ML20045B259

Special Rept:On 930430,fire Detector 17-1 Failed & No Spares Available.On 930504,impairment Permit 3221 Initiated to Document Hole in Block Wall.On 930510,block Wall Between Room 19 & Corridor 4 Impaired.Compensatory Measures Taken

ML20045B259
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	06/09/1993
From:	Gates W OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LIC-93-0065, LIC-93-65, NUDOCS 9306170071
Download: ML20045B259 (2)

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i , $b b bib b Nh Omaha Public Power District P.O. Box 399 Hwy.75- North of Ft.Calhoun Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0399 402/636-2000 June 9, 1993 LIC-93-0065 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station: P1-137 Washington, DC 20555

Reference:

Docket No. 50-285 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

Special Report on Inoperability of Fire Protection Equipment The Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), holder of Operating License DPR-40, submits this report, regarding four separate fire protection impairments, pursuant to the requirements of Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) Unit No. 1, Technical Specification (TS) 2.19, " Fire Protection System."

Technical Specification 2.19(1) requires a minimum of 50% of the fire detection instrumentation of zones in specified areas outside of containment to be operable. With more than 50% of the detectors inoperable in a zone in safety related areas outside of the containment or with two adjacent detectors in a zone inoperable, an hourly fire watch patrol is to be established. The inoperable instruments are to be restored to operable status within 14 days, or a report is to be prepared and submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, pursuant to TS 5.9.3, within an additional 30 days.

On April 30, 1993, with FCS shutdown for a short duration planned outage, electrical maintenance personnel were performing a fire detector surveillance test on detectors located inside containment. During this test, Fire Detector 17-1 failed. This detector was installed as original equipment, and there were no spares available for replacement. However, Fire Detector 30-1, located in the Control Room Elevator Machine Room, was identical to Fire Detector 17-1. It was decided to switch the two detectors so as to make all detectors inside containment operable. Fire Detector 30-1 was inoperable until replacement parts could be obtained. The required parts have since been received, and the detector was restored to an operable status on June 8, 1993. Appropriate compensatory measures were in place while the detector was inoperable.

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i Technical Specification 2.19(7) requires that all penetration fire barriers prctecting safety-related areas shall be functional (intact). With a penetration fire barrier non-functional, within one hour, either a continuous fire watch is to be established on at least one side of the affected penetration, or the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the penetration is to be verified and an hourly fire watch patrol established. The non-functional '

penetration is to be restored to functional status within seven days, or a report '

is to be prepared and submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, pursuant to TS 5.9.3, within an additional 30 days.

On May 4, 1993, Fire Protection Impairment Permit (FPIP) 3221 was initiated to document a hole due to cracking in the grout around a piece of threaded rod

)enetrating into a block in the block wall in Room 55 (Battery Room No. 2). This 1 ole was identified as a result of routine walkdowns by the Fire Protection System Engineer. On May 10, 1993, FPIP 3231 was written to document two small anchor holes, of unknown origin, which were found in the block wall in Room 54 (Battery Room No. 1). These holes were identified during installation of scaffolding to be used in repairing the previously identified hole. In both ,

cases, the holes )enetrated into the void of the block, thereby giving the block a width of less tlan six inches. Six inches is the minimum width that a block can have and still maintain its fire rating. Fire watches were established for ,

both rooms and Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 931425 was initiated to correct these problems. Required work was' completed on May 20, 1993, and the barriers have been declared operable.  !

On May 10, 1993, the block wall between Room 19 and Corridor 4 was impaired in i order to support work associated with cleaning Component Cooling Water Heat t Exchanger AC-1A. FPIP 3228 was issued to document this configuration. The ,

barrier was returned to an operable condition and the impairment cleared on <

June 7, 1993. Appropriate compensatory measures were in place for the duration of the impairment.  ;

t If you have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely, 4

4V..N $ As W. G. Gates Vice President WGG:jrg i c: LeBoeuf, Lamt, Leiby & MacRae J. L. Milhor.n, NRC Regional Administrater, Region IV S. D. Bloor , NRC Project Manager  :

R. P. Mullikin, NRC Senior Resident Inspector  !

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