ML19207B137

LER 79-019/01T-1 on 790723:as Result of Review of Safety Injection Sys Cable Used in Containment,Determined That Four Valves Require Wire Replacement Prior to Startup. Cable Will Be Replaced During Refueling

ML19207B137
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	08/17/1979
From:	Werling J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19207B133	List: ML19207B132 ML19207B137 ML19207B139
References
LER-79-019-01T, LER-79-19-1T, NUDOCS 7908230435
Download: ML19207B137 (2)

Text

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" o 1 7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMSER bd 69 EVENT DATE is 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBA8LE CONSEQUENCES h FITI l As a result of a review of SIS cable used in containment, it was determined wire from I f5T31 I four manufacturers may have been installed.

Three of the F* r vnnanen H un cita-14 nd I documentation indicating their production runs covering the time period that the STS o 4 o s l wire was purchased and installed would have qualified for the hostile Post LOCA lo s I containment environment.

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33 34 35 36 31 40 48 42 43 44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS g l A review of the affected equipment in containment by the Onsite Safety Committee has I The remainine l yl determined that four valves require wire reolacement prior to starte., 7 l valves that do not have qualified SIS wire close on CIB and would not be required to lgl be reopened to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The cable for safety related gl equipment in containment will be replaced during refueling.

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.:*Attachment To LER 79-19/01T-1 Beaver Valley Power Station Duquesne Light Company Docket No. 50-334 There are four manufacturers of SIS wire presently installed at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1.

Three of the four vendors have supplied documentation indicating their production runs covering the time period that the SIS wire was purchased and installed would have qualified for the hostile Post LOCA containment environment.

The following is a list of valves which were reviewed by the Onsite Safety Committee and determined to require wire replacement prior to startup:

1.Chilled Water Containment Isolation Valve [TV-CC-110E3] which supplies chilled water to the containment air coolers and air compressors.

2.Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves [PCV-RC-455C, 455D, 456].

The following is a list of valves that do not have qualified SIS wire that close on containment isolation CIB and would not be required to be reopened to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

There is a possibility that a wire failure and shorting of the wires inside the terminal boxes could cause some of the valves to open; but, due to wire dressing within the box, this is a remote possibility. The Onsite Safety Committee has determined that even in the event the valve would reopen, the outside isolation valve would maintain containment integrity and no cable replacement is required at this time.

Because of lack of qualification from one vendor and inadequate documentation of qualification for the other three vendors, the SIS vire for safety related equipment in containment will be replaced during the fall refueling outage with fully qualified and documented wire.

1.Sample System Containment Isolation Valves [TV-SS-100A1, 102A2, 103Al, 104A1, 105A1, 109A1, IllAl and 112Al].

2.Primary Drains Transfer Pump Discharge Containment Isolation [TV-DG-108A].

3.Containment Sump Pump Discharge Containment Isolation (TV-DA-100A].

4.Sealed Reference Pressure System Containment Isolation [TV-LM-101A, 101B] -

normally closed.

5.Nitrogen Supply to Safety Injection Accumulators Containment Isolation

[TV-SI-101].

6."A" Reactor Coolant Loop Bypass Valve [MOV-RC-587] limit switch.

7.Component Cooling Water Containment Isolation valves [TV-CC-103C1, 107El, 107A, 107D1, 107C, and 105C].

8.Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves [TV-CH-200A, 200B, 200C].

9.Letdown containment Isolation valve [TV-CH-460B].

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