IR 05000269/2006006
| ML061180004 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 04/27/2006 |
| From: | Ogle C R NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1 |
| To: | Hamilton B H Duke Energy Corp |
| References | |
| IR-06-006 | |
| Download: ML061180004 (31) | |
Text
April 27, 2006
Duke Energy Corporation (DEC)ATTN.:Mr. B. H. HamiltonSite Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672
SUBJECT: OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASESINSPECTION REPORT 05000269/2006006, 05000270/2006006, 05000287/2006006
Dear Mr. Hamilton:
On March 16, 2006, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspectionat your Oconee Nuclear Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on March 16, 2006, with Mr. David Baxter, Station Manager and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.The report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green). Thisfinding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of itsvery low safety significance and because it had been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this issue as a non-cited violation in accordance with SectionVI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you deny this non-cited violation you should providea response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Oconee Nuclear Station.
DEC2In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) com ponent ofNRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,Charles R. Ogle, ChiefEngineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor SafetyDocket Nos.:50-269, 50-270, 50-287License Nos.:DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000269/2006006,05000270/2006006,05000287/2006006
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information
_________________________OFFICERII:DRSRII:DRSRII:DRSRII:DRSRII:DRSRII:DRSRII:DRS SIGNATURE/RA//RA/ via phone/RA/via email/RA/ /RA/via email/RA/via email/RA/NAMEMmaymiMScottMMichelBMillerLHajosHCampbellCJulianDATE4/18 /20064/18 /20064/17 /20064/18/20064/18 /20064/18/20064/18 /2006 E-MAIL COPY? YES YES YES YES NO NO YES OFFICERII/DRPSIGNATURE/RA/ DCPayne forNAMEMErnestesDATE4/21/06E-MAIL COPY? YES YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO DEC3cc w\encl.:B. G. Davenport Compliance Manager (ONS)
Duke Energy Corporation Electronic Mail DistributionLisa VaughnAssociate General Counsel Duke Energy Corporation 526 South Church Street Mail Code EC 07H Charlotte, NC 28201-1244Anne CottinghamWinston & Strawn LLP Electronic Mail DistributionBeverly Hall, Acting DirectorDivision of Radiation Protection N. C. Department of Environmental Health & Natural Resources Electronic Mail DistributionHenry J. Porter, Assistant DirectorDiv. of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.
S. C. Department of Health and Environmental Control Electronic Mail DistributionR. Mike GandyDivision of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.
S. C. Department of Health and Environmental Control Electronic Mail DistributionCounty Supervisor of Oconee County 415 S. Pine Street Walhalla, SC 29691-2145Lyle Graber, LISNUS Corporation Electronic Mail DistributionR. L. Gill, Jr., M anagerNuclear Regulatory Issues and Industry Affairs Duke Energy Corporation 526 S. Church Street Charlotte, NC 28201-0006Peggy ForceAssistant Attorney General N. C. Department of Justice Electronic Mail DistributionDistribution w/encl: (See page 4)
EnclosureU. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IIDocket Nos.:50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Nos.:DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55 Report No.:50-269/2006006, 50-270/2006006, 50-287/2006006 Licensee:Duke Energy Corporation Facility:Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Location:7800 Rochester HighwaySeneca, SC 29672Dates:February 13, 2006 - March 16, 2006 Inspectors:C. Julian, Team leaderM. Maymi, Reactor Inspector M. Scott, Sr. Reactor InspectorH. Cambell, Contract Inspector L. Hajos, Contractor Inspector B. Miller, Reactor Inspector Trainee E. Michel, Reactor Inspector TraineeApproved by:Charles R. Ogle, ChiefEngineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000269/2006006, 05000270/2006006, 05000287/2006006; 02/13/2006 - 03/16/2006;Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3; Component Design Bases Inspection.This inspection was conducted by a team of five NRC inspectors from the Region II office andtwo NRC contract inspectors. One Green finding, which was a non-cited violation, was identifiedduring this inspection. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green,
White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercialnuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3,dated July 2000.A.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green.
The team identified a Green, non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1.b for a non-conservative operator action setpoint in the Emergency OperatingProcedures. Specifically, the 6 foot level setpoint for operator action to complete the BWST to Reactor Building Emergency Sump (RBES) swap over by closing the BWST suction valves did not include enough margin to preclude degradation or damage to the pumps due to vortex formation in the BWST in all cases. When the NRC notified thelicensee of this condition, the licensee entered it into the corrective action program.This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the procedure qualityattribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring reliable, available, and capable systems that respond to initiating events toprevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance because no actual loss of safety function occurred and operators have been trained to identify loss of pump suction. This finding has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PIP O-06-01374. (Section 1R21.2.1.1 )
B.Licensee-Identified Violations
None Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
1.REACTOR SAFETYCornerstones: Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity1R21Component Design Bases Inspection (71111.21).1Inspection Sample Selection ProcessThe team selected risk significant components and operator actions for review usinginformation contained in the licensee's Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). Ingeneral, this included components and operator actions that had a risk achievement worth factor greater than two or Birnbaum value greater than 1E-6. The components selected were located within the high and low pressure safety injection, Borated Water Storage Tank, Keowee hydroelectric emergency power units, Standby Shutdown Facility, and vital electrical distribution systems. The sample selection included 25components, seven operator actions, and six operating experience items. Additionally, the team reviewed two modifications by performing activities identified in IP 71111.17, Permanent Plant Modifications, Section 02.02.a. and IP 71111.02, Evaluations ofChanges, Tests, or Experiments. The team performed a margin assessment and detailed review of the selected risk-significant components to verify that the design bases have been correctly implemented and maintained. This design margin assessment considered original design issues, margin reductions due to modification, or margin reductions identified as a result of material condition issues.
Equipment reliability issues were also considered in theselection of components for detailed review. These included items such as failed performance test results, significant corrective action, repeated maintenance, Maintenance Rule (a)1 status, degraded conditions, NRC resident inspector input ,system health reports, industry operating experience and licensee problem equipmentlists. Consideration was also given to the uniqueness and complexity of the design, operating experience, and the available defense in depth margins. An overall summary of the reviews performed and the specific inspection findings identified are included in the following sections of the report. A specific list of documents reviewed is included in the attachment to this report..2 Results of Detailed Reviews.2.1 Detailed Component Reviews.2.1.1Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) Level Transmitters
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed relevant portions of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report(UFSAR), Technical Specifications (TS), uncertainty calculations, Problem Investigation 5EnclosureProcess reports (PIPs), work orders and completed surveillances related to the BWSTlevel transmitters. Although specific scaling calculations were not available, the combination of calibration procedures and physical layout diagrams allowed for verification of transmitter elevations and resultant scaling. Further, the external layout and configuration of the transmitters was examined to the extent possible. A significant portion of the review was devoted to calculation OSC-2820, "Emergency Procedure Guidelines Setpoint", Rev. 31, where several operator actions regarding BWST level were evaluated.
b. Findings
Introduction:
The team identified a Green, non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4.1.b for anon-conservative operator action setpoint in the Emergency Operating Procedures.
Specifically, the 6 foot level setpoint for operator action to complete the BWST to Reactor Building Emergency Sump (RBES) swap over by closing the BWST suction valves did not include enough margin to preclude degradation or damage to the pumps due to vortex formation in the BWST in all cases.Description: In response to a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA), the High PressureInjection (HPI), Low Pressure Injection (LPI) and Reactor Building Spray (RBS) systemspump borated water from the BWST until the tank is nearly empty. Suction for the ECCS systems must then be transferred from the BWST to the Reactor BuildingEmergency Sump (RBES). The Oconee Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)direct the operators to monitor the decreasing BWST level, at 9 feet to open the suction valves to the RBES, and at 6 feet to close the suction valves from the BWST. Appendix E of calculation OSC-2820 used a methodology developed by Harleman, and contained in a reference included in the List of Documents Reviewed attached to this report, to calculate the BWST level margin that should be allowed to prevent vortex formation and potential air ingestion into the safety related pumps. The calculation concluded that awater level depth of 14.2 inches above the top of the BWST suction line was sufficient to adequately protect the pumps from subsequent potential air ingestion and potentialdegradation. When operator action times, valve stroke times and BWST level measurement uncertainties were included, an action setpoint of 6 feet BWST level was determined to be acceptable. At this level the operators were directed by the EOPs tobegin closing the BWST suction valves LP-21 and LP-22.The inspectors questioned if the vortex margin calculation was sufficiently conservative.The inspectors recognized that there are several analytical approaches for determining adequate suction water levels to avoid potential vortex-induced pump damage. When the conservative Hydraulics Institute method, contained in a reference included in the List of Documents Reviewed attached to this report, was applied, a depth margin of over 10 feet is recommended to preclude vortex creation for the specific tank suction geometry and high flow conditions at Oconee.The licensee acknowledged that use of the Harleman method was not sufficientlyconservative for pump protection and documented this deficiency in their corrective 6Enclosureaction program by initiating PIP 06-01374. Using the Reddy-Pickford methodology, contained in a reference included in the List ofDocuments Reviewed attached to this report, the licensee concluded that vortex prevention will require approximately 5.1 feet level remaining in the BWST. The PIPaddressed current operability of the BWST by stating that BWST isolation will beinitiated at 6 feet and simulator validation has shown that the level will not decreasebelow 3.32 feet worst case. The licensee consulted with the pump vendors and were told that the pumps can tolerate up to 5% gas by volume without distress and 5% to 10% gas by volume for up to an hour. A conservative calculation assuming total voiding of the BWST suction piping with additional pump suction from the sump flow path, predicted a 7.5% void fraction. A short term corrective action documented in the PIP is to raise the BWST normal level and the operator action setpoints to ensure that theRBES swap occurs above levels in which air entraining vortexing is expected to occur.
A longer term action as documented in the PIP at the end of the inspection is to perform a plant modification to install a vortex suppressor in the BWSTs of all three units.Analysis: Failing to provide adequate procedure guidance to preclude damage ordegradation to the RBS, LPI and HPI pumps on BWST to RBES swap over in the EOPs is a performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor because it is related to the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affects the objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that res pond toinitiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance because although the RBS, LPI and HPI pumps could be damaged or degraded during a LOCA, the actual safety system function is not lost due to theavailability of third standby LPI and HPI pumps and the tolerance of LPI pumps to shortterm air entrainment. Additionally, the procedures caution the operators to monitor pump parameters for indication of suction loss and the operators receive training on this phenomenon.Enforcement: TS 5.4.1.b requires that written procedures shall be established coveringEmergency Operating Procedures. Procedures EP/1, 2, 3/A/1800/001 EmergencyOperating Procedure, were written, in part, to fulfill this requirement. Contrary to TS5.4.1.b, appropriate instructions were not provided in procedures EP/1, 2, 3/A/1800/001Emergency Operating Procedure, for operator actions setpoint for BWST to RBES swap over at a level in the BWST that would preclude pump damage or degradation due to vortex formation in the BWST in all cases. Because the licensee took actions to enter this item into their corrective action program (PIP O-06-01374), this violation is identified as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC EnforcementPolicy, and is identified as NCV 05000269, 270, 287/2006006-01, Non-Conservative EOP Procedure Setpoint for Operator Action to Accomplish BWST to RBES Swap Over on Low BWST Level.
7Enclosure.2.1.2Keowee Hydroelectric Generator Wheel Pit (Turbine) Vacuum Breaker/Air AdmissionValve
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the operation, testing, and maintenance of vacuum breakervalves MT-25 installed on the Keowee Hydro Units. This included a review of calculations, maintenance and corrective action documents, and discussions with cognizant licensee personnel. This review was performed to verify that the valves continue to operate in accordance with their design basis.
b. Findings
The licensee could not provide the inspectors an analysis of the potential consequencesto Keowee operability of the vacuum breaker valves failing open or failing to open. Available design documentation (calculation KC-0085 and technical manual KM-200-158) state that "these valves are required to open following a load rejection from power to limit vacuum inside the turbine case. This action is to prevent the turbine from being exposed to a water column separation. Following a column separation, flooding or "back slapping" of the turbine could occur. This action could damage the turbine thrust bearing and cause the unit to fail." The inspectors determined that these vacuum breakers have not been included in a preventive maintenance program (PIP 06-01183)and have not been in scope for the maintenance rule and license renewal. The inspectors were concerned that normal operational testing may not be adequate to detect valve degradation. In addition, design aspects of the MT-25 vacuum breakers such as possible failure modes and significance were not available for review by the inspectors. This issue remains unresolved pending the inspectors' review of the licensee's determination of any impacts the potential vacuum breaker failures could have on the Keowee emergency power function. Accordingly, this item is identified as URI 05000269, 270, 287/2006006-002, Possible Vacuum Breaker Failure Impact to Keowee Emergency Power Function..2.1.3LPI to HPI Pump Suction Header Manual Valves LP-54 and LP-56
a. Inspection Scope
Manual valves LP-54 and LP-56 are normally open valves in the flow path used to alignthe HPI pumps in piggyback mode. The team reviewed preventive and corrective maintenance work order history, and corrective action documents to verify the reliabilityand availability of manual valves LP-54 and LP-56. In addition, the team reviewedDesign Basis Documents (DBD), periodic test and operating procedures that manipulate these manual valves to verify the configuration of these valve was adequately controlled.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
8Enclosure.2.1.4Reactor Building Sump Suction Isolation Valves LP-19 and LP-20
a. Inspection Scope
Motor operated valves (MOV) LP-19 and LP-20 are used to align LPI pump suction tothe containment recirculation sump. The team reviewed preventive and correctivemaintenance work order history, maintenance rule component status, and corrective action documents to verify the reliability and availability of MOVs LP-19 and LP-20. In addition, the team reviewed DBDs, periodic stroke time test procedures, stroke timetrends, actuator open/close thrust margin calculations, and test acceptance criteria to verify these were consistent with system design bases. The team also reviewed common cause failure issues to verify these were addressed and corrective actions were adequate.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.5LPI Pump Discharge Check Valves LP-31, LP-33, and LP-35
a. Inspection Scope
Check valves LP-31, 33, and 35 are used during LPI pump operation and preventbackflow through the pump when the pump is not running and the LPI headers are cross-connected. The team reviewed corrective maintenance work order history, and corrective action documents to verify the check valves were reliable and periodically inspected. In addition, the team reviewed DBDs, and completed test procedures to verify that the check valves stroked open allowing sufficient flow from the LPI pump, andprevented backflow.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.6RCS/LPI Isolation LP-1 and LPI Hot Leg Suction Isolation LP-2
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed preventive and corrective maintenance work order history,maintenance rule component status and corrective action documents to verify the reliability and availability of MOVs LP-1 and LP-2. These MOVs are used to align theReactor Coolant System (RCS) for decay heat removal. In addition, the team reviewed DBDs, periodic stroke time test procedures, stroke time trends, actuator open/close thrust margin calculations, and test acceptance criteria to verify these were consistent with system design bases. The team also reviewed an LP-1 pressure interlock, which prevents an inadvertent opening of the MOV during normal operation, signal testing and 9Enclosurecalibration procedures to verify that the interlock setpoint is being maintained andtested.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.7 LPI Coolers (Decay Heat Removal Coolers)
a. Inspection Scope
The LPI coolers are cooled by the Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) system. Theteam reviewed DBDs, performance test calculations that verify heat removal capability,system health reports, and test acceptance criteria to verify they were consistent withdesign basis. In addition the team reviewed LPSW flow test and flow balance verification procedures, LPSW corrective action documents, completed flow test results, and adequate flow verification calculations to verify availability and reliability of LPSW tothe LPI coolers, and to verify degraded conditions are being addressed.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.8Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) Auxiliary Service Water (ASW) Pump to SteamGenerator (SG) Throttle Valve CCW-268
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed preventive and corrective maintenance work order history,maintenance rule component status, and corrective action documents to verify the reliability and availability of MOV CCW-268. This MOV is a normally closed valve usedto throttle flow to the SGs when the SSF ASW system is required. In addition, the teamreviewed DBDs, valve data sheet calculations, actuator open/close thrust margin calculations, a valve replacement modification, stroke test procedure, test acceptance criteria, and MOV trend reports to verify acceptance criteria were consistent with systemdesign bases, and to verify MOV design margins were being maintained.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.9SSF Sump Pump Discharge Check Valves CCW-312 and CCW-313
a. Inspection Scope
Check valves CCW-312 and 313 are credited for closing during a seismically inducedTurbine Building Flood to prevent back flow from the yard drain system into the SSF 10Enclosurepump room. The team reviewed preventive and corrective maintenance work orderhistory, preventive maintenance procedures and completed work orders, and corrective action documents to verify the check valves were reliable and periodically inspected.
11EnclosureIn addition, the team reviewed DBDs, and a completed temporary test procedure thatverified the check valves stroked open, and also prevented backleakage when operating the alternate sump pump.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.10MOVs HP-24 & HP-25: BWST to HPI Pump Suction Valves
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), TechnicalSpecifications (TS), DBDs, and associated drawings to determine the design basis performance requirements of these valves. Further, PIPs, work orders, system healthreports and surveillances were reviewed to assess the operating history and generalperformance of these valves.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.11MOVs LP-15 & LP-16: LPI Discharge to HPI Suction Valves, (PiggyBack Valves)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR, TS, DBDs, and associated drawings to determinethe design basis performance requirements of these valves. Further, PIPs, work orders, system health reports and surveillances were reviewed to assess the operating historyand general performance of these valves.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.12LPI PUMPS
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR, TS, DBDs, and associated drawings to determinethe design basis performance requirements of these pumps. Also, TAC documentation (Test Acceptance Criteria), PIPs, work order s, system health reports and surveillanceswere reviewed to assess the operating history and general performance of these pumps.
b. Findings
12EnclosureNo findings of significance were identified..2.1.13LP-28, Manual BWST Isolation Valves
a. Inspection Scope
These valves are locked open on each unit to align the BWST to the suction of theECCS pumps. Further, they must be capable of being closed after a postulated tornado event, as well as to prevent reverse flow from the containment sump during a LOCA.
The LPI DBD, TS 3.5.3, flow diagrams and surveillance procedures were reviewed bythe inspectors to establish design basis performance requirements. In addition, PIPs, work orders and system health reports were reviewed to assess the operating historyand general performance of these valves.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.14MOVs LP-103 & LP-104: Post-LOCA Boron Dilution Isolation Valves
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the DBD, and associated drawings to determine the designbasis performance requirements of these valves. Further, PIPs, work orders, systemhealth reports and surveillances were reviewed to assess the operating history andgeneral performance of these valves.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.15High Pressure Injection (HPI) Pump and Motor Coolers
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the UFSAR, DBDs, TS, Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC),calculations, and drawings to identify design basis information for the HPI pumps and the pump motor cooler cooling sources. The team also reviewed HPI pump flow tests, bearing oil analysis, vibration data trends, HPI system health reports, bearing and statortemperature data trends, flow rate and differential pressure trends, and corrective action documents. These documents were reviewed to verify HPI pump design margins were being maintained and to confirm that the licensee was entering problems which could affect system performance into the corrective action program, and initiating appropriatecorrective actions.
13EnclosureThe team also verified that the HPI pump motor coolers had adequate cooling byreviewing the availability and reliability of all cooling sources. The review included motorcooler flow rate trends, completed procedures which verified minimum required flow to the motor coolers from the LPSW and HPSW sources, and which also verified systemcheck valves function to open and/or prevent backflow. In addition, LPSW to HPI cooler maintenance rule a(1) status and associated corrective actions were reviewed to verify these were adequate and commensurate with risk significance. To verify the availability of the Auxiliary Service Water (ASW) system cooling flow pathto the HPI pump motor coolers, the team reviewed the completed temporary procedures performed to verify adequate flow and check valve operation. The team also reviewed ASW to LPSW flow path check valve preventive maintenance and piping inspections that verified sections of piping that were not maintained dry were not degraded by fouling or blockage.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 6LPI to HPI Pump Suction Header Check Valves LP-55 and LP-57
a. Inspection Scope
Check valves LP-55 and LP-57 are used when aligning HPI pumps in piggyback modeto allow flow from LPI discharge header to the suction of the HPI pumps. The team reviewed preventive and corrective maintenance work order history, and corrective action documents to verify the check valves were reliable and periodically inspected. In addition, the team reviewed DBDs, and completed test procedures that verified the check valves stroked open allowing sufficient flow to the HPI pump suction, and prevented backleakage from the opposite train when closed.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.17Pressurizer Power Operated Relief and High Point Primary Vent Valves
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed DBDs to establish the design basis equipment capability of thepressurizer power operated relief and primary high point vent valves. These valves are used in the emergency procedures for forced cooling. The team reviewed testing and operational history of the valves. Also, the team reviewed the corrective action documents for the valves for the past three years.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.18Main Turbine Generator Condenser Isolation Valves and the Circulating Water PumpIsolation Valves
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the design basis and equipment capability for the main generatorcondenser isolation and the circulating water pump discharge isolation valves.
The team reviewed the turbine flood design basis documents and corrective action documents for the last 10 years and work orders for the last 3 years. Select problems with the valves were reviewed in depth including periodic testing results. The team discussed technical details with maintenance personnel, valve engineers, operators, and system engineers.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.19Keowee Hydroelectric Generator Wheel Pit (Turbine) Sump Pumps
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the design basis and equipment capability for the two turbine sumppumps located in the wheel pit. The sump pumps empty the wheel pit and keep turbine shaft packing water out of the shaft's lower guide bearing. The team verified the safety-related power sources, reviewed the adequacy of equipment performance testing and maintenance work orders, and assessed potential common cause failure mechanisms.
System related corrective action documents were reviewed to assess the recent performance history of the equipment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.20 BWST: Structural Considerations of the Tank
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR, structural calculations and relevant PRA data todetermine the tank design basis. The inspectors also reviewed past Civil/Coating Inspection Reports of the tanks for all three units, PIPs, and work orders, to verify that the tanks continue to meet their design basis.
16Enclosure
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.2 1 Transformers CT-3 and
CT-4
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed work orders, procedures, PIPs, and test records for transformersCT-3 and CT-4. The cognizant system engineer was interviewed and a work orderaddressing replacement of wiring in CT-4 control cabinet was reviewed (98573929-01).
Also, affected design calculations were reviewed and the team performed a partial system walk-down of Unit 1, 2 and 3 Main Step Up and Start Up transformers. Thisreview was accomplished to verify that the components continue to perform to their documented design basis.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.22 HPI Pump C, Switchgear TD, Circuit Breakers N1, N2, E1, E2, S1 and S2
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed calculations, drawings, maintenance procedures, and vendor dataon the equipment that supplies power from offsite to engineered safety feature buses.
The team reviewed the protective relaying calculations for the 4 kilovolt (kV) Class 1E service motors to determine if the protection and coordination were within the motors' allowable thermal limits and operating conditions. The team performed a partial systemwalk-down of the Unit 1, 2 and 3 4 kilovolt (V) and 480volt (V) switchgears, located in the turbine building. The team reviewed the licensing commitments contained in the UFSAR to determine the requirements for the settings of the degraded and loss of voltage relays.
The team reviewed the basis for the setpoint, whether the settings allow for proper operation of all loads, and whether all required loads were analyzed to operate successfully during the period of set time delay. The team reviewed the surveillance procedures for the loss of voltage relays to determine compliance with the pick up and drop out limits. The team reviewed two years of maintenance history records on the 4kV breakers. This review was accomplished to verify that the components continue to perform to their documented design basis.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
17Enclosure.2.1.23 Emergency Power Switching Logic
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the logic diagrams and test procedures for circuits that control theEmergency Power Switching Logic. Logic diagrams were reviewed to determine whether the switching between various sources of power would occur as described in the UFSAR and DBD. The setpoint, time delays and the associated tolerances for relays were reviewed to determine whether the scheme would perform properly and would avoid spurious trips.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.24 Auto Transfer Features
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed logic diagrams, test procedures and calculations for circuits thatcontrol the automatic transfer of power sources for the engineered safety feature buses.
Logic diagrams were reviewed to determine whether the transfer from station auxiliarypower to offsite startup power would occur immediately for unit trip scenarios, and after main generator trip for accident scenarios. The setpoint, time delays and the associated tolerances for voltage relays were reviewed to determine whether the transfer scheme would allow sufficient voltage decay to preclude damage to motors, but still avoidspurious transfer to the onsite emergency source. The team also reviewed elementary and logic diagrams, and calculations for the fast transfer of non-engineered safety feature buses to the offsite source to determine whether it would result in spurious actuation of engineered safety feature bus under-voltage protection, protect the motorsor disrupt load sequencing on the engineered safety feature buses.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.25 Engineered Safety Feature Bus Load Shed, Load Sequencing, and Breaker Coordination/Fault Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed calculations, drawings, relay setting and test reports to determinewhether engineered safety feature load shed schemes, load sequencing, and bus protection were adequate to assure availability of engineered safety feature loads withinthe times assumed in the safety analysis, and to prevent spurious tripping of buses.
The team reviewed the setpoints and time delays for undervoltage relays used in the load shed scheme, as well as power supplies and setpoints for the discrete timing relays 18Enclosureused in motor starting circuits. The team also reviewed surveillance procedures andtest reports for time delay relays to determine whether actual setpoints were consistent with the intended design.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..3Review of Low Margin Operator Actions
a. Inspection Scope
The team performed a margin assessment of a sample of risk significant, time critical operator actions. Where possible, margins were determined by the review of the assumed design basis, engineering modeling, and UFSAR stated response times and job performance times. For the selected operator actions, the team performed a walk through of associated Emergency Procedures, Abnormal Procedures, Annunciator Response Procedures, and other operations procedures with appropriate training personnel or plant operators to assess operator knowledge level, adequacy of procedures, and availability of special equipment when required. The following operatoractions were reviewed:High pressure recirculation - operator failure to initiate *Low pressure recirculation - operator failure to initiate
- High pressure injection - failure to throttle HPI pumps
- Flooding - auxiliary and turbine buildingBorated water storage tank - failure to make up during piping break
- Decay heat removal - operator response to loss of DHR Turbine bypass valves - failure to close on demandThe licensee had validated the time critical actions (TCA) in a performed surveillancerun by operations support personnel. The team compared the times generated in the surveillance against the model times in a engineering developed model and subsequent calculation (OSC-2820). The inspectors walked down several EP action locations in the plant, observing for usability of instructions and equipment and observing that the timecritical valves are appropriately tagged as time critical. Job performance measures developed by training for the non-licensed operators were observed in the plant during walk downs.The inspectors observed unpracticed and cold-to-the-scenario operator trainingpersonnel performance on the above asterisked actions. The observation occurred on the Oconee control room simulator. The training personnel were checking the scenarios to be used during operator annual requalification testing for problems. The TCAs imbedded in the scenarios were timed for comparison to those times found in the validation surveillance.
19EnclosureActivity points in the emergency procedures and abnormal procedures were comparedwith the basis documents. The loss of DHR was discussed with operations supportpersonnel procedure writers. The discussion covered the differences between the units, sequence of actions, and timeliness of the operator actions and their options.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..4Review of Industry Operating Experience
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed selected operating experience issues that had occurred at severalother nuclear facilities for applicability to this facility. The issues that received review bythe team were:NRC Generic Letter 98-02, Loss of Reactor Coolant Inventory and Associated Potentialfor Loss of Emergency Mitigation Functions While In a Shutdown Condition.NRC Information Notice 95-03, Supplements 1 & 2, Loss of Reactor Coolant Inventoryand Potential Loss of Emergency Mitigation Functions While In a Shutdown Condition.NRC Bulletin 88-10, Nonconforming Molded-Case Circuit Breakers.NRC Bulletin 88-04, Potential Safety Related Pump Loss, Minimum Flow Concerns.
NRC Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal.NRC Information Notice 90-55, Recent Operating Experience on Loss of ReactorCoolant Inventory While in Shutdown Condition.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..5Review of Permanent Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed two modifications related to the selected risk significant componentsin detail to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability ofthe components have not been degraded through modifications. The team reviewed the modification package, implementation procedure, 50.59 evaluation, calculations, post-modification testing results, corrective action documents, and performed an independent walkdown of the observable portions of the modification. The team reviewed the modifications in accordance with IP 71111.17, Permanent Plant Modifications, Section 02.02.a and IP 71111.02, Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments.
20EnclosureThe following modifications were reviewed:Modification NSM ON-33106, Emergency Sump Return Line.
Modification NSM ON-23093, LPI Passive Cross-Connect Modification.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.4.OTHER ACTIVITIES 4AO6Meetings, Including ExitExit Meeting SummaryOn March 16, 2006, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Baxter, StationManager, and other members of the licensee staff. Licensee representatives acknowledged their understanding of the inspection results. No proprietary information was reviewed during this inspection or included in the report.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee:
- K. Alter, Engineering Supervisor
- D. Baxter, Station Manager
- C. Brown System Engineer AC systemsN. Clarkson, Sr. Engineer, Regulatory Compliance
- T. Grant, Engineering Supervisor
- L. Nicholson, Manager, Safety Assurance
- J. Rowell, Electrical Engineer
- J. Smith, Technical Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
- J. Stevens, System Engineer DC systems
- J. Weast, Engineer, Regulatory Compliance
NRC
- A. Hutto, Resident Inspector
- E. Riggs, Resident Inspector
- M. Shannon, Senior Resident Inspector
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Open/ClosedNCV
- 05000269, 270, 287/2006006-01Non-Conservative EOP Procedure Setpoint forOperator Action to accomplish BWST to RBES
swap over on Low BWST Level (Section
1R21.2.1.1)
Open
- 05000269, 270, 287/2006006-02Possible Vacuum Breaker Failure Impact toKeowee Emergency Power Function (Section
1R21.2.1.2)
2Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs)04-04595, Digital EFW Control Mod Canceled00-02322, 3-CCW-22 failed to close
- 01-01794, 2CCW-20 failed to close automatically
- 01-02697, Scaffolding blockage of 3CCW-21 and -22
- 2-00106, Turbine Building Supersystem Flood MR A(1)03-06781, 1CCW-20 limit switch problem
- 2-00106, Turbine Buildi ng Supersystem Review03-06781, 1CCW-20 would not open
- 04-02597, 2CCW-24's OAC a point did not match valve position
- 03-03166, Condenser outlets did not go shut as expected
- 2-02114, 50 PIPS that constitute degraded/non-conforming conditions (NCI) per NSD 203
- 04-04089, Procedures do not require
- 04-06825, 2CCW-30 actuator is broken
- 03-01890, Calculations do not reflect EOP preferences
- 01-00936, Siphon header out of service
- 04-02623,
- OCCW-101 is non seismic
- 00-01467, TS not clear about ESV trains
- 05-05285, Discrepancies in documents for Modes 5 and 6
- 00-01416, Reviewing calc
- OSC-551 for requested support calc
- 00-02045, NLOs ETQS tasks
- 05-08243, Potential SLC for Keowee support equipment
- 05-08474,
- 04-05841,
- KHU-2 2
- TS-2 valve needs repair
- 03-03928, Critical time action needs to be expanded
- 94-1685, NRC
- DEV 94-24-05 Disagrees with Pipe Class of HPIP Recirculation Line97-4133,
- SA-97-10(ON)(SITA)(HPI/LPI) HPI/SPI SITA Audit, 11/19/97
- 98-0707, PIP O-098-0150 SITA Audit identified a possible problem with not having a zero ref. ofthe BWST on the drawing, 4/30/9800-3686, Unit Three RCS Leakage > 0,2 gpm, 11/15/2000
- 00-4064, Check Valves
- CCW-312 and
- CCW-313 Should be Included in the ONS TestingProgram, 11/21/0003-2226, 2B & 1C HPI Pump Motor Vibration Increased Following New Pump Installation, 04/22/0303-5188, 1CCW-268 Failed to Remain Closed While Stroke Testing from the Open Position, 08/16/0303-8217, 1CCW 268 Valve Was Not Fully Closing, 12/18/03
- 04-1436, 3LPSW-251 Not Controlling Flow Within Procedure Limits, 03/18/0404-3327, 2C HPI Pump Needs Rebaselining, 05/19/04
- 04-3496, 3LPSW-251 Did Not Control as Expected, 05/24/04
- 04-4108, Unexpected Entry into TS 3.10 due to 2CCW-268 Failed to Operate During StrokeTest, 06/18/04
- 3Attachment04-4824, SSF Sump Pump 1 Running Continuously Due to Failed Open Check Valve on SSF Sump Pump 2, 07/24/0404-5365, Unplanned Entry into TS 3.5.2 and
- SLC 16.6.12 due to Having Low Bearing CoolingWater Flow to 3C HPI Pump Bearing Cooler, 08/18/0404-6365, SSF Sump Room Size Calculation, 09/29/04
- 04-6811, 3LPSW-251 Not Controlling Properly in Automatic, 10/14/0404-8724, Contact for
- LP-1 RC Pressure Interlock is Not
- QA-1, 12/14/04
- 05-1128, 3B HPI Pump Motor Vibration Readings Greater than Required Action Level, 02/15/05
- 05-1272, 3B HPI Pump Did Not Meet Vibration Acceptance Criteria, 02/21/05
- 05-2898, Need Stronger Barrier to Prevent Loss of Configuration Control and/or Loss of Decay Heat Removal Barrier, 04/24/0505-3223, 1LPSW-159, HPI Pump Motor Temperature Control Outlet Valve, Found Closed, 05/04/0505-3770, Oconee SSF Risk Reduction Review, 05/31/05
- 05-4359, Unit 1 LPSW System MR a(1) due to Repetitive MPFFs Associated with LPSW Flowto the HPI Motors, 06/30/05 05-4776, 1B HPI Pump has Two Vibration Points in the Alert Range, 07/24/05
- 05-6829, Material Found in 2LP-19 & 20 Suction Piping from RBES, 10/24/05
- 05-6982, 2LPSW-252 Did Not Operate Properly, 10/28/05
- 05-7036, Station ASW Pump Suction Pipe Inspection Revealed Interior Tubercle Formation, 10/29/0505-7146, FME Discovered in CCW Piping, 11/01/05
- 05-7616, Vibration Value for 2C HPI Pump Outside Acceptance Criteria, 11/11/05
- 06-0637, ASW Pump Low Flow, 02/03/06
- 04-02106, Weld 2-LP-0189-5 Found to be Below Minimum Wall Thickness in a 4" AreaProceduresPT/0/A/0129/033, Time Critical Verifications, Rev. 2AP/2/A/1700/026, Loss of Decay Heat Removal, Rev. 16
- EP/1/A/1800/001, Oconee Unit One Emergency Procedures, Rev. 34
- NADP-3, Managing the Operating Experience Program, Rev. 3
- IP/0/A/3011/013 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Test and Inspection
- AP/1/A/1700/024, Loss of LPSW, Rev. 18
- MP/0/A/1200/078, Valve-Pacific-Swing Check- Disassembly, Repair and Reassembly, Rev. 16
- OP/1,2,3/A/1104/002 D, Restoration of HPI Injection, Rev. 12, 16, 16
- OP/1,2,3/A/1104/04, Low Pressure Injection System, Rev. 111, 123, 116
- PT/1,2,3/A/0150/54,
- LP-15 and
- LP-16 Leak Test, Rev. 5, 2, 4
- PT/1,2,3/A/0150/67,
- LP-40 and
- LP-41 Leak Test, Rev. 3, 2, 4
- PT/1,2/A/0152/006, Condenser Circulating Water System Valve Stroke Test, Rev. 12, 16
- PT/1,2,3/A/0204/007, Reactor Building Spray Pump Test, Rev. 84, 72, 80
- PT/1/A/0600/010, "Reactor Coolant Leakage", Rev. 071
- IP/0/A/0203/001A, Low Pressure Injection System Borated Water Storage Tank LevelInstrument Calibration, Rev. 33
- 4AttachmentCompleted Performance TestsPT/1/A/015/006 , 1CCW-10, test id 10188, 1/18/2006 (TYPICAL for 1/2/3-CCW 10-13 and 20-
- 25)
- PT/0/A/0129/033, Time Critical Verifications, Revision 2, performed 9 to 11, 2005
- PT/2/A/0610/001L & PT/2/A0610/001J, Load Shed Channel Verification
- PT 0/A/0120/033, Discrepancies Process Record Time Critical Action Verification 9/28/02 to 10/6/02 - AB FloodPT 0/A/0120/033, Discrepancies Process Record Time Critical Action Verification 11/ 2005, enclosure 13.10IP/0/A/031/003 B, Engineered Safeguards System Analog Channel A RC Pressure ChannelCalibration, completed
- 04/16/05,11/02/
- 05, 12/08/04PT/1,3/A/025/023, LPSW System Flow Test, completed 12/11/03, 12/12/04PT/1,2/A/025/072, LPSW System Flow Balance Verification, completed 05/11/05, 11/21/05PT/1/A/0152/012, Low Pressure Injection System Valve Stroke Test, 05/02/05
- PT/1,2/A/0202/011, High Pressure Injection Pump Test, completed 08/22/04, 11/12/04, 08/24/04PT/1,2/A/0203/006 A, Low Pressure Injection Pump Test - Recirculation, completed 08/24/03, 01/18/05, 10/30/04
- PT/1/A/0203/006 B, Low Pressure Injection Pump Test - Decay Heat, completed 11/27/03
- PT/1/A/0203/013, 1LP-55 and 1LP-57 Check Valve Test, completed 0813/03, 02/17/05PT/1,2,3/A/0230/015, High Pressure Injection Motor Cooler Flow Test, completed 12/19/05,
- 2/02/06
- PT/1,2,3/A/0251/024, HPI Full Flow Test, completed 04/27/05, 05/20/04, 12/15/04TT/1,2,3/A/0251/50, ASW to HPI Pump Motor Cooler Flow Test, completed 11/27/95, 05/20/96, 07/10/95IP/0/A/0203/001A, Low Pressure Injection System Borated Water Storage Tank LevelInstrument Calibration, completed 4/4/05 & 12/29/03TT/0/A/0400/033, SSF Sump Pump, SSF Sump Pump Discharge Check Valve, and SSF PumpRoom Water In-Leakage Test, completed 02/21/06Performance Measures Observed in the Simulator or Plant (February 2006)CRO-097, Align HPI/LPI Piggyback Mode Following a SBLOCACRO-019, Initiate Forced High Pressure Injection Cooling
- NLO-004, Manually Bypass the KI Inverter
- NLO-022 Align and Start the Station Aux Service Water Pump
- CRO-004, Performed Required Actions for Failed LPI Train
- NLO-033A, Align "B" LPSW Pump power from alternate Unit
- CRO-021, Isolate a Main Steam Line Rupture
- NEO Time Critical Task
- 1146501, Perform outside the control room actions to control Auxiliary Building flooding
- NEO Time Critical Task
- GO-02-13(NPA)(OPS)(ALL) Operations and TrainingPIP 01-03545, Audit 1-O0DBG-055-01, Design Basis Group Initiatives
- PIP 01-03546, Level II Assessment of Risk Significant Time Critical Actions
- 5AttachmentWork Orders98618741, K2, repair AC GBO pump . High vibration (TYPICAL, Keowee hydro units wheel pitcomponents)
- 98676711 Refurbish Breaker for B2T-08
- 98631217 PM on Breaker & Relays in
- BIT-6
- 98683858-01 - Degraded Grid Under Voltage Relays 27YBDGX
- 98683859-01 - Degraded Grid Under Voltage Relays 27YBDGY
- 98683860-01 - Degraded Grid Under Voltage Relays 27YBDGZ
- 98573929-02 Replace wiring in
- CT-4 Control cabinet
- 98100667 &
- 98625990, PM Check Valve 1HP-194 & 2HP-194, completed 6/15/97 & 4/07/0498377225,
- 98545755, &
- 98660647, PM Check Valve 3LPSW-503, completed 11/16/01,05/10/03, & 11/08/04
- 98427212 &
- 98695228, PM Check Valve 1LPSW-502, completed
- 03/31/02, 04/16/0598545734 &
- 98660628, PM Check Valve 3LPSW-502, completed
- 05/14/03, 11/08/0498583350 &
- 98390073 PM Check Valve 1HP-486 & 2HP-486, completed 10/13/03 & 5/19/0198625819 &
- 98719938, PM Check Valve 2LPSW-502, completed
- 04/04/04, 11/02/0598696537, U1 BWST Level Instrument Calibration, completed 4/4/05
- 98613979, U1 BWST Level Instrument Calibration, completed 12/29/03
- 98677772 &
- 98600130, PM Check Valve
- CCW-100, completed
- 10/16/03, 03/02/0598679351, Inspect/Repair
- CCW-313 for Proper Operation, completed 08/04/0498697869, Disassemble and Examine Valve
- CCW-312, completed 09/13/05CalculationsOSC-8493, Hydraulic Analysis to Support Unit 3
- LDST-RBES Return Line Modification, Rev. 1OSC-4300 Protective Relaying Calculations (Undervoltage) following appendices Rev. 10
- OSC-4200 Appendix P - 87T Transformer Differential Type HU Relays, Rev. 7
- OSC-4300 Appendix H - 51TN Transformer neutral over-current relays Rev. 6
- OSC-3120 Electrical Protective Relay Settings & Breaker coordination Rev. 11
- OSC-2060 Oconee Unit 2, Voltage & Load Flow Study, Rev.19
- OSC-2061 Oconee Unit 3, Voltage & Load Flow Study, Rev. 14 (page 38 - 47), short circuit portion.OSC-2061, Appendix O, Unit 3 LBLOCA analysis when fed from the 230kV switchyard and pre-outage calculation 3eOC22, Rev. 17OSC-8113 125VDC Vital Instrumentation and Control Load Profile, Battery Sizing and
- Voltage Analysis, Rev. 0
- OSC-5749 6.9kV & 4.16kV Auxiliary System Transfer AnalysisOSC-2042, HPI Pump Motor Upper Bearing Cooling Report, Rev. 5
- OSC-2651, Reactor Building Normal and Emergency Sump Level Instrument Loop Accuracy Calculation
- ON-LWDLT113, 120;
- ON-LPILT3P, 112, Rev. 5OSC-2820, "Emergency Procedure Guidelines Setpoint", Rev. 31
- OSC-3189, BWST Level Uncertainty, Rev. 6
- OSC-3993, Unit 1 LPI Heat Exchanger Performance Calculation, Rev. 12
- OSC-4156, Unit 2 LPI Heat Exchanger Performance Calculation, Rev. 12
- OSC-4269,
- CCW-268/CCW-410,
- CCW-287 and
- CCW-411 Valve Data Sheet Calculation
- NSMON-52882 (SSF Type IV), Rev. 5OSC-4338, Unit 3 LPI Heat Exchanger Performance Calculation, Rev. 9
- 6AttachmentOSC-5674, Unit 1 Generic Letter 89-10 MOV Calculation, Rev. 21OSC-5675, Unit 2 Generic Letter 89-10 MOV Calculation, Rev. 22
- OSC-7043, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Post Outage RBCU and LPI Cooler Flow Verification, Rev. 9
- OSC-8176,
- GL 89-10 Review for Valves
- CCW-268 and
- CCW-287, Rev. 0
- OSC-8441, U2 LPI Hydraulic Calculation, Rev. 7
- OSC-8441, Unit 2 LPI Hydraulic Calculation for NSM
- ON 23093, Rev 7
- OSC-7632, LPI System Passive Cross-Connect Modification NSM
- ON-X3093Modification DocumentsNSM
- ON-33106, Reactor Building Emergency Sump Return Line Modification, Rev. 1NSM
- ON-23093, EOPI Passive LPI Cross Connect.
- NSM
- ON-52882, Replacement of SSF ASW Valves 1/2/3CCW-268, Rev. 0 DrawingsOFD-101A-3.2, Flow Diagram of High Pressure Injection System, Rev. 370-2705, One Line Diagram 120VAC & 125VDC Station Auxiliary Circuits Instrumentation Vital Buses, Rev. 720-2700, One Line Diagram Relays & Meters 19kV, Rev. 14
- 0-702-A One Line Diagram 6900V & 4160V Auxiliary Systems, Rev. 270-2703 One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary circuits 600/208V Rev. 490-2703-B One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary circuits 600/208V Rev. 530-2703-G One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary circuits 600/208V Rev. 67OEE-117-2 Elementary Diagram 4160V switchgear No. B1T Start-up breaker Unit No. 1 Rev.
- OLD-2000 (sheets 01, 03, 04, 07, 10, 12, 14, 16, 20) 4kV
- Logic Diagrams Rev. 0OLD-2005-01 Logic Diagram Keowee Emergency Start Channel A, Rev. 0
- OM 2300-0024.001 Vendor Drawing No. NP254562 CT3 Transformer nameplate
- OFD-101A-1,2,3.3, High Pressure Injection System (Charging Section), Rev. 19, 20, 19
- OFD-102A-1,2,3.1, Low Pressure Injection System (Borated Water Supply & LPI PumpSuction), Rev. 49, 42, 50OFD-102A-1,2,3.2, Low Pressure Injection System (LPI Pump Discharge), Rev. 43, 38, 31
- OFD-121D-1.2, Emergency Feedwater System (Auxiliary Service Water), Rev. 14OFD-124B-1,2,3.1, Low Pressure Service Water System (Auxiliary Building Services), Rev. 51, 57, 48OFD-124C-1.3, High Pressure Service Water System (Auxiliary Building), Rev. 15OFD-133A-2.5, Condenser Circulating Water System (SSF Auxiliary Service), Rev. 42
- OM 201.H-0202 001, Non-Nuclear Instrumentation Schematic Diagram Reactor Coolant RC Pressure Control, Rev. D1System Design Basis DocumentsOSS-254.00-00-1003, Flood, Section 20.2.14, Revision 20OSS-0254.00-00-1047, Keowee Turbine Sump (TS) Pump System, Revision 8
- OSS-0254.00-00-4005, Design Basis Event, Revision 17
- OSS-0254.00-00-2000, 4kV Essential Auxiliary Power System, Rev. 13OSS-0254.00-00-1000, Emergency Feedwater and the Auxiliary Service Water Systems, Rev. 40
- 7AttachmentOSS-0254.00-00-1001, High Pressure Injection and Purification & Deborating Demineralizer Systems, Rev. 32OSS-0254.00-00-1002, High Pressure Service Water System, Rev. 24
- OSS-0254.00-00-1005, Standby Shutdown Facility Auxiliary Service Water System, Rev. 22OSS-0254.00-00-1008, SSF Diesel Support Systems, Rev. 25
- OSS-0254.00-00-1039, Low Pressure Service Water System, Rev. 34
- OSS-0254.00-00-1028, Low Pressure Injection and Core Flood System (LPI), Rev. 26Miscellaneous DocumentsTechnical Specifications (TS) & Selected Licensee Commitments (SLCs)Auxiliary, Reactor, Turbine, and Building Flood Analysis Notebook, Probabilistic AssessmentSAAG File No. 465NRC Inspection Report
- 05000269,270, 287/20020012 95001 Close Out of Auxiliary Building Flood Valve: RC, CCW, LPI, HPI, and LPSW IST test data for the last three years
- EOP/TBD Revision 9 Deviation Document Oconee Design Study
- ONDS-0340, Auxiliary Building Internal Flooding Evaluation, 11.7.00#74-1152414-10, AREVA Technical Document, Chapter
- IV.J, Loss of Decay Heat Removal System Operation, date 12/31/2005Critical Manual Valves Health Report, Report Period 2005
- Oconee Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Molded Case Circuit Breaker Health Report 2005T3
- HPI Pumps Motor Inboard and Outboard Oil Analysis Results, 2002-2006
- HPI Pumps Vibration Analysis Results, 2003-2006
- HPI Pumps Flow and Differential Pressure Trending, 1992-2006
- Test Acceptance Criteria Sheets, Valves 1/2/3LP-1,2,19,20 & 1/2/3CCW-268Memorandum, "Regulatory Compliance Position on Crediting Containment Overpressure for non Bounding LOCAs", 4/1/2004
- Check Valve Health Report, Report Time Period: 2004T2, Stroke Time Data Trending, Valves 1/2/3LP-1,2,19,20 & 1/2/3CCW-268, 2003-2005MOV Margin Report, Valves 1/2/3CCW-268 & 1/2/3LP-1,2,19 & 20
- Health Reports, Low Pressure Injection, High Pressure Injection, Low Pressure Service Water, Standby Shutdown Facility, Miscellaneous Heat Exchangers, Check Valves, PreventiveMaintenance Living Program, 2004T3, 2005T3
- SA-00-39 (ON)(NPAS)(SITA), 09/2000
- OAC Detailed Design Specification, "Continuous Reactor Coolant Leakage Monitor", 520-
- Motor Operated Valves Health Report, Report Time Period: 2005T3
- IST LPI Pump Developed Head Test Data, Trending over Jan-06 through Dec-05, (compiled results taken from PT/*/0203/06A, B)51-5043764-00, Areva Engineering Information Record Oconee Unit 2 CF/LPI/DHR LBB
- Evaluation for Reduced Weld Thickness
- TT/2/A/150/070,
- ON-23093 LPI Cross Connect Post Modification Test, Rev 000
- 8Attachment
- 9AttachmentReferences On Vortex Margin Calculations"Selective Withdrawal from a Vertically Stratified Fluid", 8
th Congress International AssociationHydraulic Research, August, 1959, Donald R. F. Harleman, Robert L. Morgan, Robert A.
- Purple."Pump Intake Design", ANSI/HI 9.8-1998, Hydraulic Institute.
"Vortices at Intakes in Conventional Sumps", Dr. Y. R. Reddy and J. A. Pickford, Water PowerMarch 1972.PIPs Written As A Result Of This InspectionPIP 06-0893 Identified a discrepancy in
- OSC 2820 on BWST level
- PIP 06-01051 The mass of the PZR steam does not appear to be accounted for
- MT-25, also piping may need to be included in the License Renewal Scope
- LP-1 is not tested, but it
is
- PIP 06-01084 Typo on a one-line drawing (.66hp Vs 66hp)
- PIP 06-01374 Evaluate BWST vortex
- PIP 06-01425 Seismic analysis for valve
- MT-25 piping could not be located
- PIP 06-01475 Keowee vacuum breaker valve
- MT-25 stuck partially open after shutdown
- PIP 06-01854 During the recent NRC Component Design Basis Inspection a number ofcalculation problems/issues were identified.
- PIP 06-01160 Calculation needs to be updated to be as-built following station modification.
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AC-Alternating CurrentADAMS-Agency wide Documents Access and Management System
ANSI-American National Standards Institute
AP-Abnormal Procedure
ASW-Auxiliary Service Water
BWST-Borated Water Storage Tank
CCW-Condenser Circulating Water
CFR-Code of Federal Regulations-Direct CurrentDEC-Duke Energy Corporation
DHR-Decay Heat Removal
ECCS-Emergency Core Cooling Systems
EFW-Emergency Feedwater
10AttachmentEOP-Emergency Operating ProcedureGL-Generic LetterHPI-High Pressure InjectionHPSW-High Pressure Service Water
IP-Inspection Procedure
IR-Inspection Report
ISI-Inservice Inspection
IST-Inservice Testing
KHU-Keowee Hydroelectric Unit
LDST-Letdown Storage Tank
LOCA-Loss Of Coolant Accident
LPSW-Low Pressure Service Water
LPI-Low Pressure Injection
MOV-Motor Operated Valve
NCV-Non-Cited Violation
NDE-Non-Destructive Examination
NRC-Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR-Nuclear Reactor Regulation
NSD-Nuclear System Directive
ONS-Oconee Nuclear Station
PARS-Publicly Available Records
PIP-Problem Investigation Process report
PM-Preventive Maintenance
PMT-Post-Maintenance Testing
PRA-Probabilistic Risk AssessmentPT-Performance Test
RB-Reactor Building
RBES-Reactor Building Emergency Sump
RBS-Reactor Building Spray
RCS-Reactor Coolant System
Rev.-Revision
- II [[]]
SDP-Significance Determination Process
SG-Steam Generator
SLC-Selected Licensee Commitments
SSF-Standby Shutdown FacilityTS-Technical Specification
TCA-Time Critical Action
UFSAR-Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
URI-Unresolved Item