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Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML20029E4501994-05-13013 May 1994 Special Rept:On 940503,radiation Monitor RM-064 Removed from Svc to Support Installation of Mod MR-FC-84-155D.Alternate Method of Monitoring in Place Per TS Table 2-10.Monitor Will Be Returned to Operable Status by 940630 ML20046B1641993-07-29029 July 1993 Special Rept Re Inoperability of post-accident Monitoring Instrumentation Due to Number of Operable Channels Being Less than Min.Preplanned Alternate Method for Monitoring Parameters in Place ML20045B2591993-06-0909 June 1993 Special Rept:On 930430,fire Detector 17-1 Failed & No Spares Available.On 930504,impairment Permit 3221 Initiated to Document Hole in Block Wall.On 930510,block Wall Between Room 19 & Corridor 4 Impaired.Compensatory Measures Taken ML20044G4951993-05-26026 May 1993 Special Rept:On 930416,fire Suppression Water Sys Taken Out of Svc & Inoperable for More than 7 Days to Repair Fire Pump Strainer.On 930426,penetration Seal 19-E-30 Breached to Drain Hx.Fire Watch in Place Until Repairs Made ML20028H8551991-01-28028 January 1991 Special Rept:On 901215,Halon Fire Suppression Sys for Control Room walk-in Cabinets Declared Inoperable.Caused by Integrity Breach of Halon Containment Cabinet When Metal Panel Removed.Panel Reinstalled ML20043G8211990-06-14014 June 1990 Ro:On 900508,31 & 0601,fire Doors,Barriers & Dampers Declared Inoperable for More than 7 Days.Compensatory Measures Will Remain in Place Until Equipment Restored to Operable Status ML20043A4361990-05-16016 May 1990 Special Rept:On 900411,fire Damper FD-88 Declared Inoperable as Fire Barrier.On 900423,fire Door 1007-15 Discovered Inoperable as Fire Barrier.On 900424,fire Door 1007-37 Declared Inoperable to Surveillance Testing ML20006E2661990-02-0909 February 1990 Special Rept:On 900103-26,fire Barriers 57-F-266,57-F-269 & 70-E-1 Inoperable to Allow Addl Cable Installation Specified by Plant Mod.On 900112 & 15,fire Doors 1007-15,1007-16, 1007-39 & 989-5 Inoperable in Order to Install New Doors ML20006A5311990-01-19019 January 1990 Special Rept:On 891213,listed Fire Barrier Seals Discovered in Degraded Condition & Inoperable for More than 7 Days.On 891219,fire Barrier Penetration 20-E-7 Breached & Inoperable for More than 7 Days.Compensatory Measures in Place ML20011D5651989-12-22022 December 1989 Special Rept:On 891116,21 & 23,inoperability of Fire Protection Equipment Occurred.Caused by Broken Anchor Bolts in Door Frame.Compensatory Measures Were Implemented & Door Will Be Repaired by 900202 ML19354D5591989-12-22022 December 1989 Special Rept:Follow Up to 891027 Rept on Inoperability of Fire Barriers.Fire Barrier Penetration Seals 19-E-39 & 19-W-14 Restored on 890027.Fire Door 1013-7 Remains Inoperable ML19325E2601989-10-27027 October 1989 Special Rept:On 890920,26 & 1006,fire Barrier Penetration Seals 19-E-39 & 19-W-14 Breached to Facilitate HX Maint,Mod Involving Fire Barrier Penetration 81-N-23 Inoperable & Fire Door 1013-7 Also Inoperable,Respectively.Causes Stated ML20042A0571982-02-0404 February 1982 Ro:On 820203,radiological Effluent Tech Spec Limit Violated for 3 Minutes When Radioactive Gas Released Through Ventilation Stack.Cause Not Stated.Offsite Survey Showed All Sample Media at Normal Background Levels ML19318A5861980-05-22022 May 1980 Ro:On 800515,during Primary Sys Leakage Insp,Leakage Detected from Reactor Coolant Pump RC-3C.Caused by Corrosion Damage to Closure Studs.Studs W/Significant Corrosion Will Be Replaced & Metallurgical Exams Performed ML20039D5921976-05-11011 May 1976 RO 50-285/76-17:on 760427,primary Air Start Motor for Diesel Generator 2 Failed to Disengage After Generator Was Started.Caused by Improper Air Gap Setting for Electronics Switching Tachometer.Setting Will Be Checked in Future 1994-05-13
[Table view] Category:LER)
MONTHYEARML20029E4501994-05-13013 May 1994 Special Rept:On 940503,radiation Monitor RM-064 Removed from Svc to Support Installation of Mod MR-FC-84-155D.Alternate Method of Monitoring in Place Per TS Table 2-10.Monitor Will Be Returned to Operable Status by 940630 ML20046B1641993-07-29029 July 1993 Special Rept Re Inoperability of post-accident Monitoring Instrumentation Due to Number of Operable Channels Being Less than Min.Preplanned Alternate Method for Monitoring Parameters in Place ML20045B2591993-06-0909 June 1993 Special Rept:On 930430,fire Detector 17-1 Failed & No Spares Available.On 930504,impairment Permit 3221 Initiated to Document Hole in Block Wall.On 930510,block Wall Between Room 19 & Corridor 4 Impaired.Compensatory Measures Taken ML20044G4951993-05-26026 May 1993 Special Rept:On 930416,fire Suppression Water Sys Taken Out of Svc & Inoperable for More than 7 Days to Repair Fire Pump Strainer.On 930426,penetration Seal 19-E-30 Breached to Drain Hx.Fire Watch in Place Until Repairs Made ML20028H8551991-01-28028 January 1991 Special Rept:On 901215,Halon Fire Suppression Sys for Control Room walk-in Cabinets Declared Inoperable.Caused by Integrity Breach of Halon Containment Cabinet When Metal Panel Removed.Panel Reinstalled ML20043G8211990-06-14014 June 1990 Ro:On 900508,31 & 0601,fire Doors,Barriers & Dampers Declared Inoperable for More than 7 Days.Compensatory Measures Will Remain in Place Until Equipment Restored to Operable Status ML20043A4361990-05-16016 May 1990 Special Rept:On 900411,fire Damper FD-88 Declared Inoperable as Fire Barrier.On 900423,fire Door 1007-15 Discovered Inoperable as Fire Barrier.On 900424,fire Door 1007-37 Declared Inoperable to Surveillance Testing ML20006E2661990-02-0909 February 1990 Special Rept:On 900103-26,fire Barriers 57-F-266,57-F-269 & 70-E-1 Inoperable to Allow Addl Cable Installation Specified by Plant Mod.On 900112 & 15,fire Doors 1007-15,1007-16, 1007-39 & 989-5 Inoperable in Order to Install New Doors ML20006A5311990-01-19019 January 1990 Special Rept:On 891213,listed Fire Barrier Seals Discovered in Degraded Condition & Inoperable for More than 7 Days.On 891219,fire Barrier Penetration 20-E-7 Breached & Inoperable for More than 7 Days.Compensatory Measures in Place ML20011D5651989-12-22022 December 1989 Special Rept:On 891116,21 & 23,inoperability of Fire Protection Equipment Occurred.Caused by Broken Anchor Bolts in Door Frame.Compensatory Measures Were Implemented & Door Will Be Repaired by 900202 ML19354D5591989-12-22022 December 1989 Special Rept:Follow Up to 891027 Rept on Inoperability of Fire Barriers.Fire Barrier Penetration Seals 19-E-39 & 19-W-14 Restored on 890027.Fire Door 1013-7 Remains Inoperable ML19325E2601989-10-27027 October 1989 Special Rept:On 890920,26 & 1006,fire Barrier Penetration Seals 19-E-39 & 19-W-14 Breached to Facilitate HX Maint,Mod Involving Fire Barrier Penetration 81-N-23 Inoperable & Fire Door 1013-7 Also Inoperable,Respectively.Causes Stated ML20042A0571982-02-0404 February 1982 Ro:On 820203,radiological Effluent Tech Spec Limit Violated for 3 Minutes When Radioactive Gas Released Through Ventilation Stack.Cause Not Stated.Offsite Survey Showed All Sample Media at Normal Background Levels ML19318A5861980-05-22022 May 1980 Ro:On 800515,during Primary Sys Leakage Insp,Leakage Detected from Reactor Coolant Pump RC-3C.Caused by Corrosion Damage to Closure Studs.Studs W/Significant Corrosion Will Be Replaced & Metallurgical Exams Performed ML20039D5921976-05-11011 May 1976 RO 50-285/76-17:on 760427,primary Air Start Motor for Diesel Generator 2 Failed to Disengage After Generator Was Started.Caused by Improper Air Gap Setting for Electronics Switching Tachometer.Setting Will Be Checked in Future 1994-05-13
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217B5401999-10-0606 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License DPR-40 ML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data LIC-99-0096, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1.With ML20211J9321999-09-0202 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee Proposed Alternatives Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety. Proposed Alternatives Authorized for Remainder of Third ten- Yr ISI Interval for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1 LIC-99-0084, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station.With ML20216E6431999-08-26026 August 1999 Rev 19 to TDB-VI, COLR for FCS Unit 1 ML20210R1961999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1 ML20210G2181999-07-27027 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-40 ML20210D9951999-07-22022 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 191 to License DPR-40 ML20216E6361999-07-21021 July 1999 Rev 18 to TDB-VI, COLR for FCS Unit 1 ML20210R2081999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1 LIC-99-0065, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML20210P5461999-06-0808 June 1999 Rev 0,Vols 1-5 of Fort Calhoun Station 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual, to Be Conducted on 990810. Pages 2-20 & 2-40 in Vol 2 & Page 4-1 in Vol 4 of Incoming Submittal Not Included ML20195B4581999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to CE NPSD-683, Development of RCS Pressure & Temp Limits Rept for Removal of P-T Limits & LTOP Requirements from Ts ML20207H7401999-05-31031 May 1999 Performance Indicators Rept for May 1999 LIC-99-0053, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 11999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1 ML20195B4521999-05-17017 May 1999 Technical Data Book TDB-IX, RCS Pressure - Temp Limits Rept (Ptlr) ML20206L4241999-05-10010 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Corrective Actions to Ensure That Valves Are Capable of Performing Intended Safety Functions & OPPD Adequately Addressed Requested Actions Discussed in GL 95-07 ML20206M2601999-05-0606 May 1999 SER Concluding That Licensee IPEEE Complete Re Info Requested by Suppl 4 to GL 88-20 & IPEEE Results Reasonable Given FCS Design,Operation & History LIC-99-0047, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.With ML20195E8621999-04-30030 April 1999 Performance Indicators, for Apr 1999 ML20205Q5831999-04-15015 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 190 to License DPR-40 ML20210J4331999-03-31031 March 1999 Changes,Tests, & Experiments Carried Out Without Prior Commission Approval for Period 981101-990331.With USAR Changes Other than Those Resulting from 10CFR50.59 ML20206G2641999-03-31031 March 1999 Performance Indicators Rept for Mar 1999 LIC-99-0034, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1.With ML20205J8181999-02-28028 February 1999 Performance Indicators, for Feb 1999 LIC-99-0025, Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With ML20207F3291999-01-31031 January 1999 FCS Performance Indicators for Jan 1999 ML20203B0991998-12-31031 December 1998 Performance Indicators for Dec 1998 LIC-99-0026, 1998 Omaha Public Power District Annual Rept. with1998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Omaha Public Power District Annual Rept. with LIC-99-0003, Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station.With ML20198S3771998-12-31031 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 189 to License DPR-40 ML20198S4831998-12-31031 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 188 to License DPR-40 ML20196G2251998-12-18018 December 1998 Rev 2 to EA-FC-90-082, Potential Over-Pressurization of Containment Penetration Piping Following Main Steam Line Break in Containment ML20198M3141998-11-30030 November 1998 Performance Indicators Rept for Nov 1998 LIC-98-0172, Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With LIC-98-0160, Special Rept:On 981113,MSL RM RM-064 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage Past Isolation Valve HCV-922.Troubleshooting Has Indicated That Leakage Has Stopped & Cause of Leak Continues to Be Investigated1998-11-25025 November 1998 Special Rept:On 981113,MSL RM RM-064 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage Past Isolation Valve HCV-922.Troubleshooting Has Indicated That Leakage Has Stopped & Cause of Leak Continues to Be Investigated ML20203B0721998-11-16016 November 1998 Rev 6 to HI-92828, Licensing Rept for Spent Fuel Storage Capacity Expansion ML20196E4981998-10-31031 October 1998 Performance Indicators Rept for Oct 1998 ML20196G2441998-10-31031 October 1998 Changes,Tests & Experiments Carried Out Without Prior Commission Approval. with USAR Changes Other than Those Resulting from 10CFR50.59 LIC-98-0154, Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With ML20154M4881998-10-19019 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 186 to License DPR-40 ML20154N2411998-10-19019 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 187 to License DPR-40 LIC-98-0136, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With ML20155G4261998-09-30030 September 1998 Performance Indicators for Sept 1998 ML20154A1251998-08-31031 August 1998 Performance Indicators, Rept for Aug 1998 LIC-98-0122, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.With1998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.With ML20238F7231998-08-17017 August 1998 Owner'S Rept for Isis ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency 1999-09-30
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1623 MA4NEY e OMAHA, NESMASMA 68102 s TELEPHONE 536 4000 AREA CCDE 402 May 22, 1980 FC-494-80 Mr. K. V. Seyfrit U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011
Dear Mr. Seyfrit:
This special maintenance report concerning reactor coolant pump leakage at the Fort Calhoun Station, is being submitted in accordance with Section 5.9.3.d of the station Technical Specifications. This document is intended only as an interim report. A final report will be submitted to the Commission following completion of maintenance activities and a discussion of the leakage problem with the nuclear steam supply system vendor, F.ombustion Engineering; the pump manufacturer, Byron Jackson and the District's inservice inspection agency, Southwest Research Institute.
On the evening of May 15, 1980, plant operating personnel were per-forming a cold pressure test of the reactor coolant system prior to plant startup. The primary system was pressurized to approximately 180 psig using one low pressure safety injection pump. A routine primary system leakage inspection by operations personnel revealed leakage coming from reactor coolant pump RC-3C. At this time the low pressure safety injection pump was secured. On the morning of May 16, 1980, the system was again pressurized using the low pressure safety injection pump. An inspection by maintenance personnel revealed leakage from the shaft seal on pump RC-3C. This seal was subsequently tightened which reduced but did not terminate the leakage. Further investigation re-vealed leakage emanating from the gasketed surface between the pump casing and the pump cover. At this time, technical assistance was requested from the pump manufacturer, Byron Jackson. On the afternoon of May 16, tho other three reactor coolant pumps RC-3A, RC-3B and RC-3D were inspected. Leakage was found to be coming from RC-3A and RC-3B.
In addition, it was noted that corrosion damage had occurred to a number of the closure studs on pumps RC-3A and RC-3B. No stud damage was evident on RC-3D.
Y h0 8 0 0 62 3 0$/ 3 _ _ _ _.
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lb:. K. V. Seyfrit Page Two FC-494-80 The pump cover and the pump casing for the reactor coolant pumps are constructed of ASIM A-351, Grade CF8M stainless steel. Sealing between the pump cover and the pump casing is accomplished by means of two concentric 304 stainless steel Flexicallic gaskets. A leak-off line is included between the two gaskets and is presently blanked off with a pipe plug. To aid in determining the source of the leakage, the leak-off line for each pump was unplugged and the system was repressurized to approximately 180 psig. Pump RC-3A showed slight leakage through the leak-off line. Pumps RC-3B and RC-3C showed considerably more leakage.
No leakage was noted for RC-3D.
As of May 21, 1980, the closure studs have been removed from pumps RC-3B and RC-3C. Each pump makes use of 16 closure studs constructed of ASIH A-193, Grade B7 carbon steel, chrome plated in the thread area, and phosphate coated in the shank area. The studs are approximately 3-1/2" in diameter and approxi=ately 29" in length. During assembly the studs are hydraulically tensioned to approximately 23,500 psi. The residual stress in the studs, when they are held by the nuts, is approximately
'* 15,500 psi.
Inspection of the closure studs for RC-3B revealed three studs with substanical corrosion in the shank area. Nominal diameter in this area was 1 to 1-1/2" minimum. In addition, one stud was substantially corroded, although not to the extent of the previous three. The closure studs for RC-3C, although exhibiting some corrosion in several cases, were in re-latively good condition. At present, three studs have been identified on RC-3A which exhibit corrosion similar to the worst three on RC-3B.
However, a final determination of stud condition on RC-3A cannot be made until the studs are removed. The studs on RC-3D have been found to be acceptible for continued service. It should be noted that although corrosion had significantly reduced the stress in a number of the studs on RC-3B, full hydraulic tension pressure was required for removal of all studs. All studs on RC-3B and RC-3C were removed intact.
The pump cover has been removed from RC-3C. The gasketed surfaces on the pump cover and the pump casing are in good condition with no evidence of steam cutting. No damage is obvious to the inner gasket on RC-3C; the outer gasket exhibits some signs of deterioration of the asbestos filler, although no complete voids were noted in this gasket.
The pump cover has not yet been removed from RC-3B. Disassembly of RC-3A is still in the early stages.
Prior to reassembly of these pumps, all studs exhibiting significant corrosion will be replaced. All new or acceptable used studs will be subjected to examination by ultrasonic, visual and magnetic particle techniques prior to installation. Any studs which contain flaws greater than allowed by ASME Section XI will not be used. Consideration is being given to installing some type of monitoring device on the leak-off lines between the primary and secondary gaskets. In order to preclude a recurrence of the corrosion noted in this inspection, future inservice inspection, presently limited to ultrasonic examination, will be
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Mr. K. V. Seyfrit Page Three FC-494-80 supplemented with visual examination of the studs installed in the reactor coolant pumps. It is notable that a straight beam ultrasonic examination, was performed on the RC-3A and RC-3B studs during the 1980 refueling outage. Sufficient portions of the studs can be viewed with the pump assembled to allow discovery of any corrosion similar to that which has occurred thus far. It is emphasized that even with the damaged studs discovered during this inspection, the one GPM reactor coolant system leak rate limit discussed in the station Technical Specifications was never exceeded due to leakage from the reactor coolant pump casing to pump cover joint.
In order to assist with the investigation into the cause of the stud damage, at least one stud will be submitted for metallurgical examination.
Sincerely i f j
hik t. \ U I)br ender C.\Stevens nager Fort Calhoun Station SCS/JJF:jbk cc: Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 (3)
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 (30)
Mr. W. C. Jones Mr. R. L. Andrews SARC Chairman PRC Chairman
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