ML17309A434
| ML17309A434 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1989 |
| From: | Mecredy R ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9001020174 | |
| Download: ML17309A434 (366) | |
Text
j ACCELERATED DISIBUTION DEMON~ON SYSTEM r
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRXBUTXON SYSTEM (RIDS)
DOCKET FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MECREDY,R.C. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION R
SUBJECT:
"1989 Rept of Facility Changes, Tests & Experime ducted w/o Prior Approval for Aug 1988 Jul 1989." W 91219 ltr. I DISTRIBUTION CODE IE47D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR TITLE: 50.59 Annual Report of Changes, Tests or ENCL J'IZE:
Experim nts Made t E
W/o Approv NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).'5000244 RECIPIENT COPIES'TTR RECXPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PDl-3LA 1 0'1 PD1-3 PD E JOHNSON,A 0 INTERNAL: AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DS P/TPAB 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11 1 1. NRR/DOEA/OEAB11 1 1 NR8/JEEP/PRPB11 2 '2 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 G- F 02 1 1 RGN1 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC 1 1 A
D D
NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIERIS:
S PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASIXI CONI'ACI'HEDOCUMENT CORIROL DESK, ROOM P 1-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME PROM DISHUBUTION TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 19 ENCL
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$ 1>If ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ~ 89 EAS( Av'ENUE, HOCHESTER, N.Y. 14649.0001 Tf LCP~OhC L+tA coDf 7lc 546 2700 December 19, 1989 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk
,Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Annual Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Conducted Without Prior Commission Approval R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244 Gentlemen:
The subject report is hereby submitted as required by 10 CFR 50.59(b). Enclosed are the original and one copy of the report containing descriptions and summaries of the safety evaluations conducted in support of changes to the facility and procedures described in the UFSAR and special tests, from August 1988 through July 1989.
Very truly yours, Robert C. Mec dy General Manager, Nuclear Production RES/jdw Enc.
xc: USNRC Region I Office USNRC Resident Inspector 9'001020i74 85'0731 PDR ADOCK 05000244 R PDC
1989 REPORT OF FAC ILITY CHANGES g TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS CONDUCTED WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL FOR AUGUST 1988 THROUGH JULY 1989 SECTION A COMPLETED ENGINEERING WORK REQUESTS (EWR)
SECTION B COMPLETED STATION MODIFICATIONS (SM)
SECTION C TEMPORARY BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION, STRUCTURE FEATURES'HIELDING'ND FLUID SYSTEM FEATURES SECTION D PROCEDURE CHANGES SECTION E COMPLETED SPECIAL TESTS (ST) AND EXPERIMENTS R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER =PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-244 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION DATED DECEMBER 19 g 1989 9001020174
e SECTION A COMPLETED ENGINEERING WORK REQUESTS (EWRs)
This section contains a description of modifications in the facility as described in the safety analysis report, and a summary of the safety evaluation for those changes, pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(b).
The basis for inclusion of an EWR in this section is closure of the completed modification package in the Document Control Department.
EWR-1660 RCS OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL PROVIDE AUTOMATIC PRESSURE RELIEF DURING LOW TEMPERATURE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OPERATION. THE DESIGN PROVIDES REDUNDANT TRAINS OF PRESSURE SENSING INSTRUMENTATION AND RELIEVXNG CAPACITY.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE SMALL BREAK LOCA, AND RCS OVERPRESSURIZATION TRANSIENT.
BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH F 1 TO 4 '
OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS THEREFORE/ BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.
EWR-2602 PRESSURIZER SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVE PIPING THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE VERIFICATION OF THE FUNCTION ABILITY AND THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE PRESSURIZER RELIEF AND SAFETY VALVE PIPING. THIS WORK WILL INCLUDE DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF THE PIPING INCLUDING EFFECTS DUE TO SEISMIC EVENTS AS WELL AS SYSTEM OPERATION. THE PIPE SUPPORTS WILL BE EVALUATED FOR THE RESULTING LOADS AND MODXFIED AS NECESSARY. THIS WORK ALSO INCLUDES THERMAL ANALYSIS, DESIGN AND INSTALLATION OF A REFLECTIVE INSULATION SYSTEM ON THE PRESSURIZER HEAD AND SAFETY VALVE LOOP SEALS.
THIS VERIFICATION AND MODIFICATION XS NECESSARY TO COMPLY WITH NUREG 0737'ECTION IIELD 1g PERFORMANCE TESTING OF BWR AND PWR RELIEF AND SAFETY VALVES A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICA-TION ARE SEISMIC EVENT AND THE OCCUEGU NCE OF A SMALL LOCA.
BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 I I OF THE SAFETY ANALYS S g T HAS THEREFORE g BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES/ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES'F ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.
EWR 3059 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS MODIFICATIONS THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE UPGRADING OF SAFETY-RELATED OVERHEAD LOAD HANDLING SYSTEMS. THE MAJOR ADDITION IS THE INSTALLATION OF A MECHANISM BY WHICH THE PRESSURIZER HATCH BLOCKS WILL BE PHYSICALLY PROHIBITED FROM FALLING INTO THE PRESSURIZER CAVITY DURING REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT. THIS WILL BE ACHIEVED THROUGH INSTALLATION OF STRONG BACKS ON THE HATCH COVER BLOCKS.
OTHER MODIFICATIONS, ORIGINALLY CONSIDERED IN REVISION 0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA/SAFETY ANALYSIS WERE INCLUDED TO FULLY COMPLY WITH THE ORIGINAL INTERPRETATION OF NUREG-0612.
REVISION 1 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS DELETES THE MODIFICATION OF MONORAILS NOTED IN REVISION 0.
BASED UPON FURTHER ENGINEERING REVIEWS THESE MONORAIL SYSTEMS WERE DETERMINED TO ALREADY BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH ANSI B30.11-1980.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR~ AND THE VENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THXS MODIFICATION ARE >DECONTROL OF HEAVY LOADSii GUIDELINES (NUREG 0612) AND SEISMIC EVENTS.
THE DESIGN FOR UPGRADING OF THE PRESSURIZER HATCH BLOCKS WILL ENHANCE THE CAPABILITY OF THE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE TO WITHSTAND SEISMIC EVENTS. XT WILL ALSO ENSURE THAT DURING MOVEMENT OF THE HATCH BLOCKS, ACCIDENTAL DROPPING OF A BLOCK FROM THE JIB CRANE WILL NOT CAUSE DAMAGE TO THE PRESSURIZER, ITS INSTRUMENTATION AND ASSOCIATED VALVES LOCATED AT THE TOP OF THE PRESSURIZER.
THUS ~ I II I I I TH S MOD F CAT ON NE THER NCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES g NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR, 1) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING AND FOLLOWING A SEISMXC EVENT,
- 2) POSE A THREAT TO THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BOUNDARY.
BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LXFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.
EWR-3175 CONTROL ROD DROP TEST CABLE THIS MODIFICATION INVOLVES THE INSTALLATION OF AN INSTRUMEN-TATION CABLE FROM THE CONTROL ROD DRIVE CABINETS IN THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING TO THE ROD POSITION INDICATION RACKS IN THE RELAY ROOM. THESE NEW CABLES ARE REQUIRED TO TEST THE CONTROL ROD DROP RATE. PRESENTLY, I&C RUNS A TEMPORARY CABLE FOR THIS PURPOSE AND THEN REMOVES IT WHEN TESTING ZS COMPLETED. TO CONSERVE TIME AND MANPOWER DURING SHUTDOWN PERIODS'T ZS PROPOSED THAT A PERMANENT CABLE AND A SPARE BE INSTALLED FOR CONTROL ROD DROP TESTING.
THIS MODIFICATION IS DESIGNATED NOT SEISMIC CATEGORY HOWEVER THE DESIGN SHALL MEET SECTION C.2 OF USNRC REG. GUIDE I,
1.29.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE. 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE (1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES (2) A SEISMIC EVENT.
THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY OR IMPACT OF A FIRE ~
ADDITIONAL WIRING AND CABLE WILL BE ADDED IN THIS MODXFICATION, WHICH COULD ADD TO THE FIRE LOADING OF THE PLANT. THEREFORE, THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT ALL SUCH CABLE MEET THE IEEE 383-1974 FLAME TEST, REQUIREMENTS.
BECAUSE OF THIS THERE WILL BE NO SXGNIFICANT INCREASE OF FIRE LOADING CAUSED BY THIS MODIFICATION.
THIS MODIFICATION IS DESXGNATED NOT SEISMIC CATEGORY Ig HOWEVERS ANY NEW CABLE AND CONDUIT SHALL BE INSTALLED SUCH THAT IT WILL NOT IMPACT ANY SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS DURING A SEISMIC EVENT.
THIS MODIFICATION HAS BEEN REVIEWED TO ENSURE THAT FAILURE OF THE ELECTRICAL CABLE INSTALLED WILL NOT RESULT ZN DISABLING OF VITAL EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO SAFELY SHUTDOWN THE PLANT DURING POSTULATED FIRES OR A SEISMIC EVENT.
EWR-3258A SERVICE WATER CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL PROVIDE MECHANICAL MANUAL REMOTE OPERATORS TO CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 4629'630'643 AND 4644 FUNCTION OF THE REMOTE MANUAL OPERATORS IS TO FACILITATE
'HE OPERATING THE ASSOCIATED VALVES WHERE ACCESS BY PERSONNEL IS RESTRICTED DUE TO NEARBY PIPING AND EQUIPMENT. ALL NEW VALVES WERE INSTALLED UNDER THE PREVIOUS REVISION.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED,IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY 'GUIDE 1.70. THE. EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE')
PRIMARY SYSTEM PIPE RUPTURES B) RUPTURE OF THE STEAM AND FEEDWATER PIPES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT C) FIRE OR EARTHQUAKE BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS THEREFOREJ BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED.. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.
EWR-3645 GROUNDWATER LEVEL THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE INSTALLATION OF THREE PERMANENT GROUNDWATER MONITORING WELLS.
THE DESIGN BASES FOR THE HIGHEST STILL GROUNDWATER LEVEL FOR THE R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ASSUMED FOR THE DESIGN OF THE PLANT STRUCTURES WAS 250.0 MSL. AS A RESULT OF SEP TOPIC II-3.5 "FLOODING POTENTIAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS IT IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE IF THE ORIGINAL DESIGN BASIS GROUNDWATER LEVEL (DBGWL) IS AN ACCEPTABLE UPPER LIMIT TO BE USED TO CALCULATE THE LOADING CAPABILITY OF THE PLANT STRUCTURES. TO ASCERTAIN THE CORRECT DBGWL, THREE GROUNDWATER MONITORING WELLS WILL BE INSTALLED ON THE R. E. GINNA PLANT SITE. THIS INSTALLATION WILL CONSIST OF THREE FULL-ENCASED BORINGS DRILLED INTO THE GROUNDWATER TABLE. A LIQUID LEVEL DETECTION AND INDICATION UNIT WILL BE INSTALLED ON ONE WELL TO CONSTANTLY MONITOR AND RECORD THE GROUNDWATER LEVEL.
REFER TO RGGE DRAWING NUMBER 33013-1384 FOR THE LOCATION OF THE THREE BORINGS. IF MORE DATA TO ESTABLISH A DBGWL IS NEEDED'HE OTHER TWO WELLS WILL BE AVAILABLE TO MONITOR THIS INSTALLATION WILL INCLUDE THREE FULL-CASED BORINGS DRILLED INTO THE WATER TABLE~ ONE FULLY ELECTRONIC LIQUID LEVEL SENSING MONITORED THREE FLANGE CAPS FOR THE WELL HEADS'NE ALL-WEATHER ENCLOSURE FOR THE TRANSMITTER AND A RUN OF ELECTRIC CABLE CONNECTED TO AN EXISTING CHART RECORDER INSIDE THE PLANT.
IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF FAILURE OF ANY COMPONENT OF THIS MODIFICATION, NONE OF THE CLASS IE EQUIPMENT IN THE PLANT WILL BE PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING ITS SAFETY FUNCTION.
THE ACCIDENT EVENTS ANALYZED BY THE FSAR HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AND NONE WILL BE AFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION.
EWR-3 678 OVEREXCITATION .RELAY THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION CONSISTING OF INSTALLATION OF AN OVEREXCITATION RELAY ON THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD. OVEREXCITATION OF THE GSU AND NO. 11 TRANSFORMERS CAN MOST COMMONLY OCCUR DURING PLANT STARTUP.
AS THE TURBINE GENERATOR IS BEING BROUGHT UP TO RATED VOLTAGE AND SPEED g THE EXC ITATION LEVEL (VOLTS/HERTZ ), MUST NOT EXCEED THE TRANSFORMERS CAPABILITIES. IF THESE CAPABILITIES ARE EXCEEDED, THERMAL DAMAGE TO THE UNITS WILL OCCUR. DEPENDING UPON THE MAGNITUDE AND DURATION OF OVEREXCZTATIONg TRANSFORMER FAILURE WILL OCCUR EITHER IMMEDIATEL'Y OR AFTER REPEATED LESS SEVERE EVENTS. THE EXISTING OVEREXCITATION RELAY AT GINNAg WHICH OPERATES 'THE CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATOR, IS AN ELECTROMECHANICAL DEVICE ~ ITS OPERATING CHARACTERISTIC DOES NOT ACCURATELY MATCH THE TRANSFORMER ' OVEREXCITATION CAPABILITIES~ THE RELAY PROPOSED II ZN THE MOD F CATION g HOWEVER ~ CAN BE SET TO DUPLICATE THE TRANSFORMER'S CAPABILITIES FOR VERY ACCURATE ALARM AND TRIP OPERATION. THIS RELAY, WHICH'NCORPORATES MICROPROCESSOR TECHNOLOGY, WILL INITIALLY BE INSTALLED WITH ITS OUTPUTS CONNECTED TO THE PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER FOR ALARMING AND DATA RETENTION.
A REVIEW HAS -.BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GZNNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE (1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES, (2)- A SEISMIC EVENT, (3) A LOSS OF LOAD.
BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS THEREFOREJ BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL .OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.
EWR-3728 WASTE EVAPORATOR LINE THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR).ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH INVOLVES REPLACING AND REROUTING THE PIPING BETWEEN V1799E AND 1654A OUTSIDE THE HIGH RADIATION AREA.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN PERFORMED OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GZNNA STATION UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT AND NRC IE CIRCULAR NO. 80-18. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THE MODXFZCATION ARE:
A) RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE SYSTEM LEAK OR FAILURE B) FIRES C) SEISMIC EVENTS THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT IS MADE:
THE PROBABILITY OF RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE SYSTEM LEAK OR FAILURE WILL NOT BE INCREASED SINCE THE MODIFICATION WILL MEET OR EXCEED PRESENTLY ESTABLXSHED CRITERIA.
BASED ON THE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED ZN SECTION 27.0 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA, THE MODIFICATION WILL NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OR THE EFFECTS OF A FXRE SINCE THE MATERIALS USED WILL MEET CRITERIA EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN THOSE PRESENTLY INSTALLED.
THIS MODIFICATION IS NON-SAFETY RELATED BUT WILL BE SEISMIC-ALLY SUPPORTED SO THAT IT DOES NOT AFFECT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. BASED ON NRC ZE CIRCULAR NO. 80-18 AND NRC REG.
GUIDE 1.143 THE NON-SEISMIC CLASSIFICATION IS ACCEPTABLE.
BASED UPON ALL THE ABOVE ANALYSES:
- 1) STRUCTURES f SYSTEMS g AND COMPONENTS PROVI DED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES'F ACCIDENTS ARE ADEQUATE.
2). MARGIN OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATING AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED.
BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GINNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS'T HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATXONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.
(7)
EWR-3882 SIMULATOR BUILDING AND TRAINING CENTER ALARM PANEL THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION I
WH CH CONS I I STS OF NSTALLZNG AN ALARM PANEL ZN THE GUARDHOUSE'~
AND INSTALLING CONDUIT AND CABLE IN 'THE GUARDHOUSE AND THE SIMULATOR BUILDING. THE ALARM CIRCUITS WILL CONSIST OF EXISTING DIRECT BURIAL CABLE BETWEEN THE GUARDHOUSE AND, TRAINING CENTER, NEW CABLE WILL BE INSTALLED BETWEEN THE TRAINING BUILDING SECURITY PANEL AND THE SIMULATOR BUILDING ALARM PANEL. POWER TO THE GUARDHOUSE ALARM PANEL WILL BE FROM THE EXISTING LIGHTING PANEL IN THE GUARDHOUSE WHICH IS FED FROM NON-CLASS 1E BUS 15. THE ADDITIONAL LOAD OF APPROXIMATELY 1-AMP WILL NOT DEGRADE BUS 15 '
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS.
MODIFICATION ARE: LOSS OF A.C.,POWER, SEISMIC AND FIRE.
BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.5 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS THEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES~ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.
EWR-3895 INSTALL STATES BLOCKS THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL PROVIDE NEW SLIDING LINK TERMINAL BLOCKS TO SEVERAL AGASTAT" TIME RELAYS'HE PURPOSE OF THESE NEW TERMINAL BLOCKS IS TO FACILITATE TESTING OF TIME RELAYS WITHOUT DISCON-NECTING WIRES. THIS WILL ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY OF RECONNECTING WIRES INCORRECTLY AFTER RELAY TESTING.
DEVICES AFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION ARE:
- 1) EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR 1A AND 1B
- 2) CIRCULATING WATER PUMP 1A AND 1B
- 3) FEEDWATER PUMP lA AND 1B
- 4) 4160 VAC BUS 11A AND 11B
- 5) NO. 1 GENERATOR BACKUP RELAYS
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR, AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSXS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS, SPECIFICALLY FIRE AND EARTHQUAKE.
BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO
'F THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS THEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED 4.4'F THAT THE MARGINS SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE 'IFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.
EWR-3983 INSTRUMENTATION REROUTE FOR TORNADOES AND HELB THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE REROUTING OF REQUIRED INSTRUMENTATION CABLE WHICH MAY BE AFFECTED BY TORNADOES OR HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS.
IN THE NRC'S REVIEW OF PIPE BREAKS INSIDE CONTAINMENT ZT WAS NOTED THAT SAFETY RELATED INSTRUMENTATION CABLE TRAYS AND CONDUIT'ASSED WITHIN THE ZONE OF INFLUENCE OF BREAKS ON THE CVCS CHARGING AND LETDOWN LINES AND ACCUMULATOR "A" LEVEL
~
TAP. IN THE EVENT OF A POSTULATED FAILURE OF THESE LINES,
<HOT OR COLD SAFE SHUTDOWN AND APPROPRIATE ACCIDENT MITIGATION INSTRUMENTATION SHOULD REMAIN AVAILABLE.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY THE USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE 1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES, 2) A SEISMIC EVENTS 3) A HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK (HELB)g 4) A TORNADOS 5)
A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA).
BASED UPON THE ANALYSIS DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS IT HAS~ THEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS~ AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.
EWR-3989 TURBINE BUILDING PRESSURIZATION THE SCOPE OF EWR-3989 COVERS THE DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE TURBINE BUILDING'S STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AS WELL AS DESIGN AND INSTALLATION OF MODIFICATIONS THAT ARE REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF THIS ANALYSIS. TWO SPECIFIC DOUBLE ENDED PIPE RUPTURES ,WILL BE CONSIDERED ZN THE ANALYSIS: A) A BREAK IN THE 20" FEEDWATER LINE DOWNSTREAM OF THE NUMBER 5 FEEDWATER HEATER~ AND B) BREAK IN THE 12<> MAIN STEAM DUMP LINE DOWNSTREAM OF THE 36" HEADER. THE ENERGY AND PRESSURE RELEASE AS A RESULT OF A PIPE RUPTURE IN ONE OR BOTH LOCATIONS LISTED ABOVE WILL EXCEED THE PRESENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE TURBINE BUILDING.
WERE 1) THE
'T THE PROBLEM AND EFFECT OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE OF THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING WERE ORIGINALLY REVIEWED IN 1973 UNDER EWR-1836 CONTROL THAT TIME THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS BUILDING AND THE DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING THAT COULD -BE SEVERELY DAMAGED BY A PIPE RUPTURE AND INSTALLATION OF PRESSURE WALLS AT THE INTERFACES BETWEEN THESE BUILDINGS AND THE TURBINE BUILDING WOULD BE REQUIRED;
- 2) IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT OTHER PORTIONS OF THE TURBINE BUILDING, SUCH AS AT THE WALL COMMON TO THE TURBINE AND INTERMEDIATE BUILDINGS COULD REQUIRE FURTHER ANALYSIS; AND
- 3) A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE TURBINE BUILDING, WITH REGARDS TO THE ENERGY LINE BREAKS WAS CALLED FORg AS FAILURE OF THE TURBINE BUILDING COULD IMPACT THE INTER-CONNECTED SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES.
INSTALLATION OF THE TWO PRESSURE WALLS WAS ACCOMPLISHED UNDER THE ORIGINAL EWR-1836. ANALYSIS AND MODIFICATION OF THE WALL COMMON TO THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING AND TURBINE BUILDING IS BEING ACCOMPLISHED UNDER EWR-2846B.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE, PIPE BREAK IN THE TURBINE BUILDINGS AND OPERATING BASIS AND SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKES.
BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 I I I OF THE SAFETY ANALYS S g T HAS THEREFORE g BEEN DETERM NED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. ZT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS~ AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.
EWR-3992 VITAL AREA ANALYSIS SECURITY MODIFICATIONS THE MODIFICATION CONSISTS OF INSTALLING A SECURITY ALARM SWITCH ON THE DOOR OF THE TURBINE BUILDING DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL LOCATED AT ELEVATION 253'.6" OF THE TURBINE BUILDING THE REASON FOR THIS MODIFICATION IS TO COMPLY WITH AN RG&E COMMITMENT TO MODIFY THE PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN PER THE LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY VITAL AREA ANALYSIS.
A REVIEW HAS 'BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE SEISMIC.
BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 .TO 4.5 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THIS MODIFICATION IS NOT REQUIRED TO B SEISMIC AND ITS FAILURE WILL NOT AFFECT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OR SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES.
EWR 4040 DIESEL GENERATOR VAULT HUMIDITY THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO REDUCE THE EXISTING HUMIDITY LEVELS IN THE A AND B DIESEL GENERATOR VAULTS. THE STRUCTURAL/ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS WITHIN THE VAULT AREAS ARE DETERIORATING DUE TO HIGH HUMIDITY LEVELS. THIS MODIFICATION IS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF THE EXISTING SPACE CONDITIONS. THIS MODIFICATION WILL HENCE IMPROVE EXISTING CONDITIONS.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY NRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE ONLY EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS'UCH AS FIRE~
FLOODS~ STORMS'ND EARTHQUAKES'HE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT AN APPENDIX R CONFORMANCE VERIFICATION BE PERFORMED TO VERIFY THAT THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R.
THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT AFFECT ANY PREVIOUS ANALYSIS CONCERNING FLOODS OR STORMS. THIS IS A REQUIREMENT OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA.
0 THE DEHUMIDIFICATION SYSTEMS WHICH ARE REQUIRED TO BE INSTALLED UNDER THIS MODIFICATION ARE CLASSIFIED AS NON-SAFETY RELATED. THE EQUIPMENT IS NOT REQUIRED TO MAINTAINFUNCTIONAL INTEGRITY FOLLOWING A SEISMIC EVENT. HOWEVER, THE EQUIPMENT WILL BE DESIGNED AND INSTALLED SUCH AS TO NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT ANY SAFETY-RELATED COMPONENTS OR STRUCTURES. THIS ZS A REQUIREMENT OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA.
THERE FORE g I I THE MARG NS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERAT ONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED'HE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURESJ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS. PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.
EWR-4057 FEEDWATER FLOW MEASUREMENT SYSTEM THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION CONSISTING OF THE INSTALLATIONOF A FEEDWATER FLOW MEASUREMENT SYSTEM FOR MEASUREMENT OF ABSOLUTE FEEDWATER FLOW RATE. THE NEW FEEDWATER FLOW MEASUREMENT SYSTEM WILL MEASURE THE RATE OF FLOW THROUGH THE USE OF AN ULTRASONIC TECHNIQUE UTILIZING PULSES OF HIGH FREQUENCY SOUND ACROSS THE FLUID FROM ONE
-TRANSDUCER TO ANOTHER. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION WILL IMPROVE THE RELIABILITY OF THE FEEDWATER FLOW MEASUREMENT. E A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE:
A) LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER B) EXCESSIVE HEAT REMOVAL DUE TO FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE DECREASE C) FEEDWATER PIPING BREAKER D) SEISMIC AND FIRES BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS THEREFORE~ BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL .OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.
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EWR-4072 ADDITION OF DYNAMIC DATA MANAGER TO RCP VIBRATION MONITORING SYSTEM THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION OF THE EXISTING RCP VIBRATION MONITOR. PRESENTLY THE EXISTING TCP VIBRATION MONITOR PROVIDES INDICATION OF ROTOR VIBRATION AMPLITUDE ONLY. ZN ORDER TO TAKE ADVANCE OF ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR PREDICTING FAILURE AND DIAGNOSING DEGRADATION IN ROTATING MACHINERY. THE MONITOR MODULES WILL BE MODIFIED TO DIGITIZED, STORE~ AND TRANSMIT DIAGNOSTIC VIRATION DATA TO THE HEWLETT-PACKARD 9816S COMPUTER. THIS DIAGNOSTIC DATA INCLUDES R5OTATZONAL SPEED AMPLITUDE AND PHASE ANGLE~ MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM VALUES'ND DYNAMIC WAVE FORMS. THE EXISTING COMPUTER SHOFTWARE WILL PERMIT DYNAMIC AND STATIC .VIBRATION DATA TO BE DISPLAYED IN THE FORM OF GRAPHIC PLOTS'LARM LIGHTS'EPORTS~ AND LOGS' REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS RREQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES.
BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HASg THEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.
h EWR-4 135 TDAFP D. C. LUBE OZL PUMP LOCAL CONTROL THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION OF MANUAL START CIRCUITRY FOR THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP (TDAFP) DC LUBE OIL PUMP. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO PROVIDE MANUAL START/STOP CAPABILITY OF THE DC LUBE OIL'UMP SHOULD A FIRE OCCUR IN ANY AREA OF THE PLANT REQUIRING LOCAL CONTROL OF THE TDAFP. THIS MODIFICATION IS REQUIRED TO COMPLY,TO THE FIRE PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS OF THE APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN REPORT.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THZS-MODIFICATION ARE: 1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES, AND 2) A SEISMIC EVENT.
BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED, UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS THEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT . CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE, LIFE OF THE STATION HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND, COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.
EWR-4136
'A'IESEL GENERATOR EMERGENCY CONTROL PANEL THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH PROVIDES ISOLATION OF CONTROL CIRCUITS IN THE 'A'IESEL GENERATOR ROOM AND SECONDLY, TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT CONTROL FEATURES SO AS'O ALLOW LOCAL CONTROL OF -THE 'A'IESEL GENERATOR WHICH WILL SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED BY
.THE APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM REPORT REVISION 2.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE .GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE, EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. " THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE:
- 1) LOSS OF AC POWER TO STATION AUXILIARY DURING NORMAL, CONDITIONS INCLUDING THOSE CONDITIONS IN THE APPENDIX R ANALYSIS,
- 2) LOSS OF DC CONTROL POWER,
- 3) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRE, AND
- 4) EVENTS OF FLOOD, STORM, OR EARTHQUAKE.
BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3 ' TO 4 '
OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT 'HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMSJ AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.
EWR-4138 APPENDIX R CHARGING PUMP D.C. FEED THIS EWR ADDRESSES THE, MODIFICATION WHICH WILL PROVIDE A BACKUP D.C. FEED FOR THE CHARGING PUMP lA AS PART OF RG&E COMPLIANCE WITH APPENDIX R OF 10-CFR-50 ZT IS NECESSARY TO ADD AN ALTERNATIVE D.C. FEED TO THE CHARGING PUMP 1A. THE NEW BACKUP D.C. FEED WILL INSURE THAT CHARGING PUMP Al IS AVAILABLE FOR SERVICE AFTER FIRE IN THE CONTROL COMPLEX. A NEW TRANSFER SWITCH WILL ALSO BE PROVIDED WHICH WILL ISOLATE THE NORMAL D.C. FEED TO THE CHARGING PUMPlA PRIOR TO APPLYING THE BACKUP FEED.
EWR-4139 4139A APPENDIX R SPRINKLER AND FIRE DAMPER MODS THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST ADDRESSES THE INSTALLATION OF CLOSED HEAD, CLOSE-SPACED SPRINKLERS AROUND THE PERIMETERS OF THE TWO STAIRWELLS AND THE EQUIPMENT HATCH AT THE CEILING LEVEL OF THE MEZZANINE FLOOR. IN ADDITION, DUCT PENETRATIONS OF FIRE BARRIERS NEED TO BE PROTECTED AND THREE HOUR RATED DAMPERS WILL BE INSTALLED IN THE DUCT AT THE BARRIER FOR EACH OF THESE PENETRATIONS BETWEEN FIRE ZONES AMO, ABMg ABBM, AND CHG. THE DAMPERS WILL CLOSE AUTOMATICALLY AT A FIXED TEMPERATURE, PROVIDED THAT SYSTEM DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE DOES NOT PRECLUDE DAMPER FUNCTIONALITY.
THIS MODIFICATION IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR50 APPENDIX R~ SECTION IIIG 2g AND APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM REPORTS REVISION 2g DATED JANUARY 1985 '
REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UPDATE UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY NRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE ONLY EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 'EVENTS~ SUCH AS FIREg FLOODS'TORMS~ AND EARTHQUAKES'HE EFFECTS OF A MAJOR FIRE(S) ON THE MARGINS OF SAFETY ARE ADDRESSED IN THE USNRC FIRE PROTECTION SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT. THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT DEGRADE ANY EXISTING FIRE BARRIERS NOR WILL IT DEGRADE ANY EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS. THE MODIFICATION CONFORMS TO COMMITMENTS MADE, AND ARE THOSE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE WITH APPENDIX R AND THEREBY ASSURE SAFE SHUTDOWN FOLLOWING ALL POSTULATED FIRES.
THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT AFFECT ANY PREVIOUS ANALYSES CONCERNING FLOODS OR STORMS. POTENTIAL FLOODING OF THE RHR PUMPS SHALL NOT BE GREATER THAN EXISTING AS SPECIFIED IN THE DESIGN CRITERIA.
THE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM IS CLASSIFIED AS NON-NUCLEAR SAFETY CLASS BUT THE PIPING TO BE INSTALLED WILL BE DESIGNED SO THAT THE FAILURE DURING A SEISMIC EVENT WILL NOT CAUSE DAMAGE TO ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT DEGRADE EXISTING SEISMIC SYSTEMS OR STRUCTURES.
THE VENTILATION SYSTEM IS CLASSIFIED AS A NON-NUCLEAR SAFETY CLASS BUT THE FIRE DAMPER INSTALLATION WILL BE DESIGNED SO THAT FAILURE DURING A SEISMIC EVENT WILL NOT CAUSE DAMAGE TO ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT DEGRADE EXISTING SEISMIC SYSTEMS OR STRUCTURES.
RELOCATED ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS SHALL BE REINSTALLED SEISMIC CATEGORY I, HENCE THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT DEGRADE EXISTING SEISMIC SYSTEMS OR STRUCTURES.
THEREFORE, THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED'HE ADEQUACY OF AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS~
ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.
THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT ARE NOT INCREASED.
THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A TYPE DIFFERENT FROM ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN CREATED.
THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IS NOT REDUCED.
THEREFORE, THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. NO CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE REQUIRED AS THE RESULT OF THE MODIFICATION TO MAINTAIN THE PRESENT MARGINS OF SAFETY.
EWR-4276 FLUX MAPPING SEISMIC RESTRAINT THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE WORK INVOLVES SEISMICALLY ANALYZING GINNA'S RESTRAINT OF THE FLUX MAPPING SYSTEM, AND PERFORMING MODIFICATIONS WHERE NECESSARY TO UPGRADE THE EXISTING STRUCTURE. THIS RESTRAIN SUPPORTS THE 10PATH TRANSFER DEVXCES AND ISOLATION VALVES WHICH IS LOCATED DIRECTLY ABOVE THE SEAL TABLE.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICA-TION ARE')
DECREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY DUE TO A SMALL LOCA B) FIRES C) SEISMIC EVENTS BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4 '
OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS'T HAS THEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATION AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEM AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE ADEQUATE.
EWR 4330 FEEDWATER PUMP RECIRCULATION SYSTEM THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO IDENTIFY AND RESOLVE THE CAUSE OF DEGRADATION IN THE FEEDWATER PUMP RECIRCULATION SYSTEM. DEGRADATION HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED IN THE RECIRCULATION VALVES 4253 (CV-19), 4262 (CV-18) AND IN, THE PIPING DOWNSTREAM OF THESE VALVES. DEGRADATION HAS ALSO BEEN FOUND IN SUPPORTS ON THE MAIN FEEDWATER RECIRCULATION AND FEEDWATER CLEANUP LINES ENCORED IN -CONCRETE. EXCESSIVE IMPELLER WEAR IN THE MAIN FEED PUMPS HAS OCCURRED CONSISTENTLY.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICA-TION ARE: LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER AND HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT.
MODIFICATION REQUIRED BY DESIGN CRXTERIA WILL NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF A LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER AND HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE OF CONTAINMENT-'
THE DESIGN AND MATERIALS USED IN THIS MODIFICATION WILL MEET APPENDIX >>R>> REQUIREMENTS BASED UPON 10CFR50 APPENDIX R AND ENGINEERING PROCEDURE AND WILL NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF A, FIRE.
MODIFICATION TO THE FEEDWATER SYSTEMS WILL NOT DEGRADE PERFORMANCE OR FUNCTION OF ANY PLANT EQUIPMENT OR SYSTEM.
BASED UPON THE ABOVE ANALYSIS:
- 1) STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE ADEQUATE.
- 2) MARGIN OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATING'ND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE 'LIFE OF THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED.
BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GZNNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES~ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.
. EWR-4346 WIDE RANGE PRT PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION TO THE WIDE RANGE PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK (PRT) PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION AND TO THE RCS WIDE RANGE PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION.
EWR-4346 WILL REPLACE THE EXISTING P440 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER, SIGNAL PROCESSING, AND MAIN CONTROL BOARD (MCB) INDICATORS WITH MODERN INSTRUMENTS THAT ARE CAPABLE OF MONITORING PRT PRESSURE UP TO THE RATING OF THE PRT RUPTURE DISC (100 PSIG). EWR-4346 WAS WRITTEN IN RESPONSE TO HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES (HED) f0056 AND 40407. THE HEDS REQUIRE THE INSTALLATION OF A NEW WIDE RANGE PRT PRESSURE INDICATOR ON THE MCB BY JUNE 1988.
THE EXISTI NG PRT PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS INDICATORS g POWER SUPPLY g AND BISTABLES WILL BE REPLACED AND SCALED TO ACHIEVE THE NEW REQUIRED RANGE. SINCE THE PRT RUPTURE DISC RATING IS 100 PSIGg THE NEW PRT PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION RANGE WILL BE 0 TO 150 PSIG TO ENSURE THAT THE PRT RUPTURE DISC RATING PLUS ANY ASSOCIATED UNCERTAINTIES ARE COMPLETELY ENVELOPED.
ONE OF THE INDICATORS WILL BE RE-SCALED TO THE NEW WIDE RANGE SPAN AND THE OTHER WILL REMAIN A NARROW RANGE INSTRUMENT FOR MONITORING PRT PRESSURE UNDER NORMAL OPERATING CONDI-TIONS. THIS MODIFICATION WILL REQUIRE THE INSTALLATION OF NEW SCALING MODULES INTO AN INSTRUMENT RACK IN THE RELAY ROOM. THE PI-440A DISABLE SWITCH SHALL BE DELETED FROM THE PRT PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION.
ALSO INCLUDED IN THE SCOPE OF THIS EWR IS THE INSTALLATION OF TWO NEW VERTICAL SCALE INDICATORS TO DISPLAY RCS WIDE RANGE PRESSURE ON THE MCB. PRESENTLY, RCS WIDE RANGE PRESSURE IS DISPLAYED ON STRIP CHART RECORDERS 'PR-420 AND PR-429 ON THE MCB FRONT, AND A VERTICAL SCALE INDICATOR ON THE REAR OF THE MCB. READABILITY OF THE EXISTING CHART RECORDERS IS POOR/
THEREFORE'ERTICAL SCALE INDICATORS FOR DISPLAY OF RCS WIDE RANGE PRESSURE WILL BE ADDED TO THE FRONT OF THE MCB. THE INDICATOR ON THE MCB REAR WAS INSTALLED UNDER EWR-3067 (MINOR MOD) FOR USE WITH THE OVERPRESSURZZATZON SYSTEM AND THE REACTOR HEAD VENT VALVES, AND SHALL REMAIN TO PERFORM THAT FUNCTION.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. G-UIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE 1)
MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES~ 2) A SEISMIC EVENTS 3) PIPE BREAKS INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING.
THE FIRST EVENT CONSIDERED IS "MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES".
NEW WIRING AND CABLE MAY BE REQUIRED FOR THIS MODIFICATION WHICH COULD ADD TO THE FIRE LOADING OF THE PLANTg THEREFORE/
THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT ALL SUCH CABLE MEET THE IEEE-383-1974 FLAME TEST REQUIREMENTS. BECAUSE OF THIS THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OF FIRE LOADING CAUSED BY THIS MODIFICATION.
THIS MODIFICATION HAS BEEN REVIEWED TO ENSURE THAT FAILURE OF ANY ELECTRICAL CABLE INSTALLED AS A PART OF THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT RESULT IN THE DISABLING OF VITAL EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO SAFELY SHUT DOWN THE PLANT DURING POSTULATED FIRES'HUS g THE MODIFICATION-NEITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES / NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR "MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES".
THE SECOND EVENT CONSIDERED IS "A SEISMIC EVENT THE PRESSURE BOUNDARY PORTIONS OF THE PRT PRESSURE INSTRU-MENTATION ARE DESIGNATED NON SEISMIC CATEGORY I"/ HOWEVER~ ANY MODIFICATION TO THIS SYSTEM WHOSE FAILURE COULD CAUSE DAMAGE TO SAFETY RELATED'QUIPMENT WILL BE DESIGNED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS. OF USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.29, REVISION C.2.
THE RCS WIDE RANGE PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION IS DESIGNATED SEISMIC CATEGORY I'HE RCS WIDE RANGE PRESSURE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUXRES THAT ALL NEW INSTRUMENTATION BE QUALIFIED AND INSTALLED PER IEEE 344 1975'HEREFORE' SEXSMIC EVENT WILL NOT IMPACT THE PROPER OPERATION OF THE RCS WIDE RANGE PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION.
II I I I THUS / THE MOD F CAT ON NE THER NCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES g NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR "A SEISMIC*EVENT THE THIRD EVENT CONSIDERED IS ~tPIPE BREAKS INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING".
THE NEW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER WILL INTERFACE WITH THE EXISTING 3/8 INCH PRT PRESSURE SENSING LINE IN THE SAME MANNER AS DOES THE EXISTING PRESSURE TRANSMITTER. THEREFORE THIS MODIFICA-TION DOES NOT INTRODUCE ANY NEW FAILURE MODES CONCERNING PIPE BREAKS INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING.
THUS, THIS MODIFICATION NEITHER INCREASES THE DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR "PIPE BREAKS CONSEQUENCES'OR INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING".
IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSXENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS, ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFI-CATION.
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EWR 4543 PT-3 2 . 2 TEST CABLE INSTALLATION THIS PROPOSED MODIFICATION WILL PROVIDE AN ALTERNATE CONTROL CABLE TO BE DEDICATED TO PORV TESTING CONTROL CIRCUITS. THE DEDICATED CABLE WILL CONNECT RACK R2 IN THE CONTROL ROOM TO THE NEW TEST BOX LOCATED NEAR THE TOP OF THE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE. SPECIFICALLY, EXISTING SPARE CIRCUITS R881 AND R882 WILL BE USED TO ACCOMPLISH THE REQUIRED CONNECTIONS. A NEW TEST BOX WILL BE INSTALLED AND ONE NEW THREE CONDUCTOR CABLE WILL BE INSTALLED TO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED TEST BOX LOCATION NEAR TOP OF PRESSURIZER. THE ADDITION OF THE TEST BOX SERVES TWO PURPOSES'ONE TO PROVIDE A CONVENIENT RECEP TACLE FOR PT-32.2 TEST LEADS AND IT WILL REDUCE THE CABLE RUN WITHIN CONTAINMENT.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY NRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATING TO THIS MODIFIC-ATION ARE FIRE, SEISMIC AND SMALL LOCA EVENTS.
THE FIRST EVENT ANALYZED IS THE EFFECT OF A SEISMIC EVENT.
THE ONLY HARDWARE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS MODIFICATION IS THE ANCHORAGE OF CONDUIT AND A TEST BOX NEAR TOP OF THE PRES-SURIZER. THE PROPOSED TEST BOX AND CONDUIT WILL BE MOUNTED CONSISTENT WITH THE C2 REQUIREMENTS OF REGULATORY GUIDE 1.29. THUS THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILURE DUE TO A SEISMIC EVENT ARE MITIGATED.
THE SECOND EVENT ANALYZED IS THE EFFECT OF A FIRE ON THE PLANT DUE TO THIS MODIFICATION. THE CONTROL WIRING FOR THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE R2 RACK IN THE CONTROL ROOM AND THE TEST BOX LOCATED AT THE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE IS REQUIRED TO MEET REQUIREMENTS OF IEEE STD 383-1984 FLAME TEST. THUS THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE FIRE LOADING DUE TO THIS MODIFICATION.
THE THIRD EVENT ANALYZED IS THE EFFECT OF A SMALL LOCA ON THE PLANT CAUSED BY AN INADVERTENT PORV OPERATION DUE TO THIS PROPOSED MODIFICATION. THIS PROPOSED MODIFICATION WILL NOT CONNECT THE TEST BOX TO THE PORV'S; THE ONLY TIME THE TWO WILL BE CONNECTED IS DURING SHUTDOWN WHEN TESTING AND TIMING OF PORV'S IS PERFORMED. THEREFORE, THE CONSEQUENCES OF A SMALL LOCA DUE TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE MITIGATED.
THEREFORE g BASED UPON THE ABOVE I ANALYS S g IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT:
A) THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED AND B) THE STRUCTURES g SYSTEMS g AND COMPONENTS PROVI DED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE ADEQUATE.
- EWR-4640 HU-1 TRANSFORMER DIFFERENTIAL RELAY MODIFICATION THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH MODIFIES THE HU-1 DIFFERENTIAL RELAYS FOR TRANSFORMERS NO. 1, ll AND 12A.
THE HU-1 RELAY MODIFICATION WILL LOWER THE THRESHOLD OF RESTRAINT FOR THE HARMONIC RESTRAINT UNIT FROM 154 TO 7.5%.
A RESISTOR WILL BE CONNECTED IN PARALLEL WITH THE HARMONIC RESTRAINT UNIT OPERATE COIL (TOP UNIT), REDUCING THE POTENTIAL FOR SPURIOUS OPERATION RESULTING FROM INRUSH HARMONICS DURING ENERGIZATION.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY NRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICA-TION ARE FIRE,AND EARTHQUAKE, LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND LOSS OF ELECTRICAL LOAD.
THIS MODIFICATION CONSISTS OF WIRING AND COMPONENT REPLACEMENT INTERNAL TO THE HU-1 RELAY CASE. THERE IS NO INCREASE'N COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL AND NO INCREASED POTENTIAL FOR FIRE.
THIS MODIFICATION IS CLASSIFIED NON-lE WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE TRANSFORMERS AND THE EMERGENCY OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM. THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT DEGRADE THE ABILITY OF THE RELAY TO PROVIDE ITS PROTECTION FUNCTION.
THEREFORE, THE ABILITY OF CLASS 1E SYSTEM TO OPERATE PROPERLY DURING A SEISMIC EVENT WILL NOT BE IMPAIRED.
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0 UPON LOSS OF ELECTRICAL LOAD, AUXILIARY LOADS ARE AUTOMATIC-ALLY TRANSFERRED FROM THE 11 TO THE 12A TRANSFORMER. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO DECREASE THE POTENTIAL FOR INAPPROPRIATE OPERATION OF THE DIFFERENTIAL RELAY WHILE MAINTAINING THE ORIGINAL TRANSFORMER PROTECTION FUNCTION OF THE RELAY. THE CONSEQUENCE OF A FAILURE OF THE PROPOSED RESISTOR ADDITION HAS ALSO BEEN EVALUATED AND HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO BE NEGLIGIBLE. SPECIFICALLY, IF THE RESISTOR SHOULD OPENS THE HU 1 RELAY WILL REVERT BACK TO A WHICH IS THE WAY THE RELAY OPERATED PRIOR TO THE 15%'ESTRAINT MODIFICATION. THE CONSEQUENCES ASSOCIATED WITH THE RESISTOR SHORTING HAVE ALSO BEEN EVALUATED. IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT SHORT WOULD PRECLUDE THE RELAY FROM OPERATING SPURIOUS-LY. THIS IS AN ACCEPTABLE FAILURE MODE EVEN IF A DIFFERENTIAL OPERATION'S REQUIRED BECAUSE THE SYSTEM CONSISTS OF THREE SEPARATE HU-1 RELAYS AND ANY ONE OF WHICH WILL INITIATE A TRIP ~ THE MARGIN OF SAFETY'N TERMS OF PROBABILITY OF LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER FROM INAPPROPRIATE RELAY OPERATION, IS INCREASED 'AND THE DESIGN ADEQUACY AS. DOCUMENTED IN THE UFSAR
'S NOT AFFECTED.
IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MA'RGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT WILL NOT BE REDUCED. THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.-
EWR 4657 UPGRADE OF SERVICE BUILDING STRUCTURAL TO SUPPORT PCM SHIELDING THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE STRUCTURAL UPGRADE OF THE SERVICE BUILDING TO SUPPORT PERSONNEL CONTAMINATION MONITOR(S) (PCM) SHIELDING. THE PROPOSED.
MODIFICATION WILL UPGRADE THE SERVICE BUILDING FLOOR STRUCTURAL TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ADDED STRENGTH REQUIRED TO RESIST. THE ADDITIONAL LOAD DUE TO THE INSTALLATION OF LEAD SHIELDING AROUND THE PCM'S IN THE MEN'S DECONTAMXNATION AREA.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY THE USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70.
SEISMIC EVENTS NEED NOT BE CONSIDERED FOR THXS EWR BECAUSE THE SERVICE BUILDING IS CLASSIFIED AS NON-SEISMIC. ZN ADDITION, THE MODIFICATION WILL NOT REQUIRE THE REPOSITIONZNG OF INSTRUMENTATIONg CONTROLS g OR OTHER COMPONENTS ASSOCIATED WITH SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS.
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ALL EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES REQUIRED TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50g APPENDIX Rg OR TO MAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELS OF PROTECTION FROM FIRES WILL BE MAINTAINED DURING AND FOLLOWING THE STRUCTURAL UPGRADE MODIFICATXONS.
REVISION 1 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCORPORATE CHANGES TO REFERENCE RG&E UFSAR REVISION 2g DECEMBER 1986".
BASED ON THE EVALUATIONS ABOVE, THERE WILL BE NO CHANGES TO MARGINS OF SAFETY AND ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS WILL NOT BE DIMINISHED.
THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY, PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT, WILL NOT BE INCREASED BY THE PROPOSED ADDITION.
THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE OTHER THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY ON THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE CREATED BY THESE PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS.
EWR-4674 S.I. PUMP MOTOR GANTRY HOIST THIS ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST (EWR) ADDRESSES THE DESIGN AND INSTALLATION OF A PORTABLE LIFTING GANTRY HOIST ASSEMBLY FOR USE IN REMOVAL OF S.I. PUMPS AND/OR MOTORS FOR MAINTENANCE.
THIS DEVICE ZS DESIGNED FOR EASY DISASSEMBLY WITH THE GANTRIES (SUPPORTING LEGS) BOLTED TO A MONORAIL AND TO THE CONCRETE FLOOR TO PROVIDE ANCHORAGE AND SUPPORT. XT WXLL NORMALLY BY USED ONLY WHEN MAINTENANCE IS TO BE PERFORMED DURING A PLANT SHUTDOWN.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1 '0 EVENTS NEED NOT BE CONSIDERED FOR USE OF THIS GANTRY
'EISMIC HOIST BECAUSE IT WILL NOT NORMALLY BE LEFT IN PLACE DURING POWER OPERATION. ADDITIONALLYIT IS DESIGNED AND FABRICATED TO BE ANCHORED TO THE FLOOR WHEN IN PLACE OVER ONE SAFETY INJECTION PUMP. THEREFORE, IT WILL NOT CREATE A HAZARD TO OTHER SAFETY- RELATED EQUIPMENT DURING ITS USE. BOTH THE GANTRIES AND THE MONORAIL THEY SUPPORT WILL BE REMOVED FOLLOWING MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES.
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USE OF THE HOIST WILL BE ADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROLLED UNDER MAINTENANCE WORK PROCEDURES OR UNDER THE TEMPORARY MODIFICA-TION CONTROL PROGRAMS A 1406 1g TO ENSURE 1) COMPLIANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AND 2) THAT ONLY ONE TRAIN OF EQUIPMENT IS AFFECTED BY ITS INSTALLATION.
BASED ON THE EVALUATIONS ABOVE, THERE WILL BE NO CHANGES TO MARGINS OF SAFETY AND ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS WILL NOT BE DIMIN-ISHED.
THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT* TO SAFETY, PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT, WILL NOT BE INCREASED BY THE PROPOSED USE OF THIS GANTRY HOIST.
THE POSSXBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE OTHER THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY ON THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE CREATED BY THIS PROPOSED MODIFI-CATION.
TSR-88-08 FIRE PROTECTION YARD LOOP ISOLATION VALVES THE TECHNICAL STAFF REQUEST (TSR) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION OF THE FIRE PROTECTION YARD LOOP TO INCLUDE NEW ISOLATION VALVES.
THE INSTALLATION OF SIX (6) ADDITIONAL'ECTIONALIZZNGMANUAL GATE VALVES ON THE DOMESTIC WATER SYSTEM WILL PROVIDE SEGMENT ISOLATION WITHOUT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SYSTEM IMPAIRMENTS AND IMPROVE THE RELIABILITY OF THE DOMESTIC WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM.
A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED ZN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION DOES NOT AFFECT THE PLANT TRANSXENTS AND ACCIDENTS DESCRIBED IN-CHAPTER 15 OF'THE UFSAR. THE MODIFICATION DOES RELATE TO THE PLANT DESIGN AS DESCRIBED IN CHAPTER 3 OF THE UFSAR. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE FIRES AND TORNADOS AND WIND LOADING.
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THE FIRE PROTECTION YARD LOOP PROVIDES A BACKUP SOURCE OF .
COOLING WATER ZN THE EVENT THAT SERVICE WATER IS LOST. IT PROVIDES A BACKUP AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SOURCE FOR THE CON- .
DENSATE STORAGE TANKS FOR THE MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARYFEEDWATER OR TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM AND 'BACKUP FOR THE CONDENSATE SUPPLY TANK FOR THE STANDBY AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM. IT CAN BE USED TO PROVIDE COOLING WATER TO THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS IF ALL SERVICE WATER WERE TO BE LOST.
THE STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM PROVIDES DECAY HEAT REMOVAL FUNCTION IN THE EVENT OF A TORNADO STRIKE. OTHER METHODS ARE ASSUMED UNAVAILABLE. THE YARD LOOP CAN BE CONNECTED FOLLOWING DEPLETION OF THE 10i000 GALLON CONDENSATE SUPPLY TANK.. IN THE EVENT THE SCREENHOUSE WERE LOST DUE TO TORNADO STRIKE, THE YARD LOOP CAN BE USED TO PROVIDE A BACKUP SOURCE OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FOR DECAY HEAT REMOVAL AND EMERGENCY DIESEL COOLING BY USE OF CONNECTIONS AVAILABLE IN THESE AREAS.
THE INSTALLATION OF THE ISOLATION VALVES WILL NOT AFFECT THE DESIGN OR OPERATION OF THE -YARD LOOP FOR THE CASES DESCRIBED BECAUSE THE VALVES WILL BE. USED FOR ISOLATION PURPOSED, ARE MANUAL VALVES, AND DO NOT AFFECT THE CONNECTIONS TO THE CONDENSATE SUPPLY TANKi CONDENSATE STORAGE TANKSi EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM CONNECTIONS OR SERVICE BUILDING AUXILIARY FEEDWATER CONNECTION. OPERABILITY OF THE YARD SYSTEM WILL BE IMPROVED WITH THE INSTALLATION OF THE VALVES.
THEREFOREi THE METHODS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM IS NOT AFFECTED.
BECAUSE THE CONNECTIONS TO THE STANDBY .AUXILIARY FEEDWATER CONDENSATE SUPPLY TANK, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER CONDENSATE STORAGE TANKS, AND EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR PIPING IS NOT CHANGED, AND THE LOOP INTEGRITY WILL BE MAINTAINED THROUGH THE EXISTING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE AND OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED AND THE ADEQUACY OF THESE STRUCTURESi SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS IS NOT DECREASED.
THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT- OR MALFUNCTION OF'QUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETYi PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT, WILL NOT BE INCREASED BECAUSE THE CONNECTIONS PROVIDED FOR YARD LOOP TIE INS ARE NOT AFFECTED ANDi THEREFORE'ROCEDURAL REQUIRE MENTS FOR THIS BACKUP SYSTEM WILL STILL BE MAINTAINED.
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THE POSSIBILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY TYPE PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE CREATED BECAUSE THE INTEGRITY OF THE YARD LOOP WILL BE MAINTAINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE AND OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS.
THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILL NOT BE REDUCED, BECAUSE THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT BEING ALTERED BY THE MODIFICATION.
BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GINNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES'YSTEMS~ AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.
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SECTION B COMPLETED STATION MODIFICATIONS (SMs)
This section contains a description of station modification procedures performed in the facility as described in the safety analysis report. Station modification procedures are written to complete a portion of an Engineering Work Request (EWR) identified by the same parent number. Station Modifications are reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee to ensure that no unreviewed safety questions or Technical Specification changes are involved with the procedure.
The basis for inclusion of an SM in this section is closure of the SM where portions of the parent EWR, in the form of other SMs or other documentation, remain to be completed.
SM-1594.5 REMOVAL OF REVERSE OSMOSIS R.O. TANK AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS FROM THE AUXILIARY BUILDING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE REMOVAL OF THE REVERSE OSMOSIS TANK AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT FROM THE AUXILIARY BUILDING.
SM-1594.10 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM ELECTRICAL E UIPMENT AND CONDUIT INSTALLATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT, CONDUIT AND SUPPORTS.
SM-1594.12 FLUSH AND HYDROSTATIC TEST OF NEW SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS 1) TO CONTROL FLUSH AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING OF THE NEW SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM AND 2) PROVIDE INITIALVALVE LINE-UP FOR EXISTING AND NEW SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEMS'M-1594.13 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING - SERVICE WATER SYSTEM FLUSH AND HYDROSTATIC TEST THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE FLUSH AND HYDROSTATIC TEST OF THE NEW SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM SERVICE WATER PIPING.
SM-2512.117 SEISMIC UPGRADE OF PIPE SUPPORTS - ANALYSIS LINE CS-150 CONTAINMENT SPRAY RISER SECTION IN CONTAINMENT THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DOCUMENT/DIRECT MODIFICATION OF CV SPRAY PIPING SUPPORTS IN CONTAINMENT.
SM-2512.119 STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION TUBING AND PIPING SUPPORTS THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF SUPPORTS FOR THE "A<< STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION TUBING AND PIPING.
SM-2512.120 SERVICE WATER PIPING SUPPORT THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF A PIPING SUPPORT ON THE SERVICE WATER PUMP DISCHARGE PIPING.
SM-2512.121 SEISMIC UPGRADE OF PIPE SUPPORTS ANALYSIS LINE SAFW STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER BUILDING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SUPPORTS A-TRAIN IN THE SAFW BUILDING.
SM-2512.122 SEISMIC UPGRADE OF PIPE SUPPORTS - ANALYSIS LINE SAFW-450-STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER BUILDING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER CROSSOVER PIPING SUPPORTS.
SM-2799.21 RVLMS RECALIBRATION TESTING THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING OF RVLMS SYSTEM FOLLOWING RECALIBRATION.
SM-2831.1 BATTERY ROOM RACKS SEISMIC RESTRAINT MODIFICATION THE "
PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF BATTERY RACK lA AND BATTERY RACK 1B SEISMIC RESTRAINT MODIFICATION.
SM-2846.1946 A>> MSIV SOLENOID PROTECTIVE STRUCTURE THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION=ANDTURNOVER OF THE nA" MSIV SOLENOID PROTECTIVE STRUCTURE.
SM-2846.1946A A" MSIV SOLENOID PROTECTIVE STRUCTURE DOOR AND SHIELD PLATES THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL INSTALLATION OF A DOOR AND SHIELD PLATES ON THE iiAit MSIV PROTECTIVE STRUCTURE.
SM-3092.10 BORIC ACID PIPING UPGRADE PHASE 2 BAPU - MECHANICAL REMOVAL RECONSTRUCTION AND RELOCATIONS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DOCUMENT/DIRECT PIPING MODIFICATION BAPU - PHASE 2.
SM-3092.11 BORIC ACID PIPING UPGRADE PHASE 2 PRE-OUTAGE ELECTRICAL THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE PRE-OUTAGE ELECTRICAL MODIFICATION FOR THE BORIC ACID PIPING UPGRADE - PHASE 2.
SM-3092.12 BORIC ACID PIPING UPGRADE PHASE RECONSTRUCTION AND RELOCATIONS II BAPU ELECTRICAL REMOVALS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL 1) THE REMOVALS/ RE INSTALLATIONS AND TURNOVER OF HEAT TRACE ZONES AND ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT~ 2) THE DETERMINATIONS RETERMINATIONg TESTINGS AND TURNOVER OF SPECIFIC MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES (MOVs).
SM-3092.13 BORIC ACID PIPING UPGRADE BAPU PHASE II HEAT TRACT TESTING THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE BORIC ACID PIPING UPGRADE (BAPU) PHASE II HEAT TRACE SYSTEM.
SM-3296.2046 INSTALLATIONOF AUXILIARYBUILDING BACKDRAFT DAMPERS AND STATIONARY LOUVERS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE BACK DRAFT PROTECTION TO PREVENT DAMAGE TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING OUTER SHELL DURING TORNADO WIND CONDITIONS.
SM-3319.57 MCC-1C 15M THERMAL OVERLOAD HEATER REPLACEMENT THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THERMAL OVERLOAD HEATER REPLACEMENT AT MCC-1C/15M FOR MOV-1815A.
SM-3319A.1 PHASE ROTATION CHECK PRIOR TO BREAKER CHANGEOUT ON MCC-1B 1C 1D 1E 1F AND 1K THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO PERFORM A DOCUMENTED SURVEY OF PHASE ROTATION ON BREAKERS TO BE REPLACED DURING THE 1 9 8 8 OUTAGE ~ ALSO g THE PHASE ROTATION AT THE F ELD I TERMINATIONS FOR THE BORIC ACID EVAPORATOR PACKAGE AND THE
AUXILIARY BUILDING LIGHTING , TRANSFORMER 1B WILL BE DOCUMENTED.
SM-3319A.7 PHASE ROTATION CHECK PRIOR TO BREAKER CHANGEOUT AT MCC-1F THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DOCUMENT THE PHASE ROTATION AT BREAKERS, PRIOR TO REPLACEMENT AT MCC-1F.
SM-3755.2 P.O.R.V. BLOCK VALVE REPLACEMENT MECHANICAL.
THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE MECHANICAL INSTALLATION REQUIRED FOR THE NEW PORV BLOCK VALVES MOV-515 AND MOV-516.
SM-3768.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION COOLING SYSTEM - PIPING AND INSTRUMENT TUBING MODIFICATIONS THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONS TESTINGS AND TURNOVER OF PIPING AND INSTRUMENT TUBING ASSOCIATED WITH THE PENETRATION COOLING SYSTEM UPGRADE.
SM-3797.7 MRPI SYSTEM TROUBLESHOOTING AND REPAIR THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TROUBLESHOOTING, INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF PROBLEMS FOUND DURING OPERATION OF THE MRPZ SYSTEM. THIS INCLUDES CORRECTING THE 130 KHZ OSCILLATION, MODIFYING THE DATA CABINET CARDS'ND INSTALLING TIME DELAYS ON THE ROD DROP RELAYS.
SM-3881.3 BORIC ACID TANK OVERLFOW PIPING MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE BORIC ACID TANK OVERFLOW PIPING MODIFICATION.
SM-3881.5 MOV-897 AND MOV-898 FUNCTIONAL TESTING THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS TO PERFORM THE FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF NEW MOV-897 AND 898.
SM-3986.22 APPENDIX R FIRE WRAP SUPPORT UPGRADE THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF FIRE WRAP ON CONDUIT SUPPORTS.
SM-3986.23 STRUCTURAL STEEL MODIFICATION FOR FIRE WRAP THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE MODIFICATION TO THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING STRUCTURAL STEEL AND HANDRAIL'O ALLOW FOR INSTALLATION OF
'APPENDIX R FIRE WRAP.
SM-4037.2 S.P.I.N.G. TO P.P.C;S. INTERFACE LINK THE PURPOSE OF, THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATIONS TESTINGS AND TURNOVER OF THE SPING/PPCS INTERFACE WIRING AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS.
SM-4068.7 R.M.S. PUMP ANNUNCIATOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS FOR THE R.M.S. ANNUNCIATOR HOOKUP INSTALLATION.
SM-4075.5 INSTALLATION OF ELECTRIC HEATING COILS IN THE T.S.C. HVAC SYSTEM THE PURPOSE OF THIS .NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF ELECTRICAL HEATING COILS, AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS IN THE T.S.C. HVAC SYSTEM.
SM-4282.1 CV RECIRCULATION FAN CONDENSATE COLLECTOR LEVEL ELECTRICAL MODIFICATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF CABLES'ONDUITSg AND INSTRUMENTATION FOR THE CV RECIRCULATION FAN CONDENSATE COLLECTOR LEVEL SYSTEM.
SM-4526.18 D G FUEL OIL SYSTEM DAY TANK LEVEL INST. CONDUIT RUN LOCATION THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO INVESTIGATE CONDUIT ROUTING FOR THE D/G *FUEL OIL SYSTEM MODIFICATION EWR-4526.
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SM-4526.19 D G INSTRUMENT TUBXNG SUPPORTS THE'URPOSE OF THIS - NEW PROCEDURE XS TO INSTALL TEMPORARY SEISMIC SUPPORTS, ON THE DIESEL GENERATOR INSTRUMENT TUBING.
SM-4554.2 4A AND 4B FEEDWATER HEATERS REPLACEMENT THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO PERFORM 4A AND 4B LP FEEDWATER HEATERS REPLACEMENT.
SM-4618.2 PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTING OF THE MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP ROOM NEW VENTILATION SYSTEM.
SM-4638.1 GENERATOR SURGE CAPACITORS AND NEUTRAL TRANSFORMER REPLACEMENT THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF REPLACEMENT OF THE MAIN GENERATOR SURGE CAPACITORS AND NEUTRAL TRANSFORMER.
SM-4761.2 MOV 857A AND 857B POWER SUPPLY SWAPOVER'UNCTIONAL TEST THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE MOV 857A AND 857B POWER SUPPLY SWAPOVER MODIFICATION.
I SECT ON C TEMPORARY BYPASS OF I SAFETY FUNCT ON g I I I STRUCTURE FEATURES ~ SH ELD NG ~ AND FLU D SYSTEM FEATURES This section contains descriptions and summaries of safety evaluations of temporary changes pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(b).
CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL JOB FOREMAN DATE: ~~- REQUEST¹: ifM~~~d JUMPER WIR LIFTED WIRE 0 FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK+ OTME
'n ~
FUNCTION 4I TE<cv 4 ( Ov JE'E.
C~41 ~+rL E oiq $ + I uC o~g PURPOSE Jul+ ( W<w o c- ps-z 7~-
- r. c.O4 7r e~J,~ rE v o/
P3'OCATiOW:
~C ~ >~eel SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: Q'ES 0 NO SKETCH ATTACHED: 0 YES 0 NO 13M 7~
PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED); >4 TECHNICAL MANAGER: DATB ~O EE--
SHIFT SUPERVISOR: DATE o INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE & TIME DATE & TIME:
/
ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS INS L NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:
INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY ~k~ Jl>E~
VERIFIED BY: m d.c< VERIFIED BY: AX~
REVIEW (AS NECESSARY) r gP 2 1989 QA Attach additional page(s) as necessary '
49 'lEE AEVAE/88 ';,
PAGE 2 AND THE COMMITTEE HAS DETERMINED THAT NO TECHNICAL SPECIFI-CATION CHANGES OR VIOLATIONS WERE INVOLVED AND TH%K ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ~ THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTATION IS PROVIDED AS JUSTIFICATION FOR COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.59.
REFERENCES:
GINNA STATION Qh MANUAL JUSTIFICATION: THE MDH ELECTROMETER SUPPLEMENTS OUR CURRENTLY APPROVED LEVEL TEST EQUIPMENT FOR CALIBRATION OF SOURCES'HIS INSTRUMENT II WAS PURCHASED IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION VII OF THE QA AND IS USED IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION VZZZ OF THE 'AhOAL KCaMHBXS .
3 '.0-88-116-002 ~~~ 88-4391 THE PROC. SPEC. PRESENTED THIS NEW PROCEDURE:
THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ZS TO MEET PORC APPROVED GUIDANCE FOR SUCH TESTS. THE COMMITTEE REVIEWED THE PROCEDUR~
STEP BY STEP'AND RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE.
THE ABOVE ITEM WAS REVIEWED BY THE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE TECHNICAL SPECZFZCATZONS AND THE COMMITTEE HAS DETERMINED THAT NO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES OR VIOLATIONS WERE INVOLVED AND THERE. ARE NO UK%VIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ~ THE ST PROCEDURE INCLUDES SAFETY ANALYSIS TO COMPLY WITH 50.59-9.0 OTf654 DISCUSSION 9 1. 0-88-116-001 ThE REACTOR ENGINEER PRESENTED A SAFETY EVALUATION FOR BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL NUMBER 88-68 'HE JUMPER CONTROL WILL CONNECT A RECORDER TO THE TEST POINTS OF THE ACCUMULATOR LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT-935'HIS TEMPORARY CONNECTION WILL NOT CREATE AN UNREVZEWED SAFETY Q" ~
- kSOIRHXE.
ALL OF THE ABOVE ITEMS WERE REVIEWED BY THE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT
PAGE 3 TO THE TECHNICAL SPEClFICATIONS AND THE COMMITTEE.HAS DETERMINED .>>
THAT NO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES OR VIOLATIONS WERE INVOLVED IN THE CHANGES AND THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ~ ~~
'. HE CHAIRMAN ADJOURNED THE MEETING.
(, l/a.
JOYCE WRIGHT v PORC SECRETARY APPROVED BY:
ST M. ECTOR K. NAS SAVER SUPERINTENDENT QC ENGINEER il
~ >>
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~ ~
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CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1422 EVIEWED GAS AND ELECTRIC STATION 4,i- gP'OCHESTER
'II'INNA t.
BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROI Tj"'OB FOREMAN'4 C/ DATE: /0 I " gg REQUEST 0: 0.
<h -7o JUMPER WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE g FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 01HER 0 FUNCTION PT 1 7 - P9 F'R R iBAiu ~mco~ 7 C gs <Ai PURPOSE - 7JA geRerAJ& S'R 7-3 9 b7-9 +
LOCATION:~~+< ~ waco Ra 7 C Znc. <
SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED:
I'OIIC DAIE (II IIEGUIIlED).'... ZP I YES
-2r.
5"-.8')
0 NO SKETCH ATTACHED:
2r g pggP 5 YES 0 NO 1ECHNICAL MANAGER: . or A rar DA1E:
SHIFT SUPERVISOR: DATE:
INSTALLATION DATE&TIME BY'EMOVAL
/"
ENTERED INOFFICIALLOG; g
1 '~ 0 )5 A~2 I 4
DATE &
TIME'NTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ~+
NUMBER OF TAGS IN TALLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:
INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY'ERIFIED VERIFIED BY:
REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)
AUG Qh.
SposlnoN -5 Yfg Attach additional page(s) as necessary
SAFETY EVALUATZO SUEY FO gyp~ 8F SOFifr~ FPNuJM ~k gu<~PQ II Exclusion from Screenin Criteria - Items 1, 2, or 6 If "yes" is answered for items 1 or 2, provide the type of "inconsequential change" or the referenced- 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation below:
If "no" is answered for Item 6, provide basis for exclusion below:
Bas's fo xclusion:
OC 50 5 a t v uat o << Item 7.
If this "no" has been answered for each question in items 7a through 7g is not an'nreviewed Safety Question. Document: the change Justification for these conclusions below. List material referenced in the space provided as appropiiate.
Written Just icatio: M ci~n e ce r
e: cJn If "yes",
proposed PORC change shall review is an and approve this submittal, and Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) this and requires submittal to. the NRC for their review.
Submitted By:
Flj(K., (~ay I.y ytjt (I=Ott ii)fl;.
OCT 17il988
--PL(."eT TC 88 art ~
Ra 1 . i I-r tV li la :U8COOLED INCORE TC s I I I
I I I tlRF:G INS RVG t(RY I I tg4 I I I I
( I HE&I 54 OF HEFID 596 597
( I I I OR 35 OF CORE 596 616 8J I I I THOTR 49 GF I I I
I I
THOT8 TSRT 651 I
I
>> I I
6(.l ",68 I I RCS MIDE RRNGES I I LOOP Fl LOOP 8 I I I I FLO:.~'F.'E.:
- 98. 5 97. 8 D<- 2"13 2217 PSIG I
THO 602.8 597 9 0F I
TCO 549. 6 Op
- 48. 5 48. 3 GF E-- I I
I'RV:
'578. 5 573. 9 F I
RCS t(RRROM RF(NGES LOOPFI LOOP8 RVG DT 55.4 56.1 55.8 oF TRV 574.2 573t8 574.8 OF TF;EF 5'73. 3 OF itic t TRV~-TF.:EF IIEVI 1ie oF F,q 0 PF.ES"-UR I ZER LEV=L PRE.=S 48.8 iPSIG RERCTOR VESSEL LEVEL STtl T 640 oF MTF.' 0 oF 101.2r. R SUF.'GE f -qc 0F 108. 7:.'
PRES":UP I ZER PORV431 RELIEF TRI<(( CLOSED
-9a c"00 LEI!EL i l~ 2 48 PRESS PORV438 TE(lP 89. 6 CLOSED e
STERN GENERRTOR e LOOP R LOOP 8 LVLMIDE t8 279 INCH TE(1P LVLMIDE 53. o 52.
LEVEL 51. 9 II'2.2 DT PRE S 713 713 SF 3"'29 3138 NL8rH FF 3304 3248 KL8rH SF-FF -114 KL8iH FI=CLERP cEV CAthC F2= F3='=.IIU C('. r NORtlt'3L F5=
t(ODE~OH L I NE FE.r CPUR .
CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC 'I GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROI>,
E JOB DATE REQUESTS II W 7 I FOREMAN'UMPER WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE g FUSES PUL ED STATES BLOCK 0 OTHER 0 FUNCTION +C )
PURPOSE LOCATION:
SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: Pl YES 0 NO SKETCH ATIACHED: 0 YES Q NO re md>rr~sW PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED): lC 8 I~
TECHNlCALMANAGER: DATE:
SHIFT SUPERVISOR: DATE:
,INSTALIATION REMOVAL DATE 8 TIME I i2 % DATE 8 TIMF'NTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS INST+/ NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:
INSTALLED BY:
fc'NTERED REMOVED BY:
VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:
REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)
Afi m z) 6'z F' d'7 /QC>
Attach additional page(s) as necessary 40-1'ev.2/88... ~~>
SAFETY EVALUATION S pgpkssPA boi~~)4g ~ m~~<<~
SWLW Cob/FPpL Exc usion from Screenin Cr'teria - Items 1, 2, or 6
'f "yes" is answex'ed for items 1 or 2, provide the type of "inconsequential change" or the referenced loCFR50.59 safety evaluation below:
If "no" is answered for Item 6, provide basis for exclusion below:
Basis fo c us o n//A
- Item 7.
If "no" has been answez'ed for each question in items 7a through,7g.
this change is not an Unreviewed Safety Question. Document the justification for these conclusions below. List:
in the space provided as appropriate. material'referenced W 'tte Jus a o : JJJ. Wrmocn /g di V/
5' er scabs . ?.2./. 1> 7, U/= SA.< /l~~~v ~~i r r v~
S P e c
. 7. 2.&.4Q If "yes",
proposed PORC chango shall review and approve this submittal, and this
. is an Unriviewed Safety Question (USQ) and requires submittal to the NRC for their review.
Submitted By:
I'IOV 15m 1988
$ 6I.KCT FVH!-. HK"F OR TIJFII.QN CODE TC 69:86:81
~n4 IV UBCOOLED INCORE TC s RW W I- I I I !1FiRG I I IS RVG tIRX I I I H ERD 53 oF HERD 595 599 I, I C OPE 37 oF CORE 595 615 I I I T HPTR 54 oF I I HOTB 53 oF TSRT 651 I I I c; 42 I I C I I
61 I 570 RCS MIDE RRNGES T I I LOOP R LOOP B I I Sb 63 I I FLOV 98. 5 98.8 r.
I D-I- PRESS 2212 2218 PSIG THPT 597.5 598.6 oF I
I TCP D SS5.6 549.6 oF DTTH-TC 41. 9 49 8 oF E-'-I I
610 60 8 TRIIG S?6. 6 5?4'1 oF I 59 JS Rl"S IIRRROM RRNGES 608 0
DT'5 TFlVj LOOPR LOOPB RVG 1 55 4 S?4.2 573.8 '574.8 oF 55 2 oF TRE= 573 2 oF oet i93 c;08 TRVG-TREF DEVI 1 eoF*
39 c'6 PRESSUPIZER RERCTOR I 8 b07 614 LEVELYN S0c 8 VESSEL P RESSI -40 PSIG LEVEL 8 55 S TN T 640 oF MTR T 651 oF 188.8~ R F00 590 S URGE 650 OF. 188.4i B 48 PRESSUP. I"'EF. PORV431 j RELIEF TFiNI! CLOSED l t.00 608 b00 LEVEL 72. 5 45 PRES': .8 PORV438 TEt1P 85. 2 CLOSED B 569 j STERI1 GENERF!TOR 440 LOOP R LOOP B 587 581 LVLIrJ I DE 77 269 ItICH
.9 LVL'AIDE 53. 5 51. 9 LEVEL 51 ~ 8 52. 1 P P.ESS ".18 716 PSIG SF ;I,9 3118 ICLBrH.:
FF 3:.>1 3261 ICLBrH!
F-FF - I 13 -146 ICLBrH cS CONSOLE tlpf IIIII. tIODE .1.!k I. IHI:
CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL II JOB DATE REQUESTS:
FOREMAN'UMPER WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 OTHER 0 FUNCTION a -W/
PURPOSE 2 F'r/E LOCATION'AFEIY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: ~S'
( Afjj4~
e F-NO S. +ATTACHED:
l4 CRC,SKETCH 0 YES IFIIO PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED):
TECHNICALMANAGER Pdg. C J 2 Tl'-
SHIFT SUPERVISOR:+~ DATE INSTALLATION REMOVAL
- Q ~ DATE 6 TIME ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; DATE 8 TIME:
ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS INSTALLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:
INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:
VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)
~
Attach additional page(s) as necessary 49 1S2 Rev. 2/8S
S AF ET Y V LU T ON SUMMAR FO PCN 0 ~l'I elusion from Screenin Crite i - Items 1, 2, or 6 If "yes" is answered "inconsequential change" for items 1 or 2,'rovide= the type of or the referenced 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation below:
If "no" is answered for* Item 6, provide basis for exclusion below:
Bas s for Exclus o c c. - tqaQ. J Og tC <<a ~~dL, h cJ c Ji 8 -c < ec. a Sr a .4'./
C 50. 9 Safet Eva at o - Item 7 If "no" has this change been answered for each .question in items 7a through 7g is not an Unreviewed Safety Question.. Document the
)ustification for these conclusions below. List material referenced'in the space provided as appropriate.
W tte Justificat o ced If "yes",
proposed PORC change shall review and approve this submittal, and this is an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) and requires submittal to the NRC for their review.
Submitted By:
CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEOURE A.1402 REVIEWEO ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL JOB FOREMAN /a 8. S DATE: I-2 REQUESTS:
JUMPER WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE 0 FUSES PULLED 0 STATES Bl OCK OTHER 0
.FUNCTION 5e C~~el PURPOSE /~ed 4~
I a~~se LOCATION:
kr" ~sr 5cc44t~
<<4 L SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: 6 YES 0 N SKETCH ATTACHED: 0 YES MAO PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED):
TECHNICAL MANAGER: DATE:
SHIFT SUPERVISOR: DATE l l INSTALIATION REMOVAL DATE 8 TIME DATE & TIME:
' ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG'UMBER OF TAGS INSTALLED:
ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:
INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:
VERIFIED BY: VERiFIED BY:
REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)
Attach additional page(s) as necessary
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CATEGORY ftEF EOENCE PROCEDUIIE A-1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUIVlPER CONTROL JOB FOREMAN'IEFI d DATE REQUEST ¹: P1 06 JUMPER WIRE@ LIFTED WIRE 0 FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 'THER 0 FUNCTION ~(- A osn "a) 7 AP Du rn R A.B S / e e 8cu<g l5 / //:<nr ez LocA7 ~
/5 8 AC.
PURPOSE ~ T6 jr T QH(Eu To L I oL c'< R.<<>5 I u¹r~- /7 t Ivlgg i6' T ge A P LOCATION: W< 8 SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: g YES NO SKETCH ATTACHED: 0 YES 0 NO PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED):
TECHNICAL MANAGER: DATE:
SHIFT SUPERVISOR: DATE:
INSTALLATION DA1E8 llME > ~~ ~ L. DATER TIME: .?. ",~ /~ t I H.'0 'i ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; o<'EMOVAL NUMBER OF TAGS INSTALLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMgVPD: ~
INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY: i8lv'4 ~"~
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VERIFIED BY: ......~~ ~D (EL VERIFIED BY:
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gS~Sl l lON. 5 YltS.
Attach additional page(s) as necessary 49 (EE ((e¹. 2/8$ /,4A%
¹+ ',w.
CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A-1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION 8YPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL JOB 3o gv DATF'EQUEST ¹:
FOREMAN'UMPER FUNCT(ON WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE 0 OUI b P. Li'0 FUSES PULLED 0 "8 'i P.AI Q 'J STATES BLOCK 0 I 7'H CaPEEA IT OTHER g r0 %NOVI a - 'l ' gl rr V Mr "bur '7a PVLm IA'.
PURPOSE Or 7 8 r rq L
' 'TI8 - 9 W c 7 8.-/o LOCATION: A' i /AC.
SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED YES 0 NO SKETCH ATTACHED.' YES 0 NO
'ORC DATE (IF REQUIRED):
TECHNICALMANAGER: ': n
- SHIFT SUPERVISOR DATE: 3' I > - F INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE 8 TIME 3 L DATE 8, TIME:
d-! ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS INSTALLED NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:
INSTALLED BY: '~T " '>
REMOVED BY:
VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:
REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)
Attach additional page(s) as necessary
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SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: HAYES 0 NO SKETCH ATTACHED: Cf YES 0 NO PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED):
TECHNICALMANAGER: DATE:
SHIFT SUPERVISOR Mu DATE:
INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATER TIME ' > DATE K TIME:
I I ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS INSTALLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:
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Attach additional page(s) as necessary 49 TE2 Bed. 2/89 '
FIGURE 2 SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FORM 4 A,P
".VF~
'ROCEDURE
~ -j~
DATE PCN Exclusion from Screenin Criteria - Items 1, 2, or 6 If "yes" is answered for Items "inconsequential change" or the 1 or 2, provide the type of referenced 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation below:
Change Type:
If "no" was answered below:
for Item 6, provide the basis for exclusion Basis for Exclusion:
10CFR50.59 Safet Eva uatio - Item 7 If "no" has been ansvered for each question in items this change is not an Unrevieved Safety Question.
7a through 7g Document the justification for these conclusions below. List any material referenced in the space provided.
written Justification: CLJ e etenced Nate a
<F If "yes" was answered for Item 3, check this box If "yes", was ansvered for Item 7, PORC shall reviev and approve this submittal. This proposed change is an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ)'nd requires submittal to the NRC for their reviev.
Submitted By:
CATEGORY .REFERENCEPROCEDuRE A.1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL JOB DATE REQUESTS FOREMAN'UMPER WIRE Nf UFTED WIRE 0 FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 OTHER 0 FUNCTION Dc', v 5E88K 6'~M~d~K PURPOSE>>iM~~ ~ V ~. '~ oZ Zr oX r c( f 4)DM 7ES r l&C 7HZ J Age V ~~ P.
LOCATION: y5 gP IASV/ZC COi~iROI SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: +YES 0 NO SKETCH ATTACHED: 0 YES 0 NO PORC DATE(IF REQUIRED)'ECHNICAL MANAGER DATE SHIFT SUPERVISOR INSTALLATION REMOVAL g~
DATE II TIME DATER TIMF'NTERED ENTERED INOFFICIALLOP, IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED.
INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:
VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:
2 REVIEW (AS NECESSARY)
~
. / lr~
I. RECORDS DISPOSITlON. g Attach addttional page(s) as nece8%&j 40 N2Aev,2/58'-
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CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL JOB DATE: REQUESTS:
FOREMAN'UMPER WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE 0 FUSES PULLED STATES BLOCK 0 OTHER 0 FUNCTION SLY N S,)i ri'c"i s rt- i in PURPOSE ir s i. car L ~)iri ~ Cc m r'~
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LOCATION:
SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: 8 YES 0 NO SKETCH ATIACHED: 0 YES 3hC( NO PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED):
TECHNICAL MANAGER:
SHIFT SUPERVISOR: r- DATE:
DATE:
INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE & TIME DATE &
TIME'NTERED ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS INST LLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:
INSTALLED BY REMOVED BY:
VERIFIED BY: VERIFIED BY:
REVIEW (AS NECESSARY) V 8 P.c:'7 /V- r>c,'r Z.~ f > Ol
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Attach additional page(s) as necessary ,> pi,wP 49 li2 Ilev '2/8S
ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION 49.169 GINNA STATION: DATE: PAGE OF MADE BY:
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HAJJ CATEGORY 3.3.5 REFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL JOB FOREMAN'S r e~-- REQUEST¹: 0 JUMPER WIRE 0 LIFTED WIRE Kt FUSES PULLED 0 STATES BLOCK 0 OTHER 0 FUNCTION r o.oT To Mcc~
cn-h' n re PURPOSE g .n1OUC o
a6 H rn 6 LOCATION: gL fC89 SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: EI YES
~NP ATTACHED: Cf YES J'KETCH 0 NO PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED):
TECHNICALMANAGER: DATE SHIFT SUPERVISOR: DATE INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE & TIME DATE & TIME:
ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS INST 8 D: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:
INSTALLED BY: REMOVED BY:
VERIFIED VERIFIED BY:
BY'EVIEW (AS NECESSARY) e CdW rr oloAIIo or rovrorIs ron oEoS /0 r".r rrr 88 Attach additional page(s) as necessary
CATEGORY REFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402 REVIEWED ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC GINNA STATION BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION AND JUMPER CONTROL JOB FOREMAN' ~ ~ '~ V '5 JUMPER WIRE FUNCTION 4i 0 LIFTED WIRE FUSES PULLED 0 I ~,C.'THER 0 STATES BLOCK 0 r7 l NA PURPOSE LOCATION'ot. ~
SAFETY EVALUATIONREQUIRED: Pf YES ~NO ATTACHED; X(4ES ~NO f44'KETCH PORC DATE (IF REQUIRED): -b-TECHNICALMANAGER: .~l-9 -P SHIFT SUPERVISOR: DATE: ~~ ~~ ~
INSTALLATION REMOVAL DATE & TIME . 8 0'9 DATE & TIME:
ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; ENTERED IN OFFICIAL LOG; NUMBER OF TAGS INSTALLED: NUMBER OF TAGS REMOVED:
g /
INSTALLED BY: . REMOVED BY:
VERIFIED BY. f~<T'- ~ c ~M> kent'r-'r VERIFIED BY:
REVIEW (AS NECESSARY) ~ > ~ + ~a 4
Attach additional page(s) as necessary EB 142 AEV. t/88
10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation for lifting wire for Thermocouple D07 The indications for TC D07 are inconsistent with the response of other related core parameters (i.e. incore flux map & nearby thermocouple indications). Thermocouples are used to sense core outlet temperature, determine relative fuel assembly power and compensate RVLIS. Since TC D07 is not. consistent with either incore or other thermocouples it has been declared inoperable.
It has been deleted from processing in PPCS. To remove it from the averaging circuit at the thermocouple panel requires lifting its lead. The panel from averaging.
will then sense an open TC and remove it With TC D07 inoperable the minimum requirement per-Tech. Specs.
of 4 thermocouples per quadrant is met. TC D07 is not used to compensate RVLIS. The functions of the thermocouple system as described in the UfSAR are fulfilled. Therefore, neither the probability nor the consequences of an accident or malfunction evaluated in the UFSAR is increased. The possibility of a new accident or malfunction is not created. The margin of safety defined in Tech. Specs. is not reduced.
References:
Tech. Specs. 3.5.3, UFSAR Section 7.7.4 ffrey P. W and 11/30/89 PORC Approval: /2.
Cp<
JUN 13>1989 SELECT FUNC. KEY OR TURN-ON CODE 88'36:26 1 SUBCOOLED INCORE TCs R-1 -t 566 I I I I NRRGINS RVG f&R 15 HERD 58 oF HERD 593 595 CORE I9 oF CORE 594 624 BJ I I I
THOTR 57 oF I I 45 THOTB 56> oF TSRT 653 I I I I I 573 608 611 568 I I RCS MIDE RAGES I I LOOP R LOOP 6 I I 22 62 17 I I FLOM 98. 7 98. 2 8 I
573 619 598 PRESS 2245 2238 PSIG Dg THOT 596 2 597 3 oF I 22 68 39 TCOLD 553.8 549.8 oF I DTTH-TC 43.4 48.2 oF E--I I
613 607 617 TRVG 574.6 573.2 oF I 62 56 66 RCS NRRRQd RRNGES LOOPR LOQP8 RVG 681 DT 55.4 55.4 5S.4 o 48 TRVG S73.8 Sr3.r S73.3 o TREF 573 8 o 593 596 592 597 TRVG-TREF DEVI 5 0 42 41 46 4c'85 599 5 611 624 577 LEVEL PRESSURIZER 49.8 PRESS 2241 i
PSIG e~ oF 48 S8 73 26 STll T 648 WTR T 647 oF 188.3r. R 603 594 595 SURGE OF 181.9> 6 34 52 42 44 PRESSURIZER PORV431 RELIEF TRNN CLOSED 618 688 686 LEVEL S9 57 55 PRESS 3. 9 PORV438 TElIP 83. 7 CLOSED 582 564 STERN GENERRTOR 31 13 LOOP R 586 P.
LVLMIDE 279 269 INCH TEtIP LVLMIDE 53.9 51.9 35 si8 LEVEL 51. 8 58. 6 DT PRESS 699 699 PSIG SF 3172 3899 NLBrH FF 3269 3188 NLBrH SF-FF -97 -81 NLB/H F2= F3= F4= FS= F6=
CONSOLE~NORllRL tlODE=ON LINE CPUR
October 17, 1988 NEW SPENT FUEL HEAT EXCHANGER EWR 1594B PIPING SCAFFOLD 88-110 After the new heat exchanger is set on the foundations planned immediately south of the A Component Cooling Heat Exchanger, piping installation efforts will require work platforms at the area over the. west half of the SFP heat exchanger and at the area north of the east half. Each platform will rise 5 to 6 feet above the floor, and each will have some coverage over the A Component Cooling Heat Exchanger.
The durability of the 'CWHXS is such as to preclude any damage that could be postulated from toppling pipe, knuckle and plank scaffold. Cooling capability of one of the two CCWHXS is sufficient to provide for the cooling loads for the plant.
Clearance must be provided for access to valves and instruments associated with the Component Cooling Heat Exchangers and Boric Acid Evaporator Condensate Demineralizers. Care 'should be taken to prevent disturbing the smoke detector Z04DI.
With observance of the above, the work platforms will not
- 1) result in a change to the facility or its operation as described in the Safety Analysis Report, 2) provide a change to the Plant Technical Specifications, or 3) involve an unreviewed safety question.
October 20, 1988 SPENT FUEL COOLING PUMP PIPING EWR-1594B SCAFFOLDS88-111 In order to install piping for the planned Spent Fuel Cooling Pump, two scaffolds are planned above the presently existing pump, about 6 feet from the floor, per attached sketch.
The SFP cooling system is non-seismic safety related (1) however, Seismic Category I items are within the immediate vicinity, given below.
A and B Residual Heat Removal Pump Cooling Units (2)
, A Residual Heat Removal Pump Discharge Temperature TT-630 (3)
Other instruments in the area for which care should be taken to avoid disturbing are a's follows:
Component Cooling Return from Residual Heat Removal Pumps flow FI-651 and its associated tubing. (3)
A Residual Heat removal Pump discharge pressure PIC-629 and PI-629A and their associated tubing. (3)
Because of the presence of the above items the two scaffolds shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons September 23, 1988 memo attachment). The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer. The Liaison Engineer may so signify this in his stead. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. 'In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation,,and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept the installation.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, te'sting and maintenance access to the Auxiliary Building sub-basement, all valves and instrumentation in the area.
Page 1 of 2
With observance of the above requirements the scaffolds will not 1) result in a change to the assumptions for the Safety Analysis in the Safety Analysis Report, 2) provide a'hange to the Plant Technical Specifications, or 3) involve an unreviewed safety question.
NOTES
- 1) 'uality Assurance Manual Appendix A Quality and Safety Related Listing and Diagrams Section 2.2.4 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling ,outlined in RG&E Drawing 33013-1248 (portion attached).
- 2) UFSAR Section 9.4.9.1 Engineered Safety Features Equipment Ventilation and Cooling.
- 3) UFSAR Figure 5. 4-7 Residual Heat Removal System (portion .
attached)
- 4) UFSAR Figure 9.2-4 Sheet 1 Component Cooling Water System (portion attached).
Page 2 of 2
November 1, 1988 RELAY ROOM CEILING PENETRATION WORK BY AUX RELAY RACK RA-2 SCAFFOLD 88-115 The penetration work planned will require a scaffold between the Aux. Relay Rack RA-2 and the MUX Room door. It is to rise about 15 feet from the floor. Other items within the vicinity are Containment Isolation Relay Racks A-1 and A-2, Safeguards Initiation Cabinets SI-Al and SI-A2, Fox Racks 1 and 2, and Cable Tray 164.
The scaffold shall be constructed in accordan'ce with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) .
The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation.to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison .Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
If itduring observed is foreseen in the erection, that a scaffold planning stage, or is deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural-Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept the installation.
With observance of the above requirements the scaffold will not 1) result in a change to the assumptions for the Safety Analysis in the Safety Analysis Report, 2) provide a change to the Plant Technical Specifications, or 3) involve an unreviewed safety question.
November 30, 1988 FIRE WRAP UPGRADE EWR 3986 OVER MCC-1D SCAFFOLD 88-118 A scaffold is planned to-extend from the front of 480 Bus 16-eastward over MCC-1D to the wall behind MCC-lD. It is to rise about 9 feet. In order to prevent any interference with activities involving the alternate train Bus 14 and MCC-lC,
'onstruct the scaffold as a seismic it installation.
is planned to The scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B.
Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer. In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation'rom the guidelines will be necessary, verbal- guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as. described above.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing, and maintenance access to all electrical panels on the Bus 16 and MCC-,lD, to include clearance to rack out breakers.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the.
assumptions of the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on
.any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the. Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
I'
Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change to the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
November 9, 1988 FIRE WRAP UPGRADE EWR 3986 BY B SAFETY INJECTION PUMP SCAFFOLD 88-120 In order to perform the necessary upgrade a scaffold approx-imately 9 feet high will be needed to follow the routing shown in the attached sketch. The route is adjacent to the B Safety Injection Pump and the B Containment Spray Pump.
The scaffold shall be constructed so as to maintain access for testing and emergency operation to all associated valves, instruments and h'eat trace connections and circuits.
The estimated duration of the project, 30 days, is such that seismic construction requirements are imposed. The scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer. The Liaison Engineer may so signify this in his stead. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept the installation.
With observance of the above requirements the scaffold will not 1) result in a change to the assumptions for the Safety Analysis in the Safety Analysis Report, 2) provide a change to the Plant Technical Specifications, or 3) involve an unreviewed safety question.
November 9, 1988 FIRE WRAP UPGRADE EWR 3986 OVER B CONTROL ROD DRIVE MG SET SCAFFOLD 88-121 A scaffold is needed to perform the fire wrap upgrade, the work being located over the B MG set, and in the vicinity of the MG set control panels, the Reactor Trip Breaker Panels,, the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker Panels, and B Steam Generator Steam Line Pressure Transmitters. It is to rise 10 feet.
Because of the presence of the safety related features included in the above list, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer.
The Liaison Engineer may so signify this in his stead. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept the installation.
In addition to the above, several cautions are to be observed as follows:
Constrain all planking and provide toe boards to minimize the potential for dropped objects.
Special care should be taken during material movement for scaffold erection and removal to prevent striking the nearby instruments and breaker controls.
It has been determined that the scaffold installation, with observance of the above requirements will not 1) result in a change to the facility or its operation as described in the Safety Analysis Report, 2) provide a change to the Plant Technical Specifications, or 3) involve an unreviewed safety cpxestion.
November 10, 1988 SPENT FUEL COOLING EWR-1594B-CONDUIT INSTALLATION OVER SFPHX TO TRAY 136 SCAFFOLD 88-127 A scaffold is needed to install conduit supports and conduit to extend from near the Auxiliary Building intermediate floor northwest corner east over the G Aux.'ldg.'xhaust Fan suction duct to tray 136, over the east end of the Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger. Standby Auxiliary Feedwater System Containment isolation MOVs are located on the north side of the SFPHX.
The space, between the heat exchanger and containment is very congested with piping, pipe support structures, regulators, valves, instruments, and lead shielding for a process monitor in the service water piping from the heat exchanger. -A major portion of the equipment here is associated with the waste gas system supporting the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank and the Pressurizer Relief Tank, both of which are in Containment. Immersed within this space is one of the Containment Mini-purge discharge isolation valves.
Concurrent with the above planned effort is a planned repair on Turbine Aux. Feedwater Pump discharge check valve 4003.
for the scaffold for that job was based on The'uthorization maintaining operability of the SAFW system. Because of the .
location of the above discussed SAFW Containment isolation MOVs, the scaffold shall be constructed as seismic using the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The erection process shall be monitored by the -Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability, in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by'the Construction Engineer. The Liaison Engineer may so signify this in his stead. Such documentation shall be attached to the original, copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept the installation.
With observance of the above requirements the scaffold will not 1) result in a change to the assumptions for the Safety Analysis in the Safety Analysis Report, 2) provide a change to the Plant Technical Specifications, or 3) involve an unreviewed safety question.
November 23, 1988 SPENT FUEL COOLING EWR-1594B CONDUIT SUPPORT AND CONDUIT INSTALLATION BETWEEN SFP PUMP AREA AND A SAFETY INJECTION PUMP SCAFFOLD 88-128 In order to install conduit supports and conduit for this project in the Auxiliary Building Basement a scaffold is needed for work near the ceiling from the SFP pump area, east along the corridor by the Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger outlet and bypass valves, the RHR piping to Safety Injection Pump Suction and its associated flow instrumentation, over the hose reel at column 8a-N1 to the space above the A Safety Injection Pump and adjacent to A Containment Spray Pump.
As the portion by the SFP pump would essentially have the same potential effect as the scaffold of request 488-111, because of the proximity to the outlet controls of both trains of Residual Heat Removal *Heat Exchanger, because of the presence of Train A and Train B cable trays just east of the SFP pump area, because of the proximity to the C Safety Injection Pump and the B Containment Spray Pump in addition to those alternate pumps mentioned above, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The guidelines statement 6.0 shall be augmented with the requirement that the sca ffold shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift. The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer. During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Constru'ction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to the Auxiliary Building sub-basement, all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, fire fighting provisions, and adjoining rooms in the area.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Accidental Release Waste Gas Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
The installation does not involve a change to the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant technical Specification'ases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of
, equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
I The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic it feature, will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not. reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
December 6, 1988 PIPE ENTRY GROUTING IN AUXILIARY BUILDING SUB-BASEMENT SCAFFOLD 88-133 A sca ffold is needed with a work plat form about 8 feet from the floor. The corner poles shall be extended to the ceiling and horizontal poles shall be extended to at least one wall and other anchorage points or bumper contact points on the opposite side to prevent movement.
Because both trains of Residual Heat Removal Pumps are within the immediate vicinity of the scaffold, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment), incorporating the features described above. All scaffold shall be in place prior to the end of shift worked on the day it is erected.
The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be conf irmed and documented prior to sea ffold use by the Liaison Engineer. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
If it. is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, and rotating equipment in the area.
The above construction and operational requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above any existing plant it provisions will not have any adverse effect on in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Accidental Release Waste Gas Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
December 14, 1988 PIPE ENTRY GROUTING IN AUXILIARY BUILDING SUB-BASEMENT NORTHWEST CORNER SCAFFOLD 88-134 A scaffold is needed with a work platform about 8 feet from the floor. The corner poles shall be extended to the ceiling and horizontal poles shall be extended to at least one wall and other anchorage points or bumper contact points on the opposite side to prevent movement.
Because both trains of Residual Heat Removal Pumps are within the immediate vicinity of the scaffold, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment), incorporating the features described above. Scaffold in the northeast corner shall be completely dismantled be fore beg'inning this construction. All the day it is erected.
t sca ffold shall be in place prior to the end o f shi f worked on The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison
=Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall noti fy the Shi ft Supervisor o f conf irmation o f seismic capability.
If itduring observed is foreseen in the erection, that.
scaffold planning stage, or is a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a. member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, and .rotating equipment in the area.
The above construction and operational requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Accidental Release Waste Gas Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical will'e Specification, bases.
. The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment impoitant to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce *the margin of safety 'as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
December 20, 1988 t
SPENT FUEL COOLING PIPING EWR 1594B CORE BORING AT AUXILIARY BUILDING INTERMEDIATE FLOOR WEST STAIRWELL SCAFFOLD 88-139 In order to perform core boring and pipe installation at the Spent Fuel Pool Filter north vault wall, a scaffold will be needed which will be using the Auxiliary Building basement floor as part of its foundation, and will also be partly based on the intermediate floor. Between the two floors it will interact with the scaffolds88-111 for pump discharge piping (not started yet) and 88-128 for pump conduit (presently existing). The items of equipment within the vicinity of these scaffolds are described in the reviews for these installations, and their presence is the basis for requiring these to be constructed in accordance with seismic scaffold guidelines. On the intermediate floor another seismic scaffold (88-127) exists on the opposite side of the Spent Fuel Heat Exchanger, in the vicinity of the Standby Auxiliary Feedwater System Containment Isolation MOVs. To the immediate south of the stairwell, on the wall to be core bored, are Seismic Category I boundary valves in the SFP piping.
Because of the above factors the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 6.0 shall be augmented with the requirement that the scaffold shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift.
The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer. During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to the Auxiliary Building sub-basement, all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions in the area.
Locked area accesses to the Auxiliary Building sub-basement and the Spent Fuel Pool filter vault are controlled by locked gates. Ensure that the scaffold does not allow any easier access to these areas.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture Rupture of a Steam Pipe Primary System Pipe Rupture Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
January 10, 1989 FIRE WRAP UPGRADE EWR 3986 OVER B CONTROL ROD DRIVE MG SET SCAFFOLD 89-2 A scaffold is needed to perform the fire wrap upgrade, the work being located over the east end B MG set, and in the vicinity of the MG set control panels, the Reactor Trip Breaker Panels, the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker Panels, and B Steam Generator Steam Line Pressure Transmitters. It is to rise 10 feet.
Because of the presence of the safety related features included in the above list, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer.
The Liaison Engineer may so signify this in his stead. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept the installation.
In addition to the above, several cautions are to be observed as follows:
Constrain all planking and provide toe boards to minimize the potential for dropped objects.
Special care should be taken during material movement for scaffold erection and removal to prevent striking the nearby instruments and breaker controls.
Clearance shall be maintained for use of fire fighting provisions.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which .are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA) Drop Rupture of a Steam Pipe Anticipated Transients Without Scram Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
January 23, 1989 FIRE WRAP UPGRADE EWR 3986 DECK OVER CABLE TRAY 192 ADDENDUM TO SCAFFOLD 89-2 In addition to the scaffold a small deck near the stairway is needed. This is to be secured to Tray 192 and a nearby 4" diameter conduit, adjacent to the work site. The tray is supported by a double unistrut cantilevered from structural steel to the east, as shown on the attached sketch. The limiting load is considered to be a point load at the free end of the support.
The load is estimated to be roughly half of the calculated capability based on that load configuration. In order to provide a conf iguration with which the added load may be considered insignificant, vertical support shall be provided under the tray in the form of a jack stand or 4 X 4 wood with a provision to bear upward on both sides of the tray or the west side of the tray. There are numerous barriers in the surroundings which prevent any adverse effect on safety related equipment discussed in the scaffold review.
An access ladder, if used, shall be tied off.
The deck shall be at minimum of 1/2 in. plywood placed on top of the tray and shall rest on the outer tray barriers. No pressure shall be applied to cables within the trays.'leats shall be applied to prevent displacement.
The Control Room Operators shall be notified prior to commencing deck installation. ~
Based on the factors described above the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the facility or procedures as described in the Safety Analysis Report.
Because of the adequacy of the support system as augmented and existing intervening barriers discussed above it will not have any adverse effect on the Seismic Category I or non-seismic safety related equipment in the vicinity. The design bases events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA) Drop Rupture of a Steam Pipe Anticipated Transients Without Scram
1 The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because the adequacy of the 'upport system as augmented and the barriers which int'ervene with Seismic Category I or non-seismic safety-related equipment are such as to ensure there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation will not increase the probability of an occurrence or, the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report'ecause of the adequacy of the support system as augmented and the existing intervening barriers to Seismic Category I or non-seismic safety related equipment.
'The installation- will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because the adequacy of the support system as augmented and.the barriers described ensure that there will be no adverse effect on Seismic Category I or non-seismic safety related equipment within the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for- any Plant Technical Specification
~
because of the adequacy of the support system as augmented and the intervening barriers which would 'prevent any adverse effect on any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
January'25,, 1989 SERVICE WATER PIPE SUPPORT UPGRADE EWR 2512Z (SW-2200) WORK PLATFORMS 89-4 This pipe support upgrade effort will require four platforms',
one on the Auxiliary Building top floor by MCC-1L and three on the intermediate floor in, the vicinity of the G Auxiliary Building Charcoal Filter and the Heat Trace Panel 14 and distribution 14B Primary. Because of the proximity of both MCCs 1L and lM to these platforms, they shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from- Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) .
The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer arid the Liaison Engineer.
- In the final stage of construction prior to'use, the seismic capability of the scaffolds in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented piior to scaffold'se by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead.
Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In. this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing, and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, and fire fighting provisions in the area.
construction requirements are to be observed;
'he above based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions, in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses -given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Loss of Normal Feedwater Pipe Breaks Outside the Containment Building Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events
There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability
~
because there will be no interference with access provided to
~
fire fighting provisions.
~ ~
~
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident 'or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
March 8, 1989 DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL EWR 4526B DISCHARGE PIPE SUPPORT UPGRADE SCAFFOLDS 89-7 In order to perform pipe support upgrade in the Diesel Generator Rooms prior to the coming annual AI&0 seismically constructed scaffolds are proposed to permit simultaneous existence in both rooms, as shown on the attached sketch. The scaffolds shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B.
Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form.
The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions.
The above construction and operational requirements are to be observed. Based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the facility or procedures as described in the Safety Analysis Report As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Loss of all A.C. power to the station auxiliaries Decrease in heat removal by the secondary system with coincident loss of on-site and external (off-site) A.C.
power to the station Steam Generator tube rupture Rupture of a steam pipe Primary system pipe rupture Anticipated transients without SCRAM with a =loss of A.C. power Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The. installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
February 14, 1989 RHR RECIRC TIE-IN EWR 4675A PIPE TRENCH DECON SCAFFOLD FRAME ENCLOSURE 89-8 Work planned for RHR recirc tie-in in the pipe trench west of the RWST is to be supported by decontaminating the trench in the work area prior to the pipe work. An 8'x 8'x 8'caffold frame enclosure is planned to control the area during decontamination. Because of the proximity of a variety of Seismic Category I features, the scaffold frame shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer.
In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form.
The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
If itis foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
February 14, 1989 RHR HEAT EXCHANGER MONORAIL INSTALLATION AND EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION WORK PLATFORMS 89-9 Plans to install monorails to lift, each RHR Heat Exchanger and to perform eddy current testing will require work plat forms at several levels at both heat exchangers concurrently. Because of this, they shall be constructed one at a time in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo.
attachment). The guidelines statement 6.0 shall be augmented with the requirement that the scaf folds shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift. The erection process shall be monitored by, the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer. =
During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the .authorization form by the Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. In the final 'stage of construction prior to'eginning erection of the scaffold in the second heat exchanger cubicle, the seismic capability of the scaffold frame in the first cubicle in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented by the Construction Engineer, or,the Liaison Engineer in his stead. 'Such documentation .shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability. After such confirmation erection of the scaffold frame in the second cubicle may begin, accompanied by monitoring, conf irmation, notification and documentation as with the first cubicle.
If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves and instrumentation in the area.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The 'installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
March 1, 1989 RHR HEAT EXCHANGER MONORAILS MWR 89-2022 89-10 In order to,perform eddy current examination on the RHR Heat Exchanger tubes a lifting arrangement has been designed to be attached within each RHR HX cubicle.
. The sketches showing dimensions and requirements, indicating the design is Seismic Category II over I. As such, although this structural feature is not Seismic Category I, it is capable of withstanding a seismic event equal to that for which the Seismic Category I items are designed without providing any potential for damage to Seismic Category I items within, the vicinity. The installation and inspection activities shall be controlled per WP-7204-1.
An additional construction requirement shall be that the monorails are to be installed in one Residual Heat Exchanger cubicle at a time. Upon completion of the first installation the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead, shall conf irm, and document the seismic capability in relation to the -
design and installation requirements Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer'hall notify the Shift Supervisor of the confirmation prior to proceeding with installation in the second cubicle. Confirmation, documentation and notification shall follow for the second cubicle as with the first.
The construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the requirements provided prior to installation.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are-giyen below. r The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constru'cted feature it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or .in their functions as described in the analyses given ,in the Safety Analysis Report.
The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability. of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously
,'valuated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
March 9, 1989 NONREGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER PREPARATIONS FOR LIFT FOR EDDY CURRENT EXAMINATION PLATFORM 89-11 for In order to prepare to lift the Nonregenerative Heat Exchanger eddy current examination a work platform is needed just below the component cooling water inlet flange. This heat exchanger is Seismic Category I. Because of the estimated duration of the platform installation, and the ease with which a seismic scaffold can be installed it was decided to construct it as such.
Accordingly, the platform utilize a frame constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer.
In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form.
The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves and instrumentation in the area.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
N The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
The installation does not involve a* change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will.
be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the ,probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not,reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any 'equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
February 27, 1989 SAFETY INJECTION RECIRC EWR 3881 CORE BORING SCAFFOLD 89-15 In order to perform core boring in the ceiling above the Auxiliary Building Basement a work platform is needed at the site, between the A Safety Injection Pump and the Refueling Water Tank. Also within the vicinity are cable trays for Trains A and B, and the Hose Reel at Column 8a-N. It is to be constructed taking advantage of interlocking with the building structure, and in particular to surround the above column.
Because of the proximity of the above safety related features the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer.
In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form.
The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions in the 'area.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Rupture of a Steam Pipe
.Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction. of equipment important=to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The 'installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it. will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
3/1/89 RHR PUMP RECIRC. EWR-4675 PIPE TIE-IN SCAFFOLD 89-17.
The RHR recirc. tie-in effort will require a work platform in the Auxiliary Building basement as Column line 7a, which is between MOV-856 RWST outlet to RHR and RWST., Also within this vicinity are Seismic Category I instruments and controls for RHR
. Heat Exchanger outlet and bypass control. Because of these the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo, attachment) . The erection process shall be monitored by 'the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer. In the final stage of construction prior to use, the, seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be conf irmed and documented prior to sca ffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. ,This confirmation shall include review of" attributes such as configuration of the scaffold frame and securing of the planks. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of "the Authorization Form.. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.
During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, rotating equipment, fire fighting provisions, and adjoining rooms in the area.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not ,result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with, no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect-on any, existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which .are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events
~
There will be no. adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be 'no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The 'nstallation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
r The installation does 'not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the ba'ses of Technical Specifications.
3/14/89 OFF-SITE ELECTRICAL RECONFIGURATION EWR-4525 CONDUIT INSTALLATION IN RELAY ROOM SCAFFOLD 89-25 Scaffolding is needed to support conduit installation in the Relay Room, which is estimated to take about 6 weeks, and will be over Auxiliary Relay Racks, Containment Isolation Relay Racks, Safeguards Initiation Cabinets and Relay Logic and Test Racks.
The scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 6.0 shall be augmented with the requirement that the scaffold shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift. The Construction Engineer or Liaison Engineer shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer.
During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer in his stead, In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead.
THis confirmation shall include review of attributes such as configuration of the scaffold frame and securing 'of the planks.
Such documentation, shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.
During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment in the vicinity.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all instrumentation, panels, fire fighting provisions, and adjoining rooms in the area.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing'lant provisions in the immediate vicinity in in normal operation or, in their functions as described their'unctions
.in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this, proposed installation are the following:
Rupture of Steam Pipe Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory =
Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of, an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because, as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no,interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
May 9, 1989 CONDENSATE MAKEUP/REJECT PIPE SUPPORT TEMPORARY MODIFICATION 89-26 PREL1MINARY 10CFR50.59 EVALUATION As a result of this modification the following conclusions may be
, drawn:
The probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased. This modif ication will return the condensate makeup/reject line to its design intent.
- 2) The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased. This modification will not change any plant component that would change the consequences of any accident.
- 3) The probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important. to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased. The affected line does not serve an accident mitigation function and the new support will not increase the probability of any malfunction.
- 4) The consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased.
- 5) Since this modification returns the line to its original design condition, the possibility of an accident different from those evaluated in the UFSAR will not be created.
- 6) The possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be created for the same reason as g5 above.
- 7) The margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications will not be reduced since this modification will return the line to its design configuration.
3/18/89 A'STEAM GENERATOR SNUBBER REPLACEMENT EWR-1483 SCAFFOLDS AND RIGGING 89-38
'The. scaffolds for the efforts for snubber removal, bumper installation and hot clearance confirmation are designed and provided per Rochester Scaffold and Equipment Company drawings
=
RS-116 and RS-117. The following letters are attached to indicate structural Engineering evaluation of loading of steel members for scaffold support and rigging,'nd seismic capability:
- 1. S.K. Ferguson January 4, 1988 letter to R.N. Murray,
Subject:
EWR 1483 Temporary Rigging for Snubbers and Struts.
- 2. S.K. Ferguson January 14, 1988 letter to M.J. Smith,
Subject:
S/G Snubber Replacement Scaffolding EWR 1483
- 3. S.K. Ferguson February 4, 1988 letter to R.N. Murray,
Subject:
Scaffold for Snubber Removal.
The installation will take place while the unit is in cold condition; however, the hot clearance phase will take advantage of the seismic design, allowing existence of such scaf folds by both Steam Generators simultaneously. Unless further evaluation is performed to permit simultaneous dismantling of the scaffolds, scaffold at one steam generator is to be completely removed prior to starting dismantling scaffolding at, the other Steam Generator.
Based on the seismic capability of the scaffold design the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis'given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant 'provisions in the immediate vicinity, in their functions in normal",operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The 'design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Decrease'n Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire 'fighting provisions.
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
3/18/89 B STEAM .GENERATOR SNUBBER REPLACEMENT EWR-1483 SCAFFOLDS AND RIGGING 89-39 The sca ffolds for the efforts for snubber removal, bumper installation and hot clearance conf irmation are designed and provided per Rochester Scaffold and Equipment Company drawings RS-,116 and RS-117; The following letters are attached to indicate structural Engineering evaluation of, loading of steel members for scaffold support and rigging, and seismic capability:
- 1. S.K. Ferguson January 4, 1988 letter to R.N. Murray,
Subject:
EWR 1483, Temporary Rigging for Snubbers and Struts.
2 ~ S.K. Ferguson January 14, 1988 letter to M.J. Smith,
Subject:
S/G Snubber Replacement Scaffolding EWR 1483 3 ~ S.K. Ferguson February 4, 1988.letter to R.N. Murray,
Subject:
Scaffold for Snubber Removal.
4 ~ S.K. Ferguson March 6, 1989 letter to R.N. Murray,
Subject:
EWR-1483 Snubber Reduction Program Temporary Rigging "B" Main Steam Line.
The installation will take place while the unit is in cold condition; however, the hot clearance phase will take advantage of the seismic design, allowing existence of such scaffolds by both Steam Generators simultaneously. Unless further evaluation is performed to permit simultaneous dismantling of the scaffolds, scaffold at one steam generator is to be completely removed prior to starting dismantling scaffolding at the other Steam Generator.
Based on the seismic capability of the scaffold design the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events
There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability
~
becau'se there will be no interference with access provided to
~
fire fighting provisions.
~ ~ ~
~
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the- basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
May 23, 1989 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL TO LOOP B VENT VALVE 2779 FLANGE HOSE REMOVAL SCAFFOLD 89-148 A work platform is desired in order to remove the hose from a flange at the vent valve 2779. With the Reactor Coolant System at temperature greater than cold shutdown temperature the existence of more than one'rain of safeguards equipment which could be included within the area which could be affected by a scaffold must be considered. The area of the proposed scaffold includes equipment associated with two trains.
The scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering .(M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) .
The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison En'gineer. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
If itduring observed is foreseen in the erection, that. a scaffold planning stage, or is deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept the installation.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, fire fighting provisions, and adjoining rooms in the area.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Steam. Generator Tube Rupture Rupture of a Steam Pipe
.Seismic Events
There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
~ ~ ~
~
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant
~ ~ ~
Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will
~ ~ ~
be no effect on assumptions ~
provided in the Plant Technical
~
Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or= the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface
,with any existing equipment. or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does, not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant'echnical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
8/30/89 A DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM PAINTING SCAFFOLD 89-160 Scaffolding is needed for work platforms for ceiling and wall painting. Because of the many obstacles to using easy-built scaffold, pole and knuckle scaffold must be used, which will add to the duration of scaffold existence; because of this and the potential effect on the MCC within the vicinity which contains the breaker for the B Diesel Generator Air Start Compressor, the scaffolding shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement, 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking 'in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.K. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167 attached.) The guidelines statement 6.0 shall be augmented with the requirement that the scaffold shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift.
The job supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by the Liaison Engineer. During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Liaison Engineer, In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to'he guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. This confirmation shall include review of attributes such as configuration of the scaffold frame and securing of the planks. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.
During'onstruction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.
No non-seismic scaffold construction or teardown activity is to be undertaken in the alternate Diesel Generator Room unless interim or final seismic capability is established and is being maintained within the A Diesel Generator Room.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions.
The above construction and operational 'requirements are to be observed. Based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the facility or procedures as described in the Safety Analysis Report As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on a'y existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Loss of all A.C. power to the station auxiliaries Decrease in heat removal by the secondary system with coincident loss of on-site and external (off-site) A.C.
power to the station Steam Generator tube rupture Rupture of a steam pipe Primary system pipe rupture Anticipated transients without SCRAM with a loss of A.C. power Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for 'ny Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be. independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
8/30/89 A DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM PAINT SCAFFOLD END<<OF-SHIFT STATUS Since start of scaffold construction in the A Diesel Generator Room on July 10, 1989, the building crew has been alternating between this installation and an installation in the Screenhouse, with highest. priority given to the Screenhouse work. Whenever work was done on the scaffold structure in the A Diesel Generator Room, I have been notified and performed an end-of-shift inspection. At the completion of each such work effort the structure was found to be complete and seismic to the extent installed. The scaffold is yet to be turned over for use by the paint crew.
Michael J. Smith Liaison Engineer
June 20, 1989 SPENT FUEL POOL COVER 89-162 is planned, h
Work above the Spent. Fuel Pool and as a measure to prevent debris from entering, the pool is to be covered with a protective structure as shown on the attached sketch.
Should any debris enter the pool notification to the Construction Engineer shall be made. Prior to fuel transfer system operation, a complete inspection shall be made in the fuel transfer slot.
The analysis for projectile impingement on, the Spent Fuel Rack involves a mass equivalent to a utility pole. The platform assembly components represent less mass; the potential effect on the rack by the assembly would be more broadly distributed.
The above construction and operational requirements are to be observed. Based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the facility or procedures as described in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis event analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report associated with this proposed installation is the fuel handling accident.
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because of the lack of any potential effect on the fuel due to the protection afforded by the rack as described above.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report 'because the capability of the rack and the absence of safety related equipment in the area.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the rack capability described above, the lack of impact. on reactor safety and the bounding analysis of the fuel handling accident.
The installation does not reduce, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification because of .the capability of the rack.
=
The total weight of the temporary structure is estimated at 8,600 lbs. This weight. will be supported by 32 feet of SFP bridge track which is a total surface area of 4.67 ft2. The final load on the tracks is 1842 lb/ft a value far less than that experienced when the SFP bridge is moving with a fuel assembly attached.
The structure will support personnel and small tools and equipment such as paint cans and brushes, however, the cover is not intended for use as a .temporary storage area for non-related ancillary equipment.
During assembly of the structure double rigging will be used
'for all moves over the SFP area.
Sufficient space will be available for visual ~ SFP" water level verification.
June 20, 1989 MAIN STEAM LINE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER TUBING REROUTE EWR 4933 WORK PLATFORMS89-163 Work platforms are needed to perform the tubing rerouting to be located by the Intermediate Building North east stair, between the Containment wall and the north wall. Within this vicinity are the Control Rod MG Set Control Panels, the Reactor Trip Breaker Panels, the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker Panels, the B Main Steam Line Pressure Transmitters, and numerous cable trays.
The scaffold frame for these platforms is to rise approximately 20 Because of the presence of the safety related features listed above, the sca ffold frame system for the work plat forms shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B.
Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988. memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 6.0 shall be augmented with the requirement that the scaffold shall be complete and seismic to the extent installed by the end of each shift. The Construction Engineer or Liaison Engineer shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by the Construction Engineer and the Liaison Engineer.
During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer in his stead. In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Construction Engineer, or the Liaison Engineer in his stead.
This confirmation shall include review of attributes such as configuration of the scaffold frame and securing of the planks.
Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Construction Engineer or the Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, oi observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance o f the installation in the same manner as described above.
During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, fire fighting provisions, and adjoining rooms in the area.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50. 59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA) Drop Rupture of a Steam Pipe Anticipated Transients Without Scram Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
The installation does not. involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
June 22, 1989 SAFETY INJECTION TO B LOOP FLOW ORIFICE FE-924 SCAFFOLD 89-166 A work platform is needed about 4 ft. above the floor east, of the Safety Injection to B Loop MOV's 878 A and B, north of the Excess 'Letdown Letdown Heat Exchanger, which is just behind a 7 ft. high chain link barrier, west of a building column intervening with the Regenerative Heat Exchanger, also within the chain link barrier, and southeast of CVCS air operated valves for, normal charging to B Cold Leg, charging to B Hot Leg and Auxiliary Pres'surizer Spray, in order of distance from the orifice. The distance to the first CVCS valve is about 6 ft. The unit is presently with=RCS .temperature less than 350 F, to be maintained .
as such until after removal of the scaffold.
An alternate path for'harging to the A loop exists, which has a route away from the scaffold area. Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray is not normally used. The alternate path for charging to A-Loop shall be maintained operable during I
the scaffold existence.
The above construction and operational requirements are to be observed. Based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the facility or procedures as described in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because observing the requirements of maintaining less than 350 F and the alternate charging path operable will permit satisfying the assumptions and bases in the Technical Specifications dealing with Safety Injection and Chemical and Volume Control.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because observing the operational requirement of maintaining less than 350oF assures that there will be no need for the delivery capabilities of the .Safety Injection System called for in the design bases. The alternate charging path will be available in the event of any adverse affect on the normal charging path.
""* l
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a feature to be in place only during maintaining RCS temperature less than 350 F with the alternate charging path to A Loop available, there will be no effect on safety of operations.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a feature installed with imposition of RCS temperature limitation of 350 F and maintaining operability of the charging path to A Loop, it will have no effect on systems as discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
7/7/89 SCREENHOUSE WINDOW SECURITY BAR SM-89-03 BY A SERVICE WATER PUMP SCAFFOLD 89-167 Scaffolding is required in the Screenhouse for the installation of security 'bars for SM-89-03. This permit (89-167) is for a seismic scaffold adjacent to the east wall of the building near the south side of the house heating boiler (Ref.
sketch attached to permit,) . This location is within 1 1/2 times its height of safety related service water pump lA.
The scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines. provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) .
The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. 'he erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer.
Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authoiization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shal'1 review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept the installation.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to the Screenhouse all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50. 59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Seismic Events
There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature*there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
7/7/89 SCREENHOUSE WINDOW SECURITY BAR SM-89-03 BY BUS 17 SCAFFOLD 89-168 Scaffolding is required in the Screenhouse for the installation of security bars for SM-89-03. This permit (89-168) is for a seismic scaffold in the northeast corner of the building along column lines 7 and EE (Re f . sketch attached to permit) .
This location is within 1 1/2 times its height of safety related Busses 17 and 18.
The scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment).
The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer.
Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
If itduring observed is foreseen in the erection, that scaffold planning stage, or is a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept the installation.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to the Screenhouse all valves, instrumentation, panels, and fire fighting provisions.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Seismic Events
There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference
~
with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
7/7/89 SCREENHOUSE 'WINDOW SECURITY BAR SM-89-03 BY BUS 18 SCAFFOLD 89-169 Scaffolding is required in the Screenhouse ~ for the installation of security bars for SM-89-03. This permit (89-169) is for a seismic scaffold in the southeast corner of the building above the stairwell to the basement (Ref. sketch attached to permit) . This location is within 1 1/2 times its height of safety related Bus 18.
The scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) .
The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process
,shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer.
Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
If itduring observed is foreseen in the erection, that a scaffold planning stage, or .is deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept the installation.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to the Screenhouse all valves, instrumentation, panels, fire fighting provisions, and adjoining rooms in the area.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Seismic Events
There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
The installation does not involve a change in '.the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will*
be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability 'of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
'eature, The installation does -not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any because as a seismic feature, it'lant Technical Specification, will. be independent of, and will have no interface with'ny equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
7/7/89 SCREENHOUSE WINDOW SECURITY BAR SM-89-03 BY DIESEL FIRE PUMP OIL TANK SCAFFOLD 89-170 Scaffolding is required in the Screenhouse for the installation of security bars for SM-89-03. This permit. (89-170) is for a seismic scaffold on the south wall of the building near door SO (Ref. sketch attached to permit) . This location is within 1 1/2 times its height of safety related Bus 18.
The scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment.) .
The,Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation sess'ion has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer.
Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
If itduring observed is foreseen in the erection, that scaffold planning stage, or is a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept the installation.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to the Screenhouse all valves, instrumentation, panels, fire fighting provisions, and adjoining rooms in the area.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Seismic Events
There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire .fighting provisions.
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because. as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent, of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
7/7/89 SCREENHOUSE WINDOW SECURITY BAR SM-89-03 BETWEEN FIRE PUMPS SCAFFOLD 89-171 Scaffolding is required in the Screenhouse for the installation of security bars for SM-89-03. This permit (89-171) is for a seismic scaffold on the south wall of the building near door S2 (Re f . sketch attached to permit) . This location is within 1 1/2 times its height of safety related service water .
pump 1D.
The scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) .
The Job Supervisor shall verify that. an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer.
Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
If itduring observed is foreseen in the erection, that a scaffold planning stage, or is deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept the installation.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to the Screenhouse all. valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Seismic Events
There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
August 1, 1989 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR TEMPORARY STRUCTURE FEATURE AUTHORIZATION FORM 89-180 This temporary structure will be placed under the reference leg piping to support the condensate pot and associated tubing.
The reference leg piping will be lifted by hand while measuring and recording the maximum lift force. The lift will not create any substantial deflection of the root valve and will therefore not create an unexceptable stress on the welds in the reference leg. The reference leg will not be lifted past the condensates pot s original design elevation. Therefore, this temporary structure will not endanger the integrity of the reference leg piping. This temporary structure will be removed prior to leaving the hot shutdown condition.
This temporary structure will not increase the probability of an accident or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR. This temporary structure will not effect the pressure transmitter PT-429 and therefore will not effect the response of safety injection to an accident. This structure will not effect the integrity of the reference leg and will only be used to support the static load of the piping will remain intact.
This temporary structure will not create an accident of a different type then those specified in the UFSAR. The Safety Injection System will react as designed to any accident addressed in the UFSAR.
This temporary structure will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in any technical specification basis. This structure does not render any plant system inoperable, nor will it degrade any operating system.
8/11/89 SCREENHOUSE NORTH OF MCC-1G PLANT BETTERMENT PAINT SCAFFOLD 89-183 Scaffolding is needed for ceiling and wall painting in the area north*of MCC-1G not covered by previously approved scaffolds89-167 and 89-168. Because of the proximity of the service Water Pumps in both trains and MCC-1G the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 4. 0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.K. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167).
The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer.
Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that- a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary,. verbal guidance'rom a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept the installation.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, and fire fighting provisions.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Seismic Events
There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference
~
with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not 'increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
8/11/89 SCREENHOUSE SOUTH WALL OVER DIESEL FIRE PUMP PLANT BETTERMENT PAINT SCAFFOLD 89-184 Scaffolding is needed for ceiling and wall painting in the area over the Diesel Fire Pump between the areas covered by previously approved scaffolds89-170 and 89-171. Because of the proximity of the service Water Pumps and Fire Service Water Pumps in both trains the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 4. 0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.K. Fitzsimmons'on Authorization Form 89-167).
The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer.
Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept the installation.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, and fire fighting provisions.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Seismic Events
There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
8/28/89 REFUELING WATER TANK OPERATING FLOOR PAINT SCAFFOLD 89-189 In order to minimize contamination at the Aux. Bldg. top floor
- floor, it will be necessary to decon the RWST from top to the and, to facilitate future decon efforts, it is desirable to follow up with painting. Because of the nearness of 480V Bus 14 and the relatively lengthy projected duration of the scaffold existence, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) .
The guidelines statement 4. 0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. K. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167).
The Job Supervisor shall verify that, an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer.
Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall accept the installation.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, fire fighting provisions, and adjoining rooms in the area.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Rupture of a Steam Pipe Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
September 6, 1989 A MAIN STEAM ARV-3411 REPAIR WORK PLATFORM 89-190 Repair work on ARV-3411 will necessitate a work platform, constructed of pole scaffold and planks such as to surround the A Main Steam lead and the relief valve inlet piping, somewhat below the ARV inlet flange. The small tubing for the ARV air operator will be disconnected during the valve repair preparations. and As such the platform will have no potential effect on the ARVs, the structures will be restricted from movement in the direction of any other safety related equipment. The Main Steam leads and the relief piping are sufficiently sturdy to preclude any damage from the relatively light scaffold materials; however, piping of smaller diameter than the scaffold pole material is incorporated as the isolation valve 3507 bypass. The duration of scaffold existence is projected to be 2 weeks.
Because of the above factors, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M.B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment). The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167) . The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from instance a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, and fire fighting provisions in the area.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Steam Generator tube rupture Rupture of a steam pipe Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification" bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
September 7, 1989 LAUNDRY EXHAUST FAN VIBRATION/EXPANSION RING REPLACEMENT WORK PLATFORM 89-191 Repair is required on ductwork at the Laundry Exhaust Fan, located in the vicinity of the A Feedwater Line. The entries from the Motor and Turbine Auxiliary Feedwater Pump discharges are nearby, and there is a high density of snubbers for this piping in area (5 mechanical and 1 hydraulic) . A temperature sensor (TE-2096) is located at the top of the feedwater line downstream of check valve 3003.
Because of the existence of the above features within the vicinity of the proposed scaffold, scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 4. 0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guideline's provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
If itduring observed is foreseen in the erection, that a scaffold planning stage, or is deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, and fire fighting provisions in the area.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses des'cribed above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Loss of Normal Feedwater Loss of all A.C. power to the station auxiliaries Steam Generator tube rupture Rupture of a steam pipe Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it. will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
September 12, 1989 SI RECIRC FLOW ORIFICE FE-916 LEAK REPAIR WORK PLATFORM 89-192 A work platform is required to correct a leak condition at SI recirc flow orifice FE-916, located between the Refueling Water Tank and 480v Bus 16. Also within the vicinity are Temperature Indicator TI-917, and SI recirc MOVs 897 and 898.
The MOVs are within the ASME Seismic Class 2 boundary as indicated on PAID 33013-1261 Containment Spray (SI). The platform is to be about 4 ft. high, estimated to be in existence 2 days.
Because of factors given above the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment) . The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M.B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167). The Sob Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer, and its seismic capability in relation to the guidelines shall .be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or is observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing and.
maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, and fire fighting provisions in the area.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
t The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect, on any existing plant 'provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in. the Safety Analysis Report which .are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
. The installation does'ot. involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect . on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to sa fety previously evaluated in the Sa fety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain'independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
, The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
9/2 6/8 9 AUXILIARY BUILDING TOP NORTH WALL (CNMT)
PLANT BETTERMENT PAINT SCAFFOLD 89-193 A scaffold is planned for painting the north wall at the Auxiliary Building top level, to extend from the Spent Fuel Pool to the area north of 480V Bus 14, and tie into a planned scaffold around the RWST, controlled by Authorization Form 89-189.
Because of the large area to be covered, including the area surrounding 480V Bus 14, and the relatively lengthy -projected duration of the scaffold existence, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment).
The guidelines statement 4. 0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167).
The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. In addition, part of the orientation shall stress the importance of taking care not to bump any live smoke detectors. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer. In addition, the Job Supervisor shall notify the Fire Protection group during installation to allow for consultation on any potential interferences with fire detection/sprinkler provisions encountered.
During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an attachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Liaison Engineer.
In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer. This confirmation shall include review of attributes such as configuration of the scaffold frame and securing of the planks. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
If it is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the Structural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.
During construction and teardown care should be taken to prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing, and maintenance ,access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions in the area.
The scaffold shall be constructed so as not to interfere with Auxiliary Building Crane use during fuel transfer mechanism work planned. During scaffold use, G. Joss shall be contacted on prevention of painting ILRT inspection areas on the containment wall.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:"
Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Rupture of a Steam Pipe Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
9/26/89 AUXILIARY BUILDING TOP SOUTH WALL WEST FROM COLUMN LINE 8a PLANT BETTERMENT PAINT SCAFFOLD 89-194 scaffold is planned for painting the south -wall at the
'1 A
Auxiliary Building top level, to extend from the Decon Pit to the Monitor Tanks. Because of the large area to be covered, including the area immediately adj acent to both Component Cooling Heat Exchangers, and the relatively lengthy projected duration of the scaffold existence, the scaffold shall be constructed in accordance with the attached Seismic Scaffold Guidelines provided from Structural Engineering (M. B. Fitzsimmons October 31, 1988 memo attachment).
The guidelines statement 4.0 requirement to wire all plank decking in place may be replaced with the alternative requirement to use scaffold poles as hold down bars in conjunction with wooden cleats. (Acceptable as noted per M. B. Fitzsimmons on Authorization Form 89-167);
I The Job Supervisor shall verify that an orientation session has been conducted on the guidelines provided. In addition, part of the orientation shall stress the importance of taking care not to bump any live smoke detectors. The erection process shall be monitored by an assigned Liaison Engineer. In addition, the Job Supervisor shall notify the Fire Protection group during installation to allow for consultation on any potential interferences with fire detection/sprinkler provisions encountered.
During construction, the end-of-shift seismic status shall be documented on an at tachment to the field copy of the authorization form by the Liaison Engineer.
In the final stage of construction prior to use, the seismic capability of the scaffold in relation to the guidelines shall be confirmed and documented prior to scaffold use by the Liaison Engineer. This confirmation shall include review of attributes such as configuration of the scaffold frame and securing of the planks. Such documentation shall be attached to the original copy of the Authorization Form. The Liaison Engineer shall notify the Shift Supervisor of confirmation of seismic capability.
it If is foreseen in the scaffold planning stage, or observed during erection, that a deviation from the guidelines will be necessary, verbal guidance from a member of Structural Engineering shall be obtained. In this instance the Structural Engineer shall review the installation, and, upon being satisfied with its seismic capability, the'tructural Engineer shall document acceptance of the installation in the same manner as described above.
During construction and teardown care should be taken to
'prevent bumping any sensitive equipment and tubing in the vicinity.
Clearance shall be maintained for operations, testing, and maintenance access to all valves, instrumentation, panels, rotating equipment, and fire fighting provisions in the area.
The scaffold shall be constructed so as not to interfere with Auxiliary Building Crane use during fuel transfer mechanism work planned.
The above construction requirements are to be observed; based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis given in the Safety Analysis Report.
As a seismically constructed feature with no interferences with accesses described above it will not have any adverse effect on any existing plant provisions in the immediate vicinity in their functions in normal operation or in their functions as described in the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report. The design basis events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory Rupture of a Steam Pipe Seismic Events There will be no adverse effect on fire fighting capability because there will be no interference with access provided to fire fighting provisions.
The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because as a seismic feature there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because of the seismic capability and access provisions incorporated.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report, because as a seismic feature, it will remain independent of, and will have no interface with any existing equipment or systems in the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification, because as a seismic feature, it will be independent. of, and will have no interface with any equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
Tem orar Installation and 0 eration of Standb S.F.P. Coolin
~Setem As part of ENR-1594; "Spent Fuel Pool Cooling", the Standby S.F.P. Cooling Syst: em will be utilized in a different configuration then originally analyzed. The recirculation pump, heat exchanger, and associated Spent Fuel Pool pipe, valves, fitting, hoses, and instrumentation will be provided and installed as shown on attached sketch(s) and per SM-1594.8A. The standby system will remain in service until the new system is installed, tested, and placed in operation per EWR-1594.
Tem orar Fluid Provisions:
Hoses S.F.P.
are connected Heat Exchanger.
from the S.W. system to the skid mounted These two hoses which pass within each C.C.W. pump will be secured to existing plant structural 5'f members. The hose design pressure is 200 psig which exceeds the S.N. system design operating pressure. A system relief valve located on the heat exchanger shell will prevent the system pressure from exceeding 150 psig. Isolation valves are provided to isolate service water from the skid mounted heat exchanger. The C.C.N. system requires only one pump to meet the required design.
In the event of a failure which causes a complete failure of the C.C.W. system, residual heat removal would be accomplished with auxiliary feed and steam generators. This event has been analyzed in the UFSAR and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.
EWR-1594 addresses a postulated break in the six inch supply and return lines. Since there are two trains of service water, the assumption is, if one train is lost, the other train will provide the required cooling for the plant. Failure of the six inch return line would not affect the cooling of components in the service water system, A redundant service water return line is provided. In both cases stated above isolation valves are provided to isolate service water from the 'skid mounted heat exchanger and associated- hoses.
The installation and tie-in to the S.W. system of hoses to and from the skid S.F.P. heat exchanger and their locations in reference to C.C.W. pumps and associated components will not
- 1) result in a change to the facili'ty or it's operation as described in the Safety Analysis Report, 2) provide a change to the Plant Technical Specifications, or 3) involve an unreviewed safety question.
S.F.P. Recirculation Hoses Pi e and Fittin s The skid pump discharge piping hose and fitting which connects to the bottom of the skid mounted S.F.P. heat exchanger will not be located near any safety related equipment. or any other plant piping. The hose will be routed along the floor.
Page 1 of 3
The skid mounted heat exchanger discharges into the existing pool discharge pipe. The hose route is from the S.F.P. Hx Discharge along the south wall of the Auxiliary Building and ties into the existing S.F.P. discharge piping. Except for hose, valves, and fittings located over the spent fuel pool, the hose is not located next to any safety related equipment.
The hose will be secured to structural members. The hose will run within approximately two feet of radiation monitor R-18. A hose break in this area which could cause R-18 to become inoperable could increase the possibility of an unmonitored release.
During liquid releases R-18 and associated systems are monitored; thus, a failure and the release of any unmonitored release would be minimized. Plant procedures dictate that prior to any liquid release the limits for activity are below those required by 10CFR20.
The discharge hose, valves, and fittings located over the southwest corner of the Spent Fuel Pit will be tied into the existing pool discharge pipe. The existing discharge pipe is provided with a vacuum breaker to prevent the siphon effect and eventual drain down of the spent fuel pool. The hose will be secured to structural members. The combined weight of the above stated components is less than that of a 1490 lb. wooden pole or fuel handling tool with attached assembly.
The impact:of the above upon the fuel racks is analyzed in the UFSAR. Therefore, this installation bounded by .the above will not change any assumption as described in UFSAR.
The suction pipe will protrude below the normal spent fuel pool level to an elevation no lower than 275'" (elevation of upper suction pipe). The pipe and attached fittings will be located in the southeast corner of the Spent Fuel Pool.
Spent fuel is not located in this area. The pipe will be located at or above the elevation of the upper pool suction tap which has been analyzed and designed to prevent pool drain down as stated in UFSAR. A break or rupture of the suction hose outside the pool and at an elevation below the pool water level would only drain the pool water level down to that of the upper suction tap .which has been analyzed in the UFSAR. A vent valve and isolation valve located above the pool water level and in the temporary suction line could be operated to stop the siphoning of water from the pool.
Therefore, this installation does not change the assumptions as stated in UFSAR. The we'ight of the hose and fittings is less than that of a wooden pole or fuel handling tool with attached assembly. Therefore, this installation bounded by the above will not change any assumptions as described in UFSAR.
Page 2 of 3
S. F. P. Heat Exchan er The spent fuel standby heat exchanger will be located less than 1.5 times the height away from safety related equipment and the flooded weight of the heat exchangers is greater than 7200 lbs. The heat exchanger will be seismically mounted to prevent contact with the 1A CCW pump during a seismic event. Service water return from the S.F.P. back-up heat exchanger will be sampled and analyzed to detect any tube leakage.
S.F.P. Recirculation Pum The S.F.P. recirculation pump is located further than 1.5 times its height from any safety related equipment. The pump base will be secured to the floor to prevent movement. The 3 phase power supply to the pump motor will be from a non-safety related source and the cable will not be located next to any safety related components.
Back-u S ent Fuel Pool S stem Based on all the above the standby spent fuel pool cooli'ng system will not 1) result in a change to the assumptions as described in th'e Safety Analysis Report, 2) provide a change to the Plant Technical Specifications, or 3) involve an unreviewed safety question.
Prepared By: Oa~e:
Approved By:
PORC Review Date:
Page 3 of 3
TEMPORARY INSTALLATION AND OPERATION OF STANDBY S ~ F. P. COOLING SYSTEM AS PART OF gWR 1594. tiSPENT FUEL POOL COOLING<< THE STANDBY S.F.P. COOLING SYSTEM WILL BE UTILIZED IN A DIFFERENT CONFIGURATION THEN ORIGINALLY ANALYZED. THE RECIRCULATION PUMP HEAT EXCHANGER g AND ASSOC ATED SPENT FUEL POOL P I PE I g VALVES FITTING g HOSES g g I AND NSTRUMENTATION WILL BE PROVI DED AND INSTALLED AS SHOWN ON ATTACHED SKETCH(S) AND PER SM-1594.8A. THE STANDBY SYSTEM WILL REMAIN IN SERVICE UNTIL THE NEW SYSTEM IS INSTALLED, TESTED, AND PLACED IN OPERATZON PER EWR-1594.
TEMPORARY FLUID PROVISIONS:
HOSES ARE CONNECTED FROM THE S.W. SYSTEM TO THE SKID MOUNTED S.F.P. HEAT EXCHANGER. THESE TWO HOSES WHICH PASS WITHIN 5'F EACH C.C.W. PUMP WILL BE SECURED TO EXISTING PLANT STRUCTURAL MEMBERS. THE HOSE DESIGN PRESSURE IS 200 PSIG WHICH EXCEEDS THE S.W. SYSTEM DESIGN OPERATING PRESSURE. A SYSTEM RELIEF VALVE LOCATED ON THE HEAT EXCHANGER SHELL WILL PREVENT THE SYSTEM PRESSURE FROM EXCEEDING 150 PSZG.
ISOLATION VALVES ARE PROVIDED TO ISOLATE SERVICE WATER FROM THE SKID MOUNTED .HEAT EXCHANGER. THE C.C.W. SYSTEM REQUIRES ONLY ONE PUMP TO MEET THE REQUIRED DESIGN. IN THE EVENT OF A FAILURE WHICH CAUSES A COMPLETE FAILURE OF THE C.C.W.
SYSTEM, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH
AUXILIARY FEED AttD STEAM GENERATORS ~ THIS EVENT i{AS BEEN ANALYZED Itt THE UFSAR AtiD DOFS ttOT INVOLVE AN UttRFVTFWt;li SAFETY QUF.R'<'TOll.
EWR-1594 ADDRESSES A POSTULATED BREAK IN THE SIX INCH SUPPLY AND RETURN LINES. SINCE THERE ARE TWO TRAINS OF SERVICE WATER/ THE ASSUMPTION ISg IF ONE TRAIN IS LOST'HE OTHER TRAXN WILL PROVIDE THE REQUIRED COOLING FOR THE PlhtfT.
FAILURE OF TflE SIX It(CI t RETURN LIt(E WOULD NOT AFFECT THE COOLING OF COMPONENTS IN THE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM. A REDUNDANT SERVICE WATER, RETURN LINE IS PROVIDED. IN BOTH CASES STATED ABOVE ISOLATION VALVES ARE PROVIDED TO ISOLATE SERVICE WATER FROM THE SKID MOUNTED HEAT EXCHANGER AND ASSOCIATED HOSES.
THE INSTALLATION AND TIE-XN TO THE S.W. SYSTEM OF HOSES TO AND FROM THE SKID S.F.P. HEAT EXCHANGER AND THEIR LOCATIONS Itf REFERENCE TO C.C.W. PUMPS AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS WILL NOT
- 1) RESULT IN A CHANGE TO THE FACILITY OR XT'S OPERATION AS DESCRIBED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT, 2) PROVIDE A CHANGE TO THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, OR 3) INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
S.F.P. RECIRCULATION HOSES PIPE AND FITTXNGS THE SKID PUMP DISCHARGE PIPING HOSE AND FITTING WHICH CONNECTS TO THE BOTTOM OF THE SKXD MOUNTED S.F.P. HEAT EXCHANGER WILL NOT BE LOCATED NEAR ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OR ANY OTHER PLANT PIPING. THE HOSE WILL BE ROUTED ALONG THE FLOOR.
Zme yacc~ p'~
THE SKXD MOUNTED HEAT EXCHANGER DXSCHARGES INTO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING AND 'TIES INTO THE EXISTING S.F.P.
/R X'soL>7~+ DISCHARGE PEPIN . EXCEPT FOR HOSE, VALVES, AND FITTINGS tj- rd'6f LOCATED OVER THE SPENT FUEL POOL, THE HOSE XS NOT LOCATED NEXT TO ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. -T8~44Z WILL BE SECURED TO STRUCTURAL MEMBERS.
PROXX R Y
ES THE EXISTING DISCHARGE PIPE IS PROVIDED WXTH A VACUUM BREAKER TO
PREVENT THE SIPHON EFFECT AND EVENTUAL DRAIN DOWN OF THE SPENT FUEL POOL. THE HOSE WILL BE SECURED TO STRUCTURAL MEMBERS. E THEREFORE, THIS INSTALLATION BOUNDED BY THE ABOVE WILL NOT CHANGE ANY ASSUMPTION AS DESCRIBED IN UFSAR.
THE SUCTION PIPE WILL PROTRUDE BELOW THE NORMAL SPENT FUEL POOL LEVEL TO AN ELEVATION NO LOWER THAN 275 i 0 (ELEVATION OF UPPER SUCTION PIPE). THE PIPE AND ATTACHED FITTINGS WILL BE LOCATED IN THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THE SPENT FUEL POOL. SPENT FUEL IS NOT LOCATED IN THIS AREA. THE PIPE WILL BE LOCATED AT OR ABOVE THE ELEVATION OF THE UPPER POOL SUCTION TAP WHICH HAS BEEN ANALYZED AND DESIGNED TO PREVENT POOL DRAIN DOWN AS STATED ZN UFSAR ~ A BREAK OR RUPTURE OF THE SUCTION HOSE OUTSIDE THE POOL AND AT AN ELEVATION BELOW THE POOL WATER LEVEL WOULD ONLY DRAIN THE POOL WATER LEVEL DOWN TO THAT OF THE UPPER SUCTION TAP WHICH HAS BEEN ANALYZED IN THE UFSAR. A VENT VALVE AND ISOLATION VALVE LOCATED ABOVE THE POOL WATER LEVEL AND IN THE TEMPORARY SUCTION LINE COULD BE OPERATED TO STOP THE SIPHONING OF WATER FROM THE POOL. THEREFORE, THIS INSTALLATION DOES NOT CHANGE THE ASSUMPTIONS AS STATED IN UFSAR. THE WEIGHT OF THE HOSE AND FITTINGS IS LESS THAN THAT OF A WOODEN POLE OR FUEL HANDLING TOOL WITH ATTACHED ASSEMBLY. THEREFORE, THIS INSTALLATION BOUNDED BY THE ABOVE WILL NOT CHANGE ANY ASSUMPTIONS AS DESCRIBED IN UFSAR.
S.F.P. HEAT EXCHANGER THE SPENT FUEL STANDBY HEAT EXCHANGER WILL BE LOCATED LESS THAN 1.5 TIMES THE HEIGHT AWAY FROM SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT AND THE FLOODED WEIGHT OF THE HEAT EXCHANGERS IS GREATER THAN 7200 LBS. THE HEAT EXCHANGER WILL BE SEISMICALLY MOUNTED TO PREVENT CONTACT WITH THE lA CCW PUMP DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. SERVICE WATER RETURN FROM THE S.F.P. BACK-UP HEAT EXCHANGER WILL BE SAMPLED AND ANALYZED TO DETECT ANY TUBE LEAKAGES STANDBY S.F.P. RECIRCULATION PUMP THE S.F.P. RECIRCULATION PUMP ZS LOCATED FURTHER THAN 1.5 TIMES ITS HEIGHT FROM ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THE PUMP BASE WILL BE SECURED TO'HE AUXILIARY BUILDING OPERATING FLOOR TO PREVENT MOVEMENT. THE 3 PHASE TEMPORARY POWER SUPPLY TO THE STANDBY S.F.P. PUMP MOTOR WILL BE FROM MCC-1C POS 1H WHICH PRESENTLY IS A SPARE
~
BREAKER. THE TEMPORARY CABLE WILL BE ROUTED FROM MCC-1C POS. 1H POSITION ALONG THE EXISTING CONDUIT SUPPORTS
AND BUILDING STRUCTURES TO THE STANDBY S. F. P. PUMP. THE PUMP TEMPORARY POWER SUPPLY HAS BEEN EVALUATED AND APPROVED BY ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING (SEE LETTER
$ 13N1-RR-L2131 FROM JOHN H. SMITH). THE CABLE TO BE USED IS Q.A. APPROVED AND MEETS ZEEE 38/ SPECIFICATIONS, quJ~i "A"
e),.
TEMPORARY HOSE BETWEEN CVCS HOLD UP TANK AND S.'F ~ P ~
COOLING SYSTEM A DRAIN HOSE AND PORTABLE PUMP WILL BE INSTALLED BETWEEN THE DISCHARGE OF S.F.P. COOLING PUMP AND THE "A" H.U.T. THIS PROCEDURE SM-15948A WILL CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND DRAIN DOWN OF THE S.F.P. COOLING SYSTEM PIPING TO "A" H.U.T. THERE IS ADEQUATE CAPACITY IN H.U.T.'S TO DRAIN APPROXIMATELY 1500 GALLONS OF BORATED WATER FROM S.F.P. PIPING'ROCEDURAL CONTROLS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING OF THE DRAIN DOWN PROCESS WILL NEGATE ANY POSSIBILITY OF DRAINING OF SPENT FUEL POOL WATER TO CVCS HOLD-UP-TANKS'ACK-UP SPENT FUEL POOL SYSTEM BASED ON ALL THE ABOVE THE STANDBY SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM WILL NOT 1) RESULT IN A CHANGE TO THE ASSUMPTIONS AS DESCRIBED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT,
- 2) PROVIDE A CHANGE TO THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, OR 3) INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
THE ABOVE ITEM WAS REVIEWED BY THE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND THE COMMITTEE HAS DETERMINED THAT NO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES OR VIOLATIONS WERE INVOLVED AND THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS. THIS ITEM IS NOT COMPLETE, PENDING REVIEW OF MODIFICATION INSTALLATION.
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March 16, 1989 LOSS OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL EXPEDITIOUS ACTION INTERIM "A" HOT LEG LEVEL TRANSMITTER 89-9 Generic letter 88-17 recommended expeditious actions including installing two independent RCS water level indications with the capability to provide water level information to Control Room operators. One such provision, a pressure transmitter (PT-432A) with indication at the Main Control Board has been in permanent existence; however, a similar provision is to be installed prior to entering the next reduced reactor coolant inventory operation.
This will be installed at a test connection downstream of the Loop A Hot Leg Sample tap manual root valve 504, using tubing of identical material to the permanent installation for PT-432A in the B Loop Sample tap except that 3/8" tubing may be used in place o f 1/4" . A transmitter, similar to PT-432A, is to be installed, designated DPT-432B at the test point discussed above, to be mounted securely to the adjacent wall or on a stand which will be fabricated and installed such as to insure against toppling by use of struts, bumpers or tie-downs.
The signal cable will be installed under the controls of procedure A-1405 installation and removal of temporary cables.
The existing procedure 0-2.3.1, Draining the Reactor Coolant System, is to be revised to address the indications to be monitored, including the subject provision. Regarding level indication difference between measurement points, the difference calculated from Westinghouse ESBU/WOG-88-173 dated October 14, 1988 will be provided to operators for guidance.
The above construction and operational requirements are to be observed. Based on these, the determinations called for in 10CFR50.59 are given below.
The installation does not result in a change to the assumptions of the analyses given in the Safety Analysis Report because of the substantial tubing installation and the adequate support system to provided as discussed above, it will. not have any adverse effect on the safety-related equipment in the vicinity, or result in a decrease in reactor coolant inventory. The design bases events analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report which are associated with this proposed installation are the following:
Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory The installation does not involve a change in the Plant Technical Specifications because the substantial tubing installation and the adequacy of the support system is such as to ensure there will be no effect on assumptions provided in the Plant Technical Specification bases.
The installation does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because the substantial tubing installation and the adequacy of the support system to be utilized ensures there will be no adverse effect on safety-related equipment.
The installation does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report because the substantial tubing installation and the support system adequacy, as described above', ensures there will be no adverse effect on safety related equipment within the vicinity.
The installation does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Plant Technical Specification because of the substantial tubing installation and the adequacy of the support system which ensures against any adverse effect on equipment or systems discussed in the bases of Technical Specifications.
10CFR50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION TEMPORARY MODIFICATION 89-21A TEMPORARY CONNECTION OF LT-426 REFERENCE LEG TO LT-427 INTRODUCTION This temporary modification will connect the reference leg of LT-426 with the existing reference leg of LT-427. The plant is currently at Hot Shutdown and will remain at hot or cold shutdown while this temporary connection is in place. The purpose of this temporary connection is to determine the operability of LT-426 while connected to the reference leg of LT-427 due to a possible obstruction in the reference leg of LT-426.
The reference leg of LT-426 also has pressure transmitter PT-429. This pressure transmitter provides input to OT~T, low pressurizer pressure, and hi pressurizer pressure trip along with low pressurizer pressure safety injection and pressure interlock input to PORV 430. The reference leg for LT-427 has pressure transmitter PT-430. This pressure transmitter provides input to OT~T, low pressurizer pressure, and hi pressurizer pressure trips, low pressurizer pressure safety injection along with the pressure input to PORV 430, and the low pressure alarm at 2185 pslgo The temporary connection will be constructed of 3/8 stainless steel tubing and will be connected from the low side of LT-426 on the reference leg side of V12231L and the reference leg with PT-429 (LT-426S reference leg) will be capped. The other end of the temporary connection will be connected to the drain point of the reference leg of LT-427, at the transmitter side of the low side isolation valve.
The process of valving in this temporary tubing will allow operability of the 2/3 low pressure safety injection circuitry.
Initially, LT-426 and PT-429 will be inoperable, isolated and the associated bistables will be in the trip condition. All remaining pressurizer pressure and level transmitters will be operable.
After the reference leg of LT-426 is capped, pressure transmitter PT-429 will be declared operable and its bistables reinstalled.
At this point, LT-427 will be declared inoperable and its bistables tripped. This will generate a reactor trip signal from 2/3 hi pressurizer level (reactor trip breakers will be open prior to trip of bistables). The connection will then take place between the low side of LT-426 and the reference leg of LT-427.
Page 1
SAFETY EVALUATION The probability of occurrence or the .consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased.
Since the stainless steel tubing run from LT-426 to LT-427 will be rated for system pressure and temperature, the probability of a LOCA from the temporary tubing will not be increased from the LOCA accident addressed in the UFSAR Chapter 15. Since the temporary tubing and both connection points are 3/8" in diameter, a leak from the temporary tubing will be equal to, or less than the capabilities of the charging system. Since the plant is maintained at the hot shutdown condition, the Reactor Trips from both the pressurizer pressure channels (OT+T low pressure and hi pressure) and the level .channels (hi level) are not required to be operable per Technical Specification 3.5 table 3.5-1. Letdown isolation signal will not be operable during this evolution. The consequences of an accident will not be increased because the letdown isolation signal is not assumed in the accident analysis of Chapter 15 of the UFSAR. Since, the pressurizer low pressure safety injection signal will be in the trip condition or operable, safety injection will remain fully operable dur'ing this temporary modif icat ion.
The possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be created by this temporary modification. The safety injection system will remain fully operable during this temporary modification and will respond to the accident as addressed in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification will not be reduced by this temporary modification.
Section 3.5 of Technical Specifications will be satisfied during this temporary modification. A simulated signal will be installed into the defeated LT-427 channel to allow operation of the pressurizer heaters and to keep 100kw of heaters operable. Zn Chapter 15 accident analysis, letdown isolation is to take place through CV isolation signal of AOV-371 and not via letdown isolation.
CONCLUSION Temporarily connecting the reference leg of LT-427 to LT-426 does not involve an unreviewed safety question providing the connection is performed as specified above.
Page 2
SECTION D PROCEDURE CHANGES This section contains a description of the changes to procedures as described in the UFSAR and a summary of the safety evaluation pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(b).
PROCEDURE DATE 4 8'CN us 0 0 - Items 1, 2, or 6 If "yes" is answered for Items "inconsequential change" or the 1 or 2, provide the type of referenced 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation below:
Change Type:
If "no" below:
was answered for Item 6, provide the basis for exclusion Basis for Exclusion:
- Item 7 If "no" has bean answered for each question in items this change is not an Unreviewed Safety Question.
Va through Document the 7g
)ustification for these conclusions below. List any material referenced in the space provided.
Written Justification: Va YlO If "yes+ was answered for Itea 3, check this box If "yes", was answered for Item 7, PORC shall review and approve this submittal. This proposed chinge is an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) and requires submittal to the NRC for their review.
Submitted By!
50.59 for PT-32A Amendment 34 to the Ginna Technical Specif ications, mandates logic train testing for the reactor trip and bypass breakers, on an alternate month basis. This monthly logic testing will verify the operability of all sets of reactor trip logic actuating contacts, on the train undergoing testing. During this testing, operation of one set of contacts will result in a reactor trip breaker trip, the operation of all other sets of contacts will be verified by the use of indication circuitry. The testing shall be performed monthly unless the reactor trip breakers are open or shall be performed prior to startup if testing has not been performed within the last 3 0 days. The monthly testing of the bypass breaker, will verify manual trip of the bypass breaker using the shunt trip coil, actuated from the test switches in the reactor protection rack.
The reactor trip logic was designed to have the capability of testing any of the various logic combinations while at power, with the use of the bypass breaker as the allowing factor.
During such logic testing, there is no reduction in plant safety due to the tripping scheme, whereby the train not undergoing testing generates the trip signal for its respective reactor trip breaker and the bypass breaker which is in service, bypassing the opposite trains reactor trip breaker. Therefore, if an actual trip signal were to be generated, both the bypass breaker and the reactor trip breaker on the active train would open, resulting in a reactor trip.
The probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will be increased, due to the nature of the increased testing of the logic actuating relays and associated contacts. This is an obvious point in that the history of these relays and contacts were the determining factor in the NRC's decision to'test them bi-monthly, in lieu of yearly, as had been done in the past. Therefore, by virtue of the NRC's review of this issue and their decision to increase the testing frequency, no unreviewed safety questions exist. Additionally, even if the malfunction rate increases substantially, the fact that we are testing in an established safety conscious test alignment, will not compromise plant safety or cause any unreviewed safety questions to be generated.
Gregg E. Joss 4/29/89
0 PROCEDURE DATE PCN s 0 o ee - Items 1, 2, or 6 If "yes" is answered for Items "inconsequential change" or the 1 or 2, provide the type of referenced 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation belov:
Change Type:
If "no" belov:
was answered for Item 6, provide the. basis for exclusion Basis for Exclusion:
Item 7 If "no" has been answered for each question in items 7a through 7g this change. is not an Unrevieved Safety Question. Document the justification ior these conclusions belov. List any material referenced in the space provided.
Written Justification: e ~ Vg 0~
If "yes+"was answered for Itex 3, check this box If ~yes~, was answered for Xtex 7, PORC shall review and approve this submittal. This proposed change is an Unrevieved Safety Question (VSQ) and requires subxittal to the NRC for their review.
Subxitted Byi
50.59 for PT-32B Amendment 34 to the Ginna Technical Specifications, mandates logic train testing for the reactor trip and bypass breakers, on an alternate month basis. This monthly logic testing will verify the operability of all sets of reactor trip logic actuating contacts, on the train undergoing testing. During this testing, operation of one set of contacts will result in a reactor trip breaker trip, the operation of all other sets of contacts will be verified by the use of indication circuitry. The testing shall be per formed monthly unless the reactor trip breakers are open or shall be per formed prior to startup if testing has not been performed within the last 30 days. The monthly testing of the bypass breaker, will verify manual trip of the bypass breaker using the shunt trip coil, actuated from the test switches in the reactor protection rack.
The reactor trip logic was designed to have the capability of testing any of the various logic combinations while at power, with the use of the bypass breaker as the allowing factor.
During such logic testing, there is no reduction in plant safety due to the tripping scheme, whereby the train not undergoing testing generates the trip signal for its respective reactor trip breaker and the bypass breaker which is in service, bypassing the opposite trains reactor trip breaker. Therefore, if an actual trip signal were to be generated, both the bypass breaker and the reactor trip breaker on the active train would open, resulting in a reactor trip.
The probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will be increased, due to the nature of the increased testing of the logic actuating relays and associated contacts. This is an obvious point in that the history of these relays and contacts were the determining factor in the NRC's decision to test them bi-monthly, in lieu of yearly, as had been done in the past. Therefore, by virtue of the NRC's review of this issue and their decision to increase the testing frequency, no unreviewed safety questions exist. Additionally, even if the malfunction rate increases substantially, the fact that we are testing in an established safety conscious test alignment, will not compromise plant safety or cause any unreviewed safety questions to be generated.
Gregg E. Joss 4/29/89
PROCEDURE DATE 6 PCN s on f om S ree C te Items 1, 2, or 6 If <<yes<< is answered for Items "inconsequential change<< or the 1 or 2, provide the type of referenced 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation below:
Change Type:
If <<no<<
below:
was answered for Item 6, provide the basis for exclusion Basis for Exclusion:
FR50.59 Safet Eva uatio - Item 7 If <<no<< has been answered for each question in items 7a through 7g this change is not an Unreviewed Safety Question. Document the Justification for these conclusions below. List any material referenced in the space provided.
Written Justification: "" Cuur/a+i If <<yes" was answered for Item 3, check this box
&Fit C7P /C~c4 Maw'c If "yes<<, was answered for Item 7, this submittal. This proposed change ia an PORC shall review and approve Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) and requires submittal to the NRC for their review.
Submitted By:
The attached pr ocedure RF 4." . 2 control s the e>;aminati on of f uel a semblies XTO and XT04. Doth fuel assemblies will be e amined in the spent fuel'ool during the outage period that the core is completely unloaded. Fuel assembly XT04 will be e;;amined visually only. Fuel assembly XTO~ will be e>:amined visually, but =will also have individual rods removed for specif ic measurements. To remove the rods the fuel assembly will be placed in the new fuel 'elevator and raised to a depth oF no less than 8 I't below the pool surface. At this level t: he upper tie plate will be removed and individual rods grappled. Eacts rod will be removed and r einser ted <<'0 inches by llafld to insure thei, r are no inter f erences at the gr i d .. The rod wi 1 1 be compl etel y removed by lowering the new fuel elevator. After the measurements ar e completed the rod will be'reinserted by hand 20 inches, and then fully inserted by ral sing the el evator. Addi tional 1 y per i pheral rods wi 1 1 be rei nserted using a special fi::I:ure to minimi "e tI>e potential for IiooI;out at grid 1 Qca Ii i ol I s ~
TransI er oF fueJ as emblies wit tiin the spent fuel pool will be in accordance wi th ex i st ing procedure RF B. 4. No 1 oads in e::cess of a f and its handling tool <1500 lbs) will be suspended over racks uel'ssembly containing spent fuel. Therefor e the radiological release from a potential fuel handli.ng accident remains bounded by that analy".ed in se <-ion 15.7.3 of the UFSAR.
Pl acement O'F a sI)en t f uel assemb1 y i n the new f uel el evator i s not addressed in Section 9. 1.4..~ ? in the UFSAR which speci Fical ly states
~
that the elevator wi 1 1 be used f or new f uel onl y. The saf ety concern i s the potent i al or the el evator to be rai sed to the pool surf ace wi th a F
spent fuel assembl) creating a severe radiological ha"ard. However the potential for this to ocrur is minirni";.ed through two independent measul es Fir st) elevator operation is normally controlled by a push button i:hat must be continuously depressed for operation. The elevator cable will be suitibly marked to provide the operator with indication when minimum depth is approached. Second, the up limit switch on the elevator will be adjusted to maintain the minimum Sft depth.
Transfer oF single Fuel rods will be by hand tools. These tools will be marked to indicate the minimum required depth of 6ft. The fuel rod elevator will also be equiped with limit switches to maintain the minimum depth at 6 Initial of the fuel rods from the fuel assembly will be performed manually to prevent the potential f or overloading the r od during 1owerin of the elevator. Initial insertion of the rod will also be performed manual 1 ya
The attached procedure RF 02.2 controls the e;-;amination of fuel assemblies XTOi and XT04. Bath Fuel assemblies will be e;;amined in the spent fuel pool during the outage period that the core is completely unloaded. Fuel assernbl y XTrr0 wi 11 be e~ami ned visual 1 y only. Fuel assembly XTO~ will be e;(amined visuall'y, but will also have individual rods removed for specific measurements. To remove the rods the fuel, assembly rvill be placed in the new fuel elevator and raised to a depth of ran less than 8 f t belo<v the pool sur f ace. At this level the upper tie plate will be removed and individual rods grappled. Each rod will be removed and reinser ted 20 inches by hand to insure their are no at the grids. The rnd will be completely r emoved by, interfereraces elevator
. lowering the new FIrel el evator... After the measurements are cornpl eted the rod will be reinserted by haAd 20 inches, and thorr fully inserted by r ai si'ng the . Addi ti onal 1 y peripheral rods uri 11 be reinser ted using a special f i::ture to minirni "e the potential for bool:nut at grid ~
1 neat i nns.
Transfer of f rel assemblies within the spent fuel ponl will be i' accordance with e;:i ting pr ocedur e RF 8.0. No loads in':;cess of a Fuel asserrlb 1 y and i ts handl i ng tool ( 500 1 bs) wi 1 1 be suspended over racks 1
containing spent Fuel. ThereFore the radiological release from a potential fuel handlinp accident remains bounded by that analy" ed in s- .tion 15.7.3 of the UFSAR.
Pl clcerl)erlt nf a 'spel'lt f uel assemb1 y i n the new f uel el evator i s not addressed in Section P. i.0.3.2 in the UFSAR which specifically states that the el e Ya'tnl uri 1 1 be used f or net f uel onl y. The saf ety concern i s the potential for the elevator to be raised to the pool sur face with a spent fuel assembly creating a severe radiological ha" ard. However the potential f or this to ocrur is rninirni "ed through two independent.
measures. First, el e'vator operat i on i s normal 1 y control 1 ed by a push that must be continuously depressed for operation. The elevator 'utton cable <vill be suitibly marl;ed to provide the operator with indication when rninimurg depi li i s approached-. Second, the up 1 imi t swi tch, on the elevator uril1 be adjusted to maintain the minimum 8f t depth.
Transfer oF single fuel rods will be by hand tools. These tools will be mell h'pd tn indicate the minimum required depth of 6f t. The fuel rod elevator will also be equiped with limit switches to maintain the minimum depth at 6 ft.
'I The initial pullof the fuel rod from the fuel assembly will be perfnrmed manually to prevent the potential for overloading the rod dur ing lnrvering of the el evator. Ini ti al inserti on n the rod will also F
be performed manually.
Therefore thi s proce >s does not present an unrevi cured safety question f nl the f nl 1 Diving easons:
I
- 1. The probabi 1 i ty of occur r er)ce or the consequences of an ident or malfunction oF equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report is not increased. I The f uel handl ing ace i dent i s addressed in. ch'a'pter,:.15,of 'th'e+UFSAR;- ".,;.;~'~>7;.~~'t no time is more than one fuel assembly 'hei'ng:-"Cranspdr't'Od':;by'Ya',"~"'-~',.-".
I t~ y .
WV'
handl ing tool or install ed in tlute new f uel el evator Fui e::ami flati on.
no time does the oppor<uni ty occur, f or more th'an one assembly to be damaged by a handling accident. The required buildings ventilation alignment and the r adiol'ogical source term is bounded by the LJFSAF(
assumptions.
- 2. The possibi1 it y for an accident or malfunction of a di f f erent type than any evaluated pr eviously in the safety analysis is flot cl eated ~
Severe radiological consequence= would result i F a spent fuel "assembly was rai sed to the sur Face of the pool in the new f uel. elevator.
However, this would require the failure of two independent means of restricting the assembly height to,the maximum specified.
The. margin of saf ety as def ined in the basis For any technical speci F i cati on i s flol reduced.
The required systems to mi ti gate the effects of f uel handl ing accidents are required For this Fuel examination. The required depth for the ee'amined fuel assembly in the new fuel elevator will provide suf Ficient radiological shielding, or adjustments will be made based upon review by health physics personnel. 'The double failure required raising the fuel assembly makes evaluation of this event e -sary.
SECTION E COMPLETED SPECIAL TESTS (ST) AND EXPERIMENTS This section is to contain a description of special tests and experiments performed in the facility, pursuant to the require-ments of 10 CFR 50.59(b) . Within the time frame of this report, there were two conducted.
<<<<E~~P +'"~~ CENTRAL RECORDS A-301. 1: ll OA LIFr:FIMF.
FIGURE 4 Refer to A-301.1 for structions S2~TY EMQlJATION SUNDRY REPORT ST PFs02 3>l'or No.
DESCRIPTION OF MODIFICATION, SPECIAL TEST OF EXPERIMENT:
Qgeci5,~e.s+ "QgS LEc Dgkg Y ~<mAoM UO~ IO-P-a~I" PREPARED BY: ). ~, P., A. %acres DATE:
I
. 1. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED: P~es IS.l. I I. I - ID.I. ID JsJ A. UFSAR SECTION 8 ~ ) PAGES (. 1 4l' l SECTION PAGES ~ ~ ~ A<M ( ~ 4 Sar.+ID' 9. 6, Pres /56 ~ I W~m IS B. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SECTION 5. 3 PAGES . Q- ) v~
SECTION WS'I S PAGES > ~-P +~~~ 3 >-g
- 2. EVALUATION RESULTS:
A. AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION INVOLVED (IF YES, CHECK APPLICABLE REASON BEZDW)
NO i
ZNCRFASED PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR A MALI!UNCTION:
- POSSIBILITY CREATED FOR ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION NOT CONSIDERED BEFORE:
- MARGIN OF SAPID DEFINED IN BASIS FOR TECHNXCAL SPECZFICATXONS IS REDUCED:
B. A CHANGE IN TECHNICAL SPECXFICATIONS REQUIRED ZF YESI BRIEF DESCRIPTION:
~$
APPROVED TITLE ~@+ Gi~~DDATE 0- ) hh PORC DATE: 0 8 ITEM NUMB NSARB DATE:
USNRC APPROVAL (ZF REQUIRED)
SAFETY EVALUATION Special Test "RCS Leakage Determination of 10/7/88 ST-88.2 1.0 SCOPE OF ANALYSIS:
~
The purpose of this test is to determine the cause(s) of "B" SI Accumulator ("A" Loop Accumulator) in leakage and determine the cause of an observed elevated pressure and temperature on lA High Head SI Line ("B" Loop SI Line) and correct if possible.
1 2
~ The scope of this analysis is to assure that the conduct of this test during reactor power operation does not:
a ~ increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, previously evaluated in the FSAR, or
- b. create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously, or c ~ reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification.
4' '
REFERENCES:
Ginna Updated Facility Safety Analysis Report Section and Section 15.
6 2 ' Ginna Technical Specifications Section 3.3.
2.3 RG&E Dwg. 33013-1262.
3.0 SAFETY ANALYSIS:
3.1 10 CFR 50.59 Review The proposed procedure to determine RCS leakage of 10/7/88 has been reviewed to determine (a)(2)(iii) if sections 50.59 (a)(2)(i),
(a)(2)(ii) and apply (a)(2)(i) The closure of MOV 878 "B" or "D" constitutes the entering of a limiting condition for operation (LCO) (Section 3.3 Ginna Technical Specifi-cations). The LCO constitutes an analyzed condition within the Safety Analysis Report.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased beyond that assumed in the Technical Specification LCO.
However, given that the 878 B/D flow paths are essential in delivering water to each cold leg of the RCS during an accident condition with no functional replacement, similar to the accumulator outlet valves, B/D valve, 1) it remain is recommended that the 878 active while closed and 2) should be closed no more than (1) one hour similar to the accumulator outlet valve specifi-cation.
(a)(2)(ii) No different type accident or malfunction other than the SAR evaluated accidents or malfunctions as defined by the Technical Specification LCO is created.
(a)(2)(iii) No reduction in the margin to safety as defined in the basis of Technical Specifications is intimated by this test [see discussion in (a)(2)(i) above]
4.0 PRELIMINARY SAFETY EVALUATION:
Based on the above it is determined that:
a ~ the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, previously evaluated in the safety analysis will not be increased, and
- b. the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than that evaluated previously in the safety analysis will not be created, and c ~ the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.
PREPARED BY: DATE:
Responsible S ineer REVIEWED BY: DATE:
eactor Engineer APPROVED BY: >" >~> C DATE: )0-C enical Ma ag r
A-301. 1: 11 Refer to A-301. 1 for Instructions SAFER'Y EVMZJATION
SUMMARY
REPORT pop PRDcf ~l48k No. 5 7 - P9. j I
V ~~/d'Ah'red $ 7E47ig/~rd~ /kj'dna gQ/Af5 Qc'~s~~)8i zZQ 54'C5g
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/~s~w~vio4 c)F wb'M4'olde/zS 5'A g < ~R< Ys IS 10Am& 3 W/A7/8 BY: 0'REPARED DATE: 5 3 I I I
I
- 1. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED: I I
A. UFSAR - SECTION PAGES ~ / ~ I
~,~-P3 I SECTION PAGES ~ -/~
P4')wg Fr $ S&
B. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SECTION SECTION 2 ~ EVALUATION RESULTS:
A. AN UNEKVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION INVOLVED (IF YES, CHECK APPLICABLE REASON BEZDW)
- INCREASED PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR A MALI'UNCTION:
- POSSIBILITY CREATED FOR ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION NOT CONSIDERED BEFORE:
- MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED IN BASIS FOR TECHNICAL
'PECIFICATIONS IS REDUCED:
, B. A CHANGE ZN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REQUIRED ZF YES, Hu:EF DESCRIPTION:
~ Q APPROVED TITLE PORC DATE: ITEM RJNB ./0-Bg og oe NSARB DATE:
h USNRC APPROVAL (ZF REQUIRED):
Y S
SAFETY ANALYSIS GINNA STATION TEMPERATURE STRATIFICATION MONITORING TEMPORARY MODIFICATION REVISION 0 APRIL 27 g 1989 PREPARED BY:
Electrical Engineer Date REVIEWED BY:
eactor Engineer r r Date APPROVED BY:
5anager, Technical Engineering Date
C Revision Status Sheet Latest Latest Latest Page Rev. Page Rev. Page Rev.
0 0
0
-0 0
Safety Analysis Page ii Revision 0
SAFETY ANALYSIS 1.0 SCOPE OP ANALYS1S:
NRC Bulletin No. 88-11, "Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification", requests all addressees to establish and implement a program to confirm pressurizer surge line integrity in view of the occurrence of thermal stratification, and requires them to inform the staff of the actions taken to resolve this issue. Pursuant to satisfying the requirement and schedule of Bulletin 88-11, Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation is participating in a program for partial resolution of this issue through the Westinghouse Owner's Group (WOG).
The WOG program is designed to benefit from the experience gained in the performance of several plant-specific analyses on Westinghouse PWR surge lines.
These detailed analyses included definition of revised thermal transients (including stratification). The overall analytical approach used in all of these analyses has been reviewed by the NRC staff. A significant amount of pressurizer surge line thermal monitoring data has been obtained in support of these plant-specific analyses. Additional pressurizer surge line thermal monitoring and plant system data continues to be made available within the WOG, resulting in a steadily increasing database.
Pressurizer surge line temperature stratification data will be collected at Ginna for inclusion in the WOG database.
1~2 Thermal stratification and cycling phenomena were also discovered in auxiliary piping connected to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). These phenomena may cause pipe cracks in the unisolable sections. of auxiliary piping systems. USNRC issued Bulletin 88-08 and subsequent supplements to address this phenomena. As a result, electric utilities are required to provide response to the NRC regarding the review and identification of auxiliary pipe sections connected to the RCS that may be sub)ected to thermal stratification not considered in the design of the plant.
Westinghouse has identified three piping sections that may be sub)ected to thermal stratification. These are:
Safety Analysis Page 1 Revision 0 Date 4 7 89
a) charging line to Loop B hot leg between check valve 393 and the RCS nozzle b) alternate charging line to Loop A cold leg between check valve 383A and the RCS nozzle c) auxiliary spray line between check valve 297 and the main pressurizer spray line 1.3 This analysis addresses the consequences of- installing temporary thermocouples on the pressurizer surge line, Loop B charging line, Loop A alternate charging line,-
and auxiliary spray line. Thermocouple extension wire shall be temporarily routed to a data acquisition controller. The controller shall provide a digital output to a remote personal computer. The data output line shall utilize temporary cable and existing spare circuits to exit containment.
1~4 In addition to the thermocouples, four temporary displacement transducers are to be installed on th0 pressurizer surge line. The transducers will monitor line movement during heat-up, cool-down, and during temperature stratification conditions.
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS:
Ginna Station Procedure, A 303'reparation, Review, and Approval of Safety Analysis for Minor Modifications or Special Tests".
2 ' Ginna Station Procedure, A<<1405, "Installation and Removal of Temporary Cables".
2 ' Ginna Station Procedure, "A-1406, "Control of Temporary Modifications".
2 ' R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Updated Safety Analysis Report.
2.5 USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.70, Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, LWR Edition, Revision 3, November 1978.
2.6 Appendix R Alternative Shutdown System, "Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Revision 4, January 1987.
Safety Analysis Page 2 Revision 0 Date 4 27 89
2 ' GAI, "Fire Protection Evaluation" Report No. 1936, March 1977.
3.0 SAFETY ANALYSIS:
3.1 A review has been made of all events analyzed in the Ginna FSAR and the events requiring analysis by the USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.70. The events related to this modification are:
- 1) seismic event
- 2) major and minor fires 3.1.1 All temporary instrument cable installed shall be routed to follow the respective line to be monitored and then drop vertically to containment floor elevation 235'. The temporary cable will then be routed along the floor, following the shield wall to the free standing data acquisition controller. No seismic impact is anticipated since instrument cable weight is negligible compared to pipe/insulation weight.
Instrument cable routed on the floor and the free standing controller (approx. 10"Hx 12"W x 24"D) will not affect seismic structures in the immediate vicinity.
The data acquisition controller will be placed outside of the shield wall near the lower end of the pressurizer.
3 ~ 1.2 Temporary cable used for the data link shall follow the shield wall at elevation 235', rise to elevation south-east stairs, and follow the shield wall to 253'ia Incore Reference Junction Box 1B. No seismic impact is anticipated since this cable will follow a floor/stair routing.
3 ' ~ 3 Cable separation in Incore Reference Junction Box 1B shall be maintained. The temporary data link cable shall be spliced to spare circuit A780. Cable and conductor insulation shall be restored using Raychem WCSF sleeves. The spliced cables shall be dressed in Incore Box 1B so that distance between A780 and Incore Thermocouple cables is maximized.
Safety Analysis Page 3 Revision 0 Date 7 89
3 ' ' This temporary modification will not propagate a major or minor fire. Cables used for thermocouples and thermocouple extensions are individually sheathed in Inconel Overbraid (thermocouples) or Tinned Copper Overbraid (extensions). No additional fire loading is anticipated by the overbraided cable. Temporary cable used for the data link is rated and qualified to IEEE-383 flame requirements as a minimum. Total estimated containment fire loading for this temporary data link cable is 200000 BTUs.
3 ' ~ 5 Temporary cable used for the data link will be spliced to existing spare cable A779 in the Air Handling Room.
Routing is through a floor penetration to the Mux.
Room. Total fire loading for the temporary cable in the Air Handling Room is negligible.
Total fire loading for the temporary cable in the Mux. Room is estimated at 2000 BTUs.
3.1.6 Fire barrier penetrations will be repaired and replaced in accordance with existing plant procedures. Therefore existing seals will not be degraded.
3.1 ~ 7 This modification does not affect the safe shutdown analysis. in the Appendix R submittal since there is no effect on separation of existing circuits, associated circuits, or fire area boundaries as analyzed in the Appendix R submittal.
3.1 ~ 8 This modification will not effect the capabilities of the Alternative Shutdown System. Furthermore, none of the existing procedures for obtaining an Alternative Safe Shutdown will be effected. This modification, therefore, complies with 10CFR50, Appendix R.
3~2 This modification does not degrade the capability of any Safety System to perform its function. The assumptions and conclusions of existing analyses are unchanged. No new types of events are postulated.
3~2~1 Therefore, it has been determined that the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the station have not been affected. It has also been determined that the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the consequences of accidents have not been affected.
Safety Analysis Page ~ Revision ~
4 ' PRELIMINARY SAFETY EVALUATION:
4.1 The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased by the proposed modification.
4 ' The possibility of an accident or a malfunction of a different type other than any evaluated previously will not be created by the proposed modification.
4.3 The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced by the proposed modification.
4 ' The proposed modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question or require a Technical Specification change.
Safety Analysis Page 5 Revision 0 Date 7 8
All of the above were reviewed by the PORC committee with respect l,@ to the Technical Specifications and the committee has determined that no Technical Specification changes or violations were involved.
Additionally, these changes were reviewed in c'ommittee to determine if they presented an Unreviewed Safety Question and the general summations of these reviews are as follows:
These changes do not increase the probability of occurrence, or the consequences'f an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR, because:
These changes were 'ade to ensure continued operability/availability o f plant equipment and will not result in any equipment being operated outside of its normal operating'ange. This results in continued operability/availability, of equipment important to safety.
These changes additionally will not result in a change of operating characteristics of equipment used in transient/accident mitigation which precludes an increase in the probability of occurrence of an accident. Because these changes ensure continued availability of plant equipment, the limits shown in the Technical Specifications, and the assumptions of the safety analyses of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report continue to be met. As a result there is no increase in the consequences of any presently postulated accident.
I 2 ~ These changes do not create the possibility for a new or different kind of accident, or a malfunction of a different, type from any accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR because:
These changes do not present new failure mechanisms outside of those presently anticipated, and are bounded by the events contained in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
3 ~ These changes do not reduce the margin of safety because:
Present margins as contained in the Technical Specifications are valid, and these procedure changes are made within. those limits. These procedure changes will not result in violating the baseline assumptions made for equipment availability in the Technical Specifications, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
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