAC SYSTEM. THIS MODIFICATION WILL CONSIST OF: 1) ADDING TWO COMPUTER TYPE AIR CONDITIONING UNITS TO THE NEW SAS COMPUTER ROOM, 2) INSTALLING NEW ZONE CONTROL BOXES'ACH WITH ZTS OWN THERMOSTAT') MODIFYING THE CENTRAL SYSTEM CONTROL SO THAT IT WILL AUTOMATICALLY CHANGE OVER FROM HEATING TO COOLING/ AND BACK~ AND 4)

INSTALLING A FLOW CONTROLLER TO ASSURE THAT THE MAXIMUM DESIGN FLOW RATE THROUGH THE CHARCOAL FILTER IS NOT EXCEEDED.

REVISION 1 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WAS PRESENTED AND APPROVED BY PORC . ON 11/19/86 PORC NUMBER 6 ~ 1 ~ 0-86-135-002.

THE PURPOSE OF REVISION 2 g OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS IS TO INCLUDE INSTALLATIONREFERENCE TO SPECIFICATION EE-29, EE-80 AND ZEEE 383.

N A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODZFXCA-TION ARE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS'UCH AS FIRES~

FLOODS, STORMS AND EARTHQUAKES'ASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES~ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION'.

26

EWR-4118 TOTAL CHARGING FLOW INDICATION THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION TO INSTALL TWO TRANSMITTERS FOR REACTOR COOLANT PUMP (RCP)

SEAL INJECTION FLOW.

EWR 4118 WAS WRITTEN IN RESPONSE TO A NUMBER OF HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES (HEDS) IDENTIFIED DURING THE DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW. HEDS 451 AND 471 STATE THAT INDICATION FOR REACTOR COOLANT PUMP (RCP) SEAL INJECTION FLOW AND TOTAL CHARGING FLOW ARE REQUIRED'EDS 309'10'ND 84'5/

345 ADDRESS THE PROBLEM THAT THE CHARGING FLOW CONTROLLER ZS LOCATED ON THE MIDDLE SECTION OF THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD (MCB)g AND THE 'INDICATOR ZS ON THE LEFT SECTION WHICH IS EIGHT TO TEN FEET'AWAY. THE COMBINATION OF THESE HEDS RESULTED ZN AN NRC COMMITTMENT TO PROVIDE INDICA-TION FOR SEAL INJECTION AND A DUPLICATE INDICATOR FOR CHARGING FLOW ON THE MIDDLE SECTZON OF THE MCB BY JUNE 1988. THIS PROJECT INVOLVES THE INSTALLATION OF TWO TRANS-MITTERS FOR RCP .SEAL INJECTION FLOW (FT115A AND FT116A).

THESE TWO TRANSMITTERS WOULD BE INSTALLED ZN PARALLEL WITH THE EXISTING RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW LOCAL INDICATION (FT115 AND FT116). INDICATORS FOR SEAL INJECTION FLOW WILL BE INSTALLED ON THE MIDDLE SECTION OF THE MCB. THE TWO SEAL INJECTION FLOWS WILL BE INPUT TO THE PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM (PPCS). IN ADDITION, A DUPLICATE OF THE EXISTING CONTROL BOARD INDICATION FOR CHARGING FLOW (F0128) WILL BE INSTALLED ON THE MIDDLE SECTION OF THE MCB.

THE RCP SEAL ZNJECTION FLOWS g COUPLED WITH THE EXZSTING CONTROL BOARD INDICATION FOR CHARGING FLOW, WILL ALLOW CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS TO DETERMINE TOTAL SYSTEM INFLOW.

THE NEW INDICATORS FOR SEAL INJECTION FLOW AND CHARGING FLOW WILL BE LOCATED BESIDE EACH OTHER ON THE MIDDLE SECTION OF THE MCB. THE DUPLICATE INDICATOR FOR CHARGING FLOW WILL, IN ADDITION, BE LOCATED ABOVE THE CONTROLLER FOR CHARGING FLOW. A NEW PSEUDO ANALOG POINT WILL BE CREATED ON THE PPCS TO CALCULATE TOTAL CHARGING FLOW BY COMBINING CHARGING FLOW, AN EXISTING PPCS INPUT, WITH THE NEW RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW POINTS.

DUE TO PRE-PORC COMMENTS, REVISION 0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WERE NOT PRESENTED TO PORC.

THE PURPOSE OF REVISION 1 OF THE'DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS IS TO INCLUDE COMMENTS AS A RESULT OF PRE-PORC OF REVISION 0.

27

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY THE USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE:

1) SEISMIC EVENT

2) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES

3) PIPE BREAKS OUTSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING THIS MODIFICATION IS LIMITED TO WORK DOWNSTREAM OF THE ROOT VALVES FOR THE RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW. SINCE THE ROOT VALVES DEFINE THE SAFETY CLASS BOUNDARY'HE EXISTING RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW INSTRUMENTATION ZS DESIGNATED NOT SEISMIC CATEGORY I'HE REMAINING WORKS FOR THIS MODIFICATIONS WILL BE DESIGNED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.29, REVISION C.2.

THIS 'MODIFICATION INVOLVES THE INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDINGS FIRE AREA ABBM ZONE ABBi AND THE CONTROL BUZLDINGi FIRE AREA CC ZONES CR AND RR THIS MODIFICATION ALSO REQUIRES ROUTING CABLE THROUGH THE CABLE TUNNEL WHICH IS FIRE AREA CT. A REVIEW WILL BE PERFORMED TO ASSURE CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50, APPENDIX R.

ALL NEW WIRING WILL BE QUALIFIED TO IEEE 383-1974 FLAME TEST REQUIREMENTS'IRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS WILL BE REPAIRED OR REPLACED ZN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING PLANT PROCEDURES. THEREFORE EXISTING SEALS WILL NOT BE DEGRADED.

THIS MODIFICATIONS DOES NOT AFFECT THE SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS IN THE APPENDIX R SUBMITTAL FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. THE APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS FOR LOCAL INDICATION OF RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW WILL BE MAINTAINED.

B THERE IS NO EFFECT ON SEPARATION OF EXISTING CIRCUITS i ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS, OR FIRE AREA BOUNDARIES AS ANALYZED IN THE APPENDIX R SUBMITTAL.

THIS MODIFICATION WILL INTERFACE WITH THE EXISTING 3/8 INCH RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW SENSING LINE IN THE SAME MANNER AS DOES THE EXISTING LOCAL INDICATORS. THEREFORE THIS MODIFIC-ATION DOES NOT INTRODUCE ANY NEW FAILURE MODES CONCERNING PIPE BREAKS OUTSIDE OF THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING.

IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT .THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED.

THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES i SYSTEMS i AND COMPONENTS PROVI DED FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN. AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

28

EWR-4142 CONTROL BUILDING EAST WALL MODIFICATION THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE STRUCTURAL UPGRADE REQUIREMENT OF THE EAST WALL OF THE CONTROL BUILDING.

THE EAST WALL OF THE CONTROL BUILDING MUST BE CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING THE LOADS ASSOCIATED WITH A .132 MPH TORNADO (DIRECT WIND AND ~ P = 0.4 PSI) AND TWO TORNADO MISSILES.

THIS MODIFICATION WILLg IN EFFECTS UPGRADE THE RELAY ROOM EAST WALL AS PART OF THE STRUCTURAL UPGRADE PROGRAM TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ADDED STRENGTH REQUIRED TO RESIST THE IMPOSES LOADS OF SNOWg TORNADO (DIRECT AND ~

MISSILES AND 2) PROVIDE A WATER-TIGHT BARRIER AGAINST P)g TORNADO FLOODING OF DEER CREEK.

REVISION 2 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCORPORATES CHANGES FROM REVISION 1 DELETING EXTRA CONDUIT FOR FUTURE CIRCUITS'DDING GROUNDING AND DOOR POSITION SWITCHES FOR BOTH SECURITY AND FIRE DOORS.

'

REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYSIS IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE WINDJ SNOQ AND TORNADO LOADZNGSJ FLOODING AND SEISMIC/

OF A.C. POWER AND PLANT BUILDING SECURITY.

FIRES'OSS THE DESIGN FOR WIND ~ SNOW g TORNADOES AND EXTERNAL FLOODING HAS BEEN EVALUATED ZN THE UFSAR AND WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMMITMENTS MADE TO THE USNRC WHICH ARE REFERENCED ZN SECTIONS 2 'g 'g 3 3 ~ 4 ~ 1 AND 3 ' OF THE UFSAR SEISMIC EVENTS HAVE BEEN ANALYZED UNDER THE SEP RE-EVALUATION DESIGN ANALYSIS. MODIFICATION OFwTHIS EXTERNAL WALL OF THE RELAY ROOM WILL NOT ALTER EITHER THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF EXISTING STRUCTURES OR SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT LOCATED WITHIN THE EXISTING STRUCTURES.

ALL EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES REQUIRED TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX R, OR TO MAINTAIN EQUIVALENT LEVELS OF PROTECTION FROM FIRES WILL BE MAINTAINED DURING AND FOLLOWING THE STRUCTURAL UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS.

THE MODIFICATION AFFECTS ONLY LOADING OF NON-SAFETY RELATED BUS 15. SINCE THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE SAFETY-RELATED BUSES, THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE CONSEQUENCES OF A LOSS OF A.C. POWER.

THE RELOCATION OF AN EXISTING EXTERIOR SECURITY DOOR TO THE OUTSIDE OF THE NEW STRUCTURE WILL MAINTAIN THE LEVEL OF PRESENT SECURITY FROM INTRUSION AT GZNNA STATION. 1NTERIM MEASURES DURING CONSTRUCTION WILL BE ADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROLLED TO PREVENT POSSIBLE DEGRADATION OF SECURITY BARRIERS'9

THUS g THIS MODIFICATION NEITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES g NOR DOES ZT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR:

1) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING AND FOLLOWING SSE, FLOODING AND TORNADO EVENTS

2) FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES

3) PLANT SECURITY BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE STRUCTURAL RE-ANAL-YSIS PLAN,(SRP), IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFT OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. ZT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVEN TION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4176 APPENDIX R DETECTION UPGRADE THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL INSTALL THREE (3) NEW FIRE DETECTION ZONES AND SUPERVISED BY THE FIRE SIGNALLING SYSTEM. THESE ZONES ARE:

Z-36 (SMOKE) INT. BLDG. SUB-BASEMENT FLOORS.

Z-37 (SMOKE) ZNT. BLDG. NORTH UPPER ELEVATZONS.

Z-38 (SMOKE) INT. BLDG'OUTH ALL ELEVATIONS ~

INCLUDED IN THIS MODIFICATION IS THE MOUNTING OF EQUIPMENT, ROUTING AND MOUNTING OF CONDUIT, AND ALL WIRING ASSOCIATED WITH THE NEW ZONES AND MODIFICATIONS TO THE EXISTING FIRE

~

SZGNALLING SYSTEM. THIS MODIFICATION IS REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM, GZNNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REVISION 2.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE SEISMIC AND FIRE.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS THEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

30

EWR-4221 02~H2 ANALYZER REPLACEMENT THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE DIRECT REPLACEMENT OF THE EXISTING 02/H2 ANALYZER SYSTEM. THIS MODIFICATION WILL REPLACE THE INACCURATE AND UNRELIABLE EXISTING 02/H2 ANALYZER SYSTEM WITH A NEW RELIABLE AND ACCURATE SYSTEM.

REVISION 1 OF THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCORPORATES CHANGES FROM REVISION 0 TO CORRECT TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS AND

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION OF MODIFICATION BACKGROUND INFORMATION.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRED BY USNRC REG. GUIDES 1.29, 1 ~ 60g 1 61'ND 1 70 'HE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES AND A SEISMIC EVENT.

ALL EXISTING AND NEW WIRING, CABLEg AND ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR THIS MODIFICATION COMPLIES WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX R.

THIS MODIFICATION HAS BEEN ANALYZED FOR SEISMIC EVENTS UNDER SECTION C.2 OF REG. GUIDE 1.29. THE INSTALLATION WILL MAINTAIN STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY SUCH THAT SURROUNDING SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT WILL NOT BE AFFECTED.

THIS MODIFICATION NEITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES, NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR:

1) MAJOR OR MINOR FIRES

2) SEISMIC EVENT BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND USNC REG. GUIDE 1.29 AND 1.70, ZT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES~ SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

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EWR-4235 STATUS LIGHT MODIFICATION THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH CONSXSTS OF INSTALLING A DROPPING RESISTOR IN EACH LIGHT ASSEMBLY ZN THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD (MCB). INCLUDED WITH THIS MODIFICATION IS THE REPLACEMENT OF THE EXISTING 35 VOLT BULBS WITH 30 VOLT BULBS, AND NEW INDXCATOR LIGHT LENS CAP. THIS MODIFICATION WILL PROVIDE GREATER LIGHT OUTPUT IN THE BRIGHT AND DIM MODE, THEREBY ELIMINATINGTHE PRESENT VISUAL CONTRAST BETWEEN BRIGHT AND DIM CONDITIONS. THESE STATUS LIGHTS ZN SUBJECT, PROVIDE A VISUAL INDICATION OF SELECTED VALVE POSITIONS.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICA-TION ARE LOSS OF DC OR AC CONTROL POWERS NATURAL EVENTS/

FIRE, AND EARTHQUAKE.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS THEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES~ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

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EWR-4269 C AND D STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP INTERLOCK THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION TO THE PUMP INTERLOCK.

PRESENTLY, THE ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM CONFIGURATION CONSISTS OF TWO MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARYFEEDWATER PUMPS (MDAFWPlA AND 1B) AND TWO STANDBY AUXILIARYPUMPS 1A AND 1B SUPPLY CONDENSATE WATER TO A AND B STEAM GENERATORS RESPECTIVELY. IN THE EVENT THAT EITHER ONE OR BOTH OF THESE PUMPS ARE INOPERABLE THE STANDBY PUMPS MAY BE USED TO PROVIDE AN EMERGENCY SOURCE FOR COOLING. THE STANDBY PUMPS (C AND D) ARE ELECTRICALLY INTERLOCKED WITH PRIMARY PUMPS (A AND B). THE INTERLOCKS ARE INTENDED TO PREVENT THE SIMULTANEOUS OPERATION OF THE PRIMARY PUMPS AND STANDBY PUMPS'URING NORMAL OPERATION THIS CONFIGURATION SATISFIES THIS DESIGN CRITERIA'OWEVERS WHEN PRIMARY BREAKERS ARE RACKED OUT INTO THE HELD POSITION (OR REMOVED)g THE INTERLOCKS ARE ALSO REMOVED, MAKING THE STANDBY BREAKERS INOPERABLE'HIS PROPOSED MODIFICATION WILL ELIMINATE THIS CONDITION BY INSTALLING CELL SWITCHES IN THE PRIMARY BREAKER WILL CHANGE STATE WHEN THE BREAKER IS RACKED ZN OR COMPARTMENTS'HICH OUT. THE CELL SWITCH CONTACTS WILL BE WIRED ZN PARALLEL WITH THE EXISTING INTERLOCK CONTACTS AND WILL PERMIT THE PRIMARY BREAKERS TO BE REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE AND INSURE THAT THE STANDBY BREAKERS WILL BE OPERATIONAL.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GZNNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY NRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATING TO THIS MODIFIC-ATION ARE:

A) LOSS OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FLOW B) NATURAL EVENTS/FIRE, EARTHQUAKE.

THE FIRST EVENT ANALYZED WILL BE THE LOSS OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TO THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION. THE ADDITION OF A CELL SWITCH WILL NOT EFFECT OPERABILITY OF THE MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS. THESE CELL SWITCHES SERVE AS PERMZSSIVES TO THE STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS, THEREFORE IN THE EVENT OF A FAILURE ONLY THE STARTING OF THE STANDBY PUMPS ARE AFFECTED. MANUFACTURER INSTALLATION AND TESTING PROCEDURES WILL BE PERFORMED AND A PERIODIC TESTING PROGRAM WILL BE INITIATED TO ASSURE PROPER OPERATION OF CELL SWITCHES, THEREBY REDUCING THE PROBABILITY OF FAILURE TO START STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS TO AN ACCEPTABLY LOW LEVEL. THEREFORE THIS MODIFICATION WILL HAVE A NEGLIGIBLE IMPACT UPON OPERABILITY OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM.

THE SECOND EVENT ANALYZED WILL BE THE EFFECT OF A THE PLANT DUE TO THIS MODIFICATION.

SEISMIC'VENT ON THE CELL SWITCHES HAVE BEEN QUALIFIED BY THE MANUFACTURER, THEREFORE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILURE DUE TO A SEISMIC EVENT ARE MITIGATED.

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THE THIRD EVENT ANALYZED WILL BE THE EFFECT OF A FIRE ON THE PLANT DUE TO THIS MODIFICATION. THE CONTROL WIRING USED FOR THIS MODIFICATION IS REQUIRED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF IEEE STD. 383-1984 FLAME TEST. THUS THERE ZS NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE FIRE LOADING DUE TO THIS MODIFICATION.

AN APPENDIX R CONFORMANCE VERIFICATION WILL SE PERFORMED TO ENSURE THAT THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION DOES NOT ADVERSELY IMPACT EXISTING APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE METHODS.

THEREFORE g DETERMINED THAT:

BASED UPON THE ABOVE I ANALYS S g IT HAS BEEN A) THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED AND B) THE STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE ADEQUATE.

THE 'PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT ARE NOT INCREASED.

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A TYPE DIFFERENT FROM ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS HAS NOT BEEN CREATED.

THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ZS NOT REDUCED.

THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS EWR-4281 STEAM GENERATOR MANWAY STUD TENSIONER THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION COVERING THE INSTALLATION OF STEAM GENERATOR PRIMARY MANWAY STUDS AND NUTS. IN THE PAST THE PRIMARY MANWAY COVERS HAVE BEEN ATTACHED WITH BOLTS WHICH ARE TORQUED TO OBTAIN THE PROPER GASKET SEATING. THIS ZS A TIME CONSUMING AND DIFFICULT TASK SINCE ZT MUST BE DONE IN A HIGH RADIATION AREA. THIS MODIFICATION CONSISTS OF REPLACING THE EXISTING BOLTS AND NUTS. INSTEAD OF TORQUING THE NUTS TO INDUCE THE REQUIRED AXIAL LOADS, DIRECT HYDRAULIC LOADS ARE USED TO STRETCH THE STUDS'EVISION 0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WAS PRESENTED AND APPROVED BY PORC ON NOVEMBER '5g 1986'ORC NUMBER 6.1.0-86-125-001

'4

THE PURPOSE OF REVISION 1 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS ZS TO REVISE PARAGRAPHS 2.6.1 AND 2.6.2 TO INCLUDE NEW EG&G DRAWING TITLES.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICA-

'TION ARE SEISMIC EVENTS'ECREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM INVENTORY AND FIRES.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.0D OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS THEREFOREJ BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE'NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES~ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4282 CV RECIRC FAN CONDENSATE COLLECTOR LEVELS THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION OF THE CV RECZRC FAN CONDENSATE COLLECTOR LEVELS'HIS MODIFICATION IS FOR REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING OBSOLETE PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS, SIGNAL PROCESSORS AND MAIN CONTROL BOARD INDICATORS WITH INSTRUMENTS CAPABLE OF ACCURATELY MONITORING WATER LEAKAGE WITHIN CONTAINMENT. THE EXISTING TRANSMZTTERSJ POWER SUPPLIES'ZSTABLES AND INDICATORS WILL BE REPLACED TO PROVIDE MORE ACCURATE AND RELIABLE CONDENSATE LEVEL INDICATION. THE SCALES ZN THE EXISTING LEVEL INDICATOR SHALL BE PLACED IN THE NEW LEVEL INDICATORS WITH NO CHANGE

. IN THE APPEARANCE ON THE MCB. NEW REFERENCE LEG TUBING FROM THE TRANSMITTERS TO THE CONDENSATE COLLECTION STANDPIPES WILL BE INSTALLED.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GZNNA STATION UFSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG.

GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE -(1)

MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES, (2) A SEISMIC EVENT, (3) PIPE BREAKS INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING.

NEW WIRING AND CABLE MAY BE REQUIRED FOR THIS MODIFICATION WHICH COULD ADD TO THE FIRE LOADING OF THE PLANT THEREFORE'HE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT ALL SUCH CABLE MEET THE IEEE-383-1974 FLAME TEST REQUIREMENTS. BECAUSE OF THIS THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OF FIRE LOADING CAUSED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

AN APPENDIX R CONFORMANCE REVIEW SHALL BE PREPARED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS IS MAINTAINED.

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THIS MODIFICATION WILL BE REVIEWED TO ENSURE THAT FAILURE OF ANY ELECTRICAL CABLE INSTALLED AS A PART OF THIS MODIFIC-ATION WILL NOT RESULT IN THE DISABLING OF VITAL EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO SAFELY SHUT DOWN THE PLANT DURING POSTULATED FIRES.

THE PRESSURE BOUNDARY PORTIONS OF THE CONDENSATE COLLECTOR LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION ARE NOT DESIGNATED SEISMIC CATEGORY I.

HOWEVER, ANY MODIFICATION TO THIS SYSTEM WHOSE FAILURE COULD CAUSE DAMAGE TO SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT WILL BE DESIGNED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.29, POSITION C.2.

THE NEW TRANSMITTERS WILL INTERFACE WITH THE EXISTING CONDENSATE COLLECTOR STANDPIPES IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE EXISTING TRANSMITTERS WITH THE ADDITION OF THE REFERENCE LEG TUBING PENETRATION. THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT INTRODUCE ANY NEW FAILURE MODES CONCERNING PIPE BREAKS INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING.

THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT RESULT IN A CHANGE TO THE COMMIT-MENTS MADE IN THE UFSAR, SECTIONS 3.6.1.3.2.13 AND 5.4.11.1.2.

THESE COMMITMENTS STATE THAT CONDENSATE FLOWS FROM APPROXIMATELY 1 GPM TO 30 GPM ARE TO BE MEASURED BY THE CONDENSATE MEASURING SYSTEM, USFAR SECTION 5.2.5.4.3.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT A HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW OF THIS MODIFICATION BE PERFORMED PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF DESIGN OUTPUTS, TO MINIMIZE THE PROBABILITY OF OPERATOR ERROR.

THE ITEMS ABOVE ENSURE THAT THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT DEGRADE THE CAPABILITY OF ANY SAFETY SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS FUNCTION. THE ASSUMPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF EXISTING ANALYSES ARE UNCHANGED. NO NEW TYPES OF EVENTS ARE POSTULATED.

THEREFORE, THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF 10CFR50.59 THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT PRESENT AN UNREVZEWED SAFETY QUESTION FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

1. THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE, OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS WILL NOT BE INCREASED.

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THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT AFFECT THE PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. THIS.MODIFICATION WILL COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF USNRC REGS GUIDE 1.29 POSITION C.2 TO INSURE ANY FAILURE WILL NOT AFFECT SEISMIC CATEGORY I EQUIPMENT.

AN APPENDIX R CONFORMANCE REVIEW WILL INSURE CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS.

2. THE POSSIBILITY FOR AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY ZN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS ZS NOT CREATED.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT ADD TO ~ OR MODIFY ~ ANY EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY, OR EQUIPMENT WHOSE FAILURE XS ADDRESSED IN THE FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT.

3 ~ THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IS NOT REDUCED.

AS STATED ABOVE g THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT AFFECT EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. THE EFFECT OF THIS MODIFICATION WILL BE TO INCREASE THE RELXABZLITY OF ONE OF THE DIVERSE MEANS AVAILABLEFOR OPERATORS TO DETECT LEAKAGE INSIDE CONTAINMENT.

EWR-4324 STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION ON STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO CONVERT THE STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM TO A FLASH TANK BASED PROCESS'HE PRIMARY GOAL IS TO IMPROVE RELIABILITY BY MOVING THE XNHERENT TEMPERATURE CHANGES TO THE TANK AND PIPING. NEW PIPING INSTALLED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS CONVERSION SHALL BE RESIZED TO REDUCE THE EROSION-CORROSION POTENTIAL.

REVISION 3 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCORPORATE CHANGES TO REVISION 2 AS A RESULT OF THE COMMENTS FROM THE REVIEW OF REVISION 2 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS. THE CHANGES ARE OPERATIONAL CONCERNS AND CLARIFICATION.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN PERFORMED OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE AN INCREASE OR DECREASE IN SECONDARY SYSTEM HEAT REMOVAL.

AN INCREASE ZN SECONDARY SYSTEM HEAT REMOVAL WOULD OCCUR IF A BLOWDOWN LINE RUPTURED. THIS EVENT IS ENVELOPED IN THE UFSAR BY EXAMINXNG THE INCREASE IN FEEDWATER FLOW EVENT AND THE SPECTRUM OF STEAM SYSTEM PIPING FAILURES. BOTH ANALYZED EVENTS ARE FAR MORE SEVER THAN A BLOWDOWN LINE RUPTURE.

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A DECREASE ZN SECONDARY SYSTEM HEAT REMOVAL WOULD OCCUR IF BLOWDOWN WERE SUDDENLY ISOLATED. THIS EVENT ZS SIMILAR TO A TURBINE TRIP. THE UFSAR DEFINES LOSSES TO 50% AT FULL POWER TO BE WITHIN NORMAL PLANT DESIGN. SINCE THE DESIGN CRITERIA LIMITS BLOWDOWN CAPACITY TO 7% AT FULL POWER; THEREFORE, THE SUDDEN BLOWDOWN ZSOLATXON EVENT ANALYSIS ZS NOT CONSIDERED.

THIS MODIFICATION IS NON-SEISMIC SINCE IT DOES NOT EFFECT THE SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE REACTOR.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT INCREASE THE FIRE LOADING ZN FIRE AREAS CONTAINING SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT OR DEGRADE EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION BECAUSE OF REQUIREMENT IN SECTION 27.0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA. ANALYSIS NECESSARY TO ASSURE CONTINUAL COMPLIANCE WITH lOCFR50g APPENDIX R HAS BEEN THE PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF A FIRE REQUIRED'HEREFORE, AFFECTING COLD SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT ARE UNCHANGED.

HIGH ENERGY LINE PIPE BREAKS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY REQUIRING THAT ALL EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT WILL BE PROTECTED CONSISTENT WITH REFERENCE 2.2.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GINNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ZT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. ZT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES~ SYSTEMS~ AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4350 MFW AND FW BYPASS VALVE INDICATION THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION TO INSTALL VALVE POSITION SENSORS FOR THE MAIN FEEDWATER AND FEEDWATER BYPASS VALVES (V4269g V4270g V4271g AND V4272) AND ASSOCIATED POSITION INDICATION DISPLAYED ON THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD.

THIS EWR WAS ISSUED AS A RESULT OF HUMAN ENGINEERING DIS-CREPANCY HED-65 WHICH CITED A NEED FOR ACTUAL VALVE POSITION INDICATION ON THE MCB RATHER THAN THE CONTROLLER DEMAND SIGNAL INDICATION.

DUE TO PRE PORC COMMENTS g REVISION 0 OF THE DES IGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSXS, WERE NOT .PRESENTED TO PORC.

THE PURPOSE OF REVISION l OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS ZS TO INCLUDE COMMENTS AS A RESULT OF PRE-PORC OF REVISION 0.

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A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICA-TION ARE')

MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES

2) SEISMIC EVENT

3) INCREASE ZN HEAT REMOVAL BY THE SECONDARY SYSTEM

4) DECREASE IN HEAT REMOVAL BY THE SECONDARY SYSTEM NEW WIRING AND CABLE WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THIS MODIFICATION, I

WH CH COULD ADD TO I I THE F RE LOAD NG OF THE PLANT ~ THEREFORE g THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT ALL SUCH CABLE MEET THE IEEE 383-1974 FLAME TEST REQUIREMENTS. BECAUSE OF THIS, THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN FIRE LOADING CAUSED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

REVIEWS AND/OR ANALYSES TO ASSURE CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH APPENDIX R HAVE BEEN REQUIRED. SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY FOLLOWING ALL POSTULATED FIRES'HEREFORE'ILL NOT BE JEOPARDIZED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT NEW INDICATORS INSTALLED PER THIS MODIFICATION BE MOUNTED SO AS NOT TO DEGRADE THE INTEGRITY OF THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD (MCB). THEREFORE, THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT AFFECT THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD'S SEISMIC QUALIFICATION.

THE ADDITION OF LDT'S TO THE STEM OF THE MAIN FEEDWATER AND FEEDWATER BYPASS VALVES WILL NOT DEGRADE THE VALVE'S ABILITY TO PERFORM ITS INTENDED FUNCTION. SINCE THESE VALVES ARE NOT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING A SEISMIC EVENT, THE ABILITY TO FUNCTION DURING A SEISMIC EVENT HAS NOT BEEN DEGRADED.

THE ADDITION OF MFW AND FW BYPASS VALVE INDICATION WILL AID THE OPERATOR IN MONITORING ANY INCREASE OR DECREASE ZN HEAT REMOVAL BY THE SECONDARY SYSTEM AND SHALL NOT AFFECT THE VALVES OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS.

ZT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

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i 0

EWR-4503 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER SUPPLEMENTAL UNINTERRUPTABLE POWE SUPPLY THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE INSTALLATION OF A SECOND UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (UPS) FOR THE T.S.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM. ALSO EXISTING ELECTRICAL LOADS WILL BE RE-DISTRIBUTED IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE EVEN BUS LOADING.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GZNNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDES 1.29 AND 1.70. EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODZF1CA-TION ARE MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES AND A SEISMIC EVENT.

MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY THE DESIGN CRITERIA WILL NOT DEGRADE FUNCTIONS OR PERFORMANCE OF ANY STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'R COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR THE PREVENTION AND MITIGATION OF ACCIDENTS OR ANY OTHER NON SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES ~ SYSTEMS g OR COMPONENTS.

THIS MODIFICATION AND THE MATERIALS UTILIZED WILL MEET APPENDIX R 10CFR50 CRITERIA. EVEN THOUGH THIS MODIFICATION INVOLVES EQUIPMENT WHICH IS NOT IDENTIFIED AS SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT.

NEW EQUIPMENT WILL NOT BE LOCATED IN ANY AREA THAT CONTAINS SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT THEREFORE, THIS MODIFICATION IS DESIGNATED NON-SEISMIC.

MODIFICATION WILL NOT DEGRADE PERFORMANCE OR FUNCTION OF ANY PLANT EQUIPMENT OR SYSTEM.

BASED UPON THE ABOVE ANALYSIS:

1) STRUCTURES g SYSTEMS ~ AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE ADEQUATE.

2) MARGIN OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATING AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GINNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES~ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE.MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

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EWR-4554 4A AND 4B FEEDWATER HEATERS REPLACEMENT THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE REPLACEMENT OF 4A AND 4B HEATERS.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO SPECIFY ~ PROCURE g AND INSTALL NEW FEEDWATER HEATERS AT THE FOURTH EXTRACTION POINT.

THE PRIMARY GOAL IS TO ELIMINATE THE COPPER ALLOY TUBES.

STAINLESS STEEL TUBES ARE RECOMMENDED.

REVISION 1 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCORPORATES CHANGES RESULTING FROM PRE-PORC COMMENTS OF REVISION 0 TO:

1) CLARIFY THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 75 PSI TUBE SIDE PRESSURE DROP

2) ADD ADDITIONAL INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS IN DESIGN CRITERIA

3) CLARIFY REFERENCES AND TEST REQUIREMENTS

4) ADD ASME CODE

5) ADD ACCESS ZBILITY~ MAINTENANCEg REPAIRS AND INSERVI CE INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS IN DESIGN CRITERIA A REVIEW HAS BEEN PERFORMED OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE A DECREASE IN FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE, AND A LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLOW.

THE DECREASE ZN FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE EVENT ZS ANALYZED IN THE UFSAR AS AN ACCIDENTAL OPENI NG OF THE CONDENSATE BYPASS VALVEg WHICH RESULTED IN A SUDDEN REDUCTION IN INLET FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE TO THE STEAM GENERATORS.

THE MODIFICATION HAS NO BEARING ON CONDENSATE BYPASS VALVE OPERATION OR PLANT RESPONSE TO THIS EVENT. A REDUCTION IN FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE WHICH RESULTED FROM A LOSS OF ONE FEEDWATER HEATER HAS BEEN ANALYZED IN UFSAR. THE ANALYSZS SHOWED THAT FOR A FEEDWATER ENTHALPY DECREASE CORRESPONDING TO THE LOSS OF ONE FEEDWATER HEATER AT FULL POWER MZNZMUM DNBR DOES NOT FALL BELOW THE LIMIT VALUE. AT ZERO POWER THE RESULTS ARE LESS LIMITING THAN THOSE PRESENTED IN UFSAR SECTION 15.4.1, UNCONTROLLED ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY WITHDRAWAL FROM A SUBCRITICAL CONDITION.

THE LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLOW ZS ANALYZED IN THE UFSAR AS A DISRUPTION OF SECONDARY SYSTEM HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY.

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THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT INCREASE THE'ROBABILITY OF THE DISRUPTION AS A RESULT OF CONDENSATE LINE BREAKS SINCE THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES PROPER INSPECTION AND TESTING OF NEW WELDS. THE PROBABILITY OF A LOSS OF FEEDWATER THROUGH DEGRADATION OF HEATER TUBES IS REDUCED BY REMOVING THE EXISTING ERODED COPPER TUBING.

THIS MODIFICATION ZS NON-SEISMIC SINCE IT DOES NOT EFFECT THE SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE REACTOR.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT INCREASE THE FIRE LOADING IN FIRE AREAS CONTAINING SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT OR DEGRADE EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION BECAUSE OF REQUIREMENTS IN SECTION 27.0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GINNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES~ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4638 GENERATOR 1 SURGE CAPACITORS AND NEUTRAL TRANSFORMER REPLACEMENT THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE REPLACEMENT OF THE NEUTRAL TRANSFORMER AND SURGE CAPACITORS CONTAINING PCBs. THESE COMPONENTS WILL BE REPLACED WITH SIMILAR COMPONENTS NOT CONTAINING PCBs.

REVISION 2 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCORPORATES CHANGE FROM REVISION 1 TO SPECIFY INSTALLATION TESTS TO BE PERFORMED ON THE COMPONENTS. REVISION 1 DID NOT SPECIFY THE TEST TO BE PERFORMED.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL THE EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR 'AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES'OXIC GAS RELEASES'ND LOSS OF ELECTRICAL LOAD.

NO NEW WIRING OR CABLE IS REQUIRED FOR THIS MODIFICATION.

THEREFORE, THERE WILL BE NO INCREASE OF FIRE LOADING DUE TO THIS MODIFICATION.

REVIEWS AND/OR ANALYSES TO ASSURE CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH APPENDIX R HAVE BEEN REQUIRED'AFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY FOLLOWING ALL POSTULATED FIRES'HEREFORE'ILL NOT BE JEOPARDIZED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION.

THEREFORE, THE POTENTIAL FOR A LOSS OF ELECTRICAL. LOAD EVENT

.CAUSED BY CAPACITOR FAILURE WILL NOT BE INCREASED.

42

THEREFORE g THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. THE 'ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS/

AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE INCREASED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS WILL NOT BE CREATED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.

THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED XN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILL NOT BE REDUCED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICA-TION.

THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION OR REQUIRE A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE.

EWR-4651 CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLE CABLES THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSING THE MODIFICATION OF THE CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLE CABLES TO PROVIDE FOR ALARA AND PERSONNEL SAFETY CONCERNS.

EWR 465 1 ~ CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLE (CET) CABLES g REQUESTS THE PURCHASE AND INSTALLATION OF EXTENSION CABLES AT THE BOUNDARY OF THE REACTOR HEAD AND REACTOR CAVITY BRIDGE CABLE TRAYS AT GINNA STATION FOR THE 1988 REFUELING OUTAGE. QUICK CONNECTORS INSTALLED ON THE CET CABLES AT THIS LOCATION ARE DETACHED EACH YEAR FOR REFUELING TO PERMIT LIFTING THE REACTOR HEAD FROM THE REFUELING CAVITY. THE CABLES INSTALLED IN 1983, WHICH RUN FROM THE BRIDGE CABLE TRAY DOWN TO THE THERMOCOUPLES, FALL APPROXIMATELY SIX FEET SHORT OF THE BRIDGE CABLE TRAY. AS A RESULT, THE CET QUICK CONNECTORS HANG SEVERAL FEET BELOW THE BRIDGE CABLE TRAY AND POSE ACCESSIBILITY, ALARA', AND SAFETY CONCERNS. THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS EWR IS TO PLACE THE CET QUICK CONNECTORS FOR REFUELING INTO THE BRIDGE CABLE TRAY WHERE THEY CAN BE ACCESSED CONVENIENTLY AND SAFELY.

REVISION 2 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCOR-PORATES CHANGES FROM REVISION 1 TO CORRECT THE POST INSTALL-ATION TESTING REQUIREMENTS FOR SYSTEM VERXFICATXON.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. G-UIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE (1)

MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES~ (2) A SEISMIC EVENT~ (3) A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT .(LOCA) ~

43

NEW CET EXTENSION CABLE ASSEMBLIES WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THIS MODIFICATION WHICH COULD ADD TO THE FIRE LOADING OF THE PLANT. THEREFORE'HE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT ALL SUCH CABLE ASSEMBLIES MEET THE IEEE-383-1974 FLAME TEST REQUIREMENTS. BECAUSE OF THIS THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OF FIRE LOADING CAUSED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

THIS MODIFICATION HAS BEEN REVIEWED TO ENSURE THAT FAILURE OF ANY ELECTRICAL CABLE INSTALLED AS A PART OF THZS MODIFICATION WILL NOT RESULT ZN THE DISABLING OF VITAL EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO SAFELY SHUT DOWN THE PLANT DURING POSTULATED FIRES.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT NEW CET EXTENSION CABLE ASSEMBLIES INSTALLED UNDER THIS MODIFICATION BE QUALIFIED PER ZEEE 344 1975'HEREFORE'HIS MODIFICATION WILL REMAIN FUNCTIONAL DURING AND AFTER A SEISMIC EVENT.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT THE NEW CET EXTENSION CABLE ASSEMBLIES INSTALLED UNDER THIS EWR BE QUALIFIED PER IEEE 323 1974 AND IEEE 383 1974 FOR FLAME AND LOCAL THEREFORE'HIS MODIFICATION SHALL REMAIN FUNCTIONAL DURING AND AFTER A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT.

THEREFORE, THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

EWR-4653 STEAM GENERATOR WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATION

'

THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST ADDRESSES THE ADDITION OF STEAM GENERATOR WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATION ON THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD.

THIS MODIFICATION WILL INSTALL TWO NEW VERTICAL SCALE INDICATORS TO DISPLAY STEAM GENERATOR WIDE RANGE WATER LEVEL ON THE MCB. THE EXISTING CHART RECORDER LR-460 WILL BE RETAINED FOR RECORD KEEPING AND TO SERVE AS A BACKUP LEVEL INDICATOR. THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT ALTER THE AVAILABILITY OF THE EXISTING CHART RECORDERS.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG.

GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE (1)

MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES AND (2) A SEISMIC EVENT.

NEW WIRING AND CABLE MAY BE REQUIRED FOR THE MODIFICATION WHICH COULD ADD TO THE FIRE LOADING OF THE PLANT, THEREFORE THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT ALL SUCH CABLE MEET THE IEEE-383-1974 FLAME TEST REQUIREMENTS. BECAUSE OF THIS, THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE.OF FIRE LOADING CAUSED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

44

AN APPENDIX R CONFORMANCE REVIEW SHALL BE PREPARED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS IS MAINTAINED.

THIS MODIFICATION HAS BEEN REVIEWED TO ENSURE THAT FAILURE OF ANY ELECTRICAL CABLE INSTALLED AS PART OF THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT RESULT IN THE DISABLING OF VITAL EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO SAFELY SHUTDOWN THE PLANT DURING POSTULATED FIRES.

THE STEAM GENERATOR (SG) WIDE RANGE WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENT-ATION ZS DESIGNATED SEISMIC CATEGORY 1. THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES ALL NEW SG WIDE RANGE LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION BE QUALIFIED AND INSTALLED PER 'ZEEE-344-1975. THEREFORE, A SEISMIC EVENT WILL NOT IMPAIR THE PROPER OPERATION OF THE SG WIDE RANGE WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENTATZON.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES A HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW OF THIS MODIFICATION BE PERFORMED PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF DESIGN OUTPUTS, TO MINIMIZE THE PROBABILITY OF OPERATOR ERROR.

THE ITEMS ABOVE ENSURE THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT DEGRADE THE CAPABILITY OF ANY SAFETY SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS FUNCTION.

THE ASSUMPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF EXISTING ANALYSES ARE UNCHANGED. NO NEW TYPES OF EVENTS ARE POSTULATED.

THE ACCURACY AND READABILITY OF THE NEW INDICATORS ARE AS GOOD OR BETTER THAN THE EXISTING RECORDER. THEREFORE, THE INDICATION UNCERTAINTY ZS AS GOOD OR BETTER THAN THE EXISTING SYSTEM.

THEREFORE, THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF

. ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF 10CFR50.59, THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVZEWED SAFETY QUESTION BECAUSE:

1) THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT ZS NOT INCREASED.

THE INDICATORS ADDED TO THE MCB DO NOT PROVIDE ANY AUTOMATIC CONTROL FUNCTION. THEY ARE REDUNDANT TO THE EXISTING CHART RECORDERS'UT PROVIDE A MORE READABLE INDICATION TO THE OPERATOR. THESE INDICATORS ARE SEISMIC CLASS 1E AND WILL NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF FAILURE OF THE MCB OR ADJACENT INDICATORS DUE TO A SEISMIC EVENT. AN APPENDIX R CONFORMANCE REVIEW WILL DEMONSTRATE CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS.

45

2) THE POSSIBILITY FOR AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS IS NOT CREATED.

AS DISCUSSED ABOVE g THESE INDICATORS ARE IN ADDITION TO THE EXISTING CHART RECORDERS AND ARE CLASSIFIED lE.

THIS ADDITION TO THE MCB WILL NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A FAILURE NOT PREVIOUSLY ANALYZED.

3) THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED ZN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IS NOT REDUCED.

THE ADDED INDICATORS PROVIDE A MORE CLEAR INDICATION AND INCREASE THE ABILITY OF THE OPERATOR TO MONITOR WIDE RANGE LEVEL. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY ZS NOT AFFECTED BY

.THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4656 LOWER INTERNALS STORAGE STAND MODIFI'CATIONS PHASE II THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATIONS TO THE REACTOR VESSEL LOWER INTERNALS STORAGE STAND.

THIS MODIFICATION INVOLVES AN ADDITIONAL MODIFICATION TO THE LOWER INTERNALS STORAGE STAND SUBSEQUENT TO THE CHANGES DESCRIBED IN THE ORIGINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS.

A. THIS MODIFICATION MOVES THE EASTERN SUPPORT COLUMN 1/2 INCH OUTWARD (AWAY FORM THE CENTER OF THE SUPPORT STAND) IN ORDER TO PROVIDE MORE CLEARANCE FOR THE LOWER INTERNALS. THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED BY ADDING ONE ADDITIONAL HALF-INCH THICK SPACER PLATE ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH SUPPORT COLUMNS. THE SPACER PLATES WILL BE BETWEEN THE SUPPORT COLUMNS AND THE UPPER AND LOWER CONNECTION SUPPORT RINGS.

THIS ANALYSIS REVIEWS UNDER WHAT PLANT OPERATING CONDITION THE LOWER INTERNALS STORAGE HARDWARE WILL BE IN USE'ND DETER-MINES WHAT DESIGN BASIS EVENTS ARE RELATED TO THE USE OF THE MODIFIED HARDWARE.

THE FOLLOWING DESIGN BASIS EVENTS ARE RELATED TO THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION: SEISMIC EVENTS AND FIRES.

THE LOWER INTERNALS STORAGE STAND MAY BE LEFT IN POSITION ON THE LOWER LEVEL OF THE REACTOR CAVITY. THE LOCATION OF THE LOWER INTERNALS STORAGE STAND IS NOT ADZACENT TO ANY SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM OR COMPONENT. THE LOWER INTERNALS STORAGE STAND'S LOW CENTER OF GRAVITY, WIDE BASE COMBINED WITH THE COEFFICIENT OF FRICTION ARE SUFFICIENT TO ENSURE THAT THE STAND WILL REMAIN IN PLACE DURING BOTH THE OPERATING BASIS AND SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKES.

46

THE MATERIALS TO BE USED ZN THIS PROPOSED MODIFICATION ZS STAINLESS STEEL WHICH ZS NON-COMBUSTIBLES IT WILL NOT CHANGE THE FREQUENCY OR RESULTS OF ANY FIRE THAT ZS POSTULATED.

BASED ON THE FOREGOING, THE MODIFICATIONS WILL CAUSE NO CHANGES TO THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE .LIFE OF THE STATION.

THE MODIFICATIONS WILL NOT CHANGE THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, OR COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS.

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZN'HE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT ARE NOT CHANGED.

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY ZN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS HAS NOT BEEN CREATED.

THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE A CHANGE TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

EWR-4670 M -483 ZNVERTER REPLACEMENT THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE REPLACEMENT OF THE EXISTING MQ-483 INVERTER WITH A NEW QUALIFIED ONE.

REVISION 2 OF THE DESIGN CRXTERIA STATES THE SOLID STATE CONTROLS, INC. (SCX) INVERTER IS PART NO. EV 12004/5 AS OPPOSED TO PART 12004 AS WELL AS QUALIFYING IEEE 383-1974 AS THE STANDARD USED FOR BOTH THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS' REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA FSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY THE USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE:

'1) SEISMIC EVENT

2) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES

3) INCREASE/DECREASE ZN HEAT REMOVAL BY THE SECONDARY SYSTEM

4) PIPE BREAKS INSIDE CONTAINMENT SECTION 3.0 AND 9.0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRE THAT THE NEW MQ-483 ZNVERTER BE SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED TO GINNA SPECIFIC SEISMIC RESPONSE SPECTRA.

ZN ADDITION, ZT IS REQUIRED THAT THE INVERTER BE. MOUNTED TO PREVENT SEISMIC FAILURE.

47

THIS MODIFICATION INVOLVES THE REPLACEMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND MAY INVOLVE THE INSTALLATION OF CABLE IN THE RELAY ROOM FIRE AREA. ZF NEW CABLE ZS TO BE INSTALLED' REVIEW WILL BE PERFORMED TO ASSURE CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50, APPENDIX R.

WIRING AND EQUIPMENT WILL BE INSTALLED IN COMPLIANCE WITH EE-29.

ALL NEW CABLING, IF REQUIRED, WILL BE QUALIFIED TO IEEE 383-1984 FLAME TEST REQUIREMENTS'IRE BARRIER PENETRATZONS WILL BE REPAIRED AND REPLACED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING PLANT PROCEDURES'OT DEGRADING EXISTING SEALS.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT AFFECT THE SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS IN THE APPENDIX R SUBMITTAL FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A) THE MODIFICATION INVOLVES EQUIPMENT WHICH IS NOT IDENTIFIED AS SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT IN TABLE 3-1 OF THE APPENDIX R SUBMITTAL.

B) THERE IS NO EFFECT ON SEPARATION OF EXISTING CIRCUITS/

ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS, OR FIRE AREA BOUNDARIES AS ANALYZED IN THE APPENDIX R SUBMITTAL.

THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT EFFECT THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM. THERE SHALL BE NO EFFECT ON EXISTING PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING AN ALTERNATE SAFE SHUTDOWN~

THEREBY COMPLYING WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX R.

INSTRUMENT LOOP P479 MONITORS STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT MODIFY THE INSTRUMENT LOOP.

SINCE THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT THE REPLACEMENT INVERTER ADDS NO NEW FAILURE MODES BEYOND THOSE OF THE EXISTING INVERTER, THE INTEGRITY OF LOOP P479 WILL BE UNAFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION. THEREFORE, NO NEW INSTRUMENT ERRORS OR FAILURES WILL BE INTRODUCED THAT COULD LEAD TO AN INCREASE OR DECREASE ZN SECONDARY SYSTEM HEAT REMOVAL.

INSTRUMENT LOOP P950 MONITORS CONTAINMENT PRESSURE. THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT MODIFY THE INSTRUMENT LOOP. SINCE THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT THE REPLACEMENT INVERTER ADDS NO NEW FAILURE MODES BEYOND THOSE OF THE EXISTING INVERTERg THE INTEGRITY OF LOOP P950 WILL BE UNAFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION. THEREFORE, NO NEW INSTRUMENT ERRORS OR FAILURES WILL BE INTRODUCED THAT COULD'.LEAD TO A FALSE INDICATION OF CONTAINMENT PRESSURE DURING A PIPE BREAK.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT DEGRADE THE CAPABILITY OF ANY SAFETY SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS FUNCTION. THE ASSUMPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF EXISTING ANALYSES ARE UNCHANGED. NO NEW TYPES OF EVENTS ARE POSTULATED.

48

0 BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GZNNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS'T HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED. ZT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE'DEQUACY OF STRUCTURES~ SYSTEMSJ AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

EWR-4750 CONTAINMENT FANS 1B 1D DAMPER SOLENOID ISOLATION FUSES THIS ENGXNEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE ADDITION OF ISOLATION FUSES TO THE LOOP ENTRY DAMPER SOLENOID VALVE CIRCUITS FOR CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION FANS 1B AND 1D.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1) SEISMIC EVENT

2) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES

3) PIPE BREAKS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

4) BREAK IN RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY LINES THAT PENETRATE CONTAINMENT THE NEW FUSE BLOCKS WILL BE SEISMICALLY MOUNTED AND THEREFORE WILL ENSURE A SEISMIC EVENT WILL NOT DEGRADE THE INTEGRITY OF BUS 16 UNIT 13C OR BUS 14 UNIT 2C ENCLOSURES ZN WHICH THE FUSES ARE MOUNTED.

THE MODIFICATION ZS DESIGNED TO COMPLY WITH 10CFR APPENDIX R CRITERIA AND ENGINEERING PROCEDURES. THEREFORE, THE PROBABILITY OF A MAJOR OR MINOR FIRE WILL NOT BE INCREASED.

THE FOLLOWING DESIGN BASIS EVENTS (DBE) WILL NOT AFFECT OR BE AFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION. ANY DBE THAT CAUSES A LEAD-TO-LEAD SHORT IN THE DAMPER SOLENOID VALVE CIRCUIT WILL CAUSE THE DAMPER'SOLENOID VALVE CIRCUIT FUSES TO FAIL. FUSE COORDINATION ASSURES THAT THESE FUSES WILL FAIL BEFORE SHE MAIN FAN CONTROL FUSES. THEREFORE, LOSS OF FANS 1B AND 1Dg DURING ANY DBE DUE TO A LEAD-TO-LEAD SHORT IN THE DAMPER SOLENOID VALVE CIRCUIT, WILL NOT OCCUR.

BASED UPON THE ABOVE ANALYSIS:

1) STRUCTURES ~ SYSTEMS g AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE ADEQUATE.

2) MARGIN OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATING AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED.

49

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GZNNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES@ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4754 CABLE RELOCATIONS THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE UPGRADING OF SEVERAL CIRCUIT SPLICES IN THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING AND RELOCATION OF CABLES ABOVE THE CONTAINMENT FLOOD LEVEL.

REVISION 42 ADDS A FIRE PROTECTION REQUIREMENT. CABLES AND SPLICES SHALL MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF ZEEE 383-1974.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN,THE GINNA FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY THE USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE:

1) SEISMIC EVENT

2) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES

3) PIPE BREAKS, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT ANY NEW OR RELOCATE CONDUIT BE MOUNTED TO PREVENT SEISMIC FAILURE. THEREFORE, INSTALLED CABLE SHALL REMAIN FUNCTIONAL AFTER A SEISMIC EVENT.

THIS MODIFICATION INVOLVES THE ADDITION OF NEW CABLE AND SPLICES IN CONTAINMENT AND ZN THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT ALL, NEW CABLE AND SPLICES BE QUALIFIED TO IEEE-383-1974 FLAME AND LOCA REQUIREMENTS.

FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS WILL BE REPAIRED AND REPLACED ZN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING PLANT PROCEDURES. THEREFORE, EXISTING SEALS WILL NOT BE DEGRADED.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT AFFECT THE SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS IN THE APPENDIX R SUBMITTAL SINCE THERE IS NO AFFECT ON SEPARATION OF EXISTING CIRCUITS/ ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS'R FIRE AREA BOUNDARIES AS ANALYZED IN THE APPENDIX R SUBMITTAL.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT AN APPENDIX R CONFORMANCE VERIFICATION BE PERFORMED.

THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT AFFECT THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM.'URTHERMORE, NONE OF THE EXISTING PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING AN ALTERNATIVE SAFE, SHUTDOWN WILL BE EFFECTED THIS MODIFICATIONS THEREFORE/

COMPLIES WITH 10CFR50g APPENDIX R 50

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT NEW CABLE AND SPLICES, INSTALLED AS PART OF THE CABLE RELOCATIONS, SHALL NOT AFFECT INSTRUMENT LOOP INTEGRITY'HEREFORE, NO NEW FAILURE MODES SHALL BE INTRODUCED INTO THE INSTRUMENT LOOPS.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA COLLECTIVELY REQUIRES ALL CABLES TO BE RELOCATED'O UTILIZE MATERIAL AND CONFIGURATIONS APPROVED UNDER lOCFR50.49'ND CALIBRATION OF EACH LOOP'O ENSURE THAT LOOP FUNCTION ZS NOT AFFECTED'HAT LOOP ACCURACY BE ADDRESSED, AND VERIFIED AS ACCEPTABLE, IN THE SYSTEM ZN>>

TEGRATED PACKAGES. THEREFORE, LOOP ACCURACY SHALL NOT BE DEGRADED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

ALL MATERIAL AND CONFIGURATIONS UTILIZED UNDER THIS MODIFICA-TION SHALL BE APPROVED UNDER 10CFR50.49. THEREFORE, PIPE BREAKS INSIDE OR OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT~ THAT CREATE A LOCA, HELBg SLB~ ETC'HALL NOT DEGRADE THE INTEGRITY OF SPLICES OR CABLES USED IN THIS MODIFICATION.

THE ABOVE ITEMS ENSURE THAT THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT DEGRADE THE CAPABILITY OF ANY SAFETY SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS FUNCTION. THE ASSUMPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF EXISTING ANALYSIS ARE UNCHANGED. NO NEW TYPES OF EVENTS ARE POSTU-LATED.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR, THE STRUCTURAL REANALYSIS PLAN (SRP) AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4761 HIGH HEAD RECIRCULATION EVALUATION THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE INTERCHANGING OF THE POWER AND CONTROL POWER WIRING OF MOVs 857A AND 857B. A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY NRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATING TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE FZREg SEISMIC'OCAL AND LOSS OF POWER EVENTS'HE FIRST EVENT ANALYZED ZS THE EFFECT OF A SEISMIC EVENT.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THE MODIFICATION TO BE SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 THEREFORE'HE MODIFICATION WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SYSTEM DURING A SEISMIC EVENT.

THE SECOND EVENT ANALYZED ZS THE EFFECT OF A FIRE ZN THE PLANT DUE TO THIS MODIFICATION.. THE CONTROL WIRING USED FOR MODIFICATION IS, REQUIRED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF IEEE STD'83-1974 FLAME TEST. THUS THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE FIRE LOADING DUE TO THIS MODIFICATION.

51.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA PROVIDES REQUIREMENTS TO PRESERVE ANY SILZCONE FOAM FIRE STOP OR SEAL THAT MAY NEED TO BE PENETRATED.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUXRES AN APPENDIX R REVIEW. THEREFORE, THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT AFFECT EXISTING COMPLIANCE METHODS.

THE THIRD EVENT ANALYZED IS THE EFFECT OF A LOCA. DURING THE SUMP RECIRCULATION PHASE FOLLOWING A LOCA, IF HIGH HEAD RECIRCULATION IS NECESSARY (IN CURRENT PROCEDURES WHEN RHR TOTAL IS LESS THAN 400 GPM)g THE 857Ag Bg C VALVES MUST BE OPENED. PRESENT PROCEDURE ES-1.3 CALLS FOR STARTING RHR PUMPS ALIGNED TO THE SUMP AND DISCHARGING TO THE REACTOR THROUGH THE MOV 852Ag B VALVES PRIOR TO OPENING 857A, B, C IF HIGH HEAD RECIRCULATION IS REQUIRED. SINGLE FAILURE CRITERIA REQUIRES THE TIMING OF THE ACTIVE FAILURE TO OCCUR AT THE BEGINNING OF THE HIGH HEAD RECIRCULATION PHASE., A FAILURE OF D/G 1A PRIOR OPENING THE 857 VALVES WOULD RESULT IN BOTH TRAINS LEADING TO THE SAFETY INJECTION/CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS BEING BLOCKED AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF CORE COOLING.

THIS IS THE PROBLEM WHICH WILL BE CORRECTED THRU THIS MODIFICATION.

THE FOURTH EVENT ANALYZED ZS THE EFFECT OF A LOSS OF POWER ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE VALVES. AS STATED IN THE PREVIOUS PARAGRAPH A FAILURE OF D/G lA PRIOR TO OPENING THE 857 VALVES WOULD RESULT IN BOTH TRAINS LEADING TO THE SAFETY INJECTION/CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS BEING BLOCKED AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF CORE COOLING. THIS WILL BE CORRECTED BY'HIS MODIFICATION. THEREFORE BASED UPON THE ABOVE ANALYSIS, ZT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT:

A) THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED AND B) THE STRUCTURES g SYSTEMS g AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE ADEQUATE.

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT ARE NOT INCREASED.

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A TYPE DIFFERENT FROM ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS HAS NOT BEEN CREATED.

THE MARGINS OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ZS NOT REDUCED.

52

EWR-4769 SAFEGUARDS RACK SI RELAYS THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE REMOVAL OF UNUSED RELAYS FROM THE SAFEGUARDS RACKS.

ALL BFD RELAYS, USED FOR SAFEGUARDS INITIATION LOCATED IN THE RELAY ROOM SAFEGUARDS RACKS'RE BEING REPLACED ZN ACCORDANCE WITH MAINTENANCE~ PROCEDURE M 59 ' 'IXTEEN OF THESE RELAYS ARE UNUSED AND REPRESENT AN UNNECESSARY EXPOSURE TO FAILURE FOR THE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS. THE EIGHT UNUSED RELAY COILS IN EACH TRAIN ARE CONTROLLED BY THE SAME FUSES CONTROLLING ALL THE OTHER OPERATING SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS.

THEREFORE, A COIL FAILURE IN ANY OF THESE UNITS COULD KEEP THE SAFETY INJECTION SEQUENCE FROM BEING INITIATED. THE RELAYS BEING REMOVED SERVE NO FUNCTIONAL PURPOSE. ONE OF THE TWO COIL LEADS FOR 6 OF THESE RELAYS WERE DISCONNECTED AS PART OF EWR 2950. THE REMAINING 10 RELAYS HAVE ALL UNUSED CONTACTS. COIL WIRING IS ACCOMPLISHED BY USE OF JUMPER CONNECTIONS FROM COIL TO COIL. SOME OF THESE WIRES CAN BE REMOVED WHILE PORTIONS OF OTHERS WILL BE NEEDED TO MAKE UP REMAINING CONNECTIONS.

A REVXEW ..HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENT RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION IS FIRE.

NEW WIRING WILL BE REQUXRED FOR THIS MODIFICATION WHICH COULD ADD TO THE FIRE LOADING OF THE PLANT, AND BECAUSE OF THIS POTENTIALS THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES ALL SUCH WIRE MEET THE ZEEE-383-1974 FLAME TEST REQUIREMENTS. THEREFORE, THIS MODIFICATION WILL CAUSE NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE ZN FIRE PROPAGATION HAZARD.

AS A RESULT, THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT WILL BE UNCHANGED. THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO EVALUATED ZN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL BE SAFETY'REVIOUSLY UNCHANGED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION. IN FACT, BECAUSE EQUIPMENT CONNECTED TO SAFETY INJECTION CIRCUITS (ALTHOUGH IT SERVES NO FUNCTIONAL PURPOSE) IS BEING REMOVED, THE PROBABILITY OF MALFUNCTIONING OF THE SZ CIRCUITRY ZS REDUCED.

THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR A MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS WILL NOT BE CREATED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION. THIS MODIFICATION IS BEING PERFORMED TO REMOVE EXCESS RELAYS FROM THE RELAY RACKS THUS REMOVING FROM THE CIRCUITS A PIECE OF EQUIPMENT THAT COULD MALFUNCTION.

53

THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILL NOT BE REDUCED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.

~EWR-478 TDAFP STEAM ADMISSION VALVES THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH REWXRES THE CONTROL CIRCUIT TO SEAL ZN AROUND THE CONTROL SWITCH SO THAT WHEN THE CIRCUIT IS ENERGIZE TO OPEN THE VALVE WILL CONTINUE TO OPEN TO THE FULLY OPEN POSITION.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION (1) FIRES AND (2) SEISMIC EVENTS'ND (3) LOSS OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER.

THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY OR IMPACT ON THE LEVEL OF FIRE PROTECTION AND ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES, NOR THE FIRE PROTECTION AND ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN LICENSE CONDITIONS AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

ADDITIONAL WIRING AND CABLE WILL BE ADDED IN THIS MODIFICATION, WHICH COULD ADD TO THE FXRE LOADXNG OF THE PLANT ~ THEREFORE'HE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT ALL SUCH WIRING AND CABLE MEET THE XEEE 383-1974 FLAME TEST REQUIREMENTS. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OF FIRE LOADING CAUSED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT INCREASE THE IMPACT OF A SEISMIC EVENT. THE DESIGN OF THE MODIFICATION SHALL BE SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DESIGN CRITERIA.

. THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT INCREASE THE IMPACT OF LOSS OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER. THE DESIGN OF THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT ALTER THE MANUAL OR AUTOMATIC OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM. REQUIRING THE VALVE TO GO FULL OPEN ONCE THE CIRCUIT XS ENERGIZED VS. HAVING ZT STOP WHEN THE SWITCH IS RELEASED MAKES MANUAL AND AUTOMATIC ACTUATION SIMILAR. THIS DOES NOT ADVERSELY IMPACT THE SYSTEM.

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY, PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE INCREASED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY XN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE CREATED BY THIS PROPOSED MODIFICATION.

THE MARGIN, OF 'SAFETY AS DEFINED ZN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILL NOT BE REDUCED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.

54

t>>

THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION OR REQUIRE A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE.

EWR-4794 SECURITY GATE REPLACEMENT THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE REPLACEMENT OF FIVE (5) EXISTING SECURITY GATE OPERATORS AND THE OUTER CANTILEVER VEHICLE GATE AT THE SHIPPING AND RECEIVING BUILDING WITH AN OVERHEAD SLIDE GATE. SUPPORTS WILL ALSO BE ADDED TO EXISTING GATES TO REDUCE VIBRATIONS.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO IMPROVE SECURITY GATE RELIABILITYAND MAINTAINABILITY.

EXCESSIVE VIBRATION IN THE SECURITY GATES HAS CONTINUALLY BEEN THE SOURCE OF PROBLEMS FOR THE SECURITY INTRUSION DETECTORS. DURING HIGH WINDS THE EXCESS SECURITY GATE VIBRATIONS TRIP THE SECURITY E-FIELD. THIS RESULTS IN THE NECESSITY FOR SECURITY PERSONNEL TO PATROL THE AREA.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY NRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE ONLY EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS, SPECIFICALLY NATURAL EVENTS AND LOSS OF AC.

FIRE ALL CABLE AND WIRE ORDERED FOR THIS MODIFICATION SHALL MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF ZEEE 383-1974 FLAME TEST, THUS MITIGATING ANY POTENTIAL FOR PROPAGATING A FIRE.

EARTHQUAKE DURING A SEISMIC EVENT, THE SECURITY GATE MODIFICATION WILL HAVE NO SAFETY FUNCTION, AND NEED NOT REMAIN FUNCTIONAL.

LOSS OF AC THIS MODIFICATION SHALL BE REVIEWED SO AS TO ENSURE THE ISOLATION OF CLASS 1E AND NON-CLASS lE SYSTEMS. THE SECURITY GATE SYSTEM SOURCE OF POWER IS FROM A NON-SAFEGUARDS BUS, WITH A STANDBY POWER SOURCE DEDICATED TO THE SECURITY SYSTEM. THEREFORE, THE CLASS lE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM ZS NOT EFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR" AND THE STRUCTURAL RE-ANALYSIS PLAN (SRP), ZT HAS BgEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES g SYSTEMS J AND COMPONENTS PROVI DED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

55

'U EWR-4798 SOLENOID UPGRADE THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE INSTALLATION OF BLOCKING DIODES ON SELECTED SOLENOID VALVE COILS TO PROVIDE PROTECTION AGAINST VOLTAGE TRANSIENTS DUE TO AN INDUCTIVE KICK BACK. THE DIODES ARE A RETROFIT'ROVIDED'BY THE VALVE MANUFACTURERS VALCORg AND WXLL BE INSTALLED ACROSS THE SOLENOID COILS OF THE MAINSTEAM ISOLATION AND REACTOR HEAD VENT VALVES.

REVISION 1 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCLUDES THE INSTALLATION OF DIODE ASSEMBLIES ACROSS THE HYDROGEN MONITORING SYSTEM SOLENOIDSg V921g V922~ V923 AND V924 ~

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GZNNA STATION UFSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG.

GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE (1)

MAiTOR AND MINOR FIRES~ (2) A SEISMIC EVENT~ (3) A MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK.

CABLE REQUIRED FOR THIS MODIFICATION COULD ADD TO THE FIRE LOADING OF THE PLANT. THEREFORE, THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT ALL SUCH CABLE MEET THE IEEE-383-1974 FLAME TEST REQUIREMENTS. BECAUSE OF THIS THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OF FIRE LOADING CAUSED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

THIS MODIFICATION HAS BEEN REVIEWED TO ENSURE THAT FAILURE OF ANY ELECTRICAL CABLE INSTALLED AS PART OF THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT RESULT IN THE DISABLING OF VITAL EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO SAFELY SHUT DOWN THE PLANT DURING POSTULATED FIRES.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT NEW RECTIFIER ASSEMBLIES INSTALLED UNDER THIS MODIFICATION BE QUALIFIED PER IEEE 344-1975'HEREFORE'HIS MODIFICATION WILL REMAIN FUNCTIONAL DURING AND AFTER A SEISMXC EVENT.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT THE NEW RECTIFIER ASSEMBLIES INSTALLED UNDER THIS EWR BE QUALIFIED PER IEEE 323 THIS MODIFICATION SHALL REMAIN FUNCTIONAL DURING 1974'HEREFORE AND AFTER A MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK.

THEREFORE, THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY, PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE INCREASED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.

56

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR A MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS WILL NOT BE CREATED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.

THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILL NOT BE REDUCED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.

THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVZEWED SAFETY QUESTION OR REQUIRE A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSARg IT 'HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES ~ SYSTEMS ~ AND COMPONENTS PROVI DED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4862 NIS TRIP BYPASS THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE REPLACEMENT OF THE EXISTING 108% OVERPOWER TRIP FUNCTION TEST RELAY PUSHBUTTON SWITCHES WITH MAINTAINABLE TYPE SWITCHES.

MAINTAINABLE TYPE SWITCHES ARE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN ENERGIZATZON OF THE TEST RELAYS WHICH DEENERGIZE THE REACTOR TRIP BISTABLE RELAYS DURING MAINTENANCE OF THE 108% OVERPOWER NIS POWER RANGE CHANNELS. DEENERGIZING EACH TRAIN'S 108%

OVERPOWER REACTOR TRIP BISTABLE RELAY DURING CHANNEL MAINTENANCE PLACES THE CHANNEL IN THE TRIP MODE WHICH SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS OF GINNA TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

THE EXISTING REACTOR TRIP RELAY LOGIC OF THE 108% OVERPOWER NIS POWER RANGE CHANNELS AT GINNA STATION CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING:

EACH OF THE FOUR 108% OVERPOWER NIS POWER RANGE CHANNELS HAVE A TEST RELAY ON EACH TRAIN UTILIZED FOR DEENERGIZING THE 108% OVERPOWER REACTOR TRIP BISTABLE RELAYS. EXISTING MOMENTARY TYPE SWITCHES, LOCATED ZN THE RELAY LOGIC TEST RACKS (RLTR1g RLTR2) IN THE RELAY ROOMp ENERGIZE THE TEST RELAYS WHICH DEENERGIZE THE 108% OVERPOWER REACTOR TRIP BISTABLE RELAYS PLACING THE CHANNEL IN THE TRIP MODE. THE EXISTING SWITCHES ARE PANEL MOUNT~ SINGLE POLE~ MOMENTARY PUSHBUTTON TYPE.

THE FOUR EXISTING MOMENTARY PUQHBUTTON TYPE SWITCHES ON EACH OF BOTH TRAINS (TOTAL OF EIGHT) WILL BE REPLACED BY MAINTAINABLE SELECTOR TYPE SWITCHES. THIS WILL ALLOW THE 108% OVERPOWER TRIP FUNCTION TEST RELAY TO REMAIN ENERGIZED AND MAINTAIN THE CHANNEL IN A TRIP MODE DURING MAINTENANCE.

57

'I A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG.

GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE (1)

MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES, (2) A SEISMIC EVENT, (3) A REACTOR OVERPOWER TRANSIENT (1084 OVERPOWER REACTOR TRIP).

NO NEW WIRINGg FIELD CABLE f OR OTHERWISE FLA1&fABLE MATERIALS WILL BE ADDED TO THE PLANT UNDER THIS MODIFICATION, THEREFORE/

NO INCREASE IN FIRE LOADING ZS IMPOSED.

THE NEW SELECTOR SWITCHES ARE DESIGNATED SEISMIC CATEGORY 1.

THEREFORE' SEISMIC EVENT WILL NOT IMPACT THE PROPER OPERATION OF THE SWITCHES.

CHANGING THE SUBJECT SWITCHES FROM MOMENTARY TO MAINTAINABLE DOES NOT AFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE NZS 1084 OVERPOWER REACTOR TRIP BECAUSE ACTUATION OF THE SWITCHES WILL PLACE THE CHANNEL IN THE TRIP MODE THEREFORE~ THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT EFFECT THE NIS RESPONSE TO AN OVERPOWER TRANSIENT.

THUS g THIS MODIFI CATION NE ITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR:

g

1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES

2) A SEiSMIC EVENT

3) A REACTOR OVERPOWER TRANSIENT (1084 OVERPOWER REACTOR TRIP)

IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4933 S G PRESSURE TUBING RELOCATION THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES MODIFICATION OF THE <<Bn STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER(S) TUBING AND SUPPORTS. THE PURPOSE OF THE MODIFICATION IS TO MITIGATE THE POTENTIAL FOR THE RECURRENCE OF FREEZING SENSOR LINES ZN THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING IN THE FOLLOWING FASHION:

1) REROUTING TUBING FOR SENSOR LINES PT-479 AND PT-483

2) THE ANALYSIS ON NEW TUBE ROUTING.

3) PROVIDE INSULATION ZF DEEMED NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE TUBING CONTENTS REMAIN ABOVE 32oF

4) PROVIDE SEISMIC RESTRAINT FOR THE AFFECTED TUBING.

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THE FOLLOWING ARE RESPONSES TO PRE-PORC COMMENTS ON EWR 4933 DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS REVISION 0.

1. COMMENT: WHY NOT ELIMINATE THE ADDITION OF THE FOUR VALVE SET-UP AND JUST REPLACE THE TUBING.

THE TUBING CAN BE PRE-RUN AND THEN THE CONNECTIONS MADE IN A SHORT TIME.

RESPONSE: THE PROPOSED DESIGN REQUIRED THAT THE VALVES BE INSTALLED DURING THE 1989 SPRING OUTAGE AND THEN PERFORM THE REMAINING MODIFICATIONS POST-OUTAGE. THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE FOR THIS APPROACH AT THE TIME WAS TO MAKE MODIFICATIONS TO THE "SYSTEM WITHOUT RENDERING ANY TRAIN INOPERABLE. BASED ON MY CONVERSATION WITH YOU ON 5/2/89, FILLING AND VENTING OF THE LINES AND RECALZBRATZON OF THE TRANSMITTERS WILL BE REQUIRED. THIS WILL CAUSE ONE LINE AT A TIME TO BE INOPERABLE.

ON THE BASIS THAT FILLING, VENTING, AND RECALIBRATZON ZS REQUIRED IT ZS PRUDENT TO ELIMINATE THE INSTALLATION OF THE VALVES.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA WILL BE REVISED TO REFLECT THIS CHANGE.

2. COMMENT: SHOULD INCLUDE INSERVZCE LEAK CHECK FOR PORTIONS OF TUBING WHXCH CANNOT BE HYDROED.

RESPONSE: THIS OPTION WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE ECN WHEN THE DRAWINGS ARE ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION.

3. COMMENT: IS THERE A MXNIMUM SLOPE REQUIREMENT FOR TUBING INSTALLATION.

RESPONSE: YES. THIS REQUIREMENT WILL BE SPECIFIED ON THE CONSTRUCTION DRAWINGS.

4. COMMENT: WHAT XS AN APPROPRIATE AIR SEAL.

RESPONSE: THE DETAILS OF AN APPROPRIATE AIR SEAL WILL BE EVALUATED DURING THE DESIGN PROCESS.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF THE DESIGN BASIS EVENTS TO DETERM1NE THOSE, RELATED TO THE MODIFICATION. THE EVENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS WORK ARE:

A) FIRES B) SEISMIC EVENTS C) BELOW FREEZING AMBIENT TEMPERATURE D) POSTULATED RUPTURE OF STEAM OR FEEDWATER LINES E) DIFFERENTIAL DISPLACEMENT OF CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE AND INTERMEDIATE BUILDING 59

THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT DEGRADE EXISTING FIRE BARRIERS OR AFFECT THE PERFORMANCE OF ANY EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT. ANY NEW MATERIALS USED IN ELECTRICAL MODIFICATIONS SHALL MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF ZEEE-383-1974, THUS MITIGATING THE POTENTIAL FOR PROPAGATING A FIRE.

ALL EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES REQUIRED TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX Ri OR TO MAINTAIN EQUIVALENT LEVELS OF PROTECTION FROM FIRES WILL BE MAINTAINED DURING AND FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS TO THE TUBING AND CONTROL SYSTEMS.

SEISMIC EVENTS HAVE BEEN ANALYZED UNDER THE SEP RE-EVALUATION PROGRAM. THE MODIFICATION AND SUPPORTS WILL BE EVALUATED, IN REGARD TO A SEISMIC EVENT, TO CRITERIA IDENTICAL TO THE SEISMIC UPGRADE PROGRAM. THIS WILL ENSURE THAT ANY MODIFICATIONS WILL BE DESIGNED SO AS TO EQUAL OR IMPROVE THE SYSTEM'S CAPABILITY TO WITHSTAND A SEISMIC EVENT.

BASED ON THE ABOVE ANALYSIS, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT:

A) THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATION AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED.

l B) THE STRUCTURES i SYSTEMS i AND COMPONENTS PROVI DED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS OR POSTULATED HIGH ENERGY PIPE BREAK AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS OR POSTULATED HIGH ENERGY BREAKS CONTINUE TO REMAIN ADEQUATE.

C) ALL INSTRUMENT SENSING LINE PENETRATZONS SHALL BE LOCATED AT A MINIMUM HEIGHT OF SEVEN FEET (2.2 METERS)

ABOVE FLOOR LEVEL, OR THAT ROUTING AND SUPPORT OF SENSING LINES SHALL ENSURE THAT THE FUNCTION OF THE LINES IS NOT AFFECTED BY VIBRATION, ABNORMAL HEATi COLD, OR STRESS.

THUS t THIS MODIFICATZON NEITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES i NOR DOES ZT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR:

1) FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES

2) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING AND FOLLOWING SEISMIC AND TORNADO EVENTS

3) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION FOLLOWING A HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK.

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\

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR, THE STRUCTURAL'E-ANALYSIS PLAN (SRP) AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ZT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED'T HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-5053 REPAIR HD PUMP BARREL LEA THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION ON THE HEATER DRAIN TANK PUMP BARREL LEAK REPAIR.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO INSTALL A PASSIVE VENT SYSTEM ON THE HEATER DRAIN PUMP BARREL. THE VENTS SHALL PROVIDE A CONTROLLED PATH FOR STEAM AND DEBRIS TO ESCAPE FROM THE ANNULAR REGION BETWEEN EACH PUMP BARREL AND LINER AT THE SAME TIME PREVENTING SAFETY AND/OR EROSION PROBLEMS.

A "REVIEW HAS BEEN PERFORMED OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENT RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION IS A LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLOW.

LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLOW CAN OCCUR FROM A RUPTURE OF A PUMP BARREL DUE TO THE EROSIVE ACTION OF THE VENTING STEAM.

THE ANALYZED EVENT IS FAR MORE SEVERE THAN A PUMP BARREL RUPTURE. THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF A PUMP BARREL RUPTURE SINCE THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES PROPER INSPECTION OF THE PUMP BARREL.

THIS MODIFICATION IS NON-SEISMIC SINCE IT DOES NOT EFFECT THE SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE REACTOR.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT INCREASE THE FIRE LOADING IN FIRE AREAS CONTAINING SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT OR DEGRADE EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION BECAUSE OF REQUIREMENT ZN SECTION 27 ' OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA. ANALYSIS NECESSARY TO ASSURE CONTINUAL COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50, APPENDIX R HAS BEEN REQUIRED.

THEREFORE, THE PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF A FIRE AFFECTING COLD SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT ARE UNCHANGED.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GZNNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE.MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT 'BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

61

TSR 88-07 CCW CHECK VALVE 743A INTERNALS REMOVAL THIS TECHNICAL STAFF REQUEST ADDRESSES CHANGES TO CCW CHECK VALVE 743A. THIS CHANGE INVOLVES REMOVING CHECK VALVE 743A'S INTERNALS TO ALLOW CONCLUSIVE LEAK RATE TESTING OF CCW CHECK VALVE 743. XN THE ORIGINAL PLANT DESIGN VALVE 743A WAS UTILIZED AS THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE FOR THE CCW LINE COMING FROM THE EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER.

HOWEVER/ DUE TO LEAKAGE PROBLEMS WITH VALVE 743Ag CHECK VALVE 743 WAS INSTALLED IN SERIES WITH 743A TO PERFORM THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FUNCTION. CONSEQUENTLY'HECK VALVE 743A NO LONGER PERFORMS ANY SAFETY OR OPERATIONAL FUNCTION.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GZNNA STATION UFSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG.

GUIDE 1.70 AND GZNNA PROCEDURE A-303. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE (1) SEISMIC EVENTS, (2) PIPE BREAKS INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING, AND A MAIN STEAM PIPE RUPTURE.

THIS MODIFICATION WILL BE DESIGNED SUCH THAT IT WILL NOT AFFECT THE CAPABILITY OF CHECK VALVE 743A OR ITS CONNECTED PIPING AND SUPPORTS TO WITHSTAND A SEISMIC EVENT.

THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT AFFECT THE BODY PRESSURE BOUNDARY FUNCTIONING OF CHECK VALVE 743A THEREFORE THE ASA B31.1 PRESSURE DESIGN WILL REMAIN VALID.

CCW CHECK VALVE 743 WILL STILL PROVIDE THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FUNCTIONS DURING A PRIMARY SYSTEM PIPE RUPTURE OR A MAIN STEAM LINE RUPTURE.

THUS ~ THIS MODIFICATION NEITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES g NOR DOES ZT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR:

'1) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING AND FOLLOWING SEISMIC.

2) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION FOLLOWING A PIPE BREAK INSIDE OR OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT.

'BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS/

'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

62

TSR 89-05 RHR SPENT FUEL AND CVCS NON-REGENERATZVE HEAT EXCHANGERS BOLTING UPGRADE THIS TECHNICAL STAFF REQUEST ADDRESSES FLANGE BOLTING UPGRADES FOR THE RHRg SPENT FUELS AND NON REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGERS ~ THE SHELL SIDE INLET AND OUTLET FLANGES WERE ORIGINALLY SUPPLIED WITH SA-307 GRADE B BOLTS. THESE BOLTS WILL BE REPLACED WITH SA-193 GRADE B7 BOLTS FOLLOWING STANDARD RG&E BOLTING PRACTICES.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG.

GUIDE 1.70 AND GINNA PROCEDURE A-303. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE (1) SEISMIC EVENTS, (2) PIPE BREAKS INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING, (3) AND A MAIN STEAM PIPE RUPTURE.

THE NEW BOLTING IS OF THE SAME 'PHYSICAL SIZE AS THE ORIGINAL BOLTING AND THE CHEMICAL AND PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF THE NEW MATERIALS SA 193 GR B7g IS EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN THE OLD MATERIAL SA 307 GR BE THEREFORE'HE NEW BOLTING WILL PERFORM TO THE SAME CAPACITY AS THE OLD BOLTING FOR EACH OF THE APPLICABLE EVENTS LISTED ABOVE.

THUS / THIS MODIFICATION NEITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES ~

NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR:

1) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING AND FOLLOWING SEISMIC.

2) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION FOLLOWING A PIPE BREAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT.

3) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION FOLLOWING A MAIN STEAM PIPE RUPTURE.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. ZT -HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

TSR 89-09 MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP SUCTION TRANSMITTER VALVE MANIFOLD THIS TECHNICAL STAFF REQUEST (TSR) ADDRESSES THE REPLACEMENT OF THE ISOLATION AND EQUALZZATZON VALVES FOR FT-2004 AND FT-2005 (FEEDWATER PUMP SUCTION FLOW TRANSMITTERS) WITH MANIFOLDS. IT WILL ALSO REPLACE THE BLOWDOWN VALVES IN THE SENSING LINES WHICH ARE LEAKING. THE NEW AEGVQTGEMENT WILL PROVIDE THE SAME FUNCTION AS THE PREVIOUS ONE.

63

THE VALVES ,

ASSOCIATED WITH THIS MODIFICATION SERVE TRANSMITTERS FT-2004 AND FT-2005. THESE TRANSMITTERS PROVIDE:

( 1) AN INPUT TO FEEDWATER BYPASS VALVE 3959 g WHICH OPENS ON LOW FEEDWATER NPSH.

(2) A SIGNAL TO FEEDWATER RECIRCULATION VALVES 4147 AND 4148, WHICH OPEN WHEN FEEDWATER FLOW FALLS BELOW 254 FULL FLOW WITHOUT RECIRCULATION.

A FEEDWATER BYPASS VALVE MALFUNCTION ZS DISCUSSED ZN THE FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE DECREASE ACCIDENT SCENARIO OF SECTION 15.1.1.1 IN THE UFSAR. THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT INCREASE OR DECREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCH AN ACCIDENT SINCE THE FUNCTION OF THE VALVES AND PIPING ASSOCIATED WITH THE TRANSMITTERS WILL NOT CHANGE.

THUS g THE INCORPORATION OF THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT AFFECT ANY OF THE EVENTS LISTED IN TABLES I AND ZZ OF GZNNA PROCEDURE A-303, INCLUDING THE DESIGN BASIS EVENTS OF USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70 AND IT WILL NOT CHANGE:

1) THE ASSUMPTIONS OF ANY SAFETY ANALYSIS IN THE UFSAR AND ITS SUPPLEMENTS.

2) THE PROBABILITY OF AN OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT.

3) THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT.

BASED UPON THE EVALUATIONS IN SECTION 3.1 ABOVE, THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION WILL BE UNCHANGED BY THE INSTALLATION OF THIS MODIFICATION; AND, THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE

.PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS WILL BE UNCHANGED BY THE INSTALLATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION SINCE:

A) THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE INCREASED, ORg B) THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT .OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE CREATED, ORg C) THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILL NOT INVOLVE A CHANGE ZN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SINCE NONE OF THE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION OF THE FEED AND CONDENSATE SYSTEMS WILL BE AFFECTED.

64

TSR 89-29 PRESS ZZER LEVEL TRANSMITTER MANIFOLD REPLACEMENT THIS TECHNICAL STAFF REQUEST REVISION WAS TO CHANGE THE REFERENCE IN THE DESIGN CRITERIA'EVISION 0 FROM THE 1986 ASME CODE EDITION TO THE 1983 EDITXON. THIS WILL BE CONSISTENT WXTH THE INSTALLATION AND ALSO BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ASME SECTION XIg ARTICLE IWA 7000@ REPLACEMENTS' REVIEW WAS PERFORMED OF ALL THE EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE:

CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION PRIMARY SYSTEM PIPE RUPTURE SEISMIC EVENT THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT THE NEW MANIFOLD VALVE AND FITTINGS FOR THIS MODIFICATION BE SEISMICALLY SUPPORTED, THEREFORE, THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY A SEISMIC EVENT.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT THE NEW MANXFOLD VALVE AND TUBING BE SEISMICALLY MOUNTED AND FURTHERMORE SECTIONS 4 AND 5 REQUIRE THE NEW TUBING TO BE ASME CODE CLASS 2, QUALITY GROUP B. THEREFORE, THE PROBABILITY OF A LOCA WILL NOT BE INCREASED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

THEREFORE, THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. THIS IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY, PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE INCREASED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION BECAUSE THE INSTALLATION WILL MEET ALL APPLICABLE SEISMIC AND ASME CODE REQUIREMENTS.

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS WILL NOT BE CREATED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION BECAUSE THE INSTALLATION WILL MEET ALL APPLICABLE SEISMIC AND ASME CODE REQUIREMENTS.

65

0 THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILL NOT BE REDUCED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION BECAUSE THE INSTALLATIONWILL MEET ALL APPLICABLE SEISMIC AND ASME CODE REQUIREMENTS.

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SECTION B - COMPLETED STATION MODIFICATIONS (SMs)

This section contains a description of station modification procedures performed in the facility as described in the safety analysis report. Station modification procedures are written to complete a portion of an Engineering Work Request (EWR) or Technical Staff Request (TSR) identified by the same parent number. Station Modifications are reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee to ensure that no unreviewed safety questions or Technical Specification changes are involved with the procedure.

The basis for inclusion of an SM in this section is closure of the SM where portions of the parent EWR or TSR, in the form of other SMs or other documentation, remain to be completed.

8 SM-87-01.1 SECONDARY WATER CHEMISTRY MONITORING PANEL SWCMP INTERNAL WIRING FOR 7082 ANALYZERS THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF COMPONENTS AND W1RING ZN THE NEW SWCMP.

SM-87-01.2 COMPUTERIZED SECONDARY WATER CHEMISTRY ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW ,,PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW SWCMP AND ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS.

SM-87-01.3 COMPUTERIZED SECONDARY WATER CHEMISTRY MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF TWELVE NEW CONDUCTIVITY CELLS AND THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE COMPUTERIZED SECONDARY WATER CHEMISTRY MODIFICATION.

SM-89-08 AMMONIUM HYDROXIDE SIGHTGLASS INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONi TESTINGS AND TURNOVER OF THE AMMONIUM HYDROXZ'DE TANK SZGHTGLASS.

SM-1594.6 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING - SEISMIC SUPPORTS THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF SEISMIC SUPPORTS REQUIRED FOR THE NEW SPENT FUEL POOL PIPING.

SM-1594.7 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING - SERVICE WATER PIPING AND ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF SERVICE WATER PIPING AND ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION TO THE NEW SFP HEAT EXCHANGER.

SM-1594.8 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING - STAINLESS STEEL AND ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION PIPING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF SPENT FUEL POOL STAINLESS STEEL AND ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION PIPING.

SM-1594.8A INSTALLATION AND OPERATION OF STANDBY S.F-P. COOLING SYSTEM THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, OPERATION, AND DISASSEMBLY OF THE STANDBY SK1D MOUNTED ST F.P. COOLING SYSTEM.

FLOOR PENETRATION INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF FLOOR PENETRATIONS FOR THE NEW SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM.

SM-1594.11 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING PUMP AND RADIATION MONITOR INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION'OF PUMP AND RADIATION MONITOR FOR THE NEW SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM.

SM-1594.14 SPENT FUE POOL COOLING SYSTEM ELECTRICAL MODIFICATION AND COMPLETION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION COMPLETION AND TURNOVER OF THE SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING ELECTRICAL MODIFICATION.

SM-2504.25 CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE EXHAUST VALVE ELECTRICAL .INSTALLATION AT PENETRATION 132 V7920 - CONTAINMENT BUILDING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE ELECTRICAL

. INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE EXHAUST VALVE V7920 AT PENETRATION P-132 INSIDE CONTAINMENT.

SM-2504.26 CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE EXHAUST VALVES ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE, CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE SUPPLY SYSTEM EXHAUST VALVES CDV-1A 'AND CDV-1B OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT.

SM-2512.123 SM C UPG DE OF PIPE SUPPORTS - ANALYSIS LINE SAFW-400 "D" PUMP DISCHARGE - STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER BUILDING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION~ TESTINGS AND TURNOVER OF STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SUPPORTS'B" TRAIN IN THE SAFW BUILDING.

SM-2512.124 SEISM C UPGRADE OF PIPE SUP 0 S 0 ALYSZS LINE SW-2200 SERVICE WATER AUX LIARY BUILDING THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF'ODIFICATIONS TO SERVICE WATER SUPPORTS IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING ASSOCIATED WITH FEED TO THE "C" SAFW PUMP o SEISMIC UPGRADE OF PIPE SUPPORTS-ANALYSIS LINE SAFW-800 STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FROM CONTAINMENT PENETRATION 123 TO "B" S G FEEDWATER LINE THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF SAFW SUPPORTS IN CONTAINMENT FROM PENETRATION 123 TO THE "B" FEEDWATER LINE.

SM-2512.126 SEISMIC UPGRADE OF PIPE SUPPORTS ANALYSIS LINE SAFW-900 STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FROM PENETRATION 119 TO "A>> STEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER LINE THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF PIPE SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS TO THE SAFW LINE BETWEEN 'ENETRATION 4119 AND THE "A" S/G FEEDWATER LINE.

SM-2512 '31 -

IST TEST CONNECTIONS RCDT PUMP SUCTION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE ZNSTALLATZONi TESTINGi AND TURNOVER OF TEST CONNECTIONS FOR VALVES MOV-1813A AND MOV-1813B.

,SM-'2512.132 IST TEST CONNECTIONS AUXILIARY FEEDWATER DISCHARG THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF TEST CONNECTIONS FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER DISCHARGE CHECK VALVES 4003'004'000C AND 4000D.

SM-2512.133 ZSI TEST CONNECTIONS VALVE V-3506 AND V-3507 BYPASS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONS TESTINGS AND TURNOVER OF TEST CONNECTIONS FOR VALVES 3506 AND 3507 BYPASS LOOPS (DOWNSTREAM OF V-3506A AND V-3507A) ~

SEISMIC UPGRADE OF PIPE SUPPORTS ANALYSIS LINE CVC-200 - "B" RCP SEAL RETURN THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS FOR "B" RCP SEAL RETURN LINE CONSISTING OF SUPPORTS CVU-131 AND CVU-XI'M-3319.48 CC-1B BREAKE REPLACEMENT THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONAND TURNOVER OF BRKQG"R REPLACEMENT AT SPECIFIED POSITIONS ON MCC-1B.

SM-3319.55 TESTING OF BREAKERS AT MCC-1B THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO 1) DOCUMENT AN AUXILIARY SWITCH'ESTi 2) VERIFY PROPER PHASE ROTATIONS AND

3) TO PERFORM A FUNCTIONAL TEST OF BREAKERS PLACED AT MCC-1B.

SM-3319 '8 SETTING ADJUSTMENT AND FUNCT ONAL TESTING OF BREAKERS AT MCC- H THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO PROVIDE THE DIRECTION TO ADJUST AND FUNCTIONALLY TEST BREAKERS AT MCC-1H.

SM-3319.59 UX LIARY SWIT TESTING OR SELECTED BREA RS ON MCC-1B THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DOCUMENT AN AUXILIARY SWITCH TEST FOR THE TURBINE ROOM WALL EXHAUST FANS 1F, 1Gg 1H, AND 1J.

SM-3319A.2 BREAKER CHANGEOUT REMOVAL 0 MCC-1C 1L AND 1 THE PURPOSE OF.THIS PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF BREAKER CHANGEOUTS/REMOVAL, TOL HEATER CHANGEOUTS, AND TRIP SETTING ADJUSTMENTS FOR VARIOUS UNITS ON MCC 1Ci 1Li AND 1K SM-3319A.3 BREAKER CHANGEOUT REMOVAL ON MCC-1D AND 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONS TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF BREAKER CHANGEOUTS/REMOVALS, TOL HEATER CHANGEOUTS, AND TRIP SETTING ADJUSTMENTS FOR VARIOUS UNITS ON MCC-1D AND 1M.

SM-3319A.4 BREAKER CHANGEOUT REMOVAL ON MCC-1B lE AND 1F THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF BREAKER CHANGEOUTS/REMOVALS, HKA TRIP UNIT REPLACEMENTS'ND TRIP SETTING ADJUSTMENTS FOR VARIOUS UNITS ON MCC 1Br 1Ei AND 1F ~

SM-3319A.5 REPLACEMENT OF POWER CABLES PER EWR-3319A THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF THE REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING POWER CABLES FOR THE BORIC ACID EVAPORATOR PACKAGE, THE AUXILIARY BUILDING LIGHTING TRANSFORMER 1Bg AND THE SERVICE BUILDING KITCHEN EQUIPMENT TRANSFORMER.

SM-3319A.6 BREAKER REMOVAL ON MCC-1G AND RESOLUTION OF SM-3319A.2 3319A.3 AND 3319A.4 PUNCHLIST ITEMS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONS TESTZNGr AND TURNOVER OF BREAKER REMOVALSI TOL HEATER CHANGEOUTSi BREAKER HANDLE INSTALLATIONS'ND REMOVED BREAKER COVER PLATE INSTALLATIONS.

SM-3319A.8 BREAKER CHANGEOUT AT MCC-1F FOR THE LAUNDR 'IR CONDITIONER AND THE PASS WASTE TANK EVACUATION COMPRESSOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF THE BREAKER CHANGEOUT AT MCC-1F FOR THE LAUNDRY AIR CONDITIONER AND THE PASS WASTE TANK EVACUATION COMPRESSOR.

FUSE INSTALLATION FOR THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD rrArr AND rrBrr BATTERY VOLTMETERS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF FUSES FOR THE MCB rrArr AND r'B BATTERY VOLTMETERS.

SM-3341.2 PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTING OF D.C. FUSES XSB FOR LOCKOUT RELAY

~86 11A THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE A2Y (15A) (XSB) 125 VDC FUSES WHICH FEED THE BUS llA DIFFERENTIAL LOCKOUT RELAY 86/llA.

SM-3341.3 PRE-OPERAT ONAL TESTING OF D.C. FUSES XSC FOR LOCKOUT RELAY 86 11B THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE A2Y (15A) (XSC) 125 VDC FUSES WHICH FEED THE BUS llB DIFFERENTIAL LOCKOUT RELAY 86/11B; SM-3596 '

D G irAit PRESSURE INSTRUMENT PANEL ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF JUNCTION BOXES ASSOCIATED WITH THE NEW DIESEL GENERATOR "A" INSTRUMENT PANELi INCLUDING CONDUIT AND CONDUIT SUPPORTS BETWEEN THE JUNCTION BOXES AND INSTRUMENT PANEL. ALSO, INCLUDES CABLE BETWEEN NEW PRESSURE INSTRUMENTS AND THE NEW TERMINAL STRIPS WITHIN THE JUNCTION BOXES.

SM-3596.4 D G "A" PRESSURE INSTRUMENT PANEL - ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF JUNCTION BOXES ASSOCIATED WITH THE NEW DIESEL GENERATOR B INSTRUMENT PANELi INCLUDING CONDUIT AND CONDUIT SUPPORTS BETWEEN THE JUNCTION BOXES AND INSTRUMENT PANEL. ALSO, INCLUDES CABLE BETWEEN NEW PRESSURE INSTRUMENTS AND THE NEW TERMINAL STRIPS WITHIN THE JUNCTION BOXES.

STANDBY A ZLIARY FEEDW TER CONTROL CIRCUITRY AND VALVE MOV-9746 TESTING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO'ONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW MOV CONTROL SWITCH RE-ARRANGEMENTS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE CONTROL AND INDICATION CIRCUITS. THIS INCLUDES MOVATS TESTING OF MOV-9746 AND HYDRO TESTING OF NEW VALVE INSTALLATION.

SM-3692.4 STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDW TER V VE - ELECTRIC L MODIFICATIONS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER FOR TESTING OF CONDUIT, CONDUIT SUPPORTS'ABLEi BREAKER JUMPERS AND REWORK OF THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD SWITCHES AND INDICATION.

SM-3692.5 SBAFW BUI DING ELECTRICAL SUPPORTS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONAND TURNOVER OF ELECTRICAL SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS IN THE STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER BUILDING.

SM-3692.6 STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF CONTROL CIRCUITRY FOR MOV-9746 THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF MOV-9746 LOCATED ZN THE SAFW BUILDING; CONTROL ROOM (REAR OF MCB)g AUXILIARY BUILDING (MCC AREAS) ~ HYDRO TESTING OF THE PRESSURE BOUNDARY ZS COMPLETE. ADDITIONAL COPIES OF THIS PROCEDURE MAY BE PLACED FOR COORDINATION AND CONTROL PURPOSES.

SM-3797.8 MRPI ROD DROP RELAY TIME DELAY REMOVAL I

THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE REMOVAL OF THE TIME DELAY DEVICES WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED ON THE CONTROL ROD DROP RELAYS, AND THE SUBSE{}UENT TESTING OF THE RELAYS'M-3797.9 MRPI DATA CABINET FAN INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF COOLING FANS ON THE MRPZ DATA CABINET IN CONTAINMENT.

SM-3797.10 PI ANNUNCIATOR MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF A MODIFICATION TO ANNUNCIATOR C29 FOR MRPZ FAILURE.

SM-3797 '1 1 DATA CABINET FAN REMOVAL THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE REMOVAL AND TURNOVER OF COOLING FANS FOR MRP1 DATA CABINET ZN CONTAINMENT.

SM-3881.1 SI RECIRCULATION MOD F C T ON MECHANICAL INSTALLATIO REMOVALS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE MECHANICAL PORTION OF THE SI RECIRCULATION MODIFICATION.

SM-3881.2 SI RECIRCULATION MODIFICATION - ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION AND REMOVALS MOV 897 898 THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION AND REMOVALS FOR MOV 897 AND 898.

SAFETY INJEC ZON FLOW METERS F -924 AND I-925 RESCALZNG THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF METER SCALES FOR FZ-924 AND FI-925 AND RECALZBRAT1ON OF SAFETY INJECTION FLOW TRANSMITTERS FT-924 AND FT-925

'ES L GENERA OR BUILDING FO DATION INVESTIGATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL TEST BORING AND CORE SAMPLING IN AND AROUND THE DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING.

SM-3990.2 GROUND WATER EXPLORATION OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING

'IMPINGEMENT MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE EXPLORATION AND EXCAVATION OF THE DEWATERING PITS GENERALLY BETWEEN THE DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING AND LAKE ONTARIO. THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THIS EXPLORATORY .PHASE OF THE OVERALL MODIFICATION ZS TO OBTAIN SUFFICIENT PERTINENT DATA ON THE SUBSURFACE GROUND WATER. THIS DATA WILL PROMULGATE NECESSARY ENGINEERING OUTPUTS FOR MODIFICATION ERECTION AND INSTALLATION.

SM-3991.2 SEISMIC UPGRADE OF EXISTING CONNECTIONS AND ANCHORAGES AUXILIARY BUILDING SOUTH WALL THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT/DOCUMENT STRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS.

SM-4064.5 TURBI E BUILDING SMOKE DETECTION UPGRADE AND ALARM OFF INDICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE CHANGEOUT OF TURBINE BUILDING SMOKE DETECTORS AND STPs. ALSO INCLUDED IS THE INSTALLATION OF CONTROL ROOM INDICATION OF ALARM OFF STATUS.

SM-4064.6 TSC FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION SYSTEM UPGRADE THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF MODIFICATIONS TO THE TSC FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS PRIOR TO FINAL TERMZNATZONS AND TESTING.

TURBINE BUI DING SMOKE DETECTOR ZONE Z34 MODIFICATIONS THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF MODIFICATIONS TO TURBINE BUILDING SMOKE DETECTOR ZONE Z34 - TO REMOVE DETECTORS FROM THE GENERATOR FIELD VOLTAGE REGULATOR CABINETS SM-4218 '

LT-426 TUBING REMOVAL THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE EXISTING 3/8n TUBING USED FOR LT-426 SEALED REFERENCE LEG.

SM-4230.1 TICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHO SCRAM ATWS MITIGATION ACTUATION CIRCUITRY AMSAC MODIFICATION INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO INSTALL A REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM THAT WILL TRIP THE MAIN STEAM TURBINE AND START THE FLOW OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AFTER AN ATWS EVENT.

SM-4230.2 ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WI OUT SCRAM ATWS MITIGATION SYSTEM ACTUATION CIRCUITRY AMS C MODIFICATION TESTING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO TEST A REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM THAT WILL TRIP THE MAIN STEAM TURBINE AND START THE FLOW OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AFTER AN ATWS EVENT.

SM-4230.3 ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM ATWS MITIGATION SYSTEM ACTUAT ON CI CUITRY AMSAC T STATUS MODIF CATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO INSTALL THE nAMSAC TRIPPED" STATUS LIGHT ON THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD, WHILE PROGRAMMING ZN NEW ARMING SETPOINTS AND MODIFYING THE FUNCTION CURVE WHICH GENERATES THE VARIABLE TIME DELAY FOR AMSAC. ZN ADDITION TO CHANGING THE DIGITAL OUTPUT FOR THE PPCS FROM nAMSAC ACTUATED" TO nAMSAC TRIPPEDn, BECOMING A DIRECT FUNCTION OF THE RESET STATUS.

SM-4322. 1 STATION SERV C TRANSFORMERS 3 AND 15 COOLING FANS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING AND TURNOVER OF COOLING FANS AT STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMERS 43.3 AND 415.

SM-4324.3 ELECTRICAL NSTALLATION FOR STEAM GENERATOR BLOW OWN SYSTEM THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION FOR STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM MODIFICATION. THIS PROCEDURE ALLOWS PARTIAL INSTALLATION PRIOR TO PLANT OUTAGE AND IS TO COMPLETE THE REMAINING DURING THE PLANT OUTAGE. TESTING OF THE INSTALLATION WILL BE PERFORMED UNDER ANOTHER PROCEDURE.

SM-4324.5 S E GENERATOR BLOWDO SYSTE OD FICATION FUNCTIO AL TESTING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE 1S TO PERFORM FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF THE ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION OF S/G BLOWDOWN MODIFICATION.

SM-4347 '

MODIFICATION OF THE CONTROL ROOM PLANT EVACUATION ALARM PLANT ATTENTION ALARM AND PLANT FIRE ALARM THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONAND TURNOVER OF THE CONTROL ROOM PLANT EVACUATION ALARM, PLANT ATTENTION ALAI'ND PLANT FIRE ALARM MODIFICATIONS.

SM-4347.2 CONTROL ROOM ALARM SYSTEM TESTING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE MODIFICATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONTROL ROOM ALARM SYSTEMS AND TO CONDUCT A CONTROL ROOM ALARM SURVEY.

SM-4375.1 BORIC ACID FLOW CONTROL PIPING MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE MECHANICAL PORTION OF'HE BORIC ACID FLOW CONTROL MODIFICATION.

SM-4375.2 BORIC ACID FLOW CONTROL ELECTRICAL MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF .THE BORIC ACID FLOW CONTROL AND HEAT TRACE MODIFICATION.

SM-4375.3 MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL TESTING - BORIC ACID FLOW CONTROL PIPING MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE BORIC ACID FLOW CONTROL PIPING MODIFICATION.

10

SM-4375.6 BORIC ACXD FLOW CONTROL MECHANICAL PHASE 2 MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE MECHANXCAL PORTION OF THE BORIC ACID FLOW CONTROL PHASE 2 MODIFICATION.

SM-4375 '

BORIC ACI LOW CONTROL PHASE 2 ACCEPTANCE TEST THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE BORXC ACID FLOW CONTROL PHASE 2 MODIFICATION.

SM-4375.9 REPLACEMENT OF HEAT TRACE CIRCUITS 40 AND 78 THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION~ TESTING~ AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW CHEMELEX SELF-REGULATING HEAT TRACE CABLE FOR CONDUITS 440 AND 478 (BORIC ACID BLENDER PIPING)g WHICH INCLUDES VALVES V354g V355g FCV110Ag V109g AND FT110 ~

SM-4525.2 G A R SUPP Y BUS DUCT FO D T ONS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO DIRECT/DOCUMENT INSTALLATION OF NEW BUS DUCT FOUNDATION.

SM-4525.3 G A POWER SUPPLY O.CD B. FIREWALL FOUNDATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE GINNA POWER SUPPLY O.C.B. FIREWALL FOUNDATION.

SM-4525.4 RACEWAY INSTALLAT ON FOR OFFSITE POWER RECONFXGURATION MODIFIC TION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF RACEWAY FOR THE OFFSZTE POWER MODIFICATION.

THIS PROCEDURE INCLUDES INSTALLATION OF A NEW PIPE SUPPORT FOR THE EXISTING TRANSFORMER 12B DELUGE SYSTEM.

SM-4525.5 NEW GINNA POWER SUPPLY BUS DUCT INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL INSTALLATION OF THE NEW GZNNA POWER SUPPLY BUS. DUCT.

SM-4525.6 OFFSITE POWER RECONFXGURATION: .P.S. SWITCH GEAR TRANSFORMER 2B GROUNDING THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE ZS TO ANCHOR THE P.P.S.

SWITCHGEARg COMPLETE INTERNAL WIRING'ND PERFORM ELECTRICAL INSPECTION OF P.P.S. 4160V SWITCHGEAR. THIS PROCEDURE ALSO CONTROLS THE INSTALLATION OF THE TRANSFORMER 12B GROUNDING RESISTOR.

SM-4525 '

OFFSITE POWER RECONFXGURATION: CABLE INSTALLATION RELAY PANELS 12A AND 12B THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF CABLES FOR THE OFFSZTE POWER MODIFICATION AND COMPLETE THE INSTALLATION OF RELAY PANELS 12A AND 12B.

SM-4525.8 OFFSITE POWER RECONFIGURATION: MAIN CONTROL BOARD SWITCH RELOCATION BUS 12A BUS 12B MODIFICATION AND TESTING

'HE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF:

A) 52/ 1 1 B CONTROL SW ~ S YNCH SW g AND ZND LITES B) 52/11A CONTROL SW, SYNCH SW, AND ZND. LZTES C) 12B BUS RELAYING AND CIRCUIT BREAKERS (86/12B, 86B/12Bg 52/BTB BJ 52/ 1 6SS g AND 52/ 17SS D) 12A.BUS RELAYING AND CIRCUIT BREAKERS (86/12A, 86B/12Ag 52/BTA A t 52/ 1 4 SS g 52/ 1 8SS AND 52/AVP 9A)

SM-4525.9 OFFSITE POWER RECONFZGURATION: MAIN CONTROL BOARD MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND RELOCATION OF SWITCHES, METERS, AND RELAYS WHICH MONITOR AND CONTROL THE 34.5 KV AND 4160V ELECTRIC SYSTEMS'M-4525.10 OFFSZTE POWER 'RECONFIGURATION: SWITCHYARD MODIFICATION 4160V CUBICLE MODIFICATION 480V AND 120V BREAKER XNSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THXS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE MODIFICATION OF THE 34 KV BUS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT, COMPLETE REMOVALS AT THE 12B XFMR CABINET, COMPLETE MODIFICATION OF 12A AND 12B 4160V CUBZCLES, AND INSTALL 480V AND 120V BREAKERS FOR THE OFFSXTE POWER MODIFICATION.

12

SM-4525 '2 OFFSITE POWER BACKFEED VIA UN T AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO SUPPLY POWER FROM THE 115 KV GRID THROUGH THE MAIN AND UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMERS TO THE STATION AUXILIARIES, WHILE THE STATION AUXILIARY TRANSFORMERS 412A AND 412B ARE MODIFIED PER EWR 4525.

SM-4525.14 OFFSITE POWER MODIFICATION: 4KV AND 34KV MCB METERING PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO TEST THE MCB 4 KV AND 34 KV METERING, MODIFIED UNDER EWR-4525 PER SM-4525.9.

'SM-4525 15 OFFSITE 0 R ES ORATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSERVZCE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE OFFSITE POWER MODIFICATION AND RESTORE OFFSITE POWER VIA STATION AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 12B.

SM-4526.2 D G "A" FUEL OIL SYSTEM ELECTRICAL RECONSTRUCTION AND REMOVALS THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE ELECTRICAL PORTION OF THE D/G "A" FUEL OIL SYSTEM INCLUDING INSTALLATION OF NEW EQUIPMENT AND REMOVAL OF OLD EQUIPMENT.

SM-4526 '

G "B" EL OIL SYSTEM ELECTRICAL RECONSTRUCT ON EMOVALS THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION

'ND TURNOVER OF THE ELECTRICAL PORTION OF THE D/G "B"FUEL OZL SYSTEM INCLUDING INSTALLATION OF NEW EQUIPMENT AND REMOVAL OF OLD EQUIPMENT.

SM-4526.8 DUPLEX STRAINER INSTAL TION ELECTRICAL PORTION THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF THE ELECTRICAL PORTION OF THE DUPLEX STRAINERS ZN THE DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL SYSTEM.

SM-4526.17 DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL SYSTEM DISCHARGE LINE PIPE SUPPORTS UPGRADE THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF PIPE SUPPORTS ON THE DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OZL SYSTEM DISCHARGE PIPING.

13

SM-4530.1 AC FUSED AND BREAKERS INTERMEDIATE BUZLDING'S ISCELLANEOUS DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMER REPLACEMENT THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO REPLACE THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING' MISCELLANEOUS DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMER AND REMOVE THE ELECTRICAL FEED FROM MCC 1F (UNIT 4MM) TO MCC 18 (UNIT 'D) ~

SM-4534.1

.REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MOTOR OIL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM UPGRADE THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MOTOR OIL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM FOR THE A & B REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MOTORS.

NO COMPONENT INSTALLATION REQUIRED ON RCP MOTORS. THE ROSEMOUNT 710DU INSTRUMENT RACK IS COMMON TO BOTH REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS'M-4538.1 1B DIESEL GENERATOR UPGRADE THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE 1B DIESEL GENERATOR UPGRADE. THIS MODIFICATION INCLUDES, REPLACEMENT OF A THROW OVER RELAY, THERMAL OVERLOAD RELAYS, REMOVAL OF A 51BU RELAY, AND REWIRING OF TERMINAL BOXES ON THE "A" AND "B" DIESEL SKIDS.

SM-4538.3 I INSTALLATION AND TESTING 0 NEW AUXILIARY RELAY 51VX CLAROSTAT 200 OHM RESISTOR AND SLI ZNG LINK TERMINALS .FOR AIR START VALVE ASV-1 AND ASV-2 FOR THE lA DIESEL GENERATOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE ELECTRICAL INSTALL'ATION'ESTINGS AND TURNOVER OF MODIFICATIONS TO THE 1A DIESEL GENERATOR. THESE MODIFICATIONS INCLUDE REPLACEMENT OF OVERCURRENT AUXILIARY RELAY 51VX, INSTALLATION NEW 200 OHM RESISTORS SLIDING LINKS TERMINALS FOR AIR START VALVES~

AND INSTALLATION OF A NEW MOUNTING PLATE FOR RELAYS ATR-A, ATR-B, AND A FUSE BLOCK.

THIS PROCEDURE WILL ALLOW WORK TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE FOLLOWING GENERAL AREAS OF THE PLANT: 1A DIESEL GENERATOR.

SM-4553.1 E COR BING SUPPO T U GRADE THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO SEISMICALLY UPGRADE THE REACTOR BOTTOM MOUNTED INSTRUMENTATION TUBING SUPPORT BMI-3.

14

FEED PUMP OOM VENTILATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW FEED PUMP ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS'An RCS OT LEG RHR FLOW CO ECTION THE PURPOSE 'OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE TESTING ASSOCIATED WITH FIELD DATA VERIFICATION OF THE nAn RCS HOT LEG LOOP LEVEL CORRECTION AS A RESULT OF RHR FLOW. THIS TEST IS BEING PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION WITH PROCEDURE 0-2 ~ 3 ~ 1.

SM-4675.1 P nBn RECIRCULATION PIPING T E- NS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO INSTALL THE 8 INCH CHECK VALVE AND 3 INCH PIPING TIE-INS TO THE B RHR HX DISCHARGE LINE ~

SM-4675.2 RHR RECIRCULATION MODIFICATION MCB MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE . OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM WORK SCOPE OF EWR-4675

,RHR RECIRCULATION MODIFICATION.

SM-4675 '

SYSTEM CLEANLINESS INSPECTION AND HYDROSTATIC TEST THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS FOR PERFORM CLEANLINESS INSPECTIONS AND A HYDROSTATIC TEST OF THE RHR RECIRC SYSTEM INSTALLED BY EWR-4675.

SM-4675.5 RHR PUMP tAt RECIRCULATION PIPING TZE ZNS AND BALANCE OF PIPING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE RHR A RECIRCULATION PIPING TIE INSg COMMON TRENCH TIE-INS, AND THE REMAINDER OF THE RHR A AND B RECIRCULATION PIPING AND SUPPORTS'M-4675.6 RHR PUMP tt n AN nBtt RECIRCULATION INSTRUMENTATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF INSTRUMENTATZON ASSOCIATED WITH THE A AND B RECIRCULATION PIPING MODIFICATION.

15

SM-4675.7 RHR HX nAn OUTLET PIPE SUPPORT THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE RHR HX nAn OUTLET PIPE SUPPORT.

P P SUC 0 YDRO STAT C TEST THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE HYDROSTATIC TEST OF THE INSTALLATION OF THE TI-680 AND 681 THERMOWELLS ~

SM-4675.9 RHR SYSTEM SHUTDOWN COOLING FULL FLOW'EST THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE TESTING OF THE RHR SYSTEM FULL FLOW TEST DURING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING TEST.

SM-4755.1 IST TEST CONNECTIONS FOR MOV-1813A B nAn AND nBn RCDT PUMP SUCTION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO DIRECT/DOCUMENT MODIFICATION RELOCATION OF VALVES V-1813C/E.

SM-4756.1 INSTALLATION OF MCB EXHAUST FAN SHROUD THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF THE SHROUD FOR THE MCB EXHAUST FAN.

SM-.4759.2 HIGH ST ZGHTING TOWER BASEPLATE GROUTING THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF HIGH MAST SECURITY LIGHTING BASEPLATE GROUTING AND JAM NUTS FOR THE EIGHT HIGH MAST LIGHTING TOWERS'M-4764.1 FIRE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS RELOCATIONS AND SPRINKLER SUPPLY TO SUPPORT THE CONTAMINATION STORAGE BUILDING INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE RELOCATION INSTALLATION TESTING AND TURNOVER OF FIRE SERVICE HYDRANTS GATE VALVES AND SPRINKLER SUPPLY TO THE CONTAMINATED STORAGE BUILDING.

16

SM-4764.3 CONTAMINATED STORAGE BUILDING - DOOR S29 ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION TESTING AND FLOOD BARRIER TESTING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE ELECTRICAL INSTALLATIONS TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW SECURITY DOOR S-29 AND THE TESTXNG OF THE FLOOD BARRIER ASSOCIATED WITH DOOR S-29.

SM-4764.4 ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION AND GROUND GRID INSTALLATION-CONTAMINATED STORAGE BUILDING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONAND TURNOVER OF THE ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION AND GROUNDING PORTION OF THE CONTAMINATED STORAGE FACILITY MODIFICATION.

SM-4764.6 FIRE P OTECTION ELECTRICAL XNSTALLATION AND FUNC ION L TESTING WITHIN THE CONTAMINATED STORAGE BUILDING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL AND DOCUMENT THE INSTALLATION, TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE ELECTRICAL PORTION OF THE LOCAL PREACTION FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM IN THE CONTAMINATED STORAGE BUILDING.

SM-4785.1 INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF NEW THROWOVER ELAY IN BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE CABINET THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW THROWOVER RELAY IN THE BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE CABINET.

INSTALLATION AND TESTI G OF NEW T OWOVER RELAY IN BUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGE CABINET THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW THROWOVER RELAY ZN THE BUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGE CABINET.

1'M-4785.3 INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF NEW THROWOVER RELAY IN BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROL CABINET THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONS TESTINGS AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW THROWOVER RELAY IN THE BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROL CABINET.

17

I.

f I'

Rl=.*

INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF NEW THROWOVER RELAY IN BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROL CABINET THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONS TESTINGS AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW THROWOVER RELAY IN THE BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROL CABINET.

SM-4785.5 INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF NEW THROWOVER RELAY AND LOSS OF D.C.

VOLTAGE ALARM FOR DIESEL GENERATOR 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONS TESTINGS AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW THROWOVER RELAY AND LOSS OF D.C. VOLTAGE ALARM FOR DIESEL GENERATOR 1A.

SM-4785.6 INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF NEW THROWOVER RELAY AND LOSS OF D.C.

VOLTAGE ALARM FOR DIESEL GENERATOR 1B THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION~ TESTING~ AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW THROWOVER RELAY AND LOSS OF D.C. VOLTAGE ALARM FOR DIESEL GENERATOR 1B.

ESEL FIRE P P BATTER CHARGE SUPPORT STRUCTURES NSTALLAT ON MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF THE DIESEL FIRE PUMP BATTERY CHARGER SUPPORT STRUCTURES.,

TDAFWP CHECK VALVE REPLACEMENT THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE REPLACEMENT, TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP DISCHARGE CHECK VALVES V-4003 AND V-4004.

SM-4933.1 T-478 PT-479 D PT-483 S G "B" TUBING REROUTE AND U G DE THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION~ TESTING~ AND TURNOVER OF UPGRADED STEAM GENERATOR PT 478/479/483 INSTRUMENTATZON TUBING'UPPORTS'ND BARRIERS ZN THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING (STEAM HEADER LEVEL) ~

SM-4937.1 REPLACEMENT OF HEAT TRACE CIRCU TS 12 & 34 THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW CHEMELEX SELF REGULATING HEAT TRACE CABLE FOR CIRCUITS 12 AND 34.

18

k' SM-4937.2 REPLACEMENT OF HEAT TRACE CIRCUIT 29 THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE ZNSTALLATIONg TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW CHEMELEX SELF REGULATING HEAT TRACE CABLE FOR CIRCUITS .29 (BORIC ACID BLENDER PIPING)g WHICH INCLUDES VALVES FCV 110Cg V364~ FCV 110B, AND V365A..

19

SECTION C COMPLETED TECHNICAL STAFF ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS (TSEEs)

This section contains a description of changes to the facility as described in the safety analysis report performed as technical evaluations. These are typically small changes that do not require the full controls of a modification. Technical Staff Engineering Evaluations are reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee to ensure that no unreviewed safety questions or Technical Specification changes are involved.

The basis for inclusion of a TSEE in this section is presentation to the PORC, closure of the associated TSR, and submittal to the Document Control Department. Within the time frame of this report there were none.

SECTION D - TEMPORARY BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION, STRUCTURE FEATURES, SHIELDING, AND FLUID SYSTEM FEATURES This section contains descriptions and summaries of safety evaluations of temporary changes pursuant to the requirements of lo CFR 50.'59(b).

f AEV CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A.t 402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL JOB DATe REQUEST¹:

FOREMAN'UMPER WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 OTHER 0 l

FUNCTION D

-dA PURPOSE LOCATION'AFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: Pf YES ~NO SKETCH AlTACHED.'(4ES PANO

~ tO PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED)

TECHNICALMANAGER .~/9 -l7 SHIFT SUPERVISOR DATe ~~ >>>

INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE 8 TIME DATE 8 TIMe ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG:

NUMBER OF TAGS INSTALLED:

INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:

V VER IFIEP BY: E. VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)

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10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation for lifting wire for Thermocouple D07 The indications for TC D07 are inconsistent with the response of other related core parameters (i.e. incore flux map & nearby thermocouple indications). Thermocouples are used to sense core outlet temperature, determine relative fuel assembly power and compensate RVLIS. Since TC D07 is not consistent with either, incore or other thermocouples jt has been declared inoperable.

Xt has been deleted from processing in PPCS. To remove it from the averaging circuit at the thermocouple panel requires lifting its lead. The panel will then sense an open TC and remove from averaging.

it With TC D07. inoperable the minimum requirement per Tech. Specs.

of 4 thermocouples per quadrant is met. TC D07 is, not used to compensate RVLZS. The functions of the thermocouple system as desciibed in the'fSAR are fulfilled. Therefore, neither the probability nor the consequences of an accident or malfunction evaluated in the UFSAR is increased. The possibility of a new accident or malfunction is not created. The margin of safety defined in Tech. Specs. is not reduced.

References:

Tech. Specs. 3.5.3, UFSAR Section 7.7.4 ffrey P. W and 11/30/89 PORC Approval: 2

REVIEWED'EFERENCE CATEGORY 3 3.5 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC A-1402 PROCEDURE C'i~

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SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: 0 YES 5 NO SKETCH ATTACHED: 0 YES ll/NO PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED)'ECHNICAL MANAGER DATE 2-SHIFT SUPERVISOR DATE INSTALIATION REMOVAL DATE 8 TIME DATE 8 TIME:

ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS INSTALLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

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l CATEGORY ENCE PROCEDURE A.

REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIQQ 4 fg9P GINNA STATION ( 1F BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND 98QPE$ 4CCNTROL QA DISPOSITION. S YRS.

JOB FOREMAN'~ ~ <<> ~'+ OLTE REQUESTS:

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INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE 8 TIME DATE 4 TIME c A

ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS INS ALLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

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CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A-1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION tj ( 'tFr I.

BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL JOB FOREMAN +NFL JOA36$ DATE I X5 - 9'0 REQUESTS: ~

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.SHIFT SUPERVISOR DATE:

INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATEKTIME 4 I 8' f'ZQ DATE 8 TIME ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)

Attach additional page(s) as necessary 19 1eE Bee. 2/88

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CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL JOB FOREMAN' e DATE: B- 2) -9O REQUEST¹ O -0 JUMPERWIRE0 LIFTED WIRE 0 FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 OTHER g FUNCTION DSO~ e 7 6 zA SakrE

'rT rX D PURPOSE ~4 LOCATIOtII:

SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: IEI YES

' NO SKETCH ATTACHED: ~ES 0 NO PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED)'ECHNICAL MANAGER: .

333 SHIFT SUPERVISOR DATE INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATEa TIME 3 ~~ < DATE 8 TIME ENTERED IN OFFICIAL~LOG' ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS N TALLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)

P'cy'+

A 05POSlTlQN - 5 YRS.

Attach additional page(s) as necessary AE.IAE Aev 2/88

Bypass of Safet} t unction an4 Purr!pe~~~

f<<r Tempera!}'-Cold Recaz4er' i nce t he T-C'c ! d w i !o r nnor r r ordc r for T1-450 C TI 451 has been is des i rab! i to prov ide a T-Cold recorder for

<

iinr n lab !e, i t 1

pl nnt shutdown. Th i s w i !1 he n,":>>mpi i shed by installing a 250Q.

precision resistor in sr rir s>>ith thr <<ontrol board: indicator for T-Co!d  ! 4090 4 4::~P'.

A fni!ure of the ririw!y:ristn!!r J tr mporary'ecorder cr the tr mpnrary wi rrrir wi!1 riot ef trit the T-Cold signal C'rom T-409B or T-4 108 because the temporary wiririrr is installed dovnstream of a O'I isolation nmp!ifier (TY-4098-1 L TY-4 10B-l).'herefore, the insta!lation of this recorder will not increase the probability or the consequence of an ace~dent previously evaluated 'ia Chapter 15 of the UFsAR. since a failure of the nev temporary'ecorder or its wiring will not ef fect existing plant instrumentation used for safety system controls, the probability of creating an accident not previously evaluated in Chapter 15 of the UFShR vill not be increased.

Since a failure of this recorder will not adversely effect RVLIS input from T-Cold 4098 and 410B, the margin of safety ae defined in the basis of an}'echnical Specification will not be reduced.

II 7

Maven T. hdams 3/22/90

J CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS. OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL JOB FOREMAN'UMPER WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE 0

~ ~9 FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0

OTHER l8 FUNCTION I iE17d i~ Sc:drrL:

ic. 17 WO a~ IC~r P2 - io 8-)

PURPOSE vo >en

~i'd T~C T- Ccc LOCATION: I SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: ~ES 0 NO SKETCH ATTACHED: YES 0 NO PORC DATE(IF, REQUIRED)' Z- P>

TECHNICALMANAGER DATE SHIFT SUPERVISOR: DATE INSTALLATION REINOVAL DATE 8 TIME / DATE 5 TIME:

ENTERED IN OFFICIAL L~OG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS I TA NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)

JUIII 4 iV ~

g f+

Attach additional page(s) as necessary 49 11$ Rtv 2/86

~ ~

PYViss of. Snlet} l unction and Jumpers'OD~~

for Tempcrar} T-Cold Recorder Since the 1'-(nld wide rnno~ > n<.order for Tl-4~0 C TI-451 has been unreliable, tt ts desirnhlr to provide n T-Cold recorder for plant shut down. Th i s w i l l~~ nccomp i she'.! k y i nsta 1 1 ing a 250+,

1 1 precision resistor in sc r:n.: -.tth thr .~~ t:c board indicator for 1

T Cold  ! 40'IB C 4 l t>P'I .

fai lut e 0! the newly inst n1 led teml'<~mr y recorder cr 'the tompornry i i ring vi 1 1 not ef lect the ".-~o'.') signnl from T-4098 or T-410B because the temporaty wiring:s instnl led downstream of a V/I isolat ion nmpl i f ier (TY-409B-1 L TY-4108-1) . Therefore,.'.the installation of this recorder will not increase the probability, or the consequence of an accident previously evaluated in Chapter" 15 oi the UFshR. Since a failure of the nev temporary recorder or its wiring vill not effect existing plant instrumentation used for safety system controls, the probability of creating an accident not previously evaluated in Chapter 15 of the VFSAR vill .not be increased. 1 Since a fnilure ot this recorder vill not adversely effect RVLIS input from T-Cold 409B and 410B, the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification will not be reduced'.

@even T! Adaas 3/22/90

t(I 'dg jjI Ig~

CATEGORV +KAREN/El~CEDURE REVIEWED aUC:5890 A-1402 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC

(-EN I "~ij-'I:.;-,:,5: GINNA STATION BYPAS) Pf+F+g FUNCTION AND JUMPER OI~~OL" "~ "( ",:

JOB FOREMAN'ATE: REQUEST g f 0 l WIRE 0 FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 OTHER 0 4'UMPER LIFTED WIRE/

FUNCTION I PURPOSE LOCATION: rref /WD 3'SO/P I>'7Zg SrV YrC3 SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: Pf YES 0 NO SKETCH ATTACHED:

p(sy- @+@<M

~ YES 0 NO 4/dikikA'ncchnq5'y >.0 $ t)2loS'Q PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED):

TECHNICAL MANAGER:

n SHIFT SUPERVISOR DATE:

INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE& TIME 5 5/ ( DATE & TIME ~

ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS INSTALLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY: l~/ &@i 4'C~

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY}

alia m

Ps gi /AIM r~P r Attach additional page(s} as necessary a9 i42 Rtv.2/8S

CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A-1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL JOB FOREMAN'ATE I REQUESTS. 0 -2/

JUMPER WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE 0 FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK/i OTHER+

FUNCTION 4v Va/7'~e 4 no'r fry

/8,r M Mck 7 8 r'wtrvlp/ /a Z a'o

~

PURPOSE r~

I u vol 4u. w D ~..~ Q2i 5 LOCATION Vr 2 rear OC SAFETY EVALUAT(ONREQUIRED: MES 0 NO SKETCH ATI'ACHED: /HAYES 0 NO PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED)' 7- O TECHNICALMANAGER DATE SHIFT SUPERVISOR DATE:

INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE IIT TIME DATE 8 TIME ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS INSTALLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: &luW h < REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)

Pion ~p 5-r7- )

CETR'I rU~L .Q.Ctrl DISPOSITION 5 YRS.

~

Attach additional page(s) as necessary 46142 RGY 2IM

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION JOB'AOE GlNNA STATION: OATE:

BY:

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CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A-1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION JOB JUMPERWIRECI FUNCTION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL FOREMAN'ATE' 8PS~S'o LIFTEDWIREQ S40ar FUSES PULLED 0 A>H /7 dN /4~IS &4 ~ STATES BLOCK 0

/8'4~M

• '~ OTHER A'P'k, 0

PURPOSE EN7 Pk Spent.i AdA'PS JTITPLF r ID W 57'f6 )

LOCATION: D f40EM Wow i I U GhTr~Y EVALUATIONREQUIRED 8 YES 7'AFETY 0 NO SKETCH ATTACHED: 0 YES S NO PORC DATE(IF'REQUIRED) - 2>" H J TECHNICALMANAGER: DATE SHIFT SUPERVISOR DATE INSTALlATION REMOVAL DATES TIME 2 O- DATE a TIME ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS INS NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY) c / W ~ IIt) e-zo -I S ~ J SS P CBA'l(J0 ;Z Attach additianal page(s) as necessary AS.iiE Rsv E/66

CATEGORY Cgy~

NCE PROCEDURE A-t ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC I80 GINNA STATION Rgr ~...

BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION ANO~PZItOC}NTROL alV.,p y~

JOB g C- 8 C'TATES DATE REQUEST FOREMAN'UMPER WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE FUSES PULLED 0 BLOCK 0 OTHER 0 FUNCTION PURPOSE LOCATION:

SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: ES 0 NO SKETCH AYIACHED: 0 YES II(I NO PORC DATE(IF REQUIRED) M- 2o-TECHNICALMANAGER: DATE SHIFT SUPERVISO DATE INSTALLATION REMOVAL o- 42 < >-

ENTERED IN OFFICIAL NUMBER OF TAGS INS LOG' ~ DATEaTiME: O ENTERED IN OFRCIAL ~OG; 3

NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY: V VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY) o, ~ Icar.

orsorlr(c.

I VL(LL-rC /4j I 4i W uE. 4C II uV

@r p(

Attach additional pag s) as necessary AE.(42 4', 2/66

jgSGPytr 4I/Ij{ENCEPROCEDURE A.t+

(I ROCHESTER GAS AND ELEC~.

GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION ANIIIF@P@KA'OGNTROL

~

t 630

~

4 JOB FOREMAN'ATE I 2 0 REauEST>>: >0 0

JUMPER WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 OTHER FUNCTION I I IYIE.'A'. ~EL E(" Z.'w ~ U" I'I DIC- =-zA BC iCE GC C PURPOSE Pain'g= W' ~ I g.lIIIAIAL~ 57 ~ ~ ~ 5 er 8 3 hS 3 LOCATION:

SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: 8 YES 0 NO SKETCH ATTACHED: YES PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED) 0- Z5'" $ 'n TECHNICALMANAGER ~ DATE SHIFT SUPERVISOR INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE 8 TIME /a DATE 8 TIME ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG;(

NUMBER OF TAG TALLED: NUMBER OF T REMO INSTQLLED BY: REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY) Dcr7 O E'4 z C pron f nAVA',.~ r8,.

~r~i i z~~l sWr~

f? 0 8ni Attach additional page(s) as necessary 49 142 ITev. 2/88

CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC III, /

GINNA STATION STPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUIHPER CONTROL I

JOB FOREMAN'UMPER DATE: + /P'- $0 REQUESTS 0 WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE FUSES pULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 OTHER 0 FUNCTION 8 E RABIES 4o A4AMM Eiffel~

PURPOSE A) LI I Srl~cC 8wnx'l LOCATIO orIo <4 ou Wo~ r Tor SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: 8 YES 0 NO SKETCH ATIACHED: 0 YES II NO pORC DATE (IF REQUIRED)'sr- 4~a c vs i 4 TECHNICALMANAGER

>, P 'C SHIFT SUPERVISOR. DATE <g INSTALLATION DATEa TIME ~ itr'NTERED REMOVAL DATEKTIME: t>- tX- G c a 50 IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG;r NUMBER OF TAGS INSTALLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)

~v <.>> .;E I +I ~

'~~".'>~rL

<,.'C;.S Attach additional page(s) as necessary 42 142 $ 4v. 2/65

8' c'j /

CATEGORY 3.3.5 NCE PROCEDURE Usia REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND 44 +90 At GINNA STATION ELECTRIC EA(.g~ r BYPAss oF sAFETY FUNCTloN ANbgJQI+E It 5%ITRQL Jag ~~

JOB DATE hatt) REQUESTS:

FOREMAN'UMPER WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 OTHER 0 FUNCTION C'.

PURPOSE LOCATION:

SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED:

PORC DATE(IF REQUIRED): ~

>4'KETCH ES 0 NO ATTACHED: 0 YES 8 NO TECHNICALMANAGER DATE SHIFT SUPERVISO . '?, t i>( 6-C~k~ DATE INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATER TIME gD 52 DATE 6 TIME ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL ~QG; NUMBER OF TAGS INS LE NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY) l Phl F 4r dfsonhc.

I C / VECLC r C'~

r~ I c vd 4C II uV

- v-$)

Attach additional pag s) as necessary 40 1 ~2 Rev 2/66

CATEGORY 3.3.5 REFERENCE PROCEDURE A-1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL JOBFOREMAN'P 4 ( DATE:

FUSES PULLED 0 REQUEST>>

STATES BLOCK 0

~3 ~ OTHER%

JUMPER WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE 0

.rd. i C~ng FUNCTION C /o rJ>>: r i ~ .>> cn'~T 6 v R~ 4 . ~l~~~/4q.d FURFOSE n ~rnAO C-jo fErhh>>,.n; fr~re LOCATION: C Ar, n.dIr vl SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: @YES 0 NO SKETCH ATTACHED: 0 YES II NO PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED): 6- =~o TECHNICAL MANAGER DATE: C~

SHIFT SUPERVISOR:

. ~h. 9 h INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE & TIME DATE & TIME: /'fs>

h ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS IN TA NUMBER OF TAG MOVE .

BY: D'NSTALLED REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)

Rlf~f~ p,,~t , r A

fP t tJ tyya

+A>i',' '. '

u~~>>

OISPOSt V ~ ~ >>

Pg Attach additional page(s) as necessary 49 l ~ P A>>>> PTAS

BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL ANNUNCIATOR C-10 Annunciator C-10 is described in the UFSAR as a method of providing indication of low SW flow to the control room during an accident.

A wiring anomaly is causing spurious alarms. Without this alarm, the operator will not know if adequate SW flow exists during an accident. By pulling the alarm card, the card will be prevented from alarming spuriously but indication of SW flow will be lost.

To ensure sufficient SW flow, if an SI signal is received, operations personnel will verify locally that greater than 900 gpm is available to each fan cooler. This requirement will be posted on the MCB and oncoming operators will be informed during turnover. During normal operations, the flow is 1000 gpm. When an SI signal is received, flow would go up so sufficient flow should be available. By verifying greater than 900 gpm, the assumptions of the UFSAR remain valid and no unreviewed safety question exists. Post, maintenance testing will include sufficient testing to ensure the alarm will operate when actual low flow is sensed.

Ref. UFSAR 6.2.1.1.1 a /8/ro

CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A-1402 j

REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL JOB FOREMAN'ATE: Po REQUESTS:

JUMPER WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE B FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 OTHER 0 FUNCTION i~7 V-ea iu~ c 8c oc.w g~AC pJ AT'u PURPOSE -3 IS CW LOCATION'AFETY EYALUATIQNREQUIRED; Ir YEB p Np SKETCH ATTACHED: 0 YES NO PORCDATE(IFREQUIRED) 4-lg- g TECHNICALMANAGER DATE + /~ 0 SHIFT SUPERVISOR: DATE. g- I 9-9O INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE& TIME 4 I 0 DATE & TIME:

ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS INSTALLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:

. VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)

Attach additional page(s) as necessary

~9 \it Rev. tlBB

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CATEGORY REFERERCEPRCCEDUREgq A-1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL JOB FOREMAN'UMPER DATE 7 i~ ~ REQUEST 4:

WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE/( FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 OTHER 0 FUNCTION e ~Pre C.

I I 0

'~Z PURPOSE 7 Nc /~o +/~ ~/ ~ r 7g+ ~ fk gz LOCATION'~ R~L ~ I-I I ~3,Z SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: g YES 0 NO SKETCH ATIACHED: 0 YES @NO PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED)' 7 PO TECHNICALMANAGER SHIFT SUPERVISO DATE:

INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATES TIME 0 DATE 8 TIME:

ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS I TALLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)

Attach additional page(s) as necessary I9 lEt REF,g/8S

10CFR50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION for Bypass of Safety Function for Thermocouple C-3 The circuit for thermocouple C-3 is inoperable. To ensure erroneous readings are not generated, the leads from this thermo-couple to the thermocouple panel will be lifted. This will prevent erroneous ,thermocouple readings from being included in the averaging cal'culations in the thermocouple panel. The four thermocouples per quadrant required by Tech Specs will be main-tained and thermocouple C-3 is not used by RVLIS.

Based on this evaluation, the probability and consequences of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased. The possibility of an accident or malfunction not previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not created. And, the margin of safety as defined in the basis of Tech Specs will not be reduced. Therefore, this bypass of safety function does not create an unreviewed safety question.

'

References:

UFSAR Section 4.4.5.4 & Table 7.7-3 Tech Specs Section 3.5.3 & Table 3.5-3 Prepared by: Date: 7-TC. SA

August 1, 1989 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR TEMPORARY STRUCTURE FEATURE AUTHORIZATION FORM 89-180 This temporary structure will be placed under the reference leg piping to support the condensate pot and associated tubing.

The reference leg piping will be lifted by hand while measuring and recording the maximum lift'orce. The lift will got create any substantial deflection of the root valve and will therefore not create an unexceptable stress on the welds in the reference leg. The reference leg will not be lifted past the condensates pot's original 'esign elevation. Therefore, this temporary structure will not endanger the integrity of the reference leg piping. This temporary structure will be removed'rior to leaving the hot shutdown condition.

This temporary structure will not increase the probability of an accident or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR. This temporary structure will not effect the pressure transmitter PT-429 and therefore will not effect the response of safety injection to an accident. This structure will not effect the integrity of the reference leg and will only be used to support the static load of the piping will remain intact.

This temporary structure will not create an accident of a different type then those specified in the UFSAR. The Safety Injection System will react as designed to any accident addressed in the UFSAR.

This temporary structure will not reduce'he margin of safety as defined in any technical specification basis. This structure does not render any plant system inoperable, nor will it degrade any operating system.

8/11/89 SCREENHOUSE NORTH OF MCC-1G PLANT BETTERMENT PAINT SCAFFOLD 89-183 Scaffolding is needed for ceiling and wall painting in the area north of MCC-1G not covered by previously approved scaffolds89-167 and 89-168. Because of the proximity of the service Water Pumps in both trains and MCC-1G the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.K. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167) .

The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer.

Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

If it is foreseen in the observed during erection, that scaffold planning stage, or is a deviation from the guidelines will necessary, be verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept.

the installation.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, and fire fighting provisions.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based. on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this 'proposed installation are the following:

Seismic Events

There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to

'ire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

8/11/89 SCREENHOUSE SOUTH WALL OVER DIESEL FIRE PUMP PLANT BETTERMENT PAINT SCAFFOLD 89-184 Scaffolding is needed for ceiling and wall painting in the area over the Diesel Fire Pump between the areas covered by previously approved scaffolds89-170 and 89-171. Because of the proximity of the service Water Pumps and Fire Service Water Pumps in both trains the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaceddownwith the alternative bars in conjunction requirement to use scaffold poles as hold with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.K. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167) .

The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer.

Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from instance a member o f Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept the installation.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, and fire fighting provisions.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

seismically constructed feature with no interferences with As a accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the 'Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Seismic Events

There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

. The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

September 6, 1989 A MAIN STEAM ARV-3411 REPAIR WORK PLATFORM 89-190 Repair work on ARV-3411 will necessitate a work platform, constructed of pole scaffold and planks such as to surround the A Main Steam lead and the relief valve inlet piping, somewhat below the ARV inlet flange. The small tubing for the ARV air operator will be disconnected during the valve repair preparations. As such the platform will have no potential effect on the ARVs, and the structures will be restricted from movement in the direction of any other safety related equipment. The Main Steam leads and the relief piping are sufficiently sturdy to preclude any damage from the relatively light scaffold materials; however, piping of smaller diameter than the scaffold pole material is incorporated as the isolation valve 3507 bypass. The duration of scaffold existence is projected to be 2 weeks.

Because of the above factors, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in con)unction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be; monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall beEngineer. confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning the observed during erection, that a deviation from stage, or is guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, and fire fighting provisions in the area.

f The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above any existing plant it will not have any adverse effect on provisions. in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Steam Generator tube rupture Rupture of a steam pipe Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it, will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

September 7, 1989 LAUNDRY EXHAUST FAN VIBRATION/EXPANSION RING REPLACEMENT WORK PLATFORM 89-191 Repair is required on ductwork at the Laundry Exhaust Fan, located in the vicinity of the A Feedwater Line. The entries from the Motor and Turbine Auxiliary Feedwater Pump discharges are nearby, and there is a high density of snubbers for this piping in area (5 mechanical and 1 hydraulic). A temperature sensor (TE-2096) is located at the top of the feedwater line downstream of check valve 3003.

Because of the existence of the above features within the vicinity of the proposed scaffold, scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable .as noted per M.B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that. an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

it If isforeseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance thisfrom a member of Structural instance the Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in'he same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, and fire fighting provisions in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Loss of Normal Feedwater Loss of all A.C. power to the station auxiliaries Steam Generator tube rupture Rupture of a steam pipe Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there, will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated, in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, have no interface with any it will be independent equipment or systems of, and will discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

September 12, 1989 SI RECIRC FLOW ORIFICE FE-916 LEAK REPAIR WORK PLATFORM 89-192 A work platform is required to correct a leak condition at SI recirc flow orifice FE-916, located between the Refueling Water Tank and 480v Bus 16. Also within the vicinity are Temperature Indicator TI-917, and SI recirc MOVs 897 and 898.

The MOVs are within the ASME Seismic Class 2 boundary as indicated on P&ID 33013-1261 Containment Spray (SI). The platform is to be about 4 ft. high, estimated to be in existence 2 days.

Because of factors given above the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167) . The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance this from a member of Structural instance the Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, and fire fighting provisions in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above any existing plant it provisions will not have any adverse effect on in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, have no interface with any it will be independent of, and will equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

9/26/89 AUXILIARY BUILDING, TOP SOUTH WALL WEST FROM COLUMN LINE 8a PLANT BETTERMENT PAINT SCAFFOLD 89-194 A scaffold is planned for painting the south wall at the Auxiliary Building top level, to extend from the Decon Pit to the Monitor Tanks. Because of the large area to be covered, including the area immediately adjacent to both Component Cooling Heat Exchangers, and the relatively lengthy projected duration of the scaffold existence, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering '(M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) .

The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable -as noted per M.B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167).

The Zob Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. In addition, part of the orientation shall stress the importance of taking care not to bump any live smoke detectors. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer. --In addition, the Job Supervisor shall notify the Fire Protection group during installation to allow for consultation on any potential interferences with fire detection/sprinkler provisions encountered.

During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be, documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Liaison Engineer.

In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to, the guidelines shall be conf irmed and documented prior to sca ffold use by the Liaison Engineer. This confirmation shall include review of attributes such as configuration of the scaffold frame and securing of the planks. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

During construction'nd teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment'and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing, and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions in the area.

The scaffold shall be constructed so as not to interfere with Auxiliary Building Crane use during fuel transfer mechanism work planned.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Rupture of a Steam Pipe Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

S 1/16/90 SERVICE WATER PIPE SUPPORTS SWU-625,'WU 626'WU 623'" AND SWU 624 SCREENHOUSE BASEMENT WORK PLATFORMS89-202 In order to perform the pipe support upgrade work near the ceiling for the Service Water Pump discharges, work platforms are needed, to be constructed of wood, about 3 ft. above the floor.

The individual pump discharges are 14 in. pipe, and the headers are 20 in. pipe, sufficiently sturdy to preclude any damage by the relatively short wooden platforms. No safety related instrumentation will be affected by this platform installation.

Based on the factors described above the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The instal,lation does not result in a change to the facility or procedures as described in the Safety Analysis Report.

Material of construction will be light enough so that have no effect on any component in the event of a seismic event.

it will The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report associated with the proposed installation are the following:

Seismic Event The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Teqhnical Specifications because the lightness of the installation in relation to the sturdiness of the pipe will ensure that there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specifications bases.

The installation will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because it will not affect safety related equipment in the event of a seismic event.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because of the sturdiness of the adjacent piping.

The installation of this temporary modification will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification because Specification.

it does not affect any Technical

y 1/16/90 SERVICE WATER PIPE SUPPORTS SWU-636 AND SWU-638 WORK PLATFORMS89-203 In order to perform the pipe support upgrade work near the ceiling for the Service Water Pump discharge portion in the northeast corner of the room, a work platform constructed of wood will be needed, about 3 ft. above the floor. The individual pump are 20 in. pipe, discharges are 14 in. pipe, and the headers sufficiently sturdy to preclude any damage by the relatively short wooden platforms. No safety related instrumentation will be affected by this platform installation.

Based on the factors described above the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the facility or procedures as described in the Safety Analysis Report.

Material of construction will be light enough so that it will have no effect on any component in the event of a seismic event.

The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report associated with the proposed installation are the following:

I Seismic Event The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because the lightness of the installation in relation to the sturdiness of the pipe will ensure that there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specifications bases.

The installation will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because it will not affect safety related equipment in the event of a seismic event.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because of the sturdiness of the adjacent piping.

The installation of this temporary modif ication will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification because .it does not affect any Technical Specification.

1/17/90 SCREENHOUSE PLANT BETTERMENT PAINTING SCAFFOLD ABOVE THE HOUSE HEATING BOILER 90-01 Scaffolding is required in the Screenhouse for cleaning and painting under the Plant Betterment Project. This permit (90-01) is for a seismic scaffold above and around the house heating boiler. (Ref. sketch attached to permit). This location is within 1 1/2 times its height of safety related service water pumps lA and 1B.

The scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the

.attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment).

The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to with wire'll alternative plank decking in place may be replaced the requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.K. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Station Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

If itduring observed is foreseen in the erection, that scaffold planning stage, or is a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidanceIn this from a member of Structural instance the Structural Engineering shall be obtained.

Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept the installation.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing. and maintenance access to the Screenhouse all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the

.

assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it provisions will not have any adverse effect in the immediate vicinity in on their any existing plant functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Seismic Events

There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

February 7, 1990 CONDUIT AND CABLE INSTALLATION IN AUXILIARY BUILDING SUB-BASEMENT FOR MIDLOOP INSTRUMENTATION EWR-4892 SCAFFOLD 90-14 A scaffold is needed with a work platform about 8 feet from the floor. The corner poles shall be extended to the ceiling and horizontal poles shall be extended to at least one wall and other anchorage points or bumper contact points on the opposite side to prevent movement.

Because both trains of Residual Heat Removal Pumps are within the immediate vicinity of the scaffold, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic .Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment), incorporating the features described above.

The guidelines statement 6.0 shall be augmented with the recpxirement that the scaffold shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift. The Construction Engineer or Liaison Engineer shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer. During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. This confirmation shall include review of attributes such as configuration of the scaffold frame and securing of the planks. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of conf irmation of seismic capability.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

The scaffold shall not be built until immediately prior to the planned start of the conduit installation effort.

90-14 During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, fire protection systems, and'otating equipment in the area.

The above construction and operational requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Accidental Release Waste Gas Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, have no interface with any it will be independent of, and will equipment or syst'ems discussed in the

.bases of Technical Specifications.

February 7, 1990 CONDUIT AND CABLE INSTALLATION ZN AUXILIARY BUILDING BASEMENT AT WEST STAIR FOR MID-LOOP INSTRUMENTATZON EWR-4892 SCAFFOLDS 90-15 In order to install conduit and cable for this project in the Auxiliary Building basement a scaffold is needed near the ceiling above the Spent Fuel Pool Pumps.

The SFP cooling system is non-seismic safety related (1) however, 'eismic Category I items are within the immediate vicinity, given below.

A and B Residual Heat Removal Pump Cooling Units (2)

A Residual Heat Removal Pump Discharge Temperature TT-630 (3)

Other instruments in the area for which care should be taken to avoid disturbing are as follows:

Component Cooling Return from Residual Heat Removal Pumps flow FI-651 and its associated tubing. (4)

A Residual Heat removal Pump discharge pressure PZC-629 and PI-629A and their associated tubing. (3)

Because of the above factors the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The guidelines statement 6.0 shall be augmented with the requirement that the scaffold shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift.

The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer. During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to-the field copy of the authorization form by the Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer, shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

90-15 The scaffold shall not be built until immediately prior to the planned start of the conduit installation effort.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to the Auxiliary Building sub-basement, all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above any existing plant it provisions will not have any adverse effect in the immediate vicinity in on their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

90-15 The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

NOTES:

Quality Assurance Manual Appendix A Quality and Safety Related Listing and Diagrams Section 2.2.4 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling outlined in RG&E Drawing 33013-1248 (portion attached).

2) UFSAR Section 9.4.9.1 Engineered Safety Features Equipment Ventilation and Cooling.

3) UFSAR Figure 5.4-7 Residual Heat Removal System (portion attached).

4) UFSAR Figure 9.2-4 Sheet, 1 Component Cooling Water System (portion attached).

February 7, 1990 CONDUIT AND CABLE INSTALLATION IN AUXILIARY BUILDING INTERMEDIATE LEVEL AT WEST STAIR FOR MID-LOOP INSTRUMENTATION EWR-4892 SCAFFOLD 90-16 In order to install conduit and cable for this project in the Auxiliary Building Intermediate Level a scaffold is needed near the ceiling from the stairwell north to adjacent to the Containment wall, over the west end of the Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger. Standby Auxiliary Feedwater System Containment isolation MOVs are located on the north side of the SFPHX.

The space between the heat exchanger and containment is very congested with piping, pipe support structures, regulators, valves, instruments, and lead shielding for a process monitor in the service water piping from the heat exchanger. A major portion of the equipment here is associated with the waste gas system supporting the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank and the Pressurizer Relief Tank, both of which are in Containment. Immersed within this space is one of the Containment Mini-purge discharge isolation valves.

Because of the location of the above discussed SAFW Containment isolation MOVs, the scaffold shall be constructed as seismic using the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer.

The guidelines statement 6.0 shall be augmented with the requirement that the scaffold shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift. The Construction Engineer or Liaison Engineer shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer. During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. This confirmation shall include review of attributes such as configuration of the scaffold frame and securing of the planks. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

90-16 If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

The scaffold shall not be built until immediately prior to, the planned start of the conduit installation effort.

During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, fire fighting provisions, and ad)oining rooms in the area.

Locked area access to the Spent Fuel Pool filter vault is controlled by a locked gate. Ensure that the scaffold does not allow any easier access to this area.

The above construction recpxirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in lOCFR50. 59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Accidental Release - Waste Gas Steam Generator Tube Rupture Rupture of a Steam Pipe Primary System Pipe Rupture Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference, with access provided to

.fire fighting provisions.

'I 0

90-16 The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report,, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

February 7, 1990 CONDUIT AND CABLE INSTALLATION IN CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING ROOM FOR MID-LOOP INSTRUMENTATION EWR-4892 SCAFFOLD 90-17 In order to install conduit and cable for this pro) ect in the Control Room Air Handling Room a scaffold is needed. The equipment in the immediate area is, for the most part, dedicated to continuing habitability for the Main Control Room in the post-accident environment. Because of this, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic'caffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 6.0 shall be augmented with the requirement that the scaffold shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift. The Construction Engineer or Liaison Engineer shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer. During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer in his stead.

In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. This confirmation shall include review of attributes such as configuration of the scaffold frame and securing of the planks. Such documentation shall, be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form.

The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

If it, is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

The scaffold shall not be built until immediately prior,to the planned start of the conduit installation effort.

During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for. operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions.

S.

't

90-17 The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in lOCFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above existing plant it provisions will not have any adverse effect in the immediate vicinity in on their any functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in. Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not, increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunqtion of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, in with any existing equipment or systems and will have no interface the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, have no interface with any it will be independent equipment or systems of, and will discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications..

February 13, 1990 PENETRATION SEAL INSPECTION OVER CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING UNIT SCAFFOLD 90-23 In order to inspect penetration seals above the Control Room Air Handling Unit, a scaffold is needed. The equipment in the immediate area is, for the most part, dedicated to continuing habitability for the Main Control Room in the post-accident environment. Because of this, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) .

The guidelines statement 4. 0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

. If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from instance a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as, described above.

During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

90-23 The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of,,and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

tl February 15, 1990 CONDUIT AND CABLE INSTALLATION UNDER INTERMEDIATE BUILDING NORTH CATWALK EWR-4530 SCAFFOLD 90-24 In order to install conduit and cable under the catwalk a work platf orm needed. It will be located in the immediate for heating steam and the vicinity of containment penetrations ILRT vent to roof. It will be directly above the Containment Cooler Unit flow indicators which are Seismic Category I instruments. To the immediate north are Control Rod Drive Power Cabinets.

Because of the close involvement with the Seismic Category I items the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) .

The guidelines statement 6.0 shall be augmented with the requirement that the scaffold shall be complete .and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift. The Construction Engineer or Liaison Engineer shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer. During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. Zn the final stage of construction prior to use-, the seismic capability. of the scaffold ini relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior.. to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. This confirmation shall include review of attributes such as configuration of the scaffold frame and securing of the planks. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural ,Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

The scaffold shall not be built until immediately prior to the planned start of the conduit installation effort.

90-24 During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping containment isolation valves, the instruments and cabinets described above and any other sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance 'shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, and fire fighting provisions in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no inter ferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on in the immediate vicinity in their any existing plant provisions functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Steam Line Rupture Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire Sighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the S'afety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity. 7

90-24 The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

February 16, 1990 A BATTERY ROOM EAST WALL PENETRATION SEALING INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-26 In order to inspect penetration seals on the A Battery Room wall adjacent to the A Battery, a scaffold is needed, to provide a work platform approximately 9 ft. from the floor. It is to be of wooden construction to eliminate the potential for short circuiting the battery. It shall be constructed in accordance with the. attached sketch so that it will be identical to the structure provided as Request 86-56, which was determined to be seismically acceptable (see attached 10/7/86 S.K. Ferguson memo) .

The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the construction requirements given below.

Pre-planning and prefabrication for the scaffold shall be done such as to allow completion of the structure, apart. from the decking, in one day of work within the Battery Room. As alternatives to this the following may be observed:

The portion completed shall be adequately restrained to make it seismic with bracing and interlocking and contact with adjacent structural features.

In lieu of the above, the B Main Battery System shall be maintained operable, with no non-seismic temporary structures in the B Battery Room.

During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by a qualified individual.

Extreme care must be exercised in working adjacent to or above the batteries during construction, use, and teardown of the scaffold.

Sufficient clearances are to be provided for Electrician access to the battery.

Prior to use, the structure shall be inspected by the Job Supervisor to confirm that its construction was .in accordance with the sketch. Upon successful confirmation the Job Supervisor shall document this confirmation for the original copy of the Authorization Form, and so notify the Shift Supervisor.

!

90-26 The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it, will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The affects and methods to cope with loss of D.C. power are given in the following:

UFSAR Section 8.1.4.4 Potential Risk of Station Blackout UFSAR Section 8.3.2.1 Description UFSAR Section 8.3.2.2 Analysis Procedure ER-ELEC.2 Crosstie TSC Battery to A or B DC Bus I

Also analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report associated with this proposed installation is the following:

Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, andinwill hav'e no interface with any equipment or systems discussed the bases of Technical Specifications.

2/26/90 A BATTERY ROOM NORTHWEST CORNER PENETRATION SEALING INSPECTION EWR 4941 SCAFFOLD 90-27 A work platform is needed to inspect. penetration seals in the northwest corner of the A Battery Room adjacent to the A Battery Charger, to be about 6 1/2 ft. from the floor. The duration of existence of this scaffold is estimated to be a month. In consideration of any possibility for inoperability of DC electric system equipment in the B Battery Room within this fairly lengthy duration the Seismic scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.

B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167) .

It shall not be started until the wooden scaffold over the A Battery bank is completed; as such, that scaffold (90-26) shall serve as a barrier to prevent short circuiting the battery with metal scaffold materials. This subject scaffold shall be removed prior to removal of the wooden scaffold.

The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such conf irmation o f seismic capability shall so noti fy the Shi ft Supervisor.

If itduring observed is foreseen in the erection, that a scaffold planning stage, or is deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidanceIn this from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Extreme care must be exercised in working adjacent to the batteries and other .DC electric equipment during construction, use, .and teardown 'of the scaffold.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all instrumentation and panels in the area.

90-27 The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these,. the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The affects and methods to cope with loss of D.C. power are given in the following:

UFSAR Section 8.1.4.4 Potential Risk of Station Blackout UFSAR Section 8.3.2.1 Description UFSAR Section 8.3.2.2 Analysis Procedure ER-ELEC.2 Crosstie TSC Battery to A or B DC Bus Also analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report associated with this proposed installation is the following:

Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any'xisting equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

2/26/90 A BATTERY ROOM NORTHEAST CORNER PENETRATION SEALING INSPECTION EWR 4941 SCAFFOLD 90-28 A work platform is needed to inspect penetration seals in the northeast corner of the A Battery Room adjacent to the A Battery Disconnect Switches to be about 8 ft. from the floor. The duration of existence of this scaffold is estimated to be a month. In consideration of any possibility for inoperability of DC electric system equipment in the B Battery Room within this fairly lengthy duration the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.

B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167).

It shall not be started until the wooden scaffold over the A Battery bank is completed; as such, that scaffold (90-26) shall serve as a barrier to prevent short circuiting the battery with metal scaffold materials. This subject scaffold shall be removed prior to removal of the wooden scaffold.

The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it. is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from instance a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Extreme care must be exercised in working adjacent to the batteries and other DC electric equipment during construction, use, and teardown of the scaffold.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all instrumentation and panels in the area.

'I

90-28 The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The affects and methods to cope with loss of D.C. power are given in the following:

UFSAR Section 8.1.4.4 Potential Risk of Station Blackout UFSAR Section 8.3.2.1 Description UFSAR Section 8.3.2.2 Analysis Procedure ER-ELEC.2 Crosstie TSC Battery to A or B DC Bus Also analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report associated with this proposed. installation is the following:

Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic

feature, with any it will remain independent of, in existing equipment or systems and will have no interface the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, andinwill the have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed bases of Technical Specifications.

V

03/08/90 STANDBY SFP COOLING COMPONENT MOUNTING 90-40 It has been decided to provide mountings for, and to install the standby SFP Pump in the Auxiliary Building basement, immedia-tely east of the RHR Pump Cooler Units, by the containment wall, and to do likewise with the standby SFP Heat Exchanger on the top floor immediately west of the A Component Cooling Pump. The mountings are to be of seismic design as provided for Temporary Fluid System Provision Form 88-27 for EWR 1594B and discussed in J.J Ferraro's April 5, 1989 memo on review of the pump mounting.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a .change to the assump-tions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report. As a seismically constructed feature it will not. have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report.

The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events The installation does not. involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems. in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will

90-40 have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

March 8, 1990 TUBING INSTALLATION IN AUXILIARY BUILDING SUB-BASEMENT FOR MIDLOOP INSTRUMENTATION ENR-4892 SCAFFOLD 90-41 A scaffold is needed with a work platform about 5 feet from the floor. The corner poles shall be extended to the ceiling and horizontal poles shall be extended to at least one wall and other anchorage points or bumper contact points on the opposite side to prevent movement. As such 90-14 '

it may be integrated with scaffold Because both trains of Residual Heat Removal Pumps are within the immediate vicinity of the scaffold, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment), incorporating the features described above.

The guidelines statement 6.0 shall be augmented with the requirement that the scaffold shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift. The Construction Engineer or Liaison Engineer shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer. During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Construction Engineer or the Xiaison Engineer in his stead. Zn the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. This confirmation shall include review of attributes such as configuration of the scaffold frame and securing of the planks. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

during Zf it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

The scaffold shall not be built until immediately prior to the planned start of the conduit installation effort.

90-41 During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, fire protection systems, and rotating equipment in the area.

The above construction and operational requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Accidental Release Waste Gas Decrease in Reactor Coolant inventory Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

S 0

03/29/90 RHR PUMP SUCTION MOV'S 704A & B SCAFFOLDS 90-80 In order to perform maintenance on MOV's 704A and B a scaffold is needed to provide a work platform about 10 ft. from the floor. The maintenance is to be performed with all fuel removed from Reactor. The scaffold installation is to take place prior to this to maximize the time available for valve maintenance.

Because of the need for operability of the RHR System during this period the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided. from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment).

The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

. If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed. during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural In this instance the Structural Engineering shall be obtained.

Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, rotating equipment and fire fighting provisions in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation 'oes not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse. effect vicinity in on their any existing plant provisions in the immediate functions in normal operation or in their functions as described C

90-80 in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, inandthewill with any existing equipment or systems have no interface vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent, of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

03/29/90 RHR RETURN OUTSIDE MISSILE BARRIER MOV-720 SCAFFOLD 90-81 In order to perform maintenance on MOV-720 a scaffold is needed to provided a work platform about 7 ft. from the floor.

The maintenance is to be performed with all fuel removed from the Reactor. The scaffold installation is to take place prior to this to maximize the time available for valve maintenance.

Because of the need for operability of the RHR System during this period the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment).

The guidelines statement 4. 0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the 'iaison guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a cgxalified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift, Supervisor.

If it, is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance this from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves and instrumentation in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given -in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a. seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect vicinity in on their any existing plant provisions in the immediate functions in normal operation or in their functions as described

8 90-81 II in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important, to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

April 24, 1990 B MAIN STEAM ARV-3410 REPAIR WORK PLATFORM 90-151 Repair, work on ARV-3411 will necessitate a work platform, constructed of pole scaffold and planks such as to surround the A Main Steam lead and the relief valve inlet piping, somewhat below the ARV inlet flange. As such the platform will have no potential effect on the ARVs, and the structures will be restricted from movement in the direction of any other safety related equipment.

The Main Steam leads and the relief piping are sufficiently sturdy to preclude any damage from the relatively light scaffold materials; however, piping of smaller diameter than the scaffold pole material is incorporated as the isolation valve 3506 bypass.

The duration of scaffold existence is projected to be approximately 1 1/2 weeks.

Because of the above factors, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. 'Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on 'the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance thisfrom a member of Structural instance the Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, and fire fighting provisions in the area.90-151 The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Steam Generator tube rupture Rupture of a steam pipe Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

5/10/90 NaOH TANK ROOM PENETRATION SEAL INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-156 In order to inspect penetration seals in the southeast corner of the NaOH Tank Room, a scaffold is needed, to provide a work platform approximately 12 ft. from the floor. In this location it Collection System will be and directly will be over the immediately Charging Pump southeast of Leakoff the 2 trains of Spray Additive Tank outlet valves (HCV-836A and HCV-836B) . The leakoff collection system is indicated as non-seismic on P&ID 33013-1265 sheet 2. Damage to the leakoff tank which could present potential for release from the vent header is bounded by analysis of rupture of a Gas Decay Tank.

Because of the potential effect on HCV-836A and HCV-836B the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization, Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use .by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during 'erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance this from a member of Structural instance the Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, f ire fighting provisions, and ad) oining rooms in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.90-156 The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it provisions will not have any adverse effect on in the immediate vicinity in their any existing plant functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Accidental Release Waste Gas Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic, feature, interface with any it will be independent of, and will equipment or systems discussed in the have no bases of Technical Specifications.

May 9, 1990 B BATTERY ROOM WEST WALL PENETRATION SEALING INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-157 In order to inspect penetration seals on the B Battery Room wall adjacent to the B Battery, a scaffold is needed, to provide a work platform approximately 9 ft. from the floor. It is to be of wooden construction to eliminate the potential for short circuiting the battery. It shall be constructed in accordance with the attached sketch so that it will be identical to the structure provided as Request 86-56, which was determined to be seismically acceptable (see attached 10/7/86 S.K. Ferguson memo).

The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the construction requirements given below.

Pre-planning and prefabrication for the scaffold shall be done such as to allow completion of the structure, apart from the decking, in one day of work within the Battery Room. As alternatives to this the following may be observed:

The portion completed shall be adequately restrained to make it seismic with bracing and interlocking and contact with adjacent structural features.

In lieu of the above, the A Main Battery System shall be maintained operable, with no non-seismic temporary structures in the A Battery Room.

During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by a qualified individual.

Extreme care must be exercised in working adjacent to or above the batteries during construction, use, and teardown of the scaffold.

Sufficient clearances are to be provided for Electrician access to the battery.

Prior to use, the structure .shall be inspected by the Job Supervisor to confirm that its construction was Job in accordance Supervisor with the sketch. Upon successful confirmation the original shall document this confirmation forShift Supervisor.

the copy of the Authorization Form, and so notify the

90-157 The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The affects and methods to cope with loss of D.C. power are given in the following:

UFSAR Section 8.1.4.4 Potential Risk of Station Blackout UFSAR Section 8.3.2.1 Description UFSAR Section 8.3.2.2 Analysis Procedure ER-ELEC.2 Crosstie TSC Battery to A or B DC Bus Also analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report associated with this proposed installation is the following:

Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it. will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent or of, and will discussed in the have no interface with any equipment systems bases of Technical Specifications.

5/9/90 B BATTERY ROOM SOUTHWEST CORNER PENETRATION SEALING INSPECTION EWR 4941 SCAFFOLD 90-158 A work platform is needed to inspect penetration seals in the southwest corner of the B Battery Room ad)acent to the B Battery to be about 8 ft. from the floor. The duration of existence of this scaffold is estimated to be a month. In consideration of any possibility for inoperability of DC electric system equipment in the A Battery Room within this fairly lengthy duration the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment).

The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in con)unction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167).

It shall not be started until the wooden scaffold over the B Battery bank is completed; as such, that scaffold (90-157) shall serve as a barrier to prevent short circuiting the battery with metal scaffold materials. This sub)ect scaffold shall be removed prior to removal of the wooden scaffold.

The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance thisfrom a member of Structural instance the Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Extreme care must be exercised in working adjacent to the batteries and other DC electric equipment during construction, use, and teardown of the scaffold.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all instrumentation and panels in the area.

\

90-158 The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no inter ferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The affects and methods to cope with loss of D.C. power are given in the following:

UFSAR Section 8.1.4.4 Potential Risk of Station Blackout UFSAR Section 8.3.2.1 Description UFSAR Section 8.3.2.2 Analysis Procedure ER-ELEC.2 Crosstie TSC Battery to A or B DC Bus Also analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report associated with this proposed installation is the following:

Seismic Events The installation, does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will

~

be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical &pecif~cations.

2/26/90 B BATTERY ROOM NORTH END PENETRATION SEALING INSPECTION EWR 4941 SCAFFOLD 90-159 Work platforms are needed to inspect penetration seals in the north end of the B Battery Room adjacent to the B Battery Charger and B Battery Disconnect Switches to be about 8 ft. from the floor. The duration of existence of this scaffolding is estimated

.to be a month. In consideration of any possibility for inoperability of DC electric system equipment in the A Battery Room within this fairly lengthy duration the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering,.(M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167).

It shall not be started until the wooden scaffold over the B Battery bank is completed; as such, that scaffold (90-157) shall serve as a barrier to prevent short circuiting the battery with metal scaffold materials. This subject scaffold shall be removed prior to removal of the wooden scaffold.

The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such f

conf irmation o seismic capability shall so notify the Shi f Supervisor.

t If itduring observed is foreseen in the erection, that a scaffold planning stage, or is deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Extreme care must be exercised in working adjacent to the batteries and other DC electric equip'ment during construction, use,'nd teardown of the scaffold.90-159 Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all instrumentation and panels in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses .described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The affects and methods to cope with loss of D.C. power are given in the following:

UFSAR Section 8.1.4.4 Potential Risk of Station Blackout UFSAR Section 8.3.2.1 Description UFSAR Section 8.3.2.2 Analysis Procedure ER-ELEC.2 Crosstie TSC Battery to A or B DC Bus Also analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report associated with this proposed installation is the following:

Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it .

will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis'or any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic "'fd&ure, it. will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

8

~

May 15, 1990 BUS 16 SOUTH PORTION AREA PENETRATION SEALING INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-160 In order to inspect penetration seals above the south portion of Bus 16 a scaffold is needed, to provide a work platform approximately 15 ft. from the floor.

In order to prevent any interference with activities involving the alternate train Bus 14 and MCC-lC, it is planned to construct the scaffold as a seismic installation. The scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment).

The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in con)unction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member the of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing, and maintenance access to all electrical panels on the Bus 16 and MCC-lD, to include clearance to rack out breakers.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

Cl 90-160 The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analyses, given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change to the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The insta'llation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, have no interface with any it will be independent of, and will equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

May 15, 1990 BUS16 NORTH END AREA PENETRATION SEALING INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-161 In order to inspect penetration seals above the north end of Bus 16 a scaffold is needed, to provide a work platform approximately 15 ft. from the floor.

In order to prevent any interference with activities involving the alternate train Bus 14 and MCC-1C, the scaffold as a seismic installation.

it is planned to construct The scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) .

The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection, process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

Zf it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance this from a member of Structural instance the Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing, "and maintenance access to all electrical panels on the Bus 16 and MCC-1D, to include clearance to rack out breakers.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

i The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above any existing plant it provisions will not have any adverse effect on in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change to the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

5/16/90 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP AREA PENETRATION SEAL INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-162 In order to inspect penetration seals at the north wall by the Turbine Auxiliary Feedwater Pump area, a scaffold is needed to provide a work platform approximately 10 ft. high adjacent to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. Concurrent with this are two other sites of scaffolds for inspections in the vicinities of the A and B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.

Because of the concurrent activity which could potentially affect both trains of Auxiliary Feedwater System components, construction, and teardown activities shall take place at only one site at a time. In addition, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.B. Fitzsimmons on 'Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions in the area.

The above construction requirements are 'to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Steam Line Rupture Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no e ffect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation -does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any, equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

5/16/90

~ B MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP AREA PENETRATION SEAL INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-163 In order to inspect penetration seals at the southwest corner of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump area, a scaffold is needed to provide a work platform approximately 17 ft. high adjacent to the B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. Concurrent with this are two other sites of scaffolds for inspections in the-vicinities of the A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.

Because of the concurrent activity which could potentially affect both trains of Auxiliary Feedwater System components, construction, and teardown activities shall take place at only one site at. a time. In addition, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance. with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to .wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based .on these, the determinations called. for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.90-163 The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Steam Line Rupture Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the. possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, have no interface with any it will be independent of, andinwill equipment or systems discussed 'the bases of Technical Specifications.

5/16/90 A HOUSE HEATING BOILER FEED PUMP AREA PENETRATION SEAL INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-164 In order to inspect penetration seals at the west and north walls of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump area, a scaffold is needed to provide a work platform approximately 20 ft. high adjacent to the A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. Concurrent with this

.are two other sites of scaffolds for inspections in the vicinities of the B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.

Because of the concurrent activity which could potentially affect both trains of Auxiliary Feedwater System components, construction, and teardown activities shall take place at only one site at a time. In addition, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167) . The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed Such and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual.

documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidanceIn this from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions in the area.

/he above construction requirements are to 10CFR50.59 be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in are given below.90-164 The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report, which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Steam Line Rupture Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory, Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, andthewill with any existing equipment or systems in have no interface vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

6/11/90 A AND B DIESEL GENERATOR ROOMS EWR-3990 OVEEGGWD COVER REMOVAL SCAFFOLDS 90-3.68 Scaffolds are needed just inside the Diesel Generator Room overhead doors to rise approximately 10'rom the floor. The work is planned to be done in each room simultaneously. Because of this the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment).

The guideline statement 6.0 shall be augmented with the requirement that the scaffolds shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift.

An additional requirement shall be that the scaffolds are to be erected in one Diesel Generator Room at a time. Upon completion of the first installation, prior to beginning erection of the scaffold in the second Diesel Generator Room, the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead, shall confirm and document the seismic capability in relation to the guidelines.

This confirmation shall include review of attributes such as conf iguration of the scaffold frames and securing of the planks.

Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of this confirmation prior to proceeding with the installation in the second Diesel Generator Room. After such confirmation, erection of the second scaffold may begin, accompanied by monitoring, confirmation, notification and documentation as with the first scaffold.

The Construction Engineer or Liaison Engineer shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided.

During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer in his stead.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, fire fighting provisions, and adjoining rooms in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed.

Based on these, the determinations called for in lOCFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the facility or procedures as described in the Safety Analysis Report As. a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Loss of all A.C. power to the station auxiliaries Decrease in heat removal by the secondary system with coincident loss of on-site and external (off-site) A.C.

power to the station Steam Generator tube rupture Rupture of a steam pipe Primary system pipe rupture Anticipated transients without SCRAM with a loss of A.C. power Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously

'evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

June 21, 1990 AUXILIARY BUILDING INTERMEDIATE LEVEL WEST STAIRWELL PENETRATION FIRE SEAL INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-173 A work platform is needed to inspect fire barrier penetration seals near the ceiling from the stairwell north to adjacent to the Containment wall, over the west end of the Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger. Standby Auxiliary Feedwater System Containment isolation MOVs are located on the north side of the SFPHX.

The space between the heat exchanger and containment is very congested with piping, pipe support structures, regulators, valves, instruments, and lead shielding for a process monitor in the service water piping from the heat exchanger. A mayor portion of the equipment here is associated with the waste gas system supporting the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank and the Pressurizer Relief Tank, both of which are in Containment. Immersed within this space is one of the Containment Mini-purge discharge isolation valves.

Because of the location of the above discussed SAFW Containment isolation MOVs, the scaffold shall be constructed as seismic using the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B., Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment).

The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in congunction with wooden'leats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitz s immons on Authorization'Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall .be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning thestage, observed during erection, that a deviation from or is guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Al 90-173 During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, fire fighting provisions, and adjoining rooms in the area.

Locked area access to the Spent Fuel Pool filter vault is controlled by a locked gate. Ensure that the scaffold does not allow any easier access to this area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Accidental Release Waste Gas Steam Generator Tube Rupture Rupture of a Steam Pipe Primary System Pipe Rupture Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of'an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.90-173 The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant. Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

July 2, 1990 CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING ROOM NORTH WALL PENETRATION FIRE SEAL INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-177 In order to perform fire seals inspection in the Control Room Air Handling Room a scaffold is needed. The equipment in the immediate area is, for the most part, dedicated to continuing habitability for the Main Control Room in the post-accident environment. Because of this, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 6.0 shall be augmented with the requirement that the scaffold shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift.

The guidelines statement 4. 0 requirement to wire all plank decking in plage may be replaced with the alternative requirement

.to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so, notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based .on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.90-177 The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as,a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

7/11/90 PRESSURIZER LIQUID SAMPLE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION AOV-966B LEAK REPAIR SCAFFOLD 90-183 A work platform is needed for repair of the valve inside the Nuclear Sample System isolation valve hood enclosure, to be about 6 ft. above the floor. This is to accomodate working with the valve body at about waist level. Within the vicinity are, like the valve to be repaired, other Seismic Category I Containment isolation valves which are directly connected with the Reactor Coolant System and the Steam Generator Blowdowns. Because of this, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment).

The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold, down bars in con)unction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. 'B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access, to all valves; and instrumentation in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be .observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.90-183 The installation does not result'n a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Steam Generator tube rupture Ruptiure of a steam pipe Primary system pipe rupture Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have zo interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases'of Technical Specifications.

7/23/90 SERVI CE BUILDING BASEMENT g PRIMARY WATER TREATMENT ROOM EAST WALL FIRE SEAL INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-186 A work platform is needed to inspect fire barrier penetration seals on the east wall behind the Condensate Storage Tanks. Due to the proximity of the scaffold to the CST's, the scaffold shall be constructed as seismic, The scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment).

The guidelines statement 4. 0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167) . The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Zob Supervisor, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines or is will .be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

During construction and teardown, care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, fire fighting provisions, and adjoining rooms in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

IS90-186 The installation does not result in a change to the

-

assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Loss of Normal Feedwater Seismic Events Rupture of Steam Pipe There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases; The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

.The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

,c~

RELAY ROOM NORTH WALL WEST OF DOOR TO TURBINE BUILDING PENETRATION FIRE SEAL INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-188 A work platform is needed to inspect fire barrier penetration seals in the Relay Room on the North Wall. The scaffold will be located near the AMSAC and EH Panels.

constructed as seismic.

As a result, it shall be AMSAC itself is not a Safety Related System. The importance of the AMSAC System and other modifications that have been this scaffold to installed in this cabinet be seismic.

make it desirable for During construction and tear-down, extra care should be taken to prevent bumping any panels or conduit in the area.

The scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment).

The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in con)unction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form.. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift. Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance, the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon, being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the sane manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all instrumentation, panels, and adjoining rooms in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in lOCFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important, to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other .,than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not, reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it have no interface with any equipment will be independent of, and will or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications. '

July 26, 1989 TEMPORARY OXYGEN MONITOR TEMPORARY FLUID PROVISION REQUEST 489-28 AFFECTED DRAWING: 33013-1274, Waste Disposal Gas H2 and N2 and Gas Analyzer (WD) P&ID AFFECTED PROCEDURES: 0 9 lg S 4~2 12'P ll 13'P ll ~ 6 INSTRUCTIONS TO OPERATIONS: The HP procedures referenced shall be conducted by lab personnel; TECH. SPEC. REF: Sect. 3.9.2.5, Table 3.5-5, Table 4 '-5 The MSA Gas Analyzer is out of service for oxygen monitoring. In order to continue to monitor 02 per Tech. Spec. 'requirements of Table 3.5-5 at temporary connection will be utilized. The temporary monitor will tie into the Gas Decay Tank sample 3/8 in.

tubing with poly tubing connected with tubing nuts. The temporary tubing will be operated by lab personnel at pressures suitable for the sampler; however, the tubing to be used is more than capable of withstanding full Gas Decay Tank Pressure. The outlet of the monitor is to be tied to the vent header as does the present Gas Analyzer. Pressure reduction from Gas Decay Tank pressure is accomplished at an installed reducer upstream of the Gas Analyzer and the temporary connection. Tubing associated with this modification is designated as non-code class (ANSI B31.1) per RG&E Drawing 33013-1273. It shall be installed so that safety related equipment is not potentially affected by a design basis accident (seismic event). The events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with the proposed installation are the following:

Radioactive Gas Waste System Failure Seismic Event The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because the function of the system will be maintained, pressure retaining capability is within design limits and there is no potential impact to sa fety related equipment during a seismic event.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis. Report because in the event of a'failure and because it the can be readily isolated overal'1 function of the system is being maintained.

I The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification because the

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capability to monitor 02 will be retained.

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SAFETY ANALYSIS FOR TEMPORARY RADWAST DEMINERALIZER SYSTE 1.0 SCOPE OF ANALYSIS The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the safety aspects of installing a temporary demineralizing system for processing the excessive liquid radwaste from the 1989 outage. The evaporator and recycle systems have not been able to effectively process the added waste due to reduced capacity of the evaporator package. As a result, the on-site storage capability is near capacity severely limiting operation flexibility.

1.2 The temporary liquid waste processing system is a fluidized transfer demineralization system consisting of 5 to 6 resin vessels, booster pump, mechanical filter, dewatering pump and process control unit. The entire system is interconnected with flexible reinforced non-collapsible butyl rubber hoses designed for temperatures between -20 F and 180 F and pressure from 0 to 300 psig. The supplied system is designed and operated in accordance with the following standards and operating parameters.

a) Reg. Guide 1.143 b) ANSI 55.2 c) ANSI/ASHE 831.1 d) ASME B&PV Code Section VIII & IX e) Pressure 0-150 psig

. f) Temperature 50-135 F (Resin limited) g) Flow 15-200 gpm h) Hydro tested to 225 psig I The shut-off head of the booster pump and the monitor tank transfer pump is 100 and 115 psig respectively. This is well below the design of all the temporary system components.

1~3 The temporary system will reprocess waste from the Waste Holdup Tank using one of monitoring tanks as a batch tank.

The process cycle will consist of cycling the waste from the monitoring tank thru the resin beds 5 to 6 times until the activity level is acceptable for discharge to the cask. lake. The spent resin will then be sluiced to a shipping The piping arrangement will consist of a temporary hose connected from the discharge of the waste evaporator feed pump. at valve 1762A to the discharge of the monitoring tank pump at valve 1279. This hose. will be used to transfer radwaste from the waste holdup tank via the evaporator feed pump to the A or B monitor tank. A second hose will then be connected from the discharge of the monitoring tank pump with a tee at valve 1279 to the inlet of the temporary waste processing system. This hose will be used to cycle the radwaste from

the monitor tank to the waste processing system via the monitor tank pump. A third hose will be connected from the outlet of the waste processing system to the A and B monitor tank return line at valve 1291A and/or 1234 depending on flow requirements. This hose will be used to cycle the waste back to the monitor tanks.

1.4 The entire temporary system will be located in the drumming area of the Auxiliary Building operating floor elv. 271 ft.

The allowable floor loading for this area is 300 lb/ft.

Each of the demineralizer tanks has a minimum base diameter of 24 inches and weighs 2,200 lbs. full. Consequently, in order to adhere to the maximum floor loading, a minimum clearance of 6 inches must be maintained around each vessel.

1 5 The temporary system will also required 440V power, service air, and DZ water connections. Electrical power will be

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supplied with a temporary cable from the 440V welding outlet located outside the drumming station on the truck bay wall.

The DZ water and service air will be connected with flexible rubber hoses from connections already existing within the drumming area.

1~6 The DZ water and service air are required for sluicing and vessel flushing. The DZ water connection also serves as a backup water source for cooling resins system develops during process down time.

if a leak in the

2.0 REFERENCES

2.'1'G&E R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 15.7.2 2 ' RG&E Ginna P&ID 33013-1268 2 ' RG&E Ginna P&ID 33013-1270 3 ' SAFETY ANALYSIS 3 ' A review has been performed of all the events analyzed in the Ginna Station FSAR and the events requiring analysis by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.70. The only events related to this temporary modification are a radioactive liquid waste system failure and a seismic event.

3 ' The drumming area and monitoring tank areas are designed such that any piping or tank leakage will be collected through the drainage system in the Au'xiliary Building sump to be pumped back into the liquid waste system. The building sump and basement volume is sufficient to hold the full volume of a CVCS liquid holdup tank (33,000 gallons) without A

overflowing to areas outside the building. The volume of a

A t

monitoring tank and demineralizer tank is 7, 500 gallons and 115 gallons respectively. Since either tank is less than the volume of a holdup tank, the sump still has sufficient capacity to handle the monitor tank or demineralizer tank.

4 inch drains are located with sloping floors in front of the drumming area doorway and in the monitoring tank area.

3 ' In the event the process water is lost from the spent resins in the demineralizer tanks, the resins can be cooled by the backup DI water connection. Based on the analysis presented in section 15.7.2 for the primary water CVCS spent resin storage tank, it will take 4 days for decay heat to generate enough heat to reach the resin 140 F temperature limit.

This is based on a 1% fuel failure. Waste from the waste holdup tank is collected from floor drains and is not expected to contain high activity levels. However Admini-strative controls will be established to ensure resin tanks are maintained with proper water level when concentrated resins are to be stored for more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3 ' The drumming area is enclosed by seismically designed walls.

No safety related equipment exists within the walls gf drumming area. Consequently, the demineralizer system will not affect safety related systems during a seismic event should it fail. The flexible hoses running outside the drumming area will be restrained and located to prevent interference with any safety related equipment operation.

3.5 Based upon the evaluations in sections 3.1 thru 3.4 above, the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the station will remain unchanged by the installation of this temporary modification; and, the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the prevention of accidents and for the mitigation of the consequences of accidents will be unchanged by the installation of this temporary modification.

4.0 PRELIMINARY SAFETY EVALUATION" 4.1 The proposed temporary modification does not involve an

'unreviewed safety question since:

a) the probability of occurrence or the consequences of to an accident or malfunction of equipment important safety previously evaluated in the safetywaste analysis report will not be increased since the or; tank volumes are less than previously considered, b) the possibility of an accident or malfunction inofthea different type than any evaluated previously safety analysis report will not. be created since accepted codes and standards are followed, or;

r c) the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced since waste tank volumes are less than previously assumed.

March 9, 1990 LOSS OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL EXPEDITIOUS ACTION-p/J INTERIM "A" HOT LEG LEVEL TRANSMITTER 90-03 Generic letter 88-17 recommended expeditious actions including installing two independent RCS water level indications with the capability to provide water level information to Control Room operators. One such provision, a pressure transmitter (PT-432A) with indication at the Main Control Board has been in permanent existence; 'however, a similar provision is to be installed prior to entering the next reduced reactor coolant inventory operation.

This will be installed at a test connection downstream of the Loop A Hot Leg Sample tap manual root valve 504, using tubing of material identical to the permanent installation for PT-432A in the B Loop Sample tap except that 3/8" tubing may be used in place of 1/4". The tubing is rated for pressure greater than 5,000 psig. A transmitter, similar to PT-432A, is to be installed, designated LIT-432A at the test point discussed above, to be mounted securely to the adjacent wall or on a stand which will be fabricated and installed such as to insure against toppling by use of struts, bumpers or tie-downs. In case of a break in the 3/8" tubing the leakage will be slow, and the level change will be monitored on the other channel.

The signal cable will be installed under the controls of procedure A-1405 installation and removal of temporary cables.

The existing procedure 0-2.3.1, Draining the Reactor Coolant System, is to be revised to address the indications to be mqnitored, including the subject provision. Regarding level indication difference between measurement points, the difference calculated from Westinghouse ESBU/WOG-88-173 dated October 14, 1988 will be provided to operators for guidance.

The above construction and operational requirements are to be observed. Based on these, the. determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not 'esult in a change to the assumptions of the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report because of the substantial tubing installation and the adequate support system to provided as discussed above, it will not have any adverse effect on the safety-related equipment in the vicinity, or result in a decrease in reactor coolant inventory. The design bases events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because the substantial tubing installation and the adequacy of the support system is such as to ensure there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

90-03 The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because the substantial tubing installation and the adequacy of the support system to be utilized ensure there will be no adverse effect on safety-related equipment.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because the substantial tubing installation and the support system adequacy, as described above, ensure there will be no adverse effect on safety related equipment within the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification because of the substantial tubing installation and the adequacy of the support system which ensure against any adverse effect on equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications..

3/20/90 SAFETY ANALYSIS FOR TEMPORARY RADWASTE DEMINERALIZER SYSTEM INSTALLATION 90-04 1.0 SCOPE OF ANALYSIS 1.1 The. purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the safety aspects of installing a temporary demineralizing system for processing the excessive liquid radwaste from the 1989 outage. The evaporator and recycle systems have not been able to effectively process the added waste due to reduced capacity of the evaporator package. As a result, the on-site storage capability is near capacity severely limiting operation flexibility.

1.2 The temporary liquid waste processing system is a fluidized transfer demineralization system consisting of 5 to 6 resin vessels, booster pump, mechanical filter, dewatering pump and process control unit. The entire system is interconnected with flexible reinforced non-collapsible butyl rubber hoses designed for temperatures between -20 F and 180 F and pressure from 0 to 300 psig. The supplied system is designed and operated in accordance with the following standards and operating parameters.

.a) Reg. Guide 1.143 b) ANSI 55.2 c) ANSI/ASME B31. 1 d) ASME B&PV Code Section VIII & IX e) Pressure 0-150 psig f) Temperature 50-135 F (Resin limited) g) Flow 15-200 gpm h) Hydro tested to 225 psig The shut-off head of the booster pump and the monitor tank transfer pump is 100 and 115 psig respectively. This is well below the design of all the temporary system components.

The temporary system will process waste from the Waste Holdup Tank using one of monitoring tanks as a batch tank.

The process cycle will consist of cycling the waste from the monitoring tank thru the resin beds 5 to 6 times until the activity level is acceptable for discharge to the lake. The spent resin will then be sluiced to a shipping cask. The piping arrangement will consist of a temporary hose connected from the discharge of the waste evaporator feed pump at valve 1762A to the discharge of the monitoring tank pump at valve 1279. This hose will be used to transfer radwaste from the waste holdup tank via the evaporator feed pump to the A or B monitor tank or the temporary demineralizer skid. A second hose will then be connected from the discharge of the monitoring tank pump with a tee at valve 1279 to .the inlet of the temporary waste processing system. This hose will be used to cycle the radwaste from the monitor tank to the waste processing system via the monitor tank pump. A third hose will be connected from the outlet of the waste processing system to the A and B monitor tank return line at valve 1291A and/or 1234 depending on flow requirements. This hose will be used to cycle the waste back to the monitor tanks.

The entire temporary system will be located in the drumming area of the Aux. Bldg. operating floor elv. 271 ft. The allowable live floor loading for this area is 300 lbs/ft2.

Each of the six demin. tanks has a minimum base dia. of 24 in. and weighs 2200 lbs. full. The tanks will be located on top of the 4 ft. wide by 19 ft. long by 2.5 ft. thick concrete slab in the drumming station. The reinforced slab will distribute the tank loads over the entire slab shielding area.

Using the weight of six tanks and 200 lbs. of lead per tank, the floor loading will be approx. 190 lbs/ft2. for the raised slab area. The remaining equipment has the following weights:

Process Control Unit 2000 System booster pumps (2) 9300/pump 600 Filter vessels (3) 9180/filter 540 Dewatering pump 100 Sluice pump 100 Shielding 120/filter 360 total 3700 lbs.,

Because of the equipments physical dimensions, their weights may be considered distrubuted over the lower 6 ft. x 19 ft.

floor area. This will produce a floor loading of 32 lbs/ft2.

All loads are within the 300 lbs/ft2 loading limit.

1.5 The temporary system will also required 440V power, service air, and DI water connections. Electrical power will be supplied with a temporary cable from the 440V welding outlet located outside the drumming station on the truck bay wall.

The DI water and service air will be connected with flexible rubber hoses from connections already existing within the drumming area.

1.6 The DI water and service air are required for sluicing and vessel flushing. The DI water connection also serves as a backup water source for cooling resins time.

if a leak in the system develops during process down

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 RG&E R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 15.7.2 2 ' RG&E Ginna P&ID.33013-1268 2 ' RG&E Ginna P&ID 33013-1270 2 ' CHEM-NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, INC., A proposal to Rochester Gas and Electric for Liquid Waste Processing at the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Section 2.0, Technical Approach.

N-89-0020-P02, July 19, 1989 2.5 GAI Dwg. D-422-022 3 .'0 SAFETY ANALYSIS 3 ~ 1 A review has been performed of all the events analyzed in the Ginna Station FSAR and the events requiring analysis by NRC Regulatory Guide 1 . 7 0 . The only events related to this temporary modification are a radioactive liquid waste system failure and a seismic event .

3 2 The drumming area and monitoring tank areas are designed such that any piping or tank leakage will be collected

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through the drainage system in the Auxiliary Building sump to be pumped back into the liquid waste system. The building sump and basement volume is sufficient to hold the full volume of a CVCS liquid holdup tank (33,000 gallons) without overflowing to areas outside the building. The volume of a monitoring tank and demineralizer tank is 7, 500 gallons and 115 gallons respectively. Since either tank is less than the volume of a holdup tank, the sump still has sufficient capacity to handle the monitor tank or demineralizer tank.

.4 inch drains are located with sloping floors in front of the drumming area doorway and in the monitoring tank area.

s.s In the event the process water is lost from the spent resins in the demineralizer tanks, the resins can be cooled by the backup DI water connection. Based on the analysis presented in section 15.7.2 for the primary water CVCS spent resin storage tank, it will take 4 days for decay heat to generate enough heat to reach the resin 140 F temperature limit.

This is based on a 1% fuel failure. Waste from the waste holdup tank is collected from floor drains and is not expected to contain high activity levels. However Admini-strative controls will be established to ensure resin tanks are maintained with proper water level when concentrated resins are to be stored for more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3.4 The drumming area is enclosed by seismically designed walls.

No safety related equipment exists within the walls of drumming area. Consequently, the demineralizer system will not a ffect safety related systems during a seismic event should it fail. The flexible hoses running outside the drumming area will be restrained and located to prevent interference with any safety related equipment operation.

3.5 Based upon the evaluations in sections 3.1 thru 3.4 above, the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the station will remain unchanged by the installation of this temporary modif ication; and, the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the prevention of accidents and for the mitigation of the consequences of accidents will be unchanged by the installation of this temporary modification.

4.0 PRELIMINARY SAFETY EVALUATION

4. 1 The proposed temporary modif ication does not involve an unreviewed safety question since:

a) the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be increased since the waste tank volumes are less than previously considered, or; b) the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report will not be created since accepted codes and standards are followed, or; c) the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not 'reduced since waste tank volumes are 'less than previously assumed.

SECTION E PROCEDURE CHANGES This section is to contain a description of the changes to procedures as described in the UFSAR and a summary of the safety evaluation pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(b).

There were none within this time period.

1

SECTION F COMPLETED SPECIAL TESTS (ST) AND EXPERIMENTS This section is to contain a description of special tests and experiments performed in the facility, pursuant to the require-ments of 10 CFR 50.59(b). Within the time frame of this report, there were two conducted.

SAFETY ANALYSIS GINNA STATION TEMPERATURE STRATIFICATION MONITORING TEMPORARY MODIFICATION REVISION 1 MAY 12, 1989 PREPARED BY:

Electrical Engineer Date REVIEWED BY:

Reactor Engineer Date APPROVED BY:

Manager, Technical Engineering Date

" l,f Revision Status Sheet Latest Latest Latest Page Rev. Page Rev. Page Rev.

Safety Analysis Page ii Revision 1

SAFETY ANALYSIS 1.0 SCOPE OF ANALYSIS:

NRC Bulletin No. 88-11, "Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification", requests all addressees to establish and implement a program to confirm pressurizer surge line integrity in view of the occurrence of thermal stratification, and requires them to inform the staff of the actions taken to resolve this issue. Pursuant to satisfying the requirement and schedule of Bulletin 88-11, Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation is participating in a program for partial resolution of this issue through the Westinghouse Owner's Group (WOG).

The WOG program is designed to benefit from the experience gained in the performance of several plant-specific analyses on Westinghouse PWR surge lines.

These detailed analyses included definition of revised thermal transients (including stratification). The overall analytical approach used in all of these analyses has been reviewed by the NRC staff. A significant amount of pressurizer surge line thermal monitoring data has been obtained in support of these plant-specific analyses. Additional pressurizer surge line thermal monitoring and plant system data continues to be made available within the WOG,- resulting in a steadily increasing database.

Pressurizer surge line temperature stratif ication data will be collected at Ginna for inclusion in the WOG database.

le2 Thermal stratification and cycling phenomena were also discovered in auxiliary piping connected to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). These phenomena may cause pipe cracks in the unisolable sections of auxiliary piping systems. USNRC issued Bulletin 88-08 and subsequent supplements to address this phenomena. As a result, electric utilities are required to provide response to the NRC regarding the review and identification of auxiliary pipe sections connected to the RCS that may be subjected to thermal stratification not considered in the design of the plant.

Westinghouse has identified three piping sections that may be subjected to thermal stratification. These are:

Safety Analysis Page 3. Revision 1 Date ~512 89

a) charging line to Loop B hot leg between check valve 393 and the RCS nozzle b) alternate charging line to Loop A cold leg between check valve 383A and the RCS nozzle c) auxiliary spray line between check valve 297 and the main pressurizer spray line 1.3 This analysis addresses the consequences of installing temporary thermocouples on the pressurizer surge line, Loop B charging line, Loop A alternate charging line, and auxiliary spray line. Thermocouple extension wire shall be temporarily routed to a data acquisition controller. The controller shall provide a digital output to a remote personal computer. The data output line shall utilize temporary cable and existing spare circuits to exit containment.

1.4 In addition to the thermocouples, four temporary displacement transducers are to be installed on the pressurizer surge line. The transducers will monitor line movement during heat-up, cool-down, and during temperature stratification conditions.

' ~ 1 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS:

Ginna Station and Procedure, A-303, "Preparation, Approval of Safety Analysis for Minor Modifications Review, or Special Tests".

2 ~ 2 Ginna Station Procedure, A-1405, "Installation and Removal of Temporary Cables".

2.3 Ginna Station procedure, "A-1406, "Control of Temporary Modifications".

2.4 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Updated Safety Analysis Report.

2.5 USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.70, Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, LNR Edition, Revision 3, November 1978.

2.6 Appendix R Alternative Shutdown System, "Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Revision 4, January 1987.

Safety Analysis Page 2 Revision 1 Date 5..: 2.i 89

'AI, "Fire Protection March 1977.

Evaluation" Report No. 1936, 2.8 Letter, Eliasz to Wrobel, "852-A&B Limitorque Aluminum Covers", dated 3/7/86.

3.0 SAFETY ANALYSIS'.1 A review has been made of all events analyzed in the Ginna FSAR and the events requiring analysis by the USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.70. The events related to this modification are:

1) seismic event

2) major and minor fires 3.1.1 All temporary instrument cable installed shall be routed to follow the respective line to be monitored and then drop vertically to containment floor elevation 235'. The temporary cable will then be routed along the floor, following the shield wall to the free standing data acquisition controller. No seismic impact is anticipated since instrument cable weight is negligible compared to pipe/insulation weight.

Instrument cable routed on the floor and the free standing controller (approx. 10"Hx 12"W x 24"D) will not affect seismic structures in the immediate vicinity.

The data acquisition controller will be placed outside of the shield wall near the lower end of the pressurizer.

3 ~ 1~2 Temporary cable used for the data link shall follow the shield wall at elevation 235', rise to elevation south-east stairs, and follow the shield wall to 253'ia Incore Reference Junction Box 1B. No seismic impact is anticipated since this cable will follow a floor/stair routing.

3. 1.3 Cable separation in Incore Reference Junction Box 1B shall be maintained. The temporary data link cable shall be spliced to spare circuit A780. Cable and conductor insulation shall be restored using Raychem WCSF sleeves. The spliced cables shall be dressed in Incore Box lB so that distance between A780 and Incore Thermocouple cables is maximized.

Safety Analysis Page 3 Revision 1 Date ~512/89

3.1.4 This temporary modification will not propagate a major or minor fire. Cables used for thermocouples and thermocouple extensions are individually sheathed in Inconel Overbraid (thermocouples) or Tinned Copper Overbraid (extensions). No additional fire loading is anticipated by the overbraided cable. Temporary cable used for the data link is rated and qualified to IEEE-383 flame requirements as a minimum. Total estimated containment fire loading for this temporary data link cable is 200000 BTUs.

3. 1.5 Temporary cable used for the data link will be spliced to existing spare cable A779 in the Air Handling Room.

Routing is through a floor penetration to the Mux.

Room. Total fire loading for the temporary cable in the Air Handling Room is negligible. Total fire loading for the temporary cable in the Mux. Room is estimated at 2000 BTUs.

3 ~ 1.6 Fire barrier penetrations will be repaired and replaced in accordance with existing plant procedures. Therefore existing seals will not be degraded.

3 ~ 1.7 This modification does not affect the safe shutdown analysis in the Appendix R submittal since there is no effect on separation of existing circuits, associated circuits, or fire area boundaries as analyzed in the Appendix R submittal.

3 ~ 1.8 This modification will not effect the capabilities of the Alternative Shutdown System. Furthermore, none of the existing procedures for obtaining an Alternative Safe Shutdown will be effected. This modification, therefore, complies with 10CFR50, Appendix R.

3. 1.9 Table 6.1-3 of the Ginna UFSAR gives the Aluminum inventory in Containment. The total exposed area is 2197 Ft . This temporary modification will add a total of 10 Ft of exposed Aluminum. The total weight of Aluminum in equipment is estimated to be 40 lbs. This includes Aluminum in data acquisition equipment,

.

displacement transducers, and power supply. The 40 additional pounds of aluminum added to containment will add approximately 800 scf of hydrogen during an accident.

This amount of hydrogen generation is negligble compared with 30,000 scf of total hydrogen production during an accident. (See Reference 2.8) s Safety Analysis Page 4 Revision . 1 Date 5+12@89

This modification does not degrade the capability of any Safety System to perform its function.

,

The assumptions and conclusions of existing analyses are unchanged. No new types of events are postulated.

3.2.1 Therefore, it has been determined that the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the station have not been affected. It has also been determined that the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the consequences of accidents have not been affected.

4e0 PRELIMINARY SAFETY EVALUATION:

4.1 The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased by the proposed modification.

4.2 The possibility of an accident or a malfunction of a will different type" other than any evaluated previously not be created by the proposed modification.

4 ' The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced by the proposed modification.

4 ' The proposed modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question or require a Technical Specification change.

Safety Analysis Page 5 Revision Date 5 12 89

This modification does not degrade the capability of any Safety System to perform its function. The assumptions and conclusions of existing analyses are unchanged. No new types of events are postulated.

3 '.1 Therefore, it has been determined that the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the station have not been affected. It has also been determined that the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the consequences of accidents have not been affected.

4e0 PRELIMINARY SAFETY EVALUATION:

4.1 The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased by the proposed modification.

4.2 The possibility of an accident or a malfunction of a different type other than any evaluated previously will not be created by the proposed modification.

4.3 The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced by the proposed modification.

4 ' The proposed modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question or require a Technical Specification change.

Safety Analysis Page 5 Revision 1

This modification does not degrade the capability of any Safety System to perform its function. The assumptions and conclusions of existing analyses are unchanged. No new types of events are postulated.

3.2 ' Therefore, it has been determined that the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the station have not been affected. It has also been determined that the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the consequences of accidents have not been affected.

4.0 PRELIMINARY SAFETY EVALUATION 4.1 The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment impor tant to safety will not be increased by the proposed modification.

4.2 The possibility of an accident or a malfunction of a different. type other than any evaluated previously will not be created by the proposed modification.

4.3 The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced by the proposed modif ication.

4~4 The proposed modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question or require a Technical Specification change.

Safety Analysis Page 5 Revision 1 Date 5/12~89

This modification does not degrade the capability of any Safety System to perform its function.

assumptions and conclusions of existing analyses are The unchanged. No new types of events are postulated.

3.2 ~ 1 Therefore, it has been determined that the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the station have not been affected. It has also been determined that the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the consequences of accidents have not been affected.

4.0 PRELIMINARY SAFETY EVALUATION:

4.1 The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased by the proposed modification.

4.2 The possibility of an accident or a malfunction of a different type other than any evaluated previously will not be created by the proposed modification.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced by the proposed modification.

F 4 The proposed modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question or require a Technical Specification change.

Safety Analysis Page 5 Revision Date 5~1~2 89

P This modification does not degrade the capability of any Safety System to perform its function. , The assumptions and conclusions of existing analyses are-unchanged. No new types of events are postulated.

3 ~ 2 ~ l Therefore, it has been determined that the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the station have not been affected. It has also been determined that the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the consequences of accidents have not been affected.

4e0 PRELIMINARY SAFETY EVALUATION:

4 ~ l The probability of occurrence or the accident or consequences of an malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased by the proposed modification.

4 ' The possibility of an accident or a malfunction of a different type other than any evaluated previously will not be created by the proposed modif ication.

A 4.3 The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced by the proposed modification.

4 ' The proposed modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question or require a Technical Specification change.

Safety Analysis Page 5 Revision 1 Date 5~12 89

fety Analysis For. Special Test

~

~

TSR I N Special Tost ST-09.02 Control Building Heat Generation Rate Origina3. Rev. 1 Rev. 2 Prepared By: ICClsgp Nuclear Engineer Date Initial Date Initial Date Reviewed By:

.or En neer Initial Date Initia'ate Approved By: k9 Technical ldanager Date Initial Date Initial Date 1.0 Sco~e of Analysis I The purpose of Special Te t ST-89.02 is to obtain the information necessary to determine the heat generated in various areas of. the Control Building during normal operation.

This information will then be used to analyze the thermal environment of the Control Building during Design Basis A'ccident (DBA), station blackout (SBO), and normal operating conditions.

1.2 The heat generation rate in the Control Building i" to be determined by measuring and recording area wall and air temperatures over a minimum twenty-four (24) hour period to adequate3.y account for room heat fluctuations.

1s3 The following areas of the Control Building are to b; to".ted:

a. Control Room

b. Relay Room c Computer Room

d. Battery Room 3.A

e. Battery Room 1B 2.0 Refesences ENR 4529, "Ventilation System Requirements".

Safety Analysis Revision Page 1 Special Test ST-89.02

Ginna Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, 1989.

2.2.1 Section 3.8.4.1.2, "Design of Seismic Category I Structures Control Building".

2.2.2 Section 3.10.2, "Seismic Qualification of Electrical Equipment and Instrumentation".

2.2.3 Section 3.11.3.5, "Identification of Limiting Environmental Conditions Control Building".

2.2.4 Section 6.4, "Habitability Systems".

2.2.5 Section 9.4.3, "Control Room Area Ventilation System".

2.2.6 Section 9.4.9.2, "Engineered Safety Features Ventilation Systems Relay Room".'.2.7 Section 9.4.9.3, "Engineered Safety Features Ventilation Systems Battery Rooms".

2.3 Ginna Station Technical Specifications, dated May 30, 1989.

Special Test Procedure ST-89.02, "Control Building Heat Generation Rate Testing".

3.0 Safet Anal sis 3.1 A review has been performed of all events analyzed in the Ginna Station UFSAR. The topics related to this special test are fires, circuit separation, and seismic events.

h 3.2 This special test involves placing electrical wire (used as thermocouples), temperature recorders, and digital temperature readouts in various locations throughout the Control Building and Turbine Building (Section 6 of Reference 2.4). This equipment is in place on a temporary basis only (approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per each of the five areas) and will be removed at the conclusion of the special test.

3.3 At no time will any equipment 'used during normal operation or potentially required during abnormal or emergency conditions be removed from service. All ventilation systems being tested or being used by the special test are non-safety-related (emergency ventilation systems are not affected by the test).

No Control Building penetrations are affected by the special test.

afety Analysis Revision 0 Page 2 Special Test ST-89.02

Cl

'he on a equipment is in the Turbine Building and Control Building temporary basis only, is of minimal additional fire loading, and will be removed at the conclusion of the test; therefore, there are no significant fire 'loading concerns.

Also, the areas subject to the test are either permanently staffed or frequently walked down on a normal basis by operations and security personnel. In addition, Section 6 of Reference 2.4 requires a walkdown of the test equipment at least once per shift to ensure that it is functioning properly.

These precautions assist in the early detection of any fire hazards whether induced by the special test equipment or not.

3.5 At no time will any wiring be routed through or over cable trays, etc. allowing potential circuit cross-connection (Section 5.4 of Reference 2 will be maintained throughout

') .

the Therefore, circuit separation duration of the special test.

3.6 This special test includes the use of non-seismic equipment (i.e., thermocouples and their associated lead wires) on seismic 'structures (e.g., Control Room walls arid floors) .

However, the thermocouples and,lead wires are not of sufficient weight to cause concern with respect to loading on seismic structures. Also, the thermocouples and lead wires are being used on a temporary basis and will be removed at the conclusion of the test. Section 5.0 of Reference 2.4 also requires that the wiring be placed away from normal/emergency pathways and work locations. No wiring will be placed on the Seismic Category I Control Room ceiling.

4.0 .Preliminar Safet Evaluation 4.1 The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report will not be increased by the proposed special test.

4.2 The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report will not be created by the proposed special test.

4.3 The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be redu'ced by the proposed sp~".ial test.

4.4 The proposed special test does not involve an unrevi>".'ed safety question or require a Technical Specification chanel .

Safety Analysis Revis Page 3 Special Test ST-89.02

All of the above were reviewed by the PORC committee with respect to the Technical Specifications and the committee has determined that no Technical Specification changes or violations were involved.

Additionally, these changes were reviewed in committee to determine if they presented an Unreviewed Safety Question and the general summations of these reviews are as follows:

1. These changes do not increase the probability of occurrence, or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR, because:

These changes were made to ensure continued operability/availability of plant equipment and will not result in any equipment being operated outside of its normal operating range. This results in continued operability/avail abi 1 ity of equipment. important to safety, These changes additionally will not result in a change of operating characteristics of equipment used in transient:/accident mitigation which precludes an increase in the probability of occurrence of an accident. Because these changes ensure continued availability of plant equipment, the limits shown in the Technical Specifications, and the assumptions of the safety analyses of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report continue to be met. As a result there is no increase in the consequences of any presently postulated accident.

2. These changes do not create the possibility for a new or different kind of accident, or a malfunction of a different type from any accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR

.

because:

These changes do not present new failure mechanisms outside of those presently anticipated, and are bounded by the events contained in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

I

3. These changes do not reduce the margin of safety because:

Present margins as contained in the Technical Specifications are valid, and these procedure changes are made within those limits. These procedure changes will not result in violating

~

the baseline assumptions made for equipment, availability in the Technical Specifications, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

1990 REPORT OF FACILITY CHANGES i TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS CONDUCTED WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL FOR AUGUST 1989 THROUGH JULY 1990 SECTION A COMPLETED ENGINEERING WORK REQUESTS (EWR) AND TECHNICAL STAFF REQUESTS (TSR)

SECTION B COMPLETED STATION MODIFICATIONS (SM)

SECTION C TECHNICAL STAFF ENGINEERING EVALUA-TIONS (TSEE)

SECTION D TEMPORARY BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION, STRUCTURE FEATURESi SHIELDING'ND FLUID SYSTEM FEATURES SECTION E PROCEDURE CHANGES SECTION F COMPLETED SPECIAL TESTS (ST) AND EXPERIMENTS R.ED GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-244 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION DATED DECEMBER , 1990

SECTION A - COMPLETED ENGINEERING WORK REQUESTS (EWRs)

AND TECHNICAL STAFF REQUESTS (TSRs)

This section contains a description of modifications in the facility as described in the safety analysis report, and a summary of the safety evaluation for those changes, pursuant to, the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(b).

The basis for inclusion of an EWR or TSR in this section is closure of the completed modification package in the Document Control Department.

EWR-1483 STEAM GENERATOR SNUBBER REPLACEMENT THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE REPLACEMENT OF SIX OF THE EIGHT HYDRAULIC SNUBBER PER STEAM GENERATOR.

REVISION 1 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCORPORATES CHANGES FROM REVISION 0 TO CORRECT THE FOLLOWING:

1) TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS

2) ADD ADDITIONAL REFERENCE ANSI B31.1

3) PIPING ANALYSIS AND PRIMARY EQUIPMENT SUPPORTS WILL BE EVALUATED PER TABLES li2 6 3 (ATTACHMENTS TO D AC ) AND NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH EWR-2512.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG.

GUIDE 1'.70 EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

POSTULATED PIPING FAILURE IN FLUID SYSTEMS INSIDE CONTAINMENT.

2 ~ DECREASE IN HEAT REMOVAL BY SECONDARY SYSTEM.

3. DECREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM FLOW RATE.

4 ~ DECREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY.

5. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS SUCH AS MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES'LOODS'TORMS'R EARTHQUAKES'HE INSTALLATION OF MECHANICAL BUMPERS WILL NOT CHANGE THE EFFECT OF A SEISMIC EVENT ON THE FUNCTION AND DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OF EXISTING STEAM GENERATOR RING GIRDERi REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS, MAIN STEAM LINES, FEEDWATER AND SECONDARY SHIELD WALL.

THIS MODIFICATION NEITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES, NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR THE FOLLOWING EVENTS:

1~ LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLOW

2. FEEDWATER SYSTEM PIPE BREAKS 3 ~ RCS FLOW COASTDOWN ACCIDENTS 4 ~ STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE

5. PRIMARY SYSTEM PIPE RUPTURE

6. MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES 7 ~ FLOODSi STORMS'ND EARTHQUAKES THIS MODIFICATION NEITHER EFFECTS NOR IS EFFECTED BY ANY FLOOD OR STORM PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED.

THE MATERIALS UTILIZED IN THIS MODIFICATION WILL MEET APPENDIX "R" REQUIREMENTS BASED UPON 10CFR50 APPENDIX R AND ENGINEERING PROCEDURE AND WILL NOT INCREASE AT THE PROBABILITY OF MAJOR OR MINOR FIRE.

MODIFICATION OF ADDITION OF SUPPORTS WILL NOT DEGRADE PERFORMANCE OR FUNCTION OF ANY PLANT EQUIPMENT OR SYSTEM.

BASED UPON THE ABOVE ANALYSIS:

1) STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE ADEQUATE.

2) MARGIN OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATING AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GZNNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. ZT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-1832A CIRCUIT SEPARATIONS ANALYSIS ELECTRICAL MODIFICATIONS THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL IMPROVE THE ELECTRICAL SEPARATION BETWEEN REDUNDANT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT.

REVISION 1 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WAS PRESENTED AND APPROVED BY PORC ON 2/27/85 ITEM NUMBER 6.1.0-85-021-001.

THE CHANGES TO THE DESIGN CRITERIA FOR REVISION 2 ARE DESCRIBED BELOW:

SECTION DESCRIPTION (ADDED TO SPECIAL NOTE). rrDC FUSE COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS ARE DELETED FROM REVISION 2 OF THIS DESIGN CRITERIA. DC'USE COORDINATION IS IN THE SCOPE OF EWR 3341 rr 1~ 1.3 DELETED FUSE COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.

SECTION DESCRIPTION 2.1.2 DELETED ANALYSIS 51 (FUSE COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS).

2.1.4 DELETED ANALYSIS 113 (FUSE COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS).

16 '.2 DELETED FUSE SCOPE OF EWR TYPE REQUIREMENT.

3341.

THIS ZS IN THE 16.2 ' DELETED FUSE COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.

SECTION DESCRIPTION 16.2.2 DELETED FUSE COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY THE USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES AND SEISMIC EVENTS.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE UNCHANGED'HE ADEQUACIES OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE UNCHANGED.

EWR-1832B FIRE SIGNALING SYSTEM THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL UPGRADE THE FIRE SIGNALING SYSTEM.

REVISION 6 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WERE PRESENTED AND APPROVED BY PORC ON 12-12-84 ITEM NUMBER 6.1.0-84-144-003.

THE CHANGES TO THE DESIGN CRITERIA FOR REVISION 7 ARE DESCRIBED BELOW:

SECTION DESCRIPTION 11.4 ADD: "INSTALLING UL APPROVED RELEASE MODULES FOR THE HALON SYSTEMS IN THE RELAY AND COMPUTER (MUX) ROOMS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED UNDER EWR 4064".

22.4.4 CHANGE t'ENGINEER" TO 'tENGZNEERZNG 23.6 ADD: "A NUMBER OF ELECTRICAL MODULES WILL BE CHANGED OUT UNDER EWR 4064 TO FACILITATE MAINTENANCE. THIS IS NECESSITATED BY THE FACT THAT CERTAIN ELECTRICAL MODULES WERE FURTHER DEVELOPED BY GAMEWELL AFTER THE INSTALLATION OF THE INITIAL-DESIGN MODULES.

MODULES OF CURRENT-DESIGN WERE USED WHEN NEEDED FOR MAINTENANCE REPLACEMENT RESULTING IN A MIXTURE OF OLD AND NEW MODULE DESIGNS.

THIS IN TURN CREATED A MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS SINCE THE LATEST WIRING DIAGRAM IS NOT APPLICABLE TO OLDER MODULES" ~

26 ' '3 CHANGE "ALOW" TO "ALLOW".

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF THE EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE THE FIRES ANALYZED IN G.A.I. REPORT $ 1936 AND THE SEISMIC EVENT.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE UNCHANGED'HE ADEQUACIES'F STRUCTURESi SYSTEMSi AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR, THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE UNCHANGED.

EWR-2606 POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION THIS EWR (ENGINEERING

- WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THIS DESIGN MODIFICATION.

AS A RESULT OF THE INABILITYAT THREE MILE ISLAND TO RAPIDLY OBTAIN REACTOR COOLANT SAMPLES TO ASCERTAIN THE EXTENT OF CORE DAMAGEi THE NRC IS REQUIRING THAT ALL LICENSEES EVALUATE ANDi IF REQUIREDi UPGRADE THEZR PLANTS TO ENABLE ACQUISITION OF APPROPRIATE EXPEDITIOUS SAMPLES AFTER AN ACCIDENT. ABILITY TO ASSESS THE CONDITIONS OF THE CORE EARLY IN AN ACCIDENT CAN RESULT IN TAKING REMEDIAL ACTIONS WHICH COULD LIMIT OR EVEN PRECLUDE CORE DAMAGE.

THE SAMPLING SYSTEM AT GINNA HAS BEEN EVALUATED TO BE MARGINALLY ADEQUATE FOR POST-ACCIDENT CONDITIONS AND CONSEQUENTLY REMEDIAL MODIFICATIONS ARE PLANNED.

A NEW POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM (PASS) WILL BE INSTALLED WHICH WILL ENABLE THE STATION TO OBTAIN AND ANALYZE REACTOR COOLANT'ONTAINMENT AIRi AND CONTAINMENT SUMP SAMPLES WITHIN 3 HOURS OF THE DECISION TO SAMPLE. THE PASS WILL ALSO ENABLE SAMPLING OF THESE STREAMS DURING NORMAL OPERATION.

IN-LINE CHEMICAL INSTRUMENTATION WILL BE PROVIDED IN A NEW LIQUID AND GAS SAMPLE PANEL (LGSP) WHICH WILL REMOTELY DETERMINE IMPORTANT CHEMICAL PARAMETERS OF REACTOR COOLANT, CONTAINMENT AIR, AND CONTAINMENT SUMP.

THE LGSP WILL ENABLE ACQUISITION OF DILUTED AND UNDILUTED GRAB SAMPLES OF BOTH REACTOR COOLANT AND CONTAINMENT AIR FOR IOPIC ANALYSIS IN THE EXISTING COUNTING LAB.

THE LGSP WILL BE CONTROLLED FROM A NEW ELECTRIC CONTROL PANEL (ECP) AND INSTRUMENT PANEL (IP) TO BE LOCATED IN THE HOT SHOP. REMOTELY OPERATED VALVES AND INSTRUMENTS EXTERNAL TO THE LGSP WILL ALSO BE CONTROLLED FROM THE ECP. THE LGSP WILL BE LOCATED ON THE 253'-6" ELEVATION OF THE CONTROLLED PORTION OF THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING.

3' THE PASS IS DESIGNED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF NUREG 0578 AND NUREG 0737 (SECTION II.B.3). FURTHERMORE, THE PASS INSTALLATION AT GINNA IS TO HAVE ADEQUATE PROVISIONS TO ALLOW COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONTAINMENT SUMP SAMPLING, pH AND OXYGEN ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS NOW INVOKED BY REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97 (REV. 2) DATED DECEMBER 1980.

SAMPLE LINES ASSOCIATED WITH THE PASS WILL BE INSTALLED IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THE POST ACCIDENT DOSE CRITERIA WILL BE MET FOR SAMPLING AND ACCESS TO VITAL AREAS.

THE NECESSARY MODIFICATIONS ARE SHOWN SCHEMATICALLY ON THE ATTACHED FIGURE 1. THE GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF EQUIPMENT IS SHOWN ON FIGURE 2.

STEAM. GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SAMPLE LINES FROM CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS 206 AND 207 TO THE EXISTING SAMPLE ROOM ARE TO BE REROUTED (FOR ALARA CONSIDERATIONS) USING THE SAME DESIGN CRITERIA DISCUSSED HEREIN. THESE TWO LINES ARE BEING REROUTED TO REDUCE OPERATOR EXPOSURE FOR ROUTINE SAMPLING AND ARE NOT REQUIRED AS A PART OF NUREG-0737 OR REG. GUIDE 1.97 (REV. 2) ~

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY NRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70 AND THE GINNA STATION FSAR.

THE EVENTS RELATING TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE:

(1) EARTHQUAKE AND (2) RADIOACTIVE RELEASE FROM A SUBSYSTEM OR COMPONENT ALL EQUIPMENT AND PIPING SUPPORTS ZN THE CONTAINMENTg AUXILIARY AND INTERMEDIATE BUILDINGS ARE SEISMIC CATEGORY I. THEIR DESIGN WILL ASSURE OTHER EQUIPMENT WILL NOT BE STRUCTURALLY DAMAGED AS A RESULT OF FAILURE DURING AN EARTHQUAKE. THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN EARTHQUAKE ARE NOT CHANGED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION.

FAILURE OF ANY PASS COMPONENT AFTER AN ACCIDENT SHALL NOT RESULT ZN 10CFR PART 100 DOSES TO BE EXCEEDED AND ON THIS BASIS THE SYSTEM IS CLASSIFIED AS NON-SAFETY RELATED. THIS HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY ANALYSIS.

IN THE EVENT OF A LOSS'F COOLANT ACCIDENT THE NEW PASS WILL PROVIDE A MEANS TO OBTAIN AND ANALYZE REACTOR COOLANT, CONTAINMENT AIR, AND CONTAINMENT SUMP SAMPLES. THE PASS WILL HAVE PROVISIONS TO BE PRESSURIZED WITH NITROGEN OR AIR PRIOR TO POST ACCIDENT OPERATION TO ASSURE LEAKTZGHTNESS.

THE MAZOR SYSTEM VALVES AND INSTRUMENTS ARE CONTAINED IN AN ENCLOSED, SEALED PANEL WHICH IS CONNECTED TO A CHARCOAL FILTERED STATION HVAC SYSTEM. THUS COMPONENT LEAKAGE WILL BE PREVENTED FROM UNCONTROLLED AREAS.

THEREFORE i THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

EWR-2799 REACTOR LEVEL MONITORING SYSTEM THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL PROVIDE A REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL MONITORING SYSTEM.

THE SYSTEM WILL CONSIST OF TWO REDUNDANT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TRENDING CHANNELS. EACH CHANNEL WILL DRIVE A SEPARATE INDICATOR IN THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM SHOWING REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL TO THE PLANT OPERATORS UNDER ALL PLANT CONDITIONS.

REVISION 2 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND REVISION 1 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS WERE PRESENTED AND APPROVED BY PORC ON MARCH 20i 1985, PORC NUMBER 6.1.0-85-037-002.

UNDER REVISION 3 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND REVISION 2 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'HE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ARE AFFECTED DESIGN CRITERIA STEP 4.1 REVISED FROM:

THE ATTACHMENT TO THE EXISTING HEAD VENT SYSTEM INCLUDING THE RESTRICTING DEVICE SHALL BE QUALITY GROUP A. REMAINING FLUID SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS SHALL BE QUALITY GROUP B.

TO READ:

THE ATTACHMENTS TO THE GUIDE TUBE AND THE HEAD VENT SYSTEM, INCLUDING THE RESTRI CTING DEVICE i SHALL BE QUALITY GROUP A REMAINING FLUID SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS SHALL BE QUALITY GROUP B.

STEP 5.1 REVISED FROM:

THE ATTACHMENT TO THE EXISTING HEAD VENT SYSTEM SHALL CONSIST OF A RESTRICTING DEVICE AND SHALL BE ASME CODE CLASS 1.

CONSISTENT WITH REFERENCE 6.2.2.7 THE COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE RESTRICTING DEVICE SHALL BE ASME CODE CLASS 2. THE COUPLING THAT ATTACHES TO THE REACTOR INSTRUMENTATION GUIDE TUBE SHALL BE ASME CODE CLASS 2.

TO READ:

THE ATTACHMENTS TO THE EXISTING HEAD VENT SYSTEM AND GUIDE TUBE SHALL CONSIST OF A RESTRICTING DEVICE AND SHALL BE ASME CODE CLASS 1. CONSISTENT WITH REFERENCES 6.2.2.7 THE COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE RESTRICTING DEVICE SHALL BE ASME CODE CLASS 2.

STEP 7.1 REVISED FROM:

THE SYSTEM MECHANICAL DES/GN CONDITIONS WILL BE OVER A RANGE OF 0 TO 3000 PSI, AND 50 TO 697 F. THE SYSTEM SHALL A/SO PROVIDE INVENTORY INDICATIONS FOR TEMPERATURE OgER 697 F, ASSUMING SATURATED FLUID CONDITIONS'P TO 2200 Fi ZN THE CORE.

TO READ:

TH) SYSTEM MECHANICAL DESIGN CONDITIONS ARE 0 TO 2500 PSIG AND 50 TO 680 F. THE MOST SEVERE ACCIDENT CONDITION IS 3015 PSIG AT 697 F. THE SYSTEM SHALL A%SO PROVIDE INVENTORY INDICATIONS FOR TEMPERATURE OVEQ 697 F, ASSUMING SATURATED FLUID CORES'TEP CONDITIONSi UP TO 2200 Fi IN THE 7.6 HAS BEEN ADDED THE ADDITION OF THE ATTACHMENT TO THE GUIDE TUBE SHALL NOT CAUSE THE GUIDE TUBE TO EXCEED WESTINGHOUSE ALLOWABLE LOADS FOR THE ATTACHMENT TO THE REACTOR VESSEL OR SEAL TABLE.

STEP 8.1 REVISED FROM:

THE INSTRUMENT TUBING SHALL BE SUPPORTED SUCH THAT IT REMAINS FUNCTIONAL FOLLOWING AN SSE EVENT AS WELL AS DURING NORMAL OPERATION.

TO READ:

THE INSTRUMENT TUBING SHALL BE SUPPORTED SUCH THAT IT REMAINS FUNCTIONAL FOLLOWING AN SSE EVENT AS WELL AS DURING NORMAL OPERATION AND ALL POSTULATED ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.

STEP 8.3 REVISED FROM:

THE MOST SEVERE OPERATING CONDITIONS CONSIDERED FOR THE CONNECTION TO THE HEAD VENT SYSTEM IS THE CONTROL ROD EJECTION AND THE CORRESPONDING PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE IS 3015 PSIG AND 697 F.

TO READ'HE MOST SEVERE ACCIDENT CONDITION CONSIDERED FOR THE CONNECTIONS TO THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM IS THE CONTROL ROD EJECTION. THE CORRESPONDING PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE ARE 3015 PSIG AND 697 F.

STEP 10.1 REVISED FROM:

3 ' PRIMARY REACTOR COOLANT LOOP, INCLUDING THE REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENT SYSTEM.

TO READ:

3 ) I PR MARY REACTOR COOLANT LOOP ~ INCLUDING THE REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENT SYSTEM AND THE REACTOR VESSEL BOTTOM MOUNTED INSTRUMENTATION.

STEP 31.0 REVISED FROM:

nNOT APPLICABLE'O READ:

CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURES FOR ATTACHMENT TO THIS GUIDE TUBE WILL BE DEVELOPED THAT ENSURE THAT NO FOREIGN MATERIAL ENTER THE GUIDE TUBE.

ATTACHED FIGURE 1 TO THE DESIGN CRITERIA HAS BEEN REVISED STATING THAT INPUTS TO THE FOXBORO RACK ARE 3 INSTEAD OF 4 LINE THERMOCOUPLES.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE: 1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES, 2) SEISMIC EVENT, AND 3) THE SPECTRUM OF LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENTS INSIDE OF CONTAINMENT.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'/ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE ZMPLEMENTZON OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-2846B BLOCK WALL MODIFICATION RESTRAINTS E UIPMENT PROTECTION INTERMEDIATE BUILDING THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATIONS TO PROVIDE PROTECTION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER CHECK VALVES, A AND B MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE (MSIV)

OPERATORS AND A AND B MSIV SOLENOID VALVES.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO PROVIDE 1) UPGRADED PROTECTION FOR THE A AND B MSZV OPERATORS AND AZR SOLENOID VALVES SUCH THAT MSZV CLOSURE ZS ENSURED FOR SCENARIOS INVOLVING SSE (SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE), TORNADO MISSILES/WIND LOADS AND HELB (HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS)

OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT~ 2) PROTECTION FOR THE itAii AND FEEDWATER CHECK VALVES FOR SCENARIOS INVOLVING <<B'UXILIARY TORNADO WIND LOADS AND SSE SEISMIC EVENTS.

REVISION 1 TO THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WILL ALLOW REMOVAL OF VENT VALVE 3516A. THIS VALVE, AND ASSOCIATED PIPINGi WILL BE REMOVED FROM THE B MSIV AND NOT REPLACED'HE SCOPE OF THE PIPING MODIFICATION WILL BE TO PLACE A PLUG ZN THE EXISTING COVER FOR THE >>B" MSIV PRE-PORC COMMENTS ARE ADDRESSED IN INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE 13N1-RR-L2275 AND WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO THE NEXT REVISION.

THESE CHANGES INCLUDE TYPOGRAPHICAL CORRECTIONS TO THE DESIGN CRITERIA, PARAGRAPHS 1.2 AND 23.0. TO FURTHER CLARIFY THE TEST REQUIREMENTSi A SENTENCE WILL BE ADDED TO THE DESIGN CRITERIA PARAGRAPH 23.0 STATING "ZN LIEU OF A HYDROSTATIC TEST, A LEAK CHECK MAY BE PERFORMED AT NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE EARTHQUAKESi PIPE BREAKS OUTSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING/

TORNADOES'IRESi AND TORNADO MISSILES'LL PROPOSED PROTECTIVE DEVICES ARE TO BE MOUNTED AS SEISMIC CATEGORY I IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STRUCTURAL RE-ANALYSIS PROGRAM (SRP). REMOVABLE PANELS WILL BE UTILIZED TO PROVIDE MAINTENANCE/TESTING ACCESS AS REQUIRED.

PLACEMENT OF PASSIVE PROTECTIVE DEVICES AROUND THE MSXV OPERATORS/SOLENOID VALVES AND ii Btt AFW CHECK VALVES ENSURES FUNCTIONAL OPERATION DURING AND FOLLOWING HELB SCENARIOS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT.

FIRE SYSTEMS AND FIRE BARRIERS DISCUSSED ZN THE UFSAR ARE COVERED UNDER PLANT ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS, ENSURING THAT DEGRADATION OF PROTECTION/DETECTION FEATURES NECESSARY TO COMPLY WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX R WILL NOT OCCUR.

TORNADO LOADS i SUCH AS DIRECT WINDi DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE i AND TORNADO MISSILES HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED IN THE UFSAR UNDER SEP RE-EVALUATION DESIGN AND ANALYSIS.

I THUS i THIS MODIF CATION NEITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES i NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR:

1) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING AND FOLLOWING SSE AND TORNADO EVENTS.

2) OPERATION DURING A HELB SCENARIO OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT.

3) FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE STRUCTURAL RE-ANALYSIS PLAN (SRP)g IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURESJ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-3 072 RCP 1 SEAL LEAKOFF THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL INSTALL CHECK VALVES ON THE NUMBER ONE SEAL LEAKOFF LINES FROM THE REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS (RCP) A AND B. THE NEW CHECK VALVES WILL BE ASME N-STAMPED SEISMICALLY QUALXFIED.

THE NEW CHECK VALVES WILL BE LOCATED IN CONTAINMENT INSIDE THE RCP SHIELD WALLS. THE MODIFIED PIPE SYSTEM, INCLUDING SUPPORTS, WILL BE SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED. THIS, MODIFICATION IS SCHEDULED FOR INSTALLATION DURING THE 1987 REFUELING OUTAGE.

REVISION 0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WAS PRESENTED AND APPROVED BY PORC ON JUNE 16, 1986 PORC NUMBER 6~1~ 0-86-081-001.

THE PURPOSE OF REVISXON 1 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS IS TO INCLUDE REFERENCE TO THE ASME STANDARDS' III CLASS 2 REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GZNNA TION ARE: ')

STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICA-PRIMARY SYSTEM PIPE RUPTURE, 2) INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS'IRES'LOOD/ STORM OR EARTHQUAKES AND 3)

LOSS OF A REACTOR COOLANT PUMP.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS~ IT HAS THEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDXTIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

10

EWR-3 092 BORIC ACID PIPING THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE UPGRADE OF BORIC ACID PIPING FROM SCHEDULE 10 TO SCHEDULE 40 PIPE.

INCLUDED IN THIS MODIFICATION ZS THE RE-ROUTING OF THE PIPE TO AVOID HIGH RADIATION AREAS'NSTALLATION OF A NEW HEAT TRACING SYSTEMS UPGRADING OF PIPE SUPPORTS AND ADDITION OF A ONE INCH (1>>) ISOLATION VALVE IN THE MOV 825A/B BYPASS LINE A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. REVISION 0 IDENTIFIED THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION AS FIREg SEISMIC'OSS OF OFFSITE POWERS CVCS CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS'TEAM LINE BREAK AND LOCA.

ALL EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES REQUIRED TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50g APPENDIX Rf OR TO MAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELS OF PROTECTION FROM FIRES WILL BE MAINTAINED DURING AND FOLLOWING THIS MODIFICATION.

SEISMIC EVENTS HAVE BEEN ANALYZED UNDER THE SEP RE-EVALUATION DESIGN ANALYSIS. PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORT ANALYSES SHALL BE PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EWR-2512 DESIGN CRITERIA USING ANSI B31.1 AND ASME SECTION III. SUBSECTION NF AS A BASIS.

STRUCTURAL WORK REQUIRED SHALL BE BASED UPON THE AISC CODE, EIGHTH EDITION.

THE DESIGN AND OPERATING CONDITIONS TO WHICH THE PIPING SYSTEMS WILL BE ANALYZED ARE DEFINED ZN THE OPERATING TRANSIENTS DOCUMENT GENERATED FOR EWR 2512. SYSTEM THERMAL ANALYSES SHALL EVALUATE THE NORMAL 100% POWER CONDITION, AS WELL AS OTHER ABNORMAL OPERATING TRANSIENT CONDITIONS. THE LOADING COMBINATIONS AND STRESS LIMITS OF THE EWR 2512 DESIGN CRITERIA SHALL BE MET FOR ALL NORMAL AND ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.

ALL MODIFICATIONS OR ADDITIONS TO THE EXISTING PIPING OR PIPE SUPPORTS WILL BE REQUIRED TO INTERFACE WITH THE EXISTING PIPEg PIPE SUPPORTS'ND/OR STRUCTURES AND SHALL NOT DEGRADE THE ABILITY OF THESE ITEMS TO FUNCTION ACCORDING TO THEIR ORIGINAL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS.

THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT DEGRADE PLANT SYSTEMS ON A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER. THE HEAT TRACE CIRCUITS SHALL NOT DEGRADE THE PLANT NORMAL OR EMERGENCY POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.

REDUNDANT POWER TRAINS SHALL BE MAINTAINED AND STRUCTURES AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS WORK SHALL REMAIN FUNCTIONAL FOLLOWING A SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE (SSE).

THE HEAT TRACING SYSTEM SHALL BE SUPPLIED WITH POWER FROM THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS FOLLOWING A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER. THE EFFECT OF THE NEW SYSTEM ON THE DIESEL GENERATOR LOADS SHALL BE EVALUATED.

THE MODIFICATION PERFORMED SHALL NOT INHIBIT THE AFFECTED SYSTEMS FROM PERFORMING THEIR FUNCTIONS DURING ALL NORMAL AND POSTULATED ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. THE BORIC ACID SYSTEM SHALL BE OPERABLE DURING ALL NORMAL'ESIGN TRANSIENT/ UPSET AND FAULTED CONDITIONS. THE BORIC ACID PIPING CHANGES SHALL NOT AFFECT THE CONTROL OF ANY PLANT SYSTEM.

IN REVISION 1 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA THE SOLUBILITY TEMPERATURE LIMIT FOR 12-13 WEIGHT PERCENT BORIC ACID SOLUTION IS REVISED FROM 140oF TO 145oF TO COMPLY WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ESTABLISHED AT GXNNA STATION.

THUS g THIS MODIFICATION NEITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES g NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR:

1) FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES

2) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING AND FOLLOWING SEISMIC AND TORNADO EVENTS.

3) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION FOLLOWING A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWERS STEAM BREAK OR LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA).

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ZT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODXFICATION.

EWR-3199 VITAL BATTERY LOAD FLOW MONITOR THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE DESIGN MODIFICATION WHICH WILL PROVIDE A MEANS TO MONITOR CURRENT MAGNITUDES AND DIRECTION OF BOTH SAFEGUARDS D.C. BATTERY SYSTEMS AS WELL AS THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC)

BATTERY. THE SYSTEM WILL CONSIST OF THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT TO DISPLAY THE DIRECTION AND MAGNITUDE OF CURRENT GOING INTO OR OUT OF EACH BATTERY. THE SYSTEM WILL ALSO BE CAPABLE OF ANNUNCIATING ABNORMAL BATTERY CONDITIONS AND LOSS OF CONTINUXTY OF BATTERY CIRCUITS. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION WILL SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF SEP TOPIC VIII-3.B.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS ADDITION ARE (1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES'ND (2) SEISMIC EVENTS ZT HASg THEREFORE/ BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

12

EWR-3272 SAS PPCS COMPUTER SYSTEM THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE INSTALLATION OF A SAFETY ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (SAS) AND THE REPLACEMENT OF THE P-250 PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM (PPCS). DEDICATED CRTs AND LINE PRINTERS WILL BE CONNECTED TO THE SAS AND PPCS CPUs. THE SAS SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE AN INTEGRATED DISPLAY OF CRITICAL PLANT SAFETY PARAMETERS AND PERFORM REFERENCE DIAGNOSTICS DURING EMERGENCIES. THE (SAS) SYSTEM WILL PROVIDE THE OPERATORS IN THE CONTROL ROOM, AND PERSONNEL IN THE TSC~ THE EOF AND THE ENGXNEERING CENTER WITH 1) AN INDICATION OF THE SAFETY STATUS OF THE PLANTg 2) ACCIDENT DIAGNOSTIC DXSPLAYSg AND 3) POST ACCIDENT MONITORXNG~ THE NEW PPCS WILL INITIALLYPERFORM THE SAME FUNCTIONS THAT THE P-250 PRESENTLY PERFORMS.

REVISION 0 OF THE DESIGN CRXTERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WAS PRESENTED AND APPROVED BY PORC ON 5/23/84'ORC NUMBER 6.1.0-84-082-002.

UNDER REVISION 1 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA, PARAGRAPH 3.2 FIRST SENTENCE STATING~ i>THE REMAINING EQUIPMENT<< HAS BEEN CHANGED TO READ "THE EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATXON ARE 1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES, 2) SEISMIC EVENT.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS THEREFORE/ BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURXNG THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

'THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-3296A STRUCTURAL UPGRADE PROGRAM THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE GINNA STATION STRUCTURAL UPGRADE PROGRAM WHICH IS IN RESPONSE TO THE SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM (SEP) BEGUN BY THE USNRC IN 1977. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO UPGRADE THOSE MEMBERS, CONNECTIONS AND ANCHORAGES FOUND TO BE OVERSTRESSED WHEN SUBJECTED TO .THE DESIGN LOADS SET FORTH IN THE VARIOUS SEP TOPICS.

13

REVISION 0 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA/SAFETY ANALYSIS COVERED MODIFICATIONS INCLUDED IN THE SEP TOPICS LOCATED ZN THE AUXILIARY BUILDINGS CONTROL BUILDING~ INTERMEDIATE BUILDINGS TURBINE BUILDINGS AND THE FACADE STRUCTURE REVISION 1 OF THIS DESIGN CRITERIA/SAFETY ANALYSIS:

l. ADDRESSES THE DESIGN AND INSTALLATION OF BACKDRAFT DAMPERS REQUIRED ONLY ZN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING. THESE DAMPERSg WHEN INSTALLED'ILLELIMINATE~ THE EFFECTS OF THE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES ASSOCIATED WITH THE DESIGN BASIS TORNADO.

2. INCORPORATES CHANGES IN FORMAT AND CONTENT OF VARIOUS SUB-SECTIONS OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG GUIDE 1.70. EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE: WIND AND TORNADO LOADING, FIRES AND THE SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE (SEISMIC EVENTS).

THE DESIGN FOR WIND AND TORNADO LOADINGS HAVE BEEN ANALYZED UNDER THE SEP RE-EVALUATION DESIGN ANALYSIS. MODIFICATIONS TO STRUCTURAL MEMBERS AND ATTACHMENTS WILL NOT ALTER EITHER THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF EXISTING STRUCTURES OR SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT LOCATED WITHIN THESE STRUCTURES. THE INCLUSION OF BACKDRAFT DAMPERS UNDER THIS MODIFICATION INSURES THAT THE AUXILIARY BUILDING WILL NOT BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY TORNADO WINDS.

ALL EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES REQUIRED TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50, APPENDIX R, OR TO MAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELS OF PROTECTION FROM FIRES WILL BE MAINTAINED DURING AND FOLLOWING THE STRUCTURAL UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS.

I I I I THUS g TH S MODIF CATION NE THER NCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES / NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR:

1) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING AND FOLLOWING SSE, WIND AND TORNADO EVENTS

2) FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE STRUCTURAL RE-ANAL-YSIS PLANT (SRP)g IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES~ SYSTEMS~ AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVEN TION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

14

EWR-3595 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION OF THE CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY SYSTEM. IN ORDER, TO IMPROVE RELIABILITYAND MAINTAINABILITYOF THE RADIATION AND TOXIC GAS MONITORS EWR-3595 PHASE B WAS ESTABLISHED.

REVISION 5 OF THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCORPORATES THE FOLLOWING CHANGES FROM REVIEW OF DC AND SA REVISION 4 PREVIOUSLY NOT PORC APPROVED. MODIFICATIONS APPLICABLE TO EWR-3595 PHASE B ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1) REPLACE 2 EXISTING TOXIC GAS SAMPLE PUMPS WITH TWO PUMPS'ACH WITH 1004 CAPACITY'NE PUMP WILL BE ZN OPERATING MODE, THE OTHER WILL BE IN STANDBY MODE.

THREE POSITION TOXIC GAS SAMPLE PUMP SWITCH SHALL ALSO BE INSTALLED.

2) REPLACE EXISTING RADIATION MONITOR FLOW SWITCH.

3) ADDITION OF CONTROL ROOM 'DAMPERS MANUAL ACTUATION SWITCH AT THE HVAC PANEL.

4) ADDITION OF RADIATION~ AMMONIA'ND CHLORINE LOW SAMPLE AIR FLOW SIGNALS FOR CONTROL ROOM DAMPERS ISOLATION AND INDICATION TO THE PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER.

5) REPLACE EXISTING CHLORINE FLOW METER WITH ONE THAT HAS CFM UNIT INDICATION.

6) INSTALL CLEAR POLYCARBONATE "LEXAN>> COVER FOR CHECKING PARTICULATE MONITOR PAPER ON THE RADIATION MONITOR CABINET.

7) REPLACE RADIATION MONITOR PUMP MOTOR FUSE WITH A MOTOR STARTER.

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR)

IS NOT INCREASED. THERE IS NO REDUCTION IN SYSTEM RELIABILITY OR PERFORMANCE. THE CONTROL ROOM TOXIC GAS AND RADIATION MONITORS WILL REMAIN WITHIN REMAIN WITHIN THEIR DESIGN LIMITS AND WILL HAVE NO IMPACT ON PLANT ABILITY TO WITHSTAND FIRE.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE UFSAR ARE NOT INCREASED. THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT IMPACT OR INCREASE THE CALCULATED RADIOLOGICAL DOSE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC FOR ANY EVENT EVALUATED IN THE UFSAR. THE FUNCTION AND CAPABILITY OF THE TOXIC GAS AND RADIATION MONITORS REMAIN THE SAME, AND NO FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS ARE AFFECTED.

15

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE UFSAR IS NOT INCREASED. THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT DEGRADE THE PERFORMANCE OF ANY SYSTEM FUNCTIONS'ND IN FACTg UPGRADES THE INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL OF THE MONITORS.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZN THE UFSAR ARE NOT INCREASED.'HE MODIFICATION DOES NOT IMPACT OR INCREASE THE CALCULATED RADIOLOGICAL DOES TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC FOR ANY EVENT EVALUATED IN THE UFSAR. THE FUNCTION AND CAPABILITY OF THE MONITORS TO DETECT AND ALARM/ISOLATION REMAINS THE SAMEg AND NO FISSION PRODUCT=BARRIERS ARE AFFECTED.

THE. POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE UFSAR ZS NOT CREATED. NO OTHER SYSTEMS ARE AFFECTED'OR ANY NEW FAILURE MODE ZNDUCED ~

THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIFFERENT TYPE OF MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY THAN ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZN THE UFSAR IS NOT CREATED. THE ADDITION OF THE SWITCHES, REMOTE INDICATION, AND CLEAR LEXAN COVER DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SUBJECT SYSTEM.

THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ZS NOT REDUCED. THE FUNCTIONS AND PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MONITORS (ED Gag DETECTION'SOLATIONSg ETC.) REMAIN UNCHANGED.

BASED -UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GINNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING- NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED 'URING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-3645A GZNNA STATION GROUND WATER LEVELS THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES AN ANALYSIS OF BELOW GRADE STRUCTURES AT GINNA TO EVALUATE THE EFFECTS OF THE INCREASED GROUND WATER LEVEL (GWL).

THIS EWR COVERS ONLY THE EVALUATION OF EFFECTS OF THE NEW DESIGN BASIS GROUND WATER LEVEL (DBGWL) ON SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES BELOW GRADE. THE NEW DBGWL IS DEFINED AS 265.0 FT MSL. THIS EVALUATION COMPRISES A PORTION OF A CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO THE USNRC RELATIVE TO SEP TOPIC

- III-3.A, nEFFECTS OF HIGH WATER LEVEL ON STRUCTURES R.E. GINNA 16

i PRE-PORC COMMENTS LZSTED BELOW WERE FORWARDED TO THE RESPON-SIBLE ENGINEER (RE) VIA LETTER 13N1-RR-L50391 ~ ANSWERS ARE PROVIDED FOR CLARIFICATION (SEE LETTER 13Nl-RR-L1650).

Q. DO THE RESULTS OF THIS EVALUATION HAVE ANY POTENTIAL TO IMPACT ANY ASSUMPTIONS MADE IN OUR PAST ANALYSIS OF THE CONTAINMENT VESSEL TENDONS OR THEIR ROCK ANCHORS'.

ENGINEERING REVIEW HAS ASCERTAINED THAT EVALUATION OF GROUND WATER LEVEL WILL HAVE NO POTENTIAL TO IMPACT ANY ASSUMPTIONS PREVIOUSLY MADE CONCERNING CONTAINMENT VESSEL TENDONS OR ROCK ANCHORS.

Q. 1) THE UFSAR ZS NOT REFERENCED IN SECTION 2.0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA BUT IS SPECIFICALLY CALLED OUT IN PARAGRAPH 7.4 ~

2) SAFETY ANALYSIS STEP 3.2 DOES NOT ADDRESS OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKES (OBE'S).

A. ENGINEERING WILL INCORPORATE THESE COMMENTS AS CHANGES AT THE NEXT REVISION OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA/SAFETY ANALYSIS..

A REVIEW, HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GZNNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. EVENTS RELATED TO THIS ANALYSIS ARE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS SUCH AS FIREg FLOODS'TORMS'ND EARTHQUAKES'NCORPORATING BOTH OPERATING BASIS AND SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKES'HIS ANALYSIS WILL NOT DEGRADE ANY EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS'HEREFORE'LL EXISTING FIRE PROTEC TION FEATURES REQUIRED TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX Rg OR TO MAINTAIN EQUIVALENT LEVELS OF PROTECTION WILL BE MAINTAINED DURING AND FOLLOWING THIS ANALYSIS.

I THE PRESENT DES GN FOR FLOODING ~ STORMS g OPERAT NG BAS S I I EARTHQUAKE AND SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE (SEISMIC EVENTS) HAS BEEN ANALYZED UNDER THE SEP RE-EVALUATION DESIGN ANALYSIS.

EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF INCREASED GROUND WATER LEVEL ON SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES BELOW GRADE WILL INSURE THAT THESE STRUCTURES ARE ADEQUATE TO RESIST LOAD COMBINATIONS REFERENCED ZN THE DESIGN CRITERIA (BASED UPON USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN GUIDELINES).

THUS g THIS ANALYSIS WILL NE ITHER INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES g NOR REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS INVOLVING:

1) EQUI PMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING AND FOLLOWING OBE g SSE ~ FLOODING AND STORMS g ZNCLUDING TORNADO EVENTS ~

2) FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES 17

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GINNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFZCATZONSi IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT WILL NOT BE REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURESi SYSTEMSi AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVEN TION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THIS ANALYSIS.

EWR-3698 DIVERSE TRIP MODIFICATION ON REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH MODIFIED THE CONTROL CIRCUITRY ON THE SHUNT TRIP ATTACHMENT (STA) TO THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS. PRESENTLY, THE STA IS ENERGIZED THROUGH TWO MANUAL REACTOR TRIP SWITCHES. ONLY THE UNDERVOLTAGE COIL (UVTA) AUTOMATICALLY CAUSES A REACTOR TRIP WHEN A SCRAM IS REQUIRED. THE UVTA WOULD ALSO CAUSE A REACTOR TRIP ON LOSS OF D.C. CONTROL POWER. THIS MODIFICATION IS REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH USNRC 83-28. 854 OF THIS MODIFICATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED UNDER THE PREVIOUS REVISIONS. THIS PROJECT IS SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION DURING THE 1987 OUTAGE.

REVISION 1 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WAS PRESENTED AND APPROVED BY PORC ON FEBRUARY 5, 1986 PORC NUMBER 6.1.0-86-015-001.

THE PURPOSE OF REVISION 2 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS IS TO INCLUDE:

A) NEW INDICATOR LIGHT TO VERIFY THAT THE STA IS OPERATIONAL. (PARAGRAPH 7.3.1)

B) NEW TRIP TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR BOTH UVTA AND STA.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE:

1) ALL POSTULATED ACCIDENTS REQUIRING A REACTOR TRIP.

2) LOSS OF D.C. CONTROL POWER.

3) NATURAL EVENT/FIRE i AND EARTHQUAKE~

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, ZT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURESi SYSTEMSi AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

18

I4 EWR-3755 PORV BLOCK VALVE S REPLACEMENT THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE REPLACEMENT OF PRESSURIZER MOTOR-OPERATED BLOCK VALVES 515 AND 516 WITH NEW SEISMICALLY AND ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED GATE VALVES.

THE REPLACEMENT IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE EXISTING BLOCK VALVE SEAT RINGS ARE APPROACHING THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE LIMITS FOR REMACHINZNG.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDES 1.29 AND 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1) INCREASE IN HEAT REMOVAL BY SECONDARY SYSTEM.

2) DECREASE IN HEAT REMOVAL BY SECONDARY SYSTEM.

3) DECREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM FLOW RATE.

4) REACTIVITY AND POWER DISTRIBUTION ANOMALIES.

5) INCREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY.

6) DECREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY.

7) INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS SUCH AS MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES, FLOODS, STORMS, OR EARTHQUAKES.

THE FOLLOWING ACCIDENTS APPLICABLE TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

INCREASE IN HEAT REMOVAL BY SECONDARY SYSTEM I I THE FOLLOWING ACC DENTS g APPLI CABLE TO TH S EVENT g WERE ANALYZED:

A) DECREASE IN FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE B) INCREASE IN FEEDWATER FLOW C) EXCESSIVE LOAD INCREASE INCIDENT D) INADVERTANT OPENING OF A STEAM GENERATOR RELIEF/S-AFETY VALVE E) SPECTRUM OF STEAM SYSTEM PIPING FAILURES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF CONTAINMENT 2 ~ DECREASE IN HEAT REMOVAL BY SECONDARY SYSTEM I I I THE FOLLOW NG ACC DENTS g APPLZ CABLE TO TH S EVENT g WERE ANALYZED:

A) STEAM PRESSURE REGULATOR MALFUNCTION OR FAILURE THAT RESULTS ZN DECREASING STEAM FLOW B) LOSS OF EXTERNAL ELECTRICAL LOAD C) TURBINE TRIP D) LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM E) LOSS OF OFFSZTE ALTERNATING CURRENT POWER TO THE STATION AUXILIARIES F) LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLOW G) FEEDWATER SYSTEM PIPE BREAKS 19

3. REACTIVITY AND POWER DISTRIBUTION ANOMALIES I

THE FOLLOWING ACC DENTS i APPLI CABLE TO TH IS EVENT i WERE ANALYZED:

A) UNCONTROLLED ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY WITHDRAWAL FROM A SUBCRITICAL CONDITION B) UNCONTROLLED ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY WXTHDRAWAL AT POWER C) STARTUP OF AN INACTIVE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP D) CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION E) RUPTURE OF A CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM HOUSING F) ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY DROP

4. INCREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY

5. DECREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM FLOW RATE THE FOLLOWING ACCIDENTS i APPLI CABLE TO THIS EVENT i WER ANALYZED:

A) FLOW COASTDOWN ACCIDENTS B) LOCKED ROTOR ACCIDENTS

6. DECREASE. IN REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY I I I THE FOLLOW NG ACC DENTS i APPLI CABLE TO TH S EVENT i WERE ANALYZED:

A) INADVERTANT OPENING OF A PRESSURIZER SAFETY OR RELIEF VALVE B) PRIMARY SYSTEM PIPE RUPTURES THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT DEGRADE THE DESIGN, CAPABILITY OR PERFORMANCE OF THE EXISTING PRESSURIZER RELIEF SYSTEM ANDi THEREFORE, THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ABOVE EVENTS WILL NOT BE INCREASED BY THE MODIFICATION.

THIS MODIFICATION AND THE MATERIALS UTILIZED WILL MEET APPENDIX R 10CFR50 CRITERIA AS DEFINED IN ENGINEERING PROCEDURE QE-326.

THE MODIFICATION NEXTHER AFFECTS, NOR IS AFFECTED BY ANY FLOOD OR STORM PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED.

THE MODIFICATION IS DECLARED AS HAVING TO MEET, SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 CRITERIA OF USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.29 AND CONDITIONS SPECIFIED IN THE UFSAR SECTION 3.11.3 TITLED "IDENTIFICATION OF LIMITING ENVIRONMENTAL CONDXTIONS 20

$L BASED UPON ALL THE ABOVE ANALYSES:

1) STRUCTURES g SYSTEMS g AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE ADEQUATE.

2) MARGIN OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATING AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GINNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS'T HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-3768 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION COOLING THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE UPGRADE OF THE PENETRATION COOLING SYSTEM TO ENSURE THAT THE UNMONITORED PATH FOR AIRBORNE RADIATION FROM THE AUXILIARY BUILDING TO UNCONTROLLED AREAS WILL BE ELIMINATED.

REVISION 1 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCORPORATED COMMENTS TO REVISION 0, AND INCLUDED INSTALLING NEW DUCTWORK TO AN OUTSIDE AZR SOURCES A BACKDRAFT DAMPER OR OTHER MEANS OF BACKFLOW PREVENTION'O PREVENT UNMONITORED RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVITY, CHANGES TO THE EXISTING PENETRATION COOLING FAN SYSTEM INLET AEG&NGEMENT BOX TO ACCEPT THE NEW DUCTWORK/ INSTALLING A NEW STEAM HEATING COILS INSTALLING ASSOCIATED STEAM SUPPLY AND STEAM CONDENSATE RETURN PIPING, INSTALLING A NEW CONDENSATE DRAIN PAN AND PIPING, AND INSTALLING NEW PNEUMATIC AND/OR ELECTRIC TEMPERATURE CONTROL DEVICES IN THE MODIFIED SYSTEM.

IN ADDITION TO THE DESIGN WORK REQUIRED TO MODIFY THE EXISTING CONTAINMENT PENETRATION COOLING SYSTEM AN ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED TO DETERMINE THE ACTUAL BULK CONCRETE TEMPERATURES OF THE PENETRATIONS WITHOUT THE OPERATION OF THE CONTAINMENT PENETRATION COOLING SYSTEM. BULK CONCRETE TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS HAVE BEEN RELAXED IN RECENT YEARS FROM THE ORIGINAL DESIGN LIMIT OF 150oF TO 200oF PER ASME BOILER AND PRESSURE VESSEL CODEX'ECTION III/DIVISION 2g 1986 EDITION. THE ANALYSIS . DEMONSTRATES THAT THE BULK CONCRETE TEMPERATURES DURING THE WORST CASE SCENARIO COULD EXCEED 200oF THEREFORE THIS SYSTEM WILL BE MAINTAINED OPERABLE ABOVE A PRIMARY SYSTEM TEMPERATURE OF 200oF 21

REVISION 2 OF THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS UPDATES THE REFERENCE SECTIONS OF BOTH THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS AND INCORPORATES 1) A VERIFICATION THAT A STEAM COIL FAILURE (LOSS OF STEAM HEATING) WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION DURING COLD WEATHER~ AND

2) A PUSH TO TEST SWITCH ON THE EQUIPMENT HATCH TEMPERATURE ALARM PANEL TO GIVE POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF LAMP FUNCTION DURING OPERATION.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE PIPING FAILURES ZN FLUID SYSTEMS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT, SEISMIC EVENTS'IRES'ND PLANT BUILDING SECURITY'EISMIC EVENTS HAVE BEEN ANALYZED UNDER THE SEP RE-EVALUATION DESIGN ANALYSIS. MODIFICATION OF THE PENETRATION COOLING SYSTEM REQUIRES SEISMIC DESIGN FOR SUPPORTS TO ENSURE THAT MODIFIED PIPING/DUCTWORK WILL NOT COLLAPSE DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT ALTER EITHER THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF EXISTING STRUCTURES OR SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT LOCATED WITHIN THE EXISTING AUXILIARY BUILDING STRUCTURE.

ALL EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES REQUIRED TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50g APPENDIX RJ OR TO MAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELS OF PROTECTION FROM FIRES WILL BE MAINTAINED DURING AND FOLLOWING THIS MODIFICATION.

A BREAK IN THE HOUSE HEATING STEAM LINE TO BE INSTALLED UNDER THIS MODIFICATION (PIPE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT)

WILL NOT HAVE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT.

THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ASSURES DELIVERY OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO THE STEAM GENERATORS TO MAINTAIN SAFE SHUTDOWN. INVENTORY FOR THE PRIMARY SYSTEM IS ASSURED VIA CHARGING PUMPS LOCATED IN A ROOM SEPARATED FROM THE AUXILIARYBUILDING BY CONCRETE WALLS AND SEALED FIRE BARRIERS.

APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS WILL BE INSTALLED TO PRECLUDE UNMONITORED ACCESS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING VIA THE NEW INLET PENETRATION ZN ACCORDANCE WITH GINNA STATION SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

THUS g THIS MODZFZCATION NEITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES /

NOR DOES.,ZT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR:

1) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING AND FOLLOWING SEISMIC EVENTS INCLUDING PIPE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT.

2) FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES

3) PLANT SECURITY 22

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE STRUCTURAL RE-ANALYSIS PLAN (SRP)g IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED'T HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES/ SYSTEMS~ AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-3817 CATALYTIC OXYGEN REMOVAL SYSTEM THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL PROVIDE A MEANS OF REDUCING OXYGEN CONCENTRATIONS TO LESS THAN 100 PPB IN THE CONDENSATE STORAGE SYSTEM. A WESTINGHOUSE CATALYTIC OXYGEN REMOVAL SYSTEM (CORS) HAS BEEN EVALUATED TO BE THE BEST METHOD AVAILABLETO REDUCE DISSOLVED OXYGEN TO ACCEPTABLE LEVELS. THE PRINCIPLE IS TO MIX HYDROGEN WITH THE CONDENSATE AND REDUCE THE FREE OXYGEN TO WATER THROUGH EXPOSURE OF THE MIXTURE TO A METAL CATALYST SURFACE.

REVISION 0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WAS PRESENTED AND APPROVED BY PORC ON NOVEMBER 6, 1985 PORC NUMBER 6.1 0-85-114-002.

~

DUE TO PRE-PORC COMMENTS, REVISION 1 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS, WERE NOT PRESENTED TO PORC.

THE PURPOSE OF REVISION 2 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS IS TO INCLUDE COMMENTS AS A RESULT OF PRE-PORC OF REVISION l.

,A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE A LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER AND FIRES.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

23

EWR-4037 CT-1 TERMINAL REPLACEMENT THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION OF THE EXISTING EBERLINE CT-1 EFFLUENT MONITOR CONTROL TERMINALS AT GINNA STATION WITH UPGRADED 'rBr'ERSION EQUIPMENT THE PURPOSE OF THE rr Brr VERSION UPGRADE IS TO IMPROVE THE OPERABILITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE EXISTING CONTROL TERMINALS IN THE CONTROL ROOM AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER. ALSO PROPOSED ZS THE INSTALLATION OF A REPORT GENERATOR INTERFACE (RGIF) WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE CT-1 IN THE TSC TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE NEW PLANT COMPUTER PLANNED FOR INSTALLATION IN 1986. IF THE CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS HAVE ACCESS TO DATA FROM THE EFFLUENT MONITORS VIA THE PLANT COMPUTER, THE CT-1 IN THE CONTROL ROOM WOULD NO LONGER BE REQUZREDr AND COULD BE REMOVED TO DECREASE SOME OF THE CONGESTION IN THE CONTROL ROOM AND ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR DUPLICATING AT CT-1 FOR THE GINNA SIMULATOR PROJECT. IT IS PROPOSED THAT BOTH THE CONTROL ROOM AND THE TSC CONTROL TERMINALS BE UPGRADED WITH THE >>B" VERSION EQUIPMENT IN 1985 'HEN THE NEW PLANT COMPUTER IS OPERATIONAL'HE RGIF WOULD BE INSTALLED BETWEEN THE TSC CT-1 AND THE PLANT COMPUTER, AND THE CONTROL ROOM CT-1 WOULD BE REMOVED.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GZNNA STATION FSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE (1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES, (2) A SEISMIC EVENT.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSIS DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY, PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE INCREASED BY THE PROPOSED ADDITION.

EWR-4070 NO. 1 AND 2 FEEDWATER HEATER REPLACEMENT THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE REPLACEMENT OF NUMBER 1 AND 2 FEEDWATER HEATER.

THE PURPOSE OF I THIS MODIFI CATION S TO SPECI FY g PROCURE r AND INSTALL NEW FEEDWATER HEATER TUBE BUNDLES AND SHELL MODIFICATIONS AT THE FIRST AND SECOND EXTRACTION POINTS.

THE PRIMARY GOAL IS TO ELIMINATE THE COPPER ALLOY TUBES.

STAINLESS STEEL TUBES ARE RECOMMENDED.

REVISION 1 TO THE SAFETY ANALYSIS INCORPORATES A CHANGE RESULTING FROM PRE-PORC COMMENT OF REVISION 0 TO CLARIFY A STEP TO STATE THAT THE PROBABILITY OF UNINTENDED OPENING OF THE CONDENSATE BYPASS VALVE WILL NOT INCREASE DUE TO THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIREMENT TO LIMIT TUBESIDE PRESSURE DROP TO 45 PSI.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN PERFORMED OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE 24

I GI NNA STATION UFSAR ~ THE EVENTS REQU RXNG ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG ~ GUIDE 1 ~ 7 0 g AND A 1 OCFR50 ~ 59 SAFETY EVALUATION THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE A DECREASE IN FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE AND A LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLOW.

THE DECREASE ZN FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE EVENT IS ANALYZED IN THE UFSAR AS AN ACCIDENTAL OPENING OF THE CONDENSATE BYPASS VALVE, WHICH RESULTED IN A SUDDEN REDUCTION INLET FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE TO THE STEAM GENERATORS.

THIS MODIFICATION HAS NO BEARING ON CONDENSATE BYPASS VALVE OPERATION OR PLANT RESPONSE TO THIS EVENT. A REDUCTION IN FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE WHICH RESULTED FROM A LOSS OF ONE FEEDWATER HEATER HAS BEEN ANALYZED IN UFSAR. THE ANALYSIS SHOWED THAT FOR A FEEDWATER ENTHALPY DECREASE CORRESPONDING TO THE LOSS OF ONE FEEDWATER HEATER AT FULL POWER MINIMUM DNBR DOES NOT FALL BELOW THE LIMIT VALUE. AT ZERO POWER THE RESULTS ARE LESS LIMITING THAN THOSE PRESENTED IN UFSAR SECTION 15.4.1, UNCONTROLLED ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY WITHDRAWAL FROM A SUBCRITICAL CONDITION.

THE LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLOW IS ANALYZED IN THE UFSAR AS A DISRUPTION OF SECONDARY SYSTEM HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY.

THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF THE DISRUPTION AS A RESULT OF CONDENSATE LINE BREAK SINCE THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES PROPER INSPECTION AND TESTING OF NEW WELDS.

THIS MODIFICATION IS NON-SEISMIC SINCE IT DOES NOT EFFECT THE SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE REACTOR.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT INCREASE THE FXRE LOADING IN FIRE AREAS CONTAINING SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT OR DEGRADE EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION BECAUSE OF REQUIREMENTS IN SECTION 27.0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GZNNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

25

EWR-4 075 TSC HVAC MODIFICATIONS THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION OF THE GZNNA STATION TSC HVAC SYSTEM. THIS MODIFICATION WILL CONSIST OF: 1) ADDING TWO COMPUTER TYPE AIR CONDITIONING UNITS TO THE NEW SAS COMPUTER ROOM, 2) INSTALLING NEW ZONE CONTROL BOXES'ACH WITH ZTS OWN THERMOSTAT') MODIFYING THE CENTRAL SYSTEM CONTROL SO THAT IT WILL AUTOMATICALLY CHANGE OVER FROM HEATING TO COOLING'ND BACKS AND 4)

INSTALLING A FLOW CONTROLLER TO ASSURE THAT THE MAXIMUM DESIGN FLOW RATE THROUGH THE CHARCOAL FILTER ZS NOT EXCEEDED.

REVISION 1 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WAS PRESENTED AND APPROVED BY PORC ON 11/19/86 PORC NUMBER 6 ~ 1 ~ 0-86-135-002.

THE PURPOSE OF REVISION 2, OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS ZS TO INCLUDE INSTALLATIONREFERENCE TO SPECIFICATION EE-29, EE-80 AND IEEE 383.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICA-TION ARE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS'UCH AS STORMS AND FIRES'LOODS, EARTHQUAKES'ASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, ZT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

26

EWR-4118 TOTAL CHARGING FLOW INDICATION THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION TO INSTALL TWO TRANSMITTERS FOR REACTOR COOLANT PUMP (RCP)

SEAL INJECTION FLOW.

EWR 4118 WAS WRITTEN IN RESPONSE TO A NUMBER OF HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES (HEDS) IDENTIFIED DURING THE DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW. HEDS 451 AND 471 STATE THAT INDICATION FOR REACTOR COOLANT PUMP (RCP) SEAL INJECTION FLOW AND TOTAL CHARGING FLOW ARE REQUIRED'EDS 345 ADDRESS THE PROBLEM THAT THE CHARGING FLOW 84'5'09'10'ND CONTROLLER IS LOCATED ON THE MIDDLE SECTION OF THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD (MCB)g AND THE INDICATOR IS ON THE LEFT SECTION WHICH ZS EIGHT TO TEN FEET AWAY. THE COMBINATION OF THESE HEDS RESULTED IN AN NRC COMMZTTMENT TO PROVIDE INDICA-TION FOR SEAL INJECTION AND A DUPLICATE INDICATOR FOR CHARGING FLOW ON THE MIDDLE SECTION OF THE MCB BY JUNE 1988. THIS PROJECT INVOLVES THE INSTALLATION OF TWO TRANS-MITTERS FOR RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW (FT115A AND FT116A).

THESE TWO TRANSMITTERS WOULD BE INSTALLED IN PARALLEL WITH THE EXISTING RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW LOCAL INDICATION (FT115 AND FT116). INDICATORS FOR SEAL INJECTION FLOW WILL BE INSTALLED ON THE MIDDLE SECTION OF THE MCB. THE TWO SEAL INJECTION FLOWS WILL BE INPUT TO THE PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM (PPCS). IN ADDITION, A DUPLICATE OF THE EXISTING CONTROL BOARD INDICATION FOR CHARGING FLOW (F0128) WILL BE INSTALLED ON THE MIDDLE SECTION OF THE MCB.

THE RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOWS, COUPLED WITH THE EXISTING CONTROL BOARD INDICATION FOR CHARGING FLOW, WILL ALLOW CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS TO DETERMINE TOTAL SYSTEM INFLOW.

THE NEW INDICATORS FOR SEAL INJECTION FLOW AND CHARGING FLOW WILL BE LOCATED BESIDE EACH OTHER ON THE MIDDLE SECTION OF THE MCB ~ THE DUPLICATE INDICATOR FOR CHARGING FLOW WZLLg IN ADDITION, BE LOCATED ABOVE THE CONTROLLER FOR CHARGING FLOW. A NEW PSEUDO ANALOG POINT WILL BE CREATED ON THE PPCS TO CALCULATE TOTAL CHARGING FLOW BY COMBINING CHARGING FLOW, AN EXISTING PPCS INPUT, WITH THE NEW RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW POINTS.

DUE TO PRE-PORC COMMENTS, REVISION 0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WERE NOT PRESENTED TO PORC.

THE PURPOSE OF REVISION 1 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS IS TO INCLUDE COMMENTS AS A RESULT OF PRE-PORC OF REVISION 0.

27

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GINNA FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY THE USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE:

1) SEISMIC EVENT

2) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES

3) PIPE BREAKS OUTSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING THIS MODIFICATION IS LIMITED TO WORK DOWNSTREAM OF THE ROOT VALVES FOR THE RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW. SINCE THE ROOT VALVES DEFINE THE SAFETY CLASS BOUNDARYi THE EXISTING RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW INSTRUMENTATION IS DESIGNATED NOT SEISMIC CATEGORY BE I'HE REMAINING WORKi FOR THIS MODIFICATIONS WILL DESIGNED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.29, REVISION C.2.

THIS MODIFICATION INVOLVES THE INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDINGS FIRE AREA ABBM ZONE ABBi AND THE CONTROL BUILDING, FIRE AREA CC ZONES CR AND RR. THIS MODIFICATION ALSO REQUIRES ROUTING CABLE THROUGH THE CABLE TUNNEL WHICH IS FIRE AREA CT. A REVIEW WILL BE PERFORMED TO ASSURE CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50i APPENDIX R ALL NEW WIRING WILL BE QUALIFIED TO IEEE 383-1974 FLAME TEST REQUIREMENTS.

FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS WILL BE REPAIRED OR REPLACED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXZSTING PLANT PROCEDURES. THEREFORE EXISTING SEALS WILL NOT BE DEGRADED.

THIS MODIFICATIONS DOES NOT AFFECT THE SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS IN THE APPENDIX R SUBMITTAL FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. THE APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS FOR LOCAL INDICATION OF RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW WILL BE MAINTAINED.

B. THERE IS NO EFFECT ON SEPARATION OF EXISTING CIRCUITS, ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS, OR FIRE AREA BOUNDARIES AS ANALYZED IN THE APPENDIX R SUBMITTAL.

THIS MODIFICATION WILL INTERFACE WITH THE EXISTING 3/8 INCH RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW SENSING LINE IN THE SAME MANNER AS DOES THE EXISTING LOCAL INDICATORS. THEREFORE THIS MODIFIC-ATION DOES NOT INTRODUCE ANY NEW FAILURE MODES CONCERNING PIPE BREAKS OUTSIDE OF THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING.

ZT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT '/HE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED.

THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES i SYSTEMS i AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

28

EWR-4142 CONTROL BUILDING EAST WALL MODIFICATION THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE STRUCTURAL UPGRADE REQUIREMENT OF THE EAST WALL OF THE CONTROL BUILDING.

THE EAST WALL OF THE CONTROL BUILDING MUST BE CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING THE LOADS ASSOCIATED WITH A 132 MPH TORNADO (DIRECT WIND AND ~ P = 0.4 PSZ) AND TWO TORNADO MISSILES.

THIS MODIFICATION WILLg IN EFFECT~ UPGRADE THE RELAY ROOM EAST WALL AS PART OF THE STRUCTURAL UPGRADE PROGRAM TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ADDED STRENGTH REQUIRED TO RESIST THE IMPOSES LOADS OF SNOW, TORNADO (DIRECT AND ~ P), TORNADO MISSILES AND 2) PROVIDE A WATER-TIGHT BARRIER AGAINST FLOODING OF DEER CREEK.

REVISION 2 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCORPORATES CHANGES FROM REVISION 1 DELETING EXTRA CONDUIT FOR FUTURE CIRCUITS'DDING GROUNDING AND DOOR POSITION SWITCHES FOR BOTH SECURITY AND FIRE DOORS.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYSIS IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE WINDJ SNOW AND TORNADO LOADINGS~ FLOODING AND SEISMIC'IRES/

LOSS OF A.C. POWER AND PLANT BUILDING SECURITY.

I THE DES GN FOR WINDg SNOW g TORNADOES AND EXTERNAL FLOODING HAS BEEN EVALUATED IN THE UFSAR AND WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMMITMENTS MADE TO THE USNRC WHICH ARE REFERENCED ZN SECTIONS 2 'g '~

3 3' 1 AND 3 ' OF THE UFSAR SEISMIC EVENTS HAVE BEEN ANALYZED UNDER THE SEP RE-EVALUATION DESIGN ANALYSIS. MODIFICATION OF THIS EXTERNAL WALL OF THE RELAY ROOM WILL NOT ALTER EITHER THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF EXISTING STRUCTURES OR SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT LOCATED WITHIN THE EXISTING STRUCTURES.

ALL EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES REQUIRED TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX R, OR TO MAINTAIN EQUIVALENT LEVELS OF PROTECTION FROM FIRES WILL BE MAINTAINED DURING AND FOLLOWING THE STRUCTURAL UPGRADE MODIFICATIONS.

THE MODIFICATION AFFECTS ONLY LOADING OF NON-SAFETY RELATED BUS 15. SINCE THERE ZS NO CHANGE IN THE SAFETY-RELATED BUSES, THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE CONSEQUENCES OF A LOSS OF A.C. POWER.

THE RELOCATION OF AN EXISTING EXTERIOR SECURITY DOOR TO THE OUTSIDE OF THE NEW STRUCTURE. WILL MAINTAIN THE LEVEL OF PRESENT SECURITY FROM INTRUSION AT GINNA STATION. INTERIM MEASURES DURING CONSTRUCTION WILL BE ADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROLLED TO PREVENT POSSIBLE DEGRADATION OF SECURITY BARRIERS'9

I THUS ~ THIS MODIFZCATION NE ITHER NCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES /

NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR:

1) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING AND FOLLOWING SSE, FLOODING AND TORNADO EVENTS

2) FIRE"PROTECTION FEATURES

3) PLANT SECURITY BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE STRUCTURAL RE-ANAL-YSIS PLAN (SRP), ZT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFT OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES/ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVEN TION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4176 APPENDIX R DETECTION UPGRADE THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL INSTALL THREE (3) NEW FIRE DETECTION ZONES AND SUPERVISED BY THE FIRE SIGNALLING SYSTEM. THESE ZONES ARE:

Z-36 (SMOKE) INT. BLDG. SUB-BASEMENT FLOORS.

Z-37 (SMOKE) INT. BLDG. NORTH UPPER ELEVATZONS.

Z-38 (SMOKE) ZNT. BLDG. SOUTH ALL ELEVATIONS ~

INCLUDED IN THIS MODIFICATION IS THE MOUNTING OF EQUIPMENT, ROUTING AND MOUNTING OF CONDUIT, AND ALL WIRING ASSOCIATED WITH THE NEW ZONES AND MODIFICATIONS TO THE EXISTING FIRE SIGNALLING SYSTEM. THIS MODIFICATION ZS REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM, GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REVISION 2.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE SEISMIC AND FIRE.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS THEREFORE~ BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

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EWR-422 1 02/H2 ANALYZER REPLACEMENT THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE DIRECT REPLACEMENT OF THE EXISTING 02/H2 ANALYZER SYSTEM'HIS MODIFICATION WILL REPLACE THE INACCURATE AND UNRELIABLE EXISTING 02/H2 ANALYZER SYSTEM WITH A NEW RELIABLE AND ACCURATE SYSTEM.

REVISION 1 OF THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCORPORATES CHANGES FROM REVISION 0 TO CORRECT TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS AND SUMIG&Y DESCRIPTION OF MODIFICATION BACKGROUND INFORMATION.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRED BY USNRC REG. GUIDES 1.29, 1 60' 61'ND 1 70 'HE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES AND A SEISMIC EVENT.

ALL EXISTING AND NEW WIRING CABLE AND ELECTRI CAL COMPONENTS

~ g REQUIRED FOR THIS MODIFICATION COMPLIES WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX R.

THIS MODIFICATION HAS BEEN ANALYZED FOR SEISMIC EVENTS UNDER SECTION C.2 OF REG. GUIDE 1.29 'HE INSTALLATION WILL MAINTAIN STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY SUCH THAT SURROUNDING SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT WILL NOT BE AFFECTED.

THIS MODIFICATION NEITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES, NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR:

1) MAJOR OR MINOR FIRES

2) SEISMIC EVENT BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND USNC REG. GUIDE 1 ~ 29 AND 1.70, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMSJ AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

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EWR-4235 STATUS LIGHT MODIFICATION THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH CONSISTS OF INSTALLING A DROPPING RESISTOR IN EACH LIGHT ASSEMBLY IN THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD (MCB). INCLUDED WITH THIS MODIFICATION IS THE REPLACEMENT OF THE EXISTING 35 VOLT BULBS WITH 30 VOLT BULBS, AND NEW INDICATOR LIGHT LENS CAP. THIS MODIFICATION WILL PROVIDE GREATER LIGHT OUTPUT IN THE BRIGHT AND DIM MODE, THEREBY ELIMINATINGTHE PRESENT VISUAL CONTRAST BETWEEN BRIGHT AND DIM CONDITIONS. THESE STATUS LIGHTS IN SUEUECT, PROVIDE A VISUAL INDICATION OF SELECTED VALVE POSITIONS.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANAL'YSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICA-TION ARE LOSS OF DC OR AC CONTROL POWER/ NATURAL EVENTS'IRE, AND EARTHQUAKE.

BASED'PON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, ZT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS~ AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

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EWR-4269 C AND D STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP INTERLOCK THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION TO THE PUMP INTERLOCK.

PRESENTLY, THE ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM CONFIGURATION CONSISTS OF TWO MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARYFEEDWATER PUMPS (MDAFWPlA AND 1B) AND TWO STANDBY AUXILIARYPUMPS lA AND 1B SUPPLY CONDENSATE WATER TO A AND B STEAM GENERATORS RESPECTIVELY. IN THE EVENT THAT EITHER ONE OR BOTH OF THESE PUMPS ARE INOPERABLE THE STANDBY PUMPS MAY BE USED TO PROVIDE AN EMERGENCY SOURCE FOR COOLING. THE STANDBY PUMPS (C AND D) ARE ELECTRICALLY INTERLOCKED WITH PRIMARY PUMPS (A AND B). THE INTERLOCKS ARE INTENDED TO PREVENT THE SIMULTANEOUS OPERATION OF THE PRIMARY PUMPS AND STANDBY PUMPS. DURING NORMAL OPERATION THIS CONFIGURATION SATISFIES THIS DESIGN CRITERIA~ HOWEVERS WHEN PRIMARY BREAKERS ARE RACKED OUT INTO THE HELD POSITION (OR REMOVED), THE INTERLOCKS ARE ALSO REMOVED, MAKING THE STANDBY BREAKERS INOPERABLE.

THIS PROPOSED MODIFICATION WILL ELIMINATE THIS CONDITION BY INSTALLING CELL SWITCHES IN THE PRIMARY BREAKER COMPARTMENTS, WHICH WILL CHANGE STATE WHEN THE BREAKER IS RACKED IN OR OUT. THE CELL SWITCH CONTACTS WILL BE WIRED IN PARALLEL WITH THE EXISTING INTERLOCK CONTACTS AND WILL PERMIT THE PRIMARY BREAKERS TO BE REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE AND INSURE THAT THE STANDBY BREAKERS WILL BE OPERATIONAL.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY NRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATING TO THIS MODIFIC-ATION ARE:

A) LOSS OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FLOW B) NATURAL EVENTS/FIRE, EARTHQUAKE.

THE FIRST EVENT ANALYZED WILL BE THE LOSS OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TO THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION. THE ADDITION OF A CELL SWITCH WILL NOT EFFECT OPERABILITY OF THE MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS. THESE CELL SWITCHES SERVE AS PERMISSIVES TO THE STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS'HEREFORE IN THE EVENT OF A FAILURE ONLY THE STARTING OF THE STANDBY PUMPS ARE AFFECTED. MANUFACTURER INSTALLATION AND TESTING PROCEDURES WILL BE PERFORMED AND A PERIODIC TESTING PROGRAM WILL BE INITIATED TO ASSURE PROPER OPERATION OF CELL SWITCHES, THEREBY REDUCING THE PROBABILITY OF FAILURE TO START STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS TO AN ACCEPTABLY LOW LEVEL. THEREFORE THIS MODIFICATION WILL HAVE A NEGLIGIBLE IMPACT UPON OPERABILITY OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM.

THE SECOND EVENT ANALYZED WILL BE THE EFFECT OF A SEISMIC EVENT ON THE PLANT DUE TO THIS MODIFICATION. THE CELL SWITCHES HAVE BEEN QUALIFIED BY THE MANUFACTURER, THEREFORE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILURE DUE TO A SEISMIC EVENT ARE MITIGATED.

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THE THIRD EVENT ANALYZED WXLL BE THE EFFECT OF A FIRE ON THE PLANT DUE TO THIS MODIFICATION. THE CONTROL WIRING USED FOR THIS MODIFICATION IS REQUIRED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF ZEEE STD. 383-1984 FLAME TEST. THUS THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE ZN THE FIRE LOADING DUE TO THIS MODIFICATION.

AN APPENDIX R CONFORMANCE VERIFICATION WILL BE PERFORMED TO ENSURE THAT THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION DOES NOT ADVERSELY IMPACT EXISTING APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE METHODS.

THEREFORE J BASED DETERMINED THAT:

UPON THE ABOVE I ANALYS S g IT HAS BEEN A) THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED 'AND B) THE STRUCTURES / SYSTEMS g AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR'HE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE ADEQUATE.

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT ARE NOT INCREASED.

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A TYPE DIFFERENT FROM ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS HAS NOT BEEN CREATED.

THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IS NOT REDUCED.

THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

1 EWR-428 1 STEAM GENERATOR MANWAY STUD TENSIONER THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION COVERING THE INSTALLATION OF STEAM GENERATOR PRIMARY MANWAY STUDS AND NUTS'N THE PAST THE PRIMARY MANWAY COVERS HAVE BEEN ATTACHED WITH BOLTS WHICH ARE TORQUED TO OBTAIN THE PROPER GASKET SEATING. THIS IS A TIME CONSUMING AND DIFFICULT TASK SINCE ZT MUST BE DONE IN A HIGH RADIATION AREA. THIS MODIFICATION CONSISTS OF REPLACING THE EXISTING BOLTS AND NUTS. INSTEAD OF TORQUING THE NUTS TO INDUCE THE REQUIRED AXIAL LOADS~ DIRECT HYDRAULIC LOADS ARE USED TO STRETCH THE STUDS.

REVISION 0 OF THE DESIGN CRXTERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WAS PRESENTED AND APPROVED BY PORC ON NOVEMBER 5~ 1986'ORC NUMBER 6.1'.0-86-125-001.

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THE PURPOSE OF REVISION 1 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS IS TO REVISE PARAGRAPHS 2.6.1 AND 2.6 ' TO INCLUDE NEW EGE(G DRAWING TITLES.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN-THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICA-TION ARE SEISMIC EVENTS'ECREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM INVENTORY AND FIRES.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.0D OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS THEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4282 CV RECZRC FAN CONDENSATE COLLECTOR LEVELS THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION OF THE CV RECIRC FAN CONDENSATE COLLECTOR LEVELS'HIS MODIFICATION IS FOR REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING OBSOLETE PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS, SIGNAL PROCESSORS AND MAIN CONTROL BOARD INDICATORS WITH INSTRUMENTS CAPABLE OF ACCURATELY MONITORING WATER LEAKAGE WITHIN CONTAINMENT. THE EXISTING TRANSMITTERS~ POWER SUPPLIES'ISTABLES AND INDICATORS WILL BE REPLACED TO PROVIDE MORE ACCURATE AND RELIABLE CONDENSATE LEVEL INDICATION. THE SCALES IN THE EXISTING LEVEL INDICATOR SHALL BE PLACED IN THE NEW LEVEL INDICATORS WITH NO CHANGE ZN THE APPEARANCE ON THE MCB. NEW REFERENCE LEG TUBING FROM THE TRANSMITTERS TO THE CONDENSATE COLLECTION STANDPIPES WILL BE INSTALLED.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG.

GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE (1)

MAZOR AND MINOR FIRES'2) A SEISMIC EVENTS (3) PIPE BREAKS INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING.

NEW WIRING AND CABLE MAY BE REQUIRED FOR THIS MODIFICATION WHICH COULD ADD TO THE FIRE LOADING OF THE PLANT ~ THEREFORE'HE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT ALL SUCH CABLE MEET THE IEEE-383-1974 FLAME TEST REQUIREMENTS. BECAUSE OF THIS THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OF FIRE LOADING CAUSED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

AN APPENDIX R CONFORMANCE REVIEW SHALL BE PREPARED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS IS MAINTAINED.

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THIS MODIFICATION WILL BE REVIEWED TO ENSURE THAT FAILURE OF ANY ELECTRICAL CABLE INSTALLED AS A PART OF THIS MODIFIC-ATION WILL NOT RESULT IN THE DISABLING OF VITAL EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO SAFELY SHUT DOWN THE PLANT DURING POSTULATED FIRES.

THE PRESSURE BOUNDARY PORTIONS OF THE CONDENSATE COLLECTOR LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION ARE NOT DESIGNATED SEISMIC CATEGORY I.

HOWEVERS ANY MODIFICATION TO THIS SYSTEM WHOSE FAILURE COULD CAUSE DAMAGE TO SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT WILL BE DESIGNED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.29, POSITION C.2.

THE NEW TRANSMITTERS WILL INTERFACE WITH THE EXISTING CONDENSATE COLLECTOR STANDPIPES IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE EXISTING TRANSMITTERS WITH THE ADDITION OF THE REFERENCE LEG TUBING PENETRATION. THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT INTRODUCE ANY NEW FAILURE MODES CONCERNING PIPE BREAKS INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING.

THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT RESULT IN A CHANGE TO THE COMMIT-MENTS MADE IN THE UFSAR~ SECTIONS 3 ~ 6 ~ 1 ~ 3 ~ 2 13 AND 5 ' 11 1 2 ~

THESE COMMITMENTS STATE THAT CONDENSATE FLOWS FROM APPROXIMATELY 1 GPM TO 30 GPM ARE TO BE MEASURED BY THE CONDENSATE MEASURING SYSTEM, USFAR SECTION 5.2.5.4 '

DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT A HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW OF

'HE THIS MODIFICATION BE PERFORMED PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF DESIGN OUTPUTS'O MINIMIZE THE PROBABILITY OF OPERATOR ERROR THE ITEMS ABOVE ENSURE THAT THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT DEGRADE THE CAPABILITY OF ANY SAFETY SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS FUNCTION. THE ASSUMPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF EXISTING ANALYSES ARE UNCHANGED. NO NEW TYPES OF EVENTS ARE POSTULATED.

THEREFORE, THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF 10CFR50.59 THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT PRESENT AN UNREVZEWED SAFETY QUESTION FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

1. THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE, OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS WILL NOT BE INCREASED.

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THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT AFFECT THE PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. THIS MODIFICATION WILL COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.29 POSITION C.2 TO INSURE ANY FAILURE WILL NOT AFFECT SEISMIC CATEGORY I EQUIPMENT.

AN APPENDIX R CONFORMANCE REVIEW WILL INSURE CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS.

2. THE POSSIBILITY FOR AN ACCXDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS IS NOT CREATED.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT ADD TO g OR MODIFYg ANY EQUIPMENT I I IMPORTANT TO SAFETY g OR EQU PMENT WHOSE FAILURE S ADDRESSED XN THE FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT.

3. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IS NOT REDUCED.

I AS STATED ABOVE g THIS MODIF CATION DOES NOT AFFECT EQUI PMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. THE EFFECT OF THIS MODIFICATION WILL BE TO INCREASE THE RELIABILITY OF ONE OF THE DIVERSE MEANS AVAILABLEFOR OPERATORS TO DETECT LEAKAGE INSIDE CONTAXNMENT.

EWR-4324 STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION ON STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO CONVERT THE STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM TO A FLASH TANK BASED PROCESS.

THE PRIMARY GOAL ZS TO IMPROVE RELIABZLXTY BY MOVING THE INHERENT TEMPERATURE CHANGES TO THE TANK AND PIPING. NEW PIPING INSTALLED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS CONVERSION SHALL BE RESIZED TO REDUCE THE EROSION-CORROSION POTENTIAL.

REVISION 3 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCORPORATE CHANGES TO REVISION 2 AS A RESULT OF THE COMMENTS FROM THE REVIEW OF REVISION 2 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS. THE CHANGES ARE OPERATIONAL CONCERNS AND CLARIFICATION.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN PERFORMED OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE AN INCREASE OR DECREASE IN SECONDARY SYSTEM HEAT REMOVAL.

AN INCREASE IN SECONDARY SYSTEM HEAT REMOVAL WOULD OCCUR IF A BLOWDOWN LINE RUPTURED. THIS EVENT IS ENVELOPED IN THE UFSAR BY EXAMINING THE INCREASE IN FEEDWATER FLOW EVENT AND THE SPECTRUM OF STEAM SYSTEM PIPING FAILURES. BOTH ANALYZED EVENTS ARE FAR MORE SEVER THAN A BLOWDOWN LINE RUPTURE.

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A DECREASE IN SECONDARY SYSTEM HEAT REMOVAL WOULD OCCUR IF BLOWDOWN WERE SUDDENLY ISOLATED. THIS EVENT IS SIMILAR TO A TURBINE TRIP. THE UFSAR DEFINES LOSSES TO 50% AT FULL POWER TO BE WITHIN NORMAL PLANT DESIGN. SINCE THE DESIGN CRITERIA LIMITS BLOWDOWN CAPACITY TO 7% AT FULL POWER; THEREFORE, THE SUDDEN BLOWDOWN ISOLATION EVENT ANALYSIS IS NOT CONSIDERED.

THIS MODIFICATION IS NON-SEISMIC SINCE IT DOES NOT EFFECT THE SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE REACTOR.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT INCREASE THE FIRE LOADING IN FIRE AREAS CONTAINING SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT OR DEGRADE EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION BECAUSE OF REQUIREMENT IN SECTION 27.0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA. ANALYSIS NECESSARY TO ASSURE CONTINUAL COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50, APPENDIX R HAS BEEN REQUIRED.

THEREFORE, THE PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF A FIRE AFFECTING COLD SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT ARE UNCHANGED.

HIGH ENERGY LINE PIPE BREAKS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY REQUIRING THAT ALL EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT WILL BE PROTECTED CONSISTENT WITH REFERENCE 2.2.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GINNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. ZT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4350 MFW AND FW BYPASS VALVE INDICATION THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION TO INSTALL VALVE POSITION SENSORS FOR THE MAIN FEEDWATER AND FEEDWATER BYPASS VALVES (V4269i V4270i V4271i AND V4272) AND ASSOCIATED POSITION INDICATION DISPLAYED ON THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD.

THIS EWR WAS ISSUED AS A RESULT OF HUMAN ENGINEERING DIS-CREPANCY HED-65 WHICH CITED A NEED FOR ACTUAL VALVE POSITION INDICATION ON THE MCB RATHER THAN THE CONTROLLER DEMAND SIGNAL INDICATION.

DUE TO PRE-PORC COMMENTS, REVISION 0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS, WERE NOT PRESENTED TO PORC.

THE PURPOSE OF REVISION 1 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS IS TO INCLUDE COMMENTS AS A RESULT OF PRE-PORC OF REVISION 0 ~

38

i A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICA-TION ARE:

1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES

2) SEISMIC EVENT

3) INCREASE IN HEAT REMOVAL BY THE SECONDARY SYSTEM

4) DECREASE IN HEAT REMOVAL BY THE SECONDARY SYSTEM NEW WIRING AND CABLE WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THIS MODIFICATION~

I I I WH CH COULD ADD TO THE F RE LOAD NG OF THE PLANT THEREFORE ~

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT ALL SUCH CABLE MEET THE IEEE 383-1974 FLAME TEST REQUIREMENTS. BECAUSE OF THIS, THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN FIRE LOADING CAUSED BY THIS MODXFICATXON.

REVIEWS AND/OR ANALYSES TO ASSURE CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH APPENDIX R HAVE BEEN REQUIRED. SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY FOLLOWING ALL POSTULATED FIRES~ THEREFORE'ILL NOT BE JEOPARDIZED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT NEW INDICATORS INSTALLED PER THIS MODIFICATION BE MOUNTED SO AS NOT TO DEGRADE THE INTEGRITY OF THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD (MCB). THEREFORE, THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT AFFECT THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD,'S SEISMIC QUALIFICATION.

THE ADDITION OF LDT'S TO THE STEM OF THE MAIN FEEDWATER AND FEEDWATER BYPASS VALVES WILL NOT DEGRADE THE VALVE'S ABILITY TO PERFORM ITS INTENDED FUNCTION. SINCE THESE VALVES ARE NOT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURXNG A SEISMIC EVENT, THE ABILITY TO FUNCTION DURING A SEISMIC EVENT HAS NOT BEEN DEGRADED.

THE ADDITION OF MFW AND FW BYPASS VALVE INDICATION WILL AID THE OPERATOR ZN MONITORING ANY INCREASE OR DECREASE IN HEAT REMOVAL BY THE SECONDARY SYSTEM AND SHALL NOT AFFECT THE VALVES OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS.

ZT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

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EWR-4503 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER SUPPLEMENTAL UNZNTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE INSTALLATION OF A SECOND UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (UPS) FOR THE T.S.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM. ALSO EXISTING ELECTRICAL LOADS WILL BE RE-DISTRIBUTED IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE EVEN BUS LOADING.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDES 1.29 AND 1.70. EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICA-TION ARE MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES AND A SEISMIC EVENT.

MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY THE DESIGN CRITERIA WILL NOT DEGRADE FUNCTIONS OR PERFORMANCE OF ANY STRUCTURES~ SYSTEMS'R COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR THE PREVENTION AND MITIGATION OF ACCIDENTS OR ANY OTHER NON SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES~ SYSTEMS'R COMPONENTS.

THIS MODIFICATION AND THE MATERIALS UTILIZED WILL MEET APPENDIX R 10CFR50 CRITERIA. EVEN THOUGH THIS MODIFICATION INVOLVES EQUIPMENT WHICH IS NOT IDENTXFIED AS SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT.

NEW EQUIPMENT WILL NOT BE LOCATED IN ANY AREA THAT CONTAINS SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT THEREFORE, THIS MODIFICATION IS DESIGNATED NON-SEISMIC.

-

MODIFICATION WILL NOT DEGRADE PERFORMANCE OR FUNCTION OF ANY PLANT EQUIPMENT OR SYSTEM.

BASED UPON THE ABOVE ANALYSIS:

1) STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE ADEQUATE.

2) MARGIN OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL 'OPERATING AND TRANSIENT CONDITXONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GINNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS'T HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS/ AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

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i EWR-4554 4A AND 4B FEEDWATER HEATERS REPLACEMENT THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE REPLACEMENT OF 4A AND 4B HEATERS.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO SPECIFY, PROCURE, AND INSTALL NEW FEEDWATER HEATERS AT THE FOURTH EXTRACTION POINT.

THE PRIMARY GOAL IS TO ELIMINATE THE COPPER ALLOY TUBES.

STAINLESS STEEL TUBES ARE RECOMMENDED.

REVISION 1 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCORPORATES CHANGES RESULTING FROM PRE-PORC COMMENTS OF REVISION 0 TO:

1) CLARIFY THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 75 PSI TUBE SIDE PRESSURE DROP

2) ADD ADDITIONAL INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS IN DESIGN CRITERIA

3) CLARIFY REFERENCES AND TEST REQUIREMENTS

4) ADD ASME CODE

5) ADD ACCESSIBILITY I MAINTENANCE'I REPAIR I AND INSERVICE INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS IN DESIGN CRITERIA A REVIEW HAS BEEN PERFORMED OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE A DECREASE IN FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE, AND A LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLOW.

THE DECREASE IN FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE EVENT IS ANALYZED IN THE UFSAR AS AN ACCIDENTAL OPENING OF THE CONDENSATE BYPASS VALVE, WHICH RESULTED IN A SUDDEN REDUCTION ZN INLET FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE TO THE STEAM GENERATORS.

THE MODIFICATION HAS NO BEARING ON CONDENSATE BYPASS VALVE OPERATION OR PLANT RESPONSE TO THIS EVENT. A REDUCTION IN FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE WHICH RESULTED FROM A LOSS OF ONE FEEDWATER HEATER HAS BEEN ANALYZED IN UFSAR. THE ANALYSIS SHOWED THAT FOR A FEEDWATER ENTHALPY DECREASE CORRESPONDING TO THE LOSS OF ONE FEEDWATER HEATER AT FULL POWER MINIMUM DNBR DOES NOT FALL BELOW THE LXMIT VALUE. AT ZERO POWER THE RESULTS ARE LESS LIMITING THAN THOSE PRESENTED ZN, UFSAR SECTION 15.4.1, UNCONTROLLED ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY WITHDRAWAL FROM A SUBCRITICAL CONDITION.

THE LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLOW IS ANALYZED IN THE UFSAR AS A DISRUPTION OF SECONDARY SYSTEM HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY.

41

THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF THE DISRUPTION AS A RESULT OF CONDENSATE LINE BREAKS SINCE THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES PROPER INSPECTION AND TESTING OF NEW WELDS. THE PROBABILITY OF A LOSS OF FEEDWATER THROUGH DEGRADATZON OF HEATER TUBES IS REDUCED BY REMOVING THE EXISTING ERODED COPPER TUBING.

THIS MODXFICATZON IS NON-SEISMIC SINCE IT DOES NOT EFFECT THE SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE REACTOR.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT INCREASE THE FIRE LOADING IN FIRE AREAS CONTAINING SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT OR DEGRADE EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION BECAUSE OF REQUIREMENTS ZN SECTION 27.0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GINNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ZT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF'" STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4638 GENERATOR 1 SURGE CAPACXTORS AND NEUTRAL TRANSFORMER REPLACEMENT THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE REPLACEMENT OF THE NEUTRAL TRANSFORMER AND SURGE CAPACITORS CONTAINING PCBs. THESE COMPONENTS WILL BE REPLACED WITH SIMILAR COMPONENTS NOT CONTAINING PCBs.

REVISION 2 TO THIS DESIGN CRXTERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCORPORATES CHANGE FROM REVISION 1 TO SPECIFY INSTALLATION TESTS TO BE PERFORMED ON THE COMPONENTS. REVISION 1 DID NOT SPECIFY THE TEST TO BE PERFORMED.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL THE EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES'OXIC GAS RELEASES'ND LOSS OF ELECTRICAL LOAD.

NO NEW WIRING OR CABLE IS REQUIRED FOR THIS MODIFICATION.

THEREFORE, THERE WILL BE NO INCREASE OF FIRE LOADING DUE TO THIS MODIFICATION.

REVIEWS AND/OR ANALYSES TO ASSURE CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH APPENDIX R HAVE BEEN REQUIRED. SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY FOLLOWING ALL POSTULATED FIRES'HEREFORE'ILL NOT BE JEOPARDIZED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION.

THEREFORE, THE POTENTIAL FOR A LOSS OF ELECTRICAL LOAD EVENT CAUSED BY CAPACITOR FAILURE WILL NOT BE INCREASED.

42

THEREFORE, THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED'HE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS/

AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE INCREASED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS WILL NOT BE CREATED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.

THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILL NOT BE REDUCED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICA-TION.

THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION OR REQUIRE A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE.

EWR-4651 CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLE CABLES THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSING THE MODIFICATION OF THE CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLE CABLES TO PROVIDE FOR ALARA AND PERSONNEL SAFETY CONCERNS.

EWR 4 65 1 ~ CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLE ( CET) CABLES g REQUESTS THE PURCHASE AND INSTALLATION OF EXTENSION CABLES AT THE BOUNDARY OF THE REACTOR HEAD AND REACTOR CAVITY BRIDGE CABLE TRAYS AT GINNA STATION FOR THE 1988 REFUELING OUTAGE. QUICK CONNECTORS INSTALLED ON THE CET CABLES AT THIS LOCATION ARE DETACHED EACH YEAR FOR REFUELING TO PERMIT LIFTING THE REACTOR HEAD FROM THE REFUELING CAVITY'HE CABLES INSTALLED ZN 1983'HICH RUN FROM THE BRIDGE CABLE TRAY DOWN TO THE THERMOCOUPLES, FALL APPROXIMATELY SIX FEET SHORT OF THE BRIDGE CABLE TRAY. AS A RESULT, THE CET QUICK CONNECTORS HANG SEVERAL FEET BELOW THE BRIDGE CABLE TRAY AND POSE ACCESSIBILITY'LARAg AND SAFETY CONCERNS. THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS EWR ZS TO PLACE THE CET QUICK CONNECTORS FOR REFUELING INTO THE BRIDGE CABLE TRAY WHERE THEY CAN BE ACCESSED CONVENIENTLY AND SAFELY.

REVISION 2 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCOR-PORATES CHANGES FROM REVISION 1 TO CORRECT THE POST INSTALL-ATION TESTING REQUIREMENTS FOR SYSTEM VERIFICATION.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL,EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GZNNA STATION UFSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. G-UIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE (1)

MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES~ (2) A SEISMIC EVENT~ (3) A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA).

43

NEW CET EXTENSION CABLE ASSEMBLIES WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THIS MODIFICATION WHICH COULD ADD TO THE FIRE LOADING OF THE PLANT. THEREFORE, THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT ALL SUCH CABLE ASSEMBLIES MEET THE IEEE-383-1974 FLASK TEST REQUIREMENTS. BECAUSE OF THIS THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OF FIRE LOADING CAUSED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

THIS MODIFICATION HAS BEEN REVIEWED TO ENSURE THAT FAILURE OF ANY ELECTRICAL CABLE INSTALLED AS A PART OF THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT RESULT IN THE, DISABLING OF VITAL EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO SAFELY SHUT DOWN THE PLANT DURING POSTULATED FIRES.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT NEW CET EXTENSION CABLE ASSEMBLIES INSTALLED UNDER THIS MODIFICATION BE QUALIFIED PER IEEE 344 1975'HEREFORE'HIS MODIFICATION WILL REMAIN FUNCTIONAL DURING AND AFTER A SEISMIC EVENT.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT THE NEW CET EXTENSION CABLE ASSEMBLIES INSTALLED UNDER THIS EWR BE QUALIFIED PER IEEE 323 1974 AND IEEE 383 1974 FOR FLAME AND LOCAL THEREFOREJ THIS MODIFICATION SHALL REMAIN FUNCTIONAL DURING AND AFTER A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT.

THEREFORE, THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED'HE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

EWR-4653 STEAM GENERATOR WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATION THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST ADDRESSES THE ADDITION OF STEAM GENERATOR WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATION ON THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD.

THIS -

MODIFICATION WILL INSTALL TWO NEW VERTICAL SCALE INDICATORS TO DISPLAY STEAM GENERATOR WIDE RANGE WATER LEVEL ON THE MCB. THE EXISTING CHART RECORDER LR-460 WILL BE RETAINED FOR RECORD KEEPING AND TO SERVE AS A BACKUP LEVEL INDICATOR. THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT ALTER THE AVAILABILITY OF THE EXISTING CHART RECORDERS.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GZNNA STATION UFSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG.

GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE (1)

MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES AND (2) A SEISMIC EVENT.

NEW WIRING AND CABLE MAY BE REQUIRED FOR THE MODIFICATION WHICH COULD ADD TO THE FIRE LOADING OF THE PLANT, THEREFORE THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT ALL SUCH CABLE MEET THE ZEEE-383-1974 FLAME TEST REQUIREMENTS. BECAUSE OF THIS, THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OF FIRE LOADING CAUSED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

44

AN APPENDIX R CONFORMANCE REVIEW SHALL BE PREPARED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS IS MAINTAINED.

THIS MODIFICATION HAS BEEN REVIEWED TO ENSURE THAT FAILURE OF ANY ELECTRICAL CABLE INSTALLED AS PART OF THIS MODIFICATION

'ILL NOT RESULT IN THE DISABLING OF VITAL EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO SAFELY SHUTDOWN THE PLANT DURING POSTULATED FIRES.

THE STEAM GENERATOR (SG) WIDE RANGE WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENT-ATION IS DESIGNATED SEISMIC CATEGORY 1. THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES ALL NEW SG WIDE RANGE LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION BE QUALIFIED AND INSTALLED PER IEEE-344-1975. THEREFORE, A SEISMIC EVENT WILL NOT IMPAIR THE PROPER OPERATION OF THE SG WIDE RANGE WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES A HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW OF THIS MODIFICATION BE PERFORMED PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF DESIGN OUTPUTS'O MINIMIZE THE PROBABILITY OF OPERATOR ERROR THE ITEMS ABOVE ENSURE THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT DEGRADE THE CAPABILITY OF ANY SAFETY SYSTEM TO PERFORM ZTS FUNCTION.

THE ASSUMPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF EXISTING ANALYSES ARE UNCHANGED. NO NEW TYPES OF EVENTS ARE POSTULATED.

THE ACCURACY AND READABILITY OF THE NEW INDICATORS ARE AS GOOD OR BETTER THAN THE EXISTING RECORDER. THEREFORE, THE INDICATION UNCERTAINTY IS AS GOOD OR BETTER THAN THE EXISTING SYSTEM.

THEREFORE, THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF 10CFR50.59, THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION BECAUSE:

1) THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT IS NOT INCREASED.

THE INDICATORS ADDED TO THE MCB DO NOT PROVIDE ANY AUTOMATIC CONTROL FUNCTION. THEY ARE REDUNDANT TO THE EXISTING CHART RECORDERS,. BUT PROVIDE A MORE READABLE INDICATION TO THE OPERATOR. THESE INDICATORS ARE SEISMIC CLASS 1E AND WILL NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF FAILURE OF THE MCB OR ADJACENT INDICATORS DUE TO A SEISMIC EVENT. AN APPENDIX R CONFORMANCE REVIEW WILL DEMONSTRATE CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS.

45

2) THE POSSIBILITY FOR AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS IS NOT CREATED.

AS DISCUSSED ABOVE g THESE INDICATORS ARE IN ADDITION TO THE EXISTING CHART RECORDERS AND ARE CLASSIFIED 1E.

THIS ADDITION TO THE MCB WILL NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A FAILURE NOT PREVIOUSLY ANALYZED.

3) THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IS NOT REDUCED.

THE ADDED INDICATORS PROVIDE A MORE CLEAR INDICATION AND INCREASE THE ABILITY OF THE OPERATOR TO MONITOR WIDE RANGE LEVEL. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY ZS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4656 LOWER INTERNALS STORAGE STAND MODIFICATIONS PHASE II THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATIONS TO THE REACTOR VESSEL LOWER INTERNALS STORAGE STAND.

THIS MODIFICATION INVOLVES AN ADDITIONAL MODIFICATION TO THE LOWER INTERNALS STORAGE STAND SUBSEQUENT TO THE CHANGES DESCRIBED IN THE ORIGINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS.

A. THIS MODIFICATION MOVES THE EASTERN SUPPORT COLUMN 1/2 INCH OUTWARD (AWAY FORM THE CENTER OF THE SUPPORT STAND) ZN ORDER TO PROVIDE MORE CLEARANCE FOR THE LOWER INTERNALS. THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED BY ADDING ONE ADDITIONAL HALF-INCH THICK SPACER PLATE ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH SUPPORT COLUMNS. THE SPACER PLATES WILL BE BETWEEN THE SUPPORT COLUMNS AND THE UPPER AND LOWER CONNECTION SUPPORT RINGS.

THIS ANALYSIS REVIEWS UNDER WHAT PLANT OPERATING CONDITION THE LOWER INTERNALS STORAGE HARDWARE WILL BE ZN USE'ND DETER-MINES WHAT DESIGN BASIS EVENTS ARE RELATED TO THE USE OF THE MODIFIED HARDWARE.

THE FOLLOWING DESIGN BASIS EVENTS ARE RELATED TO THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION: SEISMIC EVENTS AND FIRES.

THE LOWER INTERNALS STORAGE STAND MAY BE LEFT IN POSITION ON THE LOWER LEVEL OF THE REACTOR CAVITY. THE LOCATION OF THE LOWER INTERNALS STORAGE STAND IS NOT ADJACENT TO ANY SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM OR COMPONENT. THE LOWER INTERNALS STORAGE STAND S LOW CENTER OF GRAVITY'IDE BASE COMBINED WITH THE COEFFICIENT OF FRICTION ARE SUFFICIENT TO ENSURE THAT THE STAND WILL REMAIN IN PLACE DURING BOTH THE OPERATING BASIS AND SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKES.

46

THE MATERIALS TO BE USED XN THIS PROPOSED MODIFICATION IS STAINLESS STEEL WHICH IS NON-COMBUSTIBLE. XT WILL NOT CHANGE THE FREQUENCY OR RESULTS OF ANY FIRE THAT IS POSTULATED.

BASED ON THE FOREGOING, THE MODIFICATIONS WILL CAUSE NO CHANGES TO THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION.

II I THE MOD F CAT ONS WZ LL NOT CHANGE THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES ~

SYSTEMS g OR COMPONENTS PROVI DED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS.

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUA'TED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT ARE NOT CHANGED.

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS HAS NOT BEEN CREATED.

THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE A CHANGE TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

EWR-4670 M -483 INVERTER REPLACEMENT THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE REPLACEMENT OF THE EXISTING MQ-483 INVERTER WITH A NEW QUALIFIED ONE.

REVISION 2 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA STATES THE SOLID STATE CONTROLS, ZNC. (SCI) ZNVERTER IS PART NO. EV 12004/5 AS OPPOSED TO PART 12004 AS WELL AS QUALIFYING IEEE 383-1974 AS THE STANDARD USED FOR BOTH THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA FSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY THE USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE:

1) SEISMIC EVENT

2) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES

3) INCREASE/DECREASE ZN HEAT REMOVAL BY THE SECONDARY SYSTEM

4) PIPE BREAKS INSIDE CONTAINMENT SECTION 3.0 AND 9.0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRE THAT THE NEW MQ-483 XNVERTER BE SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED TO GINNA SPECIFIC SEISMIC RESPONSE SPECTRA.

ZN ADDITION, IT ZS REQUIRED THAT THE INVERTER BE MOUNTED TO PREVENT SEISMIC FAILURE.

47

THIS MODIFICATION INVOLVES THE REPLACEMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND MAY INVOLVE THE INSTALLATION OF CABLE IN THE RELAY ROOM FIRE AREA. IF NEW CABLE ZS TO BE INSTALLED, A REVIEW WILL BE PERFORMED TO ASSURE CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50i APPENDIX R.

WIRING AND EQUIPMENT WILL BE INSTALLED IN COMPLIANCE WITH EE-29.

ALL NEW CABLINGi IF REQUIRED i WILL BE QUALIFIED TO ZEEE 3 83 1984 FLAME TEST REQUIREMENTS.

FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS WILL BE REPAIRED AND REPLACED ZN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING PLANT PROCEDURES, NOT DEGRADING EXISTING SEALS.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT AFFECT THE SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS IN THE APPENDIX R SUBMITTAL FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A) THE MODIFICATION INVOLVES EQUIPMENT WHICH IS NOT IDENTIFIED AS SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT IN TABLE 3-1 OF THE APPENDIX R SUBMITTAL.

B) THERE ZS NO EFFECT ON SEPARATION OF EXISTING CIRCUITS, ASSOCIATED CZRCUITSi OR FIRE AREA BOUNDARIES AS ANALYZED IN THE APPENDIX R SUBMITTAL.

THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT EFFECT THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM. THERE SHALL BE NO EFFECT ON EXISTING PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING AN ALTERNATE SAFE SHUTDOWNi THEREBY COMPLYING WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX R.

INSTRUMENT LOOP P479 MONITORS STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT MODIFY THE INSTRUMENT LOOP.

SINCE THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT THE REPLACEMENT ZNVERTER ADDS NO NEW FAILURE MODES BEYOND THOSE OF THE EXISTING INVERTERi THE INTEGRITY OF LOOP P479 WILL BE UNAFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION. THEREFORE, NO NEW INSTRUMENT ERRORS OR FAILURES WILL BE INTRODUCED THAT COULD LEAD TO AN INCREASE OR DECREASE IN SECONDARY SYSTEM HEAT REMOVAL.

INSTRUMENT LOOP P950 MONITORS CONTAINMENT PRESSURE. THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT MODIFY THE INSTRUMENT LOOP. SINCE THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT THE REPLACEMENT INVERTER ADDS NO NEW FAILURE MODES BEYOND THOSE OF THE EXISTING INVERTER, THE INTEGRITY OF LOOP P950 WILL BE UNAFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION THEREFOREi NO NEW INSTRUMENT ERRORS OR FAILURES WILL BE INTRODUCED THAT COULD LEAD TO A FALSE INDICATION OF CONTAINMENT PRESSURE DURING A PIPE BREAK.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT DEGRADE THE CAPABILITY OF ANY SAFETY SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS FUNCTION. THE ASSUMPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF EXISTING ANALYSES ARE UNCHANGED. NO NEW TYPES OF EVENTS ARE POSTULATED.

48

/

'

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GXNNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

EWR-4750 CONTAINMENT FANS 1B 1D DAMPER SOLENOID ISOLATION FUSES THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE ADDITION OF ISOLATION FUSES TO THE LOOP ENTRY DAMPER SOLENOID VALVE CIRCUITS FOR CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION FANS 1B AND 1D.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1) SEISMIC EVENT

2) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES

3) PIPE BREAKS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

4) BREAK IN RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY LINES THAT PENETRATE CONTAINMENT THE NEW FUSE BLOCKS WILL BE SEISMICALLY MOUNTED AND THEREFORE WILL ENSURE A SEISMIC EVENT WILL NOT DEGRADE THE INTEGRITY OF BUS 16 UNIT 13C OR BUS 14 UNIT 2C ENCLOSURES IN WHICH THE FUSES ARE MOUNTED.

THE MODIFICATION ZS DESIGNED TO COMPLY WITH 10CFR APPENDIX R CRITERIA AND ENGINEERING PROCEDURES. THEREFORE, THE PROBABILITY OF A MAJOR OR MINOR FIRE WILL NOT BE INCREASED.

THE FOLLOWING DESIGN BASIS EVENTS (DBE) WILL NOT AFFECT OR BE AFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION. ANY DBE THAT CAUSES A LEAD-TO-LEAD SHORT ZN THE DAMPER SOLENOID VALVE CIRCUIT WILL CAUSE THE DAMPER SOLENOID VALVE CIRCUIT FUSES TO FAIL. FUSE COORDINATION ASSURES THAT THESE FUSES WILL FAIL BEFORE THE MAIN FAN CONTROL FUSES. THEREFORE, LOSS OF FANS 1B AND 1Dg DURING ANY DBE DUE TO A LEAD-TO-LEAD SHORT IN THE DAMPER SOLENOID VALVE CIRCUIT, WILL NOT OCCUR.

BASED UPON THE ABOVE ANALYSIS:

1) STRUCTURES g SYSTEMS g AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS . AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE ADEQUATE.

2) MARGIN OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATING AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED.

49

0 BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GZNNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS'T HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. ZT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES/ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4754 CABLE RELOCATIONS THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE UPGRADING OF SEVERAL CIRCUIT SPLICES IN THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING AND RELOCATION OF CABLES ABOVE THE CONTAINMENT FLOOD LEVEL.

REVISION g2 ADDS A FIRE PROTECTION REQUIREMENT. CABLES AND SPLICES SHALL MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF IEEE 383-1974.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY THE USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE:

1) SEISMIC EVENT

2) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES

3) 'PIPE BREAKS'NSIDE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT ANY NEW OR RELOCATE CONDUIT BE MOUNTED TO PREVENT SEISMIC FAILURES CABLE SHALL REMAIN FUNCTIONAL AFTER A SEISMIC EVENT.

THEREFORE'NSTALLED THIS MODIFICATION INVOLVES THE ADDITION OF NEW CABLE AND SPLICES IN CONTAINMENT AND IN THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT ALL NEW CABLE AND SPLICES BE QUALIFIED TO IEEE-383-1974 FLAME AND LOCA REQUIREMENTS.

FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS WILL BE REPAIRED AND REPLACED ZN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING PLANT PROCEDURES. THEREFORE, EXISTING SEALS WILL NOT BE DEGRADED.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT AFFECT THE SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS IN THE APPENDIX R SUBMITTAL SINCE THERE IS NO AFFECT ON SEPARATION OF EXISTING CIRCUITS~ ASSOCIATED 'CIRCUITS'R FIRE AREA BOUNDARIES AS ANALYZED IN THE APPENDIX R SUBMITTAL.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT AN APPENDIX R CONFORMANCE VERIFICATION BE PERFORMED.

THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT AFFECT THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM. FURTHERMORE, NONE OF THE EXISTING PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING AN ALTERNATIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN WILL BE EFFECTED'HIS MODIFICATIONS WITH 10CFR50, APPENDIX R.

THEREFORE'OMPLZES 50

0 THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT NEW CABLE AND SPLICES, INSTALLED AS PART OF THE CABLE RELOCATIONS, SHALL NOT AFFECT INSTRUMENT LOOP INTEGRITY. THEREFORE, NO NEW FAILURE MODES SHALL BE INTRODUCED INTO THE INSTRUMENT LOOPS.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA COLLECTIVELY REQUIRES ALL CABLES TO BE RELOCATED, TO UTILIZE MATERIAL AND CONFIGURATIONS APPROVED UNDER 10CFR50.49; AND CALIBRATION OF EACH LOOP TO ENSURE THAT LOOP FUNCTION IS NOT AFFECTED; THAT LOOP ACCURACY BE ADDRESSED'ND VERIFIED AS ACCEPTABLE'N THE SYSTEM IN TEGRATED PACKAGES'HEREFORE~ LOOP ACCURACY SHALL NOT BE DEGRADED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

ALL MATERIAL AND CONFIGURATIONS UTILIZED UNDER THIS MODIFICA-TION SHALL BE APPROVED UNDER 10CFR50 49 'HEREFORE'IPE

~

BREAKS INSIDE OR OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT/ THAT CREATE A LOCA~

HELB/ SLB~ ETC'HALL NOT DEGRADE THE INTEGRITY OF SPLICES OR CABLES USED IN THIS MODIFICATION.

THE ABOVE ITEMS ENSURE THAT THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT DEGRADE THE CAPABILITY OF ANY SAFETY SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS FUNCTION. THE ASSUMPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF EXISTING ANALYSIS ARE UNCHANGED. NO NEW TYPES OF EVENTS ARE POSTU-LATED.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR g THE STRUCTURAL REANALYS SI PLAN (SRP) AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. ZT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS~ AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4761 HIGH HEAD RECIRCULATION EVALUATION THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE INTERCHANGING OF THE POWER AND CONTROL POWER WIRING OF MOVs 857A AND 857B. A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY NRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATING

-TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE FIREg SEISMIC'OCAL AND LOSS OF POWER EVENTS.

THE FIRST EVENT ANALYZED IS THE EFFECT OF A SEISMIC EVENT.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THE MODIFICATION TO BE SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 THEREFORE'HE MODIFICATION WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SYSTEM DURING A SEISMIC EVENT.

THE SECOND EVENT ANALYZED IS THE EFFECT OF A FIRE IN THE PLANT DUE TO THIS MODIFICATION. THE CONTROL WIRING USED FOR MODIFICATION IS 'EQUIRED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF ZEEE STD. 383-1974 FLAME TEST. THUS THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE FIRE LOADING DUE TO THIS MODIFICATION.

51

THE DESIGN CRITERIA PROVIDES REQUIREMENTS TO PRESERVE ANY SILICONE FOAM FIRE STOP OR SEAL THAT MAY NEED TO BE PENETRATED.

THE DES ZGN CRI TERIA REQUIRES AN APPENDI X R REVIEW THEREFORE i THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT AFFECT EXISTING COMPLIANCE METHODS.

THE THIRD EVENT ANALYZED IS THE EFFECT OF A LOCA. DURING THE SUMP RECIRCULATION PHASE FOLLOWING A LOCA, IF HIGH HEAD RECIRCULATION IS NECESSARY (IN CURRENT PROCEDURES WHEN RHR I

TOTAL S LESS THAN 4 00 GPM) i THE 8 57A i B i C VALVES MUST BE OPENED. PRESENT PROCEDURE ES-1.3 CALLS FOR STARTING RHR PUMPS ALIGNED TO THE SUMP AND DISCHARGING TO THE REACTOR THROUGH THE MOV 852A, B VALVES PRIOR TO OPENING 857A, B, C IF HIGH HEAD RECIRCULATION IS REQUIRED. SINGLE FAILURE CRITERIA REQUIRES THE TIMING OF THE ACTIVE FAILURE TO OCCUR AT THE BEGINNING OF THE HIGH HEAD RECIRCULATION PHASE. A FA1LURE OF D/G 1A PRIOR OPENING THE 857 VALVES WOULD RESULT IN BOTH TRAINS LEADING TO THE SAFETY INJECTION/CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS BEING BLOCKED AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF CORE COOLING.

THIS ZS THE PROBLEM WHICH WILL BE CORRECTED THRU THIS MODIFICATION.

THE FOURTH EVENT ANALYZED IS THE EFFECT OF A LOSS OF POWER ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE VALVES. AS STATED IN THE PREVIOUS PARAGRAPH A FAILURE OF D/G lA PRIOR TO OPENING THE 857 VALVES WOULD RESULT IN BOTH TRAINS LEADING TO THE SAFETY INJECTION/CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS BEING BLOCKED AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF CORE COOLING. THIS WILL BE CORRECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION. THEREFORE BASED UPON THE ABOVE ANALYSIS, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT:

A) THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED AND B) THE STRUCTURES i SYSTEMS i AND COMPONENTS PROVI DED FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE ADEQUATE.

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT ARE NOT INCREASED.

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A TYPE DIFFERENT FROM ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS HAS NOT BEEN CREATED.

THE MARGINS OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IS NOT REDUCED.

52

EWR-47 69 SAFEGUARDS RACK SI RELAYS THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE REMOVAL OF UNUSED RELAYS FROM THE SAFEGUARDS RACKS.

ALL BFD RELAYS, USED FOR SAFEGUARDS INITIATION LOCATED IN THE RELAY ROOM SAFEGUARDS RACKS, ARE BEING REPLACED ZN ACCORDANCE WITH MAINTENANCE, PROCEDURE M-59.9. SIXTEEN OF THESE RELAYS ARE UNUSED AND REPRESENT AN UNNECESSARY EXPOSURE TO FAILURE FOR THE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS. THE EIGHT UNUSED RELAY COILS IN EACH TRAIN ARE CONTROLLED BY THE SAME FUSES CONTROLLING ALL THE OTHER OPERATING SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS.

THEREFORE, A COIL FAILURE IN ANY OF THESE UNITS COULD KEEP THE SAFETY INJECTION SEQUENCE FROM BEING INITIATED. THE RELAYS BEING REMOVED SERVE NO FUNCTIONAL PURPOSE. ONE OF THE TWO COIL LEADS FOR 6 OF THESE RELAYS WERE DISCONNECTED AS PART OF EWR 2950. THE REMAINING 10 RELAYS HAVE ALL UNUSED CONTACTS. COIL WIRING IS ACCOMPLISHED BY USE OF JUMPER CONNECTIONS FROM COIL TO COIL. SOME OF THESE WIRES CAN BE REMOVED WHILE PORTIONS OF OTHERS WILL BE NEEDED TO MAKE UP REMAINING CONNECTIONS.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENT RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ZS FIRE.

NEW WIRING WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THIS MODIFICATION WHICH COULD ADD TO THE FIRE LOADING OF THE PLANT, AND BECAUSE OF THIS POTENTIALS THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES ALL SUCH WIRE MEET THE IEEE-383-1974 FLAME TEST REQUIREMENTS. THEREFORE, THIS MODIFICATION WILL CAUSE NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN FIRE PROPAGATION HAZARD.

I AS A RESULT, THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT WILL BE UNCHANGED. THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY, PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL BE UNCHANGED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION. IN FACT, BECAUSE EQUIPMENT CONNECTED TO SAFETY INJECTION CIRCUITS (ALTHOUGH IT SERVES NO FUNCTIONAL PURPOSE) IS BEING REMOVED'HE PROBABILITY OF MALFUNCTIONING OF THE SI CIRCUITRY IS REDUCED.

THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR A MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY ZN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS WILL NOT BE CREATED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION. THIS MODIFICATION IS BEING PERFORMED TO REMOVE EXCESS RELAYS FROM THE RELAY RACKS THUS REMOVING FROM THE CIRCUITS A PIECE OF EQUIPMENT THAT COULD MALFUNCTION.

53

THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILL NOT BE REDUCED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.

EWR-4789 TDAFP STEAM ADMISSION VALVES THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH REWIRES THE CONTROL CIRCUIT TO SEAL ZN AROUND THE CONTROL SWITCH SO THAT WHEN THE CIRCUIT IS ENERGIZE TO OPEN THE VALVE WILL CONTINUE TO OPEN TO THE FULLY OPEN POSITION.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION (1) FIRES AND (2) SEISMIC EVENTS, AND (3) LOSS OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER.

THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY OR IMPACT ON THE LEVEL OF FIRE PROTECTION AND ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES, NOR THE FIRE PROTECTION AND ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN LICENSE CONDITIONS AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

ADDITIONAL WIRING AND CABLE WILL BE ADDED ZN THIS MODIFICATIONS WHICH COULD ADD TO THE FIRE LOADING OF THE PLANT. THEREFORE, 'THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT ALL SUCH WIRING AND CABLE MEET THE IEEE 383-1974 FLAME TEST REQUIREMENTS. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OF FIRE LOADING CAUSED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT INCREASE THE IMPACT OF A SEISMIC EVENT. THE DESIGN OF THE MODIFICATION SHALL BE SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DESIGN CRITERIA.

THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT INCREASE THE IMPACT OF LOSS OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER. THE DESIGN OF THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT ALTER THE MANUAL OR AUTOMATIC OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM. REQUIRING THE VALVE TO GO FULL OPEN ONCE THE CIRCUIT IS ENERGIZED VS. HAVING IT STOP WHEN THE SWITCH IS RELEASED MAKES MANUAL AND AUTOMATIC ACTUATION SIMILAR. THIS DOES NOT ADVERSELY IMPACT THE SYSTEM.

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY, PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE INCREASED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT .OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE CREATED BY THIS PROPOSED MODIFICATION.

THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILL NOT BE REDUCED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.

54

0 THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION OR REQUIRE A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE.

EWR-4794 SECURITY GATE REPLACEMENT THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE REPLACEMENT OF FIVE (5) EXISTING SECURITY GATE OPERATORS AND THE OUTER CANTILEVER VEHICLE GATE AT THE SHIPPING AND RECEIVING BUILDING WITH AN OVERHEAD SLIDE GATE. SUPPORTS WILL ALSO BE ADDED TO EXISTING GATES TO REDUCE VIBRATIONS.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION ZS TO IMPROVE SECURITY GATE RELIABILITYAND MAINTAINABILITY.

EXCESSIVE VIBRATION IN THE SECURITY GATES HAS CONTINUALLY BEEN THE SOURCE OF PROBLEMS FOR THE SECURITY INTRUSION DETECTORS. DURING HIGH WINDS THE EXCESS SECURITY GATE VIBRATIONS TRIP THE SECURITY E-FIELD. THIS RESULTS IN THE NECESSITY FOR SECURITY PERSONNEL TO PATROL THE AREA.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GZNNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY NRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE ONLY EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS, SPECIFICALLY NATURAL EVENTS AND LOSS OF AC ~

FIRE ALL CABLE AND WIRE ORDERED FOR THIS MODIFICATION SHALL MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF IEEE 383-1974 FLAME TEST, THUS MITIGATING ANY POTENTIAL FOR PROPAGATING A FIRE.

EARTHQUAKE DURING A SEISMIC EVENT, THE SECURITY GATE MODIFICATION WILL HAVE NO SAFETY FUNCTION, AND NEED NOT REMAIN FUNCTIONAL.

LOSS OF AC THIS MODIFICATION SHALL BE REVIEWED SO AS TO ENSURE THE ISOLATION OF CLASS 1E AND NON-CLASS 1E SYSTEMS. THE SECURITY GATE SYSTEM SOURCE OF POWER IS FROM A NON SAFEGUARDS BUSg WITH A STANDBY POWER SOURCE DEDICATED TO THE SECURITY SYSTEM. THEREFORE, THE CLASS 1E ELECTRICAL SYSTEM IS NOT EFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE STRUCTURAL RE-I I ANALYS S PLAN ( SRP ) g ZT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARG NS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

55

EWR-4798 SOLENOID UPGRADE THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE INSTALLATION OF BLOCKING DIODES ON SELECTED SOLENOID VALVE COILS TO PROVIDE PROTECTION AGAINST VOLTAGE TRANSIENTS DUE TO AN INDUCTIVE KICK BACK. THE DIODES ARE A RETROFIT PROVIDED BY THE VALVE MANUFACTURERS VALCOR/ AND WILL BE INSTALLED ACROSS THE SOLENOID COILS OF THE MAINSTEAM ISOLATION AND REACTOR HEAD VENT VALVES.

REVISION 1 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCLUDES THE INSTALLATION OF DIODE ASSEMBLIES ACROSS THE HYDROGEN MONITORING SYSTEM SOLENOIDS~ V921g V922g V923 AND V924.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG.

GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE (1)

MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES, (2) A SEISMIC EVENT, (3) A MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK.

CABLE REQUIRED FOR THIS MODIFICATION COULD ADD TO THE FIRE LOADING OF THE PLANT. THEREFORE, THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT ALL SUCH CABLE MEET THE ZEEE-383-1974 FLAME TEST REQUIREMENTS. BECAUSE OF THIS THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OF FIRE LOADING CAUSED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

THIS MODIFICATION HAS BEEN REVIEWED TO ENSURE THAT FAILURE OF ANY ELECTRICAL CABLE INSTALLED AS PART OF THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT RESULT ZN THE DISABLING OF VITAL EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO SAFELY SHUT DOWN THE PLANT DURING POSTULATED FIRES.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT NEW RECTIFIER ASSEMBLIES INSTALLED UNDER THIS MODIFICATION BE QUALIFIED PER IEEE 344-1975'HEREFORE'HIS MODIFICATION WILL REMAIN FUNCTIONAL DURING AND AFTER A SEISMIC EVENT.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT THE NEW RECTIFIER ASSEMBLIES INSTALLED UNDER THIS EWR BE QUALIFIED PER IEEE 323-1974, THEREFORE THIS MODIFICATION SHALL REMAIN FUNCTIONAL DURING AND AFTER A MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK.

I THEREFORE g THE MARG NS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED'HE ADEQUACY OF COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY, PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE INCREASED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.

56

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR A MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS WILL NOT BE CREATED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.

THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILL NOT BE REDUCED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.

THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION OR REQUIRE A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR, ZT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE L1FE OF THE PLANT'AVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4862 NZS TRIP BYPASS THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE REPLACEMENT OF THE EXISTING 1084 OVERPOWER TRIP FUNCTION TEST RELAY PUSHBUTTON SWITCHES WITH MAINTAINABLE TYPE SWITCHES.

MAINTAINABLE TYPE SWITCHES ARE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN ENERGZZATION OF THE TEST RELAYS WHICH DEENERGIZE THE REACTOR TRIP BISTABLE RELAYS DURING MAINTENANCE OF THE 1084 OVERPOWER NIS POWER RANGE CHANNELS. DEENERGIZING EACH TRAIN'S 108 OVERPOWER REACTOR TRIP BISTABLE RELAY DURING CHANNEL MAINTENANCE PLACES THE CHANNEL IN THE TRIP MODE WHICH SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS OF GZNNA TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

THE EXISTING REACTOR TRIP RELAY LOGIC OF THE 108% OVERPOWER NIS POWER RANGE CHANNELS AT GINNA STATION CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING:

EACH OF THE FOUR 1084 OVERPOWER NIS POWER RANGE CHANNELS HAVE A TEST RELAY ON EACH TRAIN UTILIZED FOR DEENERGZZING THE 108% OVERPOWER REACTOR TRIP BISTABLE RELAYS. EXISTING MOMENTARY TYPE SWITCHES, LOCATED ZN THE RELAY LOGIC TEST RACKS (RLTRlg RLTR2) IN THE REL'AY ROOMg ENERGIZE THE TEST RELAYS WHICH DEENERGZZE THE 1084 OVERPOWER REACTOR TRIP BISTABLE RELAYS PLACING THE CHANNEL IN THE TRIP MODE. THE EXISTING SWITCHES ARE PANEL MOUNTS SINGLE POLEg MOMENTARY PUSHBUTTON TYPE.

THE FOUR EXISTING MOMENTARY PUSHBUTTON TYPE SWITCHES ON EACH OF BOTH TRAINS (TOTAL OF EIGHT) WILL BE REPLACED BY MAINTAINABLE SELECTOR TYPE SWITCHES. THIS WILL ALLOW THE 1084 OVERPOWER TRIP FUNCTION TEST RELAY TO REMAIN ENERGIZED AND MAINTAIN THE CHANNEL ZN A TRIP MODE DURING MAINTENANCE.

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i A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION 'UFSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG.

GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE (1)

MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES'2) A SEISMIC EVENTS (3) A REACTOR OVERPOWER TRANSIENT (108% OVERPOWER REACTOR TRIP).

NO NEW WIRING, FIELD CABLE, OR OTHERWISE FLAMMABLE MATERIALS WILL BE ADDED TO THE PLANT UNDER THIS MODIFICATION, THEREFORE/

NO INCREASE IN FIRE LOADING ZS IMPOSED.

THE NEW SELECTOR SWITCHES ARE DESIGNATED SEISMIC CATEGORY 1.

THEREFORE' SEISMIC EVENT WILL NOT IMPACT THE PROPER OPERATION OF THE SWITCHES.

CHANGING THE SUBJECT SWITCHES FROM MOMENTARY TO MAINTAINABLE DOES NOT AFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE NIS 1084 OVERPOWER REACTOR TRIP BECAUSE ACTUATION OF THE SWITCHES WILL PLACE THE CHANNEL ZN THE TRIP MODE. THEREFORE, THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT EFFECT THE NIS RESPONSE TO AN OVERPOWER TRANSIENT.

THUS, THIS MODIFICATION NEITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES/

NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR:

1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES

2) A SEISMIC EVENT

3) A REACTOR OVERPOWER TRANSIENT (108% OVERPOWER REACTOR TRIP)

IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. ZT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS, ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4933 S G PRESSURE TUBING RELOCATION THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES MODIFICATION OF THE itBtt STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER(S) TUBING AND SUPPORTS. THE PURPOSE OF THE MODIFICATION IS TO MITIGATE THE POTENTIAL FOR THE RECURRENCE OF FREEZING SENSOR LINES ZN THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING IN THE FOLLOWING FASHION:

1) REROUTING TUBING FOR SENSOR LINES PT-479 AND PT-483

2) THE ANALYSIS ON NEW TUBE ROUTING.

3) PROVIDE INSULATION IF DEEMED NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE TUBING CONTENTS REMAIN ABOVE 32 F.

4) PROVIDE SEISMIC RESTRAINT FOR THE AFFECTED TUBING.

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1 0

THE FOLLOWING ARE RESPONSES TO PRE-PORC COMMENTS ON EWR 4933 DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS REVISION 0'.

1. COMMENT: WHY NOT ELIMINATE THE ADDITION OF THE FOUR VALVE SET-UP AND JUST REPLACE THE TUBING.

THE TUBING CAN BE PRE-RUN AND THEN THE CONNECTIONS MADE IN A SHORT TIME.

RESPONSE: THE PROPOSED DESIGN REQUIRED THAT THE VALVES BE INSTALLED DURING THE 1989 SPRING OUTAGE AND THEN PERFORM THE REMAINING MODIFICATIONS POST-OUTAGE. THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE FOR THIS APPROACH AT THE TIME WAS TO MAKE MODIFICATIONS TO THE SYSTEM WITHOUT RENDERING ANY TRAIN INOPERABLE. BASED ON MY CONVERSATION WITH YOU ON 5/2/89'ILLING AND VENTING OF THE LINES AND RECALZBRATZON OF THE TRANSMITTERS WILL BE REQUIRED. THIS WILL CAUSE ONE LINE AT A TIME TO BE INOPERABLE.

ON THE BASIS THAT FILLING~ VENTINGg AND RECALZBRATION IS REQUIRED IT ZS PRUDENT TO ELIMINATE THE INSTALLATION OF THE VALVES.

THE DESIGN CRITERIA WILL BE REVISED TO REFLECT THIS CHANGE.

2. COMMENT: SHOULD INCLUDE INSERVICE LEAK CHECK FOR PORTIONS OF TUBING WHICH CANNOT BE HYDROED.

RESPONSE: THIS OPTION WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE ECN WHEN THE DRAWINGS ARE ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION.

3. COMMENT: IS THERE A MINIMUM SLOPE REQUIREMENT FOR TUBING INSTALLATION.

RESPONSE: YES. THIS REQUIREMENT WILL BE SPECIFIED ON THE CONSTRUCTION DRAWINGS.

4. COMMENT: WHAT IS AN APPROPRIATE AIR SEAL.

RESPONSE: THE DETAILS OF AN APPROPRIATE AIR SEAL WILL BE EVALUATED DURING THE DESIGN PROCESS.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF THE DESIGN BASIS EVENTS TO DETERMINE THOSE RELATED TO THE MODIFICATION. THE EVENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS WORK ARE:

A) FIRES B) SEISMIC EVENTS C) BELOW FREEZING AMBIENT TEMPERATURE D) POSTULATED RUPTURE OF STEAM OR FEEDWATER LINES E) DIFFERENTIAL DISPLACEMENT OF CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE AND INTERMEDIATE BUILDING 59

0 THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT DEGRADE EXISTING FZRE BARRIERS OR AFFECT THE PERFORMANCE OF ANY EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT. ANY NEW MATERIALS USED IN ELECTRICAL MODIFICATIONS SHALL MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF IEEE-383-1974, THUS MITIGATING THE POTENTIAL FOR PROPAGATING A FIRE.

ALL EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES REQUIRED TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH lOCFR50 APPENDIX R, OR TO MAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELS OF PROTECTION FROM FIRES WILL BE MAINTAINED DURING AND FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS TO THE TUBING AND CONTROL SYSTEMS.

SEISMIC EVENTS HAVE BEEN ANALYZED UNDER THE SEP RE-EVALUATION PROGRAM. THE MODIFICATION AND SUPPORTS WILL BE EVALUATED, IN REGARD TO A SEISMIC EVENTi TO CRITERIA IDENTICAL TO THE SEISMIC UPGRADE PROGRAM. THIS WILL ENSURE THAT ANY MODIFICATIONS WILL BE DESIGNED SO AS TO EQUAL OR IMPROVE THE SYSTEM'S CAPABILITY TO WZTHSTAND A SEISMIC EVENT.

I BASED ON THE ABOVE ANALYS S i ZT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT A) THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATION AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED.

B) THE STRUCTURES i SYSTEMS i AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS OR POSTULATED HIGH ENERGY PIPE BREAK AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS OR POSTULATED HIGH ENERGY BREAKS CONTINUE TO REMAIN ADEQUATE.

C) ALL INSTRUMENT SENSING LINE PENETRATIONS SHALL BE LOCATED AT A MINIMUM HEIGHT OF SEVEN FEET (2.2 METERS)

ABOVE FLOOR LEVEL, OR THAT ROUTING AND SUPPORT OF SENSING LINES SHALL ENSURE THAT THE FUNCTION OF THE LINES XS NOT AFFECTED BY VIBRATIONS ABNORMAL HEATi COLD, OR STRESS.

THUS, THIS MODXFICATION NEITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES/

NOR DOES ZT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR:

1) FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES

2) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING AND FOLLOWING SEISMIC AND TORNADO EVENTS

3) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION FOLLOWING A HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK.

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0 BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR g THE STRUCTURAL RE ANALYS S I PLAN (SRP) AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. ZT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-5053 REPAIR HD PUMP BARREL LEAK THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFXCATION ON THE HEATER DRAIN TANK PUMP BARREL LEAK REPAIR.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO INSTALL A PASSIVE VENT SYSTEM ON THE HEATER DRAIN PUMP BARREL. THE VENTS SHALL PROVIDE A CONTROLLED PATH FOR STEAM AND DEBRXS TO ESCAPE FROM THE ANNULAR REGION BETWEEN EACH PUMP BARREL AND LINER AT THE SAME TIME PREVENTING SAFETY AND/OR EROSION PROBLEMS.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN PERFORMED OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GZNNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENT RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION IS A LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLOW.

LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLOW CAN OCCUR FROM A RUPTURE OF A PUMP BARREL DUE TO THE EROSIVE ACTION OF THE VENTING STEAM.

THE ANALYZED EVENT IS FAR MORE SEVERE THAN A PUMP BARREL RUPTURE. THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF A PUMP BARREL RUPTURE SINCE THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES PROPER INSPECTION OF THE PUMP BARREL.

THIS MODIFICATION IS NON-SEISMIC SINCE IT DOES NOT EFFECT THE SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE REACTOR.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT INCREASE THE FIRE LOADING ZN FIRE AREAS CONTAINING SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT OR DEGRADE EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION BECAUSE OF REQUIREMENT IN SECTXON 27.0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA. ANALYSIS NECESSARY TO ASSURE CONTINUAL COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50g APPENDIX R HAS BEEN THE PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF A FIRE REQUIRED'HEREFORE, AFFECTING COLD SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT ARE UNCHANGED.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GINNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

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0 TSR 88-07 CCW CHECK VALVE 743A INTERNALS REMOVAL THIS TECHNICAL STAFF REQUEST ADDRESSES CHANGES TO CCW CHECK VALVE 743A. THIS CHANGE INVOLVES REMOVING CHECK VALVE 743A'S, INTERNALS TO ALLOW CONCLUSIVE LEAK RATE TESTING OF CCW CHECK VALVE 743. IN THE ORIGINAL PLANT DESIGN VALVE 743A WAS UTILIZED AS THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE FOR THE CCW LINE COMING FROM THE EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER.

HOWEVERS DUE TO LEAKAGE PROBLEMS WITH VALVE 743Ag CHECK VALVE 743 WAS INSTALLED IN SERIES WITH 743A TO PERFORM THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FUNCTION. CONSEQUENTLY, CHECK VALVE 743A NO LONGER PERFORMS ANY SAFETY OR OPERATIONAL FUNCTION.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GZNNA STATION UFSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG.

GUIDE 1.70 AND GINNA PROCEDURE A-303. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE (1) SEISMIC EVENTS'2) PIPE BREAKS INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING, AND A MAIN STEAM PIPE RUPTURE.

THIS MODIFICATION WILL BE DESIGNED SUCH THAT IT WILL NOT AFFECT THE CAPABILITY OF CHECK VALVE 743A OR ITS CONNECTED PIPING AND SUPPORTS TO WITHSTAND A SEISMIC EVENT.

THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT AFFECT THE BODY PRESSURE BOUNDARY FUNCTIONING OF CHECK VALVE 743A THEREFORE THE ASA B31.1 PRESSURE DESIGN WILL REMAIN VALID.

CCW CHECK VALVE 743 WILL'TILL PROVIDE THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FUNCTIONS DURING A PRIMARY SYSTEM PIPE RUPTURE OR A MAIN STEAM LINE RUPTURE.

THUS g THIS MODIFICATION NEITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES g NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR:

1) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING AND FOLLOWING SEISMIC.

2) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTXON FOLLOWING A PIPE BREAK INSIDE OR OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS/

AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

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TSR 89-05 RHR SPENT FUEL AND CVCS NON-REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGERS BOLTING UPGRADE THIS TECHNICAL STAFF REQUEST ADDRESSES FLANGE BOLTING UPGRADES FOR THE RHRg SPENT FUELS AND NON REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGERS. THE SHELL SIDE INLET AND OUTLET FLANGES WERE ORIGINALLY SUPPLIED WITH SA-307 GRADE B BOLTS. THESE BOLTS WILL BE REPLACED WITH SA-193 GRADE B7 BOLTS FOLLOWING STANDARD RG&E BOLTING PRACTICES.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG.

GUIDE 1.70 AND GINNA PROCEDURE A-303. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE (1) SEISMIC EVENTS~ (2) PIPE BREAKS INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING, (3) AND A MAIN STEAM PIPE RUPTURE.

THE NEW BOLTING IS OF THE SAME PHYSICAL SIZE AS THE ORIGINAL BOLTING AND THE CHEMICAL AND PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF THE NEW MATERIALS SA 193 GR B7g IS EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN THE OLD MATERIAL SA 307 GR B. THEREFORE, THE NEW BOLTING WILL PERFORM TO THE SAME CAPACITY AS THE OLD BOLTING FOR EACH OF THE APPLICABLE EVENTS LISTED ABOVE.

THUS g THIS MODIFICATION NEITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES g NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR:

1) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING AND FOLLOWING SEISMIC.

2) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION FOLLOWING A PIPE BREAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT.

3) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION FOLLOWING A MAIN STEAM PIPE RUPTURE.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES~ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

TSR 89-09 MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP SUCTION TRANSMITTER VALVE MANIFOLD THIS TECHNICAL STAFF REQUEST (TSR) ADDRESSES THE REPLACEMENT OF THE ISOLATION AND EQUALIZATION VALVES FOR FT-2004 AND FT-2005 (FEEDWATER PUMP SUCTION FLOW TRANSMITTERS) WITH MANIFOLDS. IT WILL ALSO REPLACE THE BLOWDOWN VALVES IN THE SENSING LINES WHICH ARE LEAKING. THE NEW ARRANGEMENT WILL PROVIDE THE SAME FUNCTION AS THE PREVIOUS ONE.

63

THE VALVES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS MODIFICATION SERVE TRANSMITTERS FT-2004 AND FT-2005. THESE TRANSMITTERS PROVIDE:

(1) AN INPUT TO FEEDWATER BYPASS VALVE 3959, WHICH OPENS ON LOW FEEDWATER NPSH.

(2) A SIGNAL TO FEEDWATER RECIRCULATION VALVES 4147 AND 4148, WHICH OPEN WHEN FEEDWATER FLOW FALLS BELOW FLOW WITHOUT RECIRCULATION.

25%'ULL A FEEDWATER BYPASS VALVE MALFUNCTION IS DISCUSSED IN THE FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE DECREASE ACCIDENT SCENARIO OF SECTION 15.1.1.1 IN THE UFSAR. THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT INCREASE OR DECREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCH AN ACCIDENT SINCE THE FUNCTION OF THE VALVES AND PIPING ASSOCIATED WITH THE TRANSMITTERS WILL NOT CHANGE.

THUS, THE INCORPORATION OF THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT AFFECT ANY OF THE EVENTS LISTED IN TABLES I AND IZ OF GINNA PROCEDURE A-303, INCLUDING THE DESIGN BASIS EVENTS OF USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70 AND IT WILL NOT CHANGE:

1) THE ASSUMPTIONS OF ANY SAFETY ANALYSIS IN THE UFSAR AND ITS SUPPLEMENTS.

2) THE PROBABILITY OF AN OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT.

3) THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT.

BASED UPON THE EVALUATIONS IN SECTION 3.1 ABOVE, THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION WILL BE UNCHANGED BY THE INSTALLATION OF THIS MODIFICATIONS ANDg THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES~ SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND, FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS WILL BE UNCHANGED BY THE INSTALLATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION SINCE:

A) THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE INCREASED, ORg B) THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY .EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE CREATED'R C) THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILL NOT INVOLVE A CHANGE ZN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SINCE NONE OF THE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION OF THE FEED AND CONDENSATE SYSTEMS WILL BE AFFECTED.

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0 TSR 89-29 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TRANSMITTER MANIFOLD REPLACEMENT THIS TECHNICAL STAFF REQUEST REVISION WAS TO CHANGE THE REFERENCE IN THE DESIGN CRITERIA, REVISION 0 FROM THE 1986 ASME CODE EDITION TO THE 1983 EDITION. THIS WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH THE INSTALLATION AND ALSO BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ASME SECTION XIg ARTICLE IWA 7000/ REPLACEMENTS' REVIEW WAS PERFORMED OF ALL THE EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GZNNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THZS MODIFICATION ARE:

CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION PRIMARY SYSTEM PIPE RUPTURE SEISMXC EVENT THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT THE NEW MANIFOLD VALVE AND FITTINGS FOR THIS MODIFICATION BE SEISMICALLY SUPPORTED, THEREFORE, THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY A SEISMIC EVENT.

THE DESIGN CRXTERIA REQUIRES THAT THE NEW MANIFOLD VALVE AND TUBING BE SEISMICALLY MOUNTED AND FURTHERMORE SECTIONS 4 AND 5 REQUIRE THE NEW TUBING TO BE ASME CODE CLASS 2, QUALITY GROUP B. THEREFORE, THE PROBABILITY OF A LOCA WILL NOT BE INCREASED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

THEREFORE, THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. THIS IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY, PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE INCREASED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION BECAUSE THE INSTALLATION WILL MEET ALL APPLICABLE SEISMIC AND ASME CODE REQUIREMENTS.

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY ZN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS WILL NOT BE CREATED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION BECAUSE THE INSTALLATION WILL MEET ALL APPLICABLE SEISMIC AND ASME CODE REQUIREMENTS.

65

THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILL NOT BE REDUCED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION BECAUSE THE INSTALLATIONWILL MEET ALL APPLICABLE SEISMIC AND ASME CODE REQUIREMENTS.

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0 SECTION B COMPLETED STATION MODIFICATIONS (SMs)

This section contains a description of station modification procedures performed in the facility as described in the safety analysis report. Station modification procedures are written to complete a portion of an Engineering Work Request (EWR) or Technical Staff Request (TSR) identified by the same parent number. Station Modifications are reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee to ensure that no unreviewed safety questions or Technical Specification changes are involved with the procedure.

The basis for inclusion of an SM in this section is closure of the SM where portions of the parent EWR or TSR, in the form of other SMs or other documentation, remain to be completed.

SM-87-01.1 SECONDARY WATER CHEMISTRY MONITORING PANEL SWCMP INTERNAL WIRING FOR 7082 ANALYZERS THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF COMPONENTS AND WIRING IN THE NEW SWCMP.

SM-87-01.2 COMPUTERIZED SECONDARY WATER CHEMISTRY ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW SWCMP AND ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS.

SM-87-01.3 COMPUTERIZED SECONDARY WATER CHEMISTRY MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF TWELVE NEW CONDUCTIVITY CELLS AND THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE COMPUTERIZED SECONDARY WATER CHEMISTRY MODIFICATION.

SM-89-08 AMMONIUM HYDROXIDE SIGHTGLASS INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE ZNSTALLATIONi TESTINGi AND TURNOVER OF THE AMMONIUM HYDROXIDE TANK SZGHTGLASS.

SM-1594.6 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING - SEISMIC SUPPORTS THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF SEISMIC SUPPORTS REQUIRED FOR THE NEW SPENT FUEL POOL PIPING.

SM-1594.7 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING - SERVICE WATER PIPING AND ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF SERVICE WATER PIPING AND ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION TO THE NEW SFP HEAT EXCHANGER.

SM-1594.8 I SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING STAINLESS STEEL AND ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION PIPING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF SPENT FUEL POOQ STAINLESS STEEL AND ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION PIPING.

SM-1594.8A INSTALLATION AND OPERATION OF STANDBY S.F.P. COOLING SYSTEM THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONS OPERATIONS AND DISASSEMBLY OF THE STANDBY SKID MOUNTED S.F.P. COOLING SYSTEM.

SM-1594.9A FLOOR PENETRATION INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF FLOOR PENETRATIONS FOR THE NEW SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM.

SM-1594.11 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING - PUMP AND RADIATION MONITOR INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF PUMP AND RADIATION MONITOR FOR THE NEW SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM.

SM-1594.14 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM ELECTRICAL MODIFICATION AND COMPLETION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION COMPLETION AND TURNOVER OF THE SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING ELECTRICAL MODIFICATION.

SM-2504.25 CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE EXHAUST VALVE ELECTRICAL .INSTALLATION AT PENETRATION 132 V7920 - CONTAINMENT BUILDING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE EXHAUST VALVE V7920 AT PENETRATION P-132 INSIDE CONTAINMENT.

SM-2504.26 CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE EXHAUST VALVES ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE SUPPLY SYSTEM EXHAUST VALVES CDV-1A AND CDV-1B OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT.

SM-2512.123 SEISMIC UPGRADE OF PIPE SUPPORTS ANALYSIS LINE SAFW-400 nD" PUMP DISCHARGE STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER BUILDING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONS TESTINGS AND ,TURNOVER OF STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SUPPORTS, "B" TRAIN IN THE SAFW BUILDING.

SM-2512.124 SEISMIC UPGRADE OF PIPE SUPPORTS'N ANALYSIS LINE SW-2200 SERVICE WATER AUXILIARY BUILDING

'HE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF MODIFICATIONS TO SERVICE WATER SUPPORTS IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING ASSOCIATED WITH FEED TO THE 'tCtt SAFW PUMP.

SM-2512.125 SEISMIC UPGRADE OF PIPE SUPPORTS-ANALYSIS LINE SAFW-800 STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FROM CONTAINMENT PENETRATION 123 TO "B" S G FEEDWATER LINE THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF SAFW SUPPORTS ZN CONTAINMENT FROM PENETRATION 123 TO THE "B" FEEDWATER LINE.

SM-2512.126 SEISMIC UPGRADE OF PIPE SUPPORTS ANALYSIS LINE SAFW-900 STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FROM PENETRATION 119 TO "A" STEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER LINE THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF PIPE SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS TO THE SAFW LINE BETWEEN PENETRATION yll9 AND THE nAtt S/G FEEDWATER LINE.

SM-2512.131 IST TEST CONNECTIONS - RCDT PUMP SUCTION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONS TESTINGS AND TURNOVER OF TEST CONNECTIONS FOR VALVES MOV-1813A AND MOV-1813B.

SM-2512.132 IST TEST CONNECTIONS AUXILIARY FEEDWATER DISCHARGE THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONS TESTINGi AND TURNOVER OF TEST CONNECTIONS FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER DISCHARGE CHECK VALVES 4003'004'000C AND 4000D.

SM-2512.133 ISI TEST CONNECTIONS - VALVE V-3506 AND V-3507 BYPASS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE -

ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATZONi TESTINGS AND TURNOVER OF TEST CONNECTIONS FOR VALVES 3506 AND 3507 BYPASS LOOPS (DOWNSTREAM OF V-3506A AND V-3507A) ~

SM-2512.134 SEISMIC UPGRADE OF PIPE SUPPORTS - ANALYSIS LINE CVC 200 nBn RCP SEAL RETURN THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS FOR nBn RCP SEAL RETURN LINE CONSISTING OF SUPPORTS CVU 131 AND CVU-XI'M-3319

'8 MCC-1B BREAKER REPLACEMENT THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF BREAKER REPLACEMENT AT SPECIFIED POSITIONS ON MCC-1B.

SM-3319.55 TESTING OF BREAKERS AT MCC-1B THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO 1) DOCUMENT AN AUXILIARY SWITCH TEST, 2) VERIFY PROPER PHASE ROTATION, AND

3) TO PERFORM A FUNCTIONAL TEST OF BREAKERS PLACED AT MCC-lB.

SM-3319.58 SETTING ADJUSTMENT AND FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF BREAKERS AT MCC-1H THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO PROVIDE THE DIRECTION TO AZkTUST AND FUNCTIONALLY TEST BREAKERS AT MCC-lH.

SM-3319.59 AUXILIARY SWITCH TESTING FOR SELECTED BREAKERS ON MCC-1B THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DOCUMENT AN AUXILIARY SWITCH TEST FOR THE TURBINE ROOM WALL EXHAUST FANS 1FJ 1Gg 1H, AND 1Z.

SM-3319A.2 BREAKER CHANGEOUT REMOVAL ON MCC-1C 1L AND 1K THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTINGS AND TURNOVER OF BREAKER CHANGEOUTS/REMOVALS TOL HEATER CHANGEOUTS, AND TRIP SETTING AKhTUSTMENTS FOR VARIOUS UNITS ON MCC-lC, 1L, AND 1K.

SM-3319A.3 BREAKER CHANGEOUT REMOVAL ON MCC-1D AND 1M THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTINGS AND TURNOVER OF BREAKER CHANGEOUTS/REMOVALS'OL HEATER CHANGEOUTS, AND TRIP SETTING AMUSTMENTS FOR VARIOUS UNITS ON MCC-1D AND 1M.

SM-3319A.4 BREAKER CHANGEOUT REMOVAL ON MCC-1B lE AND 1F THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTINGi AND TURNOVER OF BREAKER CHANGEOUTS/REMOVALSi HKA TRIP UNIT REPLACEMENTS, AND TRIP SETTING AMUSTMENTS FOR VARIOUS UNITS ON MCC-1B, 1E, AND 1F.

SM-3319A.5 REPLACEMENT OF POWER CABLES PER EWR-3319A THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF THE REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING POWER CABLES FOR THE BORIC ACID EVAPORATOR PACKAGE, THE AUXILIARY BUILDING LIGHTING TRANSFORMER 1B, AND THE SERVICE BUILDING KITCHEN EQUIPMENT TRANSFORMER.

SM-3319A.6 BREAKER REMOVAL ON MCC-1G AND RESOLUTION OF SM-33 19A. 2 33 19A. 3 AND 3319A. 4 PUNCHLIST ITEMS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONi TESTINGS AND TURNOVER OF BREAKER REMOVALSi TOL HEATER CHANGEOUTS, BREAKER HANDLE INSTALLATIONS, AND REMOVED BREAKER COVER PLATE INSTALLATIONS'M-3319A.8 BREAKER CHANGEOUT AT MCC-1F FOR THE LAUNDRY AZR'CONDITIONER AND THE PASS WASTE TANK EVACUATION COMPRESSOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF THE BREAKER CHANGEOUT AT MCC-1F FOR THE LAUNDRY AIR CONDITIONER AND THE PASS WASTE TANK EVACUATION COMPRESSOR.

SM-3341.1 FUSE INSTALLATION FOR THE'MAIN CONTROL BOARD "A" AND "B" BATTERY VOLTMETERS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF FUSES FOR THE MCB>>Ati AND iiBn BATTERY VOLTMETERS.

SM-3341.2 PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTING OF D.C. FUSES XSB FOR LOCKOUT RELAY 86 llA THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE A2Y (15A) (gSB) 125 VDC FUSES WHICH FEED THE BUS 11A DIFFERENTIAL LOCKOUT RELAY 86/llA.

SM-3341.3 PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTING OF D.C. FUSES XSC FOR LOCKOUT RELAY 86 11B THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE A2Y (15A) (XSC) 125 VDC FUSES WHICH FEED THE BUS 11B DIFFERENTIAL LOCKOUT RELAY 86/11B.

SM-3596.2 D G "An PRESSURE INSTRUMENT PANEL - ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF JUNCTION BOXES ASSOCIATED WITH THE NEW DIESEL GENERATOR nAn INSTRUMENT PANEL, INCLUDING CONDUIT AND CONDUIT SUPPORTS BETWEEN THE JUNCTION BOXES AND INSTRUMENT PANEL. ALSO, INCLUDES CABLE BETWEEN NEW PRESSURE INSTRUMENTS AND THE NEW TERMINAL STRIPS WITHIN THE JUNCTION BOXES.

SM-3596.4 D G "An PRESSURE INSTRUMENT PANEL ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF JUNCTION BOXES ASSOCIATED WITH THE NEW DIESEL GENERATOR nBn INSTRUMENT PANELS INCLUDING CONDUIT AND CONDUIT SUPPORTS BETWEEN THE JUNCTION BOXES AND INSTRUMENT PANEL. ALSO, INCLUDES CABLE BETWEEN NEW PRESSURE INSTRUMENTS AND THE NEW TERMINAL STRIPS WITHIN THE JUNCTION BOXES.

SM-3692.2 STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER CONTROL CIRCUITRY AND VALVE MOV-9746 TESTING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW MOV CONTROL SWITCH RE-AEQUNGEMENTS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE CONTROL AND INDICATION CIRCUITS. THIS INCLUDES MOVATS TESTING OF MOV-9746 AND HYDRO TESTING OF NEW VALVE INSTALLATION.

SM-3692.4 STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER VALVE - ELECTRICAL MODIFICATIONS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER FOR TESTING OF CONDUIT, CONDUIT SUPPORTS'ABLEg BREAKER JUMPERS AND REWORK OF THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD SWITCHES AND INDICATION.

SM-3692.5 SBAFW BUILDING ELECTRICAL SUPPORTS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONAND TURNOVER OF ELECTRICAL SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS IN THE STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER BUILDING.

SM-3692.6 STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF CONTROL CIRCUITRY FOR MOV-9746 THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF MOV-9746 LOCATED IN THE SAFW BUILDING; CONTROL ROOM (REAR OF MCB)g AUXILIARY BUILDING (MCC AREAS). HYDRO TESTING OF THE PRESSURE BOUNDARY IS COMPLETE. ADDITIONAL COPIES OF THIS PROCEDURE MAY BE PLACED FOR COORDINATION AND CONTROL PURPOSES.

SM-3797.8 MRPI ROD DROP RELAY TIME DELAY REMOVAL THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE REMOVAL OF THE TIME DELAY DEVICES WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED ON THE CONTROL ROD DROP RELAYS, AND THE SUBSEQUENT TESTING OF THE RELAYS'M-3797.9 MRPI DATA CABINET FAN INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF COOLING FANS ON THE MRPI DATA CABINET IN CONTAINMENT.

SM-3797.10 MRPI ANNUNCIATOR MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF A MODIFICATION TO ANNUNCIATOR C29 FOR MRPI FAILURE.

SM-3797.11 MRP1 DATA CABINET FAN REMOVAL THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE REMOVAL AND TURNOVER OF COOLING FANS FOR MRP1 DATA CABINET ZN CONTAINMENT.

SM-3881.1 SI RECIRCULATION MODIFICATION MECHANICAL INSTALLATION AND REMOVALS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE MECHANICAL PORTION OF THE SI RECIRCULATION MODIFICATION.

SM-3881.2 SI RECIRCULATION MODIFICATION ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION AND REMOVALS MOV 897 898 THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION AND REMOVALS FOR MOV 897 AND 898.

SM-3881.7 SAFETY INJECTION FLOW METERS FI-924 AND FI-925 RESCALING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF METER SCALES FOR FI-924 AND FI-925 AND RECALIBRATZON OF SAFETY INJECTION FLOW TRANSMITTERS FT-924 AND FT-925.

SM-3990.1 DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING FOUNDATION INVESTIGATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL TEST BORING AND CORE SAMPLING IN AND AROUND THE DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING.

SM-3990.2 GROUND WATER EXPLORATION OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING IMPINGEMENT MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE EXPLORATION AND EXCAVATION OF THE DEWATERING PITS GENERALLY BETWEEN THE DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING AND LAKE ONTARIO. THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THIS EXPLORATORY PHASE OF THE OVERALL MODIFICATION IS TO OBTAIN SUFFICIENT PERTINENT DATA ON THE SUBSURFACE GROUND WATER. THIS DATA WILL PROMULGATE NECESSARY ENGINEERING OUTPUTS FOR MODIFICATION ERECTION AND INSTALLATION.

SM-3991.2 SEISMIC UPGRADE OF EXISTING CONNECTIONS AND ANCHORAGES AUXILIARY BUILDING SOUTH WALL THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT/DOCUMENT STRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS.

SM-4064.5 TURBINE BUILDING SMOKE DETECTION UPGRADE AND ALARM OFF INDICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE CHANGEOUT OF TURBINE BUILDING SMOKE DETECTORS AND STPs. ALSO INCLUDED ZS THE INSTALLATION OF CONTROL ROOM INDICATION OF ALARM OFF STATUS.

SM-4064.6 TSC FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION SYSTEM UPGRADE THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF MODIFICATIONS TO THE TSC FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS PRIOR TO FINAL TERMINATIONS AND TESTING.

SM-4064.9 TURBINE BUILDING SMOKE DETECTOR ZONE 234 MODIFICATIONS THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF MODIFICATIONS TO TURBINE BUILDING SMOKE DETECTOR ZONE Z34 - TO REMOVE DETECTORS FROM THE GENERATOR FIELD VOLTAGE REGULATOR CABINET.

SM-4218.3 LT-426 TUBING REMOVAL THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE EXISTING 3/8n TUBING USED FOR LT-426 SEALED REFERENCE LEG.

SM-4230.1 ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM ATWS MITIGATION ACTUATION CIRCUITRY AMSAC MODIFICATION INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO INSTALL A REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM THAT WILL TRIP THE MAIN STEAM TURBINE AND START THE FLOW OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AFTER AN ATWS EVENT.

SM-4230.2 ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM ATWS MITIGATION SYSTEM ACTUATION CIRCUITRY AMSAC MODIFICATION TESTING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO TEST A REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM THAT WILL TRIP THE MAIN STEAM TURBINE AND START THE FLOW OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AFTER AN ATWS EVENT.

SM-4230.3 ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM ATWS MITIGATION SYSTEM ACTUATION CIRCUITRY AMSAC TRIP STATUS MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO INSTALL THE nAMSAC TRIPPEDn STATUS LIGHT ON THE MAIN CONTROL BOARDS WHILE PROGRAMMING IN NEW ARMING SETPOINTS AND MODIFYING THE FUNCTION CURVE WHICH GENERATES THE VARIABLE TIME DELAY FOR AMSAC. ZN ADDITION TO CHANGING THE DIGITAL OUTPUT FOR THE PPCS FROM nAMSAC ACTUATEDn TO nAMSAC TRIPPEDni BECOMING A DIRECT FUNCTION OF THE RESET STATUS.

SM-4322.1 STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMERS 13 AND 15 COOLING FANS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING AND TURNOVER OF COOLING FANS AT STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMERS 413 AND gl5.

SM-4324.3 ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION FOR STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION FOR STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM MODIFICATION. THIS PROCEDURE ALLOWS PARTIAL INSTALLATION PRIOR TO PLANT OUTAGE AND IS TO COMPLETE THE REMAINING DURING THE PLANT OUTAGE. TESTING OF THE INSTALLATION WILL BE PERFORMED UNDER ANOTHER PROCEDURE.

SM-4324.5 STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM MODIFICATION FUNCTIONAL TESTING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO PERFORM FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF THE ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION OF S/G BLOWDOWN MODIFICATION.

SM-4347.1 MODIFICATION OF THE CONTROL ROOM PLANT EVACUATION ALARM PLANT ATTENTION ALARM AND PLANT FIRE ALARM THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONAND TURNOVER OF THE CONTROL ROOM PLANT EVACUATION ALARM, PLANT ATTENTION ALARM AND PLANT FIRE ALARM MODIFICATIONS.

SM-4347.2 CONTROL ROOM ALARM SYSTEM TESTING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE MODIFICATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONTROL ROOM ALARM SYSTEMS AND TO CONDUCT A CONTROL ROOM ALARM SURVEY.

SM-4375.1 BORIC ACID FLOW CONTROL PIPING MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE MECHANICAL PORTION OF'HE BORIC ACID FLOW CONTROL MODIFICATION.

SM-4375.2 BORIC ACID FLOW CONTROL ELECTRICAL MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF .THE BORIC ACID FLOW CONTROL AND HEAT TRACE MODIFICATION.

SM-4375.3 MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL TESTING - BORIC ACID FLOW CONTROL PIPING MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE BORIC ACID FLOW CONTROL PIPING MODIFICATION.

10

SM-4375.6 BORIC ACID FLOW CONTROL MECHANICAL PHASE 2 MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE MECHANICAL PORTION OF THE BORIC ACID FLOW CONTROL PHASE 2 MODIFICATION.

SM-4375.8 BORIC ACID FLOW CONTROL PHASE 2 ACCEPTANCE TEST THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE BORIC ACID FLOW CONTROL PHASE 2 MODIFICATION.

'SM-4375.9 REPLACEMENT OF HEAT TRACE CIRCUITS 40 AND 78 THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONS TESTINGS AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW CHEMELEX SELF-REGULATING HEAT TRACE CABLE FOR CONDUITS 440 AND 578 (BORI C ACID BLENDER PI PING) ~ WHICH INCLUDES VALVES V354 ~

V355g FCV1 10Ag V109 f AND FTl 10 ~

SM-4525.2 GINNA POWER SUPPLY BUS DUCT FOUNDATIONS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO DIRECT/DOCUMENT INSTALLATION OF NEW BUS DUCT FOUNDATION.

SM-4525.3 GINNA POWER SUPPLY O.C.B. FIREWALL FOUNDATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE GINNA POWER SUPPLY O.C.B. FIREWALL FOUNDATION.

SM-4525.4 RACEWAY INSTALLATIONFOR OFFSITE POWER RECONFIGURATION MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF RACEWAY FOR THE OFFSITE POWER MODIFICATION.

THIS PROCEDURE INCLUDES INSTALLATION OF A NEW PIPE SUPPORT FOR THE EXISTING TRANSFORMER 12B DELUGE SYSTEM.

SM-4525.5 NEW GINNA POWER SUPPLY BUS DUCT INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF- THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL INSTALLATION OF THE NEW GINNA POWER SUPPLY BUS .DUCTS

SM-4525.6 OFFSITE POWER RECONFIGURATION: P.P.S. SWITCH GEAR TRANSFORMER 12B GROUNDING THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO ANCHOR THE P.P.S.

SWITCHGEARg COMPLETE INTERNAL WIRING~ AND PERFORM ELECTRICAL INSPECTION OF P.P.S. 4160V SWZTCHGEAR. THIS PROCEDURE ALSO CONTROLS THE INSTALLATION OF THE TRANSFORMER 12B GROUNDING RESISTOR.

SM-4525.7 OFFSITE POWER RECONFIGURATION: CABLE INSTALLATION RELAY PANELS 12A AND 12B THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF CABLES FOR THE OFFSITE POWER MODIFICATION AND COMPLETE THE INSTALLATION OF RELAY PANELS 12A AND 12B.

SM-4525.8 OFFSITE POWER RECONFIGURATION: MAIN CONTROL BOARD SWITCH RELOCATION BUS 12A BUS 12B MODIFICATION AND TESTING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF:

A) 52/11B CONTROL SW, SYNCH SW, AND IND. LITES B) 52/11A CONTROL SW, SYNCH SW, AND IND. LITES C) 1 2 B BUS RELAYING AND CIRCUIT BREAKERS ( 8 6/ 1 2 B g 8 6B/1 2B g 52/BTB B g 52/ 1 6SS ~ AND 52/ 1 7SS D) 12A BUS RELAYING AND CIRCUIT BREAKERS (86/12Ag 86B/12Ag 52/BTA-A, 52/14SS, 52/18SS AND 52/AVP-9A)

SM-4525.9 OFFSITE POWER RECONFIGURATION: MAIN CONTROL BOARD MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND RELOCATION OF SWITCHES'ETERS'ND RELAYS WHICH MONITOR AND CONTROL THE 34.5 KV AND 4160V ELECTRIC SYSTEMS.

SM-4525.10 OFFSITE POWER RECONFIGURATION: SWITCHYARD MODIFICATION 4160V CUBICLE MODIFICATION 480V AND 120V BREAKER INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE MODIFICATION OF THE 34 KV BUS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT, COMPLETE REMOVALS AT THE 12B XFMR CABINETS COMPLETE MODIFICATION OF 12A AND 12B 4160V CUBICLES, AND INSTALL 480V AND 120V BREAKERS FOR THE OFFSITE POWER MODIFICATION.

12

SM-4525.12 OFFSITE POWER BACKFEED VIA UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO SUPPLY POWER FROM THE 115 KV GRID THROUGH THE MAIN AND UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMERS TO THE STATION AUXILIARIES, WHILE THE STATION AUXILIARY TRANSFORMERS 012A AND 012B ARE MODIFIED PER EWR 4525.

SM-4525.14 OFFSITE POWER MODIFICATION: 4KV AND 34KV MCB METERING PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTING THE PURPOSE. OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO TEST THE MCB 4 KV AND 34 KV METERING, MODIFIED UNDER EWR-4525 PER SM-4525 '

'M-4525.15 OFFSITE POWER RESTORATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSERVICE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE OFFSITE POWER MODIFICATION AND RESTORE OFFSITE POWER VIA STATION AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 12B.

SM-4526.2 D G <<Att FUEL OIL SYSTEM ELECTRICAL RECONSTRUCTION AND REMOVALS THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE ELECTRICAL PORTION OF THE D/G <<At'UEL OZL SYSTEM INCLUDING INSTALLATION OF NEW EQUIPMENT AND REMOVAL OF OLD EQUIPMENT.

SM-4526.4 D G <<B<< FUEL OIL SYSTEM ELECTRICAL RECONSTRUCTION AND REMOVALS THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE ELECTRICAL PORTION OF THE D/G <<B<<FUEL OIL SYSTEM INCLUDING INSTALLATION OF NEW EQUIPMENT AND REMOVAL OF OLD EQUIPMENT.

SM-4526.8 DUPLEX STRAINER INSTALLATION ELECTRICAL PORTION THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF THE ELECTRICAL PORTION OF THE DUPLEX STRAINERS IN THE DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OZL SYSTEM.

SM-4526.17 DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL SYSTEM DISCHARGE LINE PIPE SUPPORTS UPGRADE THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF PIPE SUPPORTS ON THE DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL SYSTEM DISCHARGE PIPING.

13

SM-4530.1 AC FUSED AND BREAKERS INTERMEDIATE BUILDING'S MISCELLANEOUS DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMER REPLACEMENT THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO REPLACE THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING' MISCELLANEOUS DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMER AND REMOVE THE ELECTRICAL FEED FROM MCC 1F (UNIT 4MM) TO MCC 18 (UNIT 8D) .

SM-4534.1 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MOTOR OIL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM UPGRADE THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MOTOR OIL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM FOR THE A 6 B REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MOTORS.

NO COMPONENT INSTALLATION REQUIRED ON RCP MOTORS. THE ROSEMOUNT 710DU INSTRUMENT RACK ZS COMMON TO BOTH REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS'M-4538.1 1B DIESEL GENERATOR UPGRADE THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE 1B DIESEL GENERATOR UPGRADE. THIS MODIFICATION INCLUDES REPLACEMENT OF A THROW OVER RELAY, THERMAL OVERLOAD RELAYS'EMOVAL OF A 51BU RELAYS AND REWIRING OF TERMINAL BOXES ON THE >>An AND nBn DIESEL SKIDS SM-4538.3 INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF NEW AUXILIARY RELAY 51VX CLAROSTAT 200 OHM RESISTOR AND SLIDING LINK TERMINALS FOR AIR START VALVE ASV-1 AND ASV-2 FOR THE 1A DIESEL GENERATOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE ELECTRICAL INSTALLATIONS TESTINGS AND TURNOVER OF MODIFICATIONS TO THE 1A DIESEL GENERATOR. THESE MODIFICATIONS INCLUDE REPLACEMENT OF OVER% JRRENT AUXILIARY RELAY 5 1VXg INSTALLATION NEW 2 00 I I OHM RES STOR g SLI D NG LINKS TERMINALS FOR AIR START VALVESg AND INSTALLATION OF A NEW MOUNTING PLATE FOR RELAYS ATR-A, ATR-B, AND A FUSE BLOCK.

THIS PROCEDURE WILL ALLOW WORK TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE FOLLOWING GENERAL AREAS OF THE PLANT: 1A DIESEL GENERATOR.

SM-4553.1 REACTOR BMI TUBING SUPPORT UPGRADE THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO SEISMICALLY UPGRADE THE REACTOR BOTTOM MOUNTED INSTRUMENTATION TUBING SUPPORT BMI-3.

14

SM-4618.1 FEED PUMP ROOM VENTILATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW FEED PUMP ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS.

SM-4671.6 An RCS HOT LEG RHR FLOW CORRECTION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING ASSOCIATED WITH FIELD DATA VERIFICATION OF THE nAn RCS HOT LEG LOOP LEVEL CORRECTION AS A RESULT OF RHR FLOW. THIS TEST IS BEING PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION WITH PROCEDURE 0-2.F 1

'M-4675.1 RHR PUMP nBn RECIRCULATION PIPING TIE-INS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO INSTALL THE 8 INCH CHECK VALVE AND 3 INCH PIPING TIE-INS TO THE B RHR HX DISCHARGE LINE ~

SM-4675.2 RHR RECIRCULATION MODIFICATION MCB MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW :PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM WORK SCOPE OF EWR-4675 RHR RECIRCULATION MODIFICATION.

SM-4675.3 RHR SYSTEM CLEANLINESS INSPECTION AND HYDROSTATIC TEST THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS FOR PERFORM CLEANLINESS INSPECTIONS AND A HYDROSTATIC TEST OF THE RHR RECIRC SYSTEM INSTALLED BY EWR-4675.

SM-4675.5 RHR PUMP 'A'ECIRCULATION PIPING TIE-INS AND BALANCE OF PIPING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE RHR A RECIRCULATION PIPING TIE INSg COMMON TRENCH TZE-INS AND THE REMAINDER OF THE RHR A AND B RECIRCULATION PIPING AND SUPPORTS.

SM-4675.6 RHR PUMP nArr AND nBn RECIRCULATION INSTRUMENTATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF INSTRUMENTATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE A AND B RECIRCULATION PIPING MODIFICATION.

15

1 SM-4675.7 RHR HX "A" OUTLET PIPE SUPPORT THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE RHR HX tiAn OUTLET PIPE SUPPORT.

SM-4675.8 RHR PUMP SUCTION HYDRO STATIC TEST THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE HYDROSTATIC TEST OF THE INSTALLATION OF THE TI-680 AND 681 THERMOWELLS.

SM-4675.9 RHR SYSTEM SHUTDOWN COOLING FULL FLOW TEST THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING OF THE RHR SYSTEM FULL FLOW TEST DURING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING TEST.

SM-4755.1 IST TEST CONNECTIONS FOR MOV-1813A B "A" AND "B" RCDT PUMP SUCTION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT/DOCUMENT MODIFICATION RELOCATION OF VALVES V-1813C/E.

SM-4756.1 INSTALLATION OF MCB EXHAUST FAN SHROUD THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF THE SHROUD FOR THE MCB EXHAUST FAN.

SM-4759.2 HIGH MAST LIGHTING TOWER BASEPLATE GROUTING THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE .INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF HIGH MAST SECURITY LIGHTING BASEPLATE GROUTZNG AND JAM NUTS FOR THE EIGHT HIGH MAST LIGHTING TOWERS.

SM-4764.1 FIRE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS RELOCATIONS AND SPRINKLER SUPPLY TO SUPPORT THE CONTAMINATION STORAGE BUILDING INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE RELOCATION INSTALLATION TESTING AND TURNOVER OF FIRE SERVICE HYDRANTS GATE VALVES AND SPRINKLER SUPPLY TO THE CONTAMINATED STORAGE BUILDING.

16

'

SM-4764.3 CONTAMINATED STORAGE BUILDING DOOR S29 ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION TESTING AND FLOOD BARRIER TESTING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION, TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW SECURITY DOOR S-29 AND THE TESTING OF THE FLOOD BARRIER ASSOCIATED WITH DOOR S-29.

SM-4764.4 ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION AND GROUND GRID INSTALLATION-CONTAMINATED STORAGE BUILDING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONAND TURNOVER OF THE ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION AND GROUNDING PORTION OF THE CONTAMINATED STORAGE FACILITY MODIFICATION.

SM-4764.6 FIRE PROTECTION ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION AND FUNCTIONAL TESTING WITHIN THE CONTAMINATED STORAGE BUILDING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL AND DOCUMENT THE INSTALLATION, TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE ELECTRICAL PORTION OF THE LOCAL PREACTION FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM ZN THE CONTAMINATED STORAGE BUILDING.

SM-4785.1'NSTALLATION AND TESTING OF NEW THROWOVER RELAY IN BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE CABINET THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONS TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW THROWOVER RELAY ZN THE BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE CABINET.

SM-4785.2 INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF NEW THROWOVER RELAY IN BUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGE CABINET THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW THROWOVER RELAY IN THE BUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGE CABINET.

SM-4785.3 INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF NEW THROWOVER RELAY IN BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROL CABINET THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONS TESTINGS AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW THROWOVER RELAY IN THE BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROL CABINET.

17

~ SM-4785 4 o INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF NEW THROWOVER RELAY IN BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROL CABINET THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONS TESTINGS AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW THROWOVER RELAY IN THE BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROL CABINET.

SM-4785.5 INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF NEW THROWOVER RELAY AND LOSS OF D.C.

VOLTAGE ALARM FOR DIESEL GENERATOR 1A THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONS TESTINGS AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW THROWOVER RELAY AND LOSS OF D.C. VOLTAGE ALARM FOR DIESEL GENERATOR lA.

SM-4785.6 INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF NEW THROWOVER RELAY AND LOSS OF D.C.

VOLTAGE ALARM FOR DIESEL GENERATOR 1B THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW THROWOVER RELAY AND LOSS OF D.C. VOLTAGE ALARM FOR DIESEL GENERATOR 1B.

SM-4809.1 DIESEL FIRE PUMP BATTERY CHARGER SUPPORT STRUCTURES INSTALLATION MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF THE DIESEL FIRE PUMP BATTERY CHARGER SUPPORT STRUCTURES'M-4931.1 TDAFWP CHECK VALVE REPLACEMENT THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE REPLACEMENTS TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP DISCHARGE CHECK VALVES V-4003 AND V-4004.

SM-4933.1 PT-478 PT-479 AND PT-483 S G "B" TUBING REROUTE AND UPGRADE THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONS TESTING/ AND TURNOVER OF UPGRADED STEAM GENERATOR PT-478/479/483 INSTRUMENTATION TUBING, SUPPORTS/

AND BARRIERS IN THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING (STEAM HEADER LEVEL) .

SM-4937.1 REPLACEMENT OF HEAT TRACE CIRCUITS 12 & 34 THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW CHEMELEX SELF REGULATING HEAT TRACE CABLE FOR CIRCUITS 12 AND 34.

18

SM-4937.2 REPLACEMENT OF HEAT TRACE CIRCUIT 29 THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONS TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW CHEMELEX SELF REGULATING HEAT TRACE CABLE FOR CIRCUITS 29 (BORIC ACID BLENDER PIPING)i WHICH INCLUDES VALVES FCV 110Ci V364i FCV llOB, AND V365A..

19

SECTION C - COMPLETED TECHNICAL STAFF ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS (TSEEs)

This section contains a description of changes to the facility as described in the safety analysis report performed as technical evaluations. These are typically small changes that do not require the full controls of a modification. Technical Staff Engineering Evaluations are reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee to ensure that no unreviewed safety questions or Technical Specification changes are involved.

The basis for inclusion of a TSEE in this section is presentation to the PORC, closure of the associated TSR, and submittal to the Document Control Department. Within the time frame of this report there were none.

SECTION D - TEMPORARY BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION, STRUCTURE FEATURES~ SHIELDING'ND FLUID SYSTEM FEATURES This section contains descriptions and summaries of safety evaluations of temporary changes pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50. 59(b) ~

0 I>" 4 CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTiON AND JUMPER CONTROL JOB DATE:

FOREMAN'UMPER WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 OTHER 0 I n FUNCTION / 0 PURPOSE LOCATION:

SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: Pf YES ~NO SKETCH ATTACHED ~ES PANO PORC DATE (IF REQUiRED)'ECHNICAL MANAGER ~!I -l1 SHIFT SUPERVISOR DATE:

INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE 8 TIME DATE 8 TIME ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS INSTALLED:

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REMOVED BY:

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10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation for lifting wire for Thermocouple D07 4

The indications for TC D07 axe inconsistent with the response of other related core parameters (i.e. incore flux map & nearby thermocouple indications). Thermocouples are used to sense core outlet temperature, determine relative fuel assembly power and compensate RVLIS. Since TC D07 is not consistent with either incore or other thermocouples it has been declared inoperable.

1t has been deleted from processing in PPCS. To remove it from the averaging circuit at the thermocouple panel requires lifting its lead.

from averaging.

The panel will then sense an open TC and remove it With TC D07 inoperable the minimum requirement per Tech. Specs.

of 4 thexmocouples pex quadrant is met. TC D07 is not used to compensate RVLIS. The functions of the thermocouple system as described in the'fSAR are fulfilled. Therefore, neither the probability nor the consequences of an accident or malfunction evaluated in the UFSAR is increased. 'The possibility of a new accident or malfunction is not created. The margin of safety defined in Tech. Specs. is not reduced.

Refexences: Tech. Specs. 3.5.3, UFSAR Section 7.7.4 ffrey P. W and 11/30/89 PORC Approval: 2

CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC jr~

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'ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS INSTALLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

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CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL JOB FOREMAN'UMPER e PATE, g0)- O REQUEST¹: O -0 WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE 0 FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 g FUNCTION A DWO~ e I r.FJ ~i OTHER E.

'JT ~jv a3i PURPOSE Td LOCATION:

SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: li8 YES 0 NO SKETCH ATIACHED; ~ES 0 NO PORC DATE(IF REQUIRED): ~ ~ 4 TECHNICAL MANAGEFt -333 SHIFT SUPERVISOFL DATE INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE a TIME DATE 8 TIME.

ENTERED IN OFFICIAL~LOG' ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS N TALLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY. VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)

IT PIR,I j.'

P 05POSlT(ON-5 VRS.

Attach additional page(s) as necessary AE 142 Reu*2/88

Bypass of Safet} t'unction and,Purr?ye~~~.

fc r Temporaty I-Cold ReCOXCeX"

~ ~ ~

I 1

S'.rr<<e the T-Cn?d wide sharira rang~ r r<<ordc r for TI-450 4 TI-451 has been unr c table, it 1 s des i rabl 1 i to prov ide a T<<Cold recorder for This wi 1 l h~ ~<<<<iimPl ished by installing a I 1~nt shutdown.

c <<is ion resistor in r tlr th~ control board.'.indicator for 250':

T-cold (409B 4 4? 0P' A  ! n r lirr.e of t he rrr~wly lns..i 1! r J temporary'ecorder" cr the temporary wirirrq wi 1 1 rrot ef! r it tire T-Cold signal from T"409B or T-4108 because the temporary wirirrq is installed. dovnstream of a V'I isolation amplifier (TY-409B-1 r TY-410B-1). Therefore, the installation of this recorder vill not increase the 'probability or the consequence of an accident previously evaluated 'in Chapter 15 of the UFShR. Since a failure of the nev temporary'ecorder or its wiring will not effect existing plant instrumentation used for safety system controls, the probability of creating an accident not previously evaluated in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR increased.

vill not be Since a failure of this recorder vill not adversely effect RVLIS input from T-Cold 4098 and 410B, the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification vill not be .reduced.

~P ~c~~

eleven T. Adams 3/22/90

CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCT)ON AND JUMPER CONTROL JOB FOREMAN' JUMPER WIRE 0 I @CA LIFTED WIRE 0

~9 FUSES PULLED 0 REQUEST STATES BLOCK 0 4:

OTHER K, FUNCTION CP r r 5 7d /W Se'Br 5 To Tw ca'7 7T- /~ 8-r PURPOSE 70 /H~

A ~rip .T~C / -Cpa LOCATION: I SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: ~YES 0 NO SKETCH ATTACHED: YES 0 NO PORC DATE(IF REQUIRED): ZZ TECHNICALMANAGER: DATE 5 -Z~D SHIFT SUPERVISOFL DATE:

INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE & TIME / DATE& TIME: ~ Q d K ENTERED IN OFFICIAL L~OG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS I TA LED: I NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)

~ w L

~ <<A L ~

J~

QA IV-5 y~

Attach additional page(s) as necessary 49 142 Aev. 2/88

PYV'rss of Sntety f unction nnd Jumper Cgl)gg+

'or Temporaty 7-Cold Recorder i * ~

Since the T-(old wide rnngr r r r.order for T1-460 C TI-451 has been unreliable, it is desirnblc to provide n T-Cold recorder. for plant shutdovn. This vi l (i~ nccompl is/ic,'. by installing a 250Il, 1

precision rc sistor in sar.rr vith the cr>>t re~) board indicator,"[or T-Cold f 40'r8 4 4108) .

A fai lur e 0! the nevly irrstni led t~m) or'hiy recorder cr 'the temporary v)ri>>g vi }1 not ef feet the I-Co!d signal from T-40QB or T-4108 because the temporary viring '.s iristnlled dovnstream pf a tr/I iSOlatiOn nmpl if ier (TY-4098-1 6 TY-4108-1) . TherefOre,.'.the ',

installation of this recorder vill not increase the probability.

or the consequence of an accident previously evaluated in Chapter" 15 of the UFSAR. Since n failure of the nev temporary recorder or its viring vill not effect existing plant instruaentat'ion used for safety system controls, the probability of creating an'accident not previously evaluated in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR vill,not. be increased.

Since a fnilure of this recorder vill not adversely effect from T-Cold 4098 and 4108, the margin of safety as defined RVLIS'nput in the basis of any Technical Specification vill not be .reduced.

~ i ~

7 6 even T. Adams, 3/22/90

I>> Kl'U>>gpj's>>

CATEGORY +KAREN)EtggCEOURE REV>>EWEO al'.:5 1%0ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC A-1 402

',t'~'t..>> 'Qb GINNA STATION BYPAss Pf qlmI)F@P FUNCTloN AND JUMPER 06N>>BURGLE "~

JOB FOREMAN DATE: REQUESTS:

JUMPER WIRE Q LIFTED WIRE/ FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 OTHER 0 FUNCTION I c,~ ~ ~

"'( 'URPOSE LOCATION: rre/ /WD /'7'7 2~ SAT,3'~Ir3 gFE>>~I 3'g~/P SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: Pf YES 0 NO SKETCH ATTACHED: ~ YES 0 NO E2>>~- wvlI8ELF cdA BTv gtMEAE'.rtog 5 &F > 0, 55&odp

-gb 0 PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED):

TECHNICALMANAGER:

SHIFT SUPERVISOR DATE:

~lb INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATELTIME 5/ GATE E TIME 7 / 0 ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTEREO IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS INSTALLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: ro REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY: l~l W/l~fW REVIEW (AS NECESSARY) err Fn i ~+ J~

C i >>C2 Z/~P s

'C~

Attach additional page(s) as necessary EO T42 Rev. 2/88

CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A-1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTfON AND JUMPER CONTROL JOB FOREMAN'UMPER r

/g po REQUEST¹'

- /

WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE 0 FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOC K/K OTHER+(

FUNCTION Hf / I/oly~p~ /~Or o

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SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: MES NO SKETCH ATIACHED: gVYES NO PORC DATE(IF REQUIRED): 4" 7- Q TECHNICALMANAGEFI: DATE:

SHIFT SUPERVISOR DATE:

INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE & TIME DATE & TIME ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS INSTALLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: ~

VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY) 2bo ~p

~ k~ ~ ll lP 4L Q

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CF%'R.~L X (:I DISPOSITION - 5 YRS.

Attach additional page(s) as necessary 49 r42 Rev. 2/8S

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION GINNA STATION:

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A CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A-1402 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL JOB FOREMAN'ATE d JUMPERWIRECI LIFTEP WIRE+ RUSES PULLEPCI STATESBLOCKO OTHER O FUNCTION > B'4~> 4o 54ocv <n~ grya /4~a  %%dd 7PPJ. /E AN~'URPOSE

&f7 P4' PJc,g rfLrtrcr8$ gszr / 0 WG 37$ V)

LOCATION: D 40rAJ Wow I Mg I P gavrW xa V-SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: 8 YES D NO SKETCH A%I'ACHED: D YES ECNO PORC DATE(IF REQUIRED): " Zv" H J TECHNICALMANAGER: DATE' 0" SHIFT SUPERVISOR: DATE INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE & TIME DATE & TIME:

ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG'UMBER NUMBER OF TAGS INS OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)

CEM'RA Attach additIonal page(s) as necessary 49 142 ASV. E/N

0 Cgyty~

CATEGORY NCE PROCEDURE REVIEWED ELECTRIC A-1 ROCHESTER GAS AND t~~0 GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION ANhgggPZA'58iNTROL IPN ~y JOB FOREMAN'UMPER REQUEST ¹: C WIRE 0 DATF'IFTED WIRE FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 OTHER 0 FUNCTION Ur PURPOSE LOCATION:

SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: ES 0 NO SKETCH ATI'ACHED; 0 YES S NO PORC DATE(IF REQUIRED) M- ZO-TECHNICALMANAGEFI: DATE SHIFT SUPERVISO .,i~Yi:W<. DATE INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE& TIME - CO 02 DATE & TIME: 3 ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL WOG'UMBER NUMBER OF TAGS INS OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)

Iar" 4/So/Ih c.

vuLc-A JS u / /(j I c ue 4r Attach additional pag s) as necessary 49 1i2 Rov. 2/88

P@typg,-

CATEGORY 3.5 1IENCEPRDCEDURE

<V EVIEWED GAS AND ELEC~,

j'.tgg'OCHESTER 180 GINNA STATION BYPAss QF sAFETY FUNcTIQN AM@P@EA CGNTRoL V-S yo

~

4 JOB FOREMAN'~ DATE: I > 0 REQUEST R:

JUMPER WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 OTHER 0 FUNCTION +

PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED): 0 Z5 &

TECHNICALMANAGER: ~ DATE:

SHIFT SUPERVISOR: ~2 INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE & TIME DATE & TIME:

ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAG TALLED: 'UMBER OF T REMOV INSTALLED BY: X REMOVED BY:

I VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY) Oc(7 r

Av'A4/

num~ r'~~Z NWr~

n4 Attach additional page(s) as necessary 49.142 Rsv. 2/88

CATEGORY RFFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION 5f BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL

~ /P'O I

JOB DATE; REQUESTS:

FOREMAN'UMPER WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 OTHER 0 FUNCTION 5 E RHI &$ 4e F'l.o dr1Jr?Qr ALAN~

PURPOSE h3Lr I Sd~cc A'W4wK LOCATION:

SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED:

PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED)

TECHNICALMANAGER:

SHIFT SUPERVISOR.

S>r RIES n'w cI si.

r

(

0 NO

/g 0

j?g gyz e'P ~

SKETCH ATIACHED:

8Ã

-

0 YES DATE:

/f EC It NO INSTALLATION DATE& TIME ~ j& O REMOVAL DATE& TIME: la t3" 0 c I 50 ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS INSTALLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)

<~A',".~,<L, i'V;. S D ~ \

Attach additional page(s) as necessary 49.1l2 Rev. 2/8S

CATEGORY NCEPROCEDURE REVIEWED JQf 4 A.t ROCHESTER GAS AND ELEC'PIC tl ~0 GINNA STATION Wggr ~,.

BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION ANREIIQIPI2Elt'~TROL ION-s y~

'OB FOREMAN'ATE: Gt0 C JUMPER WIRE 0 FUNCTION LIFTED WIRE 0'TATES FUSES PULLED 0 REQUEST BLOCK 0 4:

OTHER 0 PURPOSE LOCATIO

~ >4'KETCH SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: ES 0 NO ATTACHED: 0 YES I2I NO PORC DATE(IF REQUIRED):

TECHNICALMANAGER DATE'+

-?

SHIFT SUPERVISO . . i~~ t6.G~h.- DATE INSTALIATION REMOVAL DATE It TIME -2> 42 DATE 8 TIME:

ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL ~DE; NUMBER OF TAGS INS LE NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY) / 4 /

Ia(

T2f5 0 Cl h C I

VECLC m'zs oF cr r~ I WA a

// vW Attach additional pag s) as necessary EQ-1E2 Aev, 2/8S

( I CATEGORY 3.3.5 REFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC

- BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTlON AND JUMPER CONTROL G INNA STATION 9'p JOB FOREMAN'" REQUEST ¹:

WIRE 0 0 FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 OTHER Ef-l'UMPER LIFTED WIRE ~

Cv-n g FUNCTION C-/0 ~/I".<-i o .wrA CA TT ivy ltA /it//~ 4 PURPOSE .r 0 A/c, n ~t @AD C-I 0 /'ee i I/'nC C. rC LOCATION: ~

8

~ ( It Wt'n,4rt M SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: g YES 0 NO SKETCH ATTACHES: 0 YES It NO PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED): 6- =~o TECHNICALMANAGER: ~F- 1 SHIFT SUPERVISOR: ~: ~k. 9 >

INSTALLATION REMOVAL

'

DATE & TIME DATE & TIME: 3 VS

- ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OFTAGS IN TA ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAG MOVE .

0-~

BY: ) D'NSTALLED REMOVED BY: a&

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY) t)9P ElE'jj; Aj, ~

DtSPOSI Attach additional page(s) as necessary SS tirtTP aSS

BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL ANNUNCIATOR C-10 Annunciator C-10 is described in the UFSAR as a method of providing indication of low SW flow to the control room during an accident.

A wiring anomaly is causing spurious alarms. Without this alarm, the operator will not know if adequate SW flow exists during an accident. By pulling the alarm card, the card will be prevented from alarming spuriously but indication of SW flow will be lost.

To ensure sufficient SW flow, if an SI signal is received, operations personnel will verify locally that greater than 900 gpm is available to each fan cooler. This requirement will be posted on the MCB and oncoming operators will be informed during turnover. During normal operations, the flow is 1000 gpm. When an SI signal is received, flow would go up so sufficient flow should be available. By verifying greater than 900 gpm, the assumptions of the UFSAR remain valid and no unreviewed safety question exists. Post maintenance testing will include sufficient testing to ensure the alarm will operate when actual low flow is sensed.

Ref. UFSAR 6.2.1.1.1 c/z/go

CATEGORY GA G REFERENCE PROCEDURE A-1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC

" GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL

$0 JOB FOREMAN'ATE REQUESTS:

JUMPER WIRE 0 FUNCTION LIFTED WIRE R VPZ FUSES PULLED 0 M/A C 84OC.k'THER STATES BLOCK 0 0 ar 2u PURPOSE IS 7 LOCATION'AFETY EVAI.DATIONREQUIRED: )TYES 0 NO SKETCH ATTACHED: 0 YES jh( NO PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED)' 4 lg 0 TECHNICALMANAGER DATE. 6 /0- 0 SHIFT SUPERVISOR: DATE g- I g-Po INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE& TIME 4 I 0 DATE & TIME:

ENTERED IN OFFICIAL'OG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS INSTALLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)

'

Attach additional page(s) as necessary 49.1A2 Rev. 2/SS

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0 CATEGORY REFERENCEPROCEDUREg A-1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL JOB FOREMAN'UMPER DATE: 7 ~~ ~ REQUEST 4:

WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE j2f FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 OTHER 0 FUNCTION e- ~ sic C PURPOSE 7 rrV /W Ae A./~ ~/ Mr 7g+

LOCATION'~~ ~

SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: j8 YES

/~O

~ ~E Rt-"rr-4 ~

0 NO

'I I-I SKETCH ATTACHED:

I ~ 3Z 0 YES @NO PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED): - 0 TECHNICALMANAGEFI:

SHIFT SUPERVISO DATE INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE 8 TIME 0 DATE 8 TIME:

ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS I TALLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:

INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:

VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:

REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)

Attach additional page(s) as necessary 40 142 Rev, 2/88

10CFR50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION for Bypass of Safety Function for Thermocouple C-3 The circuit for thermocouple C-3 is inoperable. To ensure erroneous readings are not generated, the leads from this thermo-couple to the thermocouple panel will be lifted. This will prevent erroneous thermocouple readings from being included in the averaging calculations in the thermocouple panel. The four thermocouples per quadrant. required by Tech Specs will be main-tained and thermocouple C-3 is not used by RVLIS.

Based on this evaluation, the probability and consequences of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased. The possibility of an accident or malfunction not previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not created. And, the margin of safety as defined in the basis of Tech Specs will not be reduced. Therefore, this bypass of safety function does not create an unreviewed safety question.

-

References:

UFSAR Section 4.4.5.4 & Table 7.7-3

'Tech Specs Section 3.5.3 & Table 3.5-3 Prepared by: Date: 7" TC. SA

i W

0

August 1, 1989 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR TEMPORARY STRUCTURE FEATURE AUTHORIZATION FORM 89-180 This temporary structure will be placed under the reference leg piping to support the condensate pot and associated tubing.

The reference leg piping will be lifted by hand while measuring and recording the maximum lift force. The lift will not create any substantial deflection of the root valve and will therefore not create an unexceptable stress on the welds in the reference leg. The reference leg will not be lifted past the condensates pot's original design elevation. Therefore, this temporary structure will not endanger the integrity of the reference leg piping. This temporary structure will be removed prior to leaving the hot shutdown condition.

This temporary structure will not incr'ease the probability of an accident or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR. This temporary structure will not effect the pressure transmitter PT-429 and therefore will not. effect the response of safety injection to an accident. This structure will not effect the integrity of the reference leg and will only be used to support the static load of the piping will remain intact.

This temporary structure will not create an accident of a different type then those specified in the UFSAR. The Safety Injection System will react as designed to any accident. addressed in the UFSAR.

This temporary structure will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in any technical specification basis. This structure does not render any plant system inoperable, nor will it degrade any operating system.

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8/11/89 SCREENHOUSE NORTH OF MCC-1G PLANT BETTERMENT PAINT SCAFFOLD 89-183 Scaffolding is needed for ceiling and wall painting in the area north of MCC-1G not covered by previously approved scaffolds89-167 and 89-168. Because of the proximity of the service Water Pumps in both trains and MCC-1G the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.K. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167).

The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer.

Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept the installation.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, and fire fighting provisions.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on, these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Seismic Events

There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurr'ence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.,

8/11/89 SCREENHOUSE SOUTH WALL OVER DIESEL FIRE PUMP PLANT BETTERMENT PAINT SCAFFOLD 89-184 Scaffolding is needed for ceiling and wall painting in the area over the Diesel Fire Pump between the areas covered by previously approved scaffolds89-170 and 89-171. Because of the proximity of the service Water Pumps and Fire Service Water Pumps in both trains the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank 'decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.K. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167) .

The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned 'Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer.

Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept the installation.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, and fire fighting provisions.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50. 59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above any existing plant it provisions will not have any adverse effect on in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Seismic Events

i There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

September 6, 1989 A MAIN STEAM ARV-3411 REPAIR WORK PLATFORM 89-190 Repair work on ARV-3411 will necessitate a work platform/

constructed of pole scaffold and planks such as to surround the A Main Steam lead and the relief valve inlet piping, somewhat below the ARV inlet flange. The small for the ARV air operator will be disconnected during the tubing valve repair preparations. As such the platform will have no potential effect on the ARVs, and the structures will be restricted from movement in the direction of any other safety related equipment. The Main Steam leads and the relief piping are sufficiently sturdy to preclude any damage from the relatively light scaffold materials; however, piping of smaller diameter than the scaffold pole material is incorporated as the isolation valve 3507 bypass. The duration of scaffold existence is projected to be 2 weeks.

Because of the above factors, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, and fire fighting provisions in the area.

The above 'construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Steam Generator tube rupture Rupture of a steam pipe Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

September 7, 1989 LAUNDRY EXHAUST FAN VIBRATION/EXPANSION RING REPLACEMENT WORK PLATFORM 89-191 Repair is required on ductwork at the Laundry Exhaust Fan, located in the vicinity of the A Feedwater Line. The entries from the Motor and Turbine Auxiliary Feedwater Pump discharges are nearby, and there is a high density of snubbers for this piping in area (5 mechanical and 1 hydraulic). A temperature sensor (TE-2096) is located at the top of the feedwater line downstream of check valve 3003.

Because of the existence of the above features within the vicinity of the proposed scaffold, scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 4. 0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, and fire fighting provisions in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Loss of Normal Feedwater Loss of all A.C. power to the station auxiliaries Steam Generator tube rupture Rupture of a steam pipe Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

September 12, 1989 SI RECIRC FLOW ORIFICE FE-916 LEAK REPAIR WORK PLATFORM 89-192 A work platform is required to correct a leak condition at SI recirc flow orifice FE-916, located between the Refueling Water Tank and 480v Bus 16. Also within the vicinity are Temperature Indicator TI-917, and SI recirc MOVs 897 and 898.

The MOVs are within the ASME Seismic Class 2 boundary as indicated on P&ID 33013-1261 Containment Spray (SI). The platform is to be about 4 ft. high, estimated to be in existence 2 days.

Because of factors given above the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer. Such e documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation 'in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, and fire fighting provisions in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not. have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

in Reactor Coolant Inventory 'ecrease Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic 'feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

9/2 6/89 AUXILIARY BUILDING TOP SOUTH WALL WEST FROM COLUMN LINE 8a PLANT BETTERMENT PAINT SCAFFOLD 89-194 A scaffold is planned for painting the south wall at the Auxiliary Building top level, to extend from the Decon Pit to the Monitor Tanks. Because of the large area to be covered, including the area immediately adj acent to both Component Cooling Heat Exchangers, and the relatively lengthy projected duration of the scaffold existence, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines 'rovided from Structural Engineering '(M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment).

The guidelines statement 4. 0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167).

The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. In addition, part of the orientation shall stress the importance of taking care not to bump any live smoke detectors. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer. In addition, the Job Supervisor shall notify the Fire Protection group during installation to allow for consultation on any potential interferences with fire detection/sprinkler provisions encountered.

During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Liaison Engineer.

In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer. This confirmation shall include review of attributes such as configuration of the scaffold frame and securing of the planks. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing, and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipme'nt, and fire fighting provisions in the area.

The scaffold shall be constructed so as not to interfere with Auxiliary Building Crane use during fuel transfer mechanism work planned.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Rupture of a Steam Pipe Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

1/16/90 SERVICE WATER PIPE SUPPORTS SWU 625 g SWU 626 g SWU 623 g 'ND SWU 624 SCREENHOUSE BASEMENT WORK PLATFORMS89-202 In order to perform the pipe support upgrade work near the ceiling for the Service Water Pump discharges, work platforms are needed, to be constructed of wood, about 3 ft. above the floor.

The individual pump discharges are 14 in. pipe, and the headers are 20 in. pipe, sufficiently sturdy to preclude any damage by the relatively short wooden platforms. No safety related instrumentation will be affected by this platform installation.

Based on the factors described above the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the facility or procedures as described in the Safety Analysis Report.

Material of construction will be light enough so that have no effect on any component in the event of a seismic event.

it will The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report associated with the proposed installation are the following:

Seismic Event The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because the lightness of the installation in relation to the sturdiness of the pipe will ensure that there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specifications bases.

The installation will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because it in the event of a seismic event.

will not affect safety related equipment The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because of the sturdiness of the adjacent piping.

The installation of this temporary modification will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification Specification.

because it does not affect any Technical

1/16/90 SERVICE WATER PIPE SUPPORTS SWU-636 AND SWU-638 WORK PLATFORMS89-203 In order to perform the pipe support upgrade work near the ceiling for the Service Water Pump discharge portion in the northeast corner of the room, a work platform constructed of wood will be needed, about. 3 ft. above the floor. The individual pump discharges are 14 in. pipe, and the headers are 20 in. pipe, sufficiently sturdy to preclude any damage by the relatively short wooden platforms. No safety related instrumentation will be affected by this platform installation.

Based on the factors described above the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the facility or procedures as described in the Safety Analysis Report.

Material of construction will be light enough so that it have no effect on any component in the event of a seismic event.

will The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report associated with the proposed installation are the following:

Seismic Event The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because the lightness of the installation in relation to the sturdiness of the pipe will ensure that there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specifications bases.

The installation will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because it will not affect safety related equipment in the event of a seismic event.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because of the sturdiness of the adjacent piping.

The installation of this temporary modification will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification because Specification.

it does not affect any Technical

1/17/9 0 SCREENHOUSE PLANT BETTERMENT PAINTING SCAFFOLD ABOVE THE HOUSE HEATING BOILER 90-01 Scaffolding is required in the Screenhouse for cleaning and painting under the Plant Betterment Project. This permit (90-01) ,is for a seismic scaffold above and around the house heating boiler. (Ref. sketch attached to permit). This location is within 1 1/2 times its height of safety related service water pumps lA and 1B.

The scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) .

The guidelines statement 4. 0 requirement to wire decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement

'll plank to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.K. Fit zsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Station Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidanceIn this from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and'pon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept the installation.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to the Screenhouse all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire I fighting provisions.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Seismic Events

There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

Ih February 7, 1990 CONDUIT AND CABLE INSTALLATION IN AUXILIARY BUILDING SUB-BASEMENT FOR MIDLOOP INSTRUMENTATION EWR-4892 SCAFFOLD 90-14 A scaffold is needed with a work platform about 8 feet from the floor. The corner poles shall be extended to the ceiling and horizontal poles shall be extended to at least one wall and other anchorage points or bumper contact points on the opposite side to prevent moVement.

Because both trains of Residual Heat Removal Pumps are within the immediate vicinity of the scaffold, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment), incorporating the features described above.

The guidelines statement 6.0 shall be augmented with the requirement that the scaffold shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift. The Construction Engineer or Liaison Engineer shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer. During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. This confirmation shall include review of attributes such as configuration of the scaffold frame and securing of the planks. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

The scaffold shall not be built until immediately prior to the planned start of the conduit installation effort.

l/

90-14 During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, fire protection systems, and rotating equipment in the area.

The above construction and operational requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Accidental Release - Waste Gas Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in'he Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

0 February 7, 1990 CONDUIT AND CABLE INSTALLATION IN AUXILIARY BUILDING BASEMENT AT WEST STAIR FOR MID-LOOP INSTRUMENTATION EWR-4892 SCAFFOLDS 90-15 In order to install conduit and cable for this project in the Auxiliary Building basement a scaffold is needed near the ceiling above the Spent Fuel Pool Pumps.

The SFP cooling system is non-seismic safety related (1) however, Seismic Category I items are within the immediate vicinity, given below.

A and B Residual Heat Removal Pump Cooling Units (2)

A Residual Heat Removal Pump Discharge Temperature TT-630 (3)

Other instruments in the area for which care should be taken to avoid disturbing are as follows:

Component Cooling Return from Residual Heat Removal Pumps flow FI-651 and its associated tubing. (4)

A Residual Heat removal Pump discharge pressure PIC-629 and PI-629A and their associated tubing. (3)

Because of the above factors the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitz simmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 6.0 shall be augmented with the requirement that the scaffold shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift.

The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer. During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

90-15 The scaffold shall not be built until immediately prior to the planned start of the conduit installation effort.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that. a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to the Auxiliary Building sub-basement, all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it, will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

90-15 The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in'a the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment, or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

NOTES:

1) Quality Assurance Manual Appendix A Quality and Safety Related Listing and Diagrams Section 2.2.4 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling outlined in RG&E Drawing 33013-1248 (portion attached).

2) UFSAR Section 9.4.9.1 Engineered Safety Features Equipment Ventilation and Cooling.

3) UFSAR Figure 5.4-7 Residual Heat Removal System (portion attached).

UFSAR Figure 9.2-4 Sheet 1 Component Cooling Water System (portion attached).

February 7, 1990 CONDUIT AND CABLE INSTALLATION IN AUXILIARY BUILDING INTERMEDIATE LEVEL AT WEST STAIR FOR MID-LOOP INSTRUMENTATION EWR-4892 SCAFFOLD 90-16 In order to install conduit and cable for this project in the Auxiliary Building Intermediate Level a scaffold is needed near the ceiling from the stairwell north to adj'acent to the Containment wall, over the west end of the Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger. Standby Auxiliary Feedwater System Containment isolation MOVs are located on the north side of the SFPHX.

The space between the heat exchanger and containment is very congested with piping, pipe support structures, regulators, valves, instruments, and lead shielding for a process monitor in the service water piping .from the heat exchanger. A major portion of the equipment here is associated with the waste gas system supporting the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank and the Pressurizer Relief Tank, both of which are in Containment. Immersed within this space is one of the Containment Mini-purge discharge isolation valves.

Because of the location of the above discussed SAFW Containment isolation MOVs, the scaffold shall be constructed as seismic using the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer.

The guidelines statement 6.0 shall be augmented with the requirement that the scaffold shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift. The Construction Engineer or Liaison Engineer shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer. During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. This confirmation shall include review of attributes such as configuration of the scaffold frame and securing of the planks. Such documentation shall, be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

0 it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

The scaffold shall not be built until immediately prior to the planned start of the conduit installation effort.

During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, fire fighting provisions, and adjoining rooms in the area.

Locked area access to the Spent Fuel controlled by a locked gate. Ensure that Pool filter vault is the scaffold does not allow any easier access to this area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The -installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report. which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

,

Accidental Release Waste Gas Steam Generator Tube Rupture Rupture of a Steam Pipe Primary System Pipe Rupture Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

90-16 The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident. or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment. or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

February 7, 1990 CONDUIT AND CABLE INSTALLATION IN*CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING ROOM FOR MID-LOOP INSTRUMENTATION EWR-4892 SCAFFOLD 90-17 In order to install conduit and cable for this project in the Control Room Air Handling Room a scaffold is needed. The equipment in the immediate area is, for the most part, dedicated to continuing habitability for the Main Control Room in the post-accident environment. Because of this, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 6. 0 shall be augmented with the requirement that the scaffold shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end. of each shift. The Construction Engineer or Liaison Engineer shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer. During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer in his stead.

In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. This confirmation shall include review of attributes such as configuration of the scaffold frame and securing of the planks. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form.

The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

The scaffold shall not be built until immediately prior to the planned start of the conduit installation effort.

During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions.

90-17 The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in lOCFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated wi;th this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve. a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

~ ~ ~

The znstallatz.on does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

February 13, 1990 PENETRATION SEAL INSPECTION OVER CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING UNIT SCAFFOLD 90-23 I

In order to inspect penetration seals above the Control Room Air Handling Unit, a scaffold is needed. The equipment in the immediate area is, for the most part, dedicated to continuing habitability for the Main Control Room in the post-accident environment. Because of this, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) .

The guidelines statement 4. 0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the, original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

90-23 The installation does not result in a ,change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

February 15, 1990 CONDUIT AND CABLE INSTALLATION UNDER INTERMEDIATE BUILDING NORTH CATWALK EWR-4530 SCAFFOLD 90-24 In order to install conduit and cable under the catwalk a work platform needed. It will be located in the immediate vicinity of containment penetrations for heating steam and the ILRT vent to roof. It will be directly above the Containment Cooler Unit flow indicators which are Seismic Category I instruments. To the immediate north are Control Rod Drive Power Cabinets.

Because of the close involvement with the Seismic Category I items the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment).

The guidelines statement 6. 0 shall be augmented with the recpxirement that the scaffold shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift. The Construction Engineer or Liaison Engineer shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer. During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer in 'his stead. In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. This confirmation shall include review of attributes such as configuration of the scaffold frame and securing of the planks. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

The scaffold shall not be built until immediately prior to the planned start of the conduit installation effort.

90-24 During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping containment isolation valves, the instruments and cabinets described above and any other sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, and fire fighting provisions in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their'unctions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Steam Line Rupture Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a s'eismic feature there will be no ef fect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Sa fety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent, of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment, or systems in the vicinity.

90-24 The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

February 16, 1990 A BATTERY ROOM EAST WALL PENETRATION SEALING INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-26 In order to inspect penetration seals on the A Battery Room wall adjacent to the A Battery, a scaffold is needed, to provide a work platform approximately 9 ft. from the floor. It is to be of wooden construction to eliminate the potential for short circuiting the battery. It shall be constructed in accordance with the attached sketch so that it will be identical to the structure provided as Request 86-56, which was determined to be seismically acceptable (see attached 10/7/86 S.K. Ferguson memo) .

The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the construction requirements given below.

Pre-planning and prefabrication for the scaffold shall be done such as to allow completion of the structure, apart from the decking, in one day of work within the Battery Room. As alternatives to this the following may be observed:

The portion completed shall be adequately restrained to make it seismic with bracing and interlocking and contact with adjacent structural features.

In lieu of the above, the B Main Battery System shall be maintained operable, with no non-seismic temporary structures in the B Battery Room.

During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by a qualified individual.

Extreme care must be exercised in working adjacent to or above the batteries during construction, use, and teardown of the scaffold.

Sufficient clearances are to be provided for Electrician access to the battery.

Prior to use, the structure shall be inspected by the Job Supervisor to confirm that its construction was in accordance with the sketch. Upon successful confirmation the Job Supervisor shall document- this conf irmation for the original copy of the Authorization Form, and so notify the Shift Supervisor.

90-26 The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The affects and methods to cope with loss of D.C. power are given in the following:

UFSAR Section 8.1.4.4 Potential Risk of Station Blackout UFSAR Section 8.3.2.1 Description UFSAR Section 8.3.2.2 Analysis Procedure ER-ELEC.2 Crosstie TSC Battery to A or B DC Bus Also analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report associated with this proposed installation is the following:

Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have.no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

2/26/90 A BATTERY ROOM NORTHWEST CORNER PENETRATION SEALING INSPECTION EWR 4941 SCAFFOLD 90-27 A work platform is needed to inspect penetration seals in the northwest corner of the A Battery Room adjacent to the A Battery Charger, to be about 6 1/2 ft. from the floor. The duration of existence of this scaffold is estimated to be a month. In consideration of any possibility for inoperability of DC electric system equipment in the B Battery Room within this fairly lengthy duration the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic 'Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.

B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167) .

It shall not be started until the wooden scaffold over the A Battery bank is completed; as such, that scaffold (90-26) shall serve as a barrier to prevent short circuiting the battery with metal scaffold materials. This subject scaffold shall be removed prior to removal of the wooden scaffold.

The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has, been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If itduring observed is foreseen in the erection, that a scaffold planning stage, or is deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall, be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Extreme care must be exercised in working adjacent to the batteries and other DC electric equipment during construction, use, and teardown of the scaffold.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all instrumentation and panels in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in lOCFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The affects and methods to cope with loss of D.C. power are given in the following:

UFSAR Section 8.1.4.4 Potential Risk of Station Blackout UFSAR Section 8.3.2.1 Description UFSAR Section 8.3.2.2 Analysis Procedure ER-ELEC.2 Crosstie TSC Battery to A or B DC Bus Also analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report associated with this proposed installation is the following:

Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

2/26/90 A BATTERY ROOM NORTHEAST CORNER PENETRATION SEALING INSPECTION EWR 4941 SCAFFOLD 90-28 A work platform is needed to inspect penetration seals in the northeast corner of the A Battery Room adjacent to the A Battery Disconnect Switches to be about 8 ft. from the floor. The duration of existence of this scaffold is estimated to be a month. In consideration of any possibility for inoperability of DC electric system equipment in the B Battery Room within this fairly lengthy duration the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.

B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167) .

It shall not be started until the wooden scaffold over the A Battery bank is completed; as such, that scaffold (90-26) shall serve as a barrier to prevent short circuiting the battery with metal scaffold materials. This subject scaffold shall be removed prior to removal of the wooden scaffold.

The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Extreme care must be exercised in working adjacent to the batteries and other DC electric equipment during construction, use, and teardown of the scaffold.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all instrumentation and panels in the area.

90-28 The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The affects and methods to cope with loss of D.C. power are given in the following:

UFSAR Section 8.1.4.4 Potential Risk of Station Blackout UFSAR Section 8.3.2.1 Description UFSAR Section 8.3.2.2 Analysis Procedure ER-ELEC.2 Crosstie TSC Battery to A or B DC Bus Also analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report associated with this proposed installation is the following:

Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of

, equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

03/08/90 STANDBY SFP COOLING COMPONENT MOUNTING 90-40 It has been decided to provide mountings for, and to install the standby SFP Pump in the Auxiliary Building basement, immedia-tely east of the RHR Pump Cooler, Units, by the containment wall, and to do likewise with the standby SFP Heat Exchanger on the top floor immediately west of the A Component Cooling Pump. The mountings are to be of seismic design as provided for Temporary Fluid System Provision Form 88-27 for EWR 1594B and discussed in J.J Ferraro's April 5, 1989 memo on review of the pump mounting.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a,change to the assump-tions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report. As a seismically constructed feature it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report.

The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification,

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

because as a seismic feature,

~ ~

it

~

will be independent of, and will

~ ~ ~

i 90-40 have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

March 8, 1990 TUBING INSTALLATION IN AUXILIARY BUILDING SUB-BASEMENT FOR MIDLOOP INSTRUMENTATION EWR-4892 SCAFFOLD 90-41 A scaffold is needed with a work platform about 5 feet from the floor. The corner poles shall be extended to the ceiling and horizontal poles shall be extended to at least one wall and other anchorage points or bumper contact points on the opposite side to prevent movement. As such it may be integrated with scaffold 90-14.

Because both trains of Residual Heat Removal Pumps are within the immediate vicinity of the scaffold, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment), incorporating the features described above.

The guidelines statement 6.0 shall be augmented with the requirement that the scaffold shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift. The Construction Engineer or Liaison Engineer shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer. During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. This confirmation shall include review of attributes such as configuration of the scaffold frame and securing of the planks. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.

it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

The scaffold shall not be built until immediately prior to the planned start of the conduit installation effort.

90-41 During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, fire protection systems, and rotating equipment in the area.

The above construction and operational requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Accidental Release Waste Gas Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident. or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

03/29/90 RHR PUMP SUCTION MOV'S 704A 6 B SCAFFOLDS 90-80 In order to perform maintenance on MOV's 704A and B a scaffold is needed to provide a work platform about 10 ft. from the floor. The maintenance is to be performed with all fuel removed from Reactor. The scaffold installation is to take place prior to this to maximize the time available for valve maintenance.

Because of the need for operability of the RHR System during this period the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) .

The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, rotating equipment and fire fighting provisions in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their funct'ions in normal operation or in their functions as described

90-80 in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

03/29/90 RHR RETURN OUTSIDE MISSILE BARRIER MOV-720 SCAFFOLD 90-81 In order to perform maintenance on MOV-720 a scaffold is needed to provided a work platform about 7 The maintenance is to be performed with all ft. from the floor.

fuel removed from the Reactor. The scaffold installation is to take place prior to this to maximize the time available for valve maintenance.

Because of the need for operability of the RHR System during this period the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) .

The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that, a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves and instrumentation in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described

90-81 in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant: Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

0 April 24, 1990 B MAIN STEAM ARV-3410 REPAIR WORK PLATFORM 90-151 Repair .work on ARV-3411 will necessitate a work platform, constructed of pole scaffold and planks such as to surround the A Main Steam lead and the relief valve inlet piping, somewhat below the ARV inlet flange. As such the platform will have no potential effect on the ARVs, and the structures will be restricted from movement in the direction of any other safety related equipment.

The Main Steam leads and the relief piping are sufficiently sturdy to preclude any damage from the relatively light scaffold materials; however, piping of smaller diameter than the scaffold pole material is incorporated as the isolation valve 3506 bypass.

The duration of scaffold existence is projected to be approximately 1 1/2 weeks.

Because of the above factors, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authori'zation Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, and fire fighting provisions in the area.90-151 The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Steam Generator tube rupture Rupture of a steam pipe Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of saf ety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it, will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

5/10/90 NaOH TANK ROOM PENETRATION SEAL INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-156 In order to inspect penetration seals in the southeast corner of the NaOH Tank Room, a scaffold is needed, to provide a work plat form approximately 12 ft. from the floor. In this location it will be directly over the Charging Pump Leakoff Collection System and will be immediately southeast of the 2 trains of Spray Additive Tank outlet valves (HCV-836A and HCV-836B). The leakoff collection system is indicated as non-seismic on P&ID 33013-1265 sheet 2. Damage to the leakoff tank which could present potential for release from the vent header is bounded by analysis of rupture of a Gas Decay Tank.

Because of the potential effect on HCV-836A and HCV-836B the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, fire fighting provisions, and adjoining rooms in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

'k 0

90-156 The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Accidental Release Waste Gas Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

May 9, 1990 B BATTERY ROOM WEST WALL PENETRATION SEALING INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-157 In order to inspect penetration seals on the B Battery Room wall adjacent to the B Battery, a scaffold is needed, to provide a work platform approximately 9 ft. from the floor. It is to be of wooden construction to, eliminate the potential for short circuiting the battery. It shall be constructed in accordance with the attached sketch so that it will be identical to the structure provided as Request 86-56, which was determined to be seismically acceptable (see attached 10/7/86 S.K. Ferguson memo) .

The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the construction requirements given below.

Pre-planning and prefabrication for the scaffold shall be done such as to allow completion of the structure, apart from the decking, in one day of work within the Battery Room. As alternatives to this the following may be observed:

The portion completed shall be adequately restrained to make it seismic with bracing and interlocking and contact with adjacent structural features.-

In lieu of the above, the A Main Battery System shall be maintained operable, with no non-seismic temporary structures in the A Battery Room.

During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by a qualified individual.

Extreme care must be exercised in working adjacent, to or above the batteries during construction, use, and teardown of the scaffold.

Sufficient clearances are to be provided for Electrician access to the battery.

Prior to use, the structure shall be inspected by the Job Supervisor to confirm that its co'nstruction was in -accordance with the sketch. Upon successful confirmation the Job Supervisor shall document this confirmation for the original copy of the Authorization Form, and so notify the Shift Supervisor.90-157 The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The affects and methods to cope with loss of D.C. power are given in the following:

UFSAR Section 8.1.4.4 Potential Risk of Station Blackout UFSAR Section 8.3.2.1 Description UFSAR Section 8.3.2.2 Analysis Procedure ER-ELEC.2 Crosstie TSC Battery to A or B DC Bus Also analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report associated with this proposed installation is the following:

Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

5/9/90 B BATTERY ROOM SOUTHWEST CORNER PENETRATION SEALING INSPECTION EWR 4941 SCAFFOLD 90-158 A work platform is needed to inspect penetration seals in the southwest corner of the B Battery Room adjacent to the B Battery to be about 8 ft. from the floor. The duration of existence of this scaffold is estimated to be a month. In consideration of any possibility for inoperability of DC electric system equipment in the A Battery Room within this fairly lengthy duration the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment).

The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167).

It shall not be started until the wooden scaffold over the B Battery bank is completed; as such, that scaffold (90-157) shall serve as a barrier to prevent short circuiting the battery with metal scaffold materials. This subject scaffold shall be removed prior to removal of the wooden scaffold.

The Zob Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Extreme care must. be exercised in working adjacent to the batteries and other DC electric equipment during construction, use, and teardown of the scaffold.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all instrumentation and panels in the area.90-158 The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The affects and methods to cope with loss of D.C. power are given in the following:

UFSAR Section 8.1.4.4 Potential Risk of Station Blackout UFSAR Section 8.3.2.1 Description UFSAR Section 8.3.2.2 Analysis Procedure ER-ELEC.2 Crosstie TSC Battery to A or B DC Bus Also analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report associated with this proposed installation is the following:

Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specif~cations.

2/26/90 B BATTERY ROOM NORTH END PENETRATION SEALING INSPECTION EWR 4941 SCAFFOLD 90-159 Work platforms are needed to inspect penetration seals in the north end of the B Battery Room adjacent to the B Battery Charger and B Battery Disconnect Switches to be about 8 ft. from the floor. The duration of existence of this scaffolding is estimated to be a month. In consideration of any possibility for inoperability of DC electric system equipment in the A Battery Room within this fairly lengthy duration the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167).

It shall not be started until the wooden scaffold over the B Battery bank is completed; as such, that scaffold (90-157) shall serve as a barrier to prevent short circuiting the battery with metal scaffold materials. This subject scaffold shall be removed prior to removal of the wooden scaffold.

The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy, of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage,'r is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Extreme care must be exercised in working adjacent to the batteries and other DC electric equipment during construction, use, and teardown of the scaffold.90-159 Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance. access to all instrumentation and panels in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The affects and methods to cope with loss of D.C. power are given in the following:

UFSAR Section 8.1.4.4 Potential Risk of Station Blackout UFSAR Section 8.3.2.1 Description UFSAR Section 8.3.2.2 Analysis Procedure ER-ELEC.2 Crosstie TSC Battery to A or B DC Bus Also analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report associated with this proposed installation is the following:

Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report. because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismi6 "fea6xre, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of'echnical Specifications.

May 15, 1990 BUS 16 SOUTH PORTION AREA PENETRATION SEALING INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-160 In order to inspect penetration seals above the south portion of Bus 16 a scaffold is needed, to provide a work platform approximately 15 ft. from the floor.

In order to prevent any interference with activities involving the alternate train Bus 14 and MCC-1C, it is planned to construct the scaffold as a seismic installation. The scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment).

The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire 'all plank decking in place.may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be conf irmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing, and maintenance access to all electrical panels on the Bus 16 and MCC-lD, to include clearance to rack out breakers.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.90-160 The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change to the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it, will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

May 15, 1990 BUS 16 NORTH END AREA PENETRATION SEALING INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-161, In order to inspect penetration seals above the north end of Bus 16 a scaffold is needed, to provide a work platform approximately 15 ft. from the floor.

In order to prevent any interference with activities involving the alternate train Bus 14 and MCC-lC, it is planned to construct the scaffold as a seismic installation. The scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) .

The guidelines statement 4. 0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing, and maintenance access to all electrical panels on the Bus 16 and MCC-lD, to include clearance to rack out breakers.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

i 0

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with described above it will not have any adverse effect on 'ccesses any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis'vents analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change to the Plant Technical'pecifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not. create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment, or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

5/16/90 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP AREA PENETRATION SEAL INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-162 In order to inspect penetration seals at the north wall by the Turbine Auxiliary Feedwater Pump area, a scaffold is needed to provide a work platform approximately 10 ft. high adjacent to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. Concurrent with this are two other sites of scaffolds for inspections in the vicinities of the A and B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.

Because of the concurrent activity which could potentially affect both trains of Auxiliary Feedwater System components, construction, and teardown activities shall take place at only one site at a time. In addition, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitz simmons on Authorization Form 89-167) . The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result, in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Steam Line Rupture Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

5/16/90 B MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP AREA PENETRATION SEAL INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-163 In order to inspect penetration seals at the southwest corner of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump area, a scaffold is needed to provide a work platform approximately 17 ft. high adjacent to the B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. Concurrent with this are two other sites of scaffolds for inspections in the vicinities of the A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.

Because of the concurrent activity which could potentially.

affect both trains of Auxiliary Feedwater System components, construction, and teardown activities shall take place at only one site at a time. In addition, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 4. 0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167) . The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will.be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

0 90-163 The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Steam Line Rupture Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic

.

feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

-The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

5/16/90 A HOUSE HEATING BOILER FEED PUMP AREA PENETRATION SEAL INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-164 In order to inspect penetration seals at the west and north walls of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump area, a scaffold is needed to provide a work platform approximately 20 ft. high adjacent to the A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. Concurrent with this are two other sites of scaffolds for inspections in the vicinities of the B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.

Because of the concurrent activity which could potentially affect both trains of Auxiliary Feedwater System components, construction, and teardown activities shall take place at only one site at a time. In addition, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall .verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic -capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained. for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

tA 0

90-164 The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events 'analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Steam Line Rupture Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important'o safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

6/11/90 A AND B DIESEL GENERATOR ROOMS EWR-3990 OVERHEAD COVER REMOVAL SCAFFOLDS 90-3.68 Scaffolds are needed just inside the Diesel Generator Room overhead doors to rise approximately 10'rom the floor. The work is planned to be done in each room simultaneously. Because of this the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) .

The guideline statement 6.0 shall be augmented with the requirement that the scaffolds shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift.

An additional requirement shall be that, the scaffolds are to be erected in one Diesel Generator Room at a time. Upon completion of the first installation, prior to beginning erection of the scaffold in the second Diesel Generator Room, the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead, shall confirm and, document the seismic capability in relation to the guidelines.

This confirmation shall include review of attributes such as configuration of the scaffold frames and securing of the planks.

Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of this confirmation prior to proceeding with the installation in the second Diesel Generator Room. After such confirmation, erection of the second scaffold may begin, accompanied by monitoring, conf irmation, notification and documentation as with the first scaffold.

The Construction Engineer or Liaison Engineer shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided.

During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer in his stead.

it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, fire fighting provisions, and adj oining rooms in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed.

Based on these, the determinations called for in lOCFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the facility or procedures as described in the, Safety Analysis Report As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Loss of all A.C. power to the station auxiliaries Decrease in heat removal by the secondary system with coincident loss of on-site and external (off-site) A.C.

power to the station Steam Generator tube rupture Rupture of a steam pipe Primary system pipe rupture Anticipated transients without SCRAM with a loss of A.C. power Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

June 21, 1990 AUXILIARY BUILDING INTERMEDIATE LEVEL WEST STAIRWELL PENETRATION FIRE SEAL INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-173 A work platform is needed to inspect fire barrier penetration seals near the ceiling from the stairwell north to adjacent to the Containment wall, over the west end of the Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger. Standby Auxiliary Feedwater System Containment isolation MOVs are located on the north side of the SFPHX.

The space between the heat exchanger and containment is very congested with piping, pipe support structures, regulators, valves, instruments, and lead shielding for a process monitor in the service water piping from the heat exchanger. A major portion of the equipment, here is associated with the waste gas system supporting the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank and the Pressurizer Relief Tank, both of which are in Containment. Immersed within

-this space is one of the Containment Mini-purge discharge isolation valves.

Because of the location of the above discussed SAFW Containment isolation MOVs, the scaffold shall be constructed as seismic using the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons. October 31, 1988 memo attachment).

The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and, documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person per forming such conf irmation o f seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

it If is foreseen in the scaffold'lanning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from instance a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this the Structural Engineer shall review the installation,, and upon being satisfied

,

with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.90-173 During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, fire fighting provisions, and adjoining rooms in the area.

Locked area access to the Spent Fuel controlled by a locked gate. Ensure that Pool filter vault is the scaffold does not, allow any easier access to this area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Accidental Release Waste Gas Steam Generator Tube Rupture Rupture of a Steam Pipe Primary System Pipe Rupture Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not, increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.90-173 The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

!

July 2, 1990

.CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING ROOM NORTH WALL PENETRATION FIRE SEAL INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-177 In order to perform fire seals inspection in the Control Room Air Handling Room a scaffold is needed. The equipment in the immediate area is, for the most part, dedicated to continuing habitability for the Main Control Room in the post-accident environment. Because of this, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 6.0 shall be augmented with the requirement that the scaffold shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift.

The guidelines statement. 4. 0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person per forming such conf irmation o f seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

90-l77 The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

7/11/90 PRESSURIZER LIQUID SAMPLE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION AOV-966B LEAK REPAIR SCAFFOLD 90-183 A work platform is needed for repair of the valve inside the Nuclear Sample System isolation valve hood enclosure, to be about 6 ft. above the floor. This is to accomodate working with the valve body at about waist level. Within the vicinity are, like the valve to be repaired, other Seismic Category I Containment isolation valves which are directly connected with the Reactor Coolant System and the Steam Generator Blowdowns. Because of this, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) .

The guidelines statement 4. 0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines

.provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to sca ffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If itduring is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, and instrumentation in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.90-183 The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety .Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Steam Generator tube rupture Ruptiure of a steam pipe Primary system pipe rupture Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety -Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent. of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

7/23/90 SERVICE BUILDING BASEMENT, PRIMARY WATER TREATMENT ROOM EAST WALL FIRE SEAL INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-186 A work platform is needed to inspect fire barrier penetration seals on the east wall behind the Condensate Storage Tanks. Due to the proximity of the scaffold to the CST's, the scaffold shall be constructed as seismic.

The Scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment).

The guidelines statement 4. 0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Job Supervisor, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be conf irmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If itduring observed is foreseen in the erection, that a scaffold planning stage, or is deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.

During construction and teardown, care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, fire fighting provisions, and adj oining rooms in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Loss of Normal Feedwater Seismic Events Rupture of Steam Pipe There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation 'does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the 'afety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

RELAY ROOM NORTH WALL WEST OF DOOR TO TURB1NE BUILDING PENETRATION FIRE SEAL INSPECTION EWR-4941 SCAFFOLD 90-188 A work platform is needed to inspect fire barrier penetration seals in the Relay Room on the North Wall. The scaffold will be located near the AMSAC and EH Panels.

constructed as seismic.

As a result, it shall be AMSAC itself is not a Safety Related System. The importance of the AMSAC System and other modifications that have been installed in this cabinet make this scaffold to be seismic.

it desirable for During construction and tear-down, extra care should be taken to prevent bumping any panels or conduit in the area.

The scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment).

The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by a qualified individual. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form.. The person performing such confirmation of seismic capability shall so notify the Shift Supervisor.

If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance, the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the sane manner as described above.

Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all instrumentation, panels, and adjoining rooms in the area.

The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in lOCFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.

As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided, to fire fighting provisions.

The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

July 26, 1989 TEMPORARY OXYGEN MONITOR TEMPORARY FLUID PROVISION REQUEST 589-28 AFFECTED DRAWING: 33013-1274, Waste Disposal Gas H2 and, N2 and Gas Analyzer (WD) P&ID AFFECTED PROCEDURES: 0 9 l~ S 4~2 ~ 12'P 11 ~ 13'P 11 6 INSTRUCTIONS TO OPERATIONS: The HP procedures referenced shall be conducted by lab personnel.

TECH. SPEC. REF: Sect. 3.9.2.5, Table 3.5-5, Table 4 '-5 The MSA Gas Analyzer is out of service for oxygen monitoring. In order to continue to monitor 02 per Tech. Spec. requirements of Table 3.5-5 at temporary connection will be utilized. The temporary monitor will tie into the Gas Decay Tank sample 3/8 in.

tubing with poly tubing connected with tubing nuts. The temporary tubing will be operated by lab personnel at pressures suitable for the sampler; however, the tubing to be used is more than capable of withstanding full Gas Decay Tank Pressure. The outlet of the monitor is to be tied to the vent header as does the present Gas Analyzer. Pressure reduction from Gas Decay Tank pressure is accomplished at an installed reducer upstream of the Gas Analyzer and the temporary connection. Tubing associated with this modif ication is designated as non-code class (ANSI B31.1) per RG&E Drawing 33013-1273. It shall be installed so that safety related equipment is not potentially af fected by a design basis accident (seismic event). The events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with the proposed installation are the following:

Radioactive Gas Waste System Failure Seismic Event The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because the function of the system will be maintained, pressure retaining capability is within design limits and there is no potential impact to safety related equipment during a seismic event.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because it can be readily isolated in the event, of a failure and because the overall function of the system is being maintained.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification because the

~ ~

capability to monitor 02 will be retained.

~ ~ ~

S'AFETY ANALYSIS FOR TEMPORARY RADWAST DEMINERALIZER SYSTEM 1~0 SCOPE OF ANALYSIS 1~1 The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the safety aspects of installing a temporary demineralizing system for processing the excessive liquid radwaste from the 1989 outage. The evaporator and recycle systems have not been able to effectively process the added waste due to reduced capacity of the evaporator package. As a result, the on-site storage capability is near capacity severely limiting operation flexibility.

1.2 The temporary liquid waste processing system is a fluidized transfer demineralization system consisting of 5 to 6 resin vessels, booster pump, mechanical filter, dewatering pump and process control unit. The entire system is interconnected with flexible reinforced non-collapsible butyl rubber hoses designed for temperatures between -20 F and 180 F and pressure from 0 to 300 psig. The supplied system is designed and operated in accordance with the following standards and operating parameters.

a) Reg. Guide 1.143 b) ANSI 55.2 c) ANSI/ASME B31 1 ~

d) ASME B&PV Code Section VIII & IX e) Pressure 0-150 psig f) Temperature 50-135 F (Resin limited) g) Flow 15-200 gpm h) Hydro tested to 225 psig The shut-off head of the booster pump and the monitor tank transfer pump is 100 and 115 psig respectively. This is well below the design of all the temporary system components.

1~3 The temporary system will ~process waste from the Waste Holdup Tank using one of monitoring tanks as a batch tank.

The process cycle will consist of cycling the waste from the monitoring tank thru the resin beds 5 to 6 times until the activity level is acceptable for discharge to the cask. lake. The spent resin will then be sluiced to a shipping The piping arrangement will consist of a temporary hose connected from the discharge of the waste evaporator feed pump. at valve 1762A to the discharge of the monitoring tank pump at valve 1279. This hose will be used to transfer radwaste from the waste holdup tank via the evaporator feed pump to the A or B monitor tank. A second hose will then be connected from the discharge of the monitoring tank pump with a tee at valve 1279 to the inlet of the temporary waste processing system. This hose will be used to cycle the radwaste from

the monit'or tank to the waste processing system via the monitor tank pump. A third hose will be connected from the outlet of the waste processing system to the A and B monitor tank return line at valve 1291A and/or 1234 depending on flow requirements. This hose will be used to cycle the waste back to the monitor tanks.

1~4 The entire temporary system will be located in the drumming area of the Auxiliary Building operating floor elv. 271 ft.

The allowable floor loading for 'this area is 300 lb/ft Each of the demineralizer tanks has a minimum base diameter of 24 inches and weighs 2,200 lbs. full. Consequently, in order to adhere to the maximum floor loading, a minimum clearance of 6 inches must be maintained around each vessel.

1~5 The temporary system will also required 440V power, service air, and DI water connections. Electrical power will be supplied with a temporary cable from the 440V welding outlet located outside the drumming station on the truck bay wall.

The DI water and service air will be connected with flexible rubber hoses from connections already existing within the drumming area.

1.6'he DI water and service air are required for sluicing and vessel flushing. The DI water connection also serves as a backup water. source for cooling resins system develops during process down time.

if a leak in the 2 ' REFERENCES 2 ' RG&E R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 15.7.2 2 ' RG&E Ginna P&ID 33013-1268 2 ' RG&E Ginna P&ID 33013-1270 3 ' SAFETY ANALYSIS 3 ~ 1 A review has been performed of all the events analyzed in the Ginna Station FSAR and the events requiring analysis by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.70. The only events related to this temporary modification are a .radioactive liquid waste system failure and a seismic event.

3 2 The drumming area and monitoring tank areas are designed such that any piping or tank leakage will be collected

~

through the drainage system in the Auxiliary Building sump to be pumped back into the liquid waste system. The building sump and basement volume is suf ficient to hold the full volume of a CVCS liquid holdup tank (33,000 gallons) without overflowing to areas outside the building. The volume of a

p monitoring tank and demineralizer tank is 7,500 gallons and 115 gallons respectively. Since either tank is less than the volume of a holdup tank, the sump still has sufficient capacity to handle the monitor tank or demineralizer tank.

4 inch drains are located with sloping floors in front of the drumming area doorway and in the monitoring tank area.

3 ' In the event the process water is lost from the spent resins in the demineralizer tanks, the resins can be cooled by the backup DI water connection. Based on the analysis presented in section 15.7.2 for the primary water CVCS spent resin storage tank, it. will take 4 days for decay heat to generate enough heat to reach the resin 140 F temperature limit.

This is based on a 14 fuel failure. Waste from the waste holdup tank is collected from floor drains and is not expected to contain high activity levels. However Admini-strative controls will be established to ensure resin tanks are maintained with proper water level when concentrated resins are to be stored for more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3~4 The drumming area is enclosed by seismically designed walls.

No safety related equipment exists within the walls gf drumming area. Consequently, the demineralizer system. will not affect safety related systems during a seismic event should drumming it fail. The flexible hoses running outside area will be restrained and located to the prevent interference with any safety related ecplipment operation.

I 3.5 Based upon the evaluations in sections 3.1 thru 3.4 above, the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the station will remain unchanged by the installation of this temporary modification; and, the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the prevention of accidents and for the mitigation of the consequences of accidents will be unchanged by the installation of this temporary modification.

4.0 PRELIMINARY SAFETY EVALUATION" L

4.1 The proposed temporary modification does not involve an

'unreviewed safety question since:

a) the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important. to safety previously evaluated in the safetywaste analysis report will not be increased since the tank volumes are less than previously considered, or; b) the possibility of an accident or malfunction ofthea different type than any evaluated previously in safety analysis report will not be created since accepted codes and standards are followed, org

c) the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced since waste tank volumes are less than previously assumed.

March 9, 1990 OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL EXPEDITIOUS ACTION--

ply'OSS INTERIM nAn HOT LEG LEVEL TRANSMITTER 90-03 Generic letter 88-17 recommended expeditious actions including installing two independent RCS water level indications with the capability to provide water level information to Control Room operators. One such provision, a pressure" transmitter (PT-432A) with indication at the Main Control Board has been in permanent existence; however, a similar provision is to be installed prior to entering the next reduced reactor coolant inventory operation.

This will be installed at a test connection downstream of the Loop A Hot Leg Sample tap manual root valve 504, using tubing of material identical to the permanent installation for PT-432A in the B Loop Sample tap except that 3/8" tubing may be used in place of 1/4". The tubing is rated for pressure greater than 5,000 psig. A transmitter, similar to PT-432A, is to be installed, designated LIT-432A at the test point discussed above, to be mounted securely to the adjacent wall or on a stand which will be fabricated and installed such as to insure against toppling by use of struts, bumpers or tie-downs. In case of a break in the 3/8" tubing the leakage will be slow, and the level change will be monitored on the other channel.

The signal cable will be installed under the controls of procedure A-1405 installation and removal of temporary cables.

The existing procedure 0-2.3.1, Draining the Reactor Coolant System, is to be revised to address the indications to be monitored, including the subject provision. Regarding level indication difference between measurement points, the difference calculated from Westinghouse ESBU/WOG-88-173 dated October 14, 1988 will be provided to operators for guidance.

The above construction and operational requirements are to be observed. Based on these, the. determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.

The installation does not 'esult in a change to the assumptions of the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report because of the substantial tubing installation and the adequate support system to provided as discussed above, it will not have any adverse effect on the safety-related equipment in the vicinity, or result in a decrease in reactor coolant inventory. The design bases events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:

Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because the substantial tubing installation and the adequacy of the support system is such as to ensure there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.

90-03 The .installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because the substantial tubing installation and the adequacy of the support system to be utilized ensure there will be no adverse effect on safety-related equipment.

The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because the substantial tubing installation and the support system adequacy, as described above, ensure there will be no adverse effect on safety related equipment within the vicinity.

The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification because of the substantial tubing installation and the adequacy of the support system which ensure against any adverse effect on equipment or .systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.

3/20/90 SAFETY ANALYSIS FOR TEMPORARY RADWASTE DEMINERALIZER SYSTEM INSTALLATION 90-04 1.0 SCOPE OF ANALYSIS 1.1 The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the safety aspects of installing a temporary demineralizing system for processing the excessive liquid radwaste from th'e 1989 outage. The evaporator and recycle systems have not been able to effectively process the added waste due to reduced capacity of the evaporator package. As a result, the on-site storage capability is near capacity severely limiting operation flexibility.

1.2 The temporary liquid waste processing system is a fluidized transfer demineralization system consisting of 5 to 6 resin vessels, booster pump, mechanical filter, dewatering pump and process control unit. The entire system is interconnected with flexible reinforced non-collapsible butyl rubber hoses designed for temperatures between -20 F and 180oF and pressure from 0 to 300 psig. The supplied system is designed and operated in accordance with the following standards and operating parameters.

a) Reg. Guide 1.143 b) ANSI 55.2 c) ANSI/ASME B31 1 ~

d) ASME B&PV Code Section VIII & IX e) Pressure 0-150 psig f) Temperature 50-135 F (Resin limited) g) Flow 15-200 gpm h) Hydro tested to 225 psig The shut-off head of the booster pump and the monitor tank transfer pump is 100 and 115 psig respectively. This is well below the design of all the temporary system components.

The temporary system will process waste from the Waste Holdup Tank using one of monitoring tanks as a batch tank.

The process cycle will consist of cycling the waste from the monitoring tank thru the resin beds 5 to 6 times until the, activity level is acceptable for discharge to the lake. The spent resin will then be sluiced to a shipping cask. The piping arrangement will consist of a temporary hose connected from the discharge of the waste evaporator feed pump at valve 1762A to the discharge of the monitoring tank pump at valve 1279. This hose will be used to transfer radwaste from the waste holdup tank via the evaporator feed pump to the A or B monitor tank or the temporary demineralizer skid. A second hose will then be connected from the discharge of the monitoring tank pump with a tee at valve 1279 to the inlet of the temporary waste processing system. This hose will be used to cycle the radwaste from the monitor tank to the waste processing system via the monitor tank pump. A third hose will be connected from the outlet of the waste processing system to the A and B monitor tank return line at valve 1291A and/or 1234 depending on flow requirements. This hose will be used to cycle the waste back to the monitor tanks.

The entire temporary system will be located in the drumming area of the Aux. Bldg. operating floor elv. 271 ft. The allowable live floor loading for this area is 300 lbs/ft2.

Each of the six demin. tanks has a minimum base dia. of 24 in. and weighs 2200 lbs. full. The tanks will be located on top of the 4 ft. wide by 19 ft. long by 2.5 ft. thick concrete slab in the drumming station. The reinforced slab will distribute the tank loads over the entire slab area.

Using the weight of six tanks and 200 lbs. of lead shielding per tank, the floor loading will be approx. 190 lbs/ft2. for the raised slab area. The remaining equipment has the following weights:

Process Control Unit 2000 System booster pumps (2) 9300/pump 600 Filter vessels (3) 9180/filter 540 Dewatering pump 100 Sluice pump 100 Shielding 120/filter 360 total 3700 lbs.

Because of the equipments physical dimensions, their weights may be considered distrubuted over the lower 6 ft. x 19 ft.

floor area. This will produce a floor loading of 32 lbs/ft2.

All loads are within the 300 lbs/ft2 loading limit.

1.5 The temporary system will also required 440V power, service air, and DI water connections. Electrical power will be supplied with a temporary cable from the 440V welding outlet located outside the drumming station on the truck bay wall.

The DI water and service air will be connected with flexible rubber hoses from connections already existing within the drumming area.

1.6 The DI water and service air are required for sluicing and vessel flushing. The DI water connection also serves as a backup water source for cooling resins system develops during process down time.

if a leak in the

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 RG&E R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 15.7.2 2 ' RG&E Ginna P&ID 33013-1268 2 ' RG&E Ginna P&ID 33013-1270 CHEM-NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, INC., A proposal to Rochester Gas and Electric for Liquid Waste Processing at the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Section 2.0, Technical Approach.

N-89-0020-P02, July 19, 1989 GAI Dwg. D-422-022 3.0 SAFETY ANALYSIS 3.1 A review has been performed of all the events analyzed in the Ginna Station FSAR and the events requiring analysis by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.70. The only events related to this temporary modification are a radioactive liquid waste system failure and a seismic event.

3 ' The drumming area and monitoring tank areas are designed such that any piping or tank leakage will be collected through the drainage system in the Auxiliary Building sump to be pumped back into the liquid waste system. The building sump and basement volume is suf ficient to hold the full volume of a CVCS liquid holdup tank (33,000 gallons) without overflowing to areas outside the building. The volume of a monitoring tank and demineralizer tank is 7, 500 gallons and 115 gallons respectively. Since either tank is less than the volume of a holdup tank, the sump still has sufficient capacity to handle the monitor tank or demineralizer tank.

4 inch drains are located with sloping floors in front of the drumming area doorway and in the monitoring tank area.

3.3 In the event the process water is lost from the spent resins in the demineralizer tanks, the resins can be cooled by the backup DI water connection. Based on the analysis presented in section 15.7. 2 for the primary water CVCS spent resin storage tank, it will take 4 days for decay heat to generate enough heat to reach the resin 140 F temperature limit.

This is based on a 14 fuel failure. Waste from the waste holdup tank is collected from floor drains and is not expected to contain high activity levels. However Admini-strative controls will be established to ensure resin tanks are maintained with proper water level when concentrated resins are to be stored for more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3.4 The drumming area is enclosed by seismically designed walls.

No safety related equipment exists within the walls of drumming area. Consequently, the demineralizer system will not affect safety related systems during a seismic event should it fail. The flexible hoses running outside the drumming area will be restrained and located to prevent interference with any safety related equipment operation.

3.5 Based upon the evaluations in sections 3.1 thru 3.'4 above, the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the station will remain unchanged by the installation of this temporary modification; and, the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the prevention of accidents and for the mitigation of the consequences of accidents will be unchanged by the installation of this temporary modification.

4.0 PRELIMINARY SAFETY EVALUATION 4.1 The proposed temporary modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question since:

a) the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not, be increased since the waste tank volumes are less than previously considered, or; b) the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report will not be created since accepted codes and standards are followed, or; c) the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced since waste tank volumes are less than previously assumed.

SECTION E PROCEDURE CHANGES This section is to contain a description of the changes to procedures as described in the UFSAR and a summary of the safety evaluation pursuant to the recgxirements of 10 CFR 50.59(b).

There were none within this time period.

SECTION F - COMPLETED SPECIAL TESTS (ST) AND EXPERIMENTS This section is to contain a description of special tests and experiments performed in the facility, pursuant to the require-ments of l0 CFR 50.59(b). Within the time frame of this report, there were two conducted.

SAFETY ANALYSIS GINNA STATION TEMPERATURE STRATIFICATION MONITORING TEMPORARY MODIFICATION REVISION 1 MAY 12, 1989 0 PREPARED BY:

Electrical Engineer Date REVIEWED BY: 5=~2.

Reactor Engineer Date APPROVED BY:

Manager, Technical Engineering Date

Revision Status Sheet Latest Latest Latest Page Rev. Page Rev. Page Rev.

Safety Analysis Page ii Revision 1 Date 5 12 89

0 SAFETY ANALYSIS 1.0 SCOPE OF ANALYSIS:

NRC Bulletin No. 88-11, "Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification", requests all addressees to establish and implement a program to confirm pressurizer surge line integrity in view of the occurrence of thermal stratification, and requires them to inform the staff of the actions taken to resolve this issue. Pursuant to satisfying the requirement and schedule of Bulletin 88-11, Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation is participating in a program for partial resolution of this issue through the Westinghouse Owner's Group (WOG).

The WOG program is designed to benefit from the experience gained in the performance of several plant-specific analyses on Westinghouse PWR surge lines.

These detailed analyses included definition of revised thermal transients (including stratification). The overall analytical approach used in all of these analyses has been reviewed by the NRC staff. A significant amount of pressurizer surge line thermal monitoring data has been obtained in support of these plant-specific analyses. Additional pressurizer surge line thermal monitoring and plant system data continues to be made available within the WOG, resulting in a steadily increasing database.

Pressurizer surge line temperature stratification data will be collected at Ginna for inclusion in the WOG database.

1.2 Thermal stratif ication and cycling phenomena were also discovered in auxiliary piping connected to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). These phenomena may cause pipe cracks in the unisolable sections of auxiliary piping systems. USNRC issued Bulletin 88-08 and subsequent supplements to address this phenomena. As a result, electric utilities are required to provide response to the NRC regarding the review and identification of auxiliary pipe sections connected to the RCS that may be subjected to thermal stratification not considered in the design of the plant.

Westinghouse has identified three piping sections that may be subjected to thermal stratification. These are:

Safety Analysis Page 1 Revision 1 Date 5 12 89

a) charging line to Loop B hot leg between check valve 393 and the RCS nozzle b) alternate charging line to Loop A cold leg between check valve 383A and the RCS nozzle c) auxiliary spray line between check valve 297 and the main pressurizer spray line 1.3 This analysis addresses the consequences of installing temporary thermocouples on the pressurizer surge line, Loop B charging line, Loop A alternate charging line, and auxiliary spray line. Thermocouple extension wire shall be temporarily routed to a data acquisition controller. The controller shall provide a digital output to a remote personal computer. The data output line shall utilize temporary cable and existing spare circuits to exit containment.

1.4 In addition to the thermocouples, four temporary displacement transducers are to be installed on the pressurizer surge line. The transducers will monitor line movement during heat-up, cool-down, and during temperature stratification conditions.

2.0 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS 2.1 Ginna Station Procedure, A-303, "Preparation, Review, and Approval of Safety Analysis for Minor Modifications or Special Tests".

2~2 Ginna Station Procedure, A-1405, "Installation and Removal of Temporary Cables".

2~3 Ginna Station Procedure, "A-1406, "Control of Temporary Modifications".

2.4 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Updated Safety Analysis Report.

2.5 USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.70, Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, LWR Edition, Revision 3, November 1978.

2.6 Appendix R Alternative Shutdown System, "Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Revision 4, January 1987.

Safety Analysis Page 2 Revision 1 Date 5 12 89

GAI, "Fire Protection Evaluation" Report No. 1936, March 1977.

2.8 Letter, Eliasz to Wrobel, "852-A&B Limitorque Aluminum Covers", dated 3/7/86.

3.0 SAFETY ANALYSIS 3.1 A review has been made of all events analyzed in the Ginna FSAR and the events requiring analysis by the USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.70. The'vents related to this modification are:

1) seismic event

, 2) major and minor fires 3.1.1 All temporary instrument cable installed shall be routed to follow the respective line to be monitored and then drop vertically to containment floor elevation 235'. The temporary cable will then be routed along the floor, following the shield wall to the free standing data acquisition controller. No seismic impact is anticipated since instrument cable weight is negligible compared to pipe/insulation weight.

Instrument cable routed on the floor and the free standing controller (approx. 10"Hx 12"W x 24"D) will not affect seismic structures in the immediate vicinity.

The data acquisition controller will be placed outside of the shield wall near the lower end of the pressurizer.

3. 1.2 Temporary cable used for the data link shall follow the shield wall at elevation 235', rise to elevation south-east stairs, and follow the shield wall to 253'ia Incore Reference Junction Box 1B. No seismic impact is anticipated since this cable will follow a floor/stair routing.

3.1.3 Cable separation in Incore Reference Junction Box 1B shall be maintained. The temporary data link cable shall be spliced to spare circuit A780. Cable and conductor insulation shall be restored using Raychem WCSF sleeves. The spliced cables shall be dressed in Incore Box 1B so that distance between A780 and Incore Thermocouple cables is maximized.

Safety Analysis Page 3 Revision 1

This temporary modification will not propagate a major or minor fire.

. Cables used for thermocouples and thermocouple extensions are individually sheathed in Inconel Overbraid (thermocouples) or Tinned Copper Overbraid (extensions). No additional fire loading is anticipated by the overbraided cable. Temporary cable used for the data link is rated and qualified to IEEE-383 flame requirements as a minimum. Total estimated containment fire loading for this temporary data link cable is 200000 BTUs.

Temporary cable used for the data'ink will be spliced to existing spare cable A779 in the Air Handling Room.

Routing is through a floor penetration to the Mux.

Room. Total fire loading for the temporary cable in the Air Handling Room is negligible. Total fire loading for the temporary cable in the Mux. Room is estimated at 2000 BTUs.

Fire barrier penetrations will be repaired and replaced in accordance with existing plant procedures. Therefore existing seals will not be degraded.

This modification does not affect the safe shutdown analysis in the Appendix R submittal since there is no effect on separation of existing circuits, associated circuits, or fire area boundaries as analyzed in the Appendix R submittal.

This modification will not effect the capabilities of the Alternative Shutdown System. Furthermore, none of the existing procedures for obtaining an Alternative Safe Shutdown will be effected. This modification, therefore, complies with 10CFR50, Appendix R.

Table 6.1-3 of the Ginna UFSAR gives the Aluminum inventory in Containment. The total exposed area is 2197 Ft . This temporary modification will add a total of 10" Ft of exposed Aluminum.. The total weight of Aluminum in equipment is estimated to be 40 lbs. This includes Aluminum in data acquisition equipment, displacement transducers, and power supply. The 40 additional pounds of aluminum added to containment will add approximately 800 scf of hydrogen during an accident.

This amount of hydrogen generation is negligble compared with 30,000 scf of total hydrogen production during an accident. (See Reference 2.8)

Safety Analysis Page 4 Revision 1

. This modification does not degrade the capability of any Safety System to perform its function. The assumptions and conclusions of existing analyses are unchanged. No new types of events are postulated.

3 '.1 Therefore, it has been determined that the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the station have not been affected. It has also been determined that the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the consequences of accidents have not been affected.

4.0 PRELIMINARY SAFETY EVALUATION:

4.1 The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased by the proposed modification.

4.2 The possibility of an accident or a malfunction of a different type other than any evaluated previously will not be created by the proposed modification.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced by the proposed modification.

4,4 The proposed modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question or require a Technical Specification change.

Safety Analysis Page 5 Revision 1 0 Date 5 12 89

This modification does not degrade the capability of any Safety System to perform its function. The assumptions and conclusions of existing analyses are unchanged. No new types of events are postulated.

3.2.1 Therefore, it has been determined that the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the station have not been affected. It has also been determined that the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the consequences of accidents have not been affected.

4.0 PRELIMINARY SAFETY EVALUATION 4.1 The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased by the proposed modification.

4.2 The possibility of an accident or a malfunction of a different type other than any evaluated previously will not be created by the proposed modification.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced by the proposed modif ication.

The proposed modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question or require a Technical Specification change.

Safety Analysis Page 5 Revision 1 i'

This modification does not degrade the capability of any Safety System to perform its function. The assumptions and conclusions of existing analyses are unchanged. No new types of events are postulated.

3 ~ 2~1 Therefore, it has been determined that the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the station have not been affected. It has also been determined that the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the consequences of accidents have not been affected.

4.0 PRELIMINARY SAFETY EVALUATION'

' The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased by the proposed modification.

4.2 The possibility of an accident or a malfunction of a different type other than any evaluated previously will not be created by the proposed modification.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced by the proposed modification.

4 ' The proposed modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question or require a Technical Specification change.

Safety Analysis Page 5 Revision 1

(

This modification does not degrade the capability of any Safety System to perform its function. The assumptions and conclusions of existing analyses are unchanged. No new types of events are postulated.

3 ~ 2 ~ l Therefore, it has been determined that the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the station have not been affected. It has also been determined that the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the consequences of accidents have not been affected.

4.0 PRELIMINARY SAFETY EVALUATION:

4.l The accident or malfunction 'f probability of occurrence or the consequences of an equipment important to safety will not be increased by the proposed modif ication.

4~2 The possibility of an accident or a malfunction of a different type other than any evaluated previously will not be created by the proposed modification.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced by the proposed modification.

4 ' The proposed modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question or require a Technical Specification change.

Safety Analysis Page 5 Revision 1

(

This modification does not degrade the capability of any Safety System to perform its function. The assumptions and conclusions of existing analyses are unchanged. No new types of events are postulated.

3.F 1 Therefore, it has been determined that the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the station have not been affected. It has also been determined that the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the consequences of accidents have not been affected.

4.0 PRELIMINARY SAFETY EVALUATION:

4 ~ l The probability of occurrence or the accident consequences of an or malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased by the proposed modification.

4.2 The possibility of an accident or a malfunction of a different type other than any evaluated previously will

" 4 '

not be created by the proposed modification.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced by the proposed modification.

The proposed modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question or require a Technical Specification change.

Safety Analysis Page 5 Revision 1

~fety Analysis For, Special Test.

R I Speci-1 Tost sT-09.02 Contro1 Bui1ding Heat Gena=ation Rate'riginal Rev.1 Rev. 2 Nuclear Engineer Date Initial Date Initial Date Reviewed By:

.or En neer Initial Date Initia'ate Approved By: S9 Technical Manager Date Initial Date Initial Date 1.0 Sco~sof Al'lBl~si8 The purpose of Special Test ST-89.02 is to obtain the information necessary to determine the heat generated in various areas of. the Control Building during normal operation.

This information will then be used to analyze the thermal environment ,of the Control Building during Design Basis Accident (DBA), station blackout (SBO), and normal operating conditions.

1.2 The heat generation rate in the Control Building i to be determined by measuring and recording area wall and air temperatures over a minimum twenty-four (24) hour period to adequately account for room heat fluctuations.

1.3 The following areas of the Control Building are to be te .ted:

a ~ Control Room

b. Relay Room C. Computer Room

d. Battery Room IA

e. Battery Room lB 2.0 References 2.1 EWR 4529, "Ventilation System Requirements".

fety Analysis .Revision 0 Page 1 Special Test ST-89.02

i Ginna Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, 1989.

2.2.1 Section 3.8.4.1.2, "Design of Seismic Category I Structures Control Building".

2.2.2 Section 3.10.2, "Seismic Qualification of Electrical Equipment and Instrumentation".

2.2.3 Section 3.11.3.5, "Identification of Limiting Environmental Conditions Control Building".

2.2.4 Section 6.4, "Habitability Systems".

2.2.5 Section 9.4.3, "Control. Room Area Ventilation System".

2.2.6 Section 9.4.9.2, "Engineered Safety Features Ventilation Systems Relay Room" .

2.2.7 Section 9.4.9.3, "Engineered Safety Features Ventilation Systems Battery Rooms".

2.3 Ginna Station Technical Specifications, dated May 30, 1989.

Special Test Procedure ST-89.02, "Control Building Heat Generation Rate Testing".

3.0 Safet Anal sis 3.1 A review has been performed of all events analyzed in the Ginna Station UFSAR. The topics related to this special test are fires, circuit separation, and seismic events.

3.2 This special test involves placing electrical wire (used as thermocouples), temperature recorders, and digital temperature readouts in various locations throughout the Control Building and Turbine Building (Section 6 of Reference 2.4) . This equipment is in place on a temporary basis only (approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per each of the five areas) and will be removed at the conclusion of the special test.

3.3 At no time will any equipment used during normal operation or potentially required during abnormal or emergency conditions be removed from service. All ventilation systems being tested or being used by the special test are non-safety-related (emergency ventilation systems are not affected by the test) .

No Control Building penetrations are affected by the special test.

fety Analysis Revision 0 Page 2 Special Test ST-89.02 Date 10 23 89

.4 The equipment is in the Turbine Building and Control Building on a temporary basis only, is of minimal additional fire loading, and will be removed at the conclusion of the test; therefore, there are'o significant fire loading concerns.

Also, the areas subject to the test are either permanently staffed or frequently walked down on a normal basis by operations and security personnel. ln addition, Section 6 of Reference 2.4 requires a walkdown of the test equipment at least once per shift to ensure that it is functioning properly.

These precautions assist in the early detection of any fire hazards whether induced by the special test equipment or not.

3.5 At no time will any wiring be routed through or over cable trays, etc. allowing potential circuit cross'-connection (Section 5.4 of Reference 2.4) . Therefore, circuit separation will be maintained throughout the duration of the special test.

3.6 This special test includes the use of non-seismic equipment (i.e., thermocouples and their associated lead wires) on seismic structures (e.g., Control Room walls and floors) .

However, the thermocouples and lead wires are not of sufficient weight to cause concern with respect to loading on seismic structures. Also, the thermocouples and lead wires are being used on a temporary basis and will be removed at the conclusion of the test. Section 5.0 of Reference 2.4 also requires that the wiring be placed away from normal/emergency pathways and work locations. No wiring will be placed on the Seismic Category I Control Room ceiling.

4.0 Preliminar Safet Evaluation 4.1 The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report will not be increased by the proposed special test.

4.2 The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different

'ype than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report will not be created by the proposed special test.

4.3 The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced by the proposed special test.

4.4 The proposed special test does not involve an unreviewed safety question or require a Technical Specification change.

fety Analysis Revision 0 Page 3 Special Test ST-89.02

All of the above were reviewed by the PORC committee with respect to the Technica'l Specif ications and the committee has determined that no Technical Specification changes or violations were involved.

Additionally, these changes were reviewed in committee to determine if they presented an Unreviewed Safety Question and the general summations of these reviews are as follows:

These changes do not increase the probability of occurrence, or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR, because:

These changes were made to ensure continued operability/availability of plant equipment and will not result in any equipment being operated outside of its normal operating range. This results in continued operability/availability of equipment important to safety.

These changes additionally will not result in a change of operating characteristics of equipment used in transient/accident mitigation which precludes an increase in the probability of occurrence of an accident. Because these changes ensure continued availability of plant equipment, the limits shown in the Technical Specifications, and the assumptions of the safety analyses of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report continue to be met. As a result there is no increase in the consequences of any presently postulated accident.

2 These changes do not create the possibility for a new or a malfunction of a different

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different kind of accident, or type from any accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR because:

These changes do not present new failure mechanisms outside of those presently anticipated, and are bounded by the events contained in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, I

3 ~ These changes do not reduce the margin of safety because:

Present margins as contained in the Technical Specifications are valid, and these procedure changes are made within those limits. These procedure changes will not, result in violating availability in the baseline assumptions made for equipment the Technical Specifications, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.