IR 05000269/2006004
| ML062990358 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, 07200040  |
| Issue date: | 10/26/2006 |
| From: | Ernstes M NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB1 |
| To: | Brandi Hamilton Duke Energy Carolinas, Duke Power Co |
| References | |
| IR-06-001, IR-06-004 | |
| Download: ML062990358 (34) | |
Text
ber 26, 2006
SUBJECT:
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000269/2006004, 05000270/2006004, 05000287/2006004, AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION INSPECTION REPORT 07200040/2006001
Dear Mr. Hamilton:
On September 30, 2006, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Oconee Nuclear Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on October 5, 2006, with you and members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. However, a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is listed in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Oconee Nuclear Station.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and any response will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Michael E. Ernstes, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287, 72-40 License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55
Enclosure:
NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2006004,05000270/2006004, 05000287/2006004 and 07200040/2006001 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287, 72-40 License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55 Report Nos: 05000269/2006004, 05000270/2006004, 05000287/2006004, and 07200040/2006001 Licensee: Duke Power Company Facility: Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Location: 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672 Dates: July 1, 2006 - September 30, 2006 Inspectors: D. Rich, Senior Resident Inspector A. Hutto, Resident Inspector E. Riggs, Resident Inspector M. Scott, Senior Reactor Inspector (Sections 1R02, 1R17, 1R07, and 4OA5.3)
J. Fuller, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R07)
B. Miller, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R07)
L. Cain, Senior Reactor Inspector (Sections 1R02 and 1R17)
D. Mas-Penaranda, Reactor Inspector (Sections 1R02 and 1R17)
W. Lewis, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R02 and 1R17)
K. Van Doorn, Senior Reactor Inspector (Sections 4OA2 and 4OA5.4)
Approved by: Michael E. Ernstes, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000269/2006004, IR 05000270/2006004, IR 05000287/2006004, IR 07200040/
2006001, 07/01/2006 - 09/30/2006; Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3; Routine Integrated Inspection Report.
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by the onsite resident inspectors and announced regional-based inspections conducted by seven reactor inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
NRC Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
None
Licensee-Identified Violations
One violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation is listed in Section 4OA7.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status:
Unit 1 began the report period at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP). On September 23, 2006, a unit coast down commenced in advance of the end-of-cycle (EOC) 23 refueling outage (RFO). The unit ended the inspection period at 91 percent RTP.
Unit 2 entered the report period at approximately 100 percent RTP. The unit was reduced to approximately 88 percent RTP on July 9, 2006, to perform turbine valve movement testing. The unit was returned to 100 percent RTP on the same day. On September 1, 2006, the unit was reduced to approximately 18 percent RTP and taken off line due to elevated main turbine oil temperatures. Following repairs to the main turbine oil cooler, the unit was placed on-line and achieved 100 percent RTP on September 9, 2006. The unit operated at or near 100 percent RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 3 entered the report period at approximately 100 percent RTP. On August 16, 2006, group 6, rod 6 dropped into the core. On August 18, 2006, the unit was taken off-line and entered Mode 3. On August 20, 2006, the unit was taken critical and achieved 100 percent RTP on August 22, 2006, where it operated for the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests or Experiments
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed selected samples of evaluations to confirm that the licensee had appropriately considered the conditions under which changes to the facility, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), or procedures may be made, and tests conducted, without prior NRC approval. The inspectors reviewed evaluations for seven changes and additional information, such as calculations, supporting analyses, the UFSAR, and drawings to confirm that the licensee had appropriately concluded that the changes could be accomplished without obtaining a license amendment. The seven evaluations reviewed are listed under the List of Documents Reviewed in the to this report.
The inspectors also reviewed samples of changes for which the licensee had determined that evaluations were not required, to confirm that the licensees conclusions to screen out these changes were correct and consistent with 10 CFR 50.59. The twenty-one screened out changes reviewed are listed under the List of Documents Reviewed in the Attachment to this report.
The inspectors also reviewed programmatic Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs) to confirm that problems were identified at an appropriate threshold, were entered into the corrective action process, and appropriate corrective actions had been initiated.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted partial equipment alignment walkdowns to evaluate the operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems while the other train or system was inoperable or out-of-service (OOS). The walkdowns included, as appropriate, reviews of plant procedures and other documents to determine correct system lineups, and verification of critical components to identify any discrepancies which could affect operability of the redundant train or backup system. The following three systems were included in this review:
- Unit 1, 2 and 3 main feeder busses, standby busses, emergency feedwater systems, the standby shutdown facility (SSF) and CT-5 during Keowee Hydroelectric Unit (KHU) out-of-tolerance test
- The A high pressure service water (HPSW) train with the B train OOS for maintenance
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Complete Walkdown of the Unit 1 HPSW System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a system walkdown on accessible portions of the Unit 1 HPSW system. The inspectors focused on verifying proper valve and breaker positioning, power availability, no damage to piping or cable tray structural supports, and material condition.
Documents and drawings reviewed for this semi-annual inspection sample included:
- OP/0/A/1104/011, HPSW
- PT/0/A/0250/005, HPSW Pump Functional Test
- PT/1/A/0152/024, HPSW System Valve Stroke Test
- UFSAR Section 9.2, Water Systems
- Selected Licensee Commitment; 16.9.8a, HPSW Requirements to Support Loss of Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Condenser Circulating Water (CCW)
- Drawings; OFD 124C-1.1, OFD 124C-1.2, OFD 124C-1.3, OFD 124C-1.4 A review of PIPs and open maintenance work orders was performed to verify that material condition deficiencies did not significantly affect the HPSW systems ability to perform its design functions and appropriate corrective action was being taken by the licensee.
The inspectors conducted a review of the system engineers trending data and system health reports to verify that appropriate trending parameters were being monitored and that no adverse trends were noted.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
.1 Fire Area Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted tours in 14 areas of the plant to verify that combustibles and ignition sources were properly controlled, and that fire detection and suppression capabilities were intact. The inspectors selected the areas based on a review of the licensees safe shutdown analysis and the probabilistic risk assessment based sensitivity studies for fire-related core damage sequences. Inspections of the following 14 areas were conducted during this inspection period:
- Unit 3 Cable Spreading Room (1)
- Unit 1, 2 and 3 Main, Auxiliary and Start Up Transformers (3)
- Unit 1, 2 and 3 Equipment Rooms (3)
- Unit 1, 2 and 3 Turbine Building Basement Level (3)
- Unit 1, 2 and 3 Turbine Building Ground Level (3)
- CT-5 (1)
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Fire Drill Observation
a. Inspection Scope
As part of the annual fire drill observation, the inspectors evaluated the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) program by reviewing training records and associated course content summaries for initial and refresher training, the SCBA maintenance program and procedures, and verified that SCBAs were available and properly stored.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Biennial Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed inspection records, test results, maintenance work orders, and other documentation to ensure that heat exchanger (HX) deficiencies that could mask or degrade performance were identified and corrected. Test procedures and records were also reviewed to verify that these were consistent with Generic Letter (GL) 89-13 licensee commitments, and industry guidelines. The inspectors reviewed the following risk significant HXs:
- The Low Pressure Injection/Decay Heat Removal (LPI/DHR) System HX (3A -
performance testing and cleaning, 1B - eddy current testing)
- Keowee Generator Cooling HXs
- Reactor Building Cooling Units (RBCUs) (Units 1, 2, and 3 - mitigation of air flow stall conditions, Unit 2 - all aspects of HX performance)
The inspectors reviewed support equipment and components associated with the heat sink function such as: the Essential Siphon Vacuum (ESV) System vacuum pump performance testing, KHU Generator Cooling units instrumentation work orders, Emergency Circulation Cooling Water (ECCW) system performance testing, and inspection reports for the three dikes and dams associated with Lake Keowee, the ultimate heat sink source.
The inspectors reviewed HX inspection and cleaning work instructions, work maintenance history, and completed inspection records for all the safety related HXs selected. The documents were reviewed to verify inspection methods were consistent with industry standards, to verify HX design margins were being maintained, and to verify overall performance of the HXs under the current maintenance frequency was adequate.
The general health of the service water system was assessed by the inspectors through review of design basis documents, system health reports, inservice testing results, and HX performance testing calculations. Additionally, the inspectors held discussions with the system engineers for low and high pressure service water and KHU.
The inspectors verified that the design basis was being maintained. Also verified was adequate service water system performance under current preventive maintenance, chemical treatments, cleaning, inspections, and test frequencies. The inspectors physically walked down accessible portions of the ESV, ECCW, KHU and its dam.
The inspectors verified that LPSW system corrosion and degradation were being monitored, and reviewed licensee LPSW pipe replacement and material condition action plans and maintenance inspection findings. Plant corrective action reports were reviewed for potential common cause problems and problems which could affect system performance to confirm that the licensee was entering problems into the corrective action program and initiating appropriate corrective actions. Documents reviewed are listed under the List of Documents Reviewed in the Attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training on September 20, 2006, to verify that operator performance was adequate, evaluators were identifying and documenting crew performance problems, and training was being conducted in accordance with licensee procedures. The scenario involved entry into multiple abnormal procedures (APs) which included AP-34, Degraded Grid, AP-16, Abnormal Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Operation, due to low oil pot levels and high vibrations, and AP-22, Loss of Instrument Air. The scenario ultimately led to a manual reactor trip and entry into the emergency procedure immediate manual actions. The inspectors observed crew performance in terms of communications; ability to take timely and proper actions; prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying alarms; correct use and implementation of procedures, including the alarm response procedures; timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; and oversight and direction provided by the shift supervisor, including the ability to identify and implement appropriate Technical Specification (TS) actions and properly classify the simulated event.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees effectiveness in performing routine maintenance activities. This review included an assessment of the licensees practices pertaining to the identification, scoping, and handling of degraded equipment conditions, as well as common cause failure evaluations. For each item selected, the inspectors performed a detailed review of the problem history and surrounding circumstances, evaluated the extent of condition reviews as required, and reviewed the generic implications of the equipment and/or work practice problem. For those systems, structures, and components (SSCs) scoped in the maintenance rule per 10 CFR 50.65, the inspectors verified that reliability and unavailability were properly monitored and that 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (a)(2) classifications were justified in light of the reviewed degraded equipment condition. The inspectors reviewed the following items:
- PIP O-06-5224, Unit 3 Dropped Control Rod
Governor/Debris Issues
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the following attributes for the eight selected SSCs and activities listed below:
- (1) the effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted;
- (2) the management of risk;
- (3) that, upon identification of an unforseen situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities; and
- (4) that maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems were adequately identified and resolved.
- Orange Operational Risk Assessment Monitor (ORAM) risk condition, Critical Activity plan for HPSW maintenance and modification work
- PIP O-06-4982, Unit 3 A2 Moisture Separator Reheater high level trip switch failed resulting in a Yellow ORAM risk condition
- PIP O-06-5742, Unexpected Orange ORAM risk condition due to KHU-2 OOS due to exciter critical alarms while CT-5 OOS for planned maintenance
- PIP O-06-6010, Carryover work from previous work week results in unexpected Red ORAM risk condition
- PIP O-06-6105, Unexpected Yellow ORAM risk condition due to Emergency Lockout of KHU-2
- Orange ORAM risk condition, Critical Activity Plan for KHU-2 Electrical Generator Forced Outage
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed selected operability evaluations affecting risk significant systems, to assess, as appropriate:
- (1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations;
- (2) whether continued system operability was warranted;
- (3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered;
- (4) if compensatory measures were involved, whether the compensatory measures were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and
- (5) where continued operability was considered unjustified, the impact on TS limiting condition for operations (LCOs). The inspectors reviewed the following six operability evaluations:
- PIP O-06-4055, One-inch, stainless steel pipe used in the LPI system has variations in wall thickness
- PIP O-06-4540, SSF B diesel engine jacket water expansion tank level less than standby level
- PIP O-06-4691, Unit 1 incore tubing leak at tank connection F-8
- PIP O-06-5078, Brake pad odor emanating from KHU-1 on unit startup
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications
.1 Annual Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed one modification package related to a safety significant system (NSM OD 100885, Cut and remove pipe between 1LP-168, 166 and 170) to verify that the associated systems design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability would be maintained following the modifications; and that the modifications would not leave the plant in an unsafe condition. The associated 10 CFR 50.59 screenings/
evaluations were also reviewed for technical accuracy and to verify license amendments were not required.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified
.2 Biennial Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated design change packages for six modifications, in the Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity cornerstone areas, to evaluate the modifications for adverse effects on system availability, reliability, and functional capability. The modifications and the associated attributes reviewed are as follows:
OD500664, High Pressure Injection (HPI) Emergency Flow Setpoint Revision (Mitigating Systems)
- Energy Needs
- Control Signals
- Post-Installation Testing
- Update of Licensee Documents
- Functional Testing Adequacy and Results OE18851, LPI Orifice Changeout (Mitigating Systems)
- Materials/ Replacement Components Control Signals
- Control Signals
- Failure Modes
- Process Medium
- Post-Installation Testing
- Update of Licensee Documents
- Functional Testing Adequacy and Results OD100291, 100293, 100308, and 100427, RCP 50G Relays (Mitigating Systems)
- Energy Needs
- Control Signals
- Process Medium
- Post-Insulation Testing
- Update of Licensee Documents
- Functional Testing Adequacy and Results OD400005, KHU Exciter Control Logic Change to Delay Generator Field Flash (Initiating Events)
- Energy Needs
- Control Signals
- Process Medium
- Timing
- Post-Insulation Testing
- Update of Licensee Documents
- Functional Testing Adequacy and Results ONOE-17652, Replace RCP 2A1 Protective Relays (Initiating Events)
- Materials/ Replacement Components Control Signals
- Energy Needs
- Control Signals
- Process Medium
- Timing
- Post-Insulation Testing
- Update of Licensee Documents
- Functional Testing Adequacy and Results
- Vendor Manuals NSM ON-53110/00/00/AL1, SSF Pressurizer Heater Capacity (Mitigating System, Barrier Integrity)
- Materials/ Replacement Components Control Signals
- Energy Needs
- Control Signals
- Failure Modes
- Post-Insulation Testing
- Update of Licensee Documents
- Functional Testing Adequacy and Results For selected modification packages, the inspectors observed the as-built configuration.
Documents reviewed included procedures, engineering calculations, modification design and implementation packages, work orders, site drawings, corrective action documents, applicable sections of the living UFSAR, supporting analyses, TSs, and design basis information.
The inspectors also reviewed selected PIPs associated with modifications to confirm that problems were identified at an appropriate threshold, were entered into the corrective action process, and appropriate corrective actions had been initiated.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed PMT procedures and/or witnessed test activities, as appropriate, for selected risk significant systems to assess whether:
- (1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel;
- (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed;
- (3) acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents;
- (4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application;
- (5) tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied;
- (6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled;
- (7) test equipment was removed following testing; and
- (8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. The inspectors observed testing and/or reviewed the results of the following five tests:
- PT/0/A/0600/021, SSF Diesel Generator Operation following replacement of the B diesel right bank jacket water pump
- PT/2/A/0600/013A, 2A Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater (MDEFW) pump test following lubrication and the installation of oil sampling ports
- PT/1/A/0600/012, Unit 1 TDEFW pump test following pump lubrication
- PT/2/A/0600/012, Unit 2 TDEFW pump test following control valve/governor inspections and maintenance
- PT/0/A/0400/015, SSF Submersible pump test following the installation of plug connection on the pumps cable reel
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted reviews and observations for selected outage activities to ensure that:
- (1) the licensee considered risk in developing the outage plan;
- (2) the licensee adhered to the outage plan to control plant configuration based on risk;
- (3) that mitigation strategies were in place for losses of key safety functions; and
- (4) the licensee adhered to operating license and TS requirements. Between September 23, 2006, and September 30, 2006, the following activities related to the KHU-2 electrical generator forced outage were reviewed for conformance to applicable procedures and selected activities associated with each evaluation were witnessed:
- Licensee Outage Risk Management Plan/Assessment
- Licensee Control of Outage Activities
- Clearance Activities
- Unit 1, 2 and 3 Emergency Electrical Power Availability
- Identification and Resolution of Problems
- Outage Configuration Management
- Emergent Work
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors witnessed surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of the seven risk-significant SSCs listed below, to assess, as appropriate, whether the SSCs met TS, the UFSAR, and licensee procedural requirements. In addition, the inspectors determined if the testing effectively demonstrated that the SSCs were ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions.
- PT/0/A/0620/018, KHU Out of Tolerance Test
- IP/0/B/0276/002, Unit 3 Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) Mitigation System AMSAC/DSS Logic Test
- PT/0/A/0400/004, SSF Diesel Engine Service Water Pump Test (IST)
- PT/0/A/0400/019, SSF Sump Pump Discharge Check Valve Test
- WO 98753857, CCW-100 Check Valve Inspection
- PT/0/A/0620/019, Keowee Over Frequency Protection Functional Test
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed documents and observed portions of the installation of one temporary modification (TSM OD501058, Temporary Installation of Plug in SSF Sewer Vent). Among the documents reviewed were system design bases, the UFSAR, TS, system operability/availability evaluations, and the 10 CFR 50.59 screening. The inspectors observed, as appropriate, that the installation was consistent with the modification documents, was in accordance with the configuration control process, adequate procedures and changes were made, and post installation testing was adequate.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation Emergency Preparedness Drill (Simulator based)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed and evaluated a simulator based emergency preparedness drill from both the simulator and the technical support center, held on August 30, 2006. The drill scenario involved a security event with the initial classification of an Unusual Event due to a credible site-specific security threat notification. The scenario progressed to an Alert condition due to hostile action occurring in the owner control area. Additional instrument failures occurred throughout the scenario. The operators were observed to determine if they properly classified the event and made the appropriate notifications and if the counties, state and NRC were promptly notified of the drill condition. The inspectors observed the post drill critique to verify that the licensee captured any drill deficiencies or weaknesses.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
Annual Sample Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected PIP O-04-00518 for review. This PIP involved the licensees evaluation for Violation 05000269,270,287/2004007-01; Failure to Obtain Prior NRC Approval to a Change to the Facility Involving Unreviewed Safety Questions on High Energy Line Break
Analysis.
This PIP was previously reviewed (see NRC Reports 05000269,270,287/2004005, 2005002, and 2005005) to verify that the licensee had performed an adequate Root Cause (RC) evaluation and initiated appropriate interim and long term corrective actions. Short term actions had included additional rigorous in line review of evaluations, increased screening assessments, and lessons learned training. The inspectors noted previously that long term corrective actions were incomplete and the licensee had not conducted an extent of condition review required by the licensees process. The inspectors reviewed the new computerized 10 CFR 50.59 process and associated training, related licensing basis training conducted by the licensee, the extent of condition review and associated corrective actions (PIP O-06-02008), recent oversight results, and a screening assessment. In addition, the inspectors reviewed 10 selected 10 CFR 50.59 documents which were the subject of the licensees extent of condition and screening assessment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
The extent of condition was reasonable with appropriate corrective actions initiated. The new computerized 10 CFR 50.59 process was a clear improvement and contained helpful cross links to additional information. A reasonable schedule for final implementation, after a validation period, has been established as approximately November, 2006. The licensee plans to continue the additional in line reviews of evaluations and the screening assessments. The inspectors concluded that the licensee had made sufficient progress and provided reasonable controls to assure quality 10 CFR 50.59 reviews.
4OA3 Event Followup
.1 PIP O-06-6105, Emergency Lockout of KHU-2
a. Inspection Scope
On September 23, 2006, an emergency lockout of KHU-2 occurred. The inspectors evaluated the event to assess the overall impact on the plant and mitigating actions. As appropriate, the inspectors:
- (1) observed plant parameters and status, including mitigating systems/trains;
- (2) determined alarms/conditions preceding and/or indicating the event;
- (3) evaluated performance of mitigating systems and licensee actions; and (4)confirmed that the licensee properly classified the event in accordance with emergency action level procedures and made timely notifications to NRC and state/county governments as required.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Unit 3 Dropped Rod
a. Inspection Scope
On August 16, 2006, Unit 3 dropped Regulating Group 6, Rod 6 during steady state operations. The dropped rod was a result of the digital rod control system inhibiting gating pulses to both redundant power supplies for that rod to protect the system from a high supply voltage from the regulated power supplies. The integrated control system automatically ran back power to approximately 55 percent as a result of the dropped rod as expected. The inspectors responded to the site and verified that TS and core operating limits report requirements were met by the licensee for quadrant power tilt ratio, axial flux and rod alignment. The inspectors also verified that the appropriate abnormal operating procedures were implemented by the operators, and that required adjustments were made to nuclear overpower trip setpoints. The unit was ultimately taken to mode 3 for troubleshooting and repairs and was returned to 100 percent power on August 22, 2006.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000287/2006-01-00, Actuation of Emergency
Generator Due to Spurious Transfer Lockout. The inspectors inspection activities and evaluation of the risk significance of this event are discussed in detail in Inspection Report (IR) 050000269,270,287/2006003, Section 4OA3, and documented as NCV 05000287/2006003-06. This LER is closed.
.4 (Closed) LER 05000270/2006-01-00, Loss of Isolation During Pump Instrument Check
Results in Reactor Trip. On April 12, 2006, while operating at 100 percent RTP with testing of the 2B2 RCP power transducer in progress, Unit 2 automatically tripped. The event was caused by the unexpected loss of the RCP during the testing of the pump power transducer, which provides computer indication of the pumps power consumption. The pump trip occurred due to a failure of an electrical isolator between the power transducer being tested and the operating circuit while connected to the test equipment. This resulted in a current imbalance between the three phases of the pump operating circuit which was sensed by the pumps protective relaying. The protective relaying caused the pump to trip automatically, which resulted in a reactor trip due to insufficient reactor coolant flow for that reactor power level. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as PIP O-06-2079. This LER is closed.
.5 (Closed) LER 05000287/2005-01-00, TS LCO Allowed Outage Time and Required
Completion Time Exceeded. The inspectors inspection activities and evaluation of the risk significance of this event are discussed in detail in IR 050000269,270,287/2005004 as Unresolved Item (URI)05000287/2005004-06, and documented as a licensee identified violation in Section 4OA7 of IR 050000269,270,287/2005005. This LER is closed.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 (Closed) URI 05000269/2006003-04, Inadequate Foreign Material Exclusion Controls
for the Unit 1, A and B Train Reactor Building Emergency Sump (RBES) Suction Lines.
This issue was discussed in detail in IR 05000269,270,287/2006003 and was left unresolved pending further inspection and assessment. Similar to URI 05000270/
2005005-02, which dealt with foreign material in the Unit 2 RBES, this finding could have resulted in the failure of the B train LPI pump during the recirculation phase of a postulated medium break or large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) scenario.
However, since this issue impacted only one LPI pump, it is considered to be of very low safety significance (Green).
Because of the very low safety significance of this issue, because it has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIP O-06-3928, and because it was identified by the licensee, this violation is being treated as a licensee identified non-cited violation (NCV), which is documented in Section 4OA7 of this report.
.2 Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
a. Inspection Scope
Under the guidance of Inspection Procedure 60855.1, the inspectors reviewed the licensees procedure for loading spent fuel shipments to the ISFSI (MP/0/A/1500/023).
The inspectors reviewed Oconee Nuclear Engineering Instruction ONEI-400 data sheets for Dry Storage Certification (DSC) for ISFSI shipments DSC-085, DSC-86, and DSC-087 and discussed spent fuel documentation with the cognizant reactor engineer to verify that the licensee had identified each fuel assembly, recorded the parameters and characteristics of each fuel assembly, and had maintained a record of each fuel assembly as a controlled document. The inspectors also observed selected licensee activities related to the shipment DSC-85 to verify that they performed these activities in a safe manner and in compliance with approved procedures.
The inspectors reviewed selected completed procedures for physical inspection and inventory of the ISFSI (PT/0/A/0750/003, Physical Inventory of Reportable Special Nuclear Material, Enclosure 13.6, Dry Cask Storage Inspections) and completed ONEI-400s to verify that records had been established for all spent fuel in storage in the ISFSI, that duplicate records were maintained by the licensee, and that an inventory had been conducted on all spent fuel stored in the ISFSI at least every 12 months.
The inspectors reviewed selected screening evaluations performed pursuant to 10 CFR 72.48 since January 1, 2005. There were no 72.48 evaluations performed during this period, as all procedure changes screened as not needing a 72.48 evaluation. The inspectors reviewed the following 72.48 screening evaluations:
- XSFM-002, Revision 12, Workplace Procedure for Selecting Spent Fuel for Use of the NUHOMS-24P Storage System at the Oconee General licensee Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
- XSFM-008, Revision 0, Workplace Procedure for Selecting Spent Fuel for Use of the NUHOMS-24PHB Storage System at the Oconee General licensee Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
- MP/0/A/1500/023, Revision 0, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Phase V DSC Loading and Storage
- XSFM-008, Revision 1, Workplace Procedure for Selecting Spent Fuel for Use of the NUHOMS-24PHB Storage System at the Oconee General licensee Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
- MP/0/A/1500/023, Revision 3, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Phase V DSC Loading and Storage
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 (Closed) URI 05000269,270,287/2006006-02, Possible Vacuum Breaker Failure Impact
to Keowee Emergency Power Function. During the original inspection (IR 05000269, 270,287/2006-006), the inspectors determined that the MT-25 vacuum breakers on the KHUs have not been included in a preventive maintenance program (PIP 06-01183) and have not been in the scope for the maintenance rule and license renewal. The inspectors were concerned that normal operational testing may not be adequate to detect valve degradation. In addition, design aspects of the MT-25 vacuum breakers such as possible failure modes and significance were not available for review by the inspectors. This issue had remained unresolved pending the inspectors review of the licensees determination of any impacts the potential vacuum breaker failures could have on the Keowee emergency power function. Subsequently the licensee gathered information addressing the points of concern.
The licensee has entered the subject valves in their maintenance program, procured a new valve with valve parts, and have plans to rotate the installed valves through a preventive maintenance overhaul. Since there were no known failures since plant startup, there is no performance deficiency.
Existing testing assured valve closure. The valve had been observed to fail open during generator no-load operation. The equipment vendor provided technical information to support that the valve failing open was not a major concern; therefore, there was no performance deficiency. The licensee was planning to enhance valve testing.
The vendor provided technical corroboration that the valve failing to open under a load rejection would result in possible KHU damage (PIP-06-1475). The existing licensee document (KC-0085, Keowee Active Valves) has the MT-25 valves listed as a single failure potential. Thus, if one KHU failed during a load rejection scenario, the second KHU would be available to support plant operation on an alternate power path to the plants. The inspectors found this explanation satisfactory.
The inspectors had thought the MT-25 valve was not in the licensees maintenance rule program and was not identified as being in license renewal. Under their maintenance rule program, this licensee identifies basic system functions in lieu of specific components. As indicated in PIP 06-1183, a MT-25 operational state (valve in operation during a KHU no-load run during the original inspection) was evaluated under the KHU super-system function and thus the supporting equipment would be normally evaluated as to its impact on unit operation and operability. The licensee did add an additional definition to the KHU super-system boundary description of the program to describe the protective importance of the MT-25 valves and their impact on providing air admission for smooth unit operation. Due to the fact that the piping drawings had not clearly depicted the valves, the practical result was that the drawing did not capture the valves and associated piping for license renewal. A corrective action was added to fix the drawings and clearly identify the valves in licensee renewal documentation. The correction of the inadvertent omission is acceptable. The fact that the drawing did not clearly show the valve and piping is considered a minor issue without any performance deficiency.
Based on the above review and the lack of a significant deficient condition, URI 05000269,270,287/2006006-002 is considered closed. There were no violations of regulatory requirements.
.4 (Closed) Violation (VIO) 05000269,270,287/2004007-01, Failure to Obtain Prior NRC
Approval to a Change to the Facility Involving Unreviewed Safety Questions on High Energy Line Break
Analysis.
This violation is considered closed based on the review discussed in section 4OA2 above.
4OA6 Management Meetings (Including Exit Meeting)
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Bruce Hamilton, Site Vice President, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 5, 2006. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a NCV.
- Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained as recommended in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Section 9.e of RG 1.33 recommends procedures be prepared for control of maintenance, repair, replacement, and modification work. Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 104, Material Condition/Housekeeping, Cleanliness/Foreign Material Exclusion and Seismic Concerns, contains requirements to prevent foreign object entry into plant systems and components. Contrary to the above, prior to June 14, 2006, adequate foreign material exclusion controls were not implemented for the Unit 1 RBES, in that on June 14 and 15, 2006, foreign material was discovered in the 1A and 1B RBES suction line. The risk significance and enforcement aspects of this issue were discussed in detail in IR 05000269,270,287/2006003 and Section 4OA5.1 of this report.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
- N. Alchaar, Civil Engineering
- K. Alter, Mechanical Engineering Supervisor
- L. Azzarello, Modification Engineering Manager
- S. Batson, Superintendent of Operations
- D. Baxter, Station Manager
- R. Brown, Emergency Preparedness Manager
- T. Bryant, Engineering Support
- A. Burns, Civil Engineer, Reactor & Electrical Systems
- B. Carney, Repair and Replacement Program
- S. Capps, Mechanical/Civil Engineering Manager
- T. Coleman, ISI Coordinator
- N. Constance, Operations Training Manager
- D. Covar, Training Instructor
- C. Curry, Maintenance Manager
- G. Davenport, Compliance Manager
- K. Davis, Corporate Eddy Current Level III Examiner
- P. Downing, Corporate Steam Generator Manager
- C. Eflin, Requalification Supervisor
- P. Earnhardt, Modifications Engineer
- P. Fowler, Access Services Manager, Duke Power
- T. Gillespie, Reactor and Electrical Systems Manager
- J. Gilreath, Site Steam Generator Engineer
- M. Glover, Engineering Manager
- T. Grant, Engineering Supervisor, Reactor & Electrical Systems
- R. Griffith, QA Manager
- B. Hamilton, Site Vice President
- L. Hekking, BACC Program
- R. Hester, Civil Engineer
- D. Hubbard, Training Manager
- T. King, Security Manager
- T. Ledford, Engineering Supervisor, Reactor & Electrical Systems
- L. Llibre, Engineering Supervisor
- D. Mayes, Corporate Consultant Engineer
- R. Murphy, Engineering Support
- S. Neuman, Regulatory Compliance Group
- L. Nicholson, Safety Assurance Manager
- J. Patterson, Engineering Supervisor
- W. Pursley, Radiation Protection Supervising Scientist
- J. Rowell, Engineer, Reactor & Electrical Systems
- J. Smith, Regulatory Affairs
- B. Spear, Engineer, Reactor & Electrical Systems
- J. Steeley, Training Supervisor
- J. Stinson, Engineer, Reactor & Electrical Systems
- P. Stovall, SRG Manager
- S. Townsend, Keowee Operations
- J. Twiggs, Radiation Protection Manager
- J. Weast, Regulatory Compliance
- A. Well, Civil Engineer
NRC
- M. Ernstes, Chief of Reactor Projects Branch 1
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
None
Opened and Closed
None
Closed
- 05000287/2006-01-00 LER Actuation of Emergency Generator Due to Spurious Transfer Lockout (Section 4OA3.3)
- 05000270/2006-01-00 LER Loss of Isolation During Pump Instrument Check Results in Reactor Trip (Section 4OA3.4)
- 05000287/2005-01-00 LER TS LCO Condition Allowed Outage Time and Required Completion Time Exceeded (Section 4OA3.5)
- 05000269/2006003-04 URI Inadequate Foreign Material Exclusion Controls for the Unit 1, A and B Train Reactor Building Emergency Sump Suction Lines (Section 4OA5.1)
- 05000269,270,287/2006006-02 URI Possible Vacuum Breaker Failure Impact to Keowee Emergency Power Function (Section 4OA5.3)
- 05000269,270,287/2004007-01 VIO Failure to Obtain Prior NRC Approval to a Change to the Facility Involving Unreviewed Safety Questions on High Energy Line Break Analysis (Section 4OA5.4)
Items
Discussed
None