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.i SEISMOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF BODEGA HEAD, CALIFORNIA 4 . -
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, By Frank Ne m nn N6
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Introduction. This report has been prepared at the request of the jf ,l 7
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1 Division of, Licensing and Re5ulation of the Ata=ic EnerEy Co=niseicn.
'; Its purpose is to analyze the seiemology of Bodega Head, California, the
. e
! site of a nuclear power plant proposed by the Pr.cific Gas and Electric y -
Conpany and to esti= ate the stron6est earthquake likely to be experienced at the site e;nd the ground motions asscelated with such an earthquate.
In the preparation of this repc.rt the vriter has reviewed the published reports set forth tu Appendin 2., T,he, cyp 1M ation filed with j u.,
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the Atonic. Energy C-4ssion by the 'Incific Gas and Electric Co=pany i on Decenber 31,1%2, end emendments thereto, particularly Ap;en?. ices i
4 and 5 of the Pre"-"" / Hazards B"- mr Seport and the report of the United States 2pe.rtnent of Interior, Geological Survey, forwarded to the f
Atomic Energy Co::ission on September 25,1%3 The "Geolosic and Seis=ologic Study of Bodega Ecad" prepared by Dr. Pierre Saint .4:and han:
9 9
1 also been reviewed.
't Earth..o.uake Phenomena. For many r.*.les beneath the earth's surface the crustal rocks in certain areas undergo very slow but steady move =enta a that deform the rock and eventually set up stresses in the rock that y
cause it to rupture or fault. Such rupturing sets up violent vibrations
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which are tritnn-itted to the earth's surfc.cc in a. complex vave pattern.
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All seismologists do not agree as to the manner in which the energy s.
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'of this' rupture is released. Some are of the view that uniform friction-
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along the fault surface prevents slipping until the stresses built up
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rp3*,4 in the rock are sufficient to overcome'it and that the energy released s
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]' Planar theory)., ' The more videly held view to which the writer sub-
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scribes is that fault surfaces are kept h an easily sliding over each
'l other by defor=ations along the fault surface that greatly increase the force' necessary to 'ause c slippage. When the accu =ulating stresses become
, . strong enough to overcome this limited area of resistance, sonetimes called "j MS a " lock", the area becomes the nucleus of the most violent vibrations
- ] generated by the resulting earthquake. Such locks, or earthquake foci, , ,
in California are generally about fiiteen or twenty miles deep. (13)
Etin the 4-diate epicentral area W of a st:eng earthquake, i I
the vibrations generally will be very violent but of relatively short duration, say fifteen seconds. Ten or fifteen miles away if the base-
- ment rock is exposed or very close to the surface the vibrations vill u j'
- ,y
& be 6ecerally less violent but of longer duratien. At distances of 100
. ' Y, miles the vibrations in basement rock vill be much weaker but may last ) 1 i
I for a minute or two. In areas where the surface for=ations are cc. posed a.
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1 1 The surface of the rock i=nediately above the focus.
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of deep alluvium, and the ground water level is h16h, the surface j
l.E;$ intensity g' beyond the epicentral area may be much greater than in s:W:.&
~6p the basement rock beneath it or on adjoining outcrops of base =ent rock.
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, The amplification of intensity on soft ground as co= pared to basement 7 '
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rock increases with distance from the epicenter. l j
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- In most areas, including the Bodega Head area, base =ent rock is 2
considered to be of a Granitic type on which the intensity is always a mininum at any given distance from the epicenter. In the central valley of southern California, however, a geat layer of sedimentary ;
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.! rock (reportedly more than five ~iles thic2 in some creas) lies just t
h above the ymitic basement and serves as a " secondary basement".
.s 1 lr Analyses of intensity distribution maps indicate that in this area {
the =4"d-".:s intensity is always about one gade of intensity hi~.,her than on adjoining areas of panitic base =ent rock; generally this means that the ground motion on the sedimentary basenent rock is about double that i
on granitic rock. (9) f
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! 3/ Intensity is a rating of the ground motion at any point within a !
.j shakt.n area based on observations of the general effects of the I Ground vibrations on people and inan'im te objects such as bn W 4"3s,
'i utility poles, trees, etc. The Modified Marcalli Earthquake .T* tensity j Scale of 1931, the scale used in the United States, describes 12
- grades of intensity using criteria of this kind. The Coast and j Geodetic Survey correlates descriptive information collected on question-
' i naire cards and assigns the M4 (Modified Mercelli) values for each lo-
'j cality. For California earthquakes these intensity values are re-
, . viewed and confirmed by seismologists at the University of California
- (Berkeley) and at the California Institute of Technology (Pasadena)
- l. i before being published. (4)
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', j . Bodega Eesd. Bodega Head is a peninsula extending into the Mi Pacific Ocean frem the California coast approximately fifty miles north-id W %
vesterly of San Francisco. The head, which lies just vest of tho Q *$o.' + . , .
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San Andrwas Fault, is composed of quartz-diorite, a granitic rock
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covered by a layer of.' sand, silt and clay up to 180' thick. The quartz-O diorite,- esti=ated to be 83 to 91 m4"4on; years old, is reported by !
'd Pacific Gas and Electric Co=pany's geological consultant to be " extensively
.1 fractured, sheared and jointed." The report of the U. S. Geological Survey i describes the rock at Bodega Head as follows: " Joints and faults are ec=-
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s... . non in the granitic rock of Bodega Hea'd . . . .' Most of the rock,is s.*
broken by joints into blocks three to five inches wide; however, rock
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- :I vith joints one to two feet apart 10 not uncc= mon e ' rarely a r. ass of q
. rock has a joint' spacing of as much as four feet. . . ." All estimates J
d of probable intensity in this report are based on the assr:ption that i the rock at Bodega Eead =ay be considered basement rock. Ecuever, the )
. 1 extensively jointed and faulted character of the rock of Bodega Head raises scue doubt as to whether it can be considered a true granitic 1
-Q basement rock, seis=ologically speabing. !
,j The Atomic Energy Commission has recently announced the dic:cvery J
, j j of a fault in the bed rock in the excavation for the proposed plant which
. .a 7 extends into the sediments above the rock. This report does not atte=pt
?!# to assess the significance of this geological fault. Any such assessment I s - 1 4.s . _ * .,.
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'O';" must avait the receipt of a further geological report,concerning this'
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. y>j fault which the Atonic Energy C d ssion has requested. j i
j WJ The San Andreas Fault. The controlling seismological feature of '4
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'the proposed site is its proximity to the San Andreas Fault, one of the M.. .
- ,g earth's peatest active earthquake faults. .The northern end of the 2,
San Andreas extends along the. floor of the Pacific Ocean to a point ,
- j off Cape Mendocino. It enters California near Point Arena and passes 4
l southeastward past Bodega Head to a point ,just off Golden Gate. It then i
.j crosses the coast again in San Mateo County and continues southward into
, the San Bernardino Mountains. (See Figures 1 a. and 1 b.) South of here y:
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- . h there is sone doubt as to whether the observed faults are geologically "y' A, . .
.y extensions of the San Andreas.
i Eistorical data shows that numerous lasser shocks (caritude 6 t
j or below) and thirty-six stronger shoc2s (nagnitude 6 or 5: eater)
- have orignated along or near the San Andreas Fault in the past 150
.1 years. (See Table I.) The California Tarthq" ^= of 1906, sc:ati=es called the San Francisco earthquake, and the most danaging earthq"** in the
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1.s United States in historic time, originated on the San Andreas. In this h
w m earthquake s . the rock rupture extended to the surfa*ce along the fault
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+g for a distance of at least 190 "4'es and perhaps up to 270 miles.
. (12)
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The =aximun slippage along the fault in exposed rock was fifteen feet.
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,Jix 75 The 1906 earthquake centered about twenty-two miles south-southeast j '".'.'.~
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%Q@ ~ ~ of Bodega Head between the southern end of To= ales Bay and Olema. (4)
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- San Francisco was about the same distance from the epicenter. Thirty
=.g 7ND p . seconds before the main shock a pre 14mina y ' shock centered on the.
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~3$V . ^- San Andreas Fault just off Golden Gate. 'This probably triggered the
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- y<.9 main' shock centering near 01e=a. In 1838,'a shodh of perhaps the sa=e .
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, intensity centered along the fault in the San Francisco Bay area !
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I according to the rather Madequate information available. The interval
. 3- of approximately seventy years between these shocks checks rather well with i
s 1. .
!- the frequency'of great shocks originating elsewhere along the Pacific
- Coast, including the Puget Sound region and =ight be considered a rough
, u-My, q app'roximation of the frequency of highly da= aging shocks along the n
M; J San Andreas.
o
'li Seisnic activity along the San Andreas nay be expected to
- continue as in the past. On the basis of the seisnic history of the c San Andreas we et.
- expect that a substantial nu:;3er of shochs v"1 4 .
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i occur along the fault in the next 100 years and that it is likely that
.x oneormoreshocksofdana51ngintensity(approninctelythe1905sh0ch) n.
g nay occur in that period. The expectation of continued occurrence of
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,Tf naf or shocks is supported from triangulation surveys which indicate that n:
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. in certain areas the terrain on the southwest side of the fault is noving j
gg northwestward with respect to the northeast side at the rate of about igy 16 'two inches per year. (2and3) l
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?f'n . .~One can only speculate on the location of the next strong shock m
l 'M on the San Andreas. 'If it should center within a few miles of l[ p.
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- Bodega Head that strip of rock would be expected to egerience the ^
].lj maximum intensity reported in the epicentral area of the 190o s.e s A
shock -- near 01ema.
We must also consider the fact that because of {
+ f,7 the proximity of the site to the San Andreas fault the underlying rock
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must be subjected to. stresses incident to the gradual deformation of q
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., the terrain on each side of the fault and vibratio"1 stresses that
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result frcs major earthquakes along the fault. It has been recently l i.
.i . estimated that the area of appreciable defor=ation may extend about 4
. ; five miles either side of the fault but adequate data on this proble:
I are difficult to find. Whether such defor=ations have been suffi-cient to rupture the Bodega Head rock structure in recent years can j{ .
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be ascertained only by a thorough study of the Head, particularly ,
b the faults, by a conpetent gecic31st. I l
Intensity distribution in earthquake creas and relation to regnitude.
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'l 1 Seismological evidence collected by the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey 1
I dndicates that the distribution of earthquake intensity on basement rock
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,. is qaite s1=ple; the intensity decreases with increase of distance ms
'9j vs basically in a circular pattern althou5h sete distortions cny occur as a d.
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result of local variations in the deep crustal rocks. This has been mu P-j ascerte.ined from studies of the Puget Sound earthquaks of 19k9, the
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Imperial Valley, California, earthquake of 1940, the Kern County
%j - l Q,q . (Bakersfield) earthquake of 1952, and other earthquakes in which the '
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intensity distribution was well determined. (See Figures 2 and 3.)
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~O in the upper part of Figure 2, the nim m , intensity reported M for a particular epicentral distance reflects basement rock conditions
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- so that the lower curve on the chart indicates the attenuation of
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- intensity on basenent rock for this shock. If the curve is drawn on L
.;[0; semi-log paper, as shown in the lover portion of Figure 2, it becomes
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a straight line showing that the attenuation rate is exponential in I
'l character. Further infor=ation on base =ent rock intensity attenuation i
p aphs vill be found in reference (9).
f Fisure 3 shows the basezent rock attenuation for the Inperial Valley earthquake of May 18, 1940, nnd the Kern county earthquake of 4
July 21, 1952. These graphs differ in slope from the Puget Sound
] graph, primarily due to differences in focal depth, but it is also apparent that the peat cass of se'd-anta y rock that "9:11es the Central Valley of California constitutes a secondary base ent rock feature that changes the pattern sof basenent rock Braphs in that area. The plotted points show that out to 100 miles this sedimentary I,
rock layer evidently serves as a ni+u= intensity base.:ect; beyond that the mini =um intensities are uniformly one grade of intensity lover 9 due to the absence of the sedimentary basement. The lover values beyond a 1
- j 100 miles represent intensities in the granitic basement rock.
,4
. .]. Earthquake Magnitude v. Intensity. The intensity of an earthquake
.@ can be related e=pirically to its magnitude , on the Richter-Gutenberg s.rt = ,
n b Magnitude measures the anount of.enerEy released at the focus of a y shock.
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i 9-1 j ma6nitude scale. For California earthquakes the designers of this
- f, 3 scale developed an empirical relationship between magnitude and
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,:x.7 , =agnitude an equivalent maximum intensity can be established.
The '
- ]> correlation, admittedly "rou6h" and relating only to " ora h ry Ground f i
... l conditions" is set out in the following Table (12, pp. 352-3): I
- Richter-Gutenberg Magnitude Intensity Table Magnitude 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Mw4 m'm intensity 1-11 111 V VI-VII VII-VIII IX-X XI j Radius (kn) 0 15 80 150 220 400 600
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. Figure 4 sNA-izes the results of a more detailed study of the na6nitude and intensity data published by the Coast and Geodetic Survey (1) for approximately 150 California earthquakes of intensity Ed-5 and over.
The vide range of =ngnitudes associated with each grade of intensity is an outstanding feature, yet there is a ennsistency about the correlation pattern that provideo important information on the ma6nitude-intensity relationship when correctly interpreted. Considering
+ ]j the facts of intensity attenuation revealed in F1Erue 2 and other s4m41a=
g'
,{ studies, the fact that =agnitude represents the amount of energy o
,,1) released at the focal point of a shock, and the fact.that the granitic
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'%' 'or sedimentary character of the basement rock in immediate epicentral -
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areas controls the observed intensities in those areas, the only l
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q explanations for the vide range of correlation values observed
.yj:. are those sum =arized briefly in Figure 4. A specific intensity e .q
- e. id in an epicentral. area may be the result of either a deep, high
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ma6nitude shock in a granitic basement area, or a shallow, low q 44 j i,. magnitude shock in a sedimentary basement area. Between these ex-l tremes there could be innu=crable combinations yielding intermediate i
results.
Figure 4 shows a remarkable consistency in the correlation between
- the minimum =a5nitudes reported for intensities IM-5 through m
- -11.
The other extreme of the correlation pattern, line a-6, is not so "1;lJ d).
vell defined because of the lack of data on strong shocks.
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An analysis of the Imperial Var.ey earthquake date can be used l to obtain an additional point on line a-b 'n order to establish more firmly the correlation between magnitude and intensity in granitic basement areas. There are two methods by which this can be done.
In the first method one can, in Figure 3, simply anchor one end of j the granitic basement attenuation 6raph (A-B) on the intensity data
,c- 3
' /.j at 100 miles epicentral distance and beyond and draw a line parallel y
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to other basement rock Graphs for California. At the critical 3-mile epi-
..\ centraldistance(whichmarksthelimitofincreasingintensities)the
'a ?.n intensity is M1-7 8. In the second method, if the granitic basement 4) a; r.o, V. intensity 'at El Centro (FM-7 2) shown in the accelerogram analysis a .
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in Figure 5, is plotted on Figure 3, it reduces to a granitic base:ent !
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rock intensity of FM-7 8 at the 3-m11e limit. The technique for this j i
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< 'Q type of intensitp determination is explained in detail in Reference
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, (9). 'This provides further justification for correlating the deduced
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, ==v4mnm granitic basement intensity of M4-7 8 with the. Richter !
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magnitude of 7 1. Tttis 'is indicated in Figure 4 by a circled "X" and
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'f'9,]a j ; the numeral "1". Along with the data in Figure 4 relating to hish
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.' ! intensity shocks-it establishes line a-b as a legitinate graph for I
H . .
- . extending the magnitude-intensity correlation for granitic basenent 1
areas into the higher ranges of magnitude and intensity.
1 d' . Intensity in epicentral area of the 1906 earthquake,. A valid
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intensity f1gure for the epicentral area of the 1906 ' earthquake 4
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19 cannot be obtained from the descriptive material available. However, w.y . .
j - a reliable estimate.of the epicentral intecaity can be developed by
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! use of the =agnitude-intensity correlation and the use of basement rock intensity attenuation gra;hs.
4 Seismological as well as geological evidence establishes that 1
F the basenent rock in the entire San Francisco Bay crea, imluding ct adjacent coastal areas, is Granitic rather than sedimentary. Eaving
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. established a correlation between magnitude and granitic basenent 1
ilg. 'intensities,' it is apparent that if line a-b in Figure 4 is extended
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.p to magnitude 8.2 -- the vell established magnitude of the 1906 shock --
..ggp - ;q the corresponding intensity vill be M<-10. This vould be the mini =un
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epicentral intensity to expect on Granitic rock in a simik shock.
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- a. -
N .
fYDl hh$$,1*hbffkh fh.h rk$$YOY0h!$ L Y, !$,a h ,
,gn ; x,v wn., 2 wn.,Lw.c..+.
..a.a.m.~e.. u-%-m:4-
. m w .,. u wa~n g w r,; wne ..p:
w,4.. %. >n p;o.u m.n. m,s.
.a mw .,.f,.:r
, . ,.m -+,..
, ,~ww, pe.:v & ,n . ~, w.
r.+ .3 gf Q Ai . 3; . ;. ,
. ;9p & W m .w u +. n :. e a <
'1 .
w .
- ), '4'
.4. i
+
a w 3:
3 If in Figure 3, intensity Md-10 is combined with the limiting
- 9
.3d
.m o epicentral distance of three miles it provides an anchor point for a!
.n 1 .
gg. .
l
( , n.3 c. s-, - . granitic. basement attenuation graph which can be drawn parallellto the j g
4,Q: other graphs in the same figure. this. deduced basement rock intensity
+,,..
)
'9:]g graph for the 1906 shock will be very close to the sedimentary basement-graph for the 1952 shock which is based on field data the same as
+ ti
,5 the graph for the 1940 shock. Further justification for the 1906 graph is found in the fact that in San Francisco, twenty-two miles .amty,
% ,q H. O. Wood (4) found the minimum intensi.ty to be equivalent to a I y..
,' g,d(jI -low'101-7.which fits the deduced'bar,enent rock attenuation graph at j
1 Q .
~'., ,
.fthat distance very well. ,
( .
- .Using the correlation between magnituds and intensity developed t
by Richter-Gutenberg, the established ,agnitude for the 1906 quake (8.2)
I gives an intensity of M4-11. However, as pointed out by Richter, (22,.
j p.353),suchcorrelationis"roush"andappliestointensitieson-
" ordinary ground." The intensity to be expected on granitic basement
.h
. 1_ rock would be approximately one grade of intensity lover or about Ei-10
. l\L as.shown in Figure 4.
. . c d.
,M. .
In summary, all the evidence available from basement rock attenua-
.d, d % i tion studies, and from a rather convicing correlation pattern between
. , .i
.,ey
- Q . magnitude and intensity, points to an epicentral intensity Mi-10 for the
~ Mi *
! y.g . ,
jl906 earthquaka. +; 2 4 ,i
. r. " 2J
'L
- I ,
1
'a .! ) '
. t' d l vs
> 4:..;) M - . . . .
.J3'>. - ., , , ,
hd mm .m._fhNffkk$;$1 A.DfkNich. f m_.c Qyd/p,4j.,.ysh.p';(Qg
., y ,, . , , - g , q ..y.
_ g. [ , 4, , gjm
r}..[ .; R Y ,m f Q y j " pe
- y T m':nf.*@ ~ Q r3 p y y.y g g .c.: & g y ;ifj & :ffh & W R *'.iN S s,--+
~
- 'gp -
. .. m -
r h,h '
c
.:p ,
s ,
t
- 13'-
,.1,
, u.
/ N- . .g .
Earthquake intensity and related ground motion. The naximum j' $ vibrational acceleration registered on a seismograph can be used as
, a rough measure of earthquake intensity. The intensities and
, m ,. ..
accelerations associated with some of the more important earthquake qVi.3.; .
-].] ' motions registered on Coast and Geodetic Survey seismographs, are w :; W
'] set forth in Figure 6. While a very vide range of accelerations is obtained~ for earthquakes of different intensity and type the most outstanding feature of such intensity-acceleration graphs is the fact that for earthquakes of the same type the acceleration increases i exponentially with respect to intensity. For each increase of one ;
i$i . grade of intensity (up to Mi-8), the acceleration is approximately w ;l _
- ) ~. 49ubled. Beyond MN8 no instrumental records are avaihble and the d
- relationship between intensity and acceleration is subject to con-jecture. .-
{
kJ Unless the pertinent periods are set forth this is technically inadequate. Fortunately, the range of significant periods is
~
limited so that acceleration can be accepted in a restricted
- sense as a measure of intensity.
i J/ As shown in Figure 6, the records of strong seismic ground
- - . . vibration can be divided into four types: (1)aclose-upshock
.j vave type of very short duration -- perhaps only a few seconds; Ej (2) a type of damaging earthquake motion most frequently register-
- ed.on strong motion seismographs and considered best adapted to
- g"*"j
- engineering studies; (3) a type representing the average ac-
? celebrations obtained for the various grades of intensity, and
- $ finally, (4) a type of elongated record obtained in the marginal 3/1; c areas of strong shocks. The shock-wave type might best be con-
?9 '.,
sidered a special case to be given consideration only after the
. [9,7 'a~ more probable types of damaging earthquake motions have been
..m j studied. .
- 'EN-. . 1 L + .* ..y . -
i 9
3 a 4
13 -t,, e,,. -t ,
.,s .
" O A.hr ( g gg=# 4 % %
{ Ed* ? W h. J ['c f4 (@;f.4],y h [,h,[. h.* .
./[+ b;;,.ry.4, 4 ;g4; , . ,9 ; , ,- ,
,,7,, 7 3 ., ,3;_ .
$]. b202sta&S! hhnu.WN.e e <s%.4 wswr&wwwMhm%w?w, Qtwwshswwmmmm%a:4 r,mnaeA
7fT .j 7 g.,]((1., . , "/W'iri.dFMF ' MnhWWWM"t'M.S QUVMM"ITNEf'd@?YNO."'W3 q
.,.o*, ; - ~ . r. .3. ,
Q;.pg;q, Gjy'f < - * . - -
99 f a.p, ,
.l
. Nj : ,
4 j i .
h
'C .) '
If the intensity-acceleration relationship established by line B j 1
, yI in Figure 6 is extended beyond FM-8 it becomes apparent that the ac-
..,,, l, l *6 6.-
J):
'celeration.vould reach 4 or 5g in an Of-22 earthquake. Nothing in
, sy '. :, . .
, .. ~_ , - >. a. ; . .
l
'fp,i seismological.l literature would support such a conclusion although
') .
< ..' evidence seems to be videly accepted that accelerations exceeding
j
-]'
1.0g have been noted by reliable observers, especially in the case
, . .. i of the great Assam earthquake of 1897 In view of the apparent 4,
}'
- validity of such evidence it would be reasonable to conclude that >
seisnic accelerations of relatively high frequency can reach values
}1 somewhat in excess of 1.Og. Accelerations substantially greater'than j
- k , .l.0g are not supported'in seismological history. Accordingly, the j l
' extrapolated portion of the graph in Figure 6 has been =odified from i (a)to(b)whichrepresentsachangeinthecom=onratioofthe (
j
^
geo=etric progression fron 2.0 to 1.0, to 1 5 to 1.0. The resulting l acce_leration for an LM-12 shock is about 15g. This would s ka the acceleration for M1-10 about 0.6g. Because of the uncertainties q
involved in such an extrapolation, the writer feels that 0.67g would g be a reasonable working value.
'M , -
':S The duration of a disturbance plays an inportant role in
- d .
, dfj governing intensity evaluations. Figure 7 gives a co=prehensive L%%,
[:7
, ik picture of the periods and a=plitudes of the ground notions related
- O to the various grades of intensity. Figure 6 shows, for instance, s
- :t *'
71 - -
the - 4m m acceleration to expect for Mi-6 in a shock-vave type '
.q i l
- N
t *
, ' "l "9d r . . . . ,_ ,; . ( . *,,6 ~
.{
.hy.
. 's
- h *}"_._.h.h.O'!Q L ,& * " $s., ll$ikN * [kh . s * ":) $ , d . . ' - ** *~
E ' ** ' '~
.7
l c
4j Q 9 8 3 Q hy-:.v $ W p y gf M L Q P;gg! # i @ ! g @ p h g d g - ,4 y,- M W i z...
- w p.k ;,.- . v.n. . go .. ni , .
- . ..ap
~
- n. '
' %@ .mg :, :6;G y.. . ,:,'m , y fGf p *u .:& u
>i.~,..
3Wo.e i .-
, ,s: .
R
',q 15 .
- 4 .
.c;.n ji ? T of earthquake; Figure 7 shows the range of periods that might be n , - , ,,,
- associated with such an acceleration under varying circumstances such M.F.) v .
s.7q. "
. ".M.w M' as focal depth And' local geological conditions.
e p'q e *
. . , ; . c. , ,.s The' diagonal coordinates in Figure 7 establish the corresponding hJ- w t.vy ' ,
- n J
- 4- vibrational velocities and displacements associated with any combina.
%j. .
e, tionofaccekerationsandper1'ods. Because the velocity function serves as a rough yardstick for measuring relative accelerations and
. at the same time serves as a measure of the potential energy of-earthquake waves of an frequencies it is fundamentany a more realistic t
. #, maasure of earthquake intensity,than acceleration. .A simpler pictur.e T mf . . .'.
2.' ! .
.of the peziods and amplitudes involved in a damagiDE earthquake motion
(;. ] , -
r ..
a:
- s. - .
- (is bbtained'by referring to the period-amplitude graph.cf the El Centro /
ground motion which is also shown.in Figure 7 .
As practically the
, entire gamut of expectable earthquake periods ves registered at ;
j
..*j .
El Centro this graph serves as an envelope to cover a vide variety 4
of records of engineering interest many of which include only a q limited range of periods.
eo V;j - . Estimates of ==v4 mum ground motions to expect from a 1906 type h3 .
. ~
earthquake in the Bodega Head' area.
Not knowing what ground periods
.J. VT1 RM
% vould be dominant in such a shock the logical procedure vould be to
-I de
) .
';h.k .~
assume an El Centro type of motion. In an earthquake of EI-10 vith a
- n _ , .
%g. ..v4 mm acceleration of .67g the amplitudes (acceleration, velocity and H L +. ' ' " , . .
gff' ;
' displacement) indicated in the El Centro graph (Figure 7) would be q
, a 0-c ,
- 4
. g., , approximately doubled. This is considered a minimum estimate.
j '
. q l-
.4
.e x g,'U -' I *.J- w st &# h - ,
'f
,9 %r,.,%W'@J?
A., . ,,g'- ,.s...
M& W%,@,,%c,::pyw47
,i t
....,g.p ,c,g Qygi.:,Q).R,p,,.4 l.g.gq.7 : , -Q.g
, y .,;;, j hl iw( { % ?.awkm:w wunwwa w.un mmuwnm.m,un_, ,..,,a, g,w.,n., wa
gis%. 3 9,,-d u;z.cr q:.ryg,;;.ggpgdWhgz.e r
- .tcW44~,Og;Ww;Q-rg. .r;pp,m;~.s ,v,4,- l 8
ynb !. .. %
A; ;.. .% ,
- 1 M3p ! 'y - eg r :
- p>. y -pi ;-9 f .w; r; . - c.c n- . . .
. 5 g. ,
-j
, :, s, ,
3 n ,v . .
i
.. - 16 --
s ,,7 .
, j , In a shock wave type of disturbance of intensity BM10, which'
- e.t J t 8 y
a -
' would result in higher accelerations than normally, associated with
, s c
- pj + ,
. ! O.13j : -
- f.p"t.m..L ;- earthquakes of that ' intensity, a' maximum acceleration of 1.Og might' , .
-n um n . .
be expected. In this instance the El Centro amplitudes shown in
.d ,
. $.] <
Figurek7 would be approximately tripled but the period distribution pattern would, no doubt, be considerab2y changed. This is considered ;f 1 to be a maximum estimate of expectable ground motions that might result from an earthquake of MM-10 intensity. It should be pointed out, however, that there is no seismological record of shock wave I
4 i. l e . type earthquakes greater than intensity %6 having occurred in
- c. . 1. .
,.5;F - ;R69. California.. Similmely, while there can be no guarantee that an p .t d . 3 : wy #- . .
3.s . . , , . - - .. ,
a F
earthquake-greater than the 1906 shock will not occur in the Bodega Head area, the history of earthquakes in active seismic areas leads one to believe that this is not likely. The pattern i
of activity in the various seismic areas of the world tends to
. remain the same over long periois of time, perhaps many centuries,
'e
,, b'efore the pattern changes. It is^ reasonable to expect that the
,; 't'- . a g
'fj y ; , .same order of stresses vill, be developed and ultimately relieved
- ,(
- . . by the same type of earthquake mechanism accompanied by the same
, , , , e. '
M,y.,; [ order' of earthquake energy release. Accordingly, ground motions up
.. h .h 1.0g vh11e possible are not considered likely.
[.r]w, ~ M @ N Conclusions.'
. From the foregoing, it' can be concluded that
. w ..;%:-
-. m. . . . . ,
,;; - .. ,J,.C gBodega' Head is not likely to be affected by an earthquake of greater 4- r. :.2 m -- a . . . . ,
'..j . . h ;;, ,M/ ,
I 4 W W e C
. 3:, <
e
. t
, hf -j . . r ,rs.,eggj$:,p ..g g g; nf , y. . . , ~;, ,
M{r w' a n; o % . uu,+:.w. ; m . u ,:.>,. . . ..
u_ps ?
~<.+.m%s;,).d: w&y &%wmk+$a . . , ~g,, ,,m.x.m, n.1 m. ,e;;,.,y:.&. . ..e,: .:
m;W,;w. ..w, 4 ,. ::.-. u . .' k..;.;.,
t -a. %: a % w m x s m i. - em+--- ~~
e
. .s T:
. , *g t # d.J. *. ,4
..m. .,..".e . .
- Dr
. , . "u' . F ,A. *. .e "f[( .1...,
' I6 ?,"* **,m ** k' # * . 'q* j A.* p . - '
..h.4'.e..r*'.'eaf , .t,, 4 b"***' 7. * -D,g.a...m pyih<*s . ..W'8.*h**
8 4
. i 7. T ':f *'*'* 7. p 2*** '*
",',*hs.,9*** h #
- m. .
,3 u t 1 --
t .
ph g.'yM
~ h; ~;" ,
YlL
..f c;.' ' ;2 n -
9: .
a J
, ?a; , *: ;. :e , .
R w -
- t .
4 17
+..
. .c, s
magnitude than the California earthquake of 1906. If the epicenter
. of'such an earthquake were located within a few miles of Bodega P9 ip'
~ 'b
.' . y ,
. ; Head,' the intensity on the granitic rock at Bodega Head would be s,..
.: y., , v, : (.r; ,, s. , ' p , - ,
> n .
- m. .
, %.J . . aabout MM-10 and the associated grcund motions would be approximately
. ..M v. s
' O.67g. If, because of its faulted and jointed nature, the rock at A%
Bodega Head doe's not respond with minimum basement rock intensities, 9
( an intensity of MI-lO could result from an earthquake centered considerably further away from Bodega Head.
While a shock wave type earthquake equivalent in magnitude 4
. ;i to the 1906 earthquake, or an earthquake of slightly g:* eater
- r ~. .
, e .
, z
-) j~ magnitude than ths 1906 earthquake are not considered likely, the c.. ; ,~n y. . , _
~ ;. ... S lq possibility that such earthquakes might occur cannot be co=pletely. '
' discounted. In such an event the ground motions on basc=ent rock at Bodega Head might reach about 1.0g.
l
)
1 1
i , .
]
.. .? !s o, .. ..
b '
. h-l ". g g .[p
~
- . t* .
.s,
'{[ f a '
i d <
mM i L. . . -
,M -
- f. j - ', , , . . v. -
7s . . .
,, 4 .1. , . . .
r -
,, l4y.
$ 4., ,
e, ,*
a a} - ee4 *
- li; y . '.
Q~ < * > ly* si y ~ ie, -
' n ;C
- L.
- 2;
. 4 -
e .
.- 't 4 f . M ,4 8 te
- .s *. .
- ' ' es-^
g s
'T 4
'g 2 * * < ,
, 'q ' *
'g . .
. u ..:. ,f,f.* ,, , , . 2, . . m 6, ,
- n. . . . . .
.i % . s *
.gy :;y8 3;,;;+ s y~y.,
" Nb,'7'*I4,>.<..,s
- . ,y, , .. .
_ hMN 'MY_NhD_Y'%'N'? -
.? WND N'*U* 3.f . ,
is.$" * . f
- W D ; ' #N- . n _ ~#<'#
. , . f., -
,,,,s. 'j.
A
+ ~.O,e.i,9.,,.-~.@ M &::~
, :s : y. .,,..
. . ,.;e. a... . . . , y9 ,. *. -e.v~. ..3,.~, ..a,m.; . se n .-, ~:.N rm. m, 6
,<v.,..
. 2 ; . &. -&,.e.n.,y ~.
- . :e. #;.~.~..
_ .: : .a .m . - e - - .
}
Of
. gg.(
9,;; %_.yfke;;g qi .4. ,jy.v.
C'w; J
. .; ~:
- 76. .v;
- <w
, '. "!. 9 1 .
. 4:, ,- . -
6
.j .
TABLE I 3,j .
.. .t p -
.. q!
t.. <.
+ ,
S'RONGER SHOCK 5 IN CALI!NRNIA ORIGINATING ON CR NEAR THE SAN ANDREAS FAULT
. v. . ,._ L :, . s...>. . .,
..6. ..: c.m.-. . . .
, . :s s .:J; .
' s .l D Year Date County M4 Intensity (2) Magnitude 1800 Oct. San Benito ---
Very large
. . ' , 1838 June San Mateo X outst uding 1852 Dec. 17 San Luis Obispo - VII-VIII ----
+
1857 Jan. 9 Ventura ,
X-XI Outstanding
.as. .
' MF) -
, ,1865 Oct. 8 Santa Cruz .
VIII-LX Very large
.a. .p :
m .gg _ -
c .. s. . -
. ,d 1885 Apr. 11 Monterey -
VII-VIII ----
1890 Apr. 24 Monterey VII very Inrge 1893 Apr. 14 Los Angeles VIII-IX ----
i 1898 ~Apr. 14 Mendocino
,, VIII-IX 75/ -
1901 Mar. 2 Monterey 'VII-VIII ----
l
<w~ 1901 Oct. 28 (4) 1 VIII 6/ ;
y ~. , + .- i
- 1. ~ 1906 "Apr. 18 Marin(5) II 83
, 1906 Apr. 18 Imperial VIII 6/
-.t*
/'k .
.. San Bernardino, w
d -1907 ' Sept. VII 6
.[
-11915 ' June 23 Imperial (2) , , , _
VIII 6-1/4 A/
- 7 j . .-- O .. .. .
. - c .22. g . . .
^.
1916 -Oct. 23 Kern -
VII .~.6
,,f '
- ] '1918 July 15 '(4) $ VI 6-1/2 a . .
- 1922 Jan. 31 (4) VI 7.6
,',i - .. .,
6
.e -
g e .;* b (. w, , . " , . ,k < L -(. *, .$. -
t * ,,
e .. .
-j.- . . . S
.,. .y.=.c.4 ..=.u %o$n. >u;. W :,w k ; 3 o ..n,~ \. w~->(continued)
.4 :',--e
..s..
- y
., w. k. r> y.g uumL b. e .x: ww : = s. s.,w
~ :-+ w w ~ +-a-~~~--
,;, .;%q, qg... g.. .n.g.g;g;xm~y. eys iy._n.- &..p.w .~.w;.w.y g:.g,:.g,g.A.m w ,g+.;rr cu ;.,,p, ,; .,,4... . ,,g.,.
. .. _ n_ v . _= .
. .. . : .>u .. .,,.., . . u - . -- . ,
'.:$5 M if.L,.* N. Q'. .i m g;j/,. _ -' ;>; - - - =
n -
, Q.)h- .2 M.,-U ]y.Q -tc:. 4.-A6 q.' -i.;e;y . e- yg+ ,
r 4.!
u W
l-
<i.
.. TABLEI(continued)
.t 1922 . Mar. 10 San Luis Obispo IX 6-1/2
. 1923 Jan. 22 (4) - VII-VIII 73 mi
- 1. A:d'
- 8. ";.f . . , , . '
(m Q nc. 1930 .
~Feb. 25
. c ., .
m Ig erial
, . . ~ , . . .. .. 9. .
VIII , (lessthan6) j Q i. .s w
91930 - Mar.1 ' ^ ' Imperial ~ -
VIII _(lessthan6)
J '-
,w.1 1932 - June 6 '(4) -
VIII 6.4 l % - ,
i 1934 June 7 Monterey VIII 6.o VR .
1 19ho May 18- Imperial I 71
', 1941 Feb. 9 . (4). VI 6.6 D! .. ..
. 1941- May 13 (4) V 6.o
~
q ,.,
- i. 1941 a oct. 3 (4) ,. .VI-VII 6.4 s.
i/.
~
1945' . May 19 : (k) . V 6.2
.- .:- ~ . :. l,.:u % - :: :
- .j' 1 c. . . .-gggg Riverside n -. ggy c +. , 4 1 :; # - " '
VII -65 i 1949 Mar. 9 San Benito m ----
1950 July 29 Imperial VIII (lessthan6) 1951 oct. 7 (4) VII 6.o 1956 oct. 11 -(4) -V 6 l
. . ~
., 1 , 1957 Mar. 22 ' San Mateo VII 53
. Jr. ,
'.,P
<QlM' -.-(1). ,considered
. Shocks.S.E. of the San Bernardino Mountains and into Imperial County are as being in the San Andreas Fault system.
..y 7: W: (2) Modified Mercalli Scale. of 1931.
.;M) J.(3) Data largely from C. F. Richter's " Elementary Seismology",1958. -
mas /:. +
- , q,. . . ,
@" ' 4) OffshoreshocksapparentJyoriginatingontheNorthwesternextensionof'the j yp. ' (c ..' ...
fi San Andrea1 Fault. <
3o.y . y.e . , , . .. s Q ' .(5) Epicenter'of main' shock -- foreshock occurred off Golden Gate 30 seconds '
l a;@
.. . earlier. ,
,i .-.
, : l
'.V.s . - - .
I.
t.
h[.
11 * ((* ,e .l N =j U
>.***j','yv.<
- , - <,.,I , , , ,
~
2 5 : 7: !YnY- Y $*
- N S! h S? . Y. . h.b'd '%. $ Es' - $d .5'E W r
G"';:k!%.*Tt Ot9Mli'Ql&:??wnlg.'9&gQ &q m n-M g.
. Wi fgs@q%';;!:1f
{ -s.&, y , .p.i
'%: uq;fg qgl?&:
- gh *
% n-C:i.h:&.% , y L. M ^ s p u .
mE 4
, cj i .
r, 3, :i: .
o- y.;
s.i APPENDIX I f
.,'Or . .
.B l'. . Earthquake History of the United States - Part II, Stronger Earthquakes .
of California and Western Nevada. U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey Pub-p h.;b:
11 cation No. 41-1, Revised (1960) edition.
m.a. .s., . ,:1 ,. ,e
,..o- ... . .. .. . .
44 +
- 2. Crustal Strain and Fault Movement Investigation - Progress Report, Bull..
N.1 No.116-1, The Resources Agency of Ca11tornia, Department of Water Re-
$6;l sources.- e .
>g
. .l .
3 Horizontal Movement in the Earth's Crust, by C. A. .Whitten (U. S. Coast fj- and Geodetic Survey), Journal of Geophysica1 Research, Vol. 65, No. 9, 1 ,
September, 1960.-
'! i .
.l I .j k.. California Earthquake of Apri118,1906, Report of the State Earthquake Investigation Commission, in 2 Vols.'and Atlas, Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1908.
" 5 Abstracts of Earthquake Reports for the Pacific Coast and Western y,; Mountain Region. Quarterly Reports of ,the U. S. Coast' and Geodetic
. , . r Survey.
y :':y.: . .
v..y '
(J6. United States Earthquakes, . Annual seismological 1 reports of the
- U. 8. Coast and Geodetic Survey.
7 Earthquake Investigations in California, 1934-1935 Special Publication
, 201,'U. S. Coast and Geodetic. Survey.
- 8. The Modified Mercalli Earthquake Intensity Scale of 1931. By H. O.
Wood and F. Neumann. Bulletin Seismological Society of America, Vol. 21,
- p. 277-283 9 Earthquake Intensity and Related Ground Motion. By F. Nemann. Univ. of Washington Press, 1954.'
ek ?
qu 10. Analysis of Earthquake Intensity Distribution Maps. By F. Neumann.
,- Publications du Bureau Central, Seismologique International, Series A, 9i- ,
Travaux Scientifiques, Facicule 20, p. 213-222.
.c ..
2J 4 11. . Synposium on Microseisms. National Academy of Sciences, National Research jQ Council, Publ. No. 306.
- M .
...'/ ., .
-aM i 12. mmantary Seismology. By C. F. Richter. W. H. Freeman and Co., San Fran-l ' cisco,'1958.
- 9.R w, q .
w.4 .. s,.3 , . ,
~
Qg 13 Earthquakes and Rock Creep. By Hugo Beniaff, Bull. Seis. Soc. A=er.
Vol. 41, pp. 31-62.
l h
Ii
~
- I'
- +I + ,
~/,, qq.h .,7 , 4 4; . , *3, ,, , ,
'*y,i w y " ; , ; .. -
e . ., m:_ .', p p u : .s . . j. ,,
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o STATE OF CALIFORNIA OF THE g -Q[ >e-
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- Application No. 43808 -
'.. .. :3:c%,f . ~.maintain eces.sity to construct, . Install, and;n . ..
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,i MEMORANDUM OF ACTION CONCERNING d .
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2.'gh . k, . LATE FILED EXHIBIT NO. 48 AND RELATED EVIDENCE 3J . p.f.e. 4.a.. g. x .p' E
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THE NORTHERN CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION TO PRESERVE BODEGA HEAD AND HARBOR, ? INC. -
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' BAY AREA CHAPTER Northern California Association
.. To Preserve ~ Bodega Head and Harbor
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2731 Durant Avenue
- 8erkeley 4, Collfomio ADVISOns May 6,'1963 Anni Adams Devid arower .
"W"'"'*'" The Publie Utilities. Commission.
State of. California J"80***'a" California State Building weiden F. Heald ' . San Francisco 2, California Jai Hedspeh
,,,n,3, w,,,4 Re . ' Application No. 43808.
, , , , , Interim Decision No. 64337
Dear Sirs:
- Thomos Perkinson ,,
. Kennch n..reh . Transmitted herewith are fifteen (IST copies of T. Eric Reynolds this Association's Memorandum of. Action on Late Filed Exhibit 48 and Related Evidence, this date, concerning Do d Ejeonen ,, Pacific Gas and Electric Company's application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the
. proposed Bodega Bay Atomic Paric.
% Copies of this document have been delivered today
,, by rosesnger to Applicant and by UeS. mail to otheri interested parties as listed in the table of Initial Distribution on page 49 of the Memorandum.
We are confident that the diligence manifest in this Memorandum, the issues of due process which it raises, and the extraordinary nature of the circum-stances with which it deals will not go unattended by '
the Commission.
Respectfully submitted, s/ David E. Pesonen DAVID E. PESONEN Executive Secretary 1
l Purposei To work for preservation of the scenic and historic hoodlands of Bodega Boy and to insure the
".. ecologicalintegrity of the surroundirig marine environment.
A California Non-profit Corporation g
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MEMORANDUM OF ACTION CONCERNING
( LATE FILED EXHIBIT NO. 48 AND RELATED EVIDENCE
( '
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, Contents Paae I. INTRODUCTION 1 j Petitioner's Standing 1 II. APPLICANT'S LATE FILED EXHIBIT 48 1 Denial of Opportunity to Cross-Examine 1 III.- DISTANCE BETWEEN THE PROPOSED FACILITY AND THE SAN ANDREAS FAULT 8 Exhibit 48 8 Applicant's Testimony 9 Additional Sources 13 IV. POTENTIAL SEISMIC ACTIVITY AT PROPOSED
. REACTOR SITE 15 9
Quality of Foundations for Proposed Facility 18 Anticipated Seismic Shock at Bodega Bay 32 Discrepancies Between Exhibit 48 and Preliminary Hazards Analysis Submitted to the AEC 38 V. ARGUMENT 43 VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 46 k
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List of Appendices ' *
. . 4 A Annotated Oblique Aerial Photographs (2), Bodega Head. f B Map, Geology of Bodega Head, William Qualde, CPUC Ex. 48, Sec. 8. '
.C Site Plan, Equipment Location Section; CPUC Ex. 2A,B.
-D ,
Vertical Aerial Photo, Bodega Head, Proposed Reactor Excavation:
7 March 63. i .
E Map, Topography, Bedrock, Dwg, 423179-2, CPUC Ex. 48,. Sec.11.
F Scheme VI, Bodega Bay Power Plant, Dwg, SK8098-7-A; CPUC Ex. 48, Sec. 8.
G Scheme VII,' Bodega Bay Power Plant,. Unnumbered; CPUC Ex. 48, S ec. 11.
H. -G.W. Housner: Fig.1, Plot Plan; Fig. 3, Section Thru Reactor; Fig. 4, Section Thru Reactor: CPUC Ex. 48, Sec.12.
1' I -Dames & Moore: Section Looking Northeast; Section Looking North-west; CPUC Ex. 48, Sec.15.
J Ackerinan, A.J. ; " Atomic Power, A Failure in Engineering Responsi-bility," American Engineer, Jan. '63.
K Pesonen, D.E. , "A Visit to the Atomic Park," reprinted from the Sebastopol Times, Copyright,1962.
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BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
~
In the matter of the application of )
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY )
. for a certificate of public convenience,. ) Application No. 43808 and necessity to construct, install, )
operate and maintain Unit No.1, a ) Interim Decision No. 64537 nuclear power unit, at its Bodega Bay )
Atomic Park. )
(Electric) )
MEMORANDUM OF ACTION CONCERNING LATE FILED EXHIBIT NO. 48 AND RELATED EVIDENCE I
INTRODUCTION Petitioner's Standine The Northern California Association to Preserve Bodega Head and Harbor (hereinafter referred to as the Association) is a non-profit corporation organized
, under the laws of the State of California. It descends directly from the unincor-porated association.of identical title, which is a party to the proceedings of Ap-plication No. 43808 before the California Public Utilities Commission and applies here to the Commission as a party to the proceedings.
II APPLICANT'S LATE FILED EXHIBIT NO. 48 Denial of Opportunity to Cross-Examine .
The Association wishes to draw the Commission's attention to certain dis-
, crepancies between. Applicant's testimony and evidence submitted by Applicant in Late Filed Exhibit 48. No opportunity was afforded during the proceedings to con-
, front Applicant with the discrepancies hereinafter set forth. These discrepancies strongly suggest that Applicant has attempted to deceive the Commission and that x, -
the testimony of Applicant's witnesses as it relates to the substance of Exhibit 48-
\ ; the San Andreas Fault and relatedi seismic conditions-is impeachable. 1
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i Since we were not afforded the exercise of cross-examining Applicant i with' respect to the subject matter discussed herein, this memorandum stands
. l partially in lieu of cross-examination. .
l Subject of the Exhibit 48 I The Commission ordered the submission of Exhibit 48 because of the in-terest which developed during the proceedings concerning possible hazards to the public stemming from the proximity of the proposed nuclear facility at Bodega Bay to the San Andreas Fault.
The Exhibit contains 24 Sections, dealing generally with three areas of interest: (1) the location of the San Andreas Fault, and related seismic and geo-logic con'ditions at Bodega Head, (2) the nature of the foundations for the proposed facility, and (3) the structural design of the proposed facility in light of the seismic, l geologic, and foundation data. These areas of interest are woven throughout Ex-hibit 48.
i For each of the above-listed areas of interest, a different consultant was retained by Applicant. The principal consultant on seismic conditions was Dr. D. Tocher of the University of California at Berkeley, assisted by Dr. William Qualde of Claremont, a geologist. The firm of Dames and Moore of San Francisco was retained to consult on the foundations. Dr. George Housner of the California l
l Institute of Technology was Applicant's principal consultant on structural design of the facility itself.
Applicant Was Afforded an Early Opportunity to Submit Seismic Data Applicant was afforded ample opportunity to submit a significant portion of the material contained in Late Filed Exhibit 48 before t'he close of the proceedirigs.
I 3
., au, a uw The proposed reactor will be of an unusually large size and will contsia
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i However, a verbal exchange between Applicant's Chief Counsel John Morrissey, Applicant's Civil Engineering Witness J. Dean Worthington, and the Commission's Staff Counsel William Bricca, early in the proceedings (Tr. 37-38, 7 Mar 62) sug-gests that Applicant was reluctant to submit the subject evidence. When asked if the ' reports of Applicant's consultants were to be put in evidence, Counsel Morrissey replied: "Well, we didn't intend to put any of them in. They are quite lengthy, they are quite voluminous. Certainly they are available for the Commission staff to look at and to study. Indeed, if we can get extra copies, we will give you an extra copy...."
The record shows that Staff Counsel Bricca then engaged in an exchange of
. remarks with Applicant's counsel Morrissey concerning the nature of expert evidence
~
regarding the San Ardreas Fault. He argued that without documentation and without the direct testimony of Applicant's consultants, the assurances given by Mr. Worth-ington constituted hearsay. But this line of inquiry was interrupted by a recess in 1
the proceedings. The matter of Applicant's putting related documents in evidence was not again raised until the closing minutes of the proceedings, three months later. '
Applicant's testimony regarding seismic effects on the proposed facility was said to be based' partly on the expert report by Dr. Tocher. This report, dated 14 September 1960, contained a map prepared by William Quaide and bearing a trace of the western limit of the San Andreas Fault Zone, running through the harbor entrance just east of Campbell Cove. (Appendix B of this memorandum.) Exhibit 48 shows that this report and map were the only survey of the location of the San Andreas l
. Fault on which Applicant relied, after deciding to place the facility at Campbell Cove '
on Bodega Head. I
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The stimulus for the Commission to require submission of Exhibit 48 was
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, a map on file with the California Bureau of Mines (Exhibit 39), prepared by F. A. )
I Johnson in 1934 and indicating the trace of a secondary fault running directly )
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through Bodega Head in a northwesterly direction just west of the reactor site
?.
(see Appendix A). This trace is not shown on Quaide's map; but the text of Dr.
Tocher's report (Ex. 48, Sec. 8, p.12) contains a pertinent conclusion, No. 4, as follows:
l "The quartz-dbrite is strongly jointed and is faulted on old minor faults. However, there have been no niovements on these faults in the past few thousand years. Lack of recent movement strongly implies, but does not guarantee, that +.here will be no movements ,
throughout the life-expectancy of a power plant @t Campbell Cove on Bodega Head]"
The record shows that the ambiguity in the proceedings which resulted s
from submission of Exhibit 39 might have been resolved if Applicant had presented
. this conclusion of Dr. Tocher's renort. In fact, Dr. Tocher himself, as we later discovered, was present in the room at the time this ambiguity was being discussed.
Nevertheless, it was necessary to summarily call to the stand a geologist from the Bureau of Mines (James Koenig), who was also present in the audience, to be examined on the significance of Exhibit 39. From the tone of the record (Tr.
1348-1360), it is clear that Applicant preferred the ambiguity which remained after Mr. Koenig's testimony to the greater certainty which would have come from testi-mony by Dr. Tocher.
Instead, the so-called " Johnson's" fault shown on Exhibit 39, was dis-cussed in correspondence between Mr. Worthington and Dr. Tocher, after the proc'eedings had been concluded. On 16 June 1962, Dr. Tocher wrote as follows \
to Mr. Worthington (Ex. 48, Sec. 22):
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. he did show on his map as the most Well-defined of the many faults and shear zones that can be observed in the quarr2-diorite of Bodega Head, but attached no greater sigpincance to dt than the.t." .
J 7 Finally, the remarks of Witness Worthing' ton and of Counsel Morrissey at the time Exhibit 48 was ordered submitted cleaNy reflNt a reluctance to ex-t pose to the Commission's attention the true location of the San Andress Fault, i the quality of the foundations, or the plant design. The fonowing excerpts from the Tranhript reasonably support this allegation (Tr. 1402-1413):
Worthington: " . . .Now, location of fault lines may have been of interest to Mr. Johnson but I am pretty certain that Dr. Quaide's interest in i this matter was much greater since his assignment was specifically to go on to Bodega Head and find .Af there were any bones of active faulting. l "He spent several days on the Head and reported that he had found none. . . "
Hollis (PUC Staff Engineer),; Tour company holds the responsibility to review the geological dirength of the foundations for this plant, does it not? " -
Worthington: "It certainly does. . .The work of Doctors Tocher and Qualde has been correlated with that of Dr. Housner. . .The prox-imity of the San Andreas Fault has been a major consideration in these designs. . . "
Hollis: "And these designs are also related to the Atomic Energy Commission site criteria and your future representations before 2
Johnson, F. A. (deceased), Thesis, Ph.D. , University of California, Berkeley,1934., "Petaluma Region," nin California Division of Mines, Bulletin 118, Apr.194 3.
a The following remarks occur on pages 24-25 of Johnson's thesis:
f "The diorite, where excellently exposed in sea cliffs, is deeply weath-ered, and badly crushed, sheared, and faulted. A zone of gouge, an inch or two thlck, fu associated with many of the faults, but generally the amount of move-ment where determinable has been slight. One well defined high-angle fault on the west side of the ridge has a strike of N 25' W, the general strike of the gneis-sold banding. Dikes can be traced but a few feet before evidence of repeated shearing, crushing, and faulting can be observed. Considering the proximity of the massif [ Bodega Head)to the San Andreas it!ft, which separates the diorite from the Franciscan Group occurring to the east on the mainland, the abundant evidence of movement which has affected the rock mass becomes tenable." ;j j --r - n . m. . . - .v ,v-- m. -- - - - - - - . - - - - - - -
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.the AEC in connection with your construction and later peJaits
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. to be received from them, if granted?"
Worthington: "That is correct. " !
Hollis: "Accordingly, for the Commission staff's information may there !
be filed, Mr. Examiner, a late filed exhibit presented for the Com- l mission's information as a matter of completeness of the record a i full geological report reflecting the company's position with respect to the proximity of the earthquake faults and their effect on plant dec!gn including the reports of Doctors Qualde and Dr. Housner and Dr. Tocher if such reports exist or can be made ?" i
, _ Morrissey: "Well, Mr..Worthington, are these reports understandable in and of themselves ?" ~
t Worthington:, "The reports are of a technical nature, of such a nature that I don't believe it would be helpful to the Commission at alN "Further, t..t. r6 ports have been worked upon through the me 11 7
. um of correspone. ace between consultants, between the Pacific Gas 't E .. and Electric Company and the consultants.
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"In order to follow through ard have any significance at all in l.
the understanding of these reports would be a trenendous job.
L "It is one which we have followed very clouity and we thorough- 1 l.
1 ly understand. A good deal of the action that lis been taken has y' been in the form of oral conversations with Dr. Housner and others. '
"I don't believe it would be helpful."
Morrissey: "Mr. Examiner, I call your ettention to the fact that we have been spending now some six ce seven days., A good bit of it was re-lated to this very subject and we have presented evidence on this subject which is sufficient to sustain our action'which we are going forward with. "
l [Mr. Bricca supports the position of Mr. Houis and' reaffirms' the Staff's ,
position, stated on Tr. 38, that "it would not be appropriate to rely on the hearsay evidence" presented by Applicant and that "the Commission i {
itself would be the best judge" of the evidenco.]
Examiner Patterson: "Well, this is certainly a very important part of this proceeding . Apparently the applicant is willing to stand upon the
, record that they have made with respect to the - " )
Morrissey: "That's correct. "
, Examiner Patterson: "--San Andreas Fault. But, the staff, I gather that is the position that additional information will be helpful to the Com-mission in evaluating this. " -
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.j. ,, Hollis: " And for completeness of the record. . . . "
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Bricca: "In the absence of receiving it, we would have to urge that this part of the burden of proof the applicant has not met. . . "
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Morrissey: "Could the summaa be prepared, Mr. Worthington?"
4: 3 '
Worthington: "Yes, a summary could be prepared. There would be a tremendous amount of work in doing so, but we can do it. . . "
Morrissey: 4Nell, Mr. Examiner, could I respectfully ask an amend-ment to what you have just ordered, to the effect that we will pro-
, vide the sammary, and we will have available at our offices the y -
documents. "
Berry (Counsel for the Sierra Club): "Mr. Examiner, I must strenuously object to this suggestion. The more and more that Counsel makes it apparent that he does not want to have these original records made completely available to the public, the more I become suspici-ous that there is something in those documents which is fairly im-
. portant. . . "
g Examiner Patterson: "
. . .Now, when might that be made available. . . "
Worthington: ". .It might take a week or so to compile this, Mr. Exam-iner."
The exhibit which was the subject of this exchange in the proceedings was ordered late filed and numbered Exhibit 48. It is the principal material on which this memorandum is based. In order for Exhibit 48 to be complete, Appli-i 1
cant found it necessary, as the exhibit shows, to conduct additional correspond-ence with his consultants after the close of the proceedings, which is included in the exhibit. The summary mentioned above is a five-page document, dated 6 July 196.?, and attached as Section 1 of Exhibit 48. The author of the summary is !
l Mr. Worthington. The Exhibit was filed on 9 July 1962, just over a month after j h .
the close of hearings on Application No. 43808. The text of the Commission's t
}. Interim Opinion No. 64537 suggests that the Commission relied exclusively on
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6 Applicant's testimony in hearings and summary of Exhibit 48 and neglected a close examination of the substance of the exhibit itself in assessing earthquake hazards
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III l DISTANCE BETWEEN THE PROPOSED FACILITY AND THE SAN ANDREAS FAULT i Exhibit 4j, Inthis discussion it will be understood that, in reference to the distance between the proposed facility at Bodega Head and the San Andreas Fault, distances are measured between the centerline of the reactor and a line of the western edge {
of the San Andreas Fault, as shown on the map prepared by William Quaide (Ex. 48, Sec. 8) . Regarding the significance of this line on Quaide's map Tocher reported as follows (Ex. 48, Sec. 8, p. 7): ,.
" Western Marcin o_f the San Andreas Fault Zone--The San Ardreas fault in this area is not a single dislocation but a zone'of dislocations a mile and one half wide. The rocks in the fault zone can not be observed, for they are crushed and broken so that they are easily eroded. The position of the zone is marked by a belt of low relief, '
covered here by sand dunes and recent marine deposits. The West-ern margin of the fault zone is indicated on the geologic map (Qualde's map] as a straight line separating granitic exposures of the southwest from the dune-covered low relief area to the northwest.
The western margin may not be as exactly straight as indicated, but evidence for a more detailed location is lacking. Very straight trends, moreover, are characteristic features of large strike slip faults such l as the San Andreas. " ;
This map shows the " Western Limit of the San Andreas Fault Zone" run-ning just east of Campbell Cove. But since this map does not show the plant lo-cation, it has been difficult to establish on one map the location of both the fault and the nuclear reactor so as to scale the distance between them.
A number of maps are included in Exhibit 48, but they vary in such a way that it is impossible to accurately plot both of these features-the fault and f
the reactor- simultaneously. The scales vary, the grid orientations vary, bench- I
- marks are placed on some. maps and deleted from others, and so forth. It should m_ _ _ _ e
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also be noted that several drawings in Exhibit 48 have been improperly indexed.
. For example, where a certain drawing is indexed as Caange'1,' Change'2 or an unnumbered drawing is actually included in the Exhibit. Thus the entire docu-ment is singularly confusing. Nevertheless, from maps we have prepared and
'from aerial photographs (Appendix D) of the excavation now in progress at the reactor site, it has been possible to plot the proposed reactorlocation within a very few feet of its precise location in relation to the western edge of the fault.
By our measurements, the distance between the proposed nuclear reactor and the western trace of the San Andreas Fault is very close to 1000 feet, j
Applicant's Testimony The Commission's attention is drawn, therefore, to Interim Opinion No.
64537 (p.19) which states that the San Andreas Fault Zone "according to the record is more than one-fourth mile east of the proposed reactor site. " (Empha-sis added.) In addition, the Commission's Interim Order takes particular and specific note of the Atomic Energy Commission reactor site criteria (Exhibit 23),
Sec. 100.10(c)(1): "No facility should be located closer than one fourth mile from the surface location of a known active earthquake fault'."
One-fourth mile equals 1320 feet, which is 320 more than the distance between the proposed Bodega Bay nuclear reactor and the San Andreas Fault Zone, according to the best evidence in the record. j l
The Commission's attention is drawn to the fact that Exhibit 48 and )
~
, other evidence show that Applicant had full knowledge of the true distance between the reactor and the fault at the time of the hearings on Application No. 43808.
Yet Applicant led the Commission and the public to believe that the l distance was greater then one-quarter mile. The distance is significant because -
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. Commission's reactor siting requirements. That Applicant submitted Exhibit 23 to the Commission is evidence that he attached some importance to the AEC
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criteria;. submission was rot an idle act.'
Nevertheless we'have the testimony in the record which led the Com-mission to note that the distance is greater than one-fourth mile..
Witness Worthington (Tr.169) testified that the San Andreas Fault is "approximately.a_ mile" from the reactor vessel. When cross-examined by staff engineer Hollis on the location of the fault Mr. Worthington referred ex-tensively to a fairly imprecise line visible on the aerial photograph in Exhibit 1,. although the nature of the examination clearly reflects that Quaide's map was the kind of data being sought (Tr. 378-380). Witness Nutting, under direct
~
. examination by Applicant's counsel Morrissey compounded the error (Tr. 520). :
Questioned, "Does the proposed site of Bodega Head satisfy the requirements of the AEC regulation, in your opinion? ," he replied, "Yes, it does. "
It should be noted that between the time of the testimony by Witness Worthington cited above (Tr. l'69, 8 Mar 62) and the testimony by Witness Nut-i ting cited above (Tr. 520, 21 May 62) the AEC reactor site criterion respecting earthquake hazards was changed.
Exhibit 23 was filed during testimony by Witness Nutting. It had be-come effective on 12 May 62 (27 FR 3509,12 Apr 62) thirty days after publica-tion in the Federal Register and nine days prior to Mr. Nutting's testimony (Tr.
. 518). At the time of Worthington's testimony, therefore, the language em-ployed (10 CFR 100.10(b)(1)). Notice of Proposed Guides, 26 FR 1224,11 Feb.
- 61) was that "No facility should be located closer than 1/4,tp 1/2 mile from ffe . .
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8
. the surface location of a known active earthquake fault." (Emphasis added.) The reason for the change, according to personal correspondence with AEC Director of Regulation, Harold L. Price, was "to avoid the ambiguity. "3 It should be noted that in the statement of Witness Nutting (Tr. 520)
+
cited above, the context dealt with the exclusion area around the reactor re-quired by the' AEC, in relation to Doran Park, the curved sandspit which defines the southern boundary of Bodega Harbor (see Appendix A). But later, under cross-examination, Witness Nutting stated that the facility would be at least one-quer-ter mile from the fault (Tr.1232).
Correspondence included in Exhibit 48 reflects that Applicant's princi-
. pal consultant on the design of the proposed facility, Dr. George Housner, suf-fered under a misapprehension as to tte distance from.the facility to the San Andreas Fault. Exhibit 48 shows no evidence that Applicant attempted to correct this error.
Presumably Dr. Housner was in possession of the Tocher and Quaide report of 14 September 1960. Perhaps, however, the map prepared by Quaide and showig the fault to run just east of the plant site was mislaid. The record 3
Pertinent in this regard, the Commission may find interest in the fol-lowing exchange during hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 88th Congress,1st Sess., pursuant to Sec. "202" of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; Feb. 20-21,1963, page 162.
Representative Westland: ". . .I think PG&E announced their Bodega Bay project -
about a year ago last August or September [1961] and yet it is still in l the mill. Is that not a long time ?. . . "
Director Price: "They had their problem first with the California Utilities Com-mission. They just finished up with.that late last year. They only '
filed their application for a license from the [ Atomic Energy] Commis-
. , sion at the end of this past December. So they have just within the past 2 months brought the case to the Commission for a construction permit. I don't anticipate that anything in our licensing process will i
delay their planned start of construction. "
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(PG&E Scheme VII). Appendix H of this memorandum. This site is close to the San Andreas Fault Zone which passes a mile or so to the east." (Emphasis added.)
And in the body of the report (p. 5), Dr. Housner confirms this error, noting that "The proposed site is only about a mile or so from the fault. . . " (Emphasis added.)
Not only does Exhibit 48 show what must be described as a casual at-tention to the location of the San Andreas Fault at Bodega Bay but a close reading of the Exhibit leads to the strong impression that Applicant was prepared to build a nuclear power plant at Bodega Head regardless of any adverse seismic consider-ations, contrary to AEC reactor site criteria, and contrary to grave reservations reflected in the reports of Applicant's own consultants. This impression is borne
~
, out by consideration of potential seismic activity at the reactor site itself and the quality of the foundations for the reactor in particular, and the facility in general. ;
Location .o_f the San Andreas Fault Confirmed _b_y. Additional Sources The Commie:: ion's Interim Order No. 64537 grants a certificate of pub-lic convenience and necessity to Applicant, subject to certain conditions. One of these conditions (1 (c)(1), page 25), is "that proper authority has been se-cured from the Atomic Energy Commission to construct the nuclear energy plant. . . "
In pursuit of satisfying this condition, Applicant filed with the AEC an application for a Class 104b (construction) license on 28 December 1962 (AEC Docket No. 50-205) . The material relating to hazards is included as Exhibit C,
" Preliminary Hazards Analysis," to the application.
On 26 February 19 63 the AEC Division of Licensing and Regulation sub-mitted to Applicant a series of questions raised by the staff of that division after study of Exhibit C to the Class 104b application.
,j On 4 March 1963, Applicant's president N.R. Sutherland certified a ,
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' Amendment No.1 to AEC Docket No. 50-205, consisting of " answers to questions J* raised by the Division'of Licensing and Regulation and attached to the [AE] Com-mission's letter dated February 26, 1963." .
~
gl j -We,wish to draw the Public Utilities Commission's attention to Item 43 of the above mentioned Amendment No.1 to AEC Docket No. 50-205 as evidence L. ,
that Applicant was informed of the actual (1000 feet) distance between the pro-posed Bodega reactor and the western limit of the San Andreas Eault Zone at the.
f time he testified to the contrary before the Commission. As the Commission will note, Applicant refers the Atomic Energy Commission to the map of 14 September 1960 prepared by William Quaide, for authority in stating this distance. Item 43 7 is reproduced below in full for the Commission's cor.venience: '
.43. hC query]
-!- "How farTrom the nearest earthquake fault or branch fault is the reactor to be located? - How far from the San Andreas fault is the reactor to be located?" l 1
hpplicant's reply] .
"The geologic and seismologic characteristics of Bodega Head have been carefully investigated by the Company's consultants,
, Mr. William Quaide, geologist, and Mr. Don Tocher, consult-ing seismologist of University of California at Berkeley. In addition, extensive soil borings were conducted to determine soil and rock conditions on Bodega Head and to dctermine wheth-er or rot rock faulting exists in the selected power plant site.
It is the conclusion of the Company's consultants' and verified by the borings that no active faulting exists on~ Bodega Head and particularly under the power plant site. The oeolooic map 1 in Appendix IV which was prepared h Mr. William Quaide in-
[ dicates the western maroin p_f the San Andreas fault zone.
J' Ittg distance from this western maroin to the reactor is approxi-mately 1000 feet. The fault zone at this point is estimated to be about a mile and a half wide. Since there are no active branchfaults on Bodega Head the western edge of the San Andreas fault is therefore the closest known active fault line to the plant site. " (Emphasis added.)
J The significance of this reply by Applicant to the AEC, insofar as the present memorandum is concerned, is that it confirms our earlier allegation that ,
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. . i Applicant possessed knowledge that 'the reactor would be less than one-quarter 3
- mile from the San Ardreas Fault at the time that he testified before the Commi,ssion that it was more than one-quarter mile distant. It was this misleading testimony which le'd .the Commission to err, by finding incorrectly that the San Andreas Fault is "more than one-fourth mile east of the proposed reactor site."
IV POTENTIAL SEISMIC ACTIVITY AT THE PROPOSED REACTOR SITE Campbell Cove, as shown on the maps in the Appendices to this memor-andum, is a gentle indentation on the eastern face of the headland, near its southern extremity. Both the surface and substrate topography of the headland show that Campbell Cove lies at the point where a " sediment filled valley" or saddle, trending east-we st across the headland, plunges below sea level.
The possibility that this valley may be controlled by secondary faulting on the headland had prompted Applicart's first consultant on seismology and geology, Mr. Clark McHuron, consulting engineering geologist, to recommend the outline of three general areas on the headland where a power plant might be safely built and to exclude Campbell Cove as a possible site (Ex. 4'8 , Sec. 4, Drawing titled " Bodega Head").
- This "sedimert filled valley" is mentioned several times in Dr. Tocher's ;
report of 14 September 19 60 (Ex. 48, Sec. 8). On page 8, in the body of the
. 4 It should be noted that, at first, McMuron found a site near Horse- ,
shoe Cove, further north and on the seaward side of the Bodega Head, to be '!
satisfactory for a power plant. This site exactly straddles the western limit
'~ -
of the San Andreas Fault as traced on Quaide's map of 14 September 1960.
l (Ex. 48, Sec. 2, Drawing 6172-A, " Proposed General Layout, Scheme No.1, Power Plant 'N'. ") ,
l
,. The site of proposed Power Plant "N" is practically identical to the
'i planned location of the University of California's Bodega Marine Laboratory. .--
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[ report: "There is no evidence indicating that the location of the east trending sediment filled valley at Campb911 Cove is. controlled by a large fault. The power plant and tunnel sites there do rot appear to straddle large faults. " (Emphasis added.) And on page 6: "Although .the evidence h not conclusive, it is sugges-tive that;the valley trend is rot controlled by faulting. " (Emphasis added.)
Although great strides have beenmade in techniques for designing earth-quake-resistant structures since the San Francisco earthquake of April 18, 1906, and the El Centro earthquake of 1940, it is still not feasible to design a structure which can withstand shearing action directly at the site itself. For this reason, when Dr. Housner replied (Ex. 48, Sec. 7, 30 June 60) to the letter of Applicant's
. chief.'ivil c engineer, Mr. Worthington (Ex. 48, Sec. 6, 24 June 60), accepting his election as Applicant's consultant on structural design, he also sent a letter to Dr. Tocher, askiig four questions dealing with possible earth movement at the proposed reactor site (Ex. 48, Sec. 7).
Of considerable interest to the Commission is the following statement in Dr. Housner's letter of 30 June 1960 to Mr. Worthington:
"As regards gross ground movement produced by faulting, I would say that if there appeared even a_small likelihood of this happen-ing, then the site should not _b_e, used. The investigation of Dr.
Tocher and Dr. Quaid [ sic] should be aimed at assessing the like-lihood of faulting occurring on or near_ the site " (Ex. 48, Sec. 7, emphasis added.)
1 Two and one half months later, Tocher and Quaide, in reply to question
.i No.1 from Dr. Housner ("What is the likelihood of active faulting occurring on or near the' site ?") reported as follows (Ex. 48, Sec. 8, p. 9): !
i "Within the probable lifetime of a large power plant (on the order of a century) there is a strong likelihood that active movement will occur )
in the San Andreas fault zone near the site on Bodega Head. . . . I 7 ;
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c report: "There is no evidence indicating that the location of the east trending
~
sediment filled valley at Campbell Cove is controlled by a large fault. The power plant and tunnel sites there do not appear to straddle large faults. " (Emphasis added.) And on page 6: "Althorgh .th.q evidence is nqt conclusive, it is sugges-tive that;the valley trend is rot controlled by faulting. " (Emphasis added.)
Although great strides have beenmade in techniques for designing earth-quake-resistant structures since the San Francisco earthquake of April 18, 1906, and the El Centro earthquake of 1940, it is still not feasible to' design a structure which can withstand shearing action directly at the. site itself. For this reason, when Dr. Housner replied (Ex. 48, Sec. 7; 30 June 60) to the letter of Applicant's chief civil engineer, Mr. Worthington (Ex. 48, Sec. 6, 24 June 60), accepting his election as Applicant's consultant on structural design, he also sent a letter to Dr. Tocher, asking four questions dealing with possible earth movement at the proposed reactor' site (Ex. 48, Sec. 7).
Of considerable interest to the Commission is the following statement in Dr. Housner's letter of 30 June 1960 to Mr. Worthington:
"As regards gross ground movement produced by faulting, I would say that if there appeared even a, small likelihood of this happen-
, ing, then the site should not he used. The investigation of Dr.
Tocher and Dr. Quaid [ sic] should be aimed at assessing the like-lihood of faulting occurring on or near the site. " (Ex. 48, Sec. 7, j emphasis added.) l
' )
Two and one half months later, Tocher and Qualde, in reply to question i j
i No.1 from Dr. Housner ("What is the likelihood of active faulting occurring on
, l l
or near the' site ?") reported as follows (Ex. 48, Sec. 8, p. 9):
"Within the probable lifetime of a large power plant (on the order of a century) there is a strono likelihood that active movement will occur in the San Andreas fault zone near the site on Bodega Head. . . .
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No evidence was found in the geologic examination to indicate
. . the existence of a laroe fault beneath the plant or tunnel sites.
Chances of disruption of the sites by breakace alono a_ larce fault are therefore small. " (Emphasis added.)
To be quite certain on this point, Dr. Housner also asked Dr. Tocher:
"What is the likelihood of ground movements occurring at the site during an eartti-quake because of fissuring or fracturirg of the rock?" (Ex. 48, Sec. 7). And Toch-er and Quaide's report answers (Ex. 48, Sec. 8, p. 9): -
"Probably quite small. . . . Complete absence of fracturing in the !
quartz-diorite cannot .b_e predicted with*
certainty, however. " ,
(Emphasis added.)
Further, as noted on page 4 of this memorandum, Tocher and Quaide's Conclusion No. 4 (Ex. 48, Sec. 8, p.12) states that:
" Lack of recent movements St Campbell Covh strongly implies,
. but does not cuarantee, thanhere will be no movements through-
. out the life-expectancy of a power plant. " (Emphasis adde'd.)
The other two questions of Tocher posed by Dr. Housner dealt with
'(1) the likelihood of landsliding at the site and (2) the expected intensity of earthquake activity at the site as compared with a "similar site 15 miles or more" i from the fault. Both of these questions will be discussed later in this memoran- !
dum.
As for the magnitude of potential earth movement near the site, we have j Applicant's own testimony under direct examination, which would appear to be - y based on Tocher and Quaide's report (Tr. 534): l l
Morrissey: "Approximately how mu'ch movement or displacement was i there in the 1906 quake of the San Andreas fault in this area, if l
. you know ? "
]
Worthington: "I haven't found any records of the amount of displace- l ment at Bodega proper. However, the displacement at the Head !
of Tomales Bay ee Appendix was about 16 feet, and I would
. . judge from study {ing the record]s both north and south of Bo i
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that the displacement was somewhere between 10 and 16 feet, more likely the latter. "
It 's
. clear from the above discussion that Tocher and Quaide's analysis I of the site could not assure against gross ground movement at the proposed re .
actor site. There is no evidence of large faults at the site-but there may be smaller faults; the likelihood of ground movement at the site is "probably quite small;" the evidence "does not guarantee" that there will be no movements at the site;" but there is a " strong likelihood" cf active movement "near the site." I Exhibit 48 shows that at the time of Tocher and Qualde's report, Dr. l Tocher possessed a carbon copy of Dr. Housner's letter of 30 June 1960 to Mr. ,
. Worthington, in which Dr. Housner was quite emphatic in stating that "even a small likelihood" of gross ground movement at the site would dictate that the l site be abandoned.
Altogether, it is reasonable to infer that Tocher and Quaide were telling Applicant as delicately as possible that Campbell Cove is an unsuitable site for a reactor from a seismological point of view. This alone should have discouraged Applicant from proceeding with his plans; nevertheless the plans went forward with vigor. i i
j Quality of Foundations for Proposed Facility The Commission's Interim Opinion No. 64537 discussed several of the features which Applicant testified made the Bodega Bay site desirable for a nucle-ar power plant. "Some of the desirable features which he enumerated as existing at the proposed site," observed the Commission's opinion (p. 4) "are. . .a_ solid cranitic type of rock providing an excellent foundation, isolation from population centers. . . " and so forth. (Emphasis added.)
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The Commission's attention is drawn to the evidence discussed below in Exhibit 48 that there is no solid granitic type of rock at Campbell Cove and that the foundations for the proposed facility are of an extremely inferior quality. l i
Irttially Applicant may have been justified in the assumption of solid 1 k
rock for the foundations at Campbell Cove. Quaide's now familiar map bears a j note referring to the northern shore of Campbell Cove: " Quartz-diorite exposed to 5 feet above sea level. " This would suggest rock at suitable elevations for .
foundtng the reactor structure.
l However, it should be noted that the term " quartz-diorite" does not '
necessarily mean " rock;" it refers to the mineral-chemical composition of the
,' material, which may vary from nearly clay to hard rock. At Campbell Cove, as
. Exhibit 48 shows, th'e quartz-diorite is closer to being clay.
The reason for this highly decomposed condition in the rock of Bodega Head is best explained in a paragraph from Tocher and Quaide's report of 14 Septembe' r 1960 (Ex. 48, Sec. 8, p. 5):
"The quartz-diorite at Bodega Head is extensively fractured, sheared, and jointed, as are all the other granitic rocks lying west of the San Andreas fault system. The rock is not penetratively sheared but is cut by innumerable discrete shear surfaces with brec-cia (broken rock) and mylonite (milled rock) zr - s ranging from a i feather edge to a foot thick. . . .Many cases were observed, however, where large dikes were cut off by faults and not observed again on the other side of the fault, indicating movements of tens of feet or more . The intensity of the faulting and jointing in the rock is so great that the formerly massive rock is now broken into a mosaic of blocks with averace dimensions o_f approximately one foot. "
.; (Emphasis added.)
. As mentioned earlier in this memorandum, the reactor site at Campbell Cove lies where an east-west trending " sediment filled valley" plunges below sea level in an easterly direction. According to Tocher and Qualde's report, the
'f entire headland was submerged at some time in the past and sediment was i ;. {
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[ deposited over the rock; subsequently the headland was uplifted. The deposits
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q have accumulated in the sediment filled east-west trending valley at Campbell ;
Cove,- therefore,' and have masked the very prominent valley which would be visi- l ble if the deposits were not present. The situation at Campbell Cove may.be com-: !
- pared to a flour-scoop buried near the surface in a flour-bin.
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e Applicant retained the firm of Dames and Moore of San Francisco to con-'
sult on the location and quality of the foundation material at Campbe11' Cove. Their '
I
[ first seismic survey, dated 25 January 1960'(Ex. 48, Sec. 5) was made available l
. to Tocher and Quaide and to Dr. Housner.
This Dames and. Moore report contained the results of 1 boring and.7 {
seismic sections in the vicinity of Campbell Cove.. The bedrock contours hy-pothesized from these tests were drawn on Drawing No. 423179; but according to Applicant's addendum to Section 6 of Exhibit 48, the original tracing of this drawing is not available. In place of it, Drawing No. 423179-2, dated 22 March 60 (Appendix E), which may differ from the original (the record affords no oppor-tunity to verify any possible difference), has been substituted (Ex, 48, Sec.11).
A traced facsimile of the Campbell Cove portion of this drawing is included as I Appendix E of this memorandum.
. i When Mr. Worthington, Applicant's chief civil engineer, wrote to Dr.
Housner on 24 June 1960 (Ex. 48, Sec. 6), he included eight enclosures, of l l l which three concern us here. The first was a map of the bedrock contours, Draw-4 f
ing 423179 mentioned above; the other two were Drawings 55319 and SK8098-7-A, !
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the latter showing a proposed plant layout, Scheme VI (Appendix F). Drawing 55319 is a detailed topographic map, later used as a base map for an alternative j
}.- to Scheme VI and is labelled Scheme VII (unnumbered and undated). (Ex. 48, Sec. ll.)
1
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The importance of these drawings will appear in a moment.
The second report by Dames and Moore, 2 December 1960 (Ex. 48, Sec.
10, p. 2), states that "for a nuclear plant the most advantageous rock elevation is about ten feet below plant grade. " This report, titled " Preliminary Soils In-vestigation and Seismic Survey," contained the results of further borings in the vicinity of Campbell Cove which showed " bedrock" to be not only severely frac-tured and jointed but to lie at unexpectedly great depths as well. This Dames and Moore report also commented on the earlier seismic survey, as follows:
" SUBSURFACE CONDITIONS:
The seismic refraction survey conducted in Phase I of this in-
~
vestigation showed bedrock to be. considerably shallower than the test borings disclosed in Phase II. The discrepancy in bedrock ele-vations is due to the difficulties in interpreting seismic velocity data for a four ' phase system where the depth.to rock rapidly in-creases or decreases along the seismic line. An indicated inter-mediate velocity layer above the granitic rock has further compli-cated the interpretation of the seismic data. This uncommon occurr-ence results in a situation termed the " case of the missing layer. "
In other words, the velocity of this layer is not found on the veloci-ty section, and depth calculations are too shallow, as generally !
the case here. The one test boring drilled in Phase I to correlate the seismic work had indicated excellent agreement between in-terpreted and actual depths to rock. It is obvious now that more .
test borinos should have been drilled to correlate with the seismic -
data jn the areas o_f the steeply slopino rock. " (Emphasis added.)
l Nevertheless, the preliminary designs for the facility, prepared by Dr.
Housner and included with his report of January 1961 (Ex. 48, Sec.12), show l l the " bedrock" at roughly ten to twenty feet below plant grade. Dr. Housner's Figure 1 (plot plan), and Figures 3 and 4 (sections through the reactor) are in-i
. cluded as Appendix H of this memorandum.
1 The proposed facility consists of several components, two of which are of particular interest to this discussion-the reactor building and the turbine-gen-
.o
'ij erator. In plan view, these two components of the facility look roughly like a '
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. wooden gavel, with the reactor building representing the head of the gavel and the turbine-generator building representing the handle.
Immediately after receipt of the second Dames and Moore report, on 8 December 1960, Mr. Worthington wrote to Dr. Housner, forwarding the report
, and also enclosing "two prints of an unnumbered drawing entitled Scheme 7, Bodega Bay Power Plant" (Appendix G) (Ex. 48, Sec.11). He also enclosed a copy of a letter to G.L. Coltrin of Applicant's engineering department, from Dr.
Tocher, dated 11 November 1960, in which Dr. Tocher referred to the plant- lay-out shown in Drawing SK8098-7-A (Scheme VI) and a's ked: "Sometime I would be interested to see how you have rearranged the plant layout to avoid the problems presented by the bedrock's being deeper than originally anticipated." (Ex. 48 Sec. 9).
From the evidence available in Exhibit 48 it is difficult to sort out pre-cisely what happened at this point in the history of the interactions among Ap-plicant and his consultants. But Drawing SK8098-7-A, Scheme VI, shows the plant layout with the turbine-generator extending in a southerly direction from the reactor building, where the so-called bedrock lies deepest. The fact that the turbine-generator would ret be founded on bedrock apparently prompted the question by Dr. Tocher noted above, regarding rearrangement of the plant layout.
Scheme VI is approximately the layout submitted to the Commission on 9 March 1962 by Mr. Worthington as " Site Plan," Exhibit 2-A (Appendix C).
However, the act of sending two prints of the unnumbered drawing,
~
l I
labelled Scheme VII, to Dr. Housner on 8 December 1960, apparently prompted
' ~
Dr. Housner to infer that this was to be the final plant layout. This layout is i
- used in Dr. Housner's Figure 1 in his final report of January 19 61-the turbine-
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generator, the, handle, extends in a westerly direction from the reactor building,
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along the contour of bedrock on the flank of the sediment filled valley. It is approximately 90 degrees out of line with the actual layout submitted to the Com-mission as final.
It would have been reasonable,for Dr. Housner to make such an inference since he received two copies of the higher-number Sch'eme VII six months after
, having received the copy of Scheme VI. Whereas Scheme VI is similar to the lay-
. out submitted to the Commission in Exhibit 2, Dr. Housner proceeded to design a facility in accordance with the abandoned Scheme VII. Exhibit 48 shows no active effort by Applicant to disabuse Dr. Housner of this error.
~
. One object of this portion of our discussion is to show that the Commis-sion's conclusion given in Interim Opinion No. 64537 regarding the foundations for the proposed facility is belied by the Commission's own record. To do so we must show that (1) the foundation for the reactor is in fact rot solid rock and (2) what passes for rock on Bodega Head is much deeper than Applicant's testimony e
has led the Commission to believe. The first part of this demonstration is not too difficult; but the second part involves pinpointing the precise location of the facility, since the " bedrock" which forms.the sediment filled valley at Campbell Cove is not level but varies sharply in elevation.
The problem of locating bedrock was again described in Dames and Moore's third and final report, " Foundation Investigation," dated 30 April 1962, "the case of t'he ' missing layer' . " (Ex. 48, Sec. 17) . Certain peculiarities of the site had twice led Dames and Moore to discard the conclusions from preceding seismic surveys . This last report notes, for example, "the additional borings drilled for j' final design purposes indicated a serious discrepancy between the actual bedrock
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surface and that which was based on the preliminary studies." Their report con-
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. cluded that the earlier conclusions should be abandoned and that there was no i sound way to resolve'the ambiguities between the earlier and later data.L
)
i Some of the data from the last Dames and Moore investigation were made 1
available to Applicant in the form of sketched cross-sections of the reactor, j j
showing the level of bedrock and overlyirg material, dated 2 February 1962, be- !
l fore the final report was submitted (Ex. 48, Sec.15). They included the find-
. j l
ings of additional borings at the reactor site, including Boring 16 at the geo-metric center of the reactor capsule, Boring 14 at the juncture of the reactor and turbine-generator buildings, and Boring 20 rear the south end of the turbine-gen-
.- erator. (Ex. 48, Sec.17.) {
1 d
. The layout plans given in Dames ard Moore's report of 30 April 1962 l are chronologically the first evidence given in Exhibit 48 of the actual location of the proposed facility. The report notes that "With the exception of the fresher portions of'the rock (i.,e. , the bottom 20 to 35 feet), it is anticipated that the entire excavation can be made without the necessity for blasting. " The Ameri-can Geological Institute's Glossary of Geology and Related Sciences states that "to the engineer, the term rock signifies firm and coherent or consolidated sub-stances that cannot be excavated normally by manual means." Not only would I
the bedrock on which the reactor would be founded not meet this definition, but as noted earlier, the rock-such as it is-is much deeper than the record of Ap-
~
plicant's formal testimony would lead one to believe. At the center of the re-actor, the depth to " bedrock" is approximately 30 feet below sea level and the rock is described by Dames and Moore as follows (Ex. 48, Sec.17, Log of Boring 16):
n-~ . - _ - - - - - -
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i s
" white and. black quartz diorite (severely jointed into mod.
. fresh blocks up to 3") with small shear zones (joints &
. shear zones altered to clay) (grading into harder & fresh -
blocks up to 8") (little or no alterationin joints) (few shear zones)"
i Besides showing the " bedrock" to beof poor quality, Dames & Moore's investigation also showed that as the bedrock crosses the site of the reactor ves-sel at from 50 to 65 feet below yard level, it inclines sharply downward in a south-erly direction. As a result, the turbine-generator foundation slab does not lie on even the poor quality rock found in Bodega Head. The turbine-generator slab i
is founded 5 feet below yard level, 20 feet above sea level, and, according to Boring 14 is underlain by approximately 65 feet of sands and clays at the point
, of juncture with the reactor building. At the southern extremity of the turbine-generator building, the depth to bedrock is even greater. At no level in Boring 14 was rock of satisfactory compressive strength discovered.
The record shows that Mr. Worthington was fully cognizant of this fact
]
l when he wrote to.Dr. Housner on 27 February 1962 (Ex. 48, Sec.15): "There is 1
evidence of some c1py material at the depth at which the turbine generator founda- (
I tion slab will be founded. " This seems to us to be a misleading description at best.
In the same letter, Mr. Worthington also wrote: "The quality of the rock is inferior,too our original assumption of ' solid rock. ' {[huotes in the origina'l.] Actu-ally, the granite rock is highly weathered at the earth-rock contact and is highly jointed At lower elevations. " (Emphasis added.)
, , Applicant's Testimony Concernino Foundation Material Despite these remarks, Mr. Worthington testified under oath several times k
during proc.eedings before the Commission that the facility would be founded.on
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solid rock. With only seven days intervening from the time he signed the above quoted letter to Dr. Housner, Mr. Worthington took the stand in hear-ings before the Commission (7 March 1962) and testified under direct examina-tion (Tr 42): i
. Morrissey: "So, the_ plant will be situ'ated on a rock base of i this type rock, is that right ?" (Emphasis added.) .
Worthington: "The foundation will be located in solid grano-diorite. " (Emphasis added.)
.i Further, under cross-examination by the Commission's staff engineer Hollis, regarding possible. future changes in the plant' design, Mr. Worthington said (Tr. 383), "the one thing that will not change .is the fact that we are found-
, ing the reactor structure on solid rock and surrounding it with very heavy con-crete structures."
Mr. Hollis had been quite thorough in' his cross-examination. Earlier while cross-examining Mr. Worthington, he had asked a question concerning I
' 1 the compressive strength and integrity of the underlying rock. Exhibit 48 shows that although the final Dames and Moore report of 30 April 1962 had not been submitted to Applicant, the data it contained had been made available l
to Mr. Worthington when he replied to the abov.e mentioned question concern-ing compressive strength and integrity of the underlying, rock. He said- (Tr. 376) that borings [ Dames and Moore's] had been made and " indicate no leakage of water. This shows the formation is tight. Lt doesn't have any open seams or anything that would indicate that this not a 100 percent suitable foundation m aterial . " (Emphasis added.)
Yet in his letter to Dr. Housner of 27 February 1962 (Ex. 48, Sec.15),
in which he had said tt}at the foundation was " inferior to. . . ' solid rock,'. . .
i highly weathered . . .hi .
c .
. ,-_]
, _,. ghly jointed. . . ," Mr. Worthington had also written:__ -
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"When the rock at the base of the reactor structure is exposed,_we can, if found n.ecessary,, grout any seams or take other measures to improve the quali-ty of the rock. " '
This statement may have been prompted by the fact that only one bor-
- ing, Number 16, conducted by Dames and Moore, showed such a " tight" condi-tion, and cinly between elevations -48 and -62,-(below mean low low tide) (73 to 87 feet below yard level of 25 feet) ( Ex. 48, Sec.17).
I
. Mr. Worthington was consistent in his testimony as to the " solid rock" foundations at Bodega Bay. Late in the proceedings,(Tr.1004), under cross-ex-amination by a member of the audience. . .
'Q "Is this a better site than the Humboldt Bay {eacto] site as far as the foundation is concerned?" -
Worthington: "I believe so, yes. "
Q. "In what respect?" l i
Worthington: "Well, it's on solid rock. " (Emphasis added.)
i
-l 5
The authors o.f this memorandum have not been able to make an analy-
. sis of Applicant's Humboldt Bay ' Unit No. 3, a nuclear power plant which is'un-dergoinglinal fuel loading at the time of this writing. However, the AEC pub-lication, Nuclearf afety," contains a discussion of the Humboldt Plant with re-spect to earthquake hazards, which suggests conditions, remarkably similar to those we have discovered at Bodega Bay. Portions of this document are repro-duced below for the Commission's convenience:
"The possibility of earthquake damage has aroused co.nsiderable
. interest, probably more than it generally deserves. Most of the hazards reports provide the information required on this subject by
!- - a short statement that the site is in an area where earthquakes are infrequent and of low intensity, and therefore the hazard from them is negligible. Such, statements .are usually based on data taken from publications of the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey. In any case, ,
reactors are constructed so that they are not susceptible to damage from any but the most intense shoc.ks. There might, however, be ,
. an indirect hazard through damage to underground pipes or wires '
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Other references of. Applicant's witnesses to solid rock or a synonymous term occur as follows: Worthington, Tr. 169, 376 and 99 6; and Nutting, Tr.1233.
outside the reactor or through landslides or tidal waves, either of f which might cause flooding;'but, 'even including these somewhat re-mote possibilities, the total earthquake hazard is very-small in most areas.
"An exception to this generalization would be the case of a reactor built .b_g the water's edae on weak foundation material in j
- an area of frequent earthquakes of hich intensity. One succested site nearly meets these conditions. It,is on the edge of a bay 1
and is underlain to a depth of 20 ft. largely by recently deposited I unconsolidated beds of clay and silt. The nature of the material below this is not clear. In the geology s'ection of the safeguards, '
report [ footnote at this point in the text refers to Tsble V-1, page 76 of the document, reactor No.11 of 20 reactors con.sidered, which is identified in the table as 'Humboldt Bay, BWR,163 My (t).), the material is described as 'slightly consolidated gravels, sands, and clays with the majority consisting of the finer grained materials;' that is, largely clay and silt. In the section on earth-quake hazards, hosever,:the same material is referred to as rock and is described as a ' fairly well indurated series of mudstones, siltstones, sandstones, and conglomerates. ' The drilling record calls the material clay and sandy soils with some sand and gravel.
"There is also some ambiouity as to the intensities of the earthquakes to be expected. The section on earthquake hazards {
lists eight shocks of intensity VIII (modified Mercalli scale) and I one of intensity IX over roughly the last hundred years, but the shock of intensity IX is discounted because the record is old and uncertain. The authors conclude that intensity VIII is the maxi-mum shock which should be expected in the future. The amblouity l' 1s in the word ' expected.' With at least nine shoc,ks of intensity VIII a.. matter of record, more shocks should certainly-be expected, but the report appears to give the impression that there'is no need to plan for anything of greater intensity. There is a very creat difference between a reactor situated on rock and subjected to an earthouake of intensity VIII and one situated on water-saturated clay and silt and subjected to a shock of intensity IX. . . . " '
(Emphasis added.)
" Geologic and Hydrologic Considerations in Power Reactor Site Selection," _ Nuclear Safety, A Review of Recent Develop- l ments; Prepared for U.S. Atomic Energy Commission by Oak l
.. Ridge National Laboratory: June 1960, V.1, No. 4; pp. 64-76.
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The first reply given above (Tr. 42) is misleading since the term " plant" )
throughout the proceedings was generally used to refer to the reactor and related ,
J
, structures; yet the closely related turbine . generator will'not,. contrary to Appli-
- cant's testimony, be founded on solid material of any kind but will be underiain
{
by more than 60 feet of sand, silt, clay and decomposed wood before even badly decomposed granodiorite is re' ached. The other testimony concerning " solid rock" flatly contradicts the results of Dames and Moore's foundation investiga-tion and the resulting letter from Mr. Worthington to Dr. Housner. Altogether '
a melancholy demonstration.
For example, when cross-examined by Mrs. Rose Gaffney of Bodega
, Bay, (a portion of whose land on Bodega Head had been condemned by Appli-l cant for the proposed facility site-See Appendix K, pp.18-19), Mr. Nutting i
, had the following to say (Tr.1233):
i Mrs. Gaffney: "Mr. Nutting, you were a witness in my eminent do-main proceedings when P.G. &E took my land by condemnation proceedings ? "
Nutting: "Yes, Mrs. Gaffney, I was. "
Mrs. Gaffney: "And you testified at that time as to the qualifications of what made it an excellent site for your plant, did you not?"
Nutting: "I believe I did, yes. " i Mrs. Gaffney: "And you found it was a very suitable site because of the solid granitic basement upon which the plant would be'lo-cated ? "
Nutting: "I would have to check on it, precisely whatI said, but in general, yes. " ' -
Mrs. Gaffney: "It had to be or P.G. &E. wouldn't be considering it, wouldn't it?" '
Nutting: "That's correct. "
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. ~ 30-Under direct examination during the second set of hearings (Tr. 528), I
)
- Mr. Worthington had appeared somewhat more certain of the foundations than '
Mr. Nutting, when he testified:
~
1 "The foundations of the Bodega site are particularly suita-ble, since it will be possible to place the plant and Lts reactor
.g_n _a_ solid oranitic formation. This is important, since the ability to locate the plant.o_n n rock will greatly reduce the effect of shaking, which may occur as a result of an earthquake."
(Emphasis added.)
This misapprehension was compounded several times by App 11 cant's n .
counsel, Mr. Morrissey. At the conclusion of the entire proceedings, after the Commission had ordered submission of Exhibit 48, he cited (Tr.1480) the testimony given by Mr. Worthington on Tr. page '169. And in summary of the
, first set of hearings (Tr. 504), he concluded that "The plant is a nuclear plant and is to be located on a very firm rock base. . . " (Emphasis added.) ;
It should be reiterated that by not having had access to the substance of Exhibit 48 at the time of the proceedings, we were precluded from the oppor-tunity to cross-examine Mr. Worthington and Mr. Nutting by confronting them with their prior signed statements which were inconsistent with their. testimony.
We also feel compelled to re-emphasize our earlier inference in- this memorandum that Applicant proceeded with plans for the Bodega Bay reactor de-spite grave reservations from his own consultants.
For example., in the conclusion of the discussion section of their report of 14 September 1960, Tocher and Quaide recommended the location of six bore holes (Ex. 48, Sec. 8, p.10), four on land and two under water in Campbell Cove "to confirm the existence of quartz-diorite at shallow depth-under the o
cove and adjacent beach." In light of the above evidence regarding the ex-3
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tremely poor quality of and the great depth to bedrock at Campbell Cove, the two concluding paragraphs of Tocher and Quaide's report (p.11) are of singular interest: -
"The primary purpose of the recommended borings on land also is to confirm the conclusions drawn from airailable geo-logic and seismic evidence regarding the shallow depth of the top of the quartz-diorite under the' proposed site of initial con- l struction (Unit #1, as shown on Drawing. SK 8098-7-A). l "It is important from the standpoint of ability to withstand i strong ground shaking that the buildings and any other larce appurtenances be constructed on foundations resting on the hard quartz-diorite bedrock. Should the borinos reveal that bedrock will not p_e reached a_t practicaQe, depths where 1,t is, proposed
,t,o erect structures, serious consideration should be given to alternate sites. " (Emphasis added.)
As we have shown, the worst fears possible conc,erning the foundations were confinned'by Dames and Moore's later studies. The approximate borings recommended by Dr. Tocher were not performed t ntil a year and a half after Toch-er'and Qualde's report was submitted. No hard bedrock is present; what passes .
for bedrock is not only very deep but, rather than being a '.' platform" it slopes steeply under the reactor and misses the turbine-generator-a large appurtenance l
1
-by 60 feet or more. Despite Tocher and Quaide's conclusions; despite the evi- j dence; despite the world-renowned treacherousness of the San Andreas Fault; l
despite an 8 billion curie fission-product inventory; despite the great public in-
)
terest in this, the largest nuclear reactor yet approved; and despite the location of this reactor upwind from a city of several million inhabitants, Applicant has l actively and cynically misled both the general public and the Commission and has anxiously accelerated its plans and its actual construction at the site. The
.- authors of this memorandum are prompted to observe that if all the data were dis-played before the public eye, the Bodega Bay Atomic Park may easily stand as an j
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, irresponsible project indeed. I 4
Anticipated Seismic Shock a_t Bodega Bay.
Tocher and Quaide's report of 14 September 1960 contains a comprehen-sive survey of " Earthquakes Felt at or Near Bodega IYead" from 1838 to 1960.
Two different scales are used by experts to describe earthquake shocks, in j i '
terms.of different application. " Magnitude" of a shock is generally described by the familiar Richter Scale measured on seismographs. The " intensity" of a shock may also be described, but this is s' more or less subjective description of the damage caused by the shock and may vary in different localities for the same shock as measured on a Richter Scale. The scale for " intensity" is the Modified Mercalli Scale,. employed in the United States since 1931.
.- On the basis of their preliminary conclusions-before borings-as to the nature of bedrock at Campbell Cove, Tocher and Quaide anticipated that an-other earthquake comparable to the famous San Francisco earthquake of April 18, 1906, would result in damage at a maximum Modified Mercalli Intensity of about VIII.
., However, in light of later evidence, principally the Dames and Moore report of 30 April 19 62, Dr. Tocher wrote to Mr. Worthington on 10 June 1962, after the close of the Commission's hearings and apparently while Exhibit 48 f
was being assembled, as follows (Ex. 48, Sec. 21):
~
". . .The highly unusual design of the structure fl2nique in '
my experience, but pe:.1aps similar in some respects to
' underground ICBM launching ' silos') and the possible gravi-ty of the consequences of wall failure lead me to urge strong-
, , ly that special consideration and analysis 'be given to the possibility of such failure because of the strong shaking and possible mass movements of the sands and clays by a majcr earthquake in the nearby San Andreas fault zone. . .
J '
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"With regard to conclusion no. 6 (p.12) [of the 14
., September '1960 report). . .and inasmuch as much of the yard j '
surface as it is now being' considered will be underlain by 40 to 30 feet of (possibly water saturated) sedimentary de-posits, I feel that a Modified Mercalli Intensity of IX should be anticipated. . . " 'f j
/
An abridged description of Modified Mercalli Intensity IX is given in l
'y y Tocher and Quaid(s report as follows: '
.I
" Damage considerable in specially designed structures; 4 well designed frame structures thrown out of plumb; great i
,. In substantial buildings with partial collapse. Buildings shifted off foundations. Ground cracked conspicuo6p]y.
Underground pipes broken. " . (Emphasis added.) -
The Commission's attention is directed to Exhibit 2-B-(Appendix C)
.; showing a cross section of the proposed equipment location, with the proposed novel containment system' underground.
~
' Tocher and Quaide's report also liy s a severe earthquake somewhere 1
yJ in the region in June 1838 when the country was uninhabited by whites. The available eviEence lead Tocher and Quaide to, conclude, however, that the in-tensity was epproximettelh comparable to Modified Mercalli Intensity X. They also give an abridgtid description of this intensity eb follows:
I "Some well-built wooden structuren deNroyed; mostmasonry and frame structures destroyed with. foundations; cround '
badly cracked. Rails bent. Lands 1' i des considerable from p river banks and steep slopes. Shifted send and mud. Water (
splashed (slopped) over banks." (Elvphasis added.) {
.j Of course, it is impossible to predict with great accuracy the intensity y
of future earthquakes. Nevertheless, the similarity of certain features in the
, vicinity of the Bodega Bay and Point Reyes region to conditions in the Southern i ,
j l
Regiop of the Earthquake Zone where the catastrophic Chilean earthquakes of I
'; May 1960 occurred, make it not unreasonable to assume that eventually there .
q.
d will be.a shock at Bodega 3sy ranging possibly up to Modified Mercalli ,
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- i Intensity XII. The description of this damage is eloquently abridge 6'In Tocher and Quaide's report
" Damage total. . Waves aeen on ground surfaces. Lines of sight and level distorted. Objacts thrown upward into the air." /
A Possible Reason for Applicant's Action
/
The material presented in this memorandum *$uggests that Applicant is prepared to run considerable risks in his expanding nuclear power program. It is well known that the potential for wide public opposition is always present.
Therefore, there is a considerable incentive to continue with a program once launched, rather than chance the public attention which would be deswn, to a major chanhe in plans. .
- Exhibit 48 shows that at the time Applicant was proceeding with court
% tion to condemn the land owned on Bodega Head ky.Mrs. Rose Gktfney, he first anticipated placing the power plant at Horseshoe Cove, at a point strad-
<,,i dling the San Andreas Fault in an.aret, that is clearly and abundantly fractured.
It is reasonable to assume that the decisisn to move the plant location from Horseshoe Cove to Campbell Cove was prompted by the discovery of the mag- .
I nitude of potential seismic activity at Horseshoe Cove.
It was not until after Applicant had purchased the Stroh property on the tip of Bodega Head and was proceeding with his condemnation suit against Mrs.
Gaffney that the later reports of Dames and Moore began to show that Campbell Cove, too, was a thoroughly unsultable site for a nuclear power plant.
Tocher and Qualde's report, alone, should have been enough to deter Applicant from proceeding at Bodega Bay. And the reasons to abandon the site j increased with each succeeding report from Dames and Moore-until the third.
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and final report of Dames and Moore, completed while proceedings were underway before the California Public Utilities Commission, showed thafnature had con-spired to deprive Applicant of the " bedrock" he had been confident of finding !
at Campbell Cove. By this time, however, 'it was too late; there was fierce f
- tnomentum accumulated behind the project; land had been purchased and land costs were rising; consultants had been paid substantial fees for their services; !
@[ extensive legal costs had been incurred; public attention to the project had been magnified by the heroic resistance put up by Mrs. Gaffney; the University of California's activities at the site had drawn further attention; the project had .
I been celebrated in the trade journals as a " breakthrough" in nuclear power; and the public relations effort which accompanied the project had been vigorously 1aunched-including an exuberant display in the August -1961 issue of PG6E h ,
, Progress, a ' document distributed monthly to several million of the utility's I customers . I h
And Atomic Energy Commissioner Leland J. Haworth had just previous- l ly testified before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, pointing to the pro-posed Bodega Bay reactor as one of the more resplendent jewels in the AEC's
{
civilian nuclear crown:0 Commissioner Haworth: "We are talking here about a real installation; !
that is the first one is not particularly different from the second l one. Real prototypes in the true sense of the word.
"The proposed Pacific Gas & Electric plant at Bodega Bay j will be one such plant, but others are needed. If they are built and if they operate as we expect, our early goal will have been
, met. Data from full-scale plants, and extrapolation from small-
+
scale pilot plants, will be available, and utility managements
, 6 Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 87th Congress, 2d Sess. , pursuant to Sec. "202" of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; Mar. 20-23,
- 19 62, p. 48. ,
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~36-could make their decisions with greater certainty."
l Representative Van Zandt: "What is the status of the Pacific Gas
& Electric plant?"
Commissioner Haworth: "They have had their hearings before the California Public Service Commission on March 7, I believe.
As far as I know, there is no decision handed down'. There was apparently not much in the way of protest or anything of that sort. So it seems to be going smoothly."
Altogether, according to the evidence submitted by Applicant's Vice President and General Manager, Mr. Shermer L. Sibley, in a recent proceed-ings in the Superior Court of Sonoma County, Applicant had invested approxi-mately $1 million in the Bodega Bay project by the time the final Dames and Moore report indicated that the Campbell Cove site was generally unsuitable.
, Applicant has formally averred in substantiation of this inferrence. In
- a. declaration dated 28 March 1963 by Applicant's Vice President and General Manager, Shermer L. Sibley, filed in the Superior Court of Sonoma County in connection with a pecition for writ of mandate or certiorari brought by the As-sociation et. al. vs. l'he Board of Supervisors of the County of Sonoma, Ap-plicant states that between 9 February 1960 and 9 February 1961 alone, he in-curred extensive costs in connection with the project:
"(1) extensive site exploration and test borings were ac-complished for the sole purpose of constructing the afore-mentioned facility; (2) detailed engineering, geological and seismological studies were conducted."
At this point, therefore, nature had progressively conspired to deprive
, Applicant of the foundations for the facility. He was then confronted with two unsavory alternatives: (1) to abandon the site and acknowledge a gross error in planning, or (2) to proceed on the expectation that the error would lie undiscov-ered. Application to the AEC for a construction pennit is proof of the choice 9.____._.___. _ _._ _ __
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Applicant has made. .
But the decision to orient the plant layout in the worst possible way, considering the formerly unsuspected depth, poor quality, and steep inclination of " bedrock," as revealed by Dames and Moore's last report, may have been prompted by future economic considerations.
. Applicant has testified that he plans to install three additional nuclear units at Bodega Head (Worthington, Tr. 36) and that " Additional units which will be installed will be relatively less expensive because they won't have to bear the initial site development costs."
The early drawings of the plant layout contained in Exhibit 48, such as Scheme VII, contain broken-line outlines of subsequent units planned for Bo-dega Head. Scheme VII, it will be recalled, is the layout showing the turbine-generator extending in a westerly direction from the reactor vessel. The layout shown for a subsequent unit would require extensive excavation.
The summary of Exhibit 48 prepared by Mr. Worthington notes that the later sections of Exhibit 48 deal with " variations.in design from ' Scheme 7' and presentation of new information to the consultants."
Actually, the " variations" shown would be more accurately described as variations of Scheme VI, which shows the turbine-generator extending in a southerly direction. The only evidence of a " variation in design" is the layouts provided in the extensive' diagrams attached to Dames and Moore's Foundation Irivestigation. These diagrams show the plant in its proper location with the l 3 turbine-generator extending in a southerly direction.
They also show broken-line layouts of the subsequent plants which Ap-
. plicant planned to install at Bodega Head. Three additional reactors are shown i
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{ each abutting the next, in a row extending westward across the head like, so 4
.to speak, piglets at a trough. Attached to each of the subsequent reactors is a turbine-generator building, extending southward from the reactor buildings, i
This arrangement, as the Dames and' Moore layouts show, pennits cheap con-J struction by simply extending the present excavation westward. Four reactors l
7 s
can, by this scheme, be constructed in a pit that would only have accommo- I dated two plants as oriented on the earlier schemes.
The advantagas of this arrangement measured in terms of the cost of installation for additional units is clearly substantial. The advantage in terms of reliability of operation and of public safety is questionable at best.
, Discrepancies between Exhibit 4_8_ and Preliminary Hazards Arialysis Submitted
.t,of the AEC .
As noted earlier in this memorandum, the Commission's Interim Order No. 64537 grants a certificate of public convenience and necessity to Appli- 1 i
cant, subject to certain conditions, including "that proper authority has been secured from the Atomic Energy Commission to construct the nuclear energy plant, . . . "
As we also noted, Applicant has pursued satisfaction of this condition I
through application on 28 December 1962 to the AEC for a Class 104b (con- i struction) license (AEC Docket No. 50-205). This application includes an l
Exhibit C, " Preliminary Hazards Analysis," which conveys certain data to the
, AEC regarding earthquake hazards.
This document, on file for public inspection at the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's San Francisco Operations Office, appears to be th' Applicant's
,- complete report to the AEC. The fact that its treatment of earthquake hazards l ;
. ?!_ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ '
. , , . _ . .,_ _ . - . _ _ . w....._.. ---__/_--....._ - - u _u
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L
, e differs.substantially from Exhibit 48, submitted to the CPUC, should be of in-terest to the Public Utilities Commission-particularly in light of the way in
. which it differs. -
, The Preliminary Hazards Analysis contains two appendices related to earthquake hazards. One consists of Dr. George Housner's report of January 1961; the other is the report of Drs. Tocher and Quaide. Both of these reports are mentioned earlier in this memorandum and are included in Exhibit 48 of CPUC Application No. 43808. However, it is of considerable significance that Applicant has not-so far as the public record shows-submitted any of the Dames and Moore reports to the Atomic Energy Commission.
, Further, the report of Dr. Housner which is included in the " Preliminary Hazards Analysis" is the same report, discussed earlier in this memorandum, l
showing the plant oriented 90 degrees from its proper position at Campbell j l
Cove, and showing the " bedrock" at levels where Dames and Moore later found water saturated sand, silt, decomposed wood and so forth. The Hazards An-alysis contains no discussion of the fact, shown in CPUC Exhibit 48, that Dr.
Housner's report had to be largely discarded in light of the April 1962 Dames and Moore report.
Further, the conclusions which Tocher and Qualde arrived at in their 14 September 1960 report to Applicant have been altered in the AEC Preliminary Hazards Analysis, without discussion of the reasons and in an apparent attempt
'to minimize their significance.
t Tocher and Quaide's report contained 7 conclusions, which were partly in the nature of implied recommendations for further investigation into the foundations for the proposed facility. When the Dames and Moore report j t.
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1 of 30 April 1962 was made available, Applicant's Chief Civil Engineer, J. Dean
, Worthington, wrote to Dr. Tocher on 15 May.1962 (Ex. 48, Sec.18) asking if any of his seven conclusions would change.in light of the latest Dames and v.
Moore report. 1 i I Dr. Tocher replied in a letter dated 10 June 19627 (Ex. 48, Sec. 21)
~
that Conclusions 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 remained unchanged. His l'etter then dis-
~
l cussed Conclusions 3 and 6, the original versions of whichwere as follows: ;
"3. The quartz-diorite thought to underly the site near sea level will provide a much better foundation than any other g'eologic formation on Bodega Head. If borings fail to show quartz-diorite near sea level at the site (as suggested by seismic and geologic evidence) the characteristics of the unexpected material should
. be studied carefully to determine if it is suitable foundation material for massive structures so close to the San Andreas fault zone."
. "6. All power plant buildings and appurtenant structures should be designed to resist an earthquake of Modified Mercalli Intensity VIII, or to provide a margin of safety, IX. (The quartz-diorite i
should provide as good foundation with respect to the hazards of j ground shaking in earthquakes, as any rock formation to be found i in the Bodega Bay region. This fortunate circumstance is largely counter-balanced by the immediate proximity of the San Andreas fault zone.)"
1 Dr. Tocher discussed his earlier Conclusion No. 3 at considerable length, but with the clear purpose of stating that conditions revealed by Dames and Moore's investigation made the Campbell Cove site a less favorable one than the earlier Conclusion No. 3 had indicated. He observed, for example, o .:
that further studies recoinmended by Dames and Moore would " involve collabora- '
tive efforts by a structural engineer and a soil mechanics engineer. In the event their findings were unfavorable or inconclusive, then serious consideration should 7
We consider it to be of especial significance to the substance of this
, memorandum that the correspondence herein discussed took place after the close of hearings before the CPUC.
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. be given to re-siting the reactor in a location where the quartz-diorite bedrock lies at a depth shallow enough that there can be no possibility of wall failure from seismic forces acting on the sands and clays."
. And with respect to his earlier Conclusion No. 6, regarding the an-
, ticipated intensity of an earthquake, he replied that " inasmuch as much of the yard surface as it is now being considered will be underlain by 40 to 80 feet of (possibly water saturated) sedimentary deposits, I feel a modified Mercalli intensity of IX should be. anticipated at the site with the plant lay-out as shown on Plate 1 of the April 30, 1962 Dames and Moore report. "
Nevertheless, these conclusions, as they are presented to the Atomic
. Energy Commission in the " Preliminary Hazards Analysis" have been unexplain-
.edly altered to give the impression of more favorable conditions than would I
have been suggested by the original version of the conclusions, before the l April 1962 report of Dames and Moore confirmed the worst possible fears about the site.
For example, Conclusion No. 3 as given in the " Preliminary Hazards Analysis" reads as follows (compare with the version given above):
"3. The quartz-diorite thought to underly the site near sea level will provide a much better foundation than any other geologic formation on Bodega Head. (The presence of quartz-diorite has been positively identified by detailed exploratory borings.)"
l In Conclusion No. 6, given above, regarding good foundations pro- 1 y vided by solid bedrock, the sentence,"This fortunate circumstance is largely counterbalanced by the immediate proximity of the San Andreas fault zone,"
. has been deleted from the version of Tocher and Quaide's report submitted to l l
th e AEC . I
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,l Other of Tocher and Qualde's conclusions have been altered as well. d
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Conclusion No. 4 in the criginsi contains the statement that "The quartz-diorite I
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I is strongly jointed and is faulted on old minor faults;" which is changed in the i l
1
" Preliminary Hazards Analysis" to: "The quartz-diorite shows evidence of old '
minor faults."
Conclusion No. 5 in the original Tocher and Qualde report contains the following sentences: "At least one and perhaps two or more major earthquakes I can be expected near the site within the next century. These may be as strong 3 or even somewhat stronger than the California earthquake of April 18, 1906."
These have been deleted from the version of Tocher and Quaide's report sub-mitted to the AEC.
And a plural reference to the frequency of future earthquakes in Tocher and Quaide's original report is changed t'o a singular reference in the version submitted to the AEC.
There is no public record, either at the CPUC or the AEC, to indicate 1
any basis for these changes. Indeed, the record which is available would sug-i gest that any justified changes in Tocher and Qualde's conclusions would be I in the opposite direction-toward pointing to the Campbell Cove site as l_ess suitable than originally assumed. )
It should be noted that Dr. George Housner had advised Applicant that he can design a " safe" facility at the Campbell Cove site, despite the evi-dence from Dames and Moore's investigation. However, certain language in l
, the correspondence from Dr. Housner included in Exhibit 48 leads the authors I of this memorandum to be strongly dubious of the information Applicant may )
~ i have forwarded to Dr. Housner. I I
For example, the preliminary sketches of cross-sections of the reactor 3
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(Appendix I), showing the nature of earth and bedrock crossing the site-as de-termined from borings 12,13,14, and 16-describe the quartz-diorite as " coarse-grained, slightly weathered, fractured & jointed." Purportedly, these sketches were prepared by Dames and Moore on 2 February 1962 and forwarded to Dr.
Housner by Mr. Worthington in his letter of 27 Febntary 1962 (Ex. 48, Sec.15);
but the final Dames and Moore report submitted in April describes this same material as " white and black quartz diorite (severely jointed into mod. fresh -
blocks.up to 3") with small shear zones (joints and shear zones altered to clay)
(grading into harder and fresh blocks up to 8") (little or no alteration in joints)
(few shear zones). "
. The record provides no means for verifying the nature of the informa-tion of foundation conditions sent to Dr. Housner by Applicant. It also pro-vides no evidence, as noted earlier, of any active attempt by Applicant to dis-abuse Dr. Housner of his impression that the plant layout would be similar to I
the abandoned Scheme VII, rather than Scheme VI, which approximates the de-
]
signs submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission.
V i
ARGUMENT We feel compelled to draw the Commission's attention to a document 1
which has received wide acclaim within the more responsible elements cif the 1
engineering profession. This is the amicus curiae brief before the United States l Supreme Court in Power Reactor Development Company vs International'U.nion.~of
. Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, et al. (No. 315 and 454, April 1961) by Professional Engineer Adolph J. Ackerman.
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Mr. Ackerman argues persuasively that the. Price-Anderson amendment
- - to the 1954 Atomic Energy. Act, providing, at a token premium, $500 million in- 1 demnity coverage to a privately constructed nuclear power plant, has encouraged unprecedented abandonment of en'gineering responsibility in the atomic power field. A copy of a popular version drawn from Mr. Ackerman's brief and pub-lished in the American Engineer Gan.1963) is attached as Appendix I to this ,
i memorandum.
1
, We feel that the situation outlined in this memorandum regarding Ap-plicant's choice of the Bodega Bay site-his misuse of the Commission's trust during testimony under oath, and his misuse of the trust implied in deferring
'certain cot.cerns for safety of the facility to the Atomic Energy Commission-
- is the clearest example to yet appear in the atomic power field of the situation described '.y Mr. Ackerman. .
The Commission is reminded that there have been no public hearings on the material in Exhibit 48, that the Exhibit was late-filed more than 30 days after the close of the hearings, and that its contents are extremely complex.
The summary of the exhibit is not consistent with the exhibit itself, the organ- )
' ization of material in the exhibit is confusing, and, therefore, the layman is i
likely to be intimidated from probing it further. We were stimulated to inves-tigate the exhibit to the degree evidenced in this memorandum after having in-spected the " Preliminary Hazards Analysis" to the AEC.
. A close reading of the Commission's Interim Opinion No. 64537 sug-
, gests that the Commission also turned away from the body of the Exhibit. On
>' ~
page 4 of the Interim Opinion, the Commission takes specific notice of Ap-
, plicant's testimony regarding the desirability of Bodega Head for a nuclear
. 4
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[ pcwer plant, because it possesses "a solid granitic type of rock providing an
, excellent foundation. "
i On page 19 of the Interim Opinion, the Commission takes especial note !
of concern over "the serious consequences wh'ich could ensue to Bodega Bay, to Sonoma County,'or to an even larger area, if high-level radioactive materials were released as a result of damage to the plant from earthquake."
This concern was accentuated by introduction of Exhibit 39, a map from the California Division of Mines and Geology Bulletin No.118, showing "a trace of a fault running directly through Bodega Head in a northwesterly di-rection." The Commission notes with respect to this map that " applicant's
~
, civil engineering witness testified that the consulting geologist engaged by applicant to specifically study the area in question reported.that he could find no signs of active faulting on Bodega Head. . .This testimony was supplemented and substantiated b_g applicant's late-filed Exhibit 48,,. " (Emphasis added.)
And yet Applicant's civil engineering witness had also testified that the foundations for the proposed facility were " solid rock," while Exhibit 48 shows that this same witness had corresponded with Applicant's consultant, Dr. George Housner, to the effect that the foundations were inferior to solid rock. This' correspondence was based on detailed studies of the site, which
\
are also included in Exhibit 48.
The Commission's Interim Opinion notes that the San Andreas Fault
, Zone "according to the record is more than one-fourth mile east of the proposed reactor site. " Yet, Exhibit 48, which is also part of the record, contains clear and unimpeachable evidence that the fault zone is less than one-fourth mile from the proposed reactor site. That Applicant relied on this evidence is shown j T
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f by his specific reference to it in Amendment No. I to the " Preliminary Hazards )
1 Analysis" submitted to the AEC in March 1963.
i
'I !
The Commission is further apprised of the fact that the matter described
]i above 'concerning the actual location of the proposed facility at Bodega Bay, the I
r ras; lature of the foundations, the actual orientation of the reactor's related
. I structures, 'and the new material concerning poss'ible earthquake intensities at I l
, the site have all been deleted from the seismological sections of Pacific Gas & 1 i
Electric Company's Preliminary Hazards Analysis, Exhibit C, application +o the .
Atomic Energy Commission for a Class 104b (construction) license. The AEC -
has been given only material up to Dr. Housner's report of January 1961, which, for example, shows the turbine-generator founded on " rock" in a wrong location and 90 degrees out of its actual orientation, rather than on 60 feet of possibly water saturated sands and silts.
In addition, the Applicant has altered the conclusions from Tocher and s Qualde's report to lend an entirely different impression from that given by the original. No explanation for either the deleted or altered data is given in the AEC application.
Therefore, the California Public Utilities Commission possesses in 4 I
1 I
its files ~ more recent, more accurate, and more pertinent information concerning the safety of the proposed installation than do the Atomic Energy Commission or the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, f l- .
8 VI
~
. PRAYER FOR' RELIEF l
As we observed in the argument above, there have been no public hear-l ;;
I ings on the material submitted in Exhibit 48. The Exhibit was late-filed more hl H
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than thirty days after the close of the proceedings on Application No. 43808.
The Commission's Interim Decision No. 64537 was made on 8 November 1962, five months after the close of the proceedings.
As we also noted, the exhibit is exceedingly complex and confusing.
At first, these qualities of the exhibit turned us away from it. But an inspection of recent material submitted by Applicant to the Atomic Energy Commission re-lating to geologic and seismologic considerations brought us back to Exhibit 48.
The Association has been thorough and diligent in its attention to the subject matter of this memorandum.
The Northern California Association to Preserve Bodega Head and Har-
, bor is prepared to present expert testimony of the highest calibre in support of any or all of the technical statements made in this memorandum.
We are further prepared to submit additional evidence showing that there has been in the recent past and will be in the near future active faulting at or near the proposed reactor site on Bodega Head itself.
4 Due process compels that we enjoy the right of cross-examination on all evidence submitted by Applicant to the proceedings of Application No. 43808.
The subject material was delivered into the Commission's hands more than a month af ter the proceedings were cone'; ded.
l The Association urges the Commission in the firmest possible terms to )
take all necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of the kind of sorry affair-
. which would appear to be characteristic in the embryonic nuclear power field- l apparent from a reading of this memorandum.
The Association urges the Commission in the strongest possible terms
' l t.o retrace its steps in granting Application No. 43808, and to deny Application
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No. 43808 on the grounds that the certificate with which it deals was obtained j j . through transparently misleading and impeachable testimony. The Commission i
is respectfully reminded that the subject testimony.has misled the Commission itself, and that the Commission itself appears to have eschewed a close read- j ing of Exhibit 48. The evidence suggests that a close reading of Exhibit 48 alone i
would have been grounds for the Commission to deny Application No. 43808.
The Association urges the Commission to re-open public hearings on I i.
Application No. 43808-in light of (1) late-filed Exhibit 48, (2) new evidence made available through Applicant's necessary relations with the Atomic Energy Commission, (3) the Association's unqualified assurance that new and related evidence can be brought to bear on this matter by experts with credentials of world' authority in seismology and geology, and (4) the grave and unprecedented consequences to the public safety, convenience and necessity which would en-sue from an error in judgment on this matter.
3 The history of the California Public . Utilities Commission is a long l and noble one in the public service. The Commission is regarded throughout the Nation as a standard in public utility regulation. The Commission's powers are broad and are known to be broad. But these powers will be narrowed pro-grest vely in proportion as they neglect to be exercised.
i Respectfully submitted, Navid E. Pesonen -
, Executive Secretary Samuel J. Rogers Member, Board of Directors 1 The Northern California Association to
- i. Preserve Bodega Head and Harbor, Inc.
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[ Initial ~ Distribution.
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't California Public Utilities' Commission (15) -
' Pacific Gas and Electric Company (2) 'l 4
- Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (1 ea )
9 AEC Division of Licensing and Regulation (2)
-4: - Joint C'ommittee on' Atomic Energy (15)
Coordinator o'f Atomic Energy Development and l-
, Radiation Protection (1)
State Attorney General (2)
Sonoma County Board of Supervisors (5)
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drawing, " Scheme VII, Bodega Bay Power Plant." UMMVnf d&#M CPUC App. 43808, Ex. 48, Sec. 11.
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PRESSURE SUPPRESSION '"ZST PROGRAM . -, e A. Introduction and Su==ary . .y g [
A pressure suppression test freil Company's Moss Landing Power Plc. in
. .:ns .ructed and operated at the a.;==er of 1962 to proof test the
[-/M - -
Bodega Bay containment desip . 2 gen ., the facility vac 9 'lar to that .
and used su . .he . . .rdvc; a . T't . .' . consisted forHumboldtBay/112ths'6...t of a full' scale 1 , the Bode 6a suppression cucmber with one full scale vent pipe and one .:ocal reac.: and. dry well vessels th about 1/ll2th the volumes of the : .'.e t a desir ..
The results cf tc.a .,.e ~ .;,r.. gram co;. ,;. - the adequacy ~.' ..a Bodega pressure suppress ,n cantnissent desigr. _..:1 pal reau . e ,
l ., Condensation of steam in the suppression pool vaa rapic wid co.y cte
.under conditions far more severJ!than those associated with the max.imum creli-ble operating accident (NC0A); the suppression chamber pressure.did not c:.:ceed 29 psig on any test.
- 2. The highest ry ved pressure obt.dned on any ts 31 3.mulating the
-4==
credible operating. . accident was ,38 psig.
i3 Variations in . suppression pool vater '.evel, pool .te . .:ure, .ry Q- vell temperature; subcooling of part of TJJ. m.;.. .,cr ve...se;. va,,er, and u;. of
' nozzles with rounded entrances as well as :. .t ty-edged orifices had only ~~
~m inor effec .s on the operr.n. ,/ of press *e .uppression. {
B. Purnose of fest Prog a=
Althou6h basically the design of the Bo:# gressure s,.u. ion .,ain-ment is quite similar to that for Humboldt 3.. fr.ere are som .,nifi. .
differences.
1
)
- 1. The vent pipe size is 24" diameter rather than 14" diame,,cr. I
- 2. There are so=e appreciable differences in the geometry of the two systems.
3 In Bodega the suppression pool is being " worked harder", that is, the energy input rate to the pool per unit water volu=e is hi6 her by a sub-stantial factor than at Humboldt. Test results shoved this factor to be about 2.4 under MCOA condition.
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. Because of these differences, testing of the Bodega containment desiga
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' I
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s . . . . . . .- . .. . . . . . . -
C. ..Description of Test Facility and Relationship to Bodega Bay Design i
- 1. General Arrangement l Figures 1 and 2 show the general arrangerant of the test facility.
The Bodega reactor vessel was simulated by a model reactor vessel which was mounted on the side of the partially buried tank containing the suppression chamber. The other large tenk shown simulates the Bodega dry well vessel and is; connected to the suppression chember by a vent line simulating one of the Bodega vent lines.
.ls
' ]* -
A rupture accident is simulated by breaking rupture. disks mounted on the flange at the bottom of the reactor vessel and letting the water and steam in the reactor vessel discharge into the dr/ vell through en orifice or nozzle.
- 2. Reactor Vessel The test reactor vessel was 27" I.D., 21 ft. long over heads and was designed for 1,250 psig internal pressure in accordance with the ASIE code. It was made from carbon steel. It was equipped with a 10" discharge nozzle and other nozzles for instru=entation, venting, draining and admission of heating steam. Its contained volume was, 80 ft.3 a,nd most tests were run with about 54 ft.3 of water in it.
l This latter figure is about 1/ll2th of the water in the Bodega primary system.
3 Dry well The test dry well was 85" I.D., and 29 ft. long over heads. It f was designed for an internal pressure of 150 psig in accordance with {
the ASIE code and was made from carbon steel. It has a 20" inlet nozzle for the steam-water mixture from the reactor vessel and a 1
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.O
- 24" discharge nozzle connected to a vent line leading to the l
)
suppression. chamber. Other nozzles vem provided for instru=ent- )
ation, venting and draining, and over-pressure relief. j
. The dry well had a <:entained volu=e of 1,100 ft.3, so=ewhat larger than 1/n2th of the present Bodega design. . This was done fl y c), )(
in case future design changes increase the size of the Bodega dry M u.. J vell. Actuauy, dry well size does not affect arv vell pressure 4 unless_ the.Jent piping is excee.,dingly mnn. Dry ven site D s "k.i M effect suppression chcaber pressure because the air in the dry well g/
is largely or entirely forced into the suppression chamber. //Il 4 l
After the first few tests a deflector plate was installed. in .
front of the discharge opening in the dry ve n to cause greater j dispersion of the steam-vater jet coming through the inlet nozzle ;
and inemase air carry over to the suppression cha=ber. 1 4.(SuppressionChamber 1
The suppression chamber was contained within a vessel 12 ft. I.D. j and 49 ft. long over heads. The vessel was partly buried in the i ground and was theesame vessel used for this purpose during the Humboldt tests. .
j p, . The suppression chamber itself, see fig. 3, vas a section of the
- s. ../ vessel described above, extending across the diameter of the vessel 1 from the top down to 28 ft below the top. The sides of the section l vere parallel and 3'-8" apart. The bottom was curved with a 13' l radius. The sides and bottom of the suppression che=ber vere steel I plates. The res.t of the vessel was fined with concrete.
l 1
The suppression chamber co tained 670 ft.3 of air and 339 ft.3 of water. The air volume was 1 n2th of the total air volu=e of the Bodega design and the water volume was 1/112th of the effective water volu=e of the Bodega design at the time the test facility was designed. I At present the Bodega suppression chamber is somewhat larger than it was when the test facility was designed, providing more water and air <
> space. Therefore the test suppression chamber was being vorled harder than the Bodega chamber would be. The water volume in the test facil- i ity was that amount of water associated with one vent pipe in the Bodega design.- Part of the vater in the Bodega suppression chc=ber lies under the eight vent pipes coming from the dry well and for test purposes was not considered available for condensing sgm. ,
However, all of the air in the suppression chc=ber was considered available for absorbing the pressure rise following an accident. I i
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' Appendix I i J l 5 Vent' Pipe I q' -
The vent pipe was a 24 in. pipe connecting the dry well to the
- N.; suppression pool. Its length was 45 ft. and it contained two tees j and one ell. The normal sub=ergence of the end of the vent pipe below the.. pool surface was four feet.
The diameter, length, and flow resistance induced by fittings were the same as that of an average vent pipe in the Bodega design.
- 6. Rupture Disk Assembly A 10 in, double rupture disk assembly together with an orifice or nozzle was used to simulate a pipe break. The assembly was
. located ir.cediately downstream from the test orifice oi nozzle which !
in turn was located on the discharge flange of the test reactor vessel. The assembly contained two rupture disks, each rated to break at 900 psig at 575' F. With test reaction pressure at 1,250 paig and a gas pressure of about 650 psig between the two disks, the disks vould hold. When the gas pressure was vented off, the upstream i
, disk would break, followed closely by the downstream disk and the test vould be under way.
F.igure 4 is a photograph showing the rupture disk assembly mounted in place. .An orifice plate may be observed on the upstream side of the assembly.
Figure 5 shows rupture disks before and afte'r testing and also O. the orifice 11 te simuleting the >roi ru>ture size. -
7 Orifices and Nozzles l
The simulated break size for each test was established by an orifice or nozzle which was mc.chined in a, steel plate mounted on the discharge flange of the test reactor vessel. Orifices were i i
machined with 'a sharp, square upsticam ed6e, a 1/16 inch flat section, I and the downstream face beveled at an angle of 60' from the axis. An l orifice with a diameter of 3 24 in. dia::eter s1=ulated the break aren l associated with the FC0A, that is, it had an area 1/112th of that of ;
a double ended break of 28 in. 0.D. Pipe. Other orifice sizes tested d had dia=eters -of,905'in., 1.66 in., 2.48 in., 3 74 in., 4 50 in., and 5 12 in.
f The nozzles were made with an entrance radius and straight !
throat length each equal to 1/4 of the throat dinneter, which approxi-mates the shape of the entrance to the Bodega reactor vessel recircul-ation outlet lines. Nozzle dia=eters tested were .905 in., 2.00 in.,
3 24 in., and 4.50 in. Additionally, the 3 24 in nozzle was tested )
with the straight throat section re=oved, leaving the entfance radius in tact.
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Appendix I l .
t 8. Instrumentation
.n, Figure 6 shows schematically the arrangement of the instrument-y- ation and figure 7 shows so=e of the instrumentation in the control shack. The pressure transducers were of the strain ccce type and *
, their output was recorded by a light beam oscillograph. The tempor-ature transducers were thermocouple and their outputs were recorded ,
, by a multi-point strip chart, recorder. Certain principal pressures '
vere also indicated by gages in the control shack.,
. D. Method of Performing Tests, .
The following were the principal steps in performing a test on this (. 1 s '
facility: '
1.
The desired test orifice or nozzle together with the double rupture i disk assembly would be installed on the discharge flange of the reactor -
VBSsSl. _
I
- 2. The suppression chamber would be filled with water to the desired level. The desired level would be established b"y overflow from a nozzle in '
the side of the suppress ~ ion chamber.
3 The reactor vessel vould be filled with water until the desired level was established in the gage glass on the reactor vessel.
- 4. Saturated steam from a 1,400 psig source would be admitted through a nozzle in the bottom of the reactor vessel to heat the water. During this time the reactor vessel vould be vented to remove any non-condensible gases and drained to maintain the desired water level. Heating up to a pressure of 1,250 psig would take about one to one and a half hours. '
5 When reactor pressure reached about 600 psig, nitrogen would be admit-ted to the space between the two rupture disks to maintain a pressure in this space equal to about one half of reactor pressure. As reactor pressure increas-ed, pressure in this space would be increased.
f
- 6. When the desired test pressure in the reactor vessel was reached, all vents, drains, and other openings in the reactor vessel, d:7 vell vessel, l and suppression chamber would be closed or checked to be closed. !
7 Final instru=ent checks vould be made and the oscillograph started (the temperature recorder would already have been running during the reactor vessel heating part.jof the test).
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l Appendix I
- 8. The nitrogen pressure between the rupture disks vould be vented
.off,and the disks vould break. During ;he blevdown from the reactor vessel, 1
/- gages in the control shack indicating d_m/ vell and suppression chcaber I pmssures vould be observed as a check on the results recorded by the oscill- i ograph.
1 i
.9 The various test vessels would then be vented and preparations for j
' the next test would begin. Frequently these would include rocc11bration of -
j the pressure transducers which proved to be quite stable throughout the test l program. !
l
, E. Test Program .
l 1
- 1. Start-up Tests I
Table I is a listing of principal test parameters and results l for each test. The first six tests were made with the suppression chamber open and with increasing orifice ' size and reactor water volume
% to check out the adequacy of the test facility itself. During this series of tests two failures cccurred which caused the loss of most test results. During test No.1 a casket on the upstream face of the orifice plate broke when the blowdown was initiated;.this was probably
)
due to improper tightening of the bolts on this joint. During test No. i 4 the rupture disks broke unexpectedly for unknown reasons. These vere !
the only incidents causing serious loss of test data during the entire -
test pro 6 ram.
u-
- 2. Tests Without Deflectord Plate
- Tests Nos. 7 through 13 vere run with the suppression chcaber q clocco, and with increasing orifice sizes up to 512 in. diemeter. I Water levels in the reactor vessel and in the suppression chamber vero j at normal levels corresponding to Bodega design. Operation was satic- j factory for all tests, however suppression chamber pressure was lover .
than predicted. This was caused by the failure to expell all the air C.A(
from the dry well during the test. To increase the air carry over, .
l a deflector plate was installed in front of the outlet nozzle in the !
dry well so that the jet of steam-vater mixtures coming from the inlet nozzle vould be dispersed, causing more air to be purged from the dry {
)
v H. . I 3 Tests With Deflector Plate Tests Nos. 14 and subsequent were run with the deflector
, plate installed. Test results indicated most (about 90fo)'of the dry well air was being forced into the suppression chcaber.
These tests were run with a variety of orifices and nozzles.
Most tests were run with all reactor vater at or very near saturation temperature i the suppression chamber filled to a depth of 11 feet, and the dry well M' 8
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Appendix I
,at' ambient temperature. However, four tests had different initial conditions, as follows:
O A. Test 22 was run with the water in the bottom of the reactor s
vessel subcooled 16' F below saturation, in order to simulate sub-
. cooled water "n the bottom of the Bodega reactor vessel. i 7
l .
B. Tests 23 and 25 vere run with the suppression pool level '
respectively raised and lowered one foot to simulate possible variations in the Bodega pool level. -
C. Test 24 was run with the dry well preheated to 150' F by inject-ing steam into it before running the test. This was to si=ulate the maximum expected dry well temperature at Bodega during plant operation.
(Note: During the Humboldt testing, the dry well was heated to 150'/ for
, several tests. No significant difference was observed between tests vith a heated and an unheated dry well.)
W During all the tests run with the deflector plate, suppression chamber pressure never excee,ded 29 psig and the dry well pressure never exceeded 38 psig with an orifice or nozzle of MCOA size. The hi6hest dry well pressure achieved was 63 psig with an orifice 250% of MCOA .
break size. The special initial conditions for the four special tests described above had no significant effect except for theitest with a preheated . dry well wheretpressures were lower due to lois of air in the dry well because' of preheating it with steem.
- 4. Representative Pressure Traces . .
.m .
._)
Figures 8,9, and 10 show the pressure traces for five tests. Figures 8 and 9 are princiad. pressures for two tests repipted for clarity.
Figure 10 is a reproduction of the oscillograph records for three other tests. Some characteristics of these traces are discussed in the next section.
F. Test Results
- 1. Reactor Vessel Pressure For all tests, reactor vessel pressure was at or near 1,250 psis initial 2y. After the rupture disks broke there was a sharp drop in pressure for all tests, the amount of the drop increasing with orifice size. This was followed by a short period of fairly steady pressure and then a gradual pressure decrease which was in turn followed by a more rapid rate of decrease. The initial drop in pressure is assumed to be caused by:
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', . (1) A brief delay between' initiation of flow and start of flashing of the water in the vessel, and
. s-@
- , G' (2) . The need for sufficient pressure loss to establish the w
- rate of flashing that corresponds to the flow rate from tho' vessel.
4 The change from a gradual pressure decrease to a more rapid rate of decrease is assumed to ' occur at the time that all water has been expelled from the vessel;-the more rapid rate of decrease.resulting from the fact that there is no more water to flash and help maintain pressure. The time after start that this change occurs is assumed to be the duration of water flow for purpose of calculating flow rates.
All these characteristics were also observed during the Humboldt' tests. *
-=-n m . .
. 2. Suppression' Chamber Pressure -
The suppression chamber pressure traes for an tests showed an initial sharp rise, generany to about -12 or 13 psis, followed by a slight drop-in pressure; then pressure vould rise. gradually reaching a
' maximum at about the time all vater and steam was expelled from the reactor vessel. This gradual pressure rise was smooth for the smaner orifice sizes and was accompanied by some pulsations for the larger orifice sizes.
The initial sharp rise in pressure followed by a slight drop vas observed d.uing the Humboldt testing. Visual. observations of suppression pool' action were also made during the Humboldt testing and this pressure characteristic was attributed to the observed violent but brief upward -
- t. surge of pool vater caused by a large blast of air coming over from the dry well at the start of the test and resulting in momentary compression of the air in the suppression chamber air space. Visusl observation was not considered practical during the Bodega testing but it is considered that this pressure characteristic is due to the cause described above.
i Following the initial sharp rise in pressure, the gradual rise is
- caused by. continued purging of the remaining air from the dry well. 1 Before the deflector plate was installed in the dry ve n , this purcinc
.* was not complete, but after its installation, purging was nearly complete.
At no time did the suppression chamber pressure exceed 29 psis, indicating that the condensation of steem under an conditions, tested was rapid cnd complete. Variations of plus or minus one foot in pool vater level had no significant effects on performance. ,
, l 3 Dry Wen Pressure 4
Calculations made of dry well pressure predicted that critical flow would not occur at the end of the vent pipe, as was the case in the Humboldt design. This means that dry ven pressure vould then be i < ao e,
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PREllENARY APrsunIx i 7 -
D PRESSURE TdEPE355CN DESIGN l -
This appendix contains design calculations for the Bodes pressure'sur;. cession.
system usin6 methods ' described in references'(1), (2), and ;3) at the end *his 4
appendix. Test results and calculations-for the Badega test facility at M ss
' Landing are also included in parts cf this . appendix to substantiate the design of . ,
Bodega or to show where margin exists.
A.E. M.dIMUM SUPPRESSION CHAMBER PRE 3SURE
't The maximum pressure in the suppression chanSar is deter.ir.ed largely :.,- the
- air which would be transferred from the dry well :s the chamber In crder to account for. vapor pressure and minor effect.s, a de:, ailed weight and enerC r balance is required. The computer weight ar.d energy balc7ee for the desi;yt conditior. is.
.~shown on Taole.I.
-It. should be noted that the rapid and complete condensausn.:f steam is :
basic requirement' of the pressure suppression syntem which
~
- Sw.med to be .ausfied .
iin these calculations. Other assumptions follow:
(1) The reactor is. operating initially at :.008 Mwt with .omal water .. al,
(# ~h T
but the water is saturated at 1250 Psig.
.cis . initially a.
(2) All'available heat of the reactor vessel and 1*
57k'F) is transferred to t'he' coolant.
(3) Heat absorption by the dry well and chamber vr ..s :..: r. 1ected.
I (4) Dry well and chamber air $s initially dry.
(5) One minute of decay heat e.nd feedwater flow are n:cd the syste:. j before venting stops. ]
i (6) Chamber air volume is redu::ed b; Ine 4 feet of water displaced from inside q the vents. l l
The design pressure of 35 ps.g is slightly greater than the calculated sca:imum !
pre j ae of 29 2 psig. The highest cnamber pressure observed in the Moss Ianding.
tes.4 was 29 psig with the dry well unneated and :nly 22 psig with the dry well n hea. ed to Bodega operating temperatur- ,
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. PREUM! NARY TABLE I f-
~
^
WGIGHT AND ENERGY 8ALANCE FOR 800EGA AT THE END OF THE VE'NTINU~YiRIID0""
PSIA,
- ~
DEG F CU F'T "'~ULi'FT/LS ~ L85 [ 87U/L8 100'O 8TD4
'" "~ "~~~ ' ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~" '~
SEFORE ,
REACTtR VE5SEL 0. $73.94 0. 'O. ""~ ~T510505.*--- D. T.1 i AEACTOR' WATER ~ '1265.00 573.94 6500. 0.0226 288232. 575.42 165856.
REACT R STEAM 1265.00 5t~3.94 ~'666 2 7 "' O.5400 5882. 1100 70- 64 74.
ORY WELL.A!R 14.70 150.00 115000. 15.3805 7477. 20.35 152.
CHAMBER AIR '14.70 90.00 d200. "13~.W M - ~ 5784- ~ f6~6T-~ 5i-POOL WATER' O. 90.00 62400. 0.0161 3875841. 57.99 224761.'
DRY WELL TOTALS 0. O. '
123500. O. 1801591. O. 172482.
CHAMBER TOTALS 0. O. 142600. O. 3081624. 0. 224819. i
~ SYSTEM TOTALS C. 266100.
- 0. 0.. ,,,5 6 832,15_. , ,, _0. _,,39,7301.
CHANGE .... .. . . . . . _ . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . _ _ . .
DECAY HEAT.. O. O. O. O. O. C. 10000.
~ ' '
FEEDWATER. -0. 402.00 0. 6. ~ (46'40. ~~ T717f3~ 24890?
(NTERCHANGE TO OW 0. O. 1300. 0. ,,.,,,._.,0 ,0. ,.0 . .
INTERCHANGE FR CH 0. O. -1300.. O. O. O. O.
~ fd75ti'I
~~
'N RY WELL TOTALS 0. O. 124800. O. ~ ~f847591. 0.~ .
.-4HAMSER TOTALS 0. O. 141300, 0, . 5.061.424,. . 91, _.12.4_8_1.9 ,
SYSTEM TOTALS 0. O. 266100. O. 5749215. O. 432191. l AFTER
'0.
~
REACTOR VESSEL 0. 275.9i 0. ~ 15 D'd 6db'."~""~ s2. f 8" -4 9 f 7 5'.' ,
02Y WELL 5 TEAM 46.09 275.91 124400. 9stAQ5. - 13594. 1094.20 ..___L4AIS,.
CHAMBER AIR 40.84 142.40 72465. 5.4647 13261. 19.04 253.
CHAMBER VAPOR 3.07 142.40 72465. 116,.0953. ... 624. 105.7. 00 ._ , . 6.60..
FOOL WATER 0. 142.40 68835. 0.0163 .4221737. 110.28 465580.
ORY WELL TOTALS 46.09 0. 124800. O. 1513594'.~ ~ ~ ~ ~ d'. '- 343'00.
CHANSER TOTALS 43.93 '
.O. 141300. 0.. ,,4235632 _ . 0.. . . .4664_92.
SYSTEM. TOTALS 0. O. 266100. O. 5749215. O. 432192..
ORY WELL PRESSURE = 31.39PSIG "
CHAPRER, PRESSURE = ,29.23PSIG s.
G
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- MAXIMUM DRY WELL PRESSUTS The Bode 6a dry well is designed on the basis of a rupture flew rate correspon- i
, ding to a complete circumferential b reak of one of the 28 inch recirculation lines. !
Flow area would be 3 44 sq ft for th: 28 inch pipe on one side of the break and i 2 96 sq ft for the 26 inch pipe feeding the other side, a total of 6.h sq ft.
The' rupture flow rate from the loss Landing tests is used for the design of the Bodega dry well. The highest rupture flow rate on.a test representing the Bodega MCOA is 5600 lb/sec per ft2 (Test 24) . Total flow rate for the 6.4 sq ft break would be 36,000 lb/sec. -
The niaximum dry well pressure under the quasi-steady vent flow condition determines the design pressure for the Bodega dry well because for the Bodeca design it is higher than the initial pressure buildup to expel' the water from the vent pipes.
The dry well pressure during the quasi-steady vent flow condition is the sum of the pressure at the discharge end of the vent. pipe (which may or may not be
()' critical end-of-pipe pressure), and the pressure drop in the vent pipe.
Table II shows the com flow rate of 36,000 lb/sec.puter Homogeneouscalculations flowfor dry with wellwater 100% pressure for ainrupture carryover the
. vents is. assumed. The calculation method is the same as presented in Appendix V of the Humboldt Final Hazards Summar;' Report, Equations (4) through (10). The method is also described on page 318 of Reference (2) under the heading " Dry Well Pressure". Based on the calculated value of 415 psig, the dry well design pressure is chosen to be 50 psig.
The five pipe sections indicated in Table II are listed in the following sequence: 6 feet of straight 24 inch pipe; 24 inch pipe entrance (K=.5); entrance to 615 inch I.D. ring header (K=.5); 30 feet of 87 inch I.D.(equivalent) pipe; and 87 inch I.D. ' equivalent) pipe entrance (K=.5) . (Exponent of ten is indicated for each number following the letter E.)
F e
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AREA = 330.21 G= 2. 5 83 . tL . j ,h
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NE 't.T ' S ECT I ON DISCFARGE = <, I ;. .91 D EA = 330.21
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G= 275TI-%L-o . ._.... . . .,. 9 , .
- 4 f.~l i 1 E-O T-- 3 6 072 89 E ~0 ; I2 d 450.000E-01 360.204E-03 E 4.7 4.
O ~---------- 4 5 5. 000 E 3 59.70 6 E-03" 3 '. 2 460.000E-01
~ ~
359.211E-0 ~ -~
1.7 465~.000E ~T 01 ~
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. .......... 4 7 5. 3 4 0 E . 0 1.... 3 5 7 . 7. 0 5.E.._0.$ _c ,
+ .
NEXT SECTICN CISCHARGE = 7 . 5 3' ,
ARYA = 33070~6 6-= 2.56b[ EI 3~-
4/ . fq i C ..........-~ 4~7 5'.3 tiO E301-~3 5 7.~7 0 5 E30 3' TX11.~3:
480.000E-01 3 5 7.2 49 E-03 ' .131 $ . 5:
........... 48 5'.~0 0 0 E-0T 3 5 6~. 7 6 5 E-0T--.3WOI 490.000E-01 3 5 6. 2 83 E- 0 3. .~~
l32h.4 495~~D~00 -T E 01 3ST 8D355 0 U32MT8i
.C 499.484E-01 3 5 5 . 3 7.5.E.. 0 3 d3II 9.; .
g
~d __-- NEXT SECTION DISCFARGE = rFJ 49s94' l
-.XR EX"d"~330' . ~2F" G 4- EY637I i err ~11 i 499.484E-01 355.375E-03_. ,320.9 .
C 500.000e-01 3 55.32e e-014 -326. 2l ~
.........~ 5 01.'3 4 5 E-01 '"3 5 5'.'2 01F or'
~~~ ~
.p 33C2l' %
C ~~ ~~ EsYT S BYT ICETilfCFARGe"~~Nh'13 AREA = 330.26 G= 2.563 cEOL l t . M1 l Cm ..........- ~5 01. 3 4 5 E- 01 ~ -~ ~
355.201E-03 ~
J33t.2 l 5'O 5. 000 e -0T 3 SV~~8 55' T.~03 W.~8' y ............ 5. g., 10..
E 0 0_ggg 0.g.0 g1. . 3 55 4. 3 8 g4.E...O'3 M ,' . 4 520.000E-01 353.450E-0Y[ :;.d 5237877E-01 3Sl- DV0F03G :34i ' . d n
C...........................................w e
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e..... ..................... 5 6 2. 2 3 5 E-01.. 3. 5.1 4.4 8..E..0 3 0 .
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7 INITIAL PRESSURE = 56.7 'A n - 4145 ;G as..............................,..............5 ..
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PREUMiNARY The following symbols are used in Table II: P sia; Q-steam quality (1b/see stesm per ib/see total flow); R-mixture density (1b cu ft); VEID-mixture, velocity (ft/sec); S-entropy of mixture; DL-equivalent length of pipe * (ft) going from the pressure in the left column of a line to the pressure in the ling above; DPDV value
, of the ' differential (dP/dy) which equals G at critical flow; H-enthalpy of mixture *
(Btu /lb);. G-flow parsmeter pipe section; and F-friction factor. {lb/see sq ft)2/14kg]; EQL-equivalent length of the Critical flow does not occur at the end of the vent piping in the calculations.
The pressure at the discharge end of the vent pipe is chamber pressure plus the four feet of water submergence, which is not over 30 psig at the time of maximum dry well pressure. The calculations assume 30 psig.
Figure 4 shows the results of similar calculations for varying flow rates.
Maximum dry well pressures in the tests all fall below this line. Test points are not indicated on the figure because the pressure at the discharge end of the vents in the tests is less than 30 psig when dry well pressure is a maximum and the calculations based on 30 psig are not strictly comparable. .
The initial transient dry well pressure buildup to expel the water from the vents has been calculated by the methods described in Reference (1) . It is significantly less than the maximum pressure during flow conditions calculated
.]' above . The test results substantiate the conclusion that the initial pressure buildup is not the maximum dry well pressure.
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e PRalM! NARY -
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1 REFERENCES Appendix / . $M
. (1) 'Pinal Hazards Summary Report, Humboldt Bay. Power Plant Unit No. 3, .
Pacific Gas and Electric Capany, September 1,1961. ,
, . (2) " Pressure Suppression", C.P. Ashworth,.D.B. Barton, C.H. Robbins,
" Nuclear Engineering", August 1962.
-i (3) " Predicting Maximum Pressures in Pressure Suppression Containment",
C.P. Ashworth, D.B. Barton, E. Janscen, C.H. Robbins, ASME Paper 61-WA-222.
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SUMMARY
EVAIlJATION FOR CONSTRUCTION PERMIT T
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i IN THE MATTER OF
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Sh PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY BODEGA BAY ATOMIC PARK I
i UNIT WMBER 1 l
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HISTORY T The Pacific Gas and Electric Company of San Franciso on December 28, 1962 submitted an application to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) for
@ a permit to construct and operate a nuclear power plant at Bodega Bay,
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. . California ' pursuant to 'the provisions of Title 10, Chapter 1 The Code es
/
[ of Federal Regulations, Part 50 (10 CFR 50) . The applic , which 3-includes a " Preliminary Hazards' Summary Report", dated Deember 28, 1962 and-Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4 to the application dated March 4, April'5, June 13 and August 9, 1963, respectively, has been reviewed by the staff of the Division of Licensing and Regulation. Technical consultants i.
assisted the AEC Regulat'ory Staff in specialized areas. The application was also considered by the AEC'S Adivsory Committee on Reactor Safe-
. guards (ACRS). The recommendations of the ACRS were expressed in a e
memorandum to the Chairman of the AEC dated April 18, 1963.
I h
Notice of a Hearing to be held in this matter was filed in the Federal Register on . The Hearing was consened on and witnesses representing Pacific Gas and Electric Company, the AEC t
Regulatory Staff and were heard through 1963.
, _ -r e k SITE The nuclear' power plant is to be located on Sodaga Head, a small peninsula of land in Sonoma County on the Coast of California about
,a -
2 50 miles northwest of San Fransico. The property owned by Pacific Gas
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g and Electric Company at th's site amounts to approximately 225 acres
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and includes the entire southern end of the peninsula. To the north 4
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.l .-3 I of. the site the Universi.ty of California is acquiring approximately -
. 320 acres for use as. a field' station- for marine biology and other scientific studies.
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- $0g Condenser cooling water is to be drawn from Bodega Bay, M!n circulated through the condenser and discharged to the Pacific Ocean.
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I" .In many respects the site may be-classed as excellent. It is y,m
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not upstream from drinking water intakes, the surrounding wat,er p affords natural isolation on three sides and the University property y '1j. to the north mitigates against the development of residential areas CL i
immediately to the north. The diffusion /imatology appears
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{ satsifactory for the discharge of radioactive gasseous effluents in '
. the'e acted quantities. As the releasefof radioactive liquid wastes ag -
to the condenser effluent is to be controlled so that the concentrations
,I
.. at the point of discharge to the ocean are less than the permissible j limits set forth in 10 CFR 20 (see footnote below) there is no reason ,
i to believe that such release will alter the local ecology. Testimony has indicated that wnitoring program will be initiated sometimef before initial operation of the plant and will continue af ter the start NT of oportions so that any effects on the ecology will be observed and b ;
rendial action will be taken, if req 61 red. 'd
, h Footnote: es ;
OM Part low 20 to Ystaj1r,easonable
. assurance that individuals in"These levels are unrestricted a'reas will not receive a dose to the whole body M@
in any period of one year in excess of 0.5 rem.*
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- 4 Recommended limits on exposure (such as the 0.5 rem per
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year), based upon extensive socientic and technical investigation and upon years of experience with the
- q, practical problems of radiation protection, represent W aconsensusastothemeasuresgenesaglydesirableto
,y provide apropriate degrees of safety ,on the situations frf to which these measures apply."qIn other words, the drinking of water contaminated to the limits set forth pq in 10 CFR 20 would not be expected to cause any measurable
% shortening of life expectancy or other dele /terious effect.
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4-1 The nuclear reactor for this plant is to be located j _ed.m i /N
, approximately 1000 feet from the,t S an Andreas Faul),
g the most active seismic fault in the United States. This is generq11y considered G
37 to be somewhat of a disadvantage-in nuclear reactor site evaluation.
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The probability of earthquake occuriance is higher in the vicinity
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a.s. s of a fault. The intensity of earth motion tends to increase with
[,J.j decreases in distance from the epicenter of an earthquake. The
, epicenter of an earthquake is most likely to occur along a fault line but may occur at other locations. Numerous observers have pointed out, however, that the amount of damage to buildings caused by earthquakes is much less when the buildings are located on rock O'g -
then when they are located on alluvial material. The, reactor
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.g}Q building at Bodega Bay is to be located on rock.
.di Further, there seems to be little doubt but that a nuclear
- power plant can be tailt to. withstand without hazardous malfunction, 1 any earhquake that is likely to occur. Forexafple,nuclearsubmarine power plants are designed to withstand forces amounting to several times the force of gravim; Thus the crucial questions in this Ch L j.g,g regard are: 1. What is3 maximum earth motion intensity temetsteh this
+,,4, ppj plant credibly could be expected to experience? 2. Has the yff applicant given satisfactory evidence that the plant will be designed ap UN and constructed to standards that give assurance that an earthquake of 3
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.pr such intensity would not cause the type or extent of daagur to the M:.9 frgy plant that would induce exposure of the public to an undue hazard?
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d, (These. questions have not yet been completely resolved.)
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. o NUCLEAR REACTOR r
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The nuclear reactor to be installed in this plant is of the direct cycle,' forced cir ulation, boiling water type, a type which a-9 with / slight variation has 3 been operated to produce electric power hh ,
90: - at Dresden, Ill., Big Rock Point, Mich., and Humboldt Bay, Calif.
Its maximum power level is to be 1008 thermal megawatts ( c)
I
. compared with 700 h for Dresden,157 MNC for Big Rock Point and
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' 165 %t for Humboldt Bay. ,
l The Bodega Bay reactor is to be designed so that at any time ,
I c.ai o k z[/e cO.e of l 4 during core life W all the control rods eye inserted 4the core r1 5 21-
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= ~*4 ' 7.:111 not exceed 0.97' endeN the most reactive rod / 6F,
' C Xu$4ehee at T;94 k fu117 withdrawn and the other rods fu11gineerted 3 the core .. av n 7 will be 0.99 or less. Thus, the reactor will remain suberitical if one rod is inadvertently withdrawn or it can be shut down even if one rod should become stuck in the fu11 withdrawn 7 position even if this occurs at low reactor temperature. The reactor is expected to exhibit negative temperature and void coefficients of reactivity in 4 the temperature and void ranges of interest.
> Au jjj Further research and development work is being conducted on the n.w.a
- ,$ proposed fuel element clad. It is expected that this work will lead q
,l, ; f to a satisfactory clad design. Even if some clad failures should
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QI The control rod drives for this reactor are similar to but
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^Hj manifest certain improvements over the rod drives which have been 4 'l 1 N
usedhuecessfully at Dresdhn, Big Roeg, Humboldt Bay and the SENN i..-
9f , plant in Italy. The applicant has stated that prototypes and
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!? and production drives will be subjected to functinnal and endurance
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tests before reactor startup. ' The R'agulatory Staff will- evaluate
- and act upon the results of these tests.
'4 i e8.Ye FUEL HANDLING To ,;. .
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p$g,6 ,3 The fuel handling' facilities at this plant are to be superior to
's.h., those at'several predec,essor plants in that spent fuel.is to be tranferred from the reactor vessel to the fuel storage pool through
- an interconnecting pool of water. Thus the hazards of fuel transfer
- j ca$ks are avoided. Refueling operations are to be I conducted inside i
I a refueling building which can be maintained at negative pressure through the action of fans which draw air through particulte and halogen
."., removal filters and'aischarge it to the radioactive gas' stack.
~ WASTE' DISPOSAL As previously mentioned radiactive liquid westes from this plant e
are mixed with condenser effluent prior to discharge to the Pacific l,
Ocean. Since this cooling water flow rate is about 250,000 gpm there should be no problem in maintaining the concentration of radionuclides in i
I
, the mixture to below the maximum permissible concentrations as provided s .
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- by 10 CFR 20. Based on observations in the Columbia River downstream A,
trie 43 from the Hanford Works no hazard is expected tesecury as the result 7l of reconcentration effects. Nevertheless, the applicant has stated s .,
Q.7 that a radiological monitoring survey of this site and its N.h M environs will be initiated two years lyefore omnencement of operation NN.5 Gw/ M CenTit w 4 M gML k, f@ . of the reactor.1 ' Although the details of the sampling program have L R C. :. ' ' not been completed, it is expected that guarterly samples will be
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taken of marine waters, planl/ ton, bottom sediments, invertebrates,
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shellfish,residentfishesandoftheintertidalal/gaeanden grass. Thus, the applicant will be able to note any reconcentration
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, : n v.o j u% course he is required by law {,10 CFR 20) to take remedial action c.a. j before such hazards beccme appreciable.
All solid wastes from this plant are to be consigned to licensed waste disposal agents for off-site disposal at approved locations.
The applicant has stated that gasseous wastes disposal will be i
1 monitored and controlled so that a maximum annual dose of 0.5 rem I '
at any off-site location, as provided by 10 CFR 20, will not be exceeded. There appears to be no reason to believe that this objective can not be met. & M *h: .... m li n p:: 1 wi.n ~. + nJ quid s' , _ ,t- ,
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. unususi effects of release of radioactive gasses to the atmosphere.
Quarperly sampling of soil, vegetationj local agricultural products, well water, stream water and stream mud; and weekly sampling of l
air particulate and air background is planned. The diffusion climatology is expected to be satisfactory. A meteorological facility is being installed at the site to develop'a better understanding of the locaf
[ meteorology.
EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT M
.j. This plant is to be equipped withgemergencies should they arise.
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- f. An emergency feedwater pumpg is provided to assure that the reactor l
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core is always kept submerged in water so long as the reactor vessel e .,
I andpipingbeneathitremain[ intact. ,A core spray system is provided i
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the core can not be kept submer8ed. An emergency condenser with a
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I large water storage capacity and provisions for make-up from the t.. l, g fire system is provided to serve as a heat sink in case the main Q);;
condenser is incapacitated. A " bleed-and-feed" system is available
.j$g.ff Oi as a back up to the emergency condenser. This system provides for 31.:
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[, bleeding steam from the main steam line to the suppression pool, 1 a pool discussed in a subsequent paragraph of this summary, and '
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. making up water thus lost thrpush action of the auxilliary feed water
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g -accomplish reactor hold down if such action becomes necessary for l'
,_ any reason.- '
y-4fy Sevesal urces of emergency electric power are4available.
GM V. ' W A startup-steadyby transformer can supply station service power from the 220 KV transmission system. An auxiliary standby transformer can supply sufficient power for orderly shutdown from a 12 KV distribution line from a nearby substation. If both these sources p S failanengine.gvengeneratorcansupplypowerforsafeshutdown
. ;.'( and decay heat removal. In addition to these sources a substantial Q' station battery will supply power for control instrumentation and, g;J.
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w 1 %;n through an inverter, essential AC loads.
'.h CONTAINMENT j
- .r 10 For ultimate containment the Bodega Bay Plant is to utilize
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([ the pressure suppression concept. The reactor vessel and the ;
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%qu;,, n}. coolant recirculation system are inclosed in a drywell vessel, a j I
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'7fy vessel whose volume is about 115,000 cu. ft. This drywell vessel !
.g is connected through eight vent pipes each IIgMX eight feet in
_ .9 I diameter to the suppression chamber, a chamber with a volume of
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approximately 142,000 cubic feet, of which about 62,000, cubic feet 0$--
- 3 is water filled. Theeightventpipesconnecttoahea/erfromwhich 5 . .. ,
-ud 112 pipes each two feet in diameter project downward and teminate !
- pt T i O 4 feet below the surface of the water in the suppression chamber.
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In the unlikely event of - j n_ 1.. . m m... ;4W:- ? .
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j a complete g bass ofacore coolant P " ..g.h _ l i yt f I system, the g pressure build up in the drywell is reduced both in magnitude and duration as a result of steam flow to the suppression i
' pool through the underwater exhausts. Tests have been conducted that o
demonstrate the effietoacy of this concept. Further tests are in progress to deteEsine where and to what extent baffles are needed
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I between the underwater exhausts.
The applicant has indicated that substantial provisions will i
be made to assure reliable containment performance in the event ,
fw of an accident. W e isolation valves are to be placed in the
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mainsteamline/andconsiderationisbeinggiventotheuseof l
I strainers ahead of the first isolation valve in each main steam line. !
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Containment leak rate tests are to be conducted after installation of
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t all penetrations by applying dry well design pressure to the completed dry well jand suppression chamber design pressure to the completed y !
'u suppression chamber. The containment leak tightness will be tested
.y ,w y[ at periodic intervals throughout the life of the plant. An indication 3 :;p ~
of inadequate containment integrity will be cause for plant shutdown.
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CONSEQUENCES OF CREDIBLE ACCIDENTS v.4 .b g' .4 : The applicant has discussed and evaluated the consequences of a 4,e, number of credible accidents. Generally they lead to no significant
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hasard to the public. Of accidents of significance to the public an-
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9 accident which is believed to represent gn upper limit of possible hasard to the public was evaluated. Conservative assumptions were used in the calculation, including the assumption that a major j break occurred in the primary 's ystem and that half of the core melted I
1 and released its' fission products to the containment vessel. As confirmed s .,
M., by calculations made by the Regulatory Staff this at;cident leads to
- f [, maximum potential whole body and thyroid dosages at any location M.
- outside the site boundary for the duration of the accident of 0.94 rem and 53 rem, respectively. From these results it may be concluded that the containment systes provided for this reactor appears to be capable of reducing the potential hazards of the maximum credible accident for this reactor to levels which do not present undue hazard to the health and l~S w safety of the public.
! 31 W
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SUMMARY
OF IMPORTANT SAFETY QUESTIONS
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X In the plant descr $1on above, a number of important safety
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fyg; questions and how they are to be resolved are pointed out. These
.u, 8h. are summarized belows w
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- , .g 1. Question
- Does the proposed site appear appropriate as a
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d,i,3 location for a reactor of the type proposed?
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Answer The site proposed for the reactor is an excellent one t
1 in all respects but one; namely the proximity to the r: .
L&t .CCIjl c:a. San Andreas faul which runs a roximately 1000 feet 4.g '
to the northeast of the proposed reactor location. 1 a:
The population distribution'is favorable; the population 1
' isolation distance factors are well within acceptable ranges; the meteorology, although not excellent for i certain portions of the time, is as good as or better l than that in California generally. Since the amount of
.i j gaseous and liquid radioactive waste to be discharge to the air and water respectively, will be controlled and 3 monitored to assure compliance with Part 20 requirements, I
there is no reason to believe that radioactive waste disposal at this site'will cause any undue hazard to the j public as a result of either direct exposure or ingestion.
i The implications of the proximity to the San Andreas ,
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'h fault are yet to be thoroughly evaluated. i
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- 2. Question
- Is the proposed reactor of well understood character and l
,' does it possess satisf actory safeguards against violent ]-
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? 'f:1 ma1 performance?
Answer: The reactor is to be similar in all important respects ;
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P ' .. to several other successfully operating boiling water
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t-reactors. Its control elements provide adequate
, shutdown margins under all conditions; its temperature w, ,
-hg and void coefficients of reactivity are negative in a.e
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- - the ranges of interest; the control rod drives for/
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this reactor are similar to ones in use in several a,.
other operating reactors.
t A research and development program is being conducted to select an optimum fuel clad design. Economic factors are certain to influence the outcome of this
. program toward the selection of a clad which will
- , not be subject to failures of a magnitude that would .j cause significant hazard to the health and safety of the
- public.
i'
- 3. Questions Does the proposed plant design include adequate facilities for the safe handling of nuclear fuel while it is not in the reactor?
, Answer: The fuel handling concept for this facility is excellent in n- '
. that during reisling operations the fuel storage pool is connected by a water channel to the reactor vessely thus7 I providing for visual observation of all operations y;
- and eliminati he hazards associated with fuel handling ww
- _ casks. Fuel storage rack design to assure suberiticality
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.3 is not complete pending further fuel element design.
Rack design will be evaluated by the Regulatory Staff
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fuel.. I iib 4. Question Do radioactive waste disposal plans and designs q sw.- \
f provide.for adequate protection of the health and j I
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safety of the public?
Answers Waste is to monitored and controlled to conform with the limitations of 10 CFR 20.
'! A radiological survey of the site and its. environs I
is to be initiated by the applicant at least two years M before commencesant of plant operation. This survey w .-
w W program is to continue for an indefinite per'iod after
, g operation begins so that any unusual effects such as
' reconcentration can be observed before they become a j hazard.
t l 5. Question! Is the plant to be equipped with facilities to cope with credible emergencies?
Answers The plant is well equipped with emergency heat removal xr n equipment, ===ama==-hsWdemar+
w equipment and auxiliary j
sources.
+- 6. Question: Is the proposed containment scheme one which provides a s
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reliable means of limiting the release rate of radioactive
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materials in case of the occurrence of a maximuis credible I i
b ]) accident to levels which are deemed tolerable for such 4
'h occurrences? l
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-l Answers The effichency of the proposed pressure suppression
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contairunent concept has been demonstrated in accident
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jj! mock-up tests. Two valves in series are to be provided
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in the main steam line thus increasing the reliability
, e (q of the most important portion d the containment isolation klosure) system. The design objective for
,v maximum leak rate of 0.57. of the contained volume 1,'s' 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at design pressure is an objective that, if met, will limit accident consequences to quite
,j, acceptable levels. Provisions are to be made for r.a f.V,, containment leak testing at full design pressure with'
.:24 .
- all penetrations installed.
- 7. Question: Do calculations of the possible consequences of the maximum credible accident indicate exposures which constitute an acceptable risk for an accident of
. extremely low probability?
I Answers Calculations of accident consequences, using conservative ,
e, i
~" assumptions, indicate maximum exposures outside the I
. l l
site boundaries of 0.94 rem to the whole body and
,7 53 rem to the thyroid. These values compare quite 9 acceptably with the guidelines set forth in 10 CFR 100.
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Assuming that tpe problems associated;1ocating this reactor within by::. y t\ p /
M .1000 feet of the '
anAndreasFaulthcanbesatisfactorilyresolved,we nG; \
4.:cT believe that a nuclear power plant of the type proposed can be con-
.m. structed and operated at the proposed Bodega Head site without undue 27:...
hazard to the health and safety of the public.
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