ML17263A833

Rev 1 to Re Ginna EALs Technical Bases.

ML17263A833
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	10/11/1994
From:	ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17263A834	List: ML17263A833 ML17263A835 ML17309A559
References
OSSI-92-402A-4, OSSI-92-402A-4-REG-1, NUDOCS 9411090266
Download: ML17263A833 (209)

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AttachmBllDNawÃI0'oOMCl0'o'4Ul4QwO~DOOUMV-R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsAnnotated Classification CriteriaBasedonResponsetoNRCRAlsCategory1.0CSFSTStatusCategory2.0-ReactorFuelCategory3.0Category4.0Category5.0Category6.0Category7.0Category8.0Category9.0ReactorCoolantSystemContainment Radioactivity ReleaseElectrical FailuresEquipment FailuresHazardsOther R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsProposedRevision19BasedonResponsetoNRCRAIsCategory1.0Category2.00Category3.0Category4.0Category5.0Category6.0Category7.0Category8.0Category9.0CSFSTStatusReactorFuelReactorCoolantSystemContainment Radioactivity ReleaseElecrtical FailuresEquipment Failures-HazardsOther10/11/94 1.0CSFSTStatus1.1Subcriticality 1.1.1Alert[SA2]ORANGEorREDpathF-0.1SUBCRITICALITY ANDEmergency borationisrequiredPowerOperations, HotShutdownCatego.0CSFSTStatus1.0CSFSTStatus12CoreCooling1.2.1SiteAreaEmergency

[fpl/fl,rl][SS4]ORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGPowerOperations, HotShutdown1.2.2GeneralEmergency

[fl,rl,cpl]1.1.2SiteAreaEmergency

[SS2]REDpathinF-0.1SUBCRITICALITY ANDeither:Emergency borationisinoperable ORPowerrangenot<6%within15min.ofinitiation ofemergency borationPowerOperations, HotShutdownREDpathinF~-0.2,CORECOOLINGANDFunctional restoration procedures noteffective within15min.PowerOperations, HotShutdown1.1.3GeneralEmergency

[SG2]REDpathinF-0.1,SUBCRITICALITY ANDActualorimminententryintoeither:REDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGORREDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINKPowerOperations, HotShutdown1-2fpl-fuelcladpot.lossfl-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss 1.0CSFSTStatus13HeatSink1.3.1SiteAreaEmergency

[fpl,rpl][SS4]REDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINKPowerOperations, HotShutdownCatego.0CSFSTStatus1.0CSFSTStatus1.4Integrity 1.4.1Alert[rpl]REDpathonF-0.4,INTEGRITY PowerOperations, HotShutdown1-3fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Catego.0CSFSTStatus1.0CSFSTStatus1.5Containment 1.5.1GeneralEmergency

[6,rl,cpl]REDpathF-0.5,CONTAINMENT resulting fromlossofreactorcoolantPowerOperations, HotShutdown1-4fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Catego.0ReactorFuel2.0ReactorFuel2.1CoolantActivity2.1.1UnusualEvent[SU4]Coolantsampleactivity:

>100%%uoof84/EbarpCi/cctotalspecificactivityOR>0.2pCi/ccI-131equivalent andtheconditions ofTechnical Specifications 3.1.4.3.b areexceededAll2.1.2Alert[0]Coolantactivity>300pCi/ccI-131equivalent Poweroperation, hotshutdown2.1.3SiteAreaEmergency

[fi.rpl/rl]Coolantactivity>300pCi/ccI-131equivalent andanyofthefollowing:

~REDpathonF-0.4,INTEGRITY

~Primarysystemleakage>46gpm~RCSsubcooling

<EOPFig.MINSUBCOOLING duetoRCSleakage~Containment radiation monitorR-29/R-30 reading>10R/hrPoweroperation, hotshutdown2.0ReactorFuel2.2FailedFuelDetectors 2.2.1UnusualEvent[SU4]LetdownLineMonitorR-9>2R/hrAll2.2.2AlertLetdownLineMonitorR-9>10R/hrPoweroperation, hotshutdown2.2.3SiteAreaEmergency

[fl,rpl]LetdownLineMonitorR-9>10R/hrandanyofthefollowing:

~REDpathonF-0.4,INTEGRITY

~Primarysystemleakage>46gpm~RCSsubcooling

<EOPFig.MINSUBCOOLING duetoRCSleakage~Containment*radiation monitorR-29/R-30 reading>10R/hrPoweroperation, hotshutdown2-1fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Catego.0ReactorFuel2.0ReactorFuel2.3Containment Radiation 2.3.1AlertContainment radiation monitorR-29/R-30 reading>10R/hrPoweroperation, hotshutdown2.3.2SiteAreaEmergency

[fl,rl]Containment radiation monitorR-29/R-30 reading>100R/hrPoweroperation, hotshutdown2.8.3GeneralEmergency

[fl,rl,cpl]Containment radiation monitorR-29/R-30 reading>1000R/hr2.0ReactorFuel2.4Refueling Accidents orOtherRadiation Monitors2.4.1UnusualEvent[AU2]Spentfuelpool(reactorcavityduringrefueling) waterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintained abovethespentfuelpoollowwaterlevelalarmsetpointAll2.4.2Alert[AA2]Con6rmedsustained alarmonanyofthefollowing radiation monitorsresulting fromanuncontrolled fuelhandlingprocess:~R-2Containment AreaMonitor~R-5SpentFuelPit~R-12Containment NobleGasPoweroperation, hotshutdown2.4.8Alert[AA2]Reportofvisualobservation ofirradiated fueluncovered All2-2fpl-fuelcladpot.lossfl-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot,lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Category.0-ReactorCoolantSystem3.0ReactorCoolantSystem3.1RCSLeakage3.1.1UnusualEvent[SU5]3.0ReactorCoolantSystem3.2PrimarytoSecondary Leakage3.2.1UnusualEvent[cl]Unidentified orpressureboundaryleakage>10gpmORIdentified leakage>25gpmPoweroperation, hotshutdown3.1.2Alert[rpl]Primarysystemleakage>46gpmPoweroperation, hotshutdownReleaseofsecondary sidetoatmosphere withprimarytosecondary leakage>0.1gpmpersteamgenerator Poweroperation, hotshutdown13.2.2SiteAreaEmergency

[rpl,cl]Unisolable releaseofsecondary sidetoatmosphere withprimarytosecondary leakage>46gpmPoweroperation, hotshutdown3.1.3SiteAreaEmergency

[fpl,rl][SS5]3.2.3SiteAreaEmergency

[fl,cl]RVLIScannotbemaintained

>43%withnoRCPsrunningORWiththereactorvesselheadremoved,itisreportedthatwaterlevelinthereactorvesselisdroppinginan.uncontrolled mannerandcoreuncoveryislikely.Releaseofsecondary sidetoatmosphere withprimarytosecondary leakage>0.1gpmpersteamgenerator ANDEither:Coolantactivity>300pCi/ccofI-131ORLetdownLineMonitorR-9>108/hrAllPoweroperation, hotshutdown3-1fpl-fuelcladpot.lossfl-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Category.0ReactorCoolantSystem3.0ReactorCoolantSystem3.3RCSSubcooling 3.3.1Alert[rl]RCSsubcooling

<EOPFig.MINSUBCOOLING duetoRCSleakagePoweroperation, hotshutdown3-2fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.

pot.losscl-contain.loss Category4.0Containment

4.0 Containment

4.1Containment Integrity Status4.1.1UnusualEvent[cl]4.0Containment 4.1Containment Integrity Status4.1.3SiteAreaEmergency

[rl,cl]Bothdoorsopenoncontainment airlockORInability toclosecontainment pressurerelieforpurgevalveswhichresultsinaradiological releasepathwaytotheenvironment ORCIorCVIvalve(s)notclosedwhenrequiredwhichresultsinaradiological releasepathwaytotheenvironment Either:CIorCVIvalve(s)notclosedwhenrequiredfollowing confirmed LOCAORInability toisolateanyprimarysystemdischarging outsidecontainment ANDRadiological releasepathwaytotheenvironment existsPoweroperation, hotshutdownPoweroperation, hotshutdown4.1.2SiteAreaEmergency

[rl,cl]Rapiduncontrolled decreaseincontainment pressurefollowing initialincreaseORLossofprimarycoolantinsidecontainment withcontainment pressureorsumplevelresponsenotconsistent withLOCAconditions Poweroperation, hotshutdown4.1.4GeneralEmergency

[fl,rl,cpl]Safetyinjection signalduetoLOCAwithlessthanminimumoperablecontainment heatremovalequipment, Table4.3ANDAnyindicators offuelcladloss,Table4.1Poweroperation, hotshutdown4-1fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss 0Category4.0Containment

4.0 Containment

4.1Containment Integrity Status4.1.5GeneralEmergency

[fpVfl,rl,cl]4.0Containment 4.2SGTubeRupturew/Secondary Release4.2.1SiteAreaEmergency

[rl,cl]Either:Rapiduncontrolled decreaseincontainment pressurefollowing initialincreaseORLossofprimarycoolantinsidecontainment withcontainment pressureorsumplevelresponsenotconsistent withLOCAconditions ANDAnyindicators offuelcladdamage,Table4.2Poweroperation, hot'hutdown 4.1.6GeneralEmergency

[fpVfl,rl,cl]Either:CIorCVIvalve(s)notclosedwhenrequiredfollowing confirmed LOCAORInability toisolateanyprimarysystemdischarging outsidecontainment ANDRadiological releasepathwaytotheenvironment existsANDAnyindicators offuelcladdamage,Table4.2Unisolable secondary sidelinebreakwithSGtuberuptureasidentified inE-3"SteamGenerator TubeRupture"Poweroperation, hotshutdown4.2.2GeneralEmergency

[fpVfl,rl,cl]Unisolable secondary sidelinebreakwithSGtuberuptureasidentified inE-3"SteamGenerator TubeRupture"ANDAnyindicators offuelcladdamage,Table4.2Poweroperation, hotshutdownPoweroperation, hotshutdown4-2fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss

4.0 Containment

4.3Combustible GasConcentrations 4.3.1GeneralEmergency Ifl,rl,cpl]

24%hydrogenconcentration incontainment Poweroperation, hotshutdownCatego.0Containment Table4.1FuelCladLossIndicators 1.Coolantactivity>300pCi/ccofI-1312.Containment radmonitorR-29/R-30 reading>100R/hr3.LetdownMonitorR-9reading>10R/hr4.REDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGTable4.2FuelCladDamaeIndicators

~ORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLING~REDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINK~Coolantactivity>300pCi/ccofI-131~Containment radmonitorR-29/R-30 reading>100H/hr~LetdownMonitorR-9reading>10R/hr<28psigN/A>28psigTable4.3MinimumOperableContainment HeatRemovalEuimentCNMTPressureRecircFansOperableSprayPumpsReuired4-3fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Category6.0Radioactivity Release6.0Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation 6.1EQluentMonitors6.1.1UnusualEvent[AU1]6.0Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation 6.1EQluentMonitors6.1.4GeneralEmergency

[AG1]AvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"NUE"for>60min.unlesssampleanalysiscanconfirmreleaserates<2xtechnical specifications withinthistimeperiod.AvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"GE"for>15min.unlessdoseassessment canconfirmreleasesarebelowTable5.2column"GE"withinthistimeperiod.AllAll6.1.2Alert[AA1]AvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"Alert"for>15min.unlessdoseassessment canconfirmreleasesarebelowTable5.2column"Alert"withinthistimeperiod.All6.1.3SiteAreaEmergency

[AS1]AvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"SAE"for>15min.unlessdoseassessment canconfirmreleasesarebelowTable5.2column"SAE"withinthistimeperiod.All5-1fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Categoryo.0Radioactivity Release6.0Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation

6.0 Radioactivity

Release/AreaRadiation 6.2DoseProjections/

Environmental Measurements/

ReleaseRates5.2DoseProjections/

Environmental Measurements/

ReleaseRates6.2.1UnusualEvent[AU1]6.2.4SiteAreaEmergency

[AS1]Confirmed sampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleaserates>2xtechnical specifications limitsfor>60min.AllDoseprojections orfieldsurveysresulting fromactualorimminentreleasewhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2column"SAE"atthesiteboundaryorbeyond.All6.2.2Alert[AA1]Confirmed sampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleaserates>200xtechnical specifications limitsfor>15min.6.2.5GeneralEmergency

[AG1]Doseprojections orfieldsurveysresulting fromactualorimminentreleasewhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2column"GE"atthesiteboundaryorbeyond.All5.2.8Alert[AA1]Doseprojections orfieldsurveysresulting fromactualorimminentreleasewhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2column"Alert"atthesiteboundaryorbeyond.All.Table5.3.PlantAreas~ReactorContainment Building~Auxiliary Building~TurbineBuilding~Emergency DieselBuilding~ScreenHouse~StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater Building5-2fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Categoo.0Radioactivity Release5.0Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation 5.3AreaRadiation Levels5.3.1'UnusualEvent[AU2]Anysustained directARMreadings>100xalarmoroAscalehiresulting fromanuncontrolled process5.3.2Alert[AA3]Sustained arearadiation levels>15mR/hrineither:ControlRoomORCentralAlarmStationandSecondary AlarmStation5.3.3Alert[AA3]Sustained abnormalarearadiation levels>8R/hrwithinanyareas,Table5.3ANDAccessisrequiredtoestablish ormaintaincoldshutdown.

All5-3fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Categoryo.0Radioactivity ReleaseMonitorTable5.1EfHuentMonitorClassification Thresholds AlertGER-llR-12R-13R-14R-15R-18R-12A(7/9)R-14A(7/9)

R-15A(7/9)

R-31/321ARV1Safety2Safety3Safety4Safety1.62E6cpm7.80E6cpm2.20E4cpm6.40E5cpm4.00E5cpm3.60E5cpmN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A1.07E7cpmN/A1.61E6cpm2.31E7cpmoffscalehiN/AN/AN/A1.900mR/hr0.951mR/hr0.476mR/hr0.317mR/hr0.238mR/hrN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A6.00pCi/cc0.533pCi/cc11.50pCi/cc19.0mR/hr9.51mR/hr4.76mR/hr3.17mR/hr2.38mR/hrN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A60.00pCi/cc5.33pCi/cc115.00pCi/cc190mR/hr95.1mRhr47.6mR/hr31.7mR/hr.23.8mR/hrTable5.2DoseProection/Env.Measurement Classification Thresholds AlertGETEDECDEThyroidTEDErateCDEThyroidrate10mRN/A10mR/hr100mR500mR100mR/hr500mR/hr1000mR5000mR1000mR/hr5000mR/hr5-4fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Catego.0Electrical Failures6.0Electrical Failures6.1LossofACPowerSources6.1.1UnusualEvent[SUl]Lossofabilitytosupplypowertothesafeguard busesfromoffsitecircuits751and767for>15min.All6.0Electrical Failures6.1LossofACPowerSources6.1.4SiteAreaEmergency

[SS1]Lossofallsafeguards busACpowerfor>15min.Poweroperation, hotshutdown6.1.2Alert[SA1]6.1.6GeneralEmergency

[SGl]6.1.3Alert[SA5]Lossofallsafeguards busACpowerfor>15min.ColdShutdown, Refueling, DefueledLossofallsafeguards busACpowerANDeither:Powerrestoration toanysafeguards busisnotlikelyin<4hrsORActualorimminententryintoORANGEorREDpathonF-0.2,"CORECOOLING"Available safeguard trainACpowerreducedtoonlyoneofthefollowing for>15min.:~EDG1A(14/18)~EDG1B(16/17)~StationAuxiliary Transformer 12A~StationAuxiliary Transformer 12BPoweroperation, hotshutdownPoweroperation, hotshutdown6-1fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Category6.0Electrical Failures6.0Electrical Failures6.2LossofDCPowerSources6.2.1UnusualEvent[SU7]<105vdcbusvoltageindications on125vdcbatteries 1Aand1Bfor>15min.ColdShutdown, Refueling 6.2.2SiteAreaEmergency

[SS3]>105vdcbusvoltageindications on125vdcbatteries 1Aand1Bfor>15min.Poweroperation, hotshutdown6-2fpl-fuelcladpot.lossfl-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Category.0Equipment Failures7.0Equipment FailuresV.1Technical Specification%Requirements 7.1.1UnusualEvent[SU2]Plantisnotbroughttorequiredoperating modewithinTechnical Specifications LCOAction-Statement Time.Poweroperation, hotshutdownV.OEquipment FailuresV.2SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation 7.2.1UnusualEvent[HU1]Reportofmainturbinefailureresulting incasingpenetration ordamagetoturbinesealsorgenerator seals.PowerOperations V.2.2Alert[HA1]Turbinefailuregenerated missilesresultinanyvisiblestructural damagetoplantvitalequipment PowerOperations, HotShutdown7.2.8Alert[HA5]EntryintoAP-CR.1"ControlRoomInaccessability" All7.2.4Alert[SA3]Reactorcoolanttemperature cannotbemaintained

<200'FColdShutdown, Refueling 7-1fyl-fuelcladpot.lossfl-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Catego.0Equipment FailuresV.OEquipment Failures7.0Equipment FailuresV.2SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation 7.3LossofIndications

/Alarms/Communication Capability V.2.5SiteAreaEmergency

[HS2]V.3.1UnusualEvent[SU3]ControlRoomevacuation ANDCorecoolingcannotbeestablished perAP-CR.1"ControlRoomInaccessibility" in<20min.AllUnplanned lossofannunciators orindications onanyControlRoomPanels,Table7.3for>15min.ANDIncreased surveillance isrequiredforsafeplantoperation Poweroperation, hotshutdown7.3.2UnusualEvent[SU6]Lossofallcommunications capability affecting theabilitytoeither:Performroutineoperations ORNotifyoffsiteagenciesorpersonnel 7-2fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Catego.0.Equipment FailuresV.OEquipment FailuresV.3LossofIndications

/Alarms/Communication Capability Table7.3VitalControlRoomPanelsV.3.3Alert[SA4]BCDEFGUnplanned lossofannunciators orindications onanyControlRoomPanels,Table7.3for>15min.ANDIncreased surveillance isrequiredforsafeplantoperation ANDeither:Aplanttransient inprogressORPPCSandSASareunavailable Poweroperation, hotshutdownV.3.4SiteAreaEmergency

[SS6]Lossofannunciators or'indications onanyControlRoomPanels,Table7.3ANDCompletelossofabilitytomonitorallcriticalsafetyfunctionstatusANDAplanttransient inprogressPoweroperation, hotshutdown7-3fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Catego.0Hazards8.0Hazards8.1SecurityThreats8.1.1UnusualEvent[HU4]8.0Hazards8.1SecurityThreats8.1.4GeneralEmergency

[HG1]Bombdeviceorotherindication ofattempted sabotagediscovered withinplantProtected Area.ORAnysecurityeventwhichrepresents apotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Securityeventwhichresultsin:LossofplantcontrolfromtheControlRoomORLossofremoteshutdowncapability All8.1.2Alert[HA4]Intrusion intoplantProtected Areabyanadversary.

ORAnysecurityeventwhichrepresents anactualsubstantial degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.All8.1.3SiteAreaEmergency

[HS1]Intrusion intoaplantsecurityvitalareabyanadversary.

ORAnysecurityeventwhichrepresents actualorlikelyfailuresofplantsystemsneededtoprotectthepublic.All8-1fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossryl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Hazards8.0Hazards8.2FireorExplosion 8.2.1UnusualEventDiU2]8.0Hazards8.3Man-MadeEvents8.3.1UnusualEventDiU1]Confirmed fireinanyplantarea,Table8.2orTable8.3notextinguished in515min.ofControlRoomnotification:

AllVehiclecrashintoorprojectile whichimpactsplantstructures orsystemswithinProtected AreaboundaryAll8.2.2Alert[HA2]8.3.2UnusualEvent[HU1]Fireorexplosion inanyplantarea,Table8.2orTable8.3whichresultsinEITHER:~visibledamagetoplantequipment orstructures neededforsafeplantoperation OR~whichaffectssafetysystemoperability asindicated bydegradedsystemperformance Reportbyplantpersonnel ofanexplosion withinProtected Areaboundaryresulting invisibledamagetopermanent structures orequipment All8.3.3UnusualEvent[HU3]Reportordetection oftoxicorflammable gasesthatcouldenterorhaveenteredwithintheProtected Areaboundaryinamountsthatcouldaffectthehealthofplantpersonnel orsafeplantoperation ORReportbylocal,countyorstateofficials forpotential evacuation ofsitepersonnel basedonoffsiteeventAll8-2fpl-fuelcladpot.lossfl-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Category8.0Hazards8.0Hazards8.3Man-MadeEvents8.3.4Alert[HA1]8.0Hazards8.4NaturalEvents8.4.1UnusualEvent[HU1]'ehiclecrashorprojectile impactwhichprecludes personnel accesstoordamagesequipment inplantvitalareas,Table8.3AllEarthquake feltinplantbyanyoperatorANDIConfirmation ofearthquake ofanintensity

>0.01gperSC-5"Earthquake Emergency Plan".All8.3.5Alert[HA3]Reportordetection oftoxicorflammable gaseswithinaplantarea,Table8.3,inconcentrations thatwillbelifethreatening toplantpersonnel orprecludeaccesstoequipment neededforsafeplantoperation 8.4.2UnusualEvent[HU1]Reportbyplantpersonnel oftornadowithinplantProtected AreaboundaryAll8.4.3UnusualEvent[HUl]DeerCreekfloodingoverentranceroadbridge(handrail)ORLakelevel>252ftORScreenHouseSuctionBaywaterlevel<15ft(low-lowlevelalarm)All8-3~fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss 8.0Hazards8.4NaturalEvents8.4.4Alert[HA1]Category.0Hazards8.0Hazards8.4NaturalEvents8.4.7Alert[HA1]Earthquake feltinplantbyanyplantoperations personnel ANDConfirmation ofearthquake ofanintensity

)0.08gperSC-5"Earthquake Emergency Plan"AllFloodwateraccumulating onscreenhouseoperating floorORLakelevel>253ftI'RScreenHouseSuctionBaywaterlevel<13ftAll8.4.5Alert[HA1]Sustained winds>75mphORTornadostrikesaplantvitalarea,Table8.3All8.4.6Alert[HAl]Table8.2PlantAreas~TurbineBuilding~TSC~ServiceBuilding~Contaminated StorageBuildingAnynaturaleventwhichresultsinareportofvisiblestructural damageorassessment byControlRoompersonnel ofactualdamagetoequipment neededforsafeplantoperation, Table8.3AllTable8.3PlantVitalAreas~ControlBuilding~ReactorContainment BuildingAuxiliary Building~Intermediate Building~Emergency DieselBuilding~StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater Building~ScreenHouse8-4fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossryl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss 9.0Other9.1.1UnusualEventCategory9.0Other9.0Other9.1.3AlertAnyevent,asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orEmergency Coordinator, thatcouldleadtoorhasledtoapotential degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Anyevent,asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orEmergency Coordinator, thatcouldcauseorhascausedactualsubstantial degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.AIl9.1.2UnusualEvent9.1.4AlertAnyevent,asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orEmergency Coordinator, thatcouldleadtoorhasledtoalossorpotential lossofcontainment, Attach.A.Poweroperation, hotshutdownAnyevent,asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orEmergency Coordinator, thatcouldleadorhasledtoa,lossorpotential lossofeitherfuelcladorRCSbarrier,Attach.A.Poweroperation, hotshutdown9-1fpl-fuelcladpot.lossQ-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss 9.0Other9.1.5SiteAreaEmergency Category9.0Other9.0Other9.1.VGeneralEmergency Asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orEmergency Coordinator, eventsareinprogresswhichindicateactualorlikelyfailuresofplantsystemsneededtoprotectthepublic.Anyreleasesarenotexpectedtoresultinexposures whichexceedEPAPAGs,Attach.A.AllAsdetermined bytheShikSupervisor orEmergency Coordinator, eventsareinprogresswhichindicateactualorimminentcoredamageandthepotential foralargereleaseofradioactive materialinexcessofEPAPAGsoutsidethesiteboundary.

All9.1.6SiteAreaEmergency Anyevent,asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orEmergency Coordinator, thatcouldleadorhasledtoeither:Lossorpotential lossofbothfuelcladandRCSbarrier,Attach.A.ORLossorpotential lossofeitherfuelcladorRCSbarrierinconjunction withalossofcontainment, Attach.A.9.1.8GeneralEmergency Anyevent,asdetermined bytheShiA.Supervisor orEmergency Coordinator, thatcouldleadorhasledtoalossofanytwofissionproductbarriersandlossorpotential lossofthethird,Attach.A.Poweroperation, hotshutdownPoweroperation, hotshutdown9-2fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossryl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss OSSI-92-402A-4-REG fgi.J2'gfI'inndEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1}Attachment CNewYorkEALUpgradeProjectR.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsTechnical BasesRevision1BasedonProposedResponses toNRCRAIs10/11/94 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument.

Rev1PURPOSEThepurposeofthisdocumentistoprovideanexplanation andrationale foreachoftheemergency actionlevels(EALs)includedintheEALUpgradeProgramforR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerStation(REGNPS).

Itisalsointendedtofacilitate thereviewprocessoftheREGNPSEALsandprovidehistorical documentation forfuturereference.

Thisdocumentisalsointendedtobeutilizedby,thoseindividuals responsible forimplementation ofEPIP-1-0"GinnaStationEventEvaluation andClassification" asatechnical reference andaidinEALinterpretation.

DISCUSSION EALsaretheplant-specific indications, conditions orinstrument readingswhichareutilizedtoclassifyemergency conditions definedintheREGNPSEmergency Plan.Subsequent totheacceptance bytheNRCofNUMARC/NESP-007 "Methodology forDevelopment ofEmergency ActionLevels"asanacceptable alternative totheNUREG0654EALguidance, thefournuclearutilities intheStateofNewYorkdecidedtoperformajointimplementation ofthenewmethodology.

Thisupgradeprojectinvolvedthefollowing plants:~NineMilePointUnit1(NMPC)~NineMilePointUnit2(NMPC)JamesA.FitzPatrick NuclearPowerPlant(NYPA)~IndianPointStation2(ConEd)~IndianPoint3NuclearPo'werStation(NYPA)~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerStation(RG&E)WhiletheupgradedEALsaresitespecific, anobjective oftheupgradeprojectwastoensureconformity andconsistency betweenthesitestotheextentpossible.

TherevisedEALswerederivedfromtheInitiating Conditions andexampleEALsgivenintheREGNPSPlant-Specific EALGuideline (PEG).ThePEGistheREGNPSinterpretation oftheNUMARCmethodology fordeveloping EALs.ThePEGidentifies deletions fromtheNUMARCmethodology bystrikingoutwordsandphrasesthatarenotapplicable toREGNPS;additions areidentified byunderlining newwordsandphrases.Thesourceofdocuments forPEGchangesfromNUNCmethodology arelistedinthereferences sectionofthePEG.ManyoftheEALsderivedfromtheNV)~Cmethodology arefissionproductbarrierbased.Thatis,theconditions whichdefinetheEALsare OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Revlbaseduponlossorpotential lossofoneormoreofthethreefissionproductbarriers.

Theprimaryfissionproductbarriersare:A.rF11inThefuelcladdingiscomprised ofthezirconium tubeswhichhousetheceramicuraniumoxidepelletsalongwiththeendplugswhichareweldedintoeachendofthefuelrods.B.rInmTheRCSiscomprised ofthereactorvesselshell,vesselhead,vesselnozzlesandpenetrations andallprimarysystemsdirectlyconnected t'othereactorvesseluptothefirstcontainment isolation valve.C~i~Yhiip'fhpcontainment structure andallisolation valvesrequiredtomaintaincontainment integrity underaccidentconditions.

Thefollowing criteriaservesasthebasesforeventclassification relatedtofissionproductbarrierloss:n1EvnAnylossorpotential lossofcontainment hhzf'nylossoranypotential lossofeitherfuelcladorRCSrnAnylossofbothfuelcladandRCSorAnypotential lossofbothfuelcladandRCSorAnypotential lossofeitherfuelcladorRCSwithalossofanyadditional barrierLossofanytwobarrierswithlossorpotential lossofathirdThoseEALs-which'reference oneormoreofthefissionproductbarrierICdesignators (FC,RCSandPC)inthePEGReference sectionofthetechnical basesarederivedfromtheFissionProductBarrierAnalysis.

Theanalysisentailedanevaluation ofeverycombination oftheplantspecificbarrierloss/potential lossindicators appliedtotheabovecriteria.

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEAI.Technical BasesDocument, RevIWherepossible, theEALshavebeenmadeconsistent with'ndutilizetheconditions definedintheREGNPSCriticalSafetyFunctionStatusTrees(CSFSTs).

Whilethesymptomsthatdriveoperatoractionsspecified intheCSFSTsarenotindicative ofgllpossibleconditions whichwarrantemergency classification, theydodefinethesymptoms, independent ofinitiating events,forwhichreactorplantsafetyand/orfissionproductbarrierintegrity arethreatened.

Wherethesesymptomsareclearlyrepresentative ofoneofthePEGInitiating Conditions, theyhavebeenutilizedasanEAL.Thisallowsforrapidclassification ofemergency situations basedonplantconditions withouttheneedforadditional evaluation oreventdiagnosis.

AlthoughsomeoftheEALspresented herearebasedonconditions definedintheCSFSTs,classification ofemergencies usingtheseEALsisnotdependent uponEmergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)entryorexecution.

TheEALscanbeutilizedindependently orinconjunction withtheEOPs.Totheextentpossible, theEALsaresymptombased.Thatis,theactionlevelisdefinedbyvaluesofkeyplantoperating parameters whichidentifyemergency orpotential emergency conditions.

Thisapproachisappropriate becauseitallowsthefullscopeofvariations inthetypesofeventstobeclassified asemergencies.

But,apurelysymptombasedapproachisnotsufBcient toaddressalleventsforwhichemergency classification isappropriate.

Particular eventstowhichnopredetermined symptomscanbeascribedhavealsobeenutilizedasEALssincetheymaybeindicative ofpotentially moreseriousconditions notyetfullyrealized.

TheEALsaregroupedintoninecategories tosimplifytheirpresentation andtopromotearapidunderstanding bytheirusers.Thesecategories are:1.2.3.45.6.7.8.9.CSFSTStatusReactorFuelReactorCoolantSystemContainment Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation Electrical FailuresEquipment FailuresHazardsOtherCategories 1through5areprimarily symptombased.Thesymptomsareindicative ofactualorpotential degradation ofeitherfissionproductbarriersorpersonnel safety.Categories 6,7and8areeventbased.Electrical Failuresarethoseeventsassociated withlossesofeitherACorvitalDCelectrical power.Equipment Failuresareabnormalandemergency eventsassociated withvitalplantsystemfailures, whileHazardsarethosenon-plant systemrelatedeventswhichhaveaffectedormayaffectplantsafety.

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument.

RevICategory9providestheEmergency Coordinator (ShiRSupervisor) thelatitudetoclassifyanddeclareemergencies basedonplantsymptomsoreventswhichinhisjudgmentwarrantclassification.

Thisjudgmentincludesevaluation oflossorpotential lossofoneormorefissionproductbarrierswarranting emergency classification consistent withtheNUMlARCbarrierlosscriteria.

Thefissionproductbarrierlossandpotential lossindicators areprovidedinAttachment A.Categories arefurtherdividedintooneormoresubcategories depending onthetypesandnumberofplantconditions thatdictateemergency classifications.

Forexample,theElectrical Failurescategoryhastwosubcategories whosevaluescanbeindicative oflossesofelectrical powersources:lossofACpowersourcesandlossofDCpowersources.AnEALmayormaynotexistforeachsubcategoryatallfourclassification levels.Similarly, morethanoneEALmayexistforasubcategoryinagivenemergency classification whenappropriate (i.e.noEALattheGeneralEmergency levelbutthreeEALsattheUnusualEventlevel).ForeachEAL,the,following information isprovided:

Classification:

UnusualEvent,Alert,SiteAreaEmergency, orGeneralEmergency NUMARCInitiating Condition

&omwhichtheEALwasderived,ifapplicable.

~Fissionproductbarrierloss/potential losscondition whichtheEALrepresents, ifapplicable.

~Operating ModeApplicability:

Oneormoreofthefollowing plantoperating conditions arelisted:PowerOperation, HotShutdown, ColdShutdown, RefuelandDefueledEAL:Description ofthecondition orsetofconditions whichcomprisetheEAL~Basis:Description oftherationale fortheEAL~PEG

Reference:

PEGIC(s)andexampleEAL(s)fromwhichtheEALisderived~BasisReference(s):

Sourcedocumentation fromwhichtheEALisderived OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Theidentified operating modesaredefinedasfollowsReactorshutdownmarginislessthanTechnical Specification minimumrequiredwithcoolanttemperature (Tavg)atorabovenormaloperating temperature.

ReactorshutdownmargingreaterthanorequaltoTechnical Specification minimumrequiredwithcoolanttemperature (Tavg)lessthannormaloperating temperature.

~IhReactorshutdownmargingreaterthanorequaltoTechnical Specification minimumrequiredwithcoolanttemperature (Tavg)lessthanorequalto200'F.E~f~gReactorshutdownmargingreaterthanorequaltoTechnical Specification minimumrequiredforrefueling operations andcoolanttemperature (Tavg)lessthanorequalto140'F.Lh~luiReactorvesselcontainsnoirradiated fuel.Theseoperating modescorrelate totheNUMARC-007 andPEGidentified operating modesasfollows:hni1BPowerOperations Startup/Hot standbyHotShutdownColdShutdownRefuelDefueledAllPowerOperations PowerOperation HotShutdownColdShutdownRefuelDefueledAll OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1PlantEmergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)aredesignedtomaintainand/orrestoreasetofcriticalsafetyfunctions whichareprioritized forrestoration effortsduringaccidentconditions.

Bymonitoring thecriticalsafetyfunctions status,theimpactofmultipleeventscanbeinherently addressed.

Thecriticalsafetyfunctions aremonitored throughtheuseofCriticalSafetyFunctionStatusTrees(CSFSTs).

Whencertainplantparameters exceedthreshold valuesspecified bytheCSFST,theplantoperatorisdirectedtooneormorefunctional restoration and/orEOPsinanattempttorestorethoseparameters towithinacceptable limits.Thefollowing CSFSTsareutilizedtobeindicative offailuresorpotential failuresofoneormorefissionproductbarriers:

'0gRdpttltl'SFSTldl tlfreactivity controlwhichmayposeathreattofuelcladandRCS'ntegrity.

CgRdptlI'SFSTldl lfcoresubcooling andthusposeadirectthreattotheintegrity ofthereactorfuelcladandRCS.~H~ink'he RedpathofthisCSFSTisindicative ofalossofabilitytoremovedecayheatfromthecoreandthusposesadirectthreattofuelcladandRCSintegrity.

TheRedpathofthisCSFSTisindicative ofadirectthreattoRCSbarrierintegrity.

RdptftgCSFSTlldltltlffcladandRCSbarrieranddirectthreattothecontainment barrierintegrity.

1-1 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev11.0CSFSTStatus1.1Subcriticality 1.1.1AlertORANGEorREDpathF-0.1SUBCRITICALITY ANDEmergency borationisrequiredNUIVIARCIC:FailureofReactorProtection systeminstrumentation tocompleteorinitiateanautomatic reactortriponceaReactorProtection systemsetpointhasbeenexceededandimmediate manualtripswerenotsuccessful whileinpoweroperations orhotstandbyFPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

PowerOperations, HotShutdownBasis:CSFSTSubcriticality

-ORANGEpathisenteredbasedonfailureoftheintermediate rangestartupratemonitorstoindicatenegativeorzerofollowing reactortrip.ThisEALaddresses anymanualtriporautomatic tripsignalfollowedbyamanualtripwhichfailstoshutdownthereactortoanextentrequiring emergency boration.

Amanualtripisanysetofactionsbythereactoroperator(s) atthereactorcontrolconsolewhichcausescontrolrodstoberapidlyinsertedintothecoreandbringsthereactorsubcritical (e.g.,reactortripbutton).Thiscondition indicates failureoftheautomatic andmanualprotection systemstotripthereactortotheextentwhichprecludes thereactorbeingmadesub-critical.

Althoughafrontlineautomatic protection systemdidnotfunctioninresponsetoaplanttransient, itisthecontinued criticality under"conditions requiring areactortripwhichposesthepotential threattofuelcladintegrity andthuswarranting declaration ofanAlert.PEG

Reference:

SA2.11-2 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1BasisReference(s):

1.CSFSTF-0.1,Subcriticality 2."Methodology forDevelopment ofEmergency ActionLevelsNUMARC/NESP-007 Revision2-Questions andAnswers,June19931-3 OSSA-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev11.0CSFSTStatus1.1Subcriticality 1.1.2SiteAreaEmergency REDpathinF-0.1SUBCRITICALITY ANDeither:Emergency borationisinoperable ORPowerrangenot<5%within15min.ofinitiation ofemergency borationNUINARCIC:FailureofReactorProtection systeminstrumentation tocompleteorinitiateanautomatic reactortriponceaReactorProtection systemsetpointhasbeenexceededandmanualscramtripwasnotsuccessful andthereiscontinued powergeneration.

FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

PowerOperations, HotShutdownBasis:CSFSTSubcriticality

-REDpathisenteredbasedonfailureofpowerrangeindication todecreasebelow5%following areactortrip.ThisportionoftheEALaddresses anymanualtriporautomatic tripsignalfollowedbyamanualtripwhichfailstoshutdownthereactortoanextentthatthereactorisproducing moreheatloadforwhichthesafetysystemsweredesigned.

Amanualtripisanysetofactionsbythereactoroperator(s) atthereactorcontrolconsolewhichcauses"controlrodstoberapidlyinsertedintothecoreandbringspowerbelowthatpercentpowerassociated withtheabilityofthesafetysystemstoremoveheatandcontinuetodecrease."

Thiscondition indicates failureofboththeautomatic andmanualprotection systemstotripthereactorinconjunction withafailureofalternate borationsystemstoreducereactorpowerbelowdecayheatlevels.Thecombination offailureofbothfrontlineandbackupprotection systemstofunctioninresponsetoaplanttransient, alongwiththecontinued production ofheatposesadirectthreattofuelcladandRCSintegrity andthuswarrantsdeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency.

1-4 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev115minutesisspecified toallowtimeforemergency borationtobeeffective andprovidesadiscriminator betweenSA2.1andSS2.1.Theclassification shouldbemadeassoonasitisapparentthatemergency borationisnotorwillnotbeeffective inreducingreactorpowerbelow5%.PEG

Reference:

SS2.1SS4.1BasisReference(s):

l.2.3.4CSFSTF-0.1,Subcriticality FR-S.1,ResponsetoReactorRestart/ATWS FR-S.2,ResponsetoLossofCoreShutdown"Methodology forDevelopment ofEmergency ActionLevelsNUMARC/NESP-007 Revision2-Questions andAnswers,June19931-5 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev11.0CSFSTStatus1.1Subcriticality 1.1.3GeneralEmergency REDpathinF-0.1,SUBCRITICALITY ANDActualorimminententryintoeitherREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGORREDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINKMBRLRCIC:FailureoftheReactorProtection Systemtocompleteanautomatic tripandmanualtripwasnotsuccessful andthereisindication ofanextremechallenge totheabilitytocoolthecore.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

PowerOperations, HotShutdownBasis:CSFSTSubcriticality

-REDpathisenteredbasedon>5%reactorpowerfollowing areactortrip.CSFSTHeatSink-REDpathisenteredbasedonboth:~bothS/G'snarrowrangelevel<5%AND~Totalfeedwater flowtoS/Gs<200gpmCSFSTCoreCooling-REDpathisenteredbasedoneither:~Coreexitthermocouples

>1200'FOR~Coreexitthermocouples

>700'FAND~RVLISlevel<43%w/noRCPs(TAF).1-6 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Thecombination oftheseconditions (reactorpower>5%andHeatSink-REDorCoreCoolingREDpath)indicates theultimateheatsinkfunctionisunderextremechallenge.

Additionally, theeffortstobringthereactorsubcritical havebeenunsuccessful and,asaresult,thereactorisproducing moreheatloadforwhichthesafetysystemsweredesigned.

Thissituation couldbetheprecursor foracoremeltsequence.

Amajorconsideration istheinability toinitially removeheatduringtheearlystagesofthissequence.

Ifemergency feedwater flowisinsufficient toremovetheamountofheatrequiredbydesignfromatleastonesteamgenerator, anextremechallenge shouldbeconsidered toexist.ThisequatestoaHEATSinkREDcondition.

IfCETsindicate>1200'Forare>700'FwithRVLIS<topofactivefuelacondition indicative ofseverechallenge toheatremovalalsoexists.Intheeventthischallenge existsatatimewhenthereactorhasnotbeenbroughtbelowthepowerassociated withsafetysystemdesignpower(5%)acoremeltsequenceisconsidered toexist.Inthissituation, coredegradation canoccurrapidly.Forthisreason,theGeneralEmergency declaration isintendedtobeanticipatory ofthefissionproductbarriermatrixdeclaration topermitmaximumoffsiteintervention time.PEG

Reference:

SG2.1BasisReference(s):

l.2.3.3.4CSFSTF-0.3,HeatSinkCSFSTF-0.1,Subcriticality CSFSTF-0.2,CoreCoolingFR-S.1,ResponsetoReactorRestart/ATWS FR-S.2,ResponsetoLossofCoreShutdown1-7 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev11.0CSFSTStatus1.2CoreCooling1.2.1SiteAreaEmergency ORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLING1%JMARCIC:Completelossoffunctionneededtoachieveormaintainhotshutdownwithreactorcoolant)200'F.FPBloss/potential loss:Fuelcladpotential loss,RCSlossModeApplicability:

PowerOperations, HotShutdownBasis:CSFSTCoreCooling-ORANGEpathisenteredbasedoneither:~Coreexitthermocouples

)700'FOR~RVLISlevel(43%w/noRCPs(TAF)Eithercondition indicates subcooling hasbeenlostandthatsomecladdamagemayoccur.ItmustalsobeassumedthatthelossofRCSinventory isaresultofalossofRCSbarrier.Therefore aSiteAreaEmergency iswarranted baseduponthepotential lossoffuelcladwithlossofRCSbarriers.

PEG

Reference:

FC1.2FC3-.2FC4.1SS4.1BasisReference(s):

1.CSFSTF-0.2,CoreCooling1-8 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev11.0CSFSTStatus1.2CoreCooling1.2.2GeneralEmergency REDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGANDFunctional restoration procedures noteffective within15min.NUINARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:Fuelcladlos,Sloss,Containment potential lossModeApplicability:

PowerOperations, HotShutdownBasis:CSFSTCoreCooling-REDpathisenteredbasedoneither:~Coreexitthermocouples

>1200'FOR~Coreexitthermocouples

>700'FAND~RVLISlevel<43%(TAF)Eithercondition indicates significant coreexitsuperheating andcoreuncoveryandisconsidered alossoftheFuelCladBarrier.ItmustalsobeassumedthatthelossofRCSinventory isaresultofalossofRCSbarrier.Theseconditions, ifnotmitigated, willlikelyleadtocoremeltwhichwillinturnresultinapotential lossofcontainment.

Therefore, declaration ofaGeneralEmergency iswarranted.

Severeaccidentanalyses(e.g.,NUREG-1150) haveconcluded thatfunctionrestoration procedures canarrestcoredegradation withinthereactorvesselinasignificant fractionofthecoredamagescenarios, andthatthelikelihood ofcontainment failureisverysmallintheseevents.Giventhis,itisappropriate toprovideareasonable periodtoallowfunctionrestoration

'rocedures toarrestthecoremeltsequence.

Whetherornotprocedures willbeeffective shouldbeapparentwithin15minutes.TheEmergency 1-9 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Coordinator shouldmakethedeclaration assoonasitisdetermined thattheprocedures havenotbeen,orwillnotbeeffective.

ForthepurposeofthisEALtheterm'effective'ith regardstofunctional restoration procedures meansthattheCSFSTCoreCooling-REDpathentrycriterion nolongerexists.PEG

Reference:

FC1.1PC6.1PC6.2BasisReference(s):

1.CSFSTF-0.2,CoreCooling1-10 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev11.0CSFSTStatus1.3HeatSink1.3.1SiteAreaEmergency REDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINKNUINARCIC:Completelossoffunctionneededtoachieveormaintainhotshutdownwithreactorcoolant>200'F.FPBloss/potential loss:Fuelcladpotential loss,RCSpotential lossModeApplicability:

PowerOperations, HotShutdownBasis:CSFSTHeatSink-REDpathisenteredbasedonboth:~bothS/0'snarrowrangelevel<5%AND~Totalfeedwater flowtoS/Gs<200gpmThecombination ofthesetwoconditions indicates theultimateheatsinkfunctionisunderextremechallenge.

ThisEALaddresses lossoffunctions requiredforhotshutdownwiththereactoratpressureandtemperature.

Undertheseconditions, thereisanactualmajorfailureofasystemintendedforprotection ofthepublicwithpotential formultiplefissionproductbarrierloss.Therefore, declaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency iswarranted.

PEG

Reference:

FC1.3RCS1.2SS4.1BasisReference(s):

1.'SFSTF-0.3,HeatSink1-11 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev11.0CSFSTStatus1.4Integrity 1.4.1AlertREDpathonF-0.4,INTEGRITY NU1VCARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:RCSpotential lossModeApplicability:

PowerOperations, HotShutdownBasis:CSFSTIntegrity

-REDpathisenteredbasedonboth:~exceeding RCScooldownrateof100'F/hrAND~allRCScoldlegtemperatures totheleRoftheRCSPressure/RCS ColdLegTemperature CurveThecombination ofthese'woconditions indicates theRCSbarrierisundersignificant challenge andshouldbeconsidered apotential lossofRCSbarrier.Anylossorpotential lossofRCSbarrierwarrantsdeclaration ofanAlert.PEG

Reference:

RCS1.1BasisReference(s):

• 1.CSFSTF-0.4,Integrity 1-12 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev11.0CSFSTStatus1.5Contaixunent 1.5.1GeneralEmergency REDpathF-0.5,CONTAINMENT NUINARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:Fuelcladloss,RCSloss,Containment potential lossModeApplicability:

PowerOperations, HotShutdownBasis:CSFSTContainment

-REDpathisenteredbasedonexceeding containment designpressureof60psig.Thispressureiswellinexcessofthatexpectedfromthedesignbasislossofcoolantaccident.

Thisisindicative ofalossofbothRCSandfuelcladboundaries inthatitisnotpossibletoreachthiscondition withoutseverecoredegradation (metal-water reaction) orfailuretoscramincombination withRCSbreach.Sincecontainment pressures atorapproaching designlevelsisalsoapotential lossofcontainment,'this combination ofconditions requiresthedeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency.

PEG

Reference:

PC1.1BasisReference(s):

1.CSFSTF-0.5,Containment 1-13 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Thereactorfuelcladdingservesastheprimaryfissionproductbarrier.Overtheusefullifeofafuelbundle,theintegrity ofthisbarriershouldremainintactaslongasfuelcladdingintegrity limitsarenotexceeded.

Should'fuel damageoccur(breachofthefuelcladdingintegrity) radioactive fissionproductsarereleasedtothereactorcoolant.Themagnitude ofsuchareleaseisdependent upontheextentofthedamageaswellasthemechanism bywhichthedamageoccurred.

Oncereleasedintothereactorcoolant,thehighly,radioactive fissionproductscanposesignificant radiological hazardsinplantfromreactorcoolantprocessstreams.Ifotherfissionproductbarriersweretofail,theseradioactive fissionproductscanposesignificant offsiteradiological consequences.

Thefollowing parameters/indicators areindicative ofpossiblefuelfailures:

A'gai,t1fiproductactivityisverylow.Smallconcentrations offissionproductsin'hecoolantareprimarily fromthefissionoftrampuraniuminthefuelcladdingorminorperforations inthecladdingitself.Anysignificant increasefromthesebase-line levelsisindicative offuelfailures.

~FilFl0'Aswithcoolantactivity, anyfuelfailureswillreleasefissionproductstothereactorcoolant.Thesefissionproductswillbecirculated withthereactorcoolantandbedetectedbythefailedfuelradiation detectorintheRCSletdownline.inAlthoughnotadirectindication ormeasurement offueldamage,exceeding predetermined limitsoncontainment highrangeradiation monitorsunderLOCAconditions isindicative possiblefuelfailures.

~flinA'riinMnir'othareaand processradiation monitoring systemsdesignedtodetectfissionproductsduringrefueling conditions aswellasvisualobservation canbeutilizedtoindicatelossorpotential lossofspentfuelcladdingintegrity.

2-1 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.1CoolantActivity2.1.1UnusualEventCoolantsampleactivity:

)100%of84/Ebarp,Ci/cctotalspecificactivityOR>0.2p,Ci/gmI-131equivalent andtheconditions ofTechnical Specifications 3.1.4.3.b areexceededNUINARCIC:Fuelcladdegradation FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:Elevatedreactorcoolantactivityrepresents apotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotential precursor ofmoreseriousproblems.

ThisEALaddresses reactorcoolantsamplesexceeding coolanttechnical specifications.

PEG

Reference:

SU4.2BasisReference(s):

1.Technical Specifications section3.1.42-2 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.1CoolantActivity2.1.2AlertCoolantactivity>300p.Ci/ccI-131equivalent IMUIKARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:FuelcladlossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:Elevatedreactorcoolantactivityrepresents apotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotential precursor ofmoreseriousproblems.

Thisamountofcoolantactivitycorresponds toabout2%to5%fuelcladdamage.Whenreactorcoolantactivityreachesthislevel,significant cladheatinghasoccurredandthusthefuelcladbarrierisconsidered lost.Therefore, declaration ofanAlertiswarranted.

PEG

Reference:

FC2.1BasisReference(s):

None2-3

,OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.1CoolantActivity2.1.3SiteAreaEmergency Coolantactivity>300pCi/ccI-131equivalent andanyofthefollowing:

~REDpathonF-0.4,INTEGRITY

~Primarysystemleakage>46gpm~RCSsubcooling

<EOPFig.MINSUBCOOLING duetoRCSleakageMMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:Fuelcladloss,RCSpotential loss/loss NodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddresses combinations offuelcladlosswithRCSlossandpotential lossindicators.

300pCi/ccI-131equivalent coolantactivitycorresponds toabout2%to5%fuelcladdamage.Whenreactorcoolantactivityreachesthislevel,significant cladheatinghasoccurredandthusthefuelcladbarrierisconsidered lost.Thiscondition incombination withanyofthefollowing RCSloss/potential lossindicators warrantsdeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency:

REDpathonF-0.4,INTEGRITY:

REDpathindicates anextremechallenge tothesafetyfunctionderivedfromappropriate instrument

readings, andindicates apotential lossofRCSbarrier.RCSsubcooling

<EOPFig.MINSUBCOOLING:

Thisindicator addresses

'conditions whereleakagefromtheRCSisgreaterthanavailable inventory controlcapacitysuchthatalossofsubcooling hasoccurred.

Thelossofsubcooling asdetermined fromE-O,ReactorTriporSafetyInjection isthe.fundamental indication thattheinventory controlsystemsareinadequate inmaintaining RCSpressureandinventory againstthemasslossthroughaleak.

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Primarysystemleakage>46gpm:Thispotential lossofRCSisbasedontheinability tomaintainnormalliquidinventory withintheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)bynormaloperation oftheChemicalandVolumeControlSystemwhichisconsidered astwopositivedisplacement chargingpumpsdischarging tothechargingheader.PEG

Reference:

FC2.1+RCS1.1,RCS2.1andRCS2.2BasisReference(s):

1.2.3.45.EPIP-2-16"CoreDamageEstimation" CSFSTF-0.4Integrity E-O,ReactorTriporSafetyInjection Technical Specifications Section3.1.5.2FSARTable9.3.62-5 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.2FailedFuelDetectors 2.2.1UnusualEventLetdownLineMonitorR-9>2R/hrNUMARCIC:Fuelcladdegradation FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:Elevatedletdownlineactivityrepresents apotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotential precursor ofmoreseriousproblems.

Thisradiation level(2H/hr)corresponds to1%fuelfailure(basesfortheTechnical Specifications coolantactivitylimits).Therefore, declaration ofanUnusualEventiswarranted.

PEG

Reference:

SU4.1BasisReference(s):

1.Technical Specifications section3.1.42.P-9"Radiation Monitoring System"3.EPIP2-16section6.2.l.b2-6 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.2FailedFuelDetectors 2.2.2AlertLetdownLineMonitorR-9>10R/hrMMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:FuelcladlossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:Thiscondition indicates thelossofthefuelcladbarrier.FailedFuelMonitorreadingsof2R/hrcorresponds to1%fuelfailures.

FailedFuelMonitorreadingsof10R/hrcorresponds to5%fuelfailuresandisconsidered anactuallossoffuelclad.Note:MonitorR-9automatically shiftsscalefrommR/hrtoR/hrwhenindicated valuesexceed1000mR/hr.PEG

Reference:

FC6.1BasisReference(s):

l.EPIP-2-16"CoreDamageEstimation" 2.P-9"Radiation Monitoring System"3.EPIP2-16section6.2.1.b2-7 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.2FailedFuelDetectors 2.2.3SiteAreaEmergency LetdownLineMonitorR-9>108/hrandanyofthefollowing:

~REDpathonF-0.4,INTEGRITY

~Primarysystemleakage>46gpm~RCSsubcooling

<EOPFig.MINSUBCOOLING duetoRCSleakageNUIKARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:Fuelcladloss,RCSpotential lossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddresses combinations offuelclad.losswithRCSlossandpotential lossindicators.

FailedFuelMonitorreadingsof10R/hrcorresponds to5%fuelfailures.

Thiscondition indicates thelossofthefuelcladbarrier.Note:MonitorR-9automatically shiRsscalefrommR/hrtoR/hrwhenindicated valuesexceed1000mR/hr.Thiscondition incombination withanyofthefollowing RCSloss/potential lossindicators warrantsdeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency:

REDpathonF-0.4,INTEGRITY:

REDpathindicates anextremechallenge tothesafetyfunctionderivedfromappropriate instrument

readings, andindicates apotential lossofRCSbarrier.RCSsubcooling

<EOPFig.MINSUBCOOLING:

Thisindicator addresses conditions whereleakagefromtheRCSisgreaterthanavailable inventory controlcapacitysuchthatalossofsubcooling hasoccurred.

Thelossofsubcooling asdetermined fromE-O,ReactorTriporSafetyInjection isthefundamental indication thattheinventory controlsystemsareinadequate inmaintaining RCSpressureandinventory againstthemasslossthroughaleak.

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Primarysystemleakage>46gpm:Thispotential lossofRCSisbasedontheinability tomaintainnormalliquidinventory withintheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)bynormaloperation oftheChemicalandVolumeControlSystemwhichisconsidered astwopositivedisplacement chargingpumpsdischarging tothechargingheader.PEG

Reference:

FC6.1+RCS1.1,RCS2.1andRCS2.2BasisReference(s):

1.2.3.45.6.7.EPIP-2-16"CoreDamageEstimation" CSFSTF-0.4Integrity E-O,ReactorTriporSafetyInjection F-0.5,Containment FR-Z.1,ResponsetoHighContainment Radiation LevelTechnical Specifications Section3.1.5.2FSARTable9.3.62-9 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.3Containment Radiation 2.3.1AlertContainment radiation monitorR-29/R-30 reading)10R/hrMB4ARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:RCSlossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:Thel0R/hrreadingisavaluewhichindicates thereleaseofreactorcoolanttothecontainment.

Thereadingwasderivedassumingtheinstantaneous releaseanddispersal ofthereactorcoolantnoblegasandiodineinventory associated withnormaloperating concentrations (i.e.,withinT/S)intothecontainment atmosphere.

ThisEALisindicative ofaRCSleakonly.Iftheradiation monitorreadingincreased tothatspecified byReactorFuelEAL2.3.2,significant fueldamagewouldalsobeindicated.

PEG

Reference:

RCS4.1BasisReference(s):

1.F-0.5,Containment 2.FR-Z.1,ResponsetoHighContainment Radiation Level3.EPIP2-16,CoreDamageEstimation 2-10 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.3Containment Radiation 2.3.2SiteAreaEmergency Containment radiation monitorR-29/R-30 reading>100R/hrNUMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:Fuelcladloss,RCSlossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:The100R/hrreadingisavaluewhichindicates thereleaseofreactorcoolant,withelevatedactivityindicative offueldamage,intothecontainment.

Thereadingisderivedassumingtheinstantaneous releaseanddispersal ofthereactorcoolantnoblegasandiodineinventory associated withaconcentration of300p.Ci/gmdoseequivalent I-131intothecontainment atmosphere.

Reactorcoolantconcentrations ofthismagnitude areseveraltimeslargerthanthemaximumconcentrations (including iodinespiking)allowedwithintechnical specifications andaretherefore indicative offueldamage(approximately 2-5%cladfailuredepending oncoreinventory andRCSvolume).Thisvalueishigherthanthatspecified inEAL2.3.1whichwouldbeindicative ofonlytheRCSbarrier.Thus,thisEALindicates alossofboththefuelcladbarrierandalossofRCSbarrierwarranting declaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency.

PEG

Reference:

FC5.1BasisReference(s):

1.P-9,Radiation Monitoring System,Section2.2.2.6,pg.P-9:22.EPIP2-16,CoreDamageEstimation 2-11 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.3Containment Radiation 2.3.3GeneralEmergency Containment radiation monitorR-29/R-30 reading>1000R/hrNUINARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:Fuelcladloss,RCSloss,Containment potential lossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:The1000H/hrreadingisavaluewhichindicates significant fueldamage(>20%cladfailure)wellinexcessoftheEALsassociated withbothlossoffuelcladandlossofRCSbarriers.

Amajorreleaseofradioactivity requiring offsiteprotective actionsfromcoredamageisnotpossibleunlessamajorfailureoffuelcladdingallowsradioactive materialtobereleasedfromthecoreintothereactorcoolant.Regardless ofwhethercontainment ischallenged, thisamountofactivityincontainment, ifreleased, couldhavesuchsevereconsequences thatitisprudenttotreatthisasapotential lossofcontainment, suchthataGeneralEmergency declaration iswarranted.

NUREG-1228 "SourceEstimations DuringIncidentResponsetoSevereNuclearPowerPlantAccidents,"

indicates thatsuchconditions donotexistwhentheamountofcladdamageislessthan20%.PEG

Reference:

PC5.12-12 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1BasisReference(s):

1.2.3.EPIP1-0,GinnaStationEventEvaluation andClassification EPIP2-16,CoreDamageEstimation NUREG-1228 "SourceEstimations DuringIncidentResponsetoSevereNuclearPowerPlantAccidents" Technology forEnergyReportNo.R-81-0122-13 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.3Refueling Accidents orOtherRadiation Monitors2.4.1UnusualEventSpentfuelpool(reactorcavityduringrefueling) waterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintained abovethespentfuelpoollowwaterlevelalarmsetpointNl3EIARCIC:Unexpected increaseinplantradiation orairborneconcentration.

FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:InlightofReactorCavitySealfailure,incidents attwodifferent PWRsandlossofwaterintheSpentFuelPit/FuelTransferCanalataBWRalloccurring since1984,explicitcoverageofthesetypesofeventsviaEALs¹1and¹2isappropriate giventheirpotential forincreased dosestoplantstaKClassification asanUnusualEventiswarranted asaprecursor toamoreseriousevent.Thespentfuelpoollowwaterlevelalarmsetpointof20in.belowtopofpoolisactuatedbyLC-661.Thedefinition of"...cannotberestoredandmaintained above..."allowstheoperatortovisuallyobservethelowwaterlevelcondition, ifpossible, andtoattemptwaterlevelrestoration instructions aslongaswaterlevelremainsabovethetopofirradiated fuel.Waterlevelrestoration instructions forlossofrefueling cavitywaterlevelduringrefueling areperformed inaccordance withtheRF-65seriesofprocedures.

Whenthefueltransfercanalisdirectlyconnected tothespentfuelpoolandreactorcavity,therecouldexistthepossibility ofuncovering irradiated fuelinthefueltransfercanal.Therefore, thisEALisapplicable forconditions i'whichirradiated fuelisbeingtransferred toandfromtheRPVandspentfuelpool.2-14T OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1PEG

Reference:

AU2.1BasisReference(s):

1.ER-SFP.1"LossofSpentFuelPitCooling"2.AR-K-293.RF-65series2-15 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.3Refueling Accidents orOtherRadiation Monitors2.4.2AlertConfirmed sustained alarmonanyofthefollowing radiation monitorsresulting fromanuncontrolled fuelhandlingprocess:~R-2Containment AreaMonitor~R-5SpentFuelPit~R-12Containment NobleGasNUMARCIC:Majordamagetoirradiated fuelorlossofwaterlevelthathasorwillresultintheuncovering ofirradiated fueloutsidethereactorvessel.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

AllBasis:NUREG-0818, "Emergency ActionLevelsforLightWaterReactors,"

formsthebasisforthisEAL.ThisEALisdefinedbythespecificareawhereirradiated fuelislocatedsuchasreactorcavity,reactorvessel,orspentfuelpool.NUREG/CR-4982, "SevereAccidentinSpentFuelPoolsinSupport,ofGenericSafetyIssue82,"July1987,indicates thatevenifcorrective actionsarenottaken,nopromptfatalities arepredicted, andthatriskofinjuryislow.Inaddition, NRCInformation NoticeNo.90-08,"KR-85HazardsfromDecayedFuel"presentsthefollowing initsdiscussion:

"Intheeventofaseriousaccidentinvolving decayedspentfuel,protective actionswouldbeneededforpersonnel onsite,whileoffsitedoses(assuming anexclusion arearadiusofonemilefromtheplantsite)wouldbewellbelowtheEnvironmental Protecti'on Agency'sProtective ActionGuides.Accordingly, itisimportant tobeabletoproperlysurveyandmonitorforKr-85intheeventofanaccidentwith'decayedspentfuel."2-16 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1WAn"uncontrolled fuelhandlingprocess"isdefinedasanyeventoractivityrelatedtothemovementofirradiated fuelwhichresultsinunexpected oruncontrolled conditions.

Thisterminology hasbeenspecifically addedtoexcludeanticipated increases inarearadiation levelsasaresultofactionsperformed inaccordance withapprovedprocedures duringrefueling operations.

Thus,anAlertClassification forthiseventisappropriate.

Escalation, ifappropriate, wouldoccurviaEmergency Coordinator judgmentinEALCategory9.0.ThebasisfortheContainment AreaMonitorsetpoint(50mR/hr)andSpentFuelPitmonitorsetpoint(25mH/hr)areaspentfuelhandlingaccidentandis,therefore, appropriate forthisEAL.PEG

Reference:

AA2.1BasisReference(s):

1.2.3.P-9Radiation Monitoring SystemNUREG-0818, "Emergency ActionLevelsforLightWaterReactors,"

NUREG/CR-4982, "SevereAccidentinSpentFuelPoolsinSupportofGenericSafetyIssue82"2-17 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev12.0ReactorFuel'.3Refueling Accidents orOtherRadiation Monitors2.4.3AlertReportofvisualobservation ofirradiated fueluncovered MBCARCIC:Majordamagetoirradiated fuelorlossofwaterlevelthathasorwillresultintheuncovering ofirradiated fueloutsidethereactorvessel.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:ThisEALisdefinedbythespecificareaswhereirradiated fuelislocatedsuchasreactorcavity,orspentfuelpool.Thereisnoindication thatwaterlevelinthespentfuelpoolorrefueling cavityhasdroppedtothelevelofthefuelotherthanbyvisualobservation.

Sincethereisnolevelindicating systeminthefueltransfercanal,visualobservation oflossofwaterlevelwouldalsoberequired.

SuQicient timeexiststotakecorrective actionsfortheseconditions andthereislittlepotential forsubstantial fueldamage.NUREG/CR-4982 "SevereAccidentinSpentFuelPoolsinSupportofGenericSafetyIssue82"indicates thatevenifcorrective actionsarenottaken,nopromptfatalities arepredicted andtheriskofinjuryislow.Inaddition, NRCInformation NoticeNo.90-08,"KR-85HazardsfromDecayedFuel"presentsthefollowing ititsdiscussion:

"Intheeventofaseriousaccidentinvolving decayedspentfuel,protective actionswouldben'cededforpersonnel onsite,whileoQ'sitedoses(assuming anexclusion arearadiusofonemilefromtheplantsite)wouldbewellbelowtheEnvironmental Protection Agency'sProtective ActionGuides.Accordingly, itisimportant tobeabletoproperlysurvey2-18 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1andmonitorforKr-85intheeventofanaccidentwithdecayedspentfuel.Thus,anAlertClassification forthiseventisappropriate.

Escalation, ifappropriate, wouldoccurviaradioactivity releasecategory5.0orEmergency Coordinator judgmentinEALCategory9.0.ThisEALappliestospentfuelrequiring watercoverageandisnotintendedtoaddressspentfuelwhichislicensedfordrystorage.PEG

Reference:

AA2.2BasisReference(s):

1.2.P-9Radiation Monitoring SystemNUREG/CR-4982 "SevereAccidentinSpentFuelPoolsinSupportofGenericSafetyIssue82".NRCInformation NoticeNo.90-08,"KR-85HazardsfromDecayedFuel"2-19 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Thereactorvesselprovidesavolumeforthecoolantwhichcoversthereactorcore.Thereactorvesselandassociated pressurepiping(reactorcoolantsystem)togetherprovideabarriertolimitthereleaseofradioactive materialshouldthereactorfuelcladdingintegrity fail.TherearethreeRCSparameters whichareindicative ofconditions whichmayposeathreattoRCSorfuelcladdingintegrity:

SCfLtlRR*

(>>Tll1ST'fitl)RCSltgindications areutilizedtoindicatepotential pipecrackswhichmaypropagate toanextentthreatening fuelclad,RCSandcontainment integrity.

RCSleakageofadegreerequiring ECCStomaintainRCSinventory posesadirectthreattofuelcladintegrity.

Reactorvesselwaterlevelisalsodirectlyrelatedtothestatusofadequatecorecooling,andtherefore fuelcladdingintegrity.

nAsubsetofRCSleakage,excessive primarytosecondary leakageinconjunction withunisolable secondary releasestoenvironment mayresultinlossesofcontainment integrity aswellasthreatenfuelcladintegrity formoresevereSGtuberuptures.

AlfRCSAllglfdtlldlthattheinventory controlsystemsareinadequate inmaintaining RCSpressureandinventory againstmasslossthroughaleak.

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev13.0ReactorCoolantSystem3.1.1UnusualEvent3.1RCSLeakageUnidentified orpressureboundaryleakage>10gpmORIdentified leakage>25gpmNUMARCIC:RCSleakagewhengreaterthan200'FFPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:Theconditions ofthisEALmaybeaprecursor ofmoreseriousconditions and,asaresult,isconsidered tobeapotential degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.The10gpmvalueforthe.unidentified leakageandpressureboundaryleakagewasselectedbecauseitisobservable withnormalControlRoomindications.

Smallervaluesmustbedetermined throughtime-consuming surveillance tests(e.g.,massbalances).

The25gpmvalueforidentified leakageissetatahighervaluebecauseofthesignificance ofidentified leakageincomparison tounidentified orpressureboundaryleakage.Onlyoperating modesinwhichthereisfuelinthereactorcoolantsystemandthesystemispressurized arespecified.

PEG

Reference:

SU5.1BasisReference(s):

None

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev13.0ReactorCoolantSystem3.1RCSLeakage3.1.2AlertPrimarysystemleakage>46gpmMMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:RCSpotential lossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALisbasedontheinability tomaintainnormalliquidinventory withintheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)bynormaloperation oftheChemicalandVolumeControlSystemwhichisconsidered astwopositivedisplacement chargingpumpsdischarging tothechargingheader.PEG

Reference:

RCS2.2BasisReference(s):

1.FSARTable9.3.63-3 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev13.0ReactorCoolantSystem3.1.3SiteAreaEmergency 3.1RCSLeakageRVLIScannotbemaintained

>43%withnoRCPsrunningORWiththereactorvesselheadremoved,itisreportedthatwaterlevelinthereactorvesselisdroppinginanuncontrolled mannerandcoreuncoveryislikelyNUINARCIC:Lossofreactorvesselwaterlevelhasorwilluncoverfuelinthereactorvessel.FPBloss/potential loss:Fuelcladpotential loss,RCSlossModeApplicability:

Basis:ThereactorvesselwaterlevelusedinthisEAListhetopofactivefuel(TAF).Thisvaluecorresponds tothelevelwhichisusedinCSFSTstoindicatechallenge tocorecoolingandlossofthefuelcladbarrier.Thisistheminimumwaterleveltoassurecorecoolingwithoutfurtherdegradation oftheclad.Severecoredamagecanoccurandreactorcoolantsystempressureboundaryintegrity maynotbeassuredifreactorvesselwaterlevelisnotmaintained abovethatcorresponding toRVLISat43%.RVLISdynamicrangeindications arenotutilizedinthisEALsincetheRCPswouldnotberunningunderconditions wherevessellevelisapproaching TAF.Thus,declaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency iswarranted undertheconditions specified bythisEAL.Escalation toaGeneralEmergency wouldbeviaradioactivity releasecategory5.0.

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1PEG

Reference:

SS5.1FC4.1BasisReference(s):

1.FR-C.1"Response toInadequate CoreCooling" OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev18.0ReactorCoolantSystem8.2PrimarytoSecondary Leakage8.2.1UnusualEventReleaseofsecondary sidetoatmosphere withprimarytosecondary leakage>0.1gpmpersteamgenerator NUlVIARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:Containment lossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddresses SGtubeleaksindicative ofalossofcontainment.

Secondary sidereleasestoatmosphere includethosefromfeedlineorsteamlinebreaksaswellasstuckopensafetyoratmospheric reliefvalvesthatcannotbeisolatedonceisolation hasbeendirected.

bytheEOPs.Asteamgenerator whichisrequiredtobeusedforplantcooldownwouldalsobecoveredunderthisEAL.Forsmallleaks,notexceeding thenormalchargingcapacitythreshold inRCSleakageEAL3.1.2,thisEALresultsinanUnusualEvent.Forlargerleaks,RCSleakageEAL3.2.2wouldresultinaSiteAreaEmergency.

ForSGtuberuptureswhichmayinvolvemultiplesteamgenerators orunisolable secondary linebreaks,SGtuberuptureEAL4.2.1wouldalsoresultinaSiteAreaEmergency.

PEG

Reference:

PC4.1BasisReference(s):

1.Technical Specifications Section3.1.5.2 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev13.0ReactorCoolantSystem3.2PrimarytoSecondary Leakage3.2.2SiteAreaEmergency Unisolable releaseofsecondary sidetoatmosphere withprimarytosecondary leakage)46gpmMMARCICN/AFPBloss/potential loss:RCSpotential loss,Containment lossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddresses SGtubeleaksindicative ofalossofbothRCSandcontainment barriers.

Unisolable secondary sidereleasestoatmosphere includethosefromfeedlineorsteamlinebreaksaswellasstuckopensafetyoratmospheric reliefvalvesthatcannotbeisolatedonceisolation hasbeendirectedbytheEOPs.Asteamgenerator whichisrequiredtobeusedforplantcooldownwouldalsobecoveredunderthisEAL.Primarytosecondary leakage)46gpmisbasedontheinability tomaintainnormalliquidinventory withintheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)bynormaloperation oftheChemicalandVolumeControlSystemwhichisconsidered astwopositivedisplacement chargingpumpsdischarging tothechargingheader.Forprimarytosecondary leakage)46gpmintheabsenceofanysecondary toatmosphere release,anAlertwouldbedeclaredbasedonEAL3.1.2,ThisEALrepresents thelossofbothRCSandcontainment barriersandtherefore warrantsdeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency.

PEG

Reference:

PC4.1+RCS2.2 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1BasisReference(s):

1.Technical Specifications Section3.1.5.22.E-3"SteamGenerator TubeRupture"3.FSARTable9.3.6 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev13.0ReactorCoolantSystem3.2PrimarytoSecondary Leakage3.2.3SiteAreaEmergency Releaseofsecondary sidetoatmosphere withprimarytosecondary leakage>0.1gpmpersteamgenerator ANDCoolantactivity)300pCi/ccofI-131MMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:Fuelcladloss,Containment lossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddresses SGtubeleaksindicative ofalossofcontainment inconjunction withalossoffuelcladding.

Unisolable secondary sidereleasestoatmosphere includethosefromfeedlineorsteamlinebreaksaswellasstuckopensafetyoratmospheric reliefvalvesthatcannotbeisolatedonceisolation hasbeendirectedbytheEOPs.Asteamgenerator whichisrequiredtobeusedforplantcooldownwouldalsobecoveredunderthisEAL.Acoolantactivity)300pCi/ccofI-131indicates alossoffuelcladding.

RefertoEALN2.1.2basisThiscondition represents alossofbothprimarycontainment withthelossoffuelcladdingandthuswarrantsdeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency.

PEG

Reference:

PC4.1+FC2.1 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1BasisReference(s):

1.Technical Specifications Section3.1.43-10 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev13.0ReactorCoolantSystem3.3RCSSubcooling 3.3.1AlertRCSsubcooling

<EOPFig.MINSUBCOOLING duetoRCSleakageNUINARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:RCSlossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddresses conditions whereleakagefromtheRCSisgreaterthanavailable inventory controlcapacitysuchthatalossofsubcooling hasoccurred.

Thelossofsubcooling isthefundamental indication thattheinventory controlsystemsareinadequate inmaintaining RCSpressureandinventory againstthemasslossthroughtheleak.LossoftheRCSbarrierwarrantsdeclaration ofanAlert.PEG

Reference:

RCS2.1BasisReference(s):

1.E-O,ReactorTripOrSafetyInjection 3-11 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Thecontainment structure isanatmospheric vaporcontainment system.ItformsaGssionproductbarrierdesignedtocontaintheradioactive fissionproductsgenerated fromanypostulated accidentsoastoprecludeexceeding offsiteexposurelimits.Thecontainment structure isalowleakagesystemhousingthereactorvessel,thereactorcoolantpiping,steamgenerators andotherbranchconnections ofthereactorprimarysystem.Thecontainment isequippedwithisolation valvesforsystemswhichpenetrate thecontainment boundary.

Thesevalvesautomatically actuatetoisolatesystemsunderemergency conditions.

Therearethreecontainment parameters whichareindicative ofconditions whichmayposeathreattocontainment integrity orindicatedegradation ofRCSorreactorfuelcladintegrity.

~inIAbnormally highcontainment pressureorfailureofcontainment coolingsystemsfollowing aLOCAareindicative ofpotential lossesofthecontainment barrierintegrity.

Theexistence ofanunisolable CIorCVIlinebreakoutsidecontainment constitutes alossofcontainment integrity aswellasalossofRCSboundary.

Inconsistent containment responsetoaknownLOCAisalsoindicative ofcontainment lossinconjunction withRCSbarrierbreach.Shouldalossoffuelcladdingintegrity occurundereitheroftheseconditions, thepotential forreleaseoflargeamountsofradioactive materials totheenvironment exists.mrwihn1SGtuberupturesinconjunction withasecondary systemlinebreakresulting inreleasetotheenvironment constitutes lossesofbothRCSandcontainment integrity.

Primarytosecondary leakageinexcessofTechnical Specifications inconjunction withfuelcladdamageandsecondary systemleakagetotheenvironment constitutes lossesoffuelclad,RCSandcontainment integrity.

Thiscondition providesthepotential forreleaseoflargeamountsofradioactive materials totheenvironment.

~mi1nr'Theexistence ofcombustible'gas concentrations incontainment poseaseverethreattocontainment integrity andareindicative ofseverelydegradedreactorcoreandRCSconditions.

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev14.0Containment 4.1Containment Integrity Status4.1.1UnusualEventBothdoorsopenoncontainment airlock.ORInability toclosecontainment pressurerelieforpurgevalveswhichresultsinaradiological releasepathwaytotheenvironment NUMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:Containment lossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddresses anindication thatunambiguously indicates lossofthecontainment barrierunderconditions whencontainment integrity isrequired.

Itisimportant tonotehowever,thatlossofcontainment duetobothairlockdoorsbeingopeniseventdependent.

Uponrecognition, shiftpersonnel wouldrapidlyrespondinanattempttoreestablish containment integrity.

Ifthedoorscannotbereclosed, anylossoftheRCSbarrierthatoccurswiththedoorsopenwouldappearasaninconsistent LOCAresponse.

Therefore, thiseventisnotusedasadefinitive indicator oflossoftheprimarycontainment barrierforpurposesofdefininghigherclassification EALs.RatheritislefttotheEmergency Coordinator's judgmentwhethersuchalosshasoccurred.

'EG

Reference:

PC7.1 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1BasisReference(s):

None OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev14.0Containment 4.1Containment Integrity Status/4.1.2SiteAreaEmergency 4Rapiduncontrolled decreaseincontainment pressurefollowing initialincreaseORLossofprimarycoolantinsidecontainment withcontainment pressureorsumplevelresponsenotconsistent withLOCAconditions MBMRCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:RCSloss,Containment lossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:Rapidunexplained lossofpressure(i.e.,notattributable tocontainment sprayorFanCoolingUnitsorcondensation effects)following aninitialpressureincreaseindicates alossofbothRCSandcontainment integrity.

Containment pressureandsumplevelsshouldincreaseasaresultofth'massandenergyreleaseintocontainment fromaLOCA.Thus,sumplevelorpressurenotincreasing indicates containment bypass(V-sequence) andalossofcontainment integrity.

ThisEALindicates lossofbothRCSandcontainment andtherefore warrantsdeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency.

PEG

Reference:

PC2.1PC2.2 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1BasisReference(s):

1.Alarmresponseprocedure, AR-C-18,Revision62.Alarmresponseprocedure, AR-C-19,Revision43.R.E.GinnaUpdatedFSAR,Figure6.2-3through6.2-5 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev14.0Containment 4.1Containment Integrity Status4.1.3SiteAreaEmergency Either:CIorCVIvalve(s)notclosedwhenrequiredfollowing confirmed LOCAORInability toisolateanyprimarysystemdischarging outsidecontainment ANDRadiological releasepathwaytotheenvironment existsMMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:RCSloss,Containment lossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALisintendedtoaddressincomplete containment isolation thatallowsdirectreleasetotheenvironment.

Itrepresents alossofboththeRCSandcontainment barrierandtherefore warrantsdeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency.

FailureofCIorCVIvalvestoisolateisintendedtoaddressincomplete containment isolation thatallowsdirectreleasetotheenvironment.

Itrepresents alossofboththeRCSandcontainment barrier.Confirmation ofaIOCAshouldbebasedondiagnostic activities consistent withE-0"ReactorTriporSafetyInjection."

"Inability toisolateanyprimarysystemdischarging outsidecontainment" isintendedtoaddressotherprimarysystems,eitherdirectorindirect, whichtheinability toisolateindicatelossofbothRCSandcontainment.

PEG

Reference:

PC3.1

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1BasisReference(s):

1.FR-2.1"Response toHighContainment Pressure" OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev14.0Containment

'4.lContainment Integrity Status4.1.4GeneralEmergency Safetyinjection signalduetoLOCAwithlessthanminimumoperablecontainment heatremovalequipment, Table4.3ANDAnyindicators offuelcladloss,Table4.1Table4.3Minimum0erableContainment HeatRemovalEuimentCNMTPressureRecircFans0erableSraPumsReuired<28psigN/A>28psigTable4.1FuelCladLossIndicators 1.Coolantactivity>300p.Ci/ccofI-1312.Containment radmonitorR-29/R-30 reading>100H/hr3.LetdownMonitorR-9reading>10H/hr4.REDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGMMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:Fuelcladloss,RCSloss,Containment potential lossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALrepresents apotential lossofcontainment inconjunction withlossesofbothRCSandfuelclad.

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Apotential lossofcontainment isconsidered toexistinthatthecontainment heatremovaVdepressurization systems(e.g.,containment sprays,Recirc.Fans,butnotincluding containment ventingstrategies) areeitherlostorperforming inadegradedmanner,asindicated byplantparameters suchascontainment

pressure, pressurizer levelandsteamlinepressureinexcessofthesetpoints atwhichtheequipment wassupposedtohaveactuated.

RCSisalsoassumedtobelostinthiscondition duetoexceeding safetyinjection initiation setpoints:

containment pressure()4psig)orlowpressurizer

(<1723psig).Table4.1presentsfuelcladlossindicators whichrepresent 2-5%cladfailures.

RefertoEAL0's2.1.2,2.2.2,and2.3.2forbasesoftheseindicators.

PEG

Reference:

PC2.5+FC2.1,FC5.1andFC6.1BasisReference(s):

l.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.Technical Specifications, Table3.5-4,pg.3.5-17R.E.GinnaUFSAR,Section6.2.2.1.2.4, pg.6.2-28Technical Specifications, Article5.2.1,pg.5.2-1FR-Z.1,ResponsetoHighContainment

Pressure, Revision3R.E.GinnaUFSAR,Section6.2.2.1,pg.6.2-24bR.E.GinnaUFSAR,Section6.2.2.2,pg.6.2-32andFigure6.2-11EPIP2-16,CoreDamageEstimation P-9,Radiation Monitoring System,Revision67,Section2.2.2.6,pg.P-9:2 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev14.0Containment 4.1Containment Integrity Status4.1.5GeneralEmergency Either:Rapiduncontrolled decreaseincontainment pressurefollowing initialincreaseORLossofprimarycoolantinsidecontainment withcontainment pressureorsumplevelresponsenotconsistent withLOCAconditions ANDAnyindicators offuelcladdamage,Table4.2Table4.2FuelCladDamageIndicators ORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGREDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINKCoolantactivity>300pCi/ccofI-131Containment radmonitorR-29/R-30 reading>100EhrLetdownMonitorR-9reading>10R/hrMMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:Fuelcladpotential loss/loss, RCSloss,Containment lossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALindicates lossofbothRCSandcontainment withlossorpotential lossofthefuelcladdingandtherefore warrantsdeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency.,

4-10

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Rapidunexplained lossofpressure(i.e.,notattributable tocontainment sprayorFanCoolingUnitsorcondensation effects)following aninitialpressureincreaseindicates alossofbothRCSandcontainment integrity.

Containment pressureandsumplevelsshouldincreaseasaresultofthemassandenergyreleaseintocontainment fromaLOCA.Thus,sumplevelorpressurenotincreasing indicates containment bypass(V-sequence) andalossofcontainment integrity.

Table4.2presentsfuelcladlossandpotential lossindicators:

~ORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,CoreCooling:RefertoEAL¹1.1.1basis~REDpathinF-0.3,HeatSink:RefertoEAL¹1.2.1basisCoolantactivity>300p,Ci/ccofI-131:RefertoEAL¹2.1.2basis~Containment radmonitorreading>100R/hr:RefertoEAL¹2.3.2basis~LetdownMonitorR-9reading>10H/hr:RefertoEAL¹2.2.2basisPEG

Reference:

PC2.1/PC2.2+

FC1.2,FC1.3,FC2.1,FC3.2,FC4.1,FC5.1andFC6.1BasisReference(s):

l.2.3.45.6.7.8.9.10.Alarmresponseprocedure, AR-C-18,Revision6Alarmresponseprocedure, AR-C-19,Revision4R.E.GinnaUpdatedFSAR,Figure6.2-3through6.2-5EPIP2-16,CoreDamageEstimation CSFSTF-0.2,CoreCooling,Revision3CSFSTF-0.3,HeatSink,Revision3FR-C.1,ResponsetoInadequate CoreCooling,Revision7FR-C.2,ResponsetoDegradedCoreCooling,Revision6,step9.aFR-C.2,ResponsetoDegradedCoreCooling,Revision6,Note,pg.3P-9"Radiation Monitoring System"4-11 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev14.0Containment 4.1Containment Integrity Status4.1.6GeneralEmergency Either:"CIorCVIvalve(s)notclosedwhenrequiredfollowing confirmed LOCAORInability toisolateanyprimarysystemdischarging outsidecontainment ANDRadiological releasepathwaytotheenvironment existsANDAnyindicators offuelcladdamage,Table4.2Table4.2FuelCladDamaeIndicators ORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGREDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINKCoolantactivity>300p,Ci/ccofI-131Containment radmonitorR-29/R-30 reading>100R/hrLetdownMonitorR-9reading>10R/hrMMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:Fuelcladloss/potential loss,RCSloss,Containment lossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALindicates lossofbothRCSandcontainment withlossorpotential lossofthefuelcladdingandtherefore warrantsdeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency.

FailureofCIorCVIvalvestoisolateisintendedtoaddressincomplete containment isolation thatallowsdirectreleasetotheenvironment.

Itrepresents alossofboththeRCSandcontainment barrier.4-12 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEAITechnical BasesDocument, Rev1"Inability toisolateanyprimarysystemdischarging outsidecontainment" isintendedtoaddressotherprimarysystems,eitherdirectorindirect, whichtheinability toisolateindicatelossofbothRCSandcontainment Table4.2presentsfuelcladlossandpotential lossindicators:

~ORANGEpathinF-0.2,CoreCooling:RefertoEAL¹1.1.1basis~REDpathinF-0.3,HeatSink:RefertoEAL¹1.2.1basis~Coolantactivity>300pCi/ccofI-131:RefertoEAL¹2.1.2basisContainment radmonitorreading>100R/hr:RefertoEAL¹2.3.2basis~LetdownMonitorR-9reading>10H/hr:RefertoEAL¹2.2.2basisPEG

Reference:

PC3.1+FC1.2,FC1.3,FC2.1,FC3.2,FC4.1,FC5.1andFC6.1BasisReference(s):

1.2.3.45.6.7.8.9.10.FR-2.1"Response toHighContainment Pressure" CSFSTF-0.2,"CoreCooling"FR-C.l,"Response toInadequate CoreCooling"EPIP2-16,CoreDamageEstimation CSFSTF-0.2,CoreCooling,Revision3CSFSTF-0.3,HeatSink,Revision3FR-C.1,ResponsetoInadequate CoreCooling,Revision7FR;C.2,ResponsetoDegradedCoreCooling,Revision6,step9.aFR-C.2,ResponsetoDegradedCoreCooling,Revision6,Note,pg.3P-9"Radiatio'n Monitoring System"4-13 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev14.0Contaixunent 4.2SGTubeRupturew/Secondary Release4.2.1SiteAreaEmergency Unisolable secondary sidelinebreakwithSGtuberuptureasidentified inE-3"SteamGenerator TubeRupture"NMGQtCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:RCSloss,Containment lossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALisintendedtoaddressthefullspectrumofSteamGenerator (SG)tuberuptureeventsinconjunction withalossofcontainment duetoasignificant secondary linebreak.ThisEALaddresses rupturedSG(s)withanunisolable secondary linebreakcorresponding tothelossof2of3fissionproductbarriers(RCSbarrierandcontainment barrier).

Thisallowsthedirectreleaseofradioactive fissionandactivation productstotheenvironment.

Resultant offsitedoseratesareafunctionofmanyvariables.

Examplesinclude:coolantactivity, actualleakrate,SGcarryover,iodinepartitioning, andmeteorology.

Theindications utilizedshouldbeconsistent withthediagnostic activities oftheemergency operating procedures (EOPs),ifavailable.

Thisshouldincludeindication ofreduction inprimarycoolantinventory, increased secondary radiation levels,andanuncontrolled orcompletedepressurization oftherupturedSG.Secondary radiation increases shouldbeobservedviaradiation monitoring ofcondenser airejectordischarge, SGblowdown, mainsteam,and/orSGsamplingsystem.Determination ofthe"uncontrolled" depressurization oftherupturedSGshouldbebasedonindication thatthepressuredecreaseintherupturedsteamgenerator isnotafunctionofoperatoraction.Thisshouldpreventdeclaration basedonadepressurization thatresultsfromanEOPinducedcooldownoftheRCSthatdoesnotinvolvetheprolonged releaseofcontaminated secondary coolantfromtheaffectedSG4-14 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1totheenvironment.

ThisEALencompasses steambreaks,feedbreaks,andstuckopensafetyorreliefvalves.PEG

Reference:

RCS3.1BasisReference(s):

1.E-3"SteamGenerator TubeRupture"4-15 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev14.0Containment 4.2SGTubeRupturew/Secondary Release4.2.2GeneralEmergency Unisolable secondary sidelinebreakwithSGtuberuptureasidentified inE-3"SteamGenerator TubeRupture"ANDAnyindicators offuelcladdamage,Table4.2Table4.2FuelCladDamaeIndicators ORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGREDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINKCoolantactivity>300p.Ci/ccofI-131Containment radmonitorR-29/R-30 reading>100R/hrLetdownMonitorR-9reading>10R/hrNUMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:Fuelcladloss/potential loss,RCSloss,Containment lossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALisintendedtoaddressthefullspectrumofSteamGenerator (SG)tuberuptureeventsinconjunction withalossofcontainment duetoasignificant secondary linebreakwithactualorpotential lossofthefuelcladintegrity.

ThisEALaddresses rupturedSG(s)withanunisolable secondary linebreakcorresponding tothelossof2of3fissionproductbarriers(RCSbarrierandcontainment barrier)withtheactualorpotential lossofthethird(fuelcladding).

Thisallowsthedirectreleaseofradioactive fissionandactivation productstotheenvironment.

Resultant offsitedoseratesareafunctionofmanyvariables.

Examplesinclude:coolantactivity, actualleakrate,SGcarryover,iodinepartitioning, andmeteorology.

4-16 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Theindications utilizedshouldbeconsistent withthediagnostic activities oftheemergency operating procedures (EOPs),ifavailable.

Thisshouldinclude.indication ofreduction inprimarycoolantinventory, increased secondary radiation levels,andanuncontrolled orcompletedepressurization oftherupturedSG.Secondary radiation increases shouldbeobservedviaradiation monitoring ofcondenser airejectordischarge, SGblowdown, mainsteam,.and/orSGsamplingsystem.Determination ofthe"uncontrolled" depressurization oftherupturedSGshouldbebasedonindication thatthepressuredecreaseintherupturedsteamgenerator isnotafunctionofoperatoraction.Thisshouldpreventdeclaration basedonadepressurization thatresultsfromanEOPinducedcooldownoftheRCSthatdoesnotinvolvetheprolonged releaseofcontaminated secondary coolantfromtheafFectedSGtotheenvironment.

ThisEALencompasses steambreaks,feedbreaks,andstuckopensafetyorreliefvalves.Table4.2presentsfuelcladlossandp'otential lossindicators:

~ORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,CoreCooling:RefertoEAL¹1.1.1basis~REDpathinF-0.3,HeatSink:RefertoEAL¹1.2.1basis~Coolantactivity>300pCi/ccofI-131:RefertoEAL¹2.1.2basis~Containment radmonitorreading>100R/hr:RefertoEAL¹2.3.2basis~LetdownMonitorR-9reading>10R/hr:RefertoEAL¹2.2.2basisThiscondition represents alossofbothRCSandprimarycontainment withthelossorpotential lossoffuelcladdingandthuswarrantsdeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency.

PEG

Reference:

RCS3.1+FC1.2,FC1.3,FC2.1,FC3.1,FC3.2,FC4.1,FC5.1andFC6.1BasisReference(s):

1.2.3.45.6.'7.8.Technical Specifications Section3.1.5.2EPIP2-16,CoreDamageEstimation CSFSTF-0.2,CoreCooling,Revision3CSFSTF-0.3,HeatSink,Revision3FR-C.1,ResponsetoInadequate CoreCooling,Revision7FR-C.2,ResponsetoDegradedCoreCooling,Revision6,step9.aFR-C.2,ResponsetoDegradedCoreCooling,Revision6,Note,pg.3P-9"Radiation Monitoring System"4-17 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev14.0Containment 4.3Combustible GasConcentrations 4.3.1GeneralEmergency

>4%hydrogenconcentration incontainment MJMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:Fuelcladloss,RCSloss,Containment potential lossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:Existence ofanexplosive mixture(4%hydrogen) meansahydrogenandoxygenconcentration ofatleastthelowerdeflagration limitcurveexists.Whenhydrogenandoxygenconcentrations reachorexceedthedeflagration limits,imminentlossofthecontainment barrierexists.Togeneratesuchlevelsofcombustible gas,lossofthefuelcladandRCSbarriersmusthaveoccurred.

ThisEALrepresents lossofbothfuelcladand,RCSwiththepotential lossofcontainment andtherefore warrantsdeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency.

PEG

Reference:

PC2.4BasisReference(s):

1.FR-Z.1"Response toHighContainment Pressure" 4-18 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev0ManyEALsare'asedonactualorpotential degradation offissionproductbarriersbecauseoftheincreased potential foroÃsiteradioactivity release.Degradation offissionproductbarriersthough,isnotalwaysapparentvianon-radiological symptoms.

Therefore, directindication ofincreased radiological effluents orarearadiation levelsareappropriate symptomsforemergency classification.

Atlowerlevels,abnormalradioactivity releasesmaybeindicative ofafailureofcontainment systemsorprecursors tomoresignificant releases.

Athigherreleaserates,offsiteradiological conditions mayresultwhichrequireoffsiteprotective actions.Increased arearadiation levelsinplantmayalsobeindicative ofthefailureofcontainment systemsorprecludeaccesstoplantvitalequipment necessary toensureplantsafety.Therearetwobasicindications ofradioactivity releaseratesandoneforarearadiation levelswhichwarrantemergency classifications.

DiiiiiifBliii'i'gsystemsprovidesarapidassessment mechanism todetermine releasesinexcessofclassifiable limits.P.Projected offsitedoses(basedoneffluentmonitorreadings) oractualoffsitefieldmeasurements indicating dosesordoseratesaboveclassifiable limits.:Sustained generalarearadiation levelsinexcessofthoseindicating lossofcontrolofradioactive materials orthoselevelswhichmayprecludeaccesstovitalplantareasalsowarrantemergency classification.

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev05.0Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation 5.1EffluentMonitors5.1.1UnusualEventAvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"NUE"for)60min.unlesssampleanalysiscanconfirmreleaserates<2xtechnical specifications withinthistimeperiod.Table5.1EffluentMonitorClassification Thresholds MonitorNUEAlertR-11R-12R-13R-14R-15R-18R-12A(7/9)

R-14A(7/9)

R-15A(7/9)R-31/321ARV1Safety2Safety3Safety4Safety1.62E6cpm7.80E6cpm2.20E4cpm6.40E5cpm4.00E5cpm3.60E5cpmN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A1.07E7cpmN/A1.61E6cpm2.31E7cpmoffscalehiN/AN/AN/A1.900mR/hr0.951mR/hr0.476mR/hr0.317mR/hr0.238mR/hrN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A6.00p,Ci/cc0.533p,Ci/cc11.50pCi/cc19.0mR/hr9.51mR/hr4.76mR/hr3.17mR/hr2.38mR/hrN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A60.00pCi/cc5.33p,Ci/cc115.00p,Ci/cc190mR/hr95.1mRhr47.6mR/hr31.7mR/hr23.8mR/hrNU1KARCIC:Anyunplanned releaseofgaseousorliquidradioactivity totheenvironment thatexceedstwotimestheradiological Technical Specifications for60minutesorlonger.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev0Basis:The"valueshown"foreachmonitoristwotimesthecalculated Technical Specification releaseratesasspecified inP-9section2.4.Unplanned releasesinexcessoftwotimesthesitetechnical specifications thatcontinuefor60minutesorlongerrepresent anuncontrolled situation andhence,apotential degradation inthelevelofsafety.Thefinalintegrated dose(whichisverylowintheUnusualEventemergency class)isnottheprimaryconcernhere;itisthedegradation inplantcontrolimpliedbythefactthatthereleasewasnotisolatedwithin60minutes.Therefore, itisnotintendedthatthereleasebeaveragedover60minutes.Forexample,areleaseof4timesT/Sfor30minutesdoesnotexceedthisinitiating condition.

Further,theEmergency Coordinator shouldnotwaituntil60minuteshaselapsed,butshoulddeclaretheeventassoonasitisdetermined thatthereleasedurationhasorwilllikelyexceed60minutes.Monitorindications arecalculated onthebasisofthemethodology ofthesiteOffsiteDoseCalculation Manual(ODCM).Annualaveragemeteorology isused.Validmeansthataradiation monitorreadinghasbeenconfirmed bytheoperators tobecorrect.PEG

Reference:

AU1.1BasisReference(s):

1.2.3.4.5.6.EPIP2-3Emergency ReleaseRateDetermination P-9Radiation Monitoring SystemEPIP2-18ControlRoomDoseAssessment Technical Specifications, Amendment No.24,Articles3.9.1.1thru3.9.2.3"Calculations forNU)~CEALs"byP.S.PolfleitFileEAL.XLSRD-15.0ODCM5.3 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev05.0Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation 5.1EffluentMonitors5.1.2Alert.AvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"Alert"for>15min.unlessdoseassessment canconfirmreleasesarebelowTable5.2column"Alert"withinthistimeperiod.MonitorTable5.1EfQuentMonitorClassification Thresholds NUEQE,R-11R-12R-13R-14R-15R-18R-12A(7/9)R-14A(7/9)

R-15A(7/9)R-31/321ARV1Safety2Safety3Safety4Safety1.62E6cpm7.80E6cpm2.20E4cpm6.40E5cpm4.00E5cpm3.60E5cpmN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A1.07E7cpmN/A1.61E6cpm2.31E7cpmoffscalehiN/AN/AN/A1.900mR/hr0.951mR/hr0.476mR/hr0.317mR/hr0.238mR/hrN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A6.00pCi/cc0.533pCi/cc11.50pCi/cc19.0mEVhr9.51mR/hr4.76mR/hr3.17mR/hr2.38mR/hrN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A60.00pCi/cc5.33pCi/cc115.00pCi/cc190mR/hr95.1mRhr47.6mR/hr31.7mR/hr23.8mR/hrTable5.2DoseProjection/

Env.Measurement Classification Thresholds TEDECDEThyroidTEDErateCDEThyroidrate10mRN/A10mR/hrN/A100mR500mR100mR/hr500mR/hr1000mR5000mR1000mR/hr5000mR/hr 0

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev0NUINARCIC:Anyunplanned releaseofgaseousorliquidradioactivity totheenvironment thatexceeds200timesradiological Technical Specifications for15minutesorlonger.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:Thiseventescalates fromtheUnusualEventbyescalating themagnitude ofthereleasebyafactorof100.Prorating the500mR/yrcriterion forbothtime(8766hr/yr)andthe200multiplier, theassociated siteboundarydoseratewouldbe10mR/hr.Therequiredreleasedurationwasreducedto15minutesinrecognition oftheincreased severity.

Monitorindications arecalculated onthebasisofthemethodology oftheEPIP2-18ControlRoomDoseAssessment.

Annualaveragemeteorology isused.Aspreviously stated;the10mR/hrvalueisbasedonaproration of200timesthe500mR/yrbasisofthe10CFR20non-occupational MPClimits,roundeddownto10mR/hr.Thevaluesforthegaseouseffluentradiation monitorsarebaseduponnotexceeding 10mR/hratthesiteboundaryasaresultoftherelease.Theconversion factorsarebaseduponthemixtureofnoblegaspresentinreactorcoolantduringtheV25/82tuberupture-normaloperations.

Sincethereisnohighrangemonitorassociated withliquide6luentmonitorR-18andthe200xTechnical Specification valueisbeyondit'supperscale,anindication of"offscale hi"isconservatively used.Validmeansthataradiation monitorreadinghasbeenconfirmed bytheoperators tobecorrect.

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev0PEG

Reference:

AA1.1BasisReference(s):

1.2.3.45.EPIP2-3Emergency ReleaseRateDetermination P-9Radiation Monitoring SystemEPIP2-18ControlRoomDoseAssessment Technical Specifications, Amendment No.24,Articles3.9.1.1thru3.9.2.3"Calculations forNUMARCEALs"byP.S.PolfleitFileEAL.XLS OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev05.0Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation 5.1EffluentMonitors5.1.3SiteAreaEmergency AvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"SAE"for)15min.unlessdoseassessment canconfirmreleasesarebelowTable5.2column"SAE"withinthistimeperiod.MonitorTable5.1EfHuentMonitorClassification Thresholds AlertR-11R-12R-13R-14R-15R-18R-12A(7/9)

R-14A(7/9)

R-15A(7/9)R-31/321ARV1Safety2Safety3Safety4Safety1.62E6cpm7.80E6cpm2.20E4cpm6.40E5cpm4.00E5cpm3.60E5cpmN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A1.07E7cpmN/A1.61E6cpm2.31E7cpmoffscalehiN/AN/AN/A1.900mR/hr0.951mR/hr0.476mR/hr0.317mR/hr0.238mR/hrN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A6.00pCi/cc0.533pCi/cc11.50p,Ci/cc19.0mR/hr9.51mR/hr4.76mR/hr3.17mR/hr2.38mR/hrN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A60.00pCi/cc5.33pCi/cc115.00pCi/cc190mR/hr95.1mRhr47.6mR/hr31.7mEUhr23.8mR/hrTable5.2DoseProjection/

Env.Measurement Classification Thresholds AlertTEDECDEThyroidTEDErateCDEThyroidrate10mRN/A10mR/hrN/A100mR500mR100mR/hr500mR/hr1000mR5000mR1000mR/hr5000mR/hr OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev0MBCARCIC:Boundarydoseresulting fromanactualorimminentreleaseofgaseousradioactivity exceeds100mRemTEDEor500mRCDEThyroidfortheactualorprojected durationoftherelease.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:Thevaluesshownweredetermined utilizing EPIP2-18"ControlRoomDoseAssessment" basedupona100mRwholebodyexposure.

Thecalculations madetheassumption ofneutralstability andan8mphwindspeed.Theseconditions represent annualaveragemeteorology.

Themostrestrictive x/Qvaluesatthe0-0.5miledistancewereused.EPIP2-18specifies thatwholebodydoseislimitingwithrespecttoemergency classification andprotective actionrecommendations basedupontheassumption ofanoblegastoiodineratioof1E-4.The100mRintegrated doseisbasedontheproposed10CFR20annualaveragepopulation exposure.

Thisvaluealsoprovidesadesirable gradient(oneorderofmagnitude) betweentheAlert,SiteAreaEmergency, andGeneralEmergency classes.Itisdeemedthatexposures lessthanthislimitarenotconsistent withtheSiteAreaEmergency classdescription.

The500mRintegrated childthyroiddosewasestablished inconsideration ofthe1:5ratiooftheEPAProtective ActionGuidelines forwholebodythyroid.Integrated dosesaregenerally notmonitored inreal-time.

Inestablishing theemergency actionlevels,adurationofonehourisassumed,basedonasiteboundarydoseof100mR/hourwholebodyor500mR/hourchildthyroid,whichever ismorelimiting(dependsonsourcetermassumptions).

AlthoughEPIP2-18providesforR-3V32releasedeterminations, thevariability ofresultsbaseduponthenumberofARV'sand/orSV'sprecludes theuseofanysinglemonitordefaultvalueforthesemonitors.

Validmeansthataradiation monitorreadinghasbeencon6rmedbytheoperators tobecorrect.

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev0PEG

Reference:

AS1.1BasisReference(s):

1.2.3.45.P-9Radiation Monitoring SystemEPIP2-18ControlRoomDoseAssessment FSARTable2.3"Calculations forMJMARCEALs"byP.S.PolfleitFileEAL.XLSRD-15.0ODCMTables3,5and7 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev05.0Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation 5.1.4GeneralEmergency 5.1EQ1uentMonitorsAvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"GE"for>15min.unlessdoseassessment canconfirmreleasesarebelowTable5.2column"GE"withinthistimeperiod.Table5.1EfQuentMonitorClassification Thresholds MonitorR-11R-12R-13R-14R-15R-18R-12A(7/9)

R-14A(7/9)

R-15A(7/9)R-31/321ARV1Safety2Safety3Safety4SafetyNUE1.62E6cpm7.80E6cpm2.20E4cpm6.40E5cpm4.00E5cpm3.60E5cpmN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AAlertN/A1.07E7cpmN/A1.61E6cpm2.31E7cpmoffscalehiN/AN/AN/A1.900mR/hr0.951mR/hr0.476mR/hr0.317mR/hr0.238mR/hrN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A6.00pCi/cc0.533p,Ci/cc11.50pCi/cc19.0mR/hr9.51mR/hr4.76mR/hr3.17mR/hr2.38mR/hrN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A60.00pCi/cc5.33pCi/cc115.00pCi/cc190mEUhr95.1mRhr47.6mR/hr31.7mR/hr23.8mR/hrTable5.2DoseProjection

/Env.Measurement Classification Thresholds TEDECDEThyroidTEDErateCDEThyroidrate10mRN/A10mR/hrN/A100mR500mR100mR/hr500mR/hr1000mR5000mR1000mR/hr5000mR/hr5-10 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev0NUIVCARCIC:Boundarydoseresulting fromanactualorimminentreleaseofgaseousradioactivity exceeds1000mRemTEDEor5000mRCDEThyroidfortheactualorprojected durationofthereleaseusingactualmeteorology.

FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:Thevaluesshownweredetermined utilizing EPIP2-18"ControlRoomDoseAssessment" basedupona1000mRwholebodyexposure.

Thecalculations madetheassumption ofneutralstability andan8mphwindspeed.Theseconditions represent annualaveragemeteorology.

EPIP2-18specifies thatwholebodydoseislimitingwithrespecttoemergency classification andprotective actionrecommendations basedupontheassumption ofanoblegastoiodineratiooflE-4.The1000mRwholebodyandthe5000mRchildthyroidintegrated dosearebasedontheEPAprotective actionguidancewhichindicates thatpublicprotective actionsareindicated ifthedoseexceeds1remwholebodyor5remchildthyroid.Thisisconsistent withtheemergency classdescription foraGeneralEmergency.

Thislevelconstitutes theupperlevelofthedesirable gradientfortheSiteAreaEmergency.

Integrated dosesaregenerally notmonitored inreal-time.

Inestablishing theemergency actionlevels,adurationofonehourisassumed,basedonasiteboundarydoseof1000mR/hourwholebodyor5000mR/hourchildthyroid,whichever ismorelimiting(dependsonsourcetermassumptions).

AlthoughEPIP2-18providesforR-3V32releasedeterminations, thevariability ofresultsbaseduponthenumberofARV'sand/orSV'sprecludes theuseofanysinglemonitordefaultvalueforthesemonitors.

Validmeansthataradiation monitorreadinghasbeen,con6rmedbytheoperators tobecorrect.5-11 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev0PEG

Reference:

AG1.1*BasisReference(s):

l.2.3.4P-9'Radiation Monitoring SystemEPIP2-18ControlRoomDoseAssessment FSARTable2.3"Calculations forMV~CEALs"byP.S.PolQeitFileEAL.XLS5-12 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev05.0Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation 5.2DoseProjections/

Environmental Measurements/Release Rates5.2.1UnusualEventConfirmed sampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleaserates>2xtechnical specifications limitsfor>60min.NUINARCIC:Anyunplanned releaseofgaseousorliquidradioactivity totheenvironment thatexceedstwotimestheradiological Technical Specifications for60minutesorlonger.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:Unplanned releasesinexcessoftwotimesthesitetechnical specifications thatcontinuefor60minutesorlongerrepresent anuncontrolled situation andhence,apotential degradation inthelevelofsafety.Thefinalintegrated dose(whichisverylowintheUnusualEventemergency class)isnottheprimaryconcernhere;itisthedegradation inplantcontrolimpliedbythefactthatthereleasewasnotisolatedwithin60minutes.Therefore, itisnotintendedthatthereleasebeaveragedover60minutes.Forexample,areleaseof4timesT/Sfor30minutesdoesnotexceedthisinitiating condition.

Further,theEmergency Coordinator shouldnotwaituntil60minuteshaselapsed,butshoulddeclaretheeventassoonasitisdetermined thatthereleasedurationhasorwilllikelyexceed60minutesPEG

Reference:

AU1.25-13 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev0BasisReference(s):,

1.Technical Specifications, Amendment No.24,Articles3.9.1.1thru3.9.2.35-14 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev05.0Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation 5.2DoseProjections/

Environmental Measurements/

ReleaseRates5.2.2AlertConfirmed sampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleaserates)200xtechnical specifications limitsfor>15min.NUINARCIC:Anyunplanned releaseofgaseousorliquidradioactivity totheenvironment thatexceeds200timesradiological Technical Specifications for15minutesorlonger.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:Confirmed sampleanalysesinexcessoftwohundredtimesthesitetechnical specifications thatcontinuefor15minutesorlongerrepresent anuncontrolled situation andhence,apotential degradation inthelevelofsafety.Thiseventescalates fromtheUnusualEventbyincreasing themagnitude ofthereleasebyafactorof100overtheUnusualEventlevel(i.e.,200timesTechnical Specifications).

Prorating the500mR/yrbasisofthe10CFR20non-occupational MPClimitsforbothtime(8766hr/yr)andthe200multiplier, theassociated siteboundarydoseratewouldbe10mR/hr.Therequiredreleasedurationwasreducedto15minutesinrecognition oftheincreased severity.

PEG

Reference:

AA1.25-15 OSSI-92-402A-4-RE GGinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev0BasisReference(s):

1.Technical Specifications, Amendment No.24,Articles3.9.1.1thru3.9.2.35-16 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev05.0Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation 5.2DoseProjections/

Environmental Measurements/

ReleaseRates5.2.3AlertDoseprojections orfieldsurveysresulting fromactualorimminentreleasewhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2column"Alert"atthesiteboundaryorbeyond.Table5.2DoseProjection

/Env.Measurement Classification Thresholds AlertTEDECDEThyroidTEDErateCDEThyroidrate10mRN/A10mB/hrN/A100mR500mR100mR/hr500mR/hr1000mR5000mR1000mH/hr5000mR/hrNUMARCIC:Anyunplanned releaseofgaseousorliquidradioactivity totheenvironment thatexceeds200timesradiological Technical Specifications for15minutesorlongerFPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis.Offsiteintegrated dosesinexcessof10mRTEDEordoseratesinexcessof10mR/hrTEDErepresent anuncontrolled situation andhence,apotential degradation inthelevelofsafety.Thiseventescalates fromtheUnusualEventbyincreasing themagnitude ofthereleasebyafactorof100overtheUnusualEventlevel(i.e.,200timesTechnical Specifications).

Prorating the5-17 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev0500mR/yrbasisof10CFR20forbothtime(8766hr/yr)andthe200multiplier, theassociated siteboundarydoseratewouldbe10mR/hr.Aspreviously stated,the10mR/hrvalueisbasedonaproration of200timesthe500mR/yrbasisof10CFR20,roundeddownto10mR/hr.PEG

Reference:

AA1.2BasisReference(s):

2.3.4Technical Specifications, Amendment No.24,Article's 3.9.1.1thru3.9.2.3EPIP2-3Emergency ReleaseRateDetermination P-9Radiation Monitoring SystemEPIP2-18ControlRoomDoseAssessment 5-18

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev05.0Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation 5.2DoseProjections/

Environmental Measurements/

ReleaseRates5.2.4SiteAreaEmergency Doseprojections orfieldsurveysresulting fromactualorimminentreleasewhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2column"SAE"atthesiteboundaryorbeyond.Table5.2DoseProjection

/Env.Measurement Classification Thresholds TEDECDEThyroidTEDErateCDEThyroidrate10mRN/A10mR/hrN/A100mR500mR100mH/hr500mH/hr1000mR5000mR1000mH/hr5000mH/hrNUINARCIC:Boundarydoseresulting fromanactualorimminentreleaseofgaseousradioactivity exceeds100mRemTEDEor500mRCDEThyroidfortheactualorprojected durationoftherelease.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

'Basis:The100mRintegrated TEDEdoseinthisEALisbasedontheproposed10CFR20annualaveragepopulation exposure.

Thisvaluealsoprovidesadesirable gradient(oneorderofmagnitude) betweentheAlert,SiteAreaEmergency, andGeneralEmergency classes.Itisdeemedthatexposures lessthanthislimitarenotconsistent withtheSiteAreaEmergency class5-19 OSSI-92-402A-4-BEG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev0description.

The500mRintegrated CDEthyroiddosewasestablished inconsideration ofthe1:5ratiooftheEPAProtective ActionGuidelines forwholebodythyroid.Inestablishing thedoserateemergency actionlevels,adurationofonehourisassumed.Therefore, thedoserateEALsarebasedonasiteboundarydoserateof100mR/hrTEDEor500mRlhrCDEthyroid,whichever ismorelimiting.

PEG

Reference:

AS1.3AS1.4BasisReference(s):

2.3.Technical Specifications, Amendment No.24,Articles3.9.1.1thru3.9.2.3EPIP2-3Emergency ReleaseRateDetermination P-9Radiation Monitoring SystemEPIP2-18ControlRoomDoseAssessment t5-20 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev05.0Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation 5.2DoseProjections/

Environmental Measurements/

ReleaseRates5.2.5GeneralEmergency Doseprojections orfieldsurveysresulting Romactualorimminentreleasewhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2column"GE"atthesiteboundaryorbeyond.Table5.2DoseProection/Env.Measurement Classification Thresholds AlertTEDECDEThyroidTEDErateCDEThyroidrate10mRN/A10mH/hrN/A100mR500mR100mH/hr500mR/hr1000mR5000mR1000mH/hr5000mH/hrNUIHARCICBoundarydoseresulting fromanactualorimminentreleaseofgaseousradioactivity exceeds1000mRemTEDEor5000mRCDEThyroidfortheactualorprojected durationofthereleaseusingactualmeteorology.

FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:TheGeneralEmergency valuesofTable5.2arebasedontheboundarydoseresulting fromanactualorimminentreleaseofgaseousradioactivity thatexceeds1000mRTEDEor5000mRCDEthyroidfortheactualorprojected durationoftherelease.The1000mRTEDEandthe5000mRCDEthyroidintegrated dosearebasedontheEPAprotective actionguidancewhich5-21 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev0indicates thatpublicprotective actionsareindicated ifthedoseexceeds1remTEDEor5remCDEthyroid.Thisisconsistent withtheemergency classdescription foraGeneralEmergency.

Thislevelconstitutes theupperlevelofthedesirable gradientfortheSiteAreaEmergency.

Actualmeteorology isspecifically identified sinceitgivesthemostaccuratedoseassessment.

Actualmeteorology (including forecasts) shouldbeusedwheneverpossible.

Inestablishing thedoserateemergency actionlevels,adurationofonehourisassumed.Therefore, thedoserateEALsarebasedonasiteboundarydoserateof1000mR/hrTEDEor5000mR/hrCDEthyroid,whichever ismorelimiting.

PEG

Reference:

AG1.3AG1.4~BasisReference(s):

2.3.4Technical Specifications, Amendment No.24,Articles3.9.1.1thru3.9.2.3EPIP2-3Emergency ReleaseRateDetermination P-9Radiation Monitoring SystemEPIP2-18ControlRoomDoseAssessment 5-22 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev05.0Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation 5.3AreaRadiation Levels5.3.1UnusualEventAnysustained directARMreadings>100xalarmoroffscalehiresulting fromanuncontrolled processMMARCIC:Unexpected increaseinplantradiation orairborneconcentration.

FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:Validelevatedarearadiation levelsusuallyhavelongleadtimesrelativetothepotential forradiological releasebeyondthesiteboundary, thusimpacttopublichealthandsafetyisverylow.ItshouldbenotedthattheCASandSASdonothaveinstalled radiation monitors.

Therefore, evaluation ofthisEALwouldrequiresurveyoftheseareas.ThisEALaddresses unplanned increases inradiation levelsinsidetheplant.Theseradiation levelsrepresent adegradation inthecontrolofradioactive materialandapotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Arearadiation levelsabove100timesthealarmsetpointhavebeenselectedbecausetheyarereadilyidentifiable onARMinstrumentation.

SinceARMsetpoints arenominally setonedecadeovernormallevels,100timesthealarmsetpointprovidesanappropriate threshold foremergency classification.

ForthoseARMswhoseupperrangelimitarelessthan100timesthealarmsetpoint, avalueofoffscalehighisused.ThisEALescalates toanAlert,iftheincreases impairthelevelofsafeplantoperation.

00 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev0PEG

Reference:

AU2.4.BasisReference(s):

None5-24 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev05.0Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation 5.3AreaRadiation Levels5.3.2AlertSustained arearadiation levels)15ma/hrineither:ControlRoomORCentralAlarmStationandSecondary AlarmStationIVUMARCIC:Releaseofradioactive materialorincreases inradiation levelswithinthefacilitythatimpedesoperation ofsystemsrequiredtomaintainsafeoperations ortoestablish ormaintaincoldshutdown.

FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:ThisEALaddresses increased radiation levelsthatimpedenecessary accesstooperating stationsrequiring continuous occupancy tomaintainsafeplantoperation orperformasafeplantshutdown.

Areasrequiring continuous occupancy includetheControlRoom,thecentralalarmstation(CAS)andthesecondary securityalarmstation(SAS).ThesecurityalarmstationsareincludedinthisEALbecauseoftheirimportance topermitting accesstoareasrequiredtoassuresafeplantoperations.

Thevalueof15mR/hrisderivedfromtheGDC19valueof5remin30dayswithadjustment forexpectedoccupancy times.AlthoughSectionIII.D.3ofNUREG-0737, "Clarification ofTMIActionPlanRequirements",

providesthatthe15mR/hrvaluecanbeaveragedoverthe30days,thevalueisusedherewithoutaveraging.

A30daydurationimpliesaneventpotentially moresignificant thananAlert.5-25 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev0Itistheimpairedabilitytooperatetheplantthatresultsintheactualorpotential degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Thecauseormagnitude oftheincreaseinradiation levelsisnotaconcernofthisEAL.TheEmergency Coordinator mustconsiderthesourceorcauseoftheincreased radiation levelsanddetermine ifanyotherEALsmaybeinvolved.

Forexample,adoserateof15mR/hrintheControlRoommaybeaprobleminitself.However,theincreasemayalsobeindicative ofhighdoseratesinthecontainment duetoaLOCA.Inthislattercase,aSiteAreaEmergency oraGeneralEmergency maybeindicated byotherEALcategories.

ThisEALisnotintendedtoapplytoanticipated temporary radiation increases duetoplannedevents(e.g.,radwastecontainer

movement, depletedresintransfers, etc.).PEG

Reference:

AA3.1BasisReference(s):

1.GDC192.NUREG-0737, "Clari6cation ofTMIActionPlanRequirements",

SectionIII.D.33.P-9Radiation Monitoring SystemRev.675-26 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev05.0Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation 5.3AreaRadiation Levels5.3.3AlertSustained abnormalarearadiation levels>8R/hrwithinanyareas,Table5.3ANDAccessisrequiredtoestablish ormaintaincoldshutdown.

Table5.3PlantAreas~ReactorContainment Building~Auxiliary Building~TurbineBuilding~Emergency DieselBuilding~ScreenHouse~StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater BuildingNUMARCIC:Releaseofradioactive materialorincreases inradiation levelswithinthefacilitythatimpedesoperation ofsystemsrequiredtomaintainsafeoperations ortoestablish ormaintaincoldshutdown.

FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:ThisEALaddresses increased radiation levelsinareasrequiring infrequent accessinordertomaintainsafeplantoperation orperformasafeplantshutdown.

Arearadiation levelsatorabove8H/hrareindicative ofradiation fieldswhichmaylimitpersonnel accessoradversely affectequipment whoseoperation maybeneededtoassureadequatecorecoolingorshutdownthereactor.Thebasisofthevalueisdescribed inNMPCmemoFileCode5-27 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev0NMP31027"Exposure Guidelines ForUnusual/Accident Conditions".

Theareasselectedareconsistent withthoselistedinotherEALsandrepresent thosestructures whichhousesystemsandequipment necessary forthesafeoperation andshutdownoftheplant.Itistheimpairedabilitytooperatetheplantthatresultsintheactualorpotential degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Thecauseormagnitude oftheincreaseinradiation levelsisnotaconcernofthisEAL.TheEmergency Coordinator mustconsiderthesourceorcauseoftheincreased radiation levelsanddetermine ifanyotherEALmaybeinvolved.

Forexample,adoserateof8R/hrmaybeaprobleminitself.However,theincreasemayalsobeindicative ofhighdoseratesinthecontainment duetoaLOCA.Inthislattercase,aSiteAreaEmergency oraGeneralEmergency maybeindicated byotherEALcategories.

ThisEALisnotmeanttoapplytoincreases inthecontainment radiation monitorsastheseareeventswhichareaddressed inotherEALs.Norisitintendedtoapplytoanticipated temporary radiation increases duetoplannedevents(e.g.,radwastecontainer

movement, depleteresintransfers, etc.).PEG

Reference:

AA3.2BasisReference(s):

1.NiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation memoFileCodeNMP31027"Exposure Guidelines ForUnusuaVAccident Conditions",

Revision1,3/18/935-28 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Lossofvitalplantelectrical powercancompromise plantsafetysystemoperability including decayheatremovalandemergency corecoolingsystemswhichmaybenecessary toensurefissionproductbarrierintegrity.

Theeventsofthiscategoryhavebeengroupedintothefollowing twolossofelectrical powertypes:APr'hiscategoryincludeslossesofonsiteand/oro6'siteACpowersourcesincluding stationblackoutevents.fDPr'hiscategoryinvolvestotallossesofvitalplant125vdcpowersources.

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev16.0Electrical Failures6.1.1UnusualEvent6.1LossofACPowerSourcesLossofabilitytosupplypowertothesafeguard busesfromoffsitecircuits751and767for>15min.NUINARCIC:Lossofalloffsitepowertoessential bussesforgreaterthan15minutes.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:Prolonged lossofalloFsiteACpowerreducesrequiredredundancy andpotentially degradesthelevelofsafetyoftheplantbyrendering theplantmorevulnerable toacompletelossofACpower(stationblackout).

Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathreshold toexcludetransient ormomentary powerlosses.PEG

Reference:

SU1.1BasisReference(s):

1.RGE-6"4160VElectrical Distribution System"2.RGE-7"480VDistribution

"

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev16.0Electrical Failures6.1LossofACPowerSources6.1.2AlertLossof'allsafeguards busACpowerfor>15min.NUlKARCIC:LossofalloffsitepowerandlossofallonsiteACpowertoessential bussesduringcoldshutdown, refueling ordefueledmode.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

ColdShutdown, Refueling, DefueledBasis:LossofallACpowercompromises allplantsafetysystemsrequiring electricpower.ThisEALisindicated by:lossofallo6'siteANDonsiteACpowertosafeguards buses14/18AND16/17forgreaterthan15minutes.Whenincoldshutdown, refueling, ordefueledmodetheeventcanbeclassified asanAlert,becauseofthesigni6cantly reduceddecayheat,lowertemperature andpressure, increasing thetimetorestoreoneoftheemergency busses,relativetothatspeci6edfortheSiteAreaEmergency EAL.Escalating totheSiteAreaEmergency, ifappropriate, isbyAbnormalRadLevels/Radiological EfHuent,orEmergency Coordinator JudgmentICs.Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathreshold toexcludetransient ormomentary powerlosses.PEG

Reference:

SA1.1BasisReference(s):

1.RGE-6"4160VElectrical Distribution System" OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev16.0Electrical Failures6.1.3Alert6.1LossofACPowerSourcesAvailable safeguard trainACpowerreducedtoonlyoneofthefollowing for>15min.:~EDG1A(14/18)~EDG1B(16/17)~StationAuxiliary Transformer 12A~StationAuxiliary Transformer 12B1%JMARCIC:ACpowercapability toessential bussesreducedtoasinglepowersourceforgreaterthan15minutessuchthatanyadditional singlefailurewouldresultinstationblackoutwithreactorcoolant>200'F.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:Thecondition indicated bythisEAListhedegradation oftheoffsitepowerwithaconcurrent failureofoneemergency generator tosupplypowertoitsemergency busses.Anotherrelatedcondition couldbethelossofalloFsitepowerandlossofonsiteemergency dieselswithonlyonetrainofemergency bussesbeingfedfromtheunitmaingenerator, orthelossofonsiteemergency dieselswithonlyonetrainofemergency bussesbeingfedfromoffsitepower.Thesubsequent lossofthissinglepowersourcewouldescalatetheeventtoaSiteAreaEmergency.

PEG

Reference:

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1BasisReference(s):

1.RGE-6"4160VElectrical Distribution" 2.RGE-7"480vDistribution" OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev16.0Electrical Failures6.1LossofACPowerSources6.1.4SiteAreaEmergency Lossofallsafeguards busACpowerfor>15min.NUINARCIC:LossofalloffsitepowerandlossofallonsiteACpowertoessential busseswithreactorcoolant>200'F.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:LossofallACpowercompromises allplantsafetysystemsrequiring electricpower.ThisEALisindicated by:lossofalloffsiteANDonsiteACpowertosafeguards buses14/18AND16/17forgreaterthan15minutes.Prolonged lossofallACpowerwillcausecoreuncoveryandlossofcontainment integrity, thusthiseventcanescalatetoaGeneralEmergency.

Thetimedurationshouldbeselectedtoexcludetransient ormomentary powerlosses,butshouldnotexceed15minutes.PEG

Reference:

SS1.1BasisReference(s):

1.RGE-6"4160VElectrical Distribution" 2.RGE-7"480vDistribution" OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev16.0Electrical Failures6.1.5GeneralEmergency 6.1LossofACPowerSourcesLossofallsafeguards busACpowerANDeither:Powerrestoration toanysafeguards busisnotlikelyin54hrsORActualorimminententryintoORANGEorREDpathonF-0.2,"CORECOOLING"NUMARCIC:Prolonged lossofalloffsitepowerandprolonged lossofallonsiteACpowerwithreactorcoolant>200'F.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:LossofallACpowercompromises allplantsafetysystemsrequiring electricpower.Prolonged lossofallACpowerwillleadtolossoffuelclad,RCS,andcontainment.

AlthoughthisEALmaybeviewedasredundant totheRPVWaterLevelEALs,itsinclusion isnecessary tobetterassuretimelyrecognition andemergency response.

ThisEALisspecified toassurethatintheunlikelyeventofprolonged stationblackout, timelyrecognition oftheseriousness oftheeventoccursandthatdeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency occursasearlyasisappropriate, basedonareasonable assessment oftheeventtrajectory.

Thelikelihood ofrestoring atleastoneemergency busshouldbebasedonarealistic appraisal ofthesituation sinceadelayinanupgradedecisionbasedononlyachanceofmitigating theeventcouldresultinalossofvaluabletimeinpreparing andimplementing publicprotective actions.

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Inaddition, undertheseconditions, fissionproductbarriermonitoring capability maybedegraded.

AlthoughitmaybedifBculttopredictwhenpowercanberestored, theEmergency Coordinator shoulddeclareaGeneralEmergency basedontwomajorconsiderations:

1.Arethereanypresentindications thatcorecoolingisalreadydegradedtothepointthatLossorPotential Lossoffissionproductbarriersisimminent?

2.Iftherearenopresentindications ofsuchcorecoolingdegradation, howlikelyisitthatpowercanberestoredintimetoassurethatalossoftwobarrierswithapotential lossofthethirdbarriercanbeprevented?

Thus,indication ofcontinuing corecoolingdegradation mustbebasedonfissionproductbarriermonitoring withparticular emphasisonEmergency Coordinator judgmentasitrelatestoimminentlossorpotential lossoffissionproductbarriersanddegradedabilitytomonitorfissionproductbarriers.

ThetimetorestoreACpowerisbasedonsiteblackoutcopinganalysisperformed inconformance with10CFR50.63 andRegulatory Guide1.155,"StationBlackout",

withappropriate allowance foroffsiteemergency response.

PEG

Reference:

SG1.1BasisReference(s):

1.2.3.4F-0.2,"CORECOOLING,"

NRClettertoDr.MecredydatedV30/92"REGinnaNuclearPowerPlantStationBlackoutAnalysis(TACM68548)RGE-6"4160vElectrical Distribution System"RGE-7"480vDistribution" OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev16.0Electrical Failures6.2.1UnusualEvent6.2LossofDCPowerSources<105vdcbusvoltageindications on125vdcbatteries 1Aand1Bfor>15min.MMARCIC:Unplanned lossofrequiredDCpowerduringcoldshutdownorrefueling modeforgreaterthan15minutes.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

ColdShutdown, Refueling Basis:ThepurposeofthisEAListorecognize alossofDCpowercompromising theabilitytomonitorandcontroltheremovalofdecayheatduringcoldshutdownorrefueling operations.

ThisEALisintendedtobeanticipatory inasmuchastheoperating crewmaynothavenecessary indication andcontrolofequipment neededtorespondtotheloss.Thebusvoltageisbasedontheminimumbusvoltagenecessary fortheoperation ofsafetyrelatedequipment.

Thisvoltagevalueincorporates amarginofatleast15minutesofoperation beforetheonsetofinability tooperateloads.PEG

Reference:

SU7.1BasisReference(s):

1.RGE-9"Instrument BusandDCPowerSystem" OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev16.0Electrical Failures6.2.2SiteAreaEmergency 6.2LossofDCPowerSources>105vdcbusvoltageindications on125vdcbatteries 1Aand1B.for>15min.NUINARCIC:LossofallvitalDCpowerwithreactorcoolant>200'F.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:LossofallDCpowercompromises abilitytomonitorandcontrolplantsafetyfunctions.

Prolonged lossofallDCpowerwillcausecoreuncovering andlossofcontainment integrity whenthereissignificant decayheatandsensibleheatinthereactorsystem.Escalation toaGeneralEmergency wouldoccurbyotherEALcategories.

Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathreshold toexcludetransient ormomentary powerlosses.Thebusvoltageisbasedontheminimumbusvoltagenecessary fortheoperation ofsafetyrelatedequipment.

Thisvoltagevalueincorporates amarginofatleast15minutesofoperation beforetheonsetofinability tooperateloads.PEG

Reference:

SS3.1BasisReference(s):

1.RGE-9"Instrument BusandDCPowerSystem"6-10 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Numerousplantsystemrelatedequipment failureeventswhichwarrantemergency classification, basedupontheirpotential toposeactualorpotential threatstoplantsafety,havebeenidentified inthiscategory.

Theeventsofthiscategoryhavebeengroupedintothefollowing eventtypes:T'OnlyoneEALfallsunderthiseventtyperelatedtothefailureoftheplanttobebroughttotherequiredplantoperating condition requiredbytechnical specifications.

milrrnr1mvinThiscategoryincludeseventswhichareindicative oflossesofoperability ofsafetysystemssuchasECCS,isolation functions, ControlRoomhabitability orcoldandhotshutdowncapabilities.

fn'nA1nliCertaineventswhichdegradetheplantoperators abilitytoeffectively assessplantconditions orcommunicate withessential personnel withinorexternaltotheplantwarrantemergency classification.

Underthiseventtypearelossesofannunciators and/orcommunication equipment.

7-1 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev17.0Equipment Failures7.1Technical Speci6cation Requirements 7.1.1Unusual'Event Plantisnotbroughttorequiredoperating modewithinTechnical Specifications LCOActionStatement Time.1%UAIARCIC:Inability toreachrequiredshutdownwithinTechnical Specification Limits.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:LimitingConditions ofOperation (LCOs)requiretheplanttobebroughttoarequiredshutdownmodewhentheTechnical Specification requiredconfiguration cannotberestored.

Depending onthecircumstances, thismayormaynotbeanemergency orprecursor toamoreseverecondition.

Inanycase,theinitiation ofplantshutdownrequiredbythesiteTechnical Specification requiresaonehourreportunder10CFR50.72 (b)non-emergency events.Theplantiswithinitssafetyenvelopewhenbeingshutdownwithintheallowable actionstatement timeintheTechnical Specifications.

Animmediate Notification ofanUnusualEventisrequiredwhentheplantisnotbroughttotherequiredoperating modewithintheallowable actionstatement timeintheTechnical Specifications.

Declaration ofanUnusualEventisbasedonthetimeatwhichtheLCO-specified actionstatement timeperiodelapsesunderthesiteTechnical Specifications andisnotrelatedtohowlongacondition mayhaveexisted.OtherrequiredTechnical Specification shutdowns thatinvolveprecursors tomoreseriouseventsareaddressed byotherEALs.7-2 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1PEG

Reference:

SU2.1BasisReference(s):

1.Technical Specifications Section3.07-3 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev17.0Equipment Failures7.2SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation 7.2.1UnusualEventReportofmainturbinefailureresulting incasingpenetration ordamagetoturbinesealsorgenerator seals.NUMARCIC:Naturalanddestructive phenomena affecting theprotected area.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

PowerOperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALisintendedtoaddressmainturbinerotatingcomponent failuresofsuf6cient magnitude tocauseobservable damagetotheturbinecasingortothesealsoftheturbinegenerator.

Ofmajorconcernisthepotential forleakageofcombustible fluids(lubricating oils)andgases(hydrogen cooling)totheplantenvirons.

Actualfiresandflammable gasbuildupareappropriately classified throughotherEALs.ThisEALisconsistent withthedefinition ofanUnusualEventwhilemaintaining theanticipatory naturedesiredandrecognizing therisktonon-safety relatedequipment.

PEG

Reference:

HU1.6BasisReference(s):

None7-4 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev17.0Equipment Failures7.2SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation 7.2.2AlertTurbinefailuregenerated missilesresultinanyvisiblestructural damagetoplantvitalequipment NUINARCIC:Naturalanddestructive phenomena affecting theplantvitalarea.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

PowerOperations, HotShutdownBasis:ThisEALaddresses thethreattosafetyrelatedequipment imposedbymissilesgenerated bymainturbinerotatingcomponent failures.

Theinvolvedequipment includessafety-related equipment, theircontrols, andtheirpowersupplies.

ThisEALisconsistent withthedefinition ofanALERTinthat,ifmissileshavedamagedorpenetrated areascontaining safety-relatedequipment, thepotential existsforsubstantial degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.PEG

Reference:

HA1.6BasisReference(s):

None7-5 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev17.0Equipment Failures7.2SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation 7.2.3AlertEntryintoAP-CR.1"ControlRoomInaccessability" MMARCIC:Controlroomevacuation hasbeeninitiated.

FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

AllBasis:WiththeControlRoomevacuated, additional support,monitoring anddirection throughtheTechnical SupportCenterand/orotheremergency operations centerisnecessary.

Inability toestablish plantcontrolfromoutsidetheControlRoomwillescalatethiseventtoaSiteAreaEmergency.

PEG

Reference:

HA5.1BasisReference(s):

1.AP-CR.1ControlRoomInaccessibility 7-6 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev17.0Equipment Failures17.2SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation 7.2.4AlertReactorcoolanttemperature cannotbemaintained

<200'FNUINARCIC:Inability tomaintainplantincoldshutdown.

FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

ColdShutdown, Refueling Basis:hThisEALaddresses completelossoffunctions requiredforcorecoolingduringrefueling andcoldshutdownmodes.Escalation toSiteAreaEmergency orGeneralEmergency wouldbethroughotherEALs.Areactorcoolanttemperature increasethatapproaches orexceedsthecoldshutdowntechnical specification limitwarrantsdeclaration ofanAlertirrespective oftheavailability oftechnical specification requiredfunctions tomaintaincoldshutdown.

TheconcernofthisEAListhelossofabilitytomaintaintheplantincoldshutdownwhichisdefinedbyreactorcoolanttemperature andnottheoperability ofequipment whichsupportsremovalofheatfromthereactor.PEG

Reference:

SA3.17-7 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1BasisReference(s):

1.AP-RHR.1"LossofRHR"2.Technical Specifications Section1.23,AP-RHR-2"LossofRHRWhileOperating atReducedRCSInventory Conditions" 7-8 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1'7.0Equipment Failures7.2SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation 7.2.5SiteAreaEmergency ControlRoomevacuation ANDCorecoolingcannotbeestablished perAP-CR.1"ControlRoomInaccessibility" in~20min.MJMARCIC:Controlroomevacuation hasbeeninitiated andcontrolofcorecoolingcannotbeestablished.

FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:ThisEALindicates thatexpeditious transferofsafetysystemshasnotoccurredbutfissionproductbarrierdamagemaynotyetbeindicated.

Thetimeintervalfortransferisbasedonanalysisorassessments astohowquicklycontrolmustbereestablished withoutcoreuncovering and/orcoredamage.Thedesigncriteriafortheremoteshutdownequipment specifies thatcontrolofsafetysystemsmustbeabletobeachievedwithoutresulting incoreuncoveryorcoredamage.REGNPSAppendixRsubmittal indicates 20minutesisthemaximumtimeforwhichcontrolofplantsafetysystemsshouldoccurunderworstcaseconditions.

Therefore, 20minutesiswithinthedesigncriteriaoftheremoteshutdownequipment.

Incoldshutdownandrefueling modes,operatorconcernisdirectedtowardmaintaining corecoolingsuchasisdiscussed inGenericLetter88-17,"LossofDecayHeatRemoval."

Inpoweroperation, andhotshutdownmodes,operatorconcernisprimarily directedtowardmaintaining criticalsafetyfunctions andtherebyassuringfissionproductbarrie'rintegrity.

7-9 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1PEG

Reference:

HS2.1BasisReference(s):

1.AP-CR.1ControlRoomInaccessibility 2.AppendixRSection6.4.5page6-353.GenericLetter88-17,"LossofDecayHeatRemoval."

7-10 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev17.0Equipment Failures7.3LossofIndications

/Alarms/Communication Capability 7.3.1UnusualEventUnplanned lossofannunciators orindications onanyControlRoomPanels,Table7.3for>15min.ANDIncreased surveillance isrequiredforsafeplantoperation Table7.3VitalControlRoomPanelsAAABCDEF0NUINARCIC:Unplanned lossofmostorallsafetysystemannunciation orindication inthecontrolroomforgreaterthan15minuteswithreactorcoolanttemperature

>2OO'F.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALrecognizes thedifhculty associated withmonitoring changingplantconditions withouttheuseofamajorportionoftheannunciation orindication equipment.

Recognition oftheavailability ofcomputerbasedindication equipment isconsidered (PPCSandSAS)."Unplanned" lossofannunciators orindicators excludesscheduled maintenance andtestingactivities.

Itisnotintendedthatplantpersonnel performadetailedcountoftheinstrumentation lostbuttheuseofjudgmentbytheShiftSupervisor asthethreshold fordetermining theseverityoftheplantconditions.

Thisjudgment7-11 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1issupported bythespecificopinionoftheShikSupervisor thatadditional operating personnel willberequiredtoprovideincreased monitoring ofsystemoperation to,safelyoperatetheplant.Itisfurtherrecognized thatmostplantdesignsprovideredundant safetysystemindication poweredfromseparateuninterruptable powersupplies.

Whilefailureofalargeportionofannunciators ismorelikelythanafailureofalargeportionofindications, theconcernisincludedinthisEALduetodifficulty associated withassessment ofplantconditions.

Thelossofspecific, orseveral,safetysystemindicators shouldremainafunctionofthatspecificsystemorcomponent operability status.Thiswillbeaddressed bytheirspecificTechnical Specification.

Theinitiation ofaTechnical Specification imposedplantshutdownrelatedtotheinstrument losswillbereportedvia10CFR50.72.

Iftheshutdownisnotincompliance withtheTechnical Specification action,theUnusualEventisbasedonEAL7.1.1,Inability toReachRequiredShutdownWithinTechnical Specification Limits.Annunciators orindicators forthisEALmustincludethoseidentified intheAbnormalOperating procedures, intheEmergency Operating Procedures, andinotherEALs(e.g.,area,process,and/oreffluentradmonitors, etc.).Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathreshold toexcludetransient ormomentary powerlosses.Duetothelimitednumberofsafetysystemsinoperation duringcoldshutdown, refueling, anddefueledmodes,thisEALisnotapplicable duringthesemodesofoperation.

ThisUnusualEventwillbeescalated toanAlertifatransient isinprogressduringthelossofannunciation orindication.

PEG

Reference:

SU3.1BasisReference(s):

None7-12 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev17.0Equipment Failures7.3LossofIndications

/Alarms/Communication Capability 7.3.2UnusualEventLossofallcommunications capability affecting theabilitytoeither:Performroutineoperations ORNotifyoffsiteagenciesorpersonnel NUMARCIC:Unplanned lossofallonsiteoroffsitecommunications capabilities.

FPBloss/potential loss:~N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:ThepurposeofthisEAListorecognize alossofcommunications capability thateitherdefeatstheplantoperations staffabilitytoperformroutinetasksnecessary forplantope'rations ortheabilitytocommunicate problemswithoffsiteauthorities.

Thelossofoffsitecommunications abilityisexpectedtobesignificantly morecomprehensive thanthecondition addressed by10CFR50.72.

Theonsitecommunications lossmustencompass thelossofallmeansofroutinecommunications (i.e.,phones,soundpoweredphonesystems,pagepartysystem,and'radios/walkie talkies).

Theoffsitecommunications lossmustencompass thelossofallmeansofcommunications withoffsiteauthorities.

ThisshouldincludeENS,Belllines,FAXtransmissions, anddedicated phonesystems.ThisEALisintendedtobeusedonlywhenextraordinary meansarebeingutilizedtomakecommunications possible(relaying ofinformation fromradiotransmissions, individuals beingsenttooffsitelocations, etc.).7-13 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1.PEG

Reference:

SU6.1BasisReference(s):

1.A-56,"Communication SystemsatGinnaStation"7-14 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev17.0Equipment Failures7.3LossofIndications

/Alarms/Communication Capability 7.3.3AlertUnplanned lossofannunciators orindications onanyControlRoomPanels,.Table7.3for>15min.ANDIncreased surveillance isrequiredforsafeplantoperation ANDeither:Aplanttransient inprogressORPPCSandSASareunavailable Table7.3VitalControlRoomPanelsAABCDEFGNUMARCIC:Unplanned lossofmostorallsafetysystemannunciation orindication incontrolroomwitheither(1)asignificant transient inprogress, or(2)compensatory non-alarming indicators areunavailable withreactorcoolant>200'F.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALrecognizes thedifBculty associated withmonitoring changingplant'onditions withouttheuseofamajorportionoftheannunciation orindication equipment duringatransient.

Recognition oftheavailability ofcomputerbasedindication equipment isconsidered (PPCS,SAS,etc.)."Unplanned" lossofannunciators orindicators doesnotincludescheduled maintenance andtestingactivities.

7-15 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Itisnotintendedthatplantpersonnel performadetailedcountoftheinstrumentation lostbuttheuseofjudgmentbytheShiftSupervisor asthethreshold fordetermining theseverityoftheplantconditions.

Thisjudgmentissupported bythespecificopinionoftheShiftSupervisor thatadditional operating personnel willberequiredtoprovideincreased monitoring ofsystemoperation tosafelyoperatetheplant.Itisfurtherrecognized thatmostplantdesignsprovideredundant safetysystemindication poweredfromseparateuninterruptable powersupplies.

Whilefailureofalargeportionofannunciators ismorelikelythanafailureofalargeportionofindications, theconcernisUicludedinthisEALduetodifFiculty associated withassessment ofplantconditions.

Thelossofspecific, orseveral,safetysystemindicators shouldremainafunctionofthatspecificsystemorcomponent operability status,Thiswillbeaddressed bythespecificTechnical Specification.

Theinitiation ofaTechnical Specification imposedplantshutdownrelatedtotheinstrument losswillbereportedvia10CFR50.72.

Annunciators orindicators forthisEALincludesthoseidentified intheAbnormalOperating Procedures, intheEmergency Operating Procedures, andinotherEALs(e.g.,area,process,and/oreffluentradmonitors, etc.)."Significant transient" includesresponsetoautomatic ormanuallyinitiated functions suchastrips,runbacksinvolving greaterthan25%thermalpowerchange,ECCSinjections, orthermalpoweroscillations of10%orgreater.Ifbothamajorportionoftheannunciation systemandallcomputermonitoring areunavailable totheextentthattheadditional operating personnel arerequiredtomonitorindications, theAlertisrequired.

Duetothelimitednumberofsafetysystemsinoperation duringcoldshutdown, refueling anddefueledmodes,noEALisindicated duringthesemodesofoperation.

ThisAlertwillbeescalated toaSiteAreaEmergency iftheoperating crewcannotmonitorthetransient inprogress, PEG

Reference:

SA4.1BasisReference(s):

None7-16 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev17.0Equipment Failures7.3LossofIndications

/Alarms/Communication Capability 7.3.4SiteAreaEmergency Lossofannunciators orindications onanyControlRoomPanels,Table7.3ANDCompletelossofabilitytomonitorallcriticalsafetyfunctionstatusANDAplanttransient inprogressTable7.3VitalControlRoomPanelsAAABCDE'GNUIKARCIC:Inability tomonitorasignificant transient inprogresswithreactorcoolant>200DFFPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALrecognizes theinability oftheControlRoomstafftomonitortheplantresponsetoatransient.

ASiteAreaEmergency isconsidered toexistiftheControlRoomstaffcannotmonitorsafetyfunctions neededforprotection ofthepublic.Annunciators forthisEALshouldbelimitedtoincludethoseidentified intheAbnormalOperating Procedures, intheCSFST'sandEmergency Operating Procedures, andinotherEALs(e.g.,rad"monitors, etc.)."Significant transient" includesresponsetoautomatic ormanuallyinitiated functions suchasscrams,runbacksinvolving greaterthan25lothermal7-17 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1powerchange,ECCSinjections, orthermalpoweroscillations of10%orgreater.Indications neededtomonitorcriticalsafetyfunctions necessary for'rotection ofthepublicmustincludeControlRoomindications, computergenerated indications anddedicated annunciation capability.

Thespecificindications shouldbethoseusedtodetermine suchfunctions astheabilitytoshutdownthereactor,maintainthecorecooledandinaeoolablegeometry, toremoveheatfromthecore,tomaintainthereactorcoolantsystemintact,andtomaintaincontainment intact."Planned" actionsareexcludedfromtheEALsincethelossofinstrumentation ofthismagnitude isofsuchsignificance duringatransient thatthecauseofthelossisnotanameliorating factor.PEG

Reference:

SS6.1BasisReference(s):

None7-18 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Hazardsarethosenon-plant systemrelatedeventswhichcandirectlyorindirectly impactplantoperation orreactorplantandpersonnel safety.Theeventsofthiscategoryhavebeengroupedintothefollowing types:PMtgpldt*dtptpintotheProtected Areaaswellasbombthreatsandsabotageattempts.

Alsoaddressed areactualsecuritycompromises threatening lossofphysicalcontroloftheplant.Plplglltt*dtpldreactorsafety.Appropriate forclassification arefireswithinthesiteProtected Areaorwhichmayaffectoperability ofvitalequipment.

EM-dttg-tMloccurring eventswhichcancausedamagetoplantfacilities suchasaircraftcrashes,missileimpacts,toxicorflammable gasleaksorexplosions fromwhateversource.Ett',tqddwhichhavepotential tocausedamagetoplantstructures orequipment significant enoughtothreatenpersonnel orplantsafety.

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev18.0Hazards8.1.1UnusualEvent8.1SecurityThreatsBombdeviceorotherindication ofattempted sabotagediscovered withinplantProtected Area.ORAnysecurityeventwhichrepresents apotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.MMARCIC:Confirmed securityeventwhichindicates apotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:ThisEALisbasedontheREGNPSSecurityContingency Plan.Securityeventswhichdonotrepresent atleastapotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplant,arereportedunder10CFR73.71 orinsomecasesunder10CFR50.72, TheplantProtected Areaboundaryiswithinthesecurityisolation zoneandisdefinedinthesecurityplan.Bombdevicesdiscovered withintheplantvitalareawouldresultinEALescalation.

PEG

Reference:

HU4.1HU4.2BasisReference(s):

1.REGNPSSecurityContingency Plan OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev18.0Hazards8.1.2Alert8.1SecurityThreatsIntrusion intoplantProtected Areabyanadversary.

ORAnysecurityeventwhichrepresents anactualsubstantial degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.MMARCIC:Securityeventinaplantprotected area.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:Thisclassofsecurityeventsrepresents anescalated threattoplantsafetyabovethatcontained intheUnusualEvent,ForthepurposesofthisEAL,theintrusion byunauth'orized personnel insidetheProtected Areaboundarycanbeconsidered asignificant securitythreat.Intrusion intoavitalareabyunauthorized personnel willescalatethiseventtoaSiteAreaEmergency.

PEG

Reference:

HA4.1HA4.2BasisReference(s):

1.REGNPSSecurityContingency Plan8.3 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev18.0Hazards8.1.3SiteAreaEmergency 8.1SecurityThreats.Intrusion intoaplantsecurityvitalareabyanadversary.

ORAnysecurityeventwhichrepresents actualorlikelyfailuresofplantsystemsneededtoprotectthepublic.MMARCIC:Securityeventinaplantvitalarea.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:Thisclassofsecurityeventsrepresents anescalated threattoplantsafetyabovethatcontained intheAlertinthatunauthorized personnel haveprogressed fromtheProtected Areatothevitalarea.PEG

Reference:

HS1.1HS1.2BasisReference(s):

1.REGNPSSecurityContingency Plan OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev18.0Hazards8.1.4GeneralEmergency 8.1SecurityThreatsSecurityeventwhichresultsin:LossofplantcontrolfromtheControlRoomORLossofremoteshutdowncapability NUMARCICSecurityeventresulting inlossofabilitytoreachandmaintaincoldshutdown.

FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:ThisEALencompasses conditions underwhichunauthorized personnel havetakenphysicalcontrolofvitalareasrequiredtoreachandmaintainsafeshutdown.

PEG

Reference:

HG1.1HG1.2BasisReference(s):

1.REGNPSSecurityContingency Plan OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1~8.0Hazards8.2.1UnusualEvent8.2FireorExplosion Confirmed fireinanyplantarea,Table8.2or8.3notextinguished in<15min.ofControlRoomnotification:

Table8.2PlantAreas~TurbineBuilding~TSCServiceBuilding~Contaminated StorageBuildingTable8.3PlantVitalAreas~ControlBuilding~ReactorContainment Building~Auxiliary Building~Intermediate Building~Emergency DieselBuilding~StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater Building~ScreenHouseNUIYIARCICFirewithinprotected areaboundarynotextinguished within15minutesofdetection.

FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Basis:ThepurposeofthisEAListoaddressthemagnitude andextentoffiresthatmaybepotentially significant precursors todamagetosafetysystems.Thisexcludessuchitemsasfireswithinadministration buildings, waste-basket fires,andothersmallfiresofnosafetyconsequence.

PEG

Reference:

HU2.1BasisReference(s):

1.SitePlotPlan OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev18.0Hazards8.2.2Alert8.2FireorExplosion Fireorexplosion inanyplantarea,Table8.2orTable8.3whichresultsinEITHER:~visibledamagetoplantequipment orstructures neededforsafeplantoperation OR~whichaffectssafetysystemoperability asindicated bydegradedsystemperformance Table8.2PlantAreas~TurbineBuilding~TSC~ServiceBuilding~Contaminated StorageBuildingTable8.3PlantVitalAreas~ControlBuilding~ReactorContainment Building~Auxiliary Building~Intermediate Building~Emergency DieselBuilding~StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater Building~ScreenHouseNUIKARCIC:Fireorexplosion affecting theoperability ofplantsafetysystemsrequiredtoestablish ormaintainsafeshutdown.

FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

All OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Basis:Thelistedareascontainfunctions andsystemsrequiredforthesafeshutdownoftheplant.TheREGNPSsafeshutdownanalysiswasconsulted forequipment andplantareasrequiredfortheapplicable mode.Withregardtoexplosions, onlythoseexplosions ofsuQicient forcetodamagepermanent structures orequipment requiredforsafeoperation, orwhichresultsindegradedperformance ofsafetysystemswithintheidentified plantareasshouldbeconsidered.

Asusedhere,anexplosion isarapid,violent,unconfined combustion, oracatastrophic failureofpressurized equipment, thatpotentially impartssignificant energytonearbystructures andmaterials.

NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitude ofthedamage.ThewordingofthisEALdoesnotimplythatanassessment ofsafetysystemperformance isintendedtobeperformed, ratherthatasaresultoftheevent,safetysystemparameter symptomsaredegradedasaresultoftheevent.Thedeclaration ofanAlertandtheactivation oftheTSCwillprovidetheEmergency Coordinator withtheresources neededtoperformdamageassessments.

TheEmergency Coordinator alsoneedstoconsideranysecurityaspectsoftheexplosions.

PEG

Reference:

HA2.1BasisReference(s):

1.SitePlotPlan OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev18.0Hazards8.3.1UnusualEvent8.3Man-MadeEventsVehiclecrashintoorprojectile whichimpactsplantstructures orsystemswithinProtected AreaboundaryNUIKARCIC:Naturalanddestructive phenomena affecting theprotected area.FPBloss/potential loss:N/A~ModeApplicability:

Basis:TheProtected Areaboundaryiswithinthesecurityisolation zoneandisdefinedinthesitesecurityplan.ThisEALaddresses suchitemsasplane,helicopter, train,barge,carortruckcrash,orimpactofotherprojectiles thatmaypotentially damageplantstructures containing functions andsystemsrequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplant.Ifthecrashisconfirmed toaffectaplantvitalarea,theeventmaybeescalated toAlert.PEG

Reference:

HU1.4BasisReference(s):

1.SitePlotPlan8-10 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev18.0Hazards8.3.2UnusualEvent8.3Man-MadeEventsReportbyplantpersonnel ofanexplosion withinProtected Areaboundaryresulting invisibledamagetopermanent structures orequipment NUINARCIC:Naturalanddestructive phenomena affecting theprotected area.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:TheProtected Areaboundaryiswithinthesecurityisolation zoneandisdefinedinthesitesecurityplan.ForthisEAL,onlythoseexplosions ofsufBcient forcetodamagepermanent structures orequipment withintheProtected Areashouldbeconsidered.

Asusedhere,anexplosion isarapid,violent,unconfined combustion, oracatastrophic failureofpressurized equipment, thatpotentially impartssignificant energytonearbystructures andmaterials.

NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitude ofthedamage.Theoccurrence oftheexplosion withreportsofevidenceofdamage(e.g.,deformation, scorching) issufficient fordeclaration.

TheEmergency Coordinator alsoneedstoconsideranysecurityaspectsoftheexplosion.

PEG

Reference:

HU1.5BasisReference(s):

1.SitePlotPlan8-11 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev18.0Hazards8.3.3UnusualEvent8.3Man-MadeEventsReportordetection oftoxicorflammable gasesthatcouldenterorhaveenteredwithintheProtected AreaboundaryinamountsthatcouldafFectthe~healthofplantpersonnel orsafeplantoperation ORReportbylocal,countyorstateofficials forpotential evacuation ofsitepersonnel basedonoffsiteeventNUMARCIC:Releaseoftoxicorflammable gasesdeemeddetrimental tosafeoperation oftheplant.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:ThisEALisbasedonreleasesinconcentrations withinthesiteboundarythat=willafFectthehealthofplantpersonnel orafFecting thesafeoperation oftheplantwiththeplantbeingwithintheevacuation areaofanofFsiteevent(i.e.,tankertruckaccidentreleasing toxicgases,etc.).Theevacuation areaisasdetermined fromtheDOTEvacuation TablesforSelectedHazardous Materials, intheDOTEmergency ResponseGuideforHazardous Materials.

Shouldanexplosion occurwithinaspecified plantarea,anAlertwouldbedeclaredbasedonEAL8.2.2.,PEG

Reference:

HU3.1HU3.28-12 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocumentRev 1BasisReference(s):

None8-13

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev18.0Hazards8.3.4Alert8.3Man-MadeEventsVehiclecrashorprojectile impactwhichprecludes personnel accesstoordamagesequipment inplantvitalareas,Table8.3Table8.3PlantVitalAreas~ControlBuilding~ReactorContainment Building~Auxiliary Building~Intermediate Building~Emergency DieselBuilding~StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater Building~ScreenHouseNUINARCIC:Naturalanddestructive phenomena afFecting theplantvitalarea.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:ThisEALaddresses eventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjected toforcesbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurredtoplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpreted asmandating alengthydamageassessment priortoclassification.

NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitude ofthedamage.ThisEALaddresses suchitemsasplane,helicopter, train,barge,carortruckcrash,orimpactofprojectiles intoaplantvitalarea.8-14 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1PEG

Reference:

HA1.5BasisReference(s):

None8-15 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev18.0Hazards8.3.5Alert8.3Man-MadeEventsReportordetection oftoxicorflammable gaseswithinaplantarea,Table8.3,inconcentrations thatwillbelifethreatening toplantpersonnel orprecludeaccesstoequipment neededforsafeplantoperation Table8.3PlantVitalAreas~ControlBuilding~ReactorContainment Building~Auxiliary Building~Intermediate Building~Emergency DieselBuilding~StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater Building~ScreenHouseMMARCIC:Releaseoftoxicorflammable gaseswithinafacilitystructure whichjeopardizes operation ofsystemsrequiredtomaintainsafeoperations ortoestablish ormaintaincoldshutdown.

FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:ThisEALisbasedongasesthathaveenteredaplantstructure precluding accesstoequipment necessary forthesafeoperation oftheplant.ThisEALappliestobuildings andareascontiguous toplantvitalareasorothersignificant buildings orareas.TheintentofthisEALisnottoincludebuildings (i.e.,warehouses) orotherareasthatarenotcontiguous orimmediately adjacenttoplantvitalareas.Itisappropriate thatincreased monitoring bedonetoascertain whetherconsequential damagehasoccurred.

8-16 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTech'nical BasesDocument, Rev1PEG

Reference:

HA3.1HA3.2BasisReference(s):

None8-17 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev18.0Hazards8.4.1UnusualEvent8.4NaturalEventsEarthquake feltinplantbyanyoperatorANDConfirmation ofearthquake ofanintensity

)0.01gperSC-5"Earthquake Emergency Plan".MMARCIC:Naturalanddestructive phenomena affecting theprotected area.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:REGNPSseismicinstrumentation actuatesat0.01g.Damagetosomeportionsofthesitemayoccurbutitshouldnotaffectabilityofsafetyfunctions tooperate.Methodsofdetection canbebasedoninstrumentation validated byareliablesource,operatorassessment, orindication receivedfromoutsideagencies.

Asde6nedintheEPRI-sponsored "Guidelines forNuclearPlantResponsetoanEarthquake",

datedOctober1989,a"feltearthquake" is:"Anearthquake ofsuQicient intensity suchthat:(a)theinventory groundmotionisfeltatthenuclearplantsiteandrecognized asanearthquake basedonaconsensus ofControlRoomoperators ondutyatthetime,and(b)forplantswithoperableseismicinstrumentation, theseismicswitchesoftheplantareactivated.

Formostplantswithseismicinstrumentation, theseismicswitchesaresetatanacceleration ofabout0.01g."PEG

Reference:

HU1.18-18 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1BasisReference(s):

1.SC-5Earthquake Emergency Plan2.EPRIdocument, "Guidelines forNuclearPlantResponsetoanEarthquake",

datedOctober19898-19 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev18.0Hazards8.4NaturalEvents8.4.2UnusualEventReportbyplantpersonnel oftornadowithinplantProtected AreaboundaryM;5hVKCIC:Naturalanddestructive phenomena affecting theprotected area.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:ThisEALisbasedontheassumption thatatornadostriking(touching down)withintheProtected Areaboundarymayhavepotentially damagedplantstructures containing functions orsystemsrequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplant.Ifsuchdamageiscon6rmedvisuallyorbyotherin-plantindications, theeventmaybeescalated toAlert.PEG

Reference:

HU1.2BasisReference(s):

None8-20 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev18.0Hazards8.4.3UnusualEvent8.4NaturalEventsDeerCreekfloodingoverentranceroadbridge(handrail)ORLakelevel>252ftORScreenHouseSuctionBaywaterlevel<15ft(low-lowlevelalarm)MMARCIC:Naturalanddestructive phenomena affecting theprotected area.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:Thiscovershighandlowlakewaterlevelconditions thatcouldbeprecursors ofmoreseriousevents.Deercreekfloodingoverentranceroadbridgemayprecludeemergency responsepersonnel accessandegress.Lakewaterlevel>252ft.corresponds toplantdesignlevels.ScreenHouseSuctionBaylevel<15R.corresponds tothelow-lowlevelalarmpointandwhichrequiresloadreduction below50%.PEG

Reference:

HU1.7BasisReference(s):

1.2.3.SC-4HighWater(Flood)Emergency PlanSC-4.1LowScreenhouse WaterLevelInteroffice Memo"Screenhouse PumpBayWaterLevel"datedV24/94toTerryWhitefromWilliamRapinandJeffreyWayland8-21 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev18.0Hazards8.4.4Alert8.4NaturalEventsEarthquake feltinplantbyanyplantoperations personnel AND~Confirmation ofearthquake ofanintensity

)0.08gperSC-5"Earthquake Emergency Plan"NUIYGMCIC:Naturalanddestructive phenomena afFecting theplantvitalarea.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:ThisEALaddresses eventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjected toforcesbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurredtoplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpreted asmandating alengthydamageassessment priortoclassification.

NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitude ofthedamage.ThisEALisbasedontheFSARdesignbasisoperating earthquake of0.08g.Seismiceventsofthismagnitude cancausedamagetoplantsafetyfunctions.

PEG

Reference:

HAl.lBasisReference(s):

1.SC-5"Earthquake Emergency Plan"8-22

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev18.0Hazards8.4.5Alert8.4NaturalEv'entsSustained winds>75mphOR,Tornadostrikesaplantvitalarea,Table8.3Table8.3PlantVitalAreas~ControlBuilding~ReactorContainment Building~Auxiliary Building~Intermediate Building~Emergency DieselBuilding~StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater Building~ScreenHouseMMARCIC:Naturalanddestructive phenomena affecting theplantvitalarea.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:ThisEALaddresses eventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjected toforcesbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurredtoplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpreted asmandating alengthydamageassessment priortoclassification.

NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitude ofthedamage.ThisEALisbasedontheFSARassumed"severeenvironmental loading"condition of75mph.Windloadsofthismagnitude cancausedamagetosafetyfunctions.

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1PEG

Reference:

HA1.2BasisReference(s):

1.RGEFSARSection3.3.2.1.4 8-24 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev18.0Hazards8.4.6Alert8.4NaturalEventsAnynaturaleventwhichresultsinareportofvisiblestructural damageorassessment byControlRoompersonnel ofactualdamagetoequipment neededforsafeplantoperation, Table8.3Table8.3PlantVitalAreas~ControlBuilding~ReactorContainment Building~Auxiliary Building~Intermediate Building~Emergency DieselBuilding~StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater Building~ScreenHouseMMARCIC:Naturalanddestructive phenomena affecting theplantvitalarea.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:ThisEALaddresses eventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjected toforcesbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurredtoplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpreted asmandating alengthydamageassessment priortoclassification.

NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitude ofthedamage.ThisEALspecifies areasinwhichstructures containing systemsandfunctions requiredforsafeshutdownoftheplantarelocated.8-25 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1'PEG

Reference:

HA1.3BasisReference(s):

None8-26 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev18.0Hazards8.4.VAlert8.4NaturalEventsFloodwateraccumulating onscreenhouseoperating floorOR'akelevel>253ftORScreenHouseSuctionBaywaterlevel<13ftNUMARCIC:Naturalanddestructive phenomena affecting theplantvitalarea.FPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:ThisEALaddresses eventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjected tolevelsbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurredtoplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpreted asmandating alengthydamageassessment priortoclassification.

NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitude ofthedamage.This.EALcovershighandlowlakewaterlevelconditions thatexceedlevelswhichthreatenvitalequipment.

Floodwateraccumulating onthescreenhouseoperating floororlakelevels>253ft.corresponds tolevelsthreatening vitalequipment.

ScreenHouseSuctionBaylevel<13ft.corresponds tothelevelbelowwhichthemotordrivenfirewater pumpsuctionbowlsareuncovered.

PEG

Reference:

HA1.78-27 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG'inna EALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1BasisReference(s):

1.SC-4HighWater(Flood)Emergency Plan2.SC-4.1LowScreenhouse WaterLevel3.Interof6ce Memo"Screenhouse PumpBayWaterLevel"dated1/24/94toTerryWhitefromWilliamRapinandJeffreyWayland8-28 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1TheEALsdefinedincategories 1.0through8.0specifythepredetermined symptomsoreventswhichareindicative ofemergency orpotential emergency conditions, andwhichwarrantclassification.

WhiletheseEALshavebeendeveloped toaddressthefullspectrumofpossibleemergency conditions whichmaywarrantclassification andsubsequent implementation oftheEmergency Plan,aprovision forclassification ofemergencies basedonoperator/management experience andjudgmentisstillnecessary.

TheEALsofthiscategoryprovidetheShiftSupervisor orEmergency Coordinator thelatitudetoclassifyemergency conditions consistent withtheestablished classification

criteria, basedupontheirjudgment.

9-1 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev19.0Other9.1.1UnusualEventAnyevent,asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orEmergency Coordinator, thatcouldleadtoorhasledtoapotential degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.NUINARCIC:Emergency DirectorJudgmentFPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:ThisEALaddresses unanticipated conditions notaddressed explicitly elsewhere butthatwarrantdeclaration ofanemergency becauseconditions existwhicharebelievedbytheEmergency Coordinator tofallundertheUnusualEventemergency class.Fromabroadperspective, oneareathatmaywarrantEmergency Coordinator judgmentisrelatedtolikelyoractualbreakdown ofsitespecificeventmitigating actions.Examplestoconsiderincludeinadequate emergency responseprocedures, transient responseeitherunexpected ornotunderstood, failureorunavailability ofemergency systemsduringanaccidentinexcessofthatassumedinaccidentanalysis, orinsufhcient availability ofequipment and/orsupportpersonnel.

PEG

Reference:

HU1.3HU5.1 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1'BasisReference(s):

None OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev19.0Other9.1.2UnusualEventAnyevent,asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orEmergency Coordinator, thatcouldleadtoorhasledtoalossorpotential lossofcontainment,

.Attachment A.NUbXARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:Containment loss/potential lossModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddresses anyotherfactorsthataretobeusedbytheEmergency Coordinator indetermining whetherthecontainment barrierislostorpotentially lost.Inaddition, theinability tomonitor,thebarriershouldalsobeincorporated inthisEALasafactorinEmergency Coordinator judgmentthatthebarriermaybeconsidered lostorpotentially lost.PEG

Reference:

PCS.XBasisReference(s):

None OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev19.0Other9.1.3AlertAnyevent,asdetermined bytheShikSupervisor orEmergency Coordinator, thatcouldcauseorhascausedactualsubstantial degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.NMGLRCIC:Emergency DirectorJudgmentFPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

BasisThisEALaddresses unanticipated conditions notaddressed explicitly elsewhere butthatwarrantdeclaration ofanemergency becauseconditions existwhicharebelievedbytheEmergency Coordinator tofallundertheAlertemergency class.PEG

Reference:

HA6.1BasisReference(s):

None OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev19.0Other9.1.4AlertAnyevent,asdetermined bytheShikSupervisor orEmergency Coordinator, thatcouldleadorhasledtoalossorpotential lossofeitherfuelcladorRCSbarrier,Attachment A.NM4A'RCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:Lossorpotential lossofeitherfuelcladorRCSbarrierModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddresses anyotherfactorsthataretobeusedbytheEmergency Coordinator indetermining whetherthefuelcladorRCSbarriersarelostorpotentially lost.Inaddition, theinability tomonitorthebarriersshouldalsobeconsidered inthisEALasafactorinEmergency Coordinator judgmentthatthebarriersmaybeconsidered lostorpotentially lost.PEG

Reference:

FC7.1RCS6.1BasisReference(s):

None OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev19.0OCher9.1.5SiteAreaEmergency Asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orEmergency Coordinator, eventsareinprogresswhichindicateactualorlikelyfailuresofplantsystemsneededtoprotectthepublic.Anyreleasesarenotexpectedtoresultinexposures whichexceedEPAPAGs.NUMARCIC:Emergency DirectorJudgmentFPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:ThisEALaddresses unanticipated conditions notaddressed explicitly elsewhere butthatwarrantdeclaration ofanemergency becauseconditions existwhicharebelievedbytheEmergency Coordinator tofallundertheemergency classdescription forSiteAreaEmergency.

PEG

Reference:

HS3.1BasisReference(s):

None OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev18.0Other9.1.6SiteAreaEmergency Anyevent,asdetermined bytheShikSupervisor orEmergency Coordinator, thatcouldleadorhasledtoeither:Lossorpotential lossofbothfuelcladandRCSbarrier,Attachment AORLossorpotential lossofeitherfuelcladorRCSbarrierinconjunction withalossofcontainment, Attachment ANUIKARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:Lossorpotential lossofbothfuelcladandRCSbarrierORLossorpotential lossofeitherfuelcladorRCSbarrierinconjunction withalossofcontainment ModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddresses unanticipated conditions affecting fissionproductbarrierswhicharenotaddressed explicitly elsewhere.

Declaration ofanemergency iswarranted becauseconditions existwhicharebelievedbytheEmergency Coordinator tofallundertheemergency classdescription forSiteAreaEmergency.

PEG

Reference:

FC7.1RCS6.1PC8.1BasisReference(s):

None OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev19.0>>Other9.1.7GeneralEmergency Asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orEmergency Coordinator, eventsareinprogresswhichindicateactualorimminentcoredamageandthepotential

.foralargereleaseofradioactive materialinexcessofEPAPAGsoutsidethesiteboundary.

NUINARCIC:Emergency DirectorJudgmentFPBloss/potential loss:N/AModeApplicability:

Basis:ThisEALaddresses unanticipated conditions notaddressed explicitly elsewhere butthatwarrantdeclaration ofanemergency becauseconditions existwhicharebelievedbytheEmergency Coordinator tofallundertheGeneralEmergency class.Releasescanreasonably beexpectedtoexceedEPAPAGplumeexposurelevelsoutsidethesiteboundary.

.PEG

Reference:

HG2.1BasisReference(s):

None OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev19.0Other9.1.8GeneralEmergency Anyevent,asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orEmergency Coordinator, thatcouldleadorhasledtoalossofanytwofissionproductbarriersandlossorpotential lossofthethird,Attachment A.NUIKARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potential loss:Lossofanytwofissionproductbarriersandlossorpotential lossofthethirdModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddresses unanticipated conditions affecting fissionproductbarrierswhicharenotaddressed explicitly elsewhere.

Declaration ofanemergency iswarranted becauseconditions existwhicharebelievedbytheEmergency Coordinator tofallundertheemergency classdescription fortheGeneralEmergency class.PEG

Reference:

FC7.1HCS6.1PC8.1BasisReference(s):

None9-10 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1ATTACHMENT AFISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERLOSS4POTENTIAL LOSSINDICATORS FissionProductBarrierLoss/Potential LossMatrix(Rosethresholds forwhichlossorpotential isdetermined tobeimminent, classifyasthoughthethreshold(s) hasbeenexceeded)

Potential Loss,ORANGEpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGREDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINKCoreExitThermocouple Readings>/00'FRVLIS543%w/noRCPsrunningEmergency Coordinator JudgmentREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGCoolantactivity>300IiCi/ccof1-131CoreExitThermocouple Readings>1200'FContainment radmonitorreading>100R/hrLetdownMonitor(R-9)reading>10R/hrEmergency Coordinator JudgmentPotential LossREDpathonF-0.4,INTEGRITY REDpathonF-0.3,HEATSINKPrimaiysystemleakage>46gpmEmergency Coordinator JudgmentRCSsubcooling

<EOPFig.MINSUBCOOLING duetoRCSleakageUnisolable secondary sidelinebreakwithSGtuberuptureasidentified inE-3"SteamGenerator TubeRupture"Containment radiation monitorreading>10R/hrEmergency Coordinator JudgmentA-2 FissionProductBarrierLoss/Potential LossMatrix+hosethresholds forwhichlossorpotential isdetermined tobeimminent, classifyasthoughthethreshold(s) hasbeenexceeded)

Potential LoseREDpathF-0.5,CONTAINMENT Rapiduncontrolled decreaseinContainment Pressurefollowing initialincreaseEither:Coreexitthermocouples

>1200'FORCoreexitthermocouples

>700'FwithRVLIS<43%(noRCPs)ANDRestoration procedures noteffective within15minutesLossofprimarycoolantinsidecontainment withcontainment pressureorsumplevelresponsenotconsistent withLOCAconditions, i.e.unexpected changesoccurintheseparameters thatarenotexplainable duetooperatoractionsorautomatic systemactions.Safetyinjection signalduetoLOCAwith<theminimumcontainment coolingsafeguards equipment operating:

CNMTpressure<28psig:2CNMTRecircFansCNMTpressure228psig:2CNMTSprayPumpsOR2CNMTRecircFansand1CNMTSprayPumpEither.CIorCVIisolation requiredandCIorCVIvalve(s)notclosedwhenrequiredORInability toisolateanyprimarysystemdischarging outsidecontainment ANDRadiological releasepathwaytotheenvironment existsContainment pressure60psigandincreasing Releaseofsecondary sidetoatmosphere withprimarytosecondary leakagegreaterthantechspecallowable of0.1CPMpersteamgenerator h4%hydrogenconcentration incontainment Bothdoorsopenoncontainment airlockORInability toclosecontainment pressurerelieforpurgevalveswhichresultsinaradiological releasepathwaytotheenvironment ORClorCVIvalve(s)notclosedwhenrequiredwhichresultsinaradiological releasepathwaytotheenvironment Containment radiation monitorreading>1000R/hrEmergency Coordinator JudgmentEmergency Coordinator JudgmentA-3 ATTACHIVlENT BWORDLIST/DEFINITIONS OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1ActuateToputintooperation; tomovetoaction;commonlyusedtorefertoautomated, multi-faceted operations.

"ActuateECCS".Adversary AsappliedtosecurityEALs,anindividual whoseintentistocommitsabotage, disruptStationoperations orotherwise commitacrimeonstationproperty.

Eventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichinvolveanactualorpotential substantial degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Anyreleasesareexpectedtobelimitedtosmallfractions oftheEPAProtective ActionGuideline exposurelevels.Available Thestateorcondition ofbeingreadyandabletobeused(placedintooperation) toaccomplish thestated(orimplied)actionorfunction.

Asappliedtoasystem,thisrequirestheoperability ofnecessary supportsystems(electrical powersupplies, coolingwater,lubrication, etc.).Can/Cannot bedetermined

(</>)Thecurrentvalueorstatusofanidentified parameter relativetothatspecified can/cannot beascertained usingallavailable indications (directandindirect, singlyorincombination).

Can/Cannot bemaintained above/below (c/>)Thevalueoftheidentified parameter(s) is/isnotabletobekeptabove/belowspecified limits.Thisdetermination includesmakinganevaluation thatconsiders bothcurrentandfuturesystemperformance inrelationtothecurrentvalueandtrendoftheparameter(s).

Neitherimpliesthattheparameter mustactuallyexceedthelimitbeforetheactionistakennorthattheactionmustbetakenbeforethelimitisreached.B-2 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Can/Cannot berestoredabove/below (c/>)Thevalueoftheidentified parameter(s) is/isnotabletobereturnedtoabove/below speci6edlimitsafterhavingpassedthoselimits.Thisdetermination includesmakinganevaluation thatconsiders bothcurrentandfuturesystemsperformances inrelationtothecurrentvalueandtrendoftheparameter(s).

Doesnotimplyanyspecifictimeintervalbutdoesnotpermitprolonged operation beyondalimitwithouttakingthespecified action.Asappliedtolossofelectrical powersources(ex.:Powercannotberestoredtoanyvitalbusin<4hrs)thespecified powersourcecannotbereturnedtoservicewithinthespecified time.Thisdetermination includesmakinganevaluation thatconsiders bothcurrentandfuturerestoration capabilities.

Impliesthatthedeclaration shouldbemadeassoonasthedetermination ismadethatthepowersourcecannotberestoredwithinthespecified time.CloseTopositionavalveordampersoastopreventflowoftheprocessfluid.Tomakeanelectrical connection tosupplypower.Con6rm/Con6rmation Tovalidate, throughvisualobservation orphysicalinspection, thatanassumedcondition isasexpectedorrequired, withouttakingactiontoalterthe"asfound"configuration.

ControlTakeaction,asnecessary, tomaintainthevalueofaspecified parameter withinapplicable limits;tofixoradjustthetime,amount,orrateof;toregulateorrestrict.

DecreaseTobecomeprogressively lessinsize,amount,number,orintensity.

Discharge Removalofafluid/gas

&omavolumeorsystem.

OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1EnterTogointo.Establish Toperformactionsnecessary tomeetastatedcondition.

"Establish communication withtheControlRoom."EvacuateToremovethecontentsof;toremovepersonnel fromanarea.ExceedsTogoorbebeyondastatedorimpliedlimit,measure,ordegree.ExistTohavebeingwithrespecttounderstood limitations orconditions.

FailureAstateofinability toperformanormalfunction.

GeneralEmergency Eventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichinvolveactualorimminentsubstantial coredegradation ormeltingwithpotential forlossofcontainment integrity.

Releasescanbereasonably expectedtoexceedEPAProtective ActionGuideline exposurelevelsoFsiteformorethantheimmediate sitearea.Logictermwhichindicates thattakingtheactionprescribed iscontingent uponthecurrentexistence ofthestatedcondition(s).

Iftheidenti6ed conditions donotexist,theprescribed actionisnottobetakenandexecution ofoperatora'ctionsmustproceedpromptlyinaccordance withsubsequent instructions.

B-4 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1'ncreaseTobecomeprogressively greaterinsize,amount,numberorintensity.

IndicateTopointoutorpointto;todisplaythevalueofaprocessvariable; tobeasignorsymbol.InitiateTheactofplacingequipment orasystemintoservice,eithermanuallyorautomatically.

Activation ofafunctionorprotective feature(i.e.initiateamanualtrip).Iajection Theactofforcingafluidintoavolumeorvessel.Inoperable Notabletoperformit'sintendedfunctionIntrusion Theactofenteringwithoutauthorization Failureofoperability orlackofaccessto.MaintainTakeaction,asnecessary, tokeepthevalueofthespecified parameter withintheapplicable limits.MonitorObserveandevaluateatafrequency sufBcient toremainapprisedofthevalue,trend,andrateofchangeofthespecified parameter.

B-5 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1NotifyTogivenoticeoforreporttheoccurrence of;tomakeknownto;toinformspecified personnel; toadvise;tocommunicate; tocontact;torelay.OpenTopositionavalveordampersoastoallowflowoftheprocessfluid.Tobreakanelectrical connection whichremovesapowersupplyfromanelectrical device.Tomakeavailable forentryorpassagebyturningback,removing, orclearingaway.OperableAbletoperformit'sintendedfunctionPerformTocarryoutanaction;toaccomplish; toaFect;toreachanobjective.

PrimarySystemThepipes,valves,andotherequipment whichconnectdirectlytothereactorvesselorreactorcoolantsystemsuchthatareduction inreactorcoolantsystempressurewilleffectadecreaseinthesteamorwaterbeingdischarged throughanunisolated breakinthesystem.RemoveTochangethelocationorpositionof.ReportTodescribeasbeinginaspecificstate.RequireTodemandasnecessary oressential.

8-6 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Taketheappropriate actionrequirestoreturnthevalueofanidentified parameter towithinapplicable limits.RiseDescribes anincreaseinaparameter astheresultofanoperatororautomatic action.SampleToperformananalysisonaspecified mediatodetermine itsproperties.

ShutdownToperformoperations necessary tocauseequipment toceaseorsuspendoperation; tostop."Shutdownunnecessary equipment."

SiteAreaEmergency Eventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichinvolveactualorlikelymajorfailuresofplantfunctions neededforprotection ofthepublic.AnyreleasesarenotexpectedtoresultinexposurelevelswhichexceedEPAProtective ActionGuideline exposurelevelsexceptnearthesiteboundary.

Sustained Prolonged.

Notintermittent oroftransitory natureTFlpTode-energize apumporfanmotor;topositionabreakersoastointerrupt orpreventtheflowofcurrentintheassociated circuit;tomanuallyactivateasemi-automatic feature.ITotakeactiontocauseshutdownofthereactorbyrapidlyinserting acontrolrodorcontrolrods(PWR).8-7 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG GinnaEALTechnical BasesDocument, Rev1Uncontrolled Anevolution lackingcontrolbutisnottheresultofoperatoraction.Unplanned Notasanexpectedresultofdeliberate action.UntilIndicates thattheassociated prescribed actionistoproceedonlysolongastheidentified condition doesnotexist.UnusualEventEventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichindicateapotential degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Noreleasesofradioactive materialrequiring offsiteresponseormonitoring areexpectedunlessfurtherdegradation ofsafetysystemsoccurs.ValidSupported orcorroborated onasoundbasis.VentToopenaneffluent(exhaust) flowpathfromanenclosedvolume;toreducepressureinanenclosedvolume.VerifyToconGrmacondition andtakeactiontoestablish thatcondition ifrequired.

"Verifyreactortrip,verifySIpumpsrunning."

B-8 f4)pi(i'IIl~'I<<->~a)A