ML20234C356
| ML20234C356 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1987 |
| From: | Kober R ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | Stahle C NRC |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8801060199 | |
| Download: ML20234C356 (51) | |
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1987 REPORT OF l
FACILITY CHANGES, TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS CONDUCTED WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL-FOR AUGUST 1986 THROUGH JULY 1987 SECTION A COMPLETED ENGINEERING WORK REQUESTS (EWR)
SECTION B COMPLETED STATION MODIFICATIONS (SM)
SECIION C TEMPORARY BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION, STRUCTURE FEATURES, SHIELDING, AND FLUID SYSTEM FEATORES SECTION D PROCEDURE CHANGES SECTION E COMPLETED SPECIAL TESTS (ST) AND EXPERIMENTS R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-244 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION DATED DECEMBER 22, 1987 880106,0199B[O 44 PpR ADOCK O PDR s, R
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SECTION A~- COMPLETED ENGINEERING WORK REQUESTS l (EWRs) l l
This section contains a description of modifications in the .)
facility as described in the safety analysis report, and a- j summary of the safety evaluation for those changes, pursuant to the require 1 tents of 10CFR50.59(b) . l The basis for inclusion of an EWR in this section is closure of l the completed modification package in,the Document Control j Departments d
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EWR - 2930 LOAD TAP CIRCUIT 751 THIS MODIFICATION CGVERS THE INSTALLATION OF A 34.5 KV OVERHEAD LINE TAP TO SUPPLY CUSTOMER LOADS. THE AMOUNT OF LOAD THAT MAY BE TAPPED SHALL BE ESTABLISHED SO THAT DURING EMERGENCY CONDITIONS CIRCUIT 751 WILL ADEQUATELY SUPPLY SAFEGUARDS LOADS AS REQUIRED BY GDC-17.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY NRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENT RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION IS LOSS OF A.C. POWER TO STATION AUXILIARIES WHEN CIRCUIT 751 IS IN SERVICE.
UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS CIRCUIT 751 WILL CARRY NO LOAD AT GINNA AND NO LOAD AT STATION 414 (XEROX). THE PROPOSED CUSTCMER LOAD WILL BE 1.5 MVA. THE ADDITION OF 20 MVA EMERGENCY LOAD AT GINNA WILL PUT A TOTAL LOAD OF 21.5 MVA ON A LINE WHICH IS DESIGNED FOR A NORMAL. SUMMER LOAD OF 29.36 MVA.
THE WORST CASE LOAD CONDITION WOULD RESULT IF GINNA REQUIRES 20 MVA, COINCIDENT WITH STATION 414 (XEROX) REQUIRING 6 MVA PLUS THE PROPOSED CUSTOMER LOAD OF 1.5 MVA (ASSUMING ALL ONSITE GENERATION IS OUT OF SERVICE). THIS RESULTS IN A TOTAL LOAD OF 27.5 MVA. THE ONLY CONSEQUENCE TO THIS NEW LOAD BEING ADDED TO CIRCUIT 751 COULD BE A LOWER THAN ACCEPTABLE VOLTAGE AT GINNA.
IF THIS SHOULD OCCUR, THEN CUSTOMER LOAD SHEDDING WOULD BE REQUIRED TO RESTORE VOLTAGE LEVELS. THIS IS, HOWEVER, VERY UNLIKELY TO OCCUR WITH A LOAD OF 1.5 MVA. IN ADDITION, THE SECOND LEVEL 0 UNDERVOLTAGE PROTECTION WOULD AUTOMATICALLY CORRECT FOR ABNORMAL VOLTAGES. SINCE GINNA ONLY EXPERIENCES 20 MVA DURING A HOT SHUTDOWN TRANSIENT t1 HOUR OR LESS) NO LONG TERM VOLTAGE PROBLEMS ARE ANTICIPATED AND NO LOAD CONDITIONS WOULD PREVENT CIRCUIT 751 FROM FUNCTIONING AS AN ADEQUATE j OFFSITE SOURCE. ASSUMING THAT THE 29.36 MVA DESIGN LIMIT IS MAINTAINED OVER THE LIFE OF THE LINE, THEN A TOTAL OF 1.5 Mvh COULD BE USED FOR FUTURE GROWTH. THEREFORE CIRCUIT 751 CAN BE USED TO SUPPLY A MAXIMUM OF 3.O MVA OF CUSTOMER LOAD CONTINUOUSLY, WITHOUT CAUSING UNACCEPTABLE INPIANT VOLTAGES AT GINNA.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF THE CUSTOMER SINGLE LINE DIAGRAM TO DETERMINE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILURE OF THE MAIN BREAKER TO i CLEAR A BUS FAULT. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT SUCH A FAILURE WOULD {
RESULT IN BLOWING THE HIGH SIDE FUSE ON THE MAIN TRANSFORMER. 1 THE FUSE WOULD THEN ISOLATE THE CUSTOMER'S ONSITE GENERATION l AND LOAD FROM RG&E'S CIRCUIT 751. THIS CONDITION WOULD RESULT I IN A MOMENTARY VOLTAGE DROP ON THE SYSTEM. NO OTHER LONG-TERM I DISTURBANCE TO CIRCUIT 751 IS ANTICIPATED. THUS THE FACT THE I CUSTOMER PLANS 150 KW OF ONSITE GENERATION AND 150 KV OF -
STANDBY GENERATION HAS NO AFFECT ON THE RELIABILITY OR AVAILABILITY OF CIRCUIT 751 TO FUNCTION AS THE SECOND OFFSITE SOURCE TO GINNA STATION.
THE TWO (2) MILES OF LINE EXTENSION REQUIRED BY THIS MODIFICATION 1
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s INCREASE THE PROBABILITY THAT CIRCUIT 751 WILL BE UNAVAILABLE DUE TO LIGHTNING AND/OR ICING CONDITIONS. ANY ADDED OUTAGE EXPOSURE OF THIS TYPE CAN BE CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE DUE TO THE FACT THAT CIRCUIT 751 IS ONLY R'EQUIRED A FEW HOURS A YEAR, IF AT ALL. IN ADDITION, THE TWO MILES OF ADDED LENGTH IS SMALL COMPARED TO THE EXISTING 10 MILES.
THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY, PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE INCREASED EY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.
THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT
, TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN A SAFETY ANALYSIS WILL NOT BE CREATED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.
THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILL NOT BE REDUCED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.
l THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION OR REQUIRE A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE.
EUR-3037 RADWASTE CONTROL SYSTEM THIS MODIFICATION WILL PROVIDE A COMPUTER BASED CONTROL SYSTEM FOR THE EXISTING RADWASTE HANDLING EQUIPMENT.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULA-TORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE
- 1) MAJOR AND HINOR FIRES, 2) SEISMIC EVENT.
BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS, THEREFORE, DEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED j DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION HAVE NOT BEFN AFFECTED. i EWR-3651 40 TON AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE UPGRADE TO SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF REQUIREMENTS THIS MODIFICATION WILL UPGRADE THE AUXILIARY BUILDING 40 TON CRANE TO THE SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF REQUIREMENTS OF NUREG-0554. INCLUDED IN THE MODIFICATION WILL BE THE REPLACEMENT OF THE MAIN HOIST GEARBOX, REPLACEMENT OF THE ROPE, DRUM AND REEVING SYSTEM, ADDED SEISMIC BRIDGE RESTRAINTS, NEW HOOK BLOCK AND STRUCTURAL IMPROVEMENTS.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENT RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION IS THE SEISMIC EVENT.
s BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.
EWR-3679 STATION 13A SYNCHRONIZING RELAY THIS MODIFICATION CONSISTS OF INSTALLATION OF A SYNCHRONIZING l
RELAY AND AUXILIARY RELAYS AT STATION 13A WHICH WILL SUPERVISE MANUAL CLOSING. THE MODIFICATION AS PROPOSED HEREIN PROVIDES PROTECTION AGAINST SYNCHRONIZING ERRORS WHEN CONNECTING NO. 1 GENERATOR TO THE 115kV SYSTEM. SYNCHRONIZING IS PRESENTLY {
ACCOMPLISHED MANUALLY BY OBSERVING THE POSITION OF THE SYNCHROSCOPE. THE GENERATOR BREAKER IS THEN CLOSED AT A TIME WHICH, ACCORDING TO THE DISCRETION OF THE OPERATOR, WILL MINIMIZE THE ANGULAR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ROTATION OF THE TURBINE-GENERATOR AND THE 115kV SYSTEM. SHOULD CLOSING OCCUR WHEN THERE 1S TOO GREAT AN ANGULAR DIFFERENCE, SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE TURBINE-GENERATOR AND THE GENERATOR STEP-UP TRANSFORMER WILL RESULT. THE FUNCTION OF THE ADDITION OF THE SYNCHRONIZING RELAY, IS TO PROVIDE LIMITS OF SLIP FREQUENCY AND ANGULAR
, DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NO. 1 GENERATOR AND THE 115kV SYSTEM WITHIN I
WHICH MANUAL CLOSING OF 1G13A72 OR 9X13A72 MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION '
ARE (1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES, (2) A SEISMIC EVENT, (3) A LOSS OF LOAD.
BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED. IT HA3 ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE ,
MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN l AFFECTED.
1 EWR-3744 CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLE SYSTEM THIS MODIFICATION INVOLVES THE REPLACEMENT OF THE 39 CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLE (CET) CONNECTORS AND EXTENSION WIRE FROM THE REACTOR HEAD AREA THROUGH A NEW THERMOCOUPLE PENETRATION TO THE CONTROL ROOM, ELIMINATING THE NEED FOR HEATED REFERENCE JUNCTION BOXES INSIDE CONTAINMENT. THIS MODIFICATION WILL MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF NUREG 0737 AND USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.97, REV. 3.
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I A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE: 1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES, 2) A SEISMIC EVENT, 3) A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA), AND 4) A HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK (HELB).
BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY l DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE {
CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS, HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE PRCPOSED MODIFICATION.
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l EWR - 3866 EADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM UPGRADE .
THIS MODIFICATION INVOLVES THE PROCUREMENT AND INSTALLATION l OF NEW AREA R.M.S. MONITORS IN LOCATIONS WHERE POST ACCIDENT l DOSE RATES HAVE BEEN ESTIMATED TO BE A POTENTIAL RADIATION HAZARD TO PLANT PERSONNEL. THESE MONITORS WOULD ALLOW PERSONNEL TO BE AWARE OF AND EVALUATE LOCAL DOSE RATES PRIOR TO ENTERING SPECIFIC AREAS. IN ADDITION, THIS PROJECT CALLS FOR THE UPGRADE l
OF A MONITOR WHOSE MAXIMUM SCALE READING DOES NOT PROVIDE SUFFI-CIENT INDICATION ON POSSIBLE POST ACCIDENT DOSE RATES.
l THE NEW R.M.S. AREA MONITORS WILL BE USED TO DETECT AND INDICATE j l RADIATION DOSE RATES IN THREE (3) NEW LOCATIONS AND ONE (1) ]
l EXISTING LOCATION. EACH MONITOR WILL PROVIDE VISUAL AND AUDIBLE ALARMS BOTH IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF THE DETECTOR AND IN A SECOND LOCATION CONVENIENT TO THE APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL. 1 THIS MODIFICATION IS IN RESPONSE TO APPENDIX B OF THE EMERGENCY l PREPAREDNESS APPRAISAL 50-244/81-22.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL THE EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC ;
REG. GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE i
- 1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES, 2) A SEISMIC EVENT, AND 3) A LOSS OF )
COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA).
I BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL l OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE I OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE l NOT BEEN AFFECTED.
l EWR-4039 l P.H. HOIST REPLACEMENTS THIS MODIFICATION INVOLVES THE REPLACEMENT OF THE P.H. CABLE
HOISTS IN CONTAINMENT AND OVER THE SPENT FUEL POOL WITH SUITABLE
" SHELF" REPLACEMENT HOISTS. ALSO INCLUDED WITH THIS MODIFICATION IS THE INSTALLATION OF DISCONNECT DEVICES IN THE PORTABLE CABLE TO THE SPENT FUEL PIT HOISTS, AND NEW PORTABLE CABLE AND DISCONNECT DEVICES TO THE REACTOR HEAD HOISTS AND EXTENDING THE PERMANENTLY INSTALLED CONDUIT AND CABLE TO THE EXISTING HOIST ON THE FUEL MANIPULATOR.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE: FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENTS, SEIEMIC EVENTS, FIRES, LOSS OF A.C. POWER AND " CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS".
BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE BEEN DETERMINED THAT NONE OF THE PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS AFFECT THE CABLE ROUTINGS, EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATIONS OR LOCATIONS, POWER SUPPLIES, FUSE AND BREAKER COORDINATION AND CONTROL OR INSTRUMENTATION LOCATION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT.
NO FIRE PROTECTIVE WRAPS OR FIRE BARRIERS WILL BE AFFECTED.
THEREFORE, SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY FOLLOWING ALL POSTULATED FIRES WILL NOT BE JEOPARDIZED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION.
, EWR-4044 MAIN CONTROL BOARD RECORDER REPLACEMENT THIS MODIFICATION WILL UPGRADE THE RECORDERS ON THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD. THIS MODIFICATION CONSISTS OF REPLACING THE EXISTING RK-28 RECORDER WITH 250 MODEL, CALLED RK-28A, AND RK-28B. THE RK-30A WILL BE REPLACED WITH NEW MODEL 165 RECORDER. THIS MODIFICATION IS NECESSARY TO DO THE FACT THAT THE EXISTING RECORDERS SPARE PARTS ARE NO LONGER BEING MANUFACTURED.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR, AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY THE USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION l ARE SEISMIC EVENTS AND FIRE.
BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS, THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE UNCHANGED, THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE UNCHANGED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILL NOT BE REDUCED.
EWR-4086 l EQUIPMENT HATCH CLOSURE PLATE l THIS MODIFICATION PROVIDES AN EQUIPMENT HATCH CLOSURE PLATE WHICH CAN BE BOLTED TO THE CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE WHEN THE
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EQUIPMENT HATCH UNIT IS REMOVED DURING PLANT OUTAGE. i A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY THE USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ;
ARE FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENTS, EARTHQUAKES AND FIRE.
BASED UPON THE ANALYSIS DESCRIBED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, THE l PLANT WILL ALREADY BY IN A COLD SHUTDOWN OR REFUELING MODE WHEN I THE CLOSURE PLANT IS USED. THUS, THERE WILL BE NO IMPACT ON I SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY AND ALL ASSUMPTIONS AND ANALYSES !
CONCERNING APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE REMAIN VALID.
i EWR-4126 ]
MODIFICATION OF BACKUP RELAYS PROTECTION SCHEME FOR REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS 1A AND 1B THIS MODIFICATION WILL REQUIRE WIRE CHANGE TO THE EXISTING CONTROL SCHEME FOR THE BACKUP RELAYS FOR THE REACTOR COOLANT .
PUMPS 1A AND 1B.
THIS MODIFICATION WILL MODIFY THE EXISTING CONTROL SCHEME So f THAT THE CONTACTS OF BOTH 62 TIME DELAY RELAY, AND 50S OVER-CURRENT RELAY MUST SIMULTANEOUSLY BE CLOSED IN ORDER TO OPERATE 86 BUS LOCKOUT RELAY.
THE SPURIOUS OPERATION OF 62 TIME DELAY RELAY HAS OCCURRED DURING REFUELING SHUTDOWN DUE TO VIBRATION INDUCED BY THE OPENING AND CLOSING OF THE R.C.P. BREAKER DOORS, CAUSING UNNECESSARY TRIPPING OF THE 4160 VOLTS BUS. THIS MODIFICATION WILL PREVENT THIS PROBLEM FROM RE-OCCURRING AGAIN.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE FIRE AND/OR EARTHQUAKE, LOSS OF COOLANT FLOW INCIDENT.
BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT )
HAS THEREFORE, DEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.
EWR-4227 REACTOR HEAD VENT VALVE CONNECTORS THIS MODIFICATION CONSISTS OF INSTALLING NECESSARY CABLE CONNECTORS TO THE REACTOR HEAD VENT VALVE CABLES. PRESENTLY THE ELFCTRICAL CABLES TO THE REACTOR HEAD VENT VALVES MUST BE CUT AND RE-SPLICED TO ACCOMMODATE REMOVAL OF THE REACTOR HEAD DURING REFUELING EACH YEAR. REPLACING THESE SPLICES WITH
4 1 QUALIFIED MULT1-CONDUCTOR CONNECTOR ASSEMBLIES WILL DECREASE THE NUMBER OF MANHOURS AND RADIATION EXPOSURE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ACTIVITY.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES, SEISMIC EVENT, AND LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA).
BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.
EWR-4228 P.T.-420 POWER SOURCE THIS MODIFICATION WILL UPGRADE THE PT-420 POWER SOURCE TO A CATEGORY 1 POWER SOURCE AS STATED IN RGEE'S FEBRUARY 28, 1985 LETTER TO THE NRC CONCERNING REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97. THIS TRANSMITTER IS PRESENTLY FED FROM 120 VAC INSTRUMENT BUS 1D WHICH IS NOT A CATEGORY 1 POWER SOURCE AND THUS CANNOT BE RELIED UPON FOLLOWING A SEISMIC EVENT.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE: 1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES, 2} SEISMIC EVENT. 'j BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN '
AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.
EWR-4270 NEW 480 VOLT 3 PHASE 60 Hz FEEDER FOR THE RADWASTE STORAG.E BUILDING THIS MODIFICATION WILL PROVIDE A NEW 480 VOLT 3 PHASE 60 Hz POWER TO THE RADWASTE STORAGE BUILDING. THE EXISTING POWER il SUPPLY SYSTEM IS INADEQUATE FOR THE PRESENT LOAD REQUIREMENTS. , l WITH THE . INSTALLATION OF A NEW UNDERGROUND FEEDER FROM THE l EXISTING PAD MOUNTED TRANSFORMER NO. 3002 TO THE NEW DISTRIBUTION PANEL IN THE RADWASTE BUILDING, THE PRESENT AND FUTURE LOAD -
REQUIREMENTS WILL BE SATISFIED. THE EXISTING POWER FEEDER AND
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I DISTRIBUTION PANEL WILL BE RETAINED AS PART OF THE RADWASTE BUILDING POWER SUPPLY.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES AND SEISMIC EVENTS.
BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.
EWR-4312 MANIPULATOR CRENE MODIFICATION THIS MODIFICATION WILL TEMPORARILY ADD A MONORAIL BEAM AND HOISI 3YSTEM TO THE NORTH SIDE OF THE FUEL MANIPUI.ATOR CRANE IN CONTAINMENT. IT WILL HAVE A 1-TON CAPACITY AND WILL BE UTILIZED PRIMARILY TO TRANSFER GUIDE TUBES FROM ONE SIDE OF THE REACTOR i CAVITY TO TF OTHER DURING THE SPLIT FIN CHANGEOUT OPERATIONS, ,
b ALL MODlJ10ATIONS WILL BE REMOVED PPM R TO PLANT STARTUP.
A R2 VIEW HAS DEEN t/ADE OF ALL EVENOS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA l STATIOP UFSAR ANO 2HE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE FUZ.s HANDLING ACCIDENTS, SEISMIC EVENTS, FIRE.T, LOSS OF A.C. POWER AND " CONTROL OF.REAVY LOADS" (NUREG-0612).
BASI.D UPOri THE MkLYSES DESCRIBED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS T H E P F,T O R E , BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY .
DURING NORMA?, OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONG ANTICIPATED }
DURINC TG1 LI .k '. OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT EEEN REDUCED. IT HAS '
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ALSO 13fEA V;SfftAINED THAT THE ADEGUACY , OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, j AND CC7M.fDftS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE ;
MITIGXIION' CG THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT LEEN l AFFECCED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION. i 4
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} EWR-4317 \ 1 C.W.P. lA AND 1B TARGST IGDICATION -
THIS MODIFICATION PCLL PROVIDE A TARGET RELAY FOR BOTH THE (55) ;
AND THE d27) RELAYS.' THE CIRCULATING WATER PUMP MOTOR 1A AND ;
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[ 1B HAVL' A LOW POWETt FACTOR RELAY (55) AND LOSS Q? EXCITA1 ION 1
/ RELAY (27'/ WITHOUT A TARGET OR ALARM KtiCTION TO IM DICA'IE .
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\ OPERATION. THE ,FU VTION OF THE TARGET 'MLAYS IS TO PAOVIDE
, LOCAL INDICXTION TitAT THE POWER FACTOR L.M (55) OR IDSS OF '
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V EXCIT)) TION IELAY (27) HAS,OPEP3TED.
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fx ) A REVISM HAS BEEN Wig E Of ALb EVENTS ANA.NYZED' IN THE GINNA !
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STATION UFSAR AND THE m, VENTS REQUIRING ANALYSTS BY USNRC '
l REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE: FIRE, EARTHQUAKE AND LOSS OF CIRCULATING WATER.
l BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DES'2RIBED IN THE CAFETY ANALYSIS, Ir1 ; l HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY f )
DUR):NG NOMIAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED ,
DURING THE . LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTUP2S, SYSTEMS, i AND COMPONENTG PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE KITIGATION CP THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENT 3 HAVE NOT BEEN
.AFFECOED BY TKd IMPLEMENTATION 6F THIS MODIFICATION. i i
EWR-4533 SEAL INJECTION FILTER V Myfd THIS MODIFICATION WILL REPIACE THE EXISTING GICBE VALVES ON THE ;
LINES TO AND FROM THE SEAL 1R7ECTION FILTERS FOR THE NEACTOR I COOLANT PUMPS (RCP) A AND B. THE NEW VALVES E LL BE ASME III CLASS 2, SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED, CLOPE VALVES. THE VALVES ' ARE ,
LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT, EERIND THE SEAL UOECTION FII!fER l SHIELD WALL. THE MODIFIED PIPIMG SYSTEM, INCD* DING SUPPORTS WILL BE SE1SMICALLY QUALIFIED.
1 A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVINTS ANALYZID IN THE GINNA j STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REGUIRING ANALYSIS BV USNRC ,
REGULATORY GOIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION , l ARE: 1) INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS / FIRES,. FLOOD, STORM, OR EARTHQUAKE, AND 2) LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT PUM16 BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT ;
HAS THEREFORE, BEEN UETERMINED THAT THE MARGZNS OF SAFET7 i DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED i DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BE7N REDUCED. IT HAS ;
ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQtACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PRCVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF _ ACCIDENTS AND '0HE
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MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT DEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPIJMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION. I s
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i SECTION B - COMPLETED STATION MODIFICATIONS (SMs)
This section contains a description of station modification procedures performed in the facility as described in the safety ,
analysis report. Station modification procedures are written to !
complete a portion of an Engineering Work Request (EWR) identified j by the same parent number. Station Modifications are reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee to ensure that no unreviewed safety questions or Technical Specification changes are involved with the procedure. l The basis for inclusion of an SM in this section is closure of the SM where portions of the parent EWR, in the form of other SMs or other documentation, remain to be completed.
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4 SM-1833.26 AUXILIARY BUILDING SUMP DRAIN LINE MODIFICATION 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION j OF A DRAIN LINE AND VALVE IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING DRAINAGE i SYSTEM.
SM-2504.8 INSTALLATION OF MINI-PURGE SYSTEM BU'rfixFLY VALVES 7479. 7480.
7481 AND OTHER ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS - MECHANICAL J
THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE MECHANICAL VALVE PORTION OF THE MINI-PURGE SYSTEM INSTALLATION.
SM-2504.11 MINI-PURGE SYSTEM ELHCTRICAL INSTALLATION OUTSIDE OF CONTAINMENT AND AUXILIARY BUILDING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION FOR THE MINI-PURGE SYSTEM.
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SM-2504.12 INSTALLATION OF MINI-PURGE SYSTEM PRESSURE BLOWER AND ASSOCIATED ;
COMPONENTS - MECHANICAL 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION -
AND TURNOVER OF THE MINI-PURGE SYSTEM PRESSURE BLOWER AND- !
ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS TO THE EXISTING ILRT EXHAUST LINE AT PENETRATION #309. I 1
SM-2504.13 ,
CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE SUPPLY SYSTEM ELFATRICAL INSTALLATION ;
j OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT i
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE COMPLETION OF THE ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE SUPPLY SYSTEM AT PENETRATION 309 IN AREAS OUTSIDE OF CONTAINMENT.
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CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE SUPPLY SYSTEM ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION
- INSIDE CONTAINMENT THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE SUPPLY SYSTEM AT PENETRATION 309 INSIDE CONTAINMENT.
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l SM-2504.15 MINI-PURGE SYSTEM MECHANICAL INSTALLATION OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AT PENETRATION 309 (V7445)
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW MINI-PURGE SUPPLY VALVE AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS AT PENETRATION 309.
1 SM-2504.16 MINI-PURGE SYSTEM MECHANICAI_ INSTALLATION INSIDE CONTAINMENT AT PENETRATION 309 (V7478)
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW MINI-PURGE SUPPLY VALVE AND j ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS AT PENETRATION 309.
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SM-2504.20 ;
CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE SUPPLY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE TEST USING l EXISTING DEPRESSURIZATION VALVES '
I THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE SUPPLY SYSTEM. i i
SM-2512.114 SEISMIC UPGRADE OF PIPE SUPPORTS - REWORK OF SUPPORT SWU-387 ON MLALYSIS LINE SW-1410 SERVICE WATER RETURN FROM A/C CHILLERS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT / DOCUMENT MODIFICA-TION OF SERVICE WATER SUPPORT SWU-387.
SM-2602.2 TESTING OF PRESSURIZER INSULATION MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING OF THE LOOP SEAL PIPING AND TURNOVER OF REFLECTIVE INSULATION ON THE TOP OF THE PRESSURIZER.
SM-2606.59 PASS PANEL _ FUNCTIONS AND CALIBRATION TEST THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURES IS TO ESTABLISH THE CALIBRATION DATA FOR THE PASS INSTRUMENTS AND DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PANEL EQUIPMENT MEETS THE DESIGN INTENT.
SM-2606.13 IN-SERVICE LEAK TEST FOR THE LGSP OF THE PASS THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING OF THE POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS PERFORMED UNDER PROCEDURE SM-2606.11. THIS WILL INCLUDE AN IN-SERVICE LEAK INSPECTION OF THE LIQUID AND GAS SAMPLE PANEL.
SM-2606.14 INSTALLATION OF FLOW SWITCH IN CV GAS INLET LINE THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE SM PROCEDURE TO CONTROL INSTALLATION.
SM-2606.20 PASS PANEL DESIGN CRITERIA CALIBRATION TEST THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO VERIFY THAT THE PASS INSTRUMENTATION MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF NUREG-0737, SECTION IIB.3 AND THE DESIGN CRITERIA.
SM-2606.20J "B" LOOP SAMPLE VERIFICATION TEST l
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS FOR "B" LOOP SAMPLE VERIFICATION TEST.
SM-2799.20 RVLMS HARDWARE AND INDICATION MODIFICATIONS THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF RVLMS HARDWARE AND INDICATOR MODIFICATIONS.
SM-3092.1 FIRE SIGNALING SYSTEM CONDUIT RELOCATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE RELOCATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF THE FIRE SIGNALING SYSTEM CONDUIT ZD33A BETWEEN DETECTOR S01 DD AND STP 2D.
SM-3092.3 CORE DRILLING FOR BORIC ACID PIPING UPGRADE IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL CORE DRILLING IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING FOR RELOCATING THE DISCHARGE PIPING FROM THE 826 VALVES.
SM-3092.5 INSTALLATION OF TRANSFORMERS, CONDUIT, CONDUIT SUPPORTS, AND !
SPLICE BOXES FOR HEAT TRACING ZONE 58 THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF TRANSFORMERS, CONDUIT, CONDUIT SUPPORTS, AND SPLICE BOXES FOR HEAT TRP.CING ZONE 58. i SM-3092.6 BORIC ACID PIPING UPGRADE, REMOVAL OF EXISTING HEAT TRACE CABLE AND EQUIPMENT THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT / DOCUMENT HEAT TRACING REMOVALS ON BORIC ACID PIPING TO SI PUMPS.
SM-3100.30 INSTALLATION OF PERFORMANCE INSTRUMENTATION FOR THE MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ,
GUIDELINES FOR THE INSTALLATION OF PERFORMANCE INSTRUMENTATION. I THIS WILL INCLUDE THERMOWELLS, PRESSURE GAUGES, AND FLOW METERS, IN THE REHEATER STEAM INLETS, 2ND AND 4TH PASS REHEATER CONDEN-SATE DRAIN LINES, MSR SHELLSIDE DRAIN LINES, CROSSUNDER PIPING AND CROSSOVER PIPING. THIS WILL ALSO INCLUDE THE INSTALLATION OF THERMOCOUPLE (WITH DIGITAL READOUT) FOR THE REHEATER TUBE BUNDLES. THIS PROCEDURE INCORPORATES WORK TO BE ACCOMPLISHED DURING AND FOLLOWING THE PLANT OUTAGE.
SM-3100.50 MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION FOR THE HDT UPGRADE THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION OF MODIFICATIONS TO THE HEATER DRAIN TANK AND ASSOCIATED SECONDARY SIDE SYSTEMS. THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO IMPROVE SECONDARY SIDE PERFORMANCE AND ALLEVIATE SECONDARY SIDE TRANSIENTS.
SM-3100.51 MODIFICATION TO THE MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER SYSTEM UPGRADE THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF MODIFICATION REQUIRED TO THE MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATERS NOT PERFORMED DURING THE 1984 OUTAGE. THESE MODIFICATIONS INCLUDE; INSTALLATION OF ISOLATION VALVES FOR THE EXCESS STEAM LINES, REHEATER HEAD PIPING WELD REPAIRS, PI ROOT VALVE ROTATION, ANNUBAR FLOW SENSOR REPAIR, ADDITION OF PI PIGTAILS, #5 EXTRACTION STEAM TEST CONNECTIONS, AND ADJUSTMENT OF EXISTING PIPE SUPPORTS.
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l SM-3100,53 FUNCTIONAL TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE HEATER DRAIN TANK MODIFICA-TION THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE FUNCTIONAL TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE HDT MODIFICATIONS. THE FUNCTIONAL l TESTING WILL INCLUDE TESTING OF EACH HEATER DRAIN TANK (HDT)
LEVEL CONTROLLER, QUENCH WATER CONTROL VALVE, MSR DRAIN LINE SOLENOID VALVES, SHELLSIDE EMERGENCY DUMP VALVES, CONDENSATE ]
BYPASS VALVE, FW HEATER 4A HIGH LEVEL MAGNETROL, AND HOTWELL LEVEL CONTROLLER.
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SM-3260.19 .
REWORK OF CABLE SPLICE CONNECTIONS FOR SOLENOID VALVE ACTJATORS OF THE MSIV, FEED REG. AND FEED REG. BYPASS VALVES THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO DOCUMENT AND CONTROL PEWORK OF SOLENOID VALVES FOR MSIV, FEED REG. AND FEED REG. BYPASS VALVES.
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SM-3272.6 RE-ROUTE OF POWER FEEDER FOR COMPUTER ROOM POWER DISTRIBUTION PANEL (MIMS PANEL)
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS THE RELOCATION OF POWER FEEDER FOR MIMS PANEL.
1 SM-3296.1643 q STRUCTURAL UPGRADE - WEST WALL AUXILIARY BUILDING >
THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT AND DOCUMENT UPGRADE OF THE AUXILIARY BUILDING WEST WALL.
SM-3296.1643A REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL INTERFERENCES TO THE AUX BUILDING WEST WALL STRUCTURAL UPGRADE THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE REMOVAL, INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL LINES THAT INTERFERE WITH THE STRUCTURAL UPGRADE OF THE AUX BUILDING WEST WALL.
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SM-3296.1644A RELOCATION OF ELECTRICAL CONDUITS TO FACILITATE STRUCTURAL UPGRADE OF THE NORTH WALL. AUXILIARY BUILDING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT / DOCUMENT RELOCA-TION OF ELECTRICAL CONDUITS WHICH INTERFERE WITH STRUCTURAL UPGRADE.
SM-3296.1645 STRUCTURAL UPGRADE - CONTROL BUILDING BELOW ELEVATION 271'0" THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT AND DOCUMENT.
MODIFICATION OF STRUCTURAL STEEL, ATTACHMENTS AND BRACING IN THE CONTROL BUILDING BELOW ELEVATION 271'0".
SM-3296.1646 STRUCTURAL UPGRADE-CONTROL BUILDING MAIN STRUCTURE COLUMNS AND BEAMS AT ELEVATION 289'-6" THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT AND DOCUMENT j CONTROL BUILDING STRUCTURAL STEEL MODIFICATIONS AT ELEVATION 1 289'-6".
SM-3296.1647 STRUCTURAL UPGRADE-CONTROL BUILDING TRUSSES AND GIRTHS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT AND DOCUMENT MODIFICATIONS TO CONTROL BUILDING TRUSSES AND GIRTHS.
SM-3296.1648A RELOCATION OF CONDUIT AND WIRE FOR CIRCUIT PSF 524 1
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO RELOCATE CONDUIT AND WIRE I (CIRCUIT PSF 524) FOR STRUCTURAL UPGRADE.
SM-3296.1657 STRUCTURAL UPGRADE - INTERMEDIATE BUILDING. UNCONTROLLED AREAS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT / DOCUMENT STRUCTUR-AL STEEL UPGRADE IN THE CLEAN INTERMEDIATE BUILDING. i SM-3296.1658 STRUCTURAL UPGRADE - CONTROLLED INTERMEDIATE BUILDING LOW ROOF i THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL-THE UPGRADE OF STRUCTURAL STEEL AT THE LOW ROOF AREA OF THE CONTROLLED AREA INTERMEDIATE BUILDING. !
I SM-3319.38 MCC-1G BREAKER REPLACEMENT THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT BREAKER REPLACE-MENT MCC-1G.
SM-3319.39 PHASE ROTATION CHECK OF BREAKERS REPLACED ON MCC-1G THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO VERIFY PHASE ROTATION FOR BREAKERS ON MCC-1G.
SM-3319.40 FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF REPLACEMENT BREAKERS ON MCC-1G THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO PERFORM FUNCTIONAL TEST i OF BREAKERS ON MCC-1G.
SM-3319.42 VERIFICATION AND/OR ADJUSTMENT FOR TRIP SETTING FOR THERMAL OVERLOAD HEATERS FOR SAFETY RELATED BREAKERS MODIFIED UNDER SM-3319 IN MCC-1C AND MCC-1D THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE VERIFICATION AND/OR ADJUSTMENT FOR TRIP SETTING FOR THERMAL OVERIDAD HEATERS l FOR SAFETY RELATED BREAKERS MODIFIED UNDER SM-3319 IN MCC-1C AND MCC-1D.
SM-3319.43 i VERIFICATION AND/OR ADJUSTMENT OF TRIP SETTING FOR THEREAL OVERLOAD HEATERS FOR NON-SAFETY RELATED BREAKERS MODIFIED UNDER SM-3319 IN MCC-1A, 1B AND 1E THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE VERIFICATION AND/OR ADJUSTMENT OF TRIP SETTING FOR THERMAL OVERLOAD HEATERS FOR NON-SAFETY RELATED BREAKERS MODIFIED UNDER SM-3319 IN MCC-1A, 1B AND 1E. ,
i SM-3319.44 i PHASE ROTATION CHECK PRIOR TO BREAKER CHANGEOUT ON MCC-1B, 1F _ _ ,
1K, IL, 1M THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT / DOCUMENT PHASE ROTATION SURVEY ON SPECIFIC MCC BREAKERS.
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l SM-3319.45 i CHANGEOUT/ TESTING OF THERMAL OVERLOAD (TOL) HEATERS IN BREAKERS {
LOCATED IN MCC-1C AND 1E PER ECN-3319-25 ]
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF TOL HEATERS AS PER ECN 3319-25. j SM-3319.49 MCC-1K BREAKER REPLACEMENT j THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT / DOCUMENT BREAKER REPLACEMENT AT SPECIFIC LOCATIONS ON MCC-1K.
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SM-3319.50 TESTING OF BREAKERS REPLACED OF_MCC-1K THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DOCUMENT PHASE ROTATION OF NEW BREAKERS ON MCC-1K.
I i SM-3319.52 TESTING OF BREAKERS REPLACED ON MCC-1L J THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO VERIFY PHASE ROTATION AND PERFORM A FUNCTIONAL TEST OF BREAKERS INSTALLED ON MCC-1L.
SM-3319.53 MCC-1M BREAKER REPLACEMEN_T THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS FOR BREAKER REPLACEMENT AT SPECIFIED POSITIONS ON MCC-1L.
i SM-3319.54 TESTING OF BREAKERS REPLACED ON MCC-1M THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO VERIFY PHASE ROTATION AND PERFORM A FUNCTIONAL TEST OF BREAKERS INSTALLED ON MCC-1L.
! SM-3319.56 l INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF BREAKER IN MCC-1D. POSITION lE THE PURPOSE .0F THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DOCUMENT AND DIRECT BREAKER REPLACEMENT REQUIRED PER NCR G85-165.
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t SM-3698.1 REACTOR TRIP BREAKER UPGRADE THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF THE CIRCUIT WIRING AND BREAKER MODIFICATION FOR THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKER.
SM-3698.2 REACTOR TRIP BREAKER PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTING THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING OF WIRING MODIFICATION PERFORMED ON THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS AND TRIP 4 CIRCUITRY. THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO MODIFY THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS AND TO ALLOW REDUNDANT TRIP SIGNAL.
SM-3698.5 TEST LIGHT ADDITION TO REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF A NEW SET OF TEST LIGHTS FOR REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS RTA AND RTB.
SM-3698.6 TESTING OF REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS TEST LIGHT ADDITION THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS TEST LIGHT MODIFICATIONS.
SM-3797.1 MICROPROCESSOR ROD POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM INSTALLATION OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL INSTALLATION OF MRPI OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT.
SM-3797.3 MICROPROCESSOR ROD POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM CONSTANT VOLTAGE TRANSFORMER INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR THE INSTALLATION OF A CONSTANT VOLTAGE TRANSFORMER FOR THE MULTIPLEX ROD POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM.
SM-3797.4 MICROPROCESSOR ROD POSITION INDICATION SYFTEM DETECTOR CHANGEOUT THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO FERFORM RPI DETECTOR REPLACE-MENT.
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MICROPROCESSOR ROD POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM ACCEPTANCE TEST THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL TESTING OF THE 4 MICROPROCESSOR ROD POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM.
I SM-3797.6 MICROPROCESSOR ROD POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM DETECTOR TOP PLATE l MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL MODIFICATIONS TO THE MRPI DETECTOR.
SM-3817.2 ,
CATALYTIC OXYGEN REMOVAL SYSTEM (CORS) WATER PIPING INSTALLATION ]
l' THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO COMPLETE TIE-INS OF THE CORS SKID UNIT WITH PLANT PIPING IN SERVICE BUILDING BASEMENT.
SM-3817.3 CORS HYDROGEN SUPPLY PIPING INSTALLATJ_ONO THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS THE INSTALLATION OF CORS HYDROGEN PIPING (EWR-3817).
SM-3817.5 CORS HYDROGEN SUPPLY PIPING PNEUMATIC TESTING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO TEST CORS HYDROGEN PIPING.
SM-3891.1 "1A" VITAL BATTERY REPLACEMENT .
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF NEW BATTERY CELLS TO REPLACE EXISTING VITAL BATTERY 1A. THE l GENERAL PURPOSF OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO INSTALL NEW COMPATIBLE BATTERY SYSTEMS CONSISTING OF BATTERIES, CHARGER $, AND BATTERY RACKS.
SM-3891.2 BATTERY CHARGER 1A1 REPLACEMENT THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF THIS MODIFICATION, INCLUDING REMCVAL OF EXISTING '75h, BATTERY CHARGER 1A1 AND MOUNTING PAD; INSTALLATION OF A NEW 200A CHARGER CABINET AND ASSOCIATED SWITCHING, CONDUIT AND WIRING. THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO INSTALL A NEW COMPATIf9LE BATTERY SYSTEMS CONSISTING OF BATTERIES, CHARGERS, AND BATTERY RACKS.
SM-3986.21 CHARGING PUMP ROOM FIRE DAMPER REWORK THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND T'URNOVER OF CLOSURE SPRINGS AND BLADE LOCKS ON THE VENTILATION FIRE DAMPERS ON THE CHARGING PUMP ROOM SOUTH WALL.
SM-4057.4 LEADING EDGE FLOWMETER (LEFM) TRANSDUCER CABLE REINSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE REINSTALLA-TION OF THE TRANSDUCER CABLES OF EWR-4057 LEADING EDGE FLOWMETER SYSTEM.
SM-4064.2 S34 TSC ADMINISTRATIVE COMPUTER ROOM FIRE PROTECTION INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION ,
OF A FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM IN THE TSC ADMINISTRATIVE COMPUTER I ROOM.
SM-4064.4 PT. ANT SMOKE DETECTOR AND STP REPLACEMENT THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL STP AND FIRE DETECTOR CHANGEOUTS. ;
SM-4099.2 RELAY ROOM DOOR S43 LATCH MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO UPGRADE THE LOCKING AND CONTROL MECHANISMS ON RELAY ROOM DOOR 543.
SM-4099.3 BATTERY ROOM B DOOR S48 LATCH MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO UPGRADE THE LOCKING AND CONTROL MECHANISMS ON B BATTERY ROOM DOOR S48.
SM-4099.4 i BATTERY ROOM A DOOR S34 LATCH MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO UPGRADE THE LOCKING AND CONTROL MECHANISMS ON "A" BATTERY ROOM DOOR S34.
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% 1 SM-4099.5 AIR HANDLING ROOM DOOR S35 LATCH MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO UPGRADE THE CONTROL MECHANISMS OF THE AIR HANDLING ROOM DOOR S35.
SM-4099.6 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR 1A DOOR S32 LATCH MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCh JsdE IS TO UPGRADE CO MECHANISM ON EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR 1A DOOR S3I.
SM-4119.1 STRUcTuxAI. UPGRADE OF THE CONTAINMENT EOUIPMENT HATC THE PURPOSE OFCONTAINMENT THIS NEW EQUIPMENT PROCEDURE HATCH IS TO CONTROL WHEELED CAR TH AND TURNOVER OF THE STRUCTURAL UPGRADE.
SM-4136.6 ENHANCEMENTS
'A' DIESEL _ GENERATOR LOCAL CONTROL PANEL (ELCP)
'A' DIESEL THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO PERFORM WORK ON
! GENERATOR LOCAL CONTROL PANEL.
SM-4136.7 (ELCP)
TESTING OF THE 'A' DIESEL GENERATOR LOCAL CONTROL PANEL ENHANCEMENTS THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO PERFORM TESTING O GENERATOR LOCAL PANEL (ELCP) AFTER SM-4136.6 MODIFICATION.
SM-4136.8 GROUND INDICATION
_'A' DIESEL GENERATOR LOCAL CONTROL PANEL (ELCP)
REFAIR THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, INDICATED GROUND ON TESTING AND T'.IRNOVER OF THE REPAIR OF AN
'A' DIESEL GENERATOR (EG1A) LOCAL CONTROL PANEL (ELCP) .
SM-4136.9 MODIFICATIONS
'A' DIESEL GENERATOR LOCAL CONTROL PANEL (ELCP)
THE PURPOSE OF'A' THIS PROCEDURE DIESEL IS TO GENERATOR LOCAL CONTROL CONTROL PANEL THE IN MODIFICATIONS TO THE (ELCP).
SM-4136.10 TESTING OF THE 'A' DIESEL GENERATOR LOCAL CONTROL PANEL (ELCP)
MODIFICATIONS THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF MODIFICATIONS TO THE 'A' DIESEL GENERATOR LOCAL CONTROL PANEL (ELCP) .
SM-4139.2 APPENDIX R - AUXILIARY BUILDING FIRE DAMPFR UPGRADE THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL INSTALLATION OF FIRE DAMPERS IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING PER EWR-4139.
SM-4139.3 AUXILIARY BUILDING FIRE DAMPER REWORK THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE REWORK, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF VENTILATION FIRE DAMPERS IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING. THE REWORK WILL INCLUDE INSTALLING CLOSURE SPRINGS AND BLADE LOCKS, AND THE APPLICATION OF A LOW FRICTION COATING TO THE DAMPER GUIDEW7JS.
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INSTALLATION OF THE AUTOMATIC TELLER MACHINE F4ECTRICAL CIRCUITS l AND RACEWAYS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DOCUMENT INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF ELECTRICAL POWER AND TELEPHONE CIRCUITRY FOR AN AUTOMATIC BANK TELLER MACHINE.
SM-4276.1 ETjjiIC RESTRAINT OF THE FLUX MAPPING SYSTEM l
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF ADDITIONAL FLUX MAPPING SYSTEM SUPPORTS TO PRECLUDE COLLAPSE ONTO THE SEAL TABLE DURING A SEISMIC EVENT.
l SM-4276.2 RELOCATION OF FLUX MAPPING CART LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM 1
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE RELOCATION AND TURNOVER OF THE FLUX MAPPING CART LEAK DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION AND SOLENOID DUMP VALVE.
SM-4330.1 PIPE SUPPORT INSTALLATION FOR NEW FPEpWATER RECIRCULATION PIPING THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF PIPE SUPPORTS FOR THE NEW FEEDWATER RECIRCULATION PIPING.
BM-4330.2 ,
MAIN FEEDWATER PUMPS RECIRCULATION BY-PASS MODIFICATION t THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF MAIN FEEDWATER PUMPS RECIRCULATION BY-PASS MODIFICATION.
SM-4330.3 MAIN FEEDWATER PUMPS RECIRCULATION BY-PASS MODIFICATION - ELECTRI-CAL THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE MAIN FEEDWATER PUMPS RECIRCULATION BYPASS ELECTRICAL WORK.
EH-4330.4 ELUSH AND HYDROSTATIC TEST OF MAIM,FEEDW1JJR RECJAQUL3T;ON SYSTEM PIPIEG THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE NEW PIPIlfG SYSTEM FLUSH AND HYDROSTATIC TEST OF THE NEWLY IMSTALLED MAIN FEEDWATER RECIRCULATION SYSTEM.
SM-4330.5 FUNCTIONAL TEST OF NEW MAIN FEEDWATER RECIRCULATION SYSTEM _-
ELECTRICAL THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE NEWLY INSTALLED MAIN FEEDWATER RECIRCULATION VALVES AND THE INTERFACE WITH EXISTING FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM COMPONENTS. .
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SM-4330.6 I
, FUNCTIONAL TEST OF SECONDARY CHEMICAL A'DDITION SYSTEM COME NENTS THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE SECONDARY CHEMICAL ADDITIOh! SYSTEM AND ASSOCIATED j COMPONENTS. !
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THE ABOVE COMPLETED MODIFICATION PROCEDURES IN SECTION B HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AS ' REQUIRED- BY 10CFn50.59 AND IT HAS BEEN.
DETERMINED THAT NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION OR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION C11NGE3 EXIST.
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SECTION C - TEMPORARY BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNC. TION, STRUCTURE FEATURES, SHIELDING AND FLUID SYSTEM FEATURES This section contains descriptions and summaries of safety evaluations of temporary changes pursuant to the requirements of
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J SAFETY ANALYSIS 1 SI Recirc Valves 897; R98 1
1.0 SCOPE OF ANALYSIS:
This analysis covers the installation of mechnnical blocking devices for SI Recirculation Valves V-897 and V-898 and the installation of a switch operated jumphr for valve closure logic. ]
2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION:
To prevent inadvertent closure upon loss of instrument air or valve diaphragm failure, installed blocking devices will retain the valves in the open position. Th6 device is simply a mechanical block installed into the recess on the valve operator. The device will be retained in the l recess via a snap-lock clamp for ease of removal. f In the event that the blocks cannot be removed due to the above failure, the proximity switch logic for valve q closure will be achieved by operating the jumper switch i for relay 897-20X1, located in the Miscellaneous Relay Rack #1, rear section.
The above measures are being taken in response to an IE Bulletin 86-03. It is postulated that pump damage may occur l within 1-2 minutes while operating 'bovea the pump shutoff )
head without recirculation. j l
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3.0 REFERENCES
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3.1 Ginna Station Updated Facility Safety Analysis Report. !
3.2 Ginna Technical Specifications.
3.3 RG&E Dwg. No. 33013-1261.
4.O SAFEM ANALYSIS: l J
4.1 A review has been made of all events analyzed in the Ginna Station FSAR and the events requiring analysis by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.70. The only event related to this installation is that of a radioactive release from o subsystem or component.
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4.1.1 During the RWST injection phano, it is assumed that Auxiliary Building accessibility will ba allow d until~the time of recirculation swap-over. 'Ihis ,is based-upon l calculated expected radiation levels; insi'de - containment.
Should the initialing event be a line break inside ths {
Auxiliary Building, then there would be no need for the recirculation 4 phase, the line being isolated by CV isolation. f
~ 1 4.2 This modification has been reviewed per assumptions of l Appendix R Alternative Shutdown System-to ensure that i failure of any electrical cable installed as a part of this modification will not result in the disabling of ',
vital equipment naeded to safely shut down the plant .
1 during postulated firee. Wiring installed under this will meet IEEE 383-1974 qualifications.
4.3 Therefore, the margins of safety during normal operations- !
and transient conditions anticipated during the. life of i I the plant will not be reduced.- The adequacy of structures, l l
l systems and components provided for the prevention of accidents and for thel mitigation of the consequences of accidents have not been affected. The modification will not cause a loss of AC power fron MCC1C or MCCID. .
a 5.0 PRELIMINARY SAFETY EVALUATION: ;
5.1 The probability of occurrence or the consequences or an g accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be increased by the proposed modification.,
5.2 The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different I type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis will not be created by the' proposed modification. i
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5.3 The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any i Technical Specification will not be reduced by the proposed I modification.
5.4 The proposed modification does not ' involve .an unreviewed i
! safety question or raquire a Technical Specification change. '
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BORIC ACID PIPE RELOCATION EWR 3092A TEMPORARY RIGGING 187-01)
To accomplish Boric Acid Pipe Relocation planned for the' {
1987 refueling shutdown preparations - for removal of the MOVs 826 A,B,C & D vere to be completed befors hand. These include j installing the subject temporary rigging. An engineered design has been provided, which include'certaih restrictions to be adhered to. In addition, to preclude activity that could affect' two trains concurrently, during unit ~ operation, activities were to be divided as follows.
Provide protection for valves and connections during beam seat and beam installation.
The above must allow access for manual operations.
Installation will not 1) result in a change to the assumptions for the safety analyses in the Safety Analysis Report, 2) provide a change to the Plant Technical Specifications, or 3) involve an unreviewed safety question.
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l East Wall of Relav Room EWR-4142 Scaffold l (87-71) {
Scaffold is needed for steel additions in the structure at the Relay Room east wall. It will extend from the north wall to the south wall and will rise to about 4 ft. below the ceiling, 16 ft. from the floor. The cabinets at the east side of the room j include instrument power supplies for safeguards trains, safeguards I logic relay racks, and Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System. l J
Erection and use of scaffold in this location will not create a hazard to the above provided that it is seismically anchored.
This structure shall be installed in accordance with a sketch which is to be reviewed by, and incorporate any recommendations from, Structural Engineering.
Access ladders shall be tied off.
Protective blankets are to be installed over the relay enclosures, cable trays and conduit. Do not allow weld electrode to come in contact with cable trays or conduits.
Wherever access for structural installation is required above cable trays, a minimum of 1/2" plywood shall be installed on top of the cable tray and shall rest on the outer cable tray barriers.
No pressure shall be applied to cables within the trays. Plywood shall be covered with fire retardant blankets.
The Control Room operators shall be notified prior to any work in this area on a daily basis and at the conclusion of daily .
activity. Include in the notification the type of work being undertaken and its location within the east wall area.
It has been determined that the scaffold installation, with observance of the above requirements, will not 1) result in a change to the assumptions for the safety analyses-in the Safety Analysis Report, 2) provide a change to the Plant Technical Specifications, or 3) involve an unreviewed safety question.
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Steel Upgrade EWR-3296 in Intermediate Building North Retween Rod Drive M-G Sets and Column 7b-G1 Scaffold 87-75 (Area E)
Work is planned to upgrade steel connections under the grating platform in this area. The M-G sets are non-safety related.
They are an intervening obstacle between the proposed scaffold and the reactor trip breaker panel. There is a f airly high concentration of cable in cable trays and at containment cable penetrations under the work area. A sensing line is routed by column 7b-G1 to "B" steam generator steam line pressure transmitter PT-483. This, plus 2 other transmitters, are to the west of the work area. Coincident damage to these instruments will affect safeguards actuation. Work platforms for the job may be installed, providing the following requirements are observed:
- 1. Scaffold supports, bracing and interlocking shall take advantage of existing structural steel to anchor the installation seismically so that it will not adversely affect the "B" steam generator pressure instrument channels. This structure shall be installed in accordance with a sketch which is to be reviewed by, and incorporate any recommendations from, Structural Engineering. In addition a minimum horizontal distance of 4 ft. should be established between the closest transmitter and the work platform.
- 2. Constrain all planking and provide toe boards to minimize the potential for dropped objects.
- 3. Covers shall be provided for cable trays and other exposed cables.
- 4. Special care should be taken during material movement for scaffold erection and removal to prevent striking the nearby instruments and breaker controls.
- 5. Special care should be taken during work by column 7b-G1 to prevent damage to the PT-4b3 sensing line.
It has been determined that the scaffold installation, with observance of the above requirements will not 1) result in a change to the assumptions for the analyses in the Safety Analysis i Report, 2) provide a change to the Plant Technical Specifications, I or 3) involve an unreviewed safety question.
Enee Brace Addition EWR-3296 at Intermediate Building North Gratinct Platform Work Platform 87-77 A steel tube knee brace is planned to be added at the North edge of the grating platform to the ceiling steel, about midway along the platform. It will extend out, beyond the South side of the control rod drive power cabinets and a number of cable trays, some containing both trains of engineered safeguards circuits.
Containment electrical penetrations are at the South side of the platform in this area with metal sheet protection and metal screen protection. The work platform may be installed provided the following stipulations are observed:
- 1. The cable trays shall be protected with covers.
- 2. Work platform supports, bracing and interlocking shall take advantage of structural steel in the area. This temporary structure shall be installed seismically in accordance with a sketch reviewed by structural engineering, as initially requested of L. Sucheski, to provide assurance that the installation will not have the potential to adversely affect 2 safeguard trains.
- 3. A fire protective cover shall be installed to intervene between the work area and the containment penetration protective screen.
It has been determined that the scaffold installation, with observance of the above requirements will not 1) result in a change to the assumptions for the safety analyses in the Safety Analysis Report, 2) provide a change to the Plant Technical Specifications, or 3) involve an unreviewed safety question.
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e A'LL OF.THE ABOVE WERE REVIEWED'BY THE PORC COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT.
TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND THE COMMITTEE HAS DETERMINED THAT NO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES OR. VIOLATIONS WERE' INVOLVED (EXCEPT AS NOTED) AND THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS.
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SECTION D - PROCEDURE CHANGES This section contains a description of the changes to procedures as described in the UFSAR and a summary of the safety evaluation pursuant to the requirements of 10CFRSO.59(b).
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\ .4 AP-CW.1 PCN 86-3283 ,
t LOSS OF CIRC WATER PUMP
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THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS PER TASK ASSIGNMENT OPS -b 86-02. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES SUBCOM .
MITTEE-REVIEW OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ON B6/08/06 AN,0 TffEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. 4 ER-ELEC.6 PCN 87-3216 ,.
RESTORATION OF OFFSITE POWER USING 12B TRANSFORMER TO BMIEfgG BUS 12A ,/
THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE DIRECTI.ON FOR RESTORING'OFFSITE POWER USING'12B TRANSFORMER TO BACKFEED BUS-12A. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES, SUBCOM-MITTEE REVIEW OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE PER A WALK AROUND PRE-PORC AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLTED.
THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE. \ . g.
RF-62 PCN 86-4349 CYCLE XVI-XVII REFUELI.NG PROCEDURE THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE A NEW REFUEIGNG PROCEDURE FOR THE 1987 REFUELING OUTAGE. THE COMMITTEE ACCEF"!ED .
THE PRE-PORC REVIEW OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE AND THEIR CONCUTJ.isiiCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECO!! MENDED APPROVAL OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE. ,
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PCN' ' d'A 3 22, 87-3120 AR$fil),
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4 qly'vPOLD00MINACCESFf_PILIT*f f p s 3 4 V 'I.T CHANGTU I. E MADN i_'O UPDAmEN THE PROCEDURE AND FOR MRPI INSTALLA7; TON.c THE COMMITTEE 1% ?f.'LPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMI7 TEE l_3WIEW OF 'fHIS PCM QM 2/14/S'I AND THEIR CONCURRENCE ~
THAT hisI#CO}OIENTS HAVE BEEN RE50D gD.
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AP-CR.1 . PCN'd6 0653 y CONTROL ROOM INACCEEFIBILITY 3^ , i il IT REQUESTED CHANGES BE MADE TO ALLOW OPERATION .W ,THE PORV FROM OUTSIDE THE CONTROL ROOM FOR AN APPENDIX R Fl'RE, UlTHO'UT ENTERING CONTAINMENT; TO ENSURE OUTSIDE AGENCIES RECEIVE i kEPORTS. ?( '
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al_)3CC. 2 PCN 87-3118 r Rr7/RPI W JUNCTIOM. /
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IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADB AS A RFEULT OF THE.MRPI INSTALLA-TION. THE COMMITTEI 3.CCEF"ED THE EMEAIENCY PROCEDURE SUBCON3dT*
TEE REVIEW OF THIS FE . ON, 2/ f 1/87 A$11'IHE,TR CO/CURRENCE THAI' ALL COMMENTS HAVE, DEEN RESOLV"D.- '
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4 j AP-3C1 1 PCN 87-3154 l t ;
LOSS _Of_ REACTOR COOLANT FLOii j\ I
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TT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE 'IP MAKE AT7bCHMENT A' CONSISTEJ:T i WITH OTHER NATURAL CIRC ATTACHME @ .7 $3{!. h.OMMIT/MEACCEF7CD.
THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOffMITW"I P.7V%EW OF4 [H.T.9 PCN ON 2/24/87 AND TH E'.R CONCURRENCE '
DHAT 'ALL COMMEliT$ EfAVE BEEN RESOLVED. %a L '
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AP-TURM.2 PCV, 7-3119 <
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AUJOMA'.'7C TURBINE RUNBACl , ,
- g IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MAD 3 & A RZSULT OF THE ILIPI INSTALLA-TION. TES COMMITTEE ACCE?TEDi TP.T. EMEMElfCY PROCFOUPI SUBCOMY.IT-TEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 2/Jh/57shrD THEIR; CONCH'RRENCE *' HAT .
ELL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. \; 3'> / 1 -
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PCNs 87-3104, 87-3I'13, 87-3121 R E A C T O R T RJ P O R S A F E T Y 1 N J E C T ; Ot l *\ ,
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IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE NADE TO UPDATE THE PROC 1 DURE AfD FOR MRPI INSTALLATION. THE COMM?.TTEE ACCEPTED Ty1 EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE RD7IEW ,OF THIS PCN ON 2/24/07 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COM1!KFTS HAV,E BEFM,.('ESOLVED. .
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pH-RCC.1 PCN 87-3122 RETRIEVAL OF A DROPPEC RCC IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO MAKE MINOR CIIANGES' AND MRPI INSTALLATION. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 2/24/87 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE '
THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.
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IS-9d . PCN 87-3124 ,
REACTOA TRJP RESPONSE .
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IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE hhDE AS A RESULT OF THE MRPI INSTALLA% 3 TION. THE COMMITTEE ACCEMED TME EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMIT- ! ,
't TER REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 2/I4/87 AND THEIR CONCURItEUCE , THAT' L i ALL COMMENTS MAVE BEEN. RESOLVED. ~ \,
4 0-6.3 PCN 87-3189 dhXLMUM UNIT PQWPA ,
IT REQUESTED CHANGES BE MADE TO INCORPORATE CHANGES TO ALLOW
, USAGE OF LEFM-601 AT ANY.PCWER LEVEL.
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? Q-6.3 FCN 86-3655 MAYIMUM UNIT PQHEE IT REQUESTED CHANGES BE MADE TO INCORPORATE THE LEFM MODEL 601 INTO THE CALORIMETRIC CALCULATIONS.
.S-163 PCN 87-3161 FAFETY INJFCTION SYSTEM ALIGNMENT IT REQUESTED CHANGES BE MADE TO ADD NEW.VALtT2 (V-1826 825 BYPASS) TO VALVE LINEUP.
S-30.1 PCN 87-3162 s [ . ,.
SAFET7 .TNJECTION SYSTEM VALVE AND BREAKER POSITION VERIFICAT7pJs s 3 '
s IT REQUESTED CHANGES BE MADE TO ADD NEW VALVE (V-1826'825 BYPASS) TO LINEUP.
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SC-3.15.15 PCN 86-5201 EMERGENCY FIRE EOUIPMENT LOCKER INVENTORY ANILTEE}?ECTION
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IT REQUESTED CHANGES BE MADE BASED ON OPERATORS REVIEW AND WALKDOWN.
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SC-3.30,1 PCN-86-5196 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN FOR CONTROL COMPLEX FIRE.,,
IT REQUESTF3 CHANGES BF. MADF,' BASED ON OPERATORS REVIEW.
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l SC-3.30.2 *iCII F6-6197 b]/TERNATIVE SHUTDOWN FOR CABLE TUIDiEL FIRE
- . l IT REQUESTED CHANGES BE MADE BASED ON OPERATOAG REVIEW. ]
'\ SC-3.30.2 PCN 86-5177 l ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN EOR CABLE TUNNEL FIRE ,
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IT REQUESTED CHANGES BE MADE TO. REVISE AND DEVELOP APPENDIX R :
ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES. !
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' ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN FOR AUXILIARY BUILDING BASEMET/ MEZZANINE : YlBE IT REQUESTED CHANGES BE MADE BASED ON OPERATORS REVIEW. , SC-3.30.3 PCN 86-5176 ] ALTERNATIVE SEQTJ),,0WN FOR AUXILIARY BUILDING BASEMENT / MEZZANINE FIRE t IT REQUESTED CHANGES BE MADE TO REVISE AND DEVELOP-APPENDIX R. ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES.
. g3-SC-3.30.4 PCN 86-5199 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN FOR BATTERY ROOM 1A FIRE
( IT REQUESTED CHANGES DE MADE BASED ON OPERATORS REVIEW. SC-3.30 4 PCN"H6-5179 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN FOR_ BATTERY ROOM 1A IBE IT REQUESTED CHANGES DE MADE TO REVISE AND. DEVELOP APPENDIX R . ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES. > SC-3.30.E PCN 06-5200 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN FOR BATTERY ROOM 1B FIRE Y IT REQUESTED CHD GES BE MADE' BASED ON OPERATORS REVIEW.
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AP-CCW.2 PCN 86-3425 LOSS OF CCW DURING POWER OPERATION IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO GIVE ACTION IN THE EVENT OF A LOSS OF LEVEL AND TO CORRECT A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 86/08/13 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL CCMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. AP-CCW.3 PCN 86-3424 LOSS OF CCW - PLANT SHUTDOWN I IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE SO THE PUMP WILL RESTART ON LOW l PRESS IF NOT PUT IN PULL STOP. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE l EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 86/08/06 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. AP-FW.1 PCN 86-3296 l PARTIAL OR COMELETE LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO ENSURE ADEQUATE SUCTION l PRESSURE. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE l SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 86/06/16 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. 3 l l AP-RCP.1 PCN 86-3290 I l RCP SEAL MALFUNCTION l l IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE BECAUSE OF A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR AND TO UPDATE TO THE NEW AR VALUES. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS j j PCN ON 86/06/16 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. ' AP-RCS.3 PCN 86-3422 HIGH REACTOR COOLANT ACTIVI_TJC IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO PREVENT OVERPRESSURIZATION OF LETDOWN LINE. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 86/08/06 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. AP-RHR.1 PCN 87-3357 LOSS OF RUB IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO GIVE CRITERIA FOR ESTABLISHING NATURAL CIRCULATION. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/06/04 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.
AP-RHR.1 PCN 86-3388 i W S OF RHR IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO PROVIDE BETTER GUIDANCE. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 86/08/13 AND RE-REVIEWED ON 87/03/25 AND l THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. j l AP-TURB.4 PCN 86-3426 I LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM l l IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE BECAUSE IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO j TRIP THE TURBINE IMMEDIATELY. THERE IS TIME TO RESTORE THE l VACUUM. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOM- i MITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 86/10/14 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE j THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. l E-0 PCN 87-3358 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION I IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER RVLIS IMPLEMENTATION. THE COMMITTF.E ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/06/04 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. l E-0 PCN 87-3200 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER CAR 1724, WHICH INCORPORATES 'j l CONCERNS REGARDING SERVICE WATER LEAKS IN CONTAINMENT. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/04/08 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT hLL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. 1 1 I I l l l
E .0 PCN 86-3522 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO INCORPORATE RVLIS DATA IN THE EOP. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 86/09/04 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. E-1 PCN 87-3361 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER RVLIS IMPLEMENTATION. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/06/04 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. E-1 PCN 86-3521 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO INCORPORATE RVLIS DATA IN THE EOP. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 86/09/04 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. E-2 PCN 86-3523 FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO INCORPORATE RVLIS IN THE EOP. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 86/09/04 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. E-3 PCN 86-3520 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO INCORPORATE RVLIS DATA IN THE EOP. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 86/09/04 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE 1 THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. l ECA-0.0 PCN 86-3524 LOSS OF ALL AC POWER IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO INCORPORATE RVLIS DATA INTO THE EOP. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 86/09/04 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.
ECA-1.1 PCN 87-3246 LOSS OF EMERGENgy COOLANT RECIRCULATION ' IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER RVLIS IMPLEMENTATION. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/05/07 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. ECA-2.1 PCN 87-3364 . l UJTCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF BOTH STEAM GENERATORS IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER RVLIS IMPLEMENTATION. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/06/04 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. 1 1
9 ECA-3.1 PCN 87-3369 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER RVLIS IMPLEMENTATION. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/06/04 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. ECA-3.2 PCN 87-3247 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SATURATED RECOVERY DESIRED IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER RVLIS IMPLEMENTATION. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/05/07 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. ECA-3.3 PCN 87-3248 SGTR WITHOUT PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER RVLIS IMPLEMENTATION. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/05/07 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS , HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. ) I ER-AFW.1 PCN 87-3167 ! ALTERNATE WATER SUPPLY TO THE AFW PUMPS IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER CAR 1724, WHICH INCORPORATED CONCERNS REGARDING SERVICE WATER LEAKS. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON , 87/03/25 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN j RESOLVED. I I ER-NIS.3 PCN 87-3214 I PR MALFUNCTION IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO UPDATE THE AXIAL TILT I PROGRAM ON THE PPCS WHEN A CHANNEL IS DEFEATED. THE COMMITTEE 4 ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/04/08 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. ER-RCC.2 PCN 86-3391 RESTORING A MISALIGNED RCC ; IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO CHANGE THE PHILOSOPHY ON ROD MISALIGNED BELOW ITS BANK TO AVOID VIOLATING INSERTION LIMITS AND BAH 4 OVERLAF. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 86/08/06 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.
l I ES-0.0 PCN 87-3359 REDIAGNOSIS IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER RVLIS IMPLEMENTATION. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/06/04 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. ES-0 1 PCN 87-3183 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER EWR-4330 FEEDWATER PUMP MODIFICATION TO PREVENT OVERHEATING A MFW PUMP. THE COMMITTEE I ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/03/25 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. ES-1.2 PCN 87-3363 POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER RVLIS IMPLEMENTATION. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/06/04 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. ES-1.3 PCN 87-3360 TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER RVLIS IMPLEMENTATION AND PER INPO AUDIT SUGGESTION. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/06/04 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. ES-1.3 PCN 87-3193 TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER CAR 1724, WHICH INCORPORATED CONCERNS REGARDING SERVICE WATER LEAKS. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/03/25 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.
O ES-1.3 PCN 86-3393 TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION l IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE BECAUSE OF AOV-898 AND AOV-897 ; BLOCKING DEVICE INSTALLATION. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE l EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 86/08/06 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. ES-3.1 PCN 87-3366 POST-SGTR COOLDOWN USING BACKFILL IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER RVLIS IMPLEMENTATION. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/06/04 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. ES-3.2 PCN 87-3367 POST-SGTR COOLDOWN USING BLOWDOWN IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER RVLIS IMPLEMENTATION. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/06/04 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. FR-C.1 PCN 87-3249 RESPONSE TO INADEOUATE CORE COOLING . l IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER RVLIS IMPLEMENTATION. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/05/07 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. I FR-C.1 PCN 86-3675 RESPONSE TO INADEOUATE CORE COOLING IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO CHANGE THE STEP LOGIC TO GIVE AN EASIER STEP CONSTRUCTION, ALSO TO REMOVE THE COMPUTER ADDRESCES FOR THERMOCOUPLE. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED '1H E EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 86/12/17 i AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE .BEEN RESOLVED. FR-C.2 PCN 87-3250 RESPONSE TO DEGRADED CORE COOLING l IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER RVLIS IMPLEMENTATION. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOFDfITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/05/07 AND THE1R CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS ; t HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. l l l
l l FR-I.3 PCN 87-3252 1 RESPONSE TO VOIDS IN REACTOR VESSEL HEAD l l IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER RVLIS IMPLEMENTATION.- THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/05/07 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. FR-P.1 PCN 87-3251 RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER RVLIS IMPLEMENTATION. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW ; OF THIS PCN ON 87/05/07 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. O-1.1D PCN 87T-340 PRE-HEATUP PLANT REQUIREMENT CHECK LIST THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR POPC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE TO ENSURE BREAKER RACKED OUT PRIOR TO LEAVING COLD SHUTDOWN THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE. THIS ITEM IS COMPLETE. SC-3.2.8 PCN 87-5027 IMMEDIATE ACTION - AUXILIARY BUILDING / CONTROLLED AREA FIRE IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER APPENDIX R AUDIT ITEM I.3. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE PRE-PORC REVIEW OF THIS PCN AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. SC-3.30._4_ PCN 87-5112 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN FOR BATTERY ROOM 1A FIRE IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER. CHANGES BASED ON'NRC APPENDIX R AUDIT. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE PRE-PORC REVIEW OF THIS PCN AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. l i L _. _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.______U
t I THE ABOVE PROCEDURE CHANGES IN SECTION D HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AS REQUIRED BY 10CFR50.59. IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, S*i' STEMS AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE WILL NOT RESULT IN A CHANGE TO THE ASSUMPTIONS IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT AND NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION OR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ; CHANGE EXISTS. 4 l l i i
,.. e. ,
i SECTION E - COMPLETED SPECIAL TESTS' (ST) ANDL EXPERIMENTS This section is to contain a description of special tests and experiments performed in the facility, pursuant to:the regul're-ments of 10CFR50.59(b). Within the time frame of this report, there were none conducted. t
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ROCHE3TER GAS AND EL' GTR!C CORPORATION e 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N Y. 14649-0001 wu w amm i [I $ $ 2[# ,n ,
~^ "' 5 62W December 24, 1987 l
l Director _of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CoYamission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Mr. Carl Stahle PWR Project Directorate No. 1
Subject:
Annual Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experi-ments Conducted Without Prior Approval R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket'No. 50-244
Dear Mr. Stahle:
The subject report is hereby submitted as required by 10CFR 50.59(b). Enclosed are the original and one copy of the report containing descriptions and summaries of the safety evaluations of the changes to the facility, described in the UFSAR and special tests, from August 1986 f.hrough July 1987. Veryitruly yours,
/ 0 0 ,
Roger W. Kober RWK:pg Enc. xc: Document Control Desk Mr. William T. Russell, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear' Regulatory Commission Region I (31 Park hvenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Ginna R.I. l FE41 i i CESTtFIED IJa.- P5&b 87b 965 t -_-_}}