IR 05000275/2007004

IR 05000275-07-004 and 05000323-07-004; Pacific Gas and Electric Company; 07/01/2007 Through 09/30/2007; Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2

ML072990316
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	10/26/2007
From:	Vincent Gaddy NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-B
To:	Keenan J S Pacific Gas & Electric Co
References
IR-07-004
Download: ML072990316 (37)

Text

October 26, 2007

John S. KeenanSenior Vice President - Generation and Chief Nuclear Officer Pacific Gas and Electric Company P.O. Box 770000 Mail Code B32 San Francisco, CA 94177-0001

SUBJECT: DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTIONREPORT 05000275/2007004 AND 05000323/2007004

Dear Mr. Keenan:

On September 30, 2007, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission completed an inspection atyour Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, facility. The enclosed integrated report documents the inspection finding that was discussed on October 3, 2007, with John Conway and members of your staff.This inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.This report documents one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance. However,because of its very low risk significance and because it is entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this as a green finding.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and itsenclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public DocumentRoom or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/Vincent G. Gaddy, ChiefProject Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Pacific Gas and Electric Company-2-Dockets: 50-275 50-323 Licenses: DPR-80 DPR-82

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000275/2007004 and 05000323/2007004

w/attachment:

Supplemental Informationcc w/enclosure:Sierra Club San Lucia Chapter ATTN: Andrew Christie P.O. Box 15755 San Luis Obispo, CA 93406Nancy CulverSan Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace P.O. Box 164 Pismo Beach, CA 93448ChairmanSan Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors County Government Building 1055 Monterey Street, Suite D430 San Luis Obispo, CA 93408Truman Burns\Robert KinosianCalifornia Public Utilities Commission 505 Van Ness Ave., Rm. 4102 San Francisco, CA 94102-3298Diablo Canyon Independent SafetyCommittee Robert R. Wellington, Esq.

Legal Counsel 857 Cass Street, Suite D Monterey, CA 93940Director, Radiological Health BranchState Department of Health Services P.O. Box 997414 (MS 7610)

Sacramento, CA 95899-7414Jennifer Post, Esq.Pacific Gas and Electric Company P.O. Box 7442 San Francisco, CA 94120City EditorThe Tribune 3825 South Higuera Street P.O. Box 112 San Luis Obispo, CA 93406-0112James D. Boyd, CommissionerCalifornia Energy Commission 1516 Ninth Street (MS 34)

Sacramento, CA 95814James R. Becker, Vice President Diablo Canyon Operations and Station Director, Pacific Gas and Electric Company Diablo Canyon Power Plant P.O. Box 56 Avila Beach, CA 93424Jennifer TangField Representative United States Senator Barbara Boxer 1700 Montgomery Street, Suite 240 San Francisco, CA 94111John T. ConwaySite Vice President Diablo Canyon Power Plant P.O. Box 56 Avila Beach, CA 93424 Pacific Gas and Electric Company-3-Electronic distribution by RIV:Regional Administrator (EEC)DRP Director (ATH)DRS Director (DDC)DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)Senior Resident Inspector (MSP)Branch Chief, DRP/B (VGG)Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E (RWD)Team Leader, DRP/TSS (CJP)RITS Coordinator (MSH3)Only inspection reports to the following:DRS STA (DAP)V. Dricks, PAO (VLD)A. Powell, OCA Region IV Coordinator (AXP10)D. Pelton, OEDO RIV Coordinator (DLP)ROPreports DC Site Secretary (AWC1)SUNSI Review Completed: __yes___ ADAMS: Yes No Initials: VGG

___ Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available Sensitive Non-Sensitive R:\_REACTORS\_DC\2007\DC2007-04RP-MSP.wpdRIV:RI:DRP/BSRI:DRP/BC:DRS/PSBC:DRS/OBMABrownMSPeckMPShannonATGody/RA VGGaddy for//RA VGGaddy for/ /RA/ /RA/10/23/0710/23/0710/22/0710/22/07C:DRS/EB1C:DRS/EB2C:DRP/BWBJonesLJSmithVGGaddy /RA/ /RA DLProulx for/ /RA/10/18/0710/22/0710/26/07OFFICIAL RECORD COPYT=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax Enclosure-1-U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IVDockets:50-275, 50-323 Licenses:DPR-80, DPR-82 Report:05000275/200700405000323/2007004Licensee:Pacific Gas and Electric Company Facility:Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location:7 1/2 miles NW of Avila Beach Avila Beach, CaliforniaDates:July 1 through September 30, 2007 Inspectors:T. Jackson, Senior Resident InspectorM. Peck, Senior Resident Inspector M. Brown, Resident Inspector D. Allen, Senior Resident Inspector, Comanche Peak G. Pick, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2 J. Melfi, Resident Inspector, Palo Verde P. Elkmann, Emergency Preparedness Inspector G. George, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 S. Graves, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 S. Makor, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1Approved By:V. G. Gaddy, Chief, Projects Branch BDivision of Reactor Projects Enclosure-2-

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000275/2007-004, 05000323/2007-004; 7/1/07 - 9/30/07; Diablo Canyon Power PlantUnits 1; Maintenance Effectiveness. This report covered a 13-week period of inspection by resident inspectors and announcedinspections on emergency preparedness, safety evaluations and heat exchangers. One self-

revealing finding (Green) was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by theircolor (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 "Significance Determination Process." Findings for which the Significance Determination Process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.A.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

Green.

A self-revealing finding was identified after an inadequate main turbinemaintenance procedure resulted in an unplanned load reduction and a reactor shutdown. On August 9, 2007, the Unit 1 generator output decreased by 60MW due to failed main turbine stop valve. Pacific Gas and Electric Company shut down the plant the following day to repair the failed valve. The valve failed because the maintenance personnel did not properly adjust the external travel stop during outage related maintenance. The travel stop was not properly adjusted because the maintenance procedure did not require the maintenance personnel to verify that the disc was properly back seated against the internal stop during adjustment. This issue was entered into Pacific Gas and Electric Company's Corrective Action Program as Non Conformance Report N0002219.The finding is greater than minor because if left uncorrected, the condition wouldbecome a more significant safety concern. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the inspectors determined the finding to have very low safety significance because the condition did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human perfo rmance, associatedwith the resources component because PG&E failed to provide an adequate main turbine maintenance procedure (H.2.c) (Section 1R12).

B.Licensee-Identified Violations

A violation of very low safety significance, which has been identified by Pacific Gas andElectric Company, has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by Pacific Gas and Electric Company have been entered into their corrective action program. This violation and corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

-4-Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant StatusAt the beginning of the inspection period, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) wasoperating Diablo Canyon Unit 1 at full power. An unplanned power reduction to 95 percent rated thermal power occurred on August 9, 2007, after a main turbine stop valve disc separated from the swing arm, partially restricting steam flow. On August 10, PG&E shutdown Unit 1 and repaired the stop valve. The licensee restarted the reactor on August 16 and achieved full power on August 19. PG&E operated Unit 1 at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.Pacific Gas and Electric operated Unit 2 at full power for the duration of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R01Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed a review of PG&E's readiness for seasonal susceptibilitiesinvolving extreme storm surges and high temperatures. The inspectors:

(1) reviewed plant procedures, the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Update, and TechnicalSpecifications (TSs) to ensure that operator actions defined in adverse weather procedures maintained the readiness of essential systems;

(2) walked down portions of the two systems listed below to ensure that adverse weather protection features were sufficient to support operability, including the ability to perform safe shutdown functions;

(3) evaluated operator staffing levels to ensure PG&E could maintain the readiness of essential systems required by plant procedures;

(4) reviewed the communications protocols between PG&E and the transmission operator; and

(5) reviewed the corrective action program (CAP) to determine if PG&E identified and corrected problems related to adverse weather conditions.* July 11, 2007: Units 1 and 2, 480V Vital switchgear rooms, inverter/chargerroom and cable spreading room*September 4, 2007: Units 1 and 2, Ultimate heat sink and intake structure Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.

The inspectors completed two samples (site-specific and hot weather).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

-5-1R02Evaluation of Changes, Tests, or Experiments (71111.02)

a. Inspection Scope

Between September 10 through September 14, 2007, the inspectors reviewed theeffectiveness of PG&E's implementation of changes to the facility structures, systems, and components; risk significant normal and emergency operating procedures; test programs; and the FSAR Update in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, "Changes, Tests, and Experiments." The inspectors reviewed 7 samples of 10 CFR Part 50.59 safety evaluations. Theevaluations were reviewed to verify that licensee personnel had appropriately considered the conditions under which the licensee may make changes to the facility or procedures, or conduct tests or experiments without prior NRC's approval. In addition, the inspectors reviewed 21 samples of 10 CFR Part 50.59 screens, in which licensee personnel determined that evaluations were not required, to ensure that the exclusion of a full evaluation was consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.59. The inspectors reviewed a sample of recent licensee action requests related to the10 CFR Part 50.59 process to determine whether the licensee had identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at the appropriate threshold. The inspection procedure specifies the inspectors review a minimum sample of5 licensee safety evaluations and a combination of 10 applicability determinations or screening. The inspectors completed a review of 7 licensee safety evaluations and 21 screens/applicability determinations.Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignments (71111.04)

.1 Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors:

(1) walked down portions of the below listed risk important systems andreviewed plant procedures and documents to verify that critical portions of the selected systems were correctly aligned; and

(2) compared deficiencies identified during the walk down to the FSAR Update and CAP to ensure problems were being identified and

corrected. *July 18, 2007: Unit 1, Seismic trip system*July 23, 2007: Unit 2, Component cooling water (CCW) system

• August 14, 2007: Unit 1 Control room ventilation system

-6-Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.The inspectors completed three samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Complete System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors:

(1) reviewed plant procedures, drawings, the FSAR Update, TSs, andvendor manuals to determine the correct alignment of the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system;

(2) reviewed outstanding design issues, operator workarounds, and FSAR Update documents to determine if open issues affected the functionality of the AFW system; and

(3) verified that PG&E was identifying and resolving equipment alignment problems. Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.

The inspectors completed one sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)Quarterly Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors walked down the below listed plant areas to assess the materialcondition of active and passive fire protection features and their operational lineup and readiness. The inspectors:

(1) verified that transient combustibles and hot work activities were controlled in accordance with plant procedures;

(2) observed the condition of fire detection devices to verify that they remained functional;

(3) observed fire suppression systems to verify that they remained functional and that access to manual actuators was unobstructed;

(4) verified that fire extinguishers and hose stations were provided at their designated locations and that they were in a satisfactory condition;

(5) verified that passive fire protection features (electrical raceway barriers, fire doors, fire dampers, steel fire proofing, penetration seals, and oil collection systems)were in a satisfactory material condition;

(6) verified that adequate compensatory measures were established for degraded or inoperable fire protection features and that the compensatory measures were commensurate with the significance of the deficiency;

-7-and

(7) reviewed the FSAR Update to determine if PG&E identified and corrected fireprotection problems.

• August 2, 2007: Fire Area TB-4, Unit 1, 4 kV F Bus switchgear room andassociated cable spreading room

• August 2, 2007: Fire Area TB-5, Unit 1, 4 kV G Bus switchgear room andassociated cable spreading room

• August 2, 2007: Fire Area TB-6, Unit 1, 4 kV H Bus switchgear room andassociated cable spreading room

• August 3, 2007: Fire Area TB-10, Unit 2, 4 kV F Bus switchgear room andassociated cable spreading room

• August 3, 2007: Fire Area TB-11, Unit 2, 4 kV G Bus switchgear room andassociated cable spreading room

• August 3, 2007: Fire Area TB-12, Unit 2, 4 kV H Bus switchgear room andassociated cable spreading room

• August 14, 2007: Fire Area CR-1, Units 1 and 2 Control room and associatedventilation rooms

• September 23, 2007: Fire Area AB-1, Zone 3N, Unit 2 Safety injection pumproomsDocuments reviewed by the inspectors included:

• Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 and 2 FSAR Update, Appendix 9.5A, FireHazards Analysis, Revision 17 *Diablo Canyon Power Plant Fire Protection Pre-Plan, dated May 14, 2003 The inspectors completed eight samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)

.1 Semi-Annual Internal Flooding

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors:

(1) reviewed the FSAR Update, the flooding analysis, and plantprocedures to assess susceptibilities involving internal flooding;

(2) reviewed the FSAR

-8-Update and CAP to determine if PG&E identified and corrected flooding problems;(3) verified that operator actions for coping with flooding can reasonably achieve the desired outcomes; and

(4) walked down the one below listed area to verify the adequacy of:

(a) equipment seals located below the floodline,

(b) floor and wall penetration seals,

(c) watertight door seals,

(d) common drain lines and sumps,

(e) sump pumps, level alarms, and control circuits, and

(f) temporary or removable flood barriers.*August 7, 2007: Units 1 and 2, Turbine buildings, elevation 85' Documents reviewed by the inspectors included:

• PG&E, Probabilistic Risk Assessment Calculation File No. F.4 , PRA InternalFloods Analysis, Revision 1 *Component History/Work Order Closure Remarks, LS-16A, datedAugust 6, 2007The inspectors completed one internal flooding sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Annual External Flooding

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors:

(1) reviewed the FSAR Update, the flooding analysis, and plantprocedures to assess susceptibilities involving external flooding;

(2) reviewed the FSAR Update and CAP to determine if PG&E identified and corrected flooding problems;

(3) inspected underground bunkers to verify the adequacy of:

(a) sump pumps,

(b) level alarm circuits,

(c) cable splices subject to submergence, and

(d) drainage for bunkers/manholes;

(4) verified that operator actions for coping with flooding can reasonably achieve the desired outcomes; and

(5) walked down the one below listed area to verify the adequacy of:

(a) equipment seals located below the floodline,

(b) floor and wall penetration seals,

(c) watertight door seals,

(d) common drain lines and sumps,

(e) sump pumps, level alarms, and control circuits, and

(f) temporary or removable flood barriers.*August 13, 2007: Units 1 and 2 Intake structure and auxiliary saltwater pumpvaults Documents reviewed by the inspectors included PG&E, Probabilistic Risk AssessmentCalculation File No. F.4 , PRA Internal Floods Analysis, Revision 1 The inspectors completed one external flooding sample.

b. Findings

-9-No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11)

a. Inspection Scope

On September 20, 2007, the inspectors observed a licensed operator evaluation toidentify deficiencies and discrepancies in the training to assess operator performance, and to assess the evaluator's critique. Documents reviewed by the inspectors included Lesson ECA3132-A, "SGTR WithFaulted Steam Generator," Revision 12.The inspectors completed one sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)

.1 Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the below listed maintenance activity to:

(1) verify theappropriate handling of structure, system, and component (SSC) performance or condition problems;

(2) verify the appropriate handling of degraded SSC functional performance;

(3) evaluate the role of work practices and common cause problems; and

(4) evaluate the handling of SSC issues reviewed under the requirements of the Maintenance Rule, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, and the TSs.*August 9, 2007: Unit 1, Failure of Main Turbine Stop Valve FCV-146 Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.

The inspectors completed one sample.

b. Findings

Introduction.

The inspectors identified a self-revealing finding after an adequate mainturbine repair procedure resulted in an unplanned power reduction and forced outage of Unit 1.Description. PG&E failed to develop an adequate main turbine maintenance procedureresulting in an unplanned load reduction and a reactor shutdown. On August 9, 2007, plant operators observed that the Unit 1 generator output had decreased by 60MW. On August 11, PG&E shut down the reactor to investigate the cause of the load reduction.

-10-The licensee determined that the load reduction resulted from inlet steam blockage afterthe disc on Turbine Stop Valve FCV-146 uncoupling from the stem. The disc uncoupled because the stem nut assembly failed. The stem nut failed due to the flow induced vibration caused by the failure of the stop valve to properly back-seat during power operations. The stop valve did not properly back-seat because the maintenance personnel failed to properly adjust the external travel stop during the turbine maintenance performed during the June 2004 refueling outage. The inspectors concluded that the travel stop was not properly adjusted because Procedure MP M-4.20, "HP Turbine Stop Valve Maintenance," Revision 12, did not require maintenance personnel to first verify that the disc was properly back seated against the internal stop during adjustment. Procedure ADI.ID1, "Nuclear Generation Procedures," required thatprocedures be written to clearly state any special limits, tolerances and other requirements in the design and licensing bases, vendor manuals and other documents.

Analysis.

The failure of PG&E to develop an adequate procedure for the main turbinestop valve maintenance was a performance deficiency. The inspectors concluded that the finding is greater than minor because less than adequate turbine maintenance procedure, if left uncorrected, would become a more significant safety concern. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process,@ Phase 1Worksheet, the inspectors determined the finding to have very low safety significancebecause the condition did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, associated with the resourcescomponent because PG&E failed to provide an adequate main turbine maintenance procedure (H.2.c).Enforcement. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective program as Non-Conformance Report N0002219. No violation of NRC requirements occurred because the turbine maintenance procedure, Procedure MP M-4.20, was neither Technical Specifications (TS) or quality related (FIN 05000275/2007004-01, Inadequate main turbine repair procedure resulted in an unplanned power reduction and forced outage).

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

.1 Risk Assessments and Management of Risk

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the removal of the 230 kV transmission line whileTransformer 2-1 was out of service on July 24, 2007. The inspectors conducted the review to verify:

(1) performance of risk assessments when required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and licensee procedures prior to changes in plant configuration for maintenance activities and plant operations;

(2) the accuracy, adequacy, and completeness of the information considered in the risk assessment;

(3) that PG&E recognizes, and/or enters as applicable, the appropriate risk category according to the risk assessment results and licensee procedures; and

(4) PG&E identified and corrected problems related to maintenance risk assessments.

-11-Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.

The inspectors completed one sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Emergent Work

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors:

(1) verified that PG&E performed actions to minimize the probability ofinitiating events and maintained the functional capability of mitigating systems and barrier integrity systems;

(2) verified that emergent work related activities such as troubleshooting, work planning/scheduling, establishing plant conditions, aligning equipment, tagging, temporary modifications, and equipment restoration did not place the plant in an unacceptable configuration; and

(3) reviewed the FSAR Update to determine if PG&E identified and corrected risk assessment and emergent work control problems.*August 14, 2007: Unit 2, Control Room Ventilation Condenser CR-37 motorreplacement with inoperable Condenser CR-38Documents reviewed by the inspectors included Procedure AD7.DC6, "On-lineMaintenance Risk Management," Revision 9.The inspectors completed one sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors:

(1) reviewed plant status documents such as operator shift logs,emergent work documentation, deferred modifications, and standing orders to determine if an operability evaluation was warranted for degraded components;

(2) referred to the FSAR Update and design bases documents to review the technical adequacy of the operability evaluations;

(3) evaluated compensatory measures associated with operability evaluations;

(4) determined degraded component impact on any TS;

(5) used the Significance Determination Process to evaluate the risk significance of degraded or inoperable equipment; and

(6) verified that PG&E has identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions associated with degraded components.

-12-*August 28, 2007: Degraded Startup Power*September 12, 2007: Units 1 and 2, Degraded residual heat removal andcontainment spray motor operated valves*September 19, 2007: Unit 1, Degraded Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-2 Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.

The inspectors completed three samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17)

a. Inspection Scope

From September 10-14, 2007, the inspectors reviewed seven permanent plantmodification packages and associated documentation, such as implementation reviews, safety evaluation applicability determinations, and screening, to verify that they were performed in accordance with regulatory requirements and plant procedures. The inspectors also reviewed the procedures governing plant modifications to evaluate the effectiveness of the program for implementing modifications to risk significant SSCs, such that these changes did not adversely affect the design and licensing basis of the facility. Further, the inspectors interviewed the cognizant design and system engineers for theidentified modifications as to their understanding of the modification packages and process. The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective action process toidentify and correct problems concerning the performance of permanent plant modifications by reviewing a sample of related condition reports.The inspection procedure specifies that the inspector should review a minimum of fivesample permanent plant modifications. The inspectors completed seven samples.

Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

-13-1R19Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected the three below listed postmaintenance test activities of risksignificant systems or components. For each item, the inspectors:

(1) reviewed the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents to determine the safety functions;

(2) evaluate the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenance activity; and

(3) reviewed the test procedure to ensure it adequately tested the safety function that may have been affected. The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed the test data to verify that acceptance criteria were met, plant impacts were evaluated, test equipment was calibrated, procedures were followed, jumpers were properly controlled, the test data results were complete and accurate, the test equipment was removed, the system was properly realigned, and deficiencies during testing were documented. The inspectors also reviewed the FSAR Update to determine if PG&E identified and corrected problems related to post-maintenance testing.*July 12, 2007: Unit 2, Preventive maintenance on Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge Level Control Valves LCV-113 and LCV-115*August 30, 2007: Unit 1, Replacement of Component Cooling Water Pump 1-2motor*September 21, 2007: Unit 2, Corrective maintenance of Reactor Vessel CavitySump Level Detector LT-62Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.

The inspectors completed three samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the plan for the Unit 1 shutdown and repair of the damagedTurbine Stop Valve 1-FCV-146 to verify that PG&E appropriately considered risk, industry experience and previous site specific problems. The inspection was focused on potential deficiencies with plant shutdown and startup, availability of required electrical sources, and maintenance and repair activities. The inspectors completed one forced outage sample.

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b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the FSAR Update, procedure requirements, and TSs to ensurethat the below listed surveillance activities demonstrated that the SSCs tested were capable of performing their intended safety functions. The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed the test data to verify that the following significant surveillance test attributes were adequate:

(1) preconditioning;

(2) evaluation of testing impact on the plant;

(3) acceptance criteria;

(4) test equipment;

(5) procedures;

(6) jumpers;

(7) test data;

(8) testing frequency and method demonstrated TS operability;

(9) test equipment removal;

(10) restoration of plant systems;

(11) fulfillment of American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code requirements;

(12) updating of performance indicator data;

(13) engineering evaluations, root causes, and bases for returning tested SSCs not meeting the test acceptance criteria were correct;

(14) reference setting data; and

(15) annunciators and alarm setpoints. The inspectors also verified that PG&E identified and implemented any needed corrective actions associated with the surveillance testing.*July 6, 2007: Unit 2, Inservice testing of Auxiliary Saltwater Pump 2-2*September 5, 2007: Unit 1, Secondary side calorimetric

• September 23, 2007: Unit 1, Diesel generator 1-1, 2- hour surveillance

• September 22, 2007: Unit 2, Reactor coolant system leak rate testDocuments reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.

The inspectors completed two routine, one reactor coolant system leakage, and onepump inservice test samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.1EP2Alert Notification System Testing (71114.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors discussed with PG&E staff the status of offsite siren and tone alert radiosystems to determine the adequacy of the methods for testing the alert and notification system in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E. PG&E's alert and notification system testing program was compared with the criteria in NUREG-0654, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Report REP-10, "Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and

-15-Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants," and PG&E's current FEMA approvedalert and notification system design report. The inspectors also reviewed the following procedures:*EP MT-35, "Site Emergency Signal Audibility Test," Revision 3A*EP MT-43, "Early Warning System Testing and Maintenance," Revision 8

• EWS Maintenance-Test-Operations Guidance, Revision 6The inspectors completed one sample during the inspection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.1EP3Emergency Response Organization Augmentation (71114.03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors discussed with PG&E staff the status of primary and backup systems foraugmenting the on-shift emergency response staff to determine the adequacy of the methods for staffing emergency response facilities. The inspectors reviewed the following documents related to the emergency response organization augmentation system to evaluate PG&E's ability to staff the emergency response facilities in accordance with the licensee emergency plan and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E:*Evaluation Report for the 2006 Recall Drill*2007 ERO On-Call Schedule

• EP-G-3, "Interim Emergency Response Organization," Revision 31

• OM 0.DC2, "Emergency Response Organization On Call," Revision 4The inspectors completed one sample during the inspection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.1EP5Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies (71114.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PG&E's CAP requirements in procedures OM7.ID1, "ProblemIdentification and Resolution, Action Requests," Revision 23, and OM7.ID4, "Root Cause Analysis and Apparent Cause Evaluations," Revision 9. The inspectors reviewed summaries of 448 action requests identified by or assigned to the emergency preparedness department between November 2005 and June 2007, and selected 29 for detailed review against the program requirements. The inspectors evaluated the response to the corrective action requests to determine that PG&E's ability to identify,

-16-evaluate, and correct problems are in accordance with the licensee programrequirements and 10 CFR Part 50.47(b)(14) and 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E. The inspectors also reviewed other documents listed in the attachment to this report.The inspectors completed one sample during the inspection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.1EP6Force-On-Force (FOF) Exercise Evaluation (71114.07)

a. Inspection Scope

For the exercise below, the inspectors:

(1) observed the evolution to identify anyweaknesses and deficiencies in classification, notification, and the protective action requirements development activities, and

(2) reviewed the identified weaknesses and deficiencies against licensee-identified findings to determine whether PG&E is properly identifying deficiencies.*August 8, 2007, Force-on-Force Drill, Day 2 The inspectors completed one sample during the inspection.

Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.4.

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee evaluations for the three emergency preparednesscornerstone performance indicators of Drill and Exercise Performance, Emergency Response Organization Participation, and Alert and Notification System Reliability, for the period from October 1, 2006, through June 30, 2007. The definitions and guidance of NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline," Revisions 2 through 4, and PG&E Procedure, AWP-EP-001, "Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators,"

Revision 8, were used to verify the accuracy of the licensee's evaluations for each performance indicator reported during the assessment period.

-17-The inspectors reviewed a 100 percent sample of drill and exercise scenarios andlicensed operator simulator training sessions, notification forms, and attendance and critique records associated with training sessions, drills, and exercises conducted during the verification period. The inspectors reviewed 13 selected emergency responder qualification, training, and drill participation records. The inspectors reviewed alert and notification system testing procedures, maintenance records, and a 100 percent sample of siren test records. The inspectors also reviewed other documents listed in the attachment to this report.The inspectors completed one sample during the inspection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

.1 Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the corrective actionprogram. This assessment was accomplished by reviewing action requests and event trend reports, and attending daily operational meetings. The inspectors:

(1) verified that equipment, human performance, and program issues were being identified by PG&E at an appropriate threshold and that the issues were entered into the corrective action program;

(2) verified that corrective actions were commensurate with the significance of the issue; and

(3) identified conditions that might warrant additional follow-up through other baseline inspection procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Selected Issue Follow-Up Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

In addition to the daily screening, the inspectors conduct an in-depth review of ActionRequest A070680, September 10, 2007, related to a fuel handling error.

The inspectors considered the following during the review of PG&E's actions:

(1) complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner;

(2) evaluation and disposition of operability/reportability issues;

(3) consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences;

(4) classification and prioritization of the resolution of the problem;

(5) identification of root and contributing causes of the problem;

(6) identification of corrective actions; and

(7) completion of corrective actions in a timely manner.

-18-Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.The inspectors completed one in-depth review sample.

b. Findings

The inspectors reviewed a licensee-identified Green noncited violation of TS 5.4.1.a,Procedures. A discussion of this non compliance is provided in Section

4OA7 of this

report.

.3 Annual Sample Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected three root cause analyses and 39 action requests for detailedreview. The reports were reviewed to ensure that the full extent of the issues were identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the action requests against the requirements of licensee Procedures OM7.ID1, "Problem Identification and Resolution, Action Requests," Revision 23, and OM7.ID4, "Root Cause Analysis and Apparent Cause Evaluations," Revision 9.The inspectors completed one in-depth annual trend review sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.4OA5Other

.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item 05000275; 05000323/2006005-01:

Additional review ofmaterial to determine if the residual heat removal heat exchangers will meet their safety function.The inspectors had questioned whether PG&E had implemented adequate designcontrol measures to demonstrate that the residual heat removal heat exchangers could perform their design safety function. The inspectors questioned whether the heat exchangers required testing to validate the design calculations and found out that PG&E did not perform the flow verification for each cooler under the Surveillance Test Program. PG&E adjusted the flow through the containment fan cooler units and validated the flow rated for the remaining heat exchangers and coolers by analysis.During the in-office review, the inspectors determined that PG&E:

(1) had establishedan appropriate method to ensure that the required heat loads supplied by CCW would receive their design basis flow and

(2) had provided information that the residual heat removal heat exchangers could perform their design basis heat removal function. The inspectors verified that both the reactor coolant system and the closed-loop CCW system had good chemistry controls and had not been contaminated. Consequently,

-19-the inspectors concluded that no additional testing would be required, as described inthe Generic Letter 89-13, Supplement 1, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment."During discussions with design engineering, PG&E agreed that the description in theFSAR Update did not clearly or accurately describe the system operation and response.

PG&E initiated an AR A0704443 to document this deficiency and indicated that they would clarify the description. Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.

This unresolved item is closed.40A6Meetings, Including ExitExit Meeting SummaryOn July 12, 2007, the inspectors presented the inspection results on emergencypreparedness to Mr. J. Becker, Vice President and Station Director, Diablo Canyon Operations, and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings. On July 25, 2007, the inspector conducted a telephonic meeting with Mr. C. Dougherty,Senior Engineer, Regulatory Services, to discuss the final characterization of one inspection issue on emergency preparedness.On September 14, 2007, the inspectors presented the results on Inspection Procedure71111.02, "Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments," and Inspection Procedure 71111.17, "Permanent Plant Modifications," to Ms. D. Jacobs, Vice President, Nuclear Services, and other members of licensee management. The licensee's management acknowledged the issues and observations presented. On September 18, 2007, the inspectors discussed the results of their additional reviewof the material to determine if the residual heat removal heat exchangers would have met their safety function with Mr. S. Hamilton, Supervisor Regulatory Services. The inspectors returned all proprietary information to PG&E. On October 3, 2007, the resident inspection results were presented to Mr. JohnConway, Site Vice President and other members of PG&E management. PG&E acknowledged the findings presented.In each case, the inspectors asked PG&E whether any materials examined during theinspection should be considered proprietary. Proprietary information was reviewed by the inspectors and left with PG&E at the end of the inspection.

-20-4OA7Licensee-Identified ViolationsOne very low safety significance (Green) violation of NRC requirements was identifiedby PG&E. This violation met the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a noncited violation.

• The inspectors reviewed one noncited violation of Technical SpecificationProcedure 5.4.1.a, after PG&E failed to adequately implement a fuel handling procedure. On September 10, 2007, operations personnel began moving the Unit 2 fuel handling bridge while a spent fuel assembly was still attached and partially inserted into the fuel rack. A second operator identified that the fuel assembly was still latched and alerted the bridge operator to stop the bridge prior to damaging the affected fuel assembly. Operating Procedure, "OP B-8H, Spent Fuel Pool Work Instructions," Section 6.2, required the operator to use the load cell to verify that the fuel assemble is disengaged prior to moving the bridge.

Contrary to the above, the operator failed to use the load cell and to verify that the fuel assemble was disengaged prior to moving the bridge.

Pacific Gas and Electric determined that plant operations had not established a qualification process or standard for fuel handlers. None of the operations personnel involved, including the fuel handling senior reactor operator, had previously performed fuel handling activities. Contributing to the event was poor communications between the operators and that the supervisor was physically involved in latching the fuel assembly rather than overseeing the work. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because there was no damage to the fuel assembly. This event was documented in PG&E

=s corrective action program as AR A0706980.ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

PG&E personnel

J. Becker, Vice President - Diablo Canyon Operations and Station Director

J. Che, Transient and Accident Analysis Engineer

S. Hamilton, Supervisor, Regulatory Services

R. Hite, Manager, Radiation Protection

D. Jacobs, Vice President - Nuclear Services

S. Ketelsen, Manager, Regulatory Services

K. Langdon, Director, Operations Services

R. Lovell, Senior Nuclear Engineer

M. Meko, Director, Site Services

K. Peters, Director, Engineering Services

J. Purkis, Director, Maintenance Services

P. Roller, Director, Performance Improvement

D. Taggart, Manager, Quality Verification

R. Waltos, Manager, Emergency Preparedness

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and

Closed

05000275/FIN-2007004-01FINInadequate main turbine repair procedure resulted in anunplanned power reduction and forced outage

(Section 1R12)

Closed

05000275/FIN-2007004-01FINInadequate main turbine repair procedure resulted in anunplanned power reduction and forced outage

(Section 1R12)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather (71111.01)Action RequestsA0630103A0637539A0696383A0702280A0694274A0706593A0706432A0706465A0701118A0705543DrawingsNumberTitleRevision102023480 Switchgear Room Ventilation System Supply &Exhaust, Sheet 13A

1ProceduresNumberTitleRevisionAR PK15-05Ambient Air Temperature16AR PK15-09Electrical Rooms Temp Monitor27

AR PK15-10ESF Rooms Temp Monitor16

OP H-10:1Auxiliary Building Switchgear Ventilation - System28

CP M019Temporary Ventilation for the Control Room,Inverter/Charger Rooms and 480V Vital Switchgear RoomsOP J-2:VIIIGuidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for DCPP13

B-1Communications with Generation and TransmissionOrganizations

13OP O-28Intake Management9Other Documents

TitleDate/Revision

FSAR Section 9.4.8

Section 1R02: Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments(71111.02)ScreensNumberTitleDateS-2006-047 Evaluation of Molded Case Circuit Breakers for 460

VACClass 1E Motors08-31-06

AttachmentS-2006-060 Evaluation of Thermal Overload Relay Settings for460VAC Class 1E motors12-29-06S-2006-043 Pressurizer heater cable insulation constituent quantities11-29-06S-2005-070Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air System7-07-05S-2006-004PG&E Transmission Organization Special ProtectionScheme3-31-06S-2006-009CALC 235T-DC Class 1E Battery Capability DuringDischarge10-24-06S-2006-024 Class 1E Non-motor Protection Device Setting Calculation8-3-26S-2006-025Supplemental LBIE Screen per Action Request A06778499-26-06S-2006-031 CALC 235T-DC Class 1E Battery Capability DuringDischarge10-24-06S-2006-033 Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage9-21-06S-2006-034Calculation of Unit 2 Containment Aluminum/Zinc after

2R129-21-06S-2006-044 Evaluation of Molded Case Circuit Breakers for 460VACClass 1E Motors12-19-06S-2006-045Thermal Overload Settings for Class 1E Motors11-17-06

S-2006-046Evaluation of Thermal Overload Relay Settings for 460VAC Class 1E Motors8-31-06S-2006-053FCV-355 Spurious Closure12-21-06S-2006-057Thermal Overload Settings for Class 1E Motors11-17-06

S-2006-058 Backup Air/Nitrogen Supply Component Changes to AOV's12-20-06S-2006-061Evaluation of Molded Case Circuit Breakers for 460VACClass 1E Motors12-19-06S-2007-010 Evaluation of Thermal Overload Relay Settings for 460VAC Class 1E Motors12-27-06S-2007-011Thermal Overload Settings for Class 1E 460V MOV Motors12-27-06S-2007-023FP-2-499:

Replace Valve Using Freeze Seal3-13-0750.59 EvaluationNumberTitleDate2005-008Replace Digital Feedwater Control System (DFWCS)10-12-052006-010Replace Digital Feedwater Control System (DFWCS)7-13-06

2007-003Replace the PDP with a new Centrifugal Charging Pump3-2-2007

2006-014Positive Displacement Pump12-21-06

Attachment2005-009Upflow Conversion and Upper Head TemperatureReduction10-7-052006-001Replacing E-Bar with DEX as a RCS indicator forEmergency Action Levels12-19-052006-004PG&E Transmission Organization Special ProtectionScheme3-31-06CalculationsNumberTitleDate195A-DCThermal Overloads for Class 1E Motors4235T-DCClass 1E,Battery Capability Calculation During Discharge0M-786EDG Fuel Oil Storage15M-1098Pressurizer heater cable insulation constituent quantitiesfor post-LOCA RHR sump screen debris generation analyses 0J-002Review of Backup Air/Nitrogen11DrawingsNumberTitleDate106714, Sheet 2Component Cooling Water System56106714, Sheet 7Misc. CCW Header "C" Components53

106714, Sheet 8Misc. CCW Header "C" Components55Action RequestsA0707165A0707166A0707178A0707328A0632073A0668408ProceduresNumberTitleRevisionDCM S-25BBackup Air/Nitrogen Supply System11TS3-ID2License Basis Impact Evaluations21A

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment (71111.04)Action RequestsA0623895A0658946A0659035A0663591A0665413A0667567A0670012A0670015A0671864A0678838A0684968A0687113

AttachmentA0621626A0671529A0680078A0689732A0689659A0683442DrawingsNumber TitleRevision102018Unit 1 Fire Protection Systems, Sheet 385102033Fire Water Storage Tank Instrumentation, Sheet 25A87

106703Unit 1 Feedwater, Sheet 3 71

107703Unit 2 Feedwater, Sheet 350

108630Drag Valve 2-900 lb

ANSI-SOC. Weld Tags

LCV-106,LCV-107,

LCV-108, LCV-109

GProceduresNumber TitleRevisionOP H-5:IIControl Room Ventilation System - Alignment Verification16EOP E-0Reactor Trip or Safety Injection31

EOP E-2Faulted Steam Generator Isolation16

CP M-4Earthquake23

OP F-2:IComponent Cooling Water System - Make Available18Other Documents

TitleDate/RevisionAFW System Health ReportFebruary 2007DCM S-3B, Auxiliary Feedwater System15A

System Training Guide I-3: Seismic Monitoring System11

AttachmentSection 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)Action RequestsA0261855A0261857A0704871A0704958A0704996A0705260

A0705334ProceduresNumber TitleRevisionMP M-4.20HP Turbine Stop Valve Maintenance15MP M-4.20HP Turbine Stop Valve Maintenance16Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)Action Requests

A0641560ProceduresNumber TitleRevisionOP J-2:VIIIGuidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for DCPP12OP J-2:IIIStarup Bank - Shutdown and Clearing20Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations (71111.15)Action RequestsA0703244A0703815A0707262A0707263A0707264A0707265A0707266A0707267A0707268A0707269A0707270A0707271

A0707272A0707273A0707274A0707275A0707276A0707278

A0707279A0707280A0705844A0706684ProceduresNumber TitleRevisionOP J-2:VIIIGuidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for DCPP13

Number TitleRevision

A-7

AttachmentOM7.ID12Operability Determination10DrawingsNumber TitleRevision437543Unit 1 480V System Bus Section H46437542Unit 1 480V System Bus Section 1G48

437916Unit 1 480V System Bus Section 1F45Other Documents

TitleDate/RevisionQuality Verification Short Form Assessment #0726200109/19/2007Herguth Laboratories, Inc. Report: 1-03-M-PP-AFWP2 Pump O.B. Brng.9/20/2007

Section 1R17:

Permanent Plant Modifications(71111.17)Design Change PackagesNumberTitleRevision/DateM-49704Replacement of the Positive Displacement Pump1N-50449Reactor Vessel Internal Configuration Change02-SJ-050731Design Change Summary/Digital Feedwater ControlSystem (DFWCS) Replacement

0E-049490Design Change Summary/Existing starter, overload relay,and overload auxiliary relay (FCV-95)

1E-49872Design Change Summary/Polar Crane Gantry DriveUpgrade 0M-50807Replace Diesel Engine Generator Lube Oil Heater &Controller2/16/07(Not available)Diablo Canyon Special Protection Scheme Modification3/14/06AuditsNumberTitleDateDA 2007-07NUPIC - Morris Material Handling3-19-07

Attachment

071220010Third-Party Supplier Quality Assurance ProgramQualification (Morris Material Handling)4-30-07 060130017Third-Party Supplier Quality Assurance ProgramQualification (Morris Material Handling)1-13-06ProceduresNumberTitleRevisionAD9.ID6Evaluation, Selection, and Control of Suppliers of Items, andServices 4CF3.ID9Design Change Development30CF4.ID3Modification Implementation20

CF4.ID4Field Change Process12MiscellaneousNumberTitleRevisionDCL-06-07910CFR 50.46 Emergency Core Cooling System EvaluationModel Changes6-20-06DCL-06-006License Amendment Request 06-02, Revision to TechnicalSpecification 5.6.5, "Core Operating Limits Report (COLR)"1-13-06DCL-06-08810

CFR 50.46 Annual Report for 2005 of Emergency CoreCooling System Evaluation Model Changes7-24-06DCL-07-07110

CFR 50.46 Annual Report of Emergency Core CoolingSystem Evaluation Model Changes for 20067-23-07

Section 1R19: Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)Action RequestsA0706246A0706247A0706248A0706287ProceduresNumber TitleRevisionSTP

V-3P6BExercising Valves

LCV-115 and 113 Auxiliary FeedwaterPump Discharge

16STP P-AFW-23Routine Surveillance Test of Motor-Driven AuxiliaryFeedwater Pump 2-3

16STP P-CCW-APerformance Test of Component Cooling Water Pumps7

AttachmentOther Documents

TitleDate/RevisionHydromotor Testing Data Sheet

FW-2-LCV-1132/22/2005Recurring Task Activity R02999617/11/2007Recurring Task Activity R03004317/11/2007

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing (71111.22)Action RequestsA0688735A0690766A0692120A0696601A0706635ProceduresNumber TitleRevisionSTP

P-ASW-22Routine Surveillance Test of Auxiliary Saltwater Pump 2-220STP R-2B1PPC Operator Heat Balance22

STP-I-1BRoutine daily Checks Required by License83

STP-M-9ADiesel Engine Routine Surveillance Test74

STP-M-9GDiesel Generator 24 Hour Load Test and Hot RestartTest 41PEP M-98ASetting Final Feedwater Flow Nozzles by "AMAG"Crossflow 17

Section 1EP5: Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies(71114.05)2006

DCPP Emergency Preparedness Program 50.54(t) Review2007 Emergency Plan 50.54(t) Assessment, March 13, 2007

EP Event Summary Report for

NUE-23 Declared 12/12/06

AttachmentProceduresNumberTitleRevisionAWP

EP-00410CFR50.54(q) Guidance1OM7.ID3Root Cause Investigations, Root Cause Team16A

OM10.ID1Maintaining Emergency Preparedness5 & 6

OM10.ID2Emergency Plan Revision and Review9

TS3.ID2Licensing Basis Impact Evaluations21AAction RequestsA0651382A0653733A0656053A0657702A0658306A0660254A0660371A0661069A0661309A0661432A0661944A0662502

A0663900A0665069A0666116A0666813A0670468A0672086

A0672770A0672772A0673332A0673461A0674368A0675270

A0675287A0677537A0679241A0680984A0680471A0681088

A0683602A0684019A0685037A0685039A0688337A0695123

A0702982A0702984A0702985Root Cause AnalysesNCR N0002200 NCR N0002215 NCR N0002199Drill Schedules2005, 2006, 2007Drill Evaluation ReportsFEMA Evaluation Report, Medical Services Drill conducted May 19, 2005Training and Qualification Tabletop Drill, conducted March 7, 2007

Integrated Consequences Drill, conducted July 13, 2005

Team C Drill, conducted September 14, 2005

Team C Remedial Drill, conducted September 23, 2005

Medical Drill, conducted June 23, 2006

Alpha/Bravo Team Full Scope Drill, conducted June 1, 2006

ERO Drill, conducted Aug 9, 2006

Team C Drill, conducted September 7, 2006

AttachmentEmergency Planning Health Reports4Q2006 1Q2007 2Q2007Quick Hit Self Assessment for EP Drill and Exercise Performance Indicator, January 2006Emergency Preparedness 10

CFR 50.54(t) Guidelines, Guidance 7, Interface with OffsiteAgenciesOffsite Emergency Worker Training Summary for Diablo Canyon Nuclear PowerPlant, January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2006Emergency Planning Coordinator Qualification Guide, Revision 5

Emergency Planning Supervisor Qualification Guide, Revision 0

EP Coordinator Qualification Process (2007 DCPP Business Plan)

Section 1EP6: Force-On-Force (FOF) Exercise Evaluation (71114.07)ProceduresNumber TitleRevisionCP

M-15ASite Specific Security Threat - Initial Response4CP M-15BSubsequent Actions for a Site Specific Security Threat2

CP M-15CHomeland Security Advisory Non-Plant Specific Threat0

SP 618Implementation of Two-Person Rule - Vital Areas4

EP G-1Emergency Classification and Emergency Plan Activation35

EP G-3Emergency Notification of Off-Site Agencies47Other Documents

TitleDate/RevisionCompleted DCPP Emergency Notification Form(EP G-3 Attachment 6.2)9/14/2004

Attachment

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151)ProceduresNumber TitleRevisionOM10.DC4Emergency Classifications and Notifications0XI1.DC1Collection and Submittal of

NRC Performance Indicators7

EP-G-2Interim Emergency Response Organization31

EP-G-3Emergency Notification of Offsite Agencies47Procedure

III.02A, "Watch Commander," Checklist 1, "Notification of an Emergency Condition,"San Luis Obispo County NPPERP, August 2006Miscellaneous DocumentsDiablo Canyon Emergency Plan, Revision 4-06Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)Action RequestA0652368A0675020A0678937A0690981A0697113A0701368

A0706980ProceduresNumber TitleRevisionTS6.ID2Control and Accountability of Special Nuclear Material 16OP B-8HSpent Fuel Pool Work Instructions21

OP B-8HSpent Fuel Pool Work Instructions22

OP B-8DS2Core Loading35

OP B-8DS2Core Loading36

AttachmentMiscellaneousTitleDate/RevisionNonconformance Report N0002202 "Fuel Assembly Improperly LoadingDuring 1C14 Core Reload"05/29/2007Nonconformance Report N0002193 "Adverse Trend/Errors that AffectReactivity/Fuel01/25/2007Other Documents2007 Operations Technical Specifications Audit, July 10 - August 8, 2007

Section 4OA5: Other Activities (71111.07B (OA))ProceduresNumber TitleRevisionSTP

V-13ACCW Flow Balancing15CalculationsNumberTitleRevision/Date M-1017Component Cooling Water System3PGE-96-590Diablo Canyon Uprating Program RHR CooldownPerformanceJuly 18, 1996(proprietary) Other DocumentsTitleRevision/DateRegulatory Guide 1.68, "Initial Test Programs For Water-Cooled NuclearPower Plants," 1Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems AffectingSafety-Related Equipment," July 18, 1989Generic Letter 89-13, Supplement 1, "Service Water System ProblemsAffecting Safety-Related Equipment," April 4, 1990Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Sections 5.5.6, 6.2.2 and 9.2.2Component Cooling Water System Flow Balance Design Basis White PaperASME

OM-SG-2000, Part 2, "Requirements for Performance Testing ofNuclear Power Plant Closed Cooling Water Systems" Attachment

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADAMSagency document and management systemAFWauxiliary feedwater

ARaction request

CCWcomponent cooling water

CFRCode of Federal RegulationsFSARFinal Safety Analysis Report

IMCInspection Manual Chapter

NRCNuclear Regulatory Commission

PARSPublicly Available Records System

PG&EPacific Gas and Electric Company

TST echnical Specifications