IR 05000338/2017009: Difference between revisions

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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 August 15, 2017  
[[Issue date::August 15, 2017]]


Mr. Daniel President and Chief Nuclear Officer Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060
Mr. Daniel President and Chief Nuclear Officer Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060
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==Dear Mr. Stoddard:==
==Dear Mr. Stoddard:==
On July 27, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on July 27, 2017, with Ms. L. Hilbert and other members of your staff. The inspection team documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
On July 27, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on July 27, 2017, with Ms. L. Hilbert and other members of your staff. The inspection team documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection  
 
report.


The NRC inspection team reviewed the plant's corrective action program and the plant's implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the plant was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
The NRC inspection team reviewed the plant's corrective action program and the plant's implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the plant was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
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The inspectors also evaluated the plant's processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the plant's audits and self-assessments. Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
The inspectors also evaluated the plant's processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the plant's audits and self-assessments. Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.


Finally, the inspectors reviewed the plant's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed plant personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the team's observations and the results of these interviews the inspectors found no evidence of challenges to your organization's safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available. The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."
Finally, the inspectors reviewed the plant's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed plant personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the team's observations and the results of these interviews the inspectors found no evidence of challenges to your organization's safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available. The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.
 
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection  
 
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."


Sincerely,/RA/ Reinaldo Rodriguez, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-338, 50-339 License Nos. NPF-4, NPF-7  
Sincerely,/RA/ Reinaldo Rodriguez, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7  
 
Division of Reactor Projects  
 
Docket Nos. 50-338, 50-339 License Nos. NPF-4, NPF-7  


===Enclosure:===
===Enclosure:===
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ML17227A373 OFFICE RII/DRP RII/DCO NRR/DIRS RII/DCO RII/DRP NAME NStaples DPiccirillo DMerzke DTerry-Ward RRodriguez DATE 8/11/2017 8/4/2017 8/4/2017 8/11/2017 8/15/2017 Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II  
ML17227A373 OFFICE RII/DRP RII/DCO NRR/DIRS RII/DCO RII/DRP NAME NStaples DPiccirillo DMerzke DTerry-Ward RRodriguez DATE 8/11/2017 8/4/2017 8/4/2017 8/11/2017 8/15/2017 Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II  


Docket Nos.: 50-338, 50-339 License Nos.: NPF-4, NPF-7 Report Nos.: 05000338/2017009 and 05000339/2017009 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company  
Docket Nos.: 50-338, 50-339  
 
License Nos.: NPF-4, NPF-7  
 
Report Nos.: 05000338/2017009 and 05000339/2017009 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company  


Facility: North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2  
Facility: North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2  


Location: Mineral, VA Dates: July 10 - 14, 2017 July 24 - 27, 2017 Inspectors: N. Staples, Senior Project Inspector, Team Leader D. Piccirillo, Senior Construction Inspector D. Merzke, Senior Reactor Operations Engineer D. Terry-Ward, Construction Inspector Approved by: R. Rodriguez, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects  
Location: Mineral, VA  
 
Dates: July 10 - 14, 2017 July 24 - 27, 2017  
 
Inspectors: N. Staples, Senior Project Inspector, Team Leader D. Piccirillo, Senior Construction Inspector D. Merzke, Senior Reactor Operations Engineer D. Terry-Ward, Construction Inspector  
 
Approved by: R. Rodriguez, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects  


=SUMMARY=
=SUMMARY=
IR 05000338/2017009 and 05000339/2017009; July 10-14 - July 24-27, 2017; North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Biennial Inspection of the Problem Identification and Resolution Report.
IR 05000338/2017009 and 05000339/2017009; July 10-14 - July 24-27, 2017; North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Biennial Inspection of the Problem Identification and Resolution  
 
Report.


The inspection was conducted by a senior project inspector, a senior construction inspector, a senior operations inspector, and a construction inspector. No findings were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 6.
The inspection was conducted by a senior project inspector, a senior construction inspector, a senior operations inspector, and a construction inspector. No findings were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 6.


Identification and Resolution of Problems The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution, as evidenced by the relatively few number of deficiencies identified by external organizations (including the NRC) that had not been previously identified by the licensee during the review period. Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues were adequate, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were adequate, and corrective actions specified for problems were acceptable. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were generally effective and implemented in a timely manner.
Identification and Resolution of Problems  
 
The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution, as evidenced by the relatively few number of deficiencies identified by external organizations (including the NRC) that had not been previously identified by the licensee during t he review period. Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues were adequate, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were adequate, and corrective actions specified for probl ems were acceptable. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were generally effective and implemented in a timely manner.


The inspectors determined that overall, audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified. Operating experience (OE) usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensee's processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations.
The inspectors determined that overall, audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified. Operating experience (OE) usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensee's processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations.
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=REPORT DETAILS=
=REPORT DETAILS=
4. OTHER ACTIVIITES  
4. OTHER ACTIVIITES  


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====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Corrective Action Program (CAP) procedures which described the administrative process for initiating and resolving problems primarily through the use of condition reports (CRs). To verify that problems were properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP, the inspectors reviewed CRs that had been issued between March 2015 and July 2017, including a detailed review of selected CRs associated with the following risk-significant systems:
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Corrective Action Program (CAP) procedures which described the administrative process for initiating and resolving problems primarily through the use of condition reports (CRs). To verify that problems were properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP, the inspectors reviewed CRs that had been issued between March 2015 and July 2017, including a detailed review of selected CRs associated with the following risk-significant systems:
High Head Safety Injection (HHSI), Reactor Protection System (RPS), and Reactor Coolant (RC). Where possible, the inspectors independently verified that the corrective actions (CA) were implemented as intended. The inspectors also reviewed selected common causes and generic concerns associated with root cause evaluations (RCE) to determine if they had been appropriately addressed. To help ensure that samples were reviewed across all cornerstones of safety identified in the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), the inspectors selected a representative number of CRs that were identified and assigned to the major plant departments, including quality assurance, health physics, chemistry, emergency preparedness and security. These CRs were reviewed to assess each department's threshold for identifying and documenting plant problems, thoroughness of evaluations, and adequacy of corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed selected CRs, verified corrective actions were implemented, and attended meetings where CRs were evaluated for significance to determine whether the licensee was identifying, accurately characterizing, and entering problems into the CAP at an appropriate threshold. The inspectors conducted plant walkdowns within the selected systems listed above and other plant areas to assess the material condition and to identify any deficiencies that had not been previously entered into the CAP. The inspectors reviewed CRs, maintenance history, CAs, completed work orders (WOs) for the systems, and reviewed associated system health reports. These reviews were performed to verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP. Items reviewed generally covered a two-year period; however, in accordance with the inspection procedure, a five-year review was performed for selected systems for age-dependent issues. Control room walk-downs were also performed to assess the main control room (MCR) deficiency list and to ascertain if deficiencies were entered into the CAP and tracked to resolution. Operator workarounds (OWA) and operator burden screenings were reviewed, and the inspectors verified compensatory measures for deficient equipment which were being implemented in the field.
High Head Safety Injection (HHSI), Reacto r Protection System (RPS), and Reactor Coolant (RC). Where possible, the inspectors independently verified that the corrective actions (CA) were implemented as intended. The inspectors also reviewed selected common causes and generic concerns associated with root cause evaluations (RCE) to determine if they had been appropriately addressed. To help ensure that samples were reviewed across all cornerstones of safety identified in the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), the inspectors selected a representative number of CRs that were identified and assigned to the major plant departments, including quality assurance, health physics, chemistry, emergency preparedness and security. These CRs were reviewed to assess each department's threshold for identifying and documenting plant problems, thoroughness of evaluations, and adequacy of corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed selected CRs, verified corrective actions were implemented, and attended meetings where CRs were evaluated for significance to determine whether the licensee was identifying, accurately characterizing, and entering problems into the CAP at an appropriate threshold.
 
The inspectors conducted plant walkdowns within the selected systems listed above and other plant areas to assess the material condition and to identify any deficiencies that had not been previously entered into the CAP. The inspectors reviewed CRs,  
 
maintenance history, CAs, completed work orders (WOs) for the systems, and reviewed associated system health reports. These reviews were performed to verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP. Items reviewed generally covered a two-year period; however, in accordance with the inspection procedure, a five-year review was performed for selected systems for age-dependent issues. Control room walk-downs were also performed to assess the main control room (MCR) deficiency list and to ascertain if deficiencies were entered into the CAP and tracked to resolution. Operator workarounds (OWA) and operator burden screenings were reviewed, and the inspectors verified com pensatory measures for deficient equipment which were being implemented in the field.


The inspectors conducted a detailed review of selected CRs to assess the adequacy of the cause evaluations of the problems identified. The inspectors reviewed these evaluations against the descriptions of the problem described in the CRs and the guidance in licensee procedure PI-AA-300-3001, "Root Cause Evaluation." The inspectors assessed if the licensee had adequately determined the cause(s) of identified problems, and had adequately addressed operability, reportability, common cause, generic concerns, extent-of-condition, and extent-of-cause. The review also assessed if the licensee had appropriately identified and prioritized corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of selected CRs to assess the adequacy of the cause evaluations of the problems identified. The inspectors reviewed these evaluations against the descriptions of the problem described in the CRs and the guidance in licensee procedure PI-AA-300-3001, "Root Cause Evaluation." The inspectors assessed if the licensee had adequately determined the cause(s) of identified problems, and had adequately addressed operability, reportability, common cause, generic concerns, extent-of-condition, and extent-of-cause. The review also assessed if the licensee had appropriately identified and prioritized corrective actions to prevent recurrence.


The inspectors reviewed selected industry operating experience (OE) items, including NRC generic communications, to verify that they had been appropriately evaluated for applicability and that issues identified through these reviews had been entered into the CAP.
The inspectors reviewed selected industry oper ating experience (OE) items, including NRC generic communications, to verify that they had been appropriately evaluated for applicability and that issues identified through these reviews had been entered into the CAP.


The inspectors reviewed site trend reports, to determine if the licensee effectively trended identified issues and initiated appropriate corrective actions when adverse trends were identified.
The inspectors reviewed site trend reports, to determine if the licensee effectively trended identified issues and initiated appropriate corrective actions when adverse trends were identified.
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Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.


b. Assessment Problem Identification The inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in identifying problems and entering them into the CAP and there was an appropriately low threshold for entering issues into the CAP. This conclusion was based on a review of the requirements for initiating CRs as described in licensee procedure PI-AA-200, "Corrective Action," in addition to management's expectation that employees were encouraged to initiate CRs for any reason. Trending was generally effective in monitoring equipment performance. Site management was actively involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues.
b. Assessment Problem Identification  
 
The inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in identifying problems and entering them into the CAP and there was an appropriately low threshold for entering issues into the CAP. This conclusion was based on a review of the requirements for initiating CRs as described in licensee procedure PI-AA-200, "Corrective Action," in addition to management's expectation that employees were encouraged to initiate CRs for any reason. Trending was generally effective in monitoring equipment performance. Site management was actively involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues.
 
Problem Prioritization and Evaluation


Problem Prioritization and Evaluation Based on the review of CRs sampled by the inspection inspectors during the onsite period, the inspectors concluded that problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in accordance with the licensee's CAP procedures as described in the CR significance determination guidance in PI-AA-200. Each CR was assigned a priority level at the CR screening meeting, and adequate consideration was given to system or component operability and associated plant risk.
Based on the review of CRs sampled by the inspection inspectors during the onsite period, the inspectors concluded that problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in accordance with the licensee's CAP procedures as described in the CR significance determination guidance in PI-AA-200. Each CR was assigned a priority level at the CR screening meeting, and adequate consideration was given to system or component operability and associated plant risk.


The inspectors determined that station personnel had conducted root cause and apparent cause analyses in compliance with the licensee's CAP procedures and assigned cause determinations were appropriate, considering the significance of the issues being evaluated. A variety of formal causal-analysis techniques were used depending on the type and complexity of the issue consistent with procedures.
The inspectors determined that station personnel had conducted root cause and apparent cause analyses in compliance with the licensee's CAP procedures and assigned cause determinations were appropriate, considering the significance of the issues being evaluated. A variety of formal causal-analysis techniques were used depending on the type and complexity of the issue consistent with procedures.


Effectiveness of Corrective Actions Based on a review of corrective action documents, interviews with licensee staff, and verification of completed corrective actions, the inspectors determined that overall, corrective actions were timely, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues, and effective, in that conditions adverse to quality were corrected and non-recurring. For significant conditions adverse to quality, the corrective actions directly addressed the cause and effectively prevented recurrence in that a review of performance indicators, CRs, and effectiveness reviews demonstrated that the significant conditions adverse to quality had not recurred. Effectiveness reviews for corrective actions to prevent recurrence were sufficient to ensure corrective actions were properly implemented and were effective.
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions  
 
Based on a review of corrective action documents, interviews with licensee staff, and verification of completed corrective actions, the inspectors determined that overall, corrective actions were timely, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues, and effective, in that conditions adverse to quality were corrected and non-recurring. For significant conditions adverse to quality, the corrective actions directly addressed the cause and effectively prevented recurrence in that a review of performance indicators, CRs, and effectiveness reviews demonstrated that the significant conditions adverse to quality had not recurred. Effectiveness reviews for corrective actions to prevent recurrence were sufficient to ensure corrective actions were properly implemented and were effective.


====c. Findings====
====c. Findings====
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The inspectors examined the licensee's use of industry OE to assess the effectiveness of the plant. In addition, the inspectors selected OE documents (e.g., NRC generic communications, 10 CFR Part 21 reports, licensee event reports, vendor notifications, and plant internal OE items, etc.) which had been issued since June 2015, to verify whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated each notification for applicability to the North Anna Power Station, and whether issues identified through these reviews were entered into the CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
The inspectors examined the licensee's use of industry OE to assess the effectiveness of the plant. In addition, the inspectors selected OE documents (e.g., NRC generic communications, 10 CFR Part 21 reports, licensee event reports, vendor notifications, and plant internal OE items, etc.) which had been issued since June 2015, to verify whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated each notification for applicability to the North Anna Power Station, and whether issues identified through these reviews were entered into the CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.


b. Assessment Based on a review of selected documentation related to operating experience issues, the inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in screening operating experience for applicability to the plant. Industry OE was evaluated at either the corporate or plant level depending on the source and type of the document. Relevant information was then forwarded to the applicable department for further action or informational purposes. OE issues requiring action were entered into the CAP for tracking and closure. In addition, operating experience was included in all root cause evaluations in accordance with licensee procedure PI-AA-300-3001, "Root Cause Evaluation."
b. Assessment Based on a review of selected documentation related to operating experience issues, the inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in screening operating experience for applicability to the plant. Industry OE was evaluated at either the corporate or plant level depending on the source and type of the document. Relevant information was then forwarded to the applicable department for further action or informational purposes. OE issues requiring action were entered into the CAP for tracking and closure. In addition, operating experience was included in all root cause evaluations in accordance with licensee procedure PI-AA-300-3001, "Root Cause  
 
Evaluation."


====c. Findings====
====c. Findings====
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====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed audit reports and self-assessment reports, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution, to assess the thoroughness and self-criticism of the licensee's audits and self-assessments, and to verify that problems identified through those activities were appropriately prioritized and entered into the CAP for resolution in accordance with licensee procedure PI-AA-100-1004, "Self Assessments."     b. Assessment The inspectors determined that the scopes of assessments and audits were adequate. Self-assessments were generally detailed and critical, as evidenced by findings consistent with the inspector's independent review. The inspectors verified that CRs were created to document areas for improvement and findings resulting from the self-assessments, and verified that actions had been completed consistent with those recommendations. Generally, the licensee performed evaluations that were technically accurate.
The inspectors reviewed audit reports and self-assessment reports, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution, to assess the thoroughness and self-criticism of the licensee's audits and self-assessments, and to verify that problems identified through those activities were appropriately prioritized and entered into the CAP for resolution in accordance with licensee procedure PI-AA-100-1004, "Self Assessments."
 
b. Assessment The inspectors determined that the scopes of assessments and audits were adequate.
 
Self-assessments were generally detailed and critical, as evidenced by findings consistent with the inspector's independent review. The inspectors verified that CRs were created to document areas for improvement and findings resulting from the self-assessments, and verified that actions had been completed consistent with those recommendations. Generally, the licensee performed evaluations that were technically accurate.


====c. Findings====
====c. Findings====
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During the course of the inspection, the inspectors assessed the station's safety-conscious work environment through review of the stations Employee Concerns Program (ECP) and interviews with various departmental personnel. The inspectors reviewed a sample of ECP issues to verify that concerns were being properly reviewed and identified deficiencies were being resolved and entered into the CAP when appropriate.
During the course of the inspection, the inspectors assessed the station's safety-conscious work environment through review of the stations Employee Concerns Program (ECP) and interviews with various departmental personnel. The inspectors reviewed a sample of ECP issues to verify that concerns were being properly reviewed and identified deficiencies were being resolved and entered into the CAP when appropriate.


b. Assessment Based on the interviews conducted and the CRs reviewed, the inspectors determined that licensee management emphasized the need for all employees to identify and report problems using the appropriate methods established within the administrative programs, including the CAP and ECP. These methods were readily accessible to all employees. Based on discussions conducted with a sample of plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that employees felt free to raise issues, and that management encouraged employees to place issues into the CAP for resolution. The inspectors did not identify any reluctance on the part of the licensee staff to report safety concerns.
b. Assessment Based on the interviews conducted and the CRs reviewed, the inspectors determined that licensee management emphasized the need for all employees to identify and report problems using the appropriate methods established within the administrative programs, including the CAP and ECP. These methods were readily accessible to all employees.
 
Based on discussions conducted with a samp le of plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that employees felt free to raise issues, and that management encouraged employees to place issues into the CAP for resolution. The inspectors did not identify any reluctance on the part of the licensee staff to report safety concerns.


====c. Findings====
====c. Findings====
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==4OA6 Exit==
==4OA6 Exit==


=====Exit Meeting Summary=====
===Exit Meeting Summary===


On July 27, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Ms. Lisa Hilbert and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
On July 27, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Ms. Lisa Hilbert and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
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: [[contact::C. Allmond]], Buried Piping Engineer  
: [[contact::C. Allmond]], Buried Piping Engineer  
: [[contact::A. McEnroe]], Maintenance Rule Engineer  
: [[contact::A. McEnroe]], Maintenance Rule Engineer  
: [[contact::M. Bordeau]], Maintenance Rule Engineer
: [[contact::M. Bordeau]], Maintenance Rule Engineer  
 
===NRC personnel===
===NRC personnel===
: G.Eatmon, Resident Inspector  
: G.Eatmon, Resident Inspector  
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===Opened and Closed===
===Opened and Closed===
None  
None  


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: 1-FCA-11, Safeguards/Quench Spray Pump House/MSVH Fire (with Eight Attachments), Rev. 8  
: 1-FCA-11, Safeguards/Quench Spray Pump House/MSVH Fire (with Eight Attachments), Rev. 8  
: 1-MPM-0412-02, Mechanical Preventive Maintenance, Disconnecting and Stroking the Unit 1   
: 1-MPM-0412-02, Mechanical Preventive Maintenance, Disconnecting and Stroking the Unit 1   
: Terry Turbine Governor Valve Stem, Rev. 2 2-MPM-0412-02, Mechanical Preventive Maintenance, Disconnecting and Stroking the Unit 2
: Terry Turbine Governor Valve Stem, Rev.
: Terry Turbine Governor Valve Stem, Rev 5.
: 2-MPM-0412-02, Mechanical Preventive Maintenance, Disconnecting and Stroking the Unit 2
: Terry Turbine Governor Valve Stem, Rev
: 5.
: ER-AA-MRL-10, Maintenance Rule Program, Rev. 4, 6
: ER-AA-MRL-10, Maintenance Rule Program, Rev. 4, 6
: ER-AA-MRL-100, Implementing Maintenance Rule, Rev. 11
: ER-AA-MRL-100, Implementing Maintenance Rule, Rev. 11
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: ER-AA-PRS-1010, Preventative Maintenance Task Basis & Maintenance Strategy, Rev. 10
: ER-AA-PRS-1010, Preventative Maintenance Task Basis & Maintenance Strategy, Rev. 10
: ER-AA-SYS-1001, System Health Report, Rev. 11
: ER-AA-SYS-1001, System Health Report, Rev. 11
: ER-AA-SYS-1003, System Performance Monitoring, Rev. 6
: ER-AA-SYS-1003, System Perfor mance Monitoring, Rev. 6
: ER-AA-5003, Life Cycle Management Planning, Rev. 8
: ER-AA-5003, Life Cycle Management Planning, Rev. 8
: NCRODP-77-NA Module, Reactor Protection Systems, dated 01/27/14
: NCRODP-77-NA Module, Reactor Protection Systems, dated 01/27/14
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: PI-AA-300-3006, Equipment Apparent Cause Evaluation (E-ACE), Rev. 2   
: PI-AA-300-3006, Equipment Apparent Cause Evaluation (E-ACE), Rev. 2   
===Condition Reports===
===Condition Reports===
: Reviewed1066672
: Reviewed
: 1066672
: 1066043
: 1066043
: 1065665
: 1065665
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: 1074281, CAPR Effectiveness   
: 1074281, CAPR Effectiveness   
===Work Orders===
===Work Orders===
: Reviewed 59102953486 59103009068  
: Reviewed  
: 59102953486  
: 59103009068  
: 59102858264  
: 59102858264  
: 59102971001  
: 59102971001  
: 59102971021 59103045083 59102858264  
: 59102971021  
: 59103045083  
: 59102858264  
: 59102962896  
: 59102962896  
: 59102644515  
: 59102644515  
: 59103032787 59102850984 59102851277  
: 59103032787  
: 59102850984  
: 59102851277  
: 59102888162  
: 59102888162  
: Self-Assessments Audit 16-04, Nuclear Oversight Audit Report, RP/Chemistry/PCP/Millstone Refueling, dated
: Self-Assessments Audit 16-04, Nuclear Oversight Audit Report, RP/Chemistry/PCP/Millstone Refueling, dated
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: PI-AA-200-202, Attachment 2, Apparent Cause Evaluation Effectiveness Review,   
: PI-AA-200-202, Attachment 2, Apparent Cause Evaluation Effectiveness Review,   
: 1-FW-P-2 governor did not maintain speed during PT, review date 3/27/15 E-ACE/CR #1049899,
: 1-FW-P-2 governor did not maintain speed during PT, review date 3/27/15 E-ACE/CR #1049899,
: PI-AA-300-3006, Equipment Cause Evaluation Checklist, Attachment 1,     validated 10/31/2016  
: PI-AA-300-3006, Equipment Cause Evaluation Checklist, Attachment 1, validated 10/31/2016  
: Self-Assessment, PIR Number
: Self-Assessment, PIR Number
: 1019503, Radiological Protection -Chemistry Quality Control,
: 1019503, Radiological Protection -Chemistry Quality Control,
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: Self-Assessment, PIR Number
: Self-Assessment, PIR Number
: 1010037, Diesel Fuel Oil Program, Report Due Date 11/30/2015 Self-Assessment PIR Number
: 1010037, Diesel Fuel Oil Program, Report Due Date 11/30/2015 Self-Assessment PIR Number
: 1059147, Respiratory Protection Program, Report Due Date
: 1059147, Respiratory Protection Program, Report Due Date  
: 06-30-2017  
: 06-30-2017  
: Self-Assessment PIR Number
: Self-Assessment PIR Number
: 1064399, Radiological Protection, dated Feb. 2017  
: 1064399, Radiological Protection, dated Feb. 2017  
: Self-Assessment PIR1008212, North Anna Maintenance Rule (a) (3) Periodic Assessment,    report due date 12/17/2015 Self-Assessment PIR1020781, Pre-PI&R Assessment, report due date 7/22/16
: Self-Assessment PIR1008212, North Anna Maintenance Rule (a) (3) Periodic Assessment,    report due date 12/17/2015 Self-Assessment PIR1020781, Pre-PI&R Assessment, report due date
: 7/22/16
: RCE001135, Root Cause Evaluation, U-1 Voltage Regulator Failed High Resulting in U1   
: RCE001135, Root Cause Evaluation, U-1 Voltage Regulator Failed High Resulting in U1   
: Manual Reactor Trip, North Anna Power Station/Unit 1, 07/15/2015   
: Manual Reactor Trip, North Anna Power Station/Unit 1, 07/15/2015   
Line 368: Line 422:
: ME-0572, Addendum D, TDAFW Pump Operation at the Point the RHR System is Placed in Service OD: 2-SI-P-1A Seal Leakage Operability Determination  
: ME-0572, Addendum D, TDAFW Pump Operation at the Point the RHR System is Placed in Service OD: 2-SI-P-1A Seal Leakage Operability Determination  
: RCE001134, Unit 1 Reactor Trip on 'B' Steam Generator Low-Low Level Due to 'B' Main Feed Regulating Valve Failing Closed System Health Report - Safety Injection Q4-2016  
: RCE001134, Unit 1 Reactor Trip on 'B' Steam Generator Low-Low Level Due to 'B' Main Feed Regulating Valve Failing Closed System Health Report - Safety Injection Q4-2016  
: SAR PIR1008212 - NAPS Maintenance Rule (a)(3) Self-Assessment Trip Report N1-02-26-15, North Anna Unit 1 Trip 02-26-15
: SAR PIR1008212 - NAPS Maintenance Rule (a)(3) Self-Assessment  
: Trip Report N1-02-26-15, North Anna Unit 1 Trip 02-26-15
: DOM-QA-1, Dominion Energy, Nuclear Facility Quality Assurance Program Description,
: DOM-QA-1, Dominion Energy, Nuclear Facility Quality Assurance Program Description,
: Topical Report, Rev. 25
: Topical Report, Rev. 25
Line 375: Line 430:
: LER 2015-002-01, Manual Reactor Trip Due to Inability to Maintain Main Generator Voltage in
: LER 2015-002-01, Manual Reactor Trip Due to Inability to Maintain Main Generator Voltage in
: Specification, report date 09/03/2015 CA3012691, CR Assignment Details, North Anna Design to create an ETE to formally document results so they may be added to the AP, complete 02/19/2016  
: Specification, report date 09/03/2015 CA3012691, CR Assignment Details, North Anna Design to create an ETE to formally document results so they may be added to the AP, complete 02/19/2016  
: CA3015121, CR Assignment Details, During the 2015 TFPI, a discrepancy was noted in Appendix R procedure 2-FCA-11 (SG/QS/MSVH Fire), complete 11/19/2015 CA3016110, Implement revisions to procedure 1 / 2-FCA-11, complete 02/16/2016 CA3017882, Perform MRule Functional Failure evaluation for TSC UPS UV transfer light lite, complete 12/17/2015  
: CA3015121, CR Assignment Details, During the 2015 TFPI, a discrepancy was noted in
: Appendix R procedure 2-FCA-11 (SG/QS/MSVH Fire), complete 11/19/2015 CA3016110, Implement revisions to procedure 1 / 2-FCA-11, complete 02/16/2016 CA3017882, Perform MRule Functional Failure evaluation for TSC UPS UV transfer light lite,
 
complete 12/17/2015  
: CA303242,
: CA303242,
: ER-AA-PRS-1003, Criticality Classification Revision Request, Attachment 1, page 1, approval date 8/3/15  
: ER-AA-PRS-1003, Criticality Classification Revision Request, Attachment 1, page 1, approval date 8/3/15  
: CA3035136, Perform MRule Functional Failure evaluation-TSC UPS Battery Ground,     complete 08/11/2016 CA3036784, Perform MRule Functional Failure evaluation (1-EP-27C-1NNSF05-RELAY-F   
: CA3035136, Perform MRule Functional Failure evaluation-TSC UPS Battery Ground, complete 08/11/2016 CA3036784, Perform MRule Functional Failure evaluation (1-EP-27C-1NNSF05-RELAY-F   
 
   (0B-C), complete 08/11/2016  
   (0B-C), complete 08/11/2016  
: CA3047691, Perform MRule Functional Failure evaluation TSC UPS "Bypass Breaker Closed"    & "UPS OFF" Alarms on 1, complete 01/25/2017
: CA3047691, Perform MRule Functional Failure evaluation TSC UPS "Bypass Breaker Closed"    & "UPS OFF" Alarms on 1, complete 01/25/2017
Line 395: Line 454:
: PI-AA-5003, CR number
: PI-AA-5003, CR number
: 1036687, Engineering Personnel identified that 1-CH-P-1C, Unit 1 "C"
: 1036687, Engineering Personnel identified that 1-CH-P-1C, Unit 1 "C"
: Charging pump, had exceeded its unavailability performance criteria back in December 2015,   completed 5/11/16
: Charging pump, had exceeded its unavailability performance criteria back in December 2015, completed 5/11/16
}}
}}

Revision as of 15:13, 29 June 2018

North Anna - NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000338/2017009 and 05000339/2017009
ML17227A373
Person / Time
Site: North Anna  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 08/15/2017
From: Reinaldo Rodriguez
Reactor Projects Branch 7
To: Stoddard D G
Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
IR 2017009
Download: ML17227A373 (14)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 August 15, 2017

Mr. Daniel President and Chief Nuclear Officer Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060

SUBJECT: NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2017009 AND 05000339/2017009

Dear Mr. Stoddard:

On July 27, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on July 27, 2017, with Ms. L. Hilbert and other members of your staff. The inspection team documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection

report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the plant's corrective action program and the plant's implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the plant was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

The inspectors also evaluated the plant's processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the plant's audits and self-assessments. Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

Finally, the inspectors reviewed the plant's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed plant personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the team's observations and the results of these interviews the inspectors found no evidence of challenges to your organization's safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available. The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection

and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,/RA/ Reinaldo Rodriguez, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-338, 50-339 License Nos. NPF-4, NPF-7

Enclosure:

IR 05000338/2017009 and 05000339/2017009

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information cc Distribution via ListServ

ML17227A373 OFFICE RII/DRP RII/DCO NRR/DIRS RII/DCO RII/DRP NAME NStaples DPiccirillo DMerzke DTerry-Ward RRodriguez DATE 8/11/2017 8/4/2017 8/4/2017 8/11/2017 8/15/2017 Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II

Docket Nos.: 50-338, 50-339

License Nos.: NPF-4, NPF-7

Report Nos.: 05000338/2017009 and 05000339/2017009 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company

Facility: North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2

Location: Mineral, VA

Dates: July 10 - 14, 2017 July 24 - 27, 2017

Inspectors: N. Staples, Senior Project Inspector, Team Leader D. Piccirillo, Senior Construction Inspector D. Merzke, Senior Reactor Operations Engineer D. Terry-Ward, Construction Inspector

Approved by: R. Rodriguez, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

IR 05000338/2017009 and 05000339/2017009; July 10-14 - July 24-27, 2017; North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Biennial Inspection of the Problem Identification and Resolution

Report.

The inspection was conducted by a senior project inspector, a senior construction inspector, a senior operations inspector, and a construction inspector. No findings were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 6.

Identification and Resolution of Problems

The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution, as evidenced by the relatively few number of deficiencies identified by external organizations (including the NRC) that had not been previously identified by the licensee during t he review period. Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues were adequate, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were adequate, and corrective actions specified for probl ems were acceptable. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were generally effective and implemented in a timely manner.

The inspectors determined that overall, audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified. Operating experience (OE) usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensee's processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations.

Based on discussions and interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve those concerns.

REPORT DETAILS

4. OTHER ACTIVIITES

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Corrective Action Program (CAP) procedures which described the administrative process for initiating and resolving problems primarily through the use of condition reports (CRs). To verify that problems were properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP, the inspectors reviewed CRs that had been issued between March 2015 and July 2017, including a detailed review of selected CRs associated with the following risk-significant systems:

High Head Safety Injection (HHSI), Reacto r Protection System (RPS), and Reactor Coolant (RC). Where possible, the inspectors independently verified that the corrective actions (CA) were implemented as intended. The inspectors also reviewed selected common causes and generic concerns associated with root cause evaluations (RCE) to determine if they had been appropriately addressed. To help ensure that samples were reviewed across all cornerstones of safety identified in the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), the inspectors selected a representative number of CRs that were identified and assigned to the major plant departments, including quality assurance, health physics, chemistry, emergency preparedness and security. These CRs were reviewed to assess each department's threshold for identifying and documenting plant problems, thoroughness of evaluations, and adequacy of corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed selected CRs, verified corrective actions were implemented, and attended meetings where CRs were evaluated for significance to determine whether the licensee was identifying, accurately characterizing, and entering problems into the CAP at an appropriate threshold.

The inspectors conducted plant walkdowns within the selected systems listed above and other plant areas to assess the material condition and to identify any deficiencies that had not been previously entered into the CAP. The inspectors reviewed CRs,

maintenance history, CAs, completed work orders (WOs) for the systems, and reviewed associated system health reports. These reviews were performed to verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP. Items reviewed generally covered a two-year period; however, in accordance with the inspection procedure, a five-year review was performed for selected systems for age-dependent issues. Control room walk-downs were also performed to assess the main control room (MCR) deficiency list and to ascertain if deficiencies were entered into the CAP and tracked to resolution. Operator workarounds (OWA) and operator burden screenings were reviewed, and the inspectors verified com pensatory measures for deficient equipment which were being implemented in the field.

The inspectors conducted a detailed review of selected CRs to assess the adequacy of the cause evaluations of the problems identified. The inspectors reviewed these evaluations against the descriptions of the problem described in the CRs and the guidance in licensee procedure PI-AA-300-3001, "Root Cause Evaluation." The inspectors assessed if the licensee had adequately determined the cause(s) of identified problems, and had adequately addressed operability, reportability, common cause, generic concerns, extent-of-condition, and extent-of-cause. The review also assessed if the licensee had appropriately identified and prioritized corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

The inspectors reviewed selected industry oper ating experience (OE) items, including NRC generic communications, to verify that they had been appropriately evaluated for applicability and that issues identified through these reviews had been entered into the CAP.

The inspectors reviewed site trend reports, to determine if the licensee effectively trended identified issues and initiated appropriate corrective actions when adverse trends were identified.

The inspectors reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution programs and processes, to verify that findings were entered into the CAP and to verify that these audits and assessments were consistent with the NRC's assessment of the licensee's CAP.

The inspectors attended various plant meetings to observe management oversight functions of the corrective action process. These meetings included Condition Report Review Team (CRT) and Corrective Action Assignment Review Team (CAART).

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Assessment Problem Identification

The inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in identifying problems and entering them into the CAP and there was an appropriately low threshold for entering issues into the CAP. This conclusion was based on a review of the requirements for initiating CRs as described in licensee procedure PI-AA-200, "Corrective Action," in addition to management's expectation that employees were encouraged to initiate CRs for any reason. Trending was generally effective in monitoring equipment performance. Site management was actively involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues.

Problem Prioritization and Evaluation

Based on the review of CRs sampled by the inspection inspectors during the onsite period, the inspectors concluded that problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in accordance with the licensee's CAP procedures as described in the CR significance determination guidance in PI-AA-200. Each CR was assigned a priority level at the CR screening meeting, and adequate consideration was given to system or component operability and associated plant risk.

The inspectors determined that station personnel had conducted root cause and apparent cause analyses in compliance with the licensee's CAP procedures and assigned cause determinations were appropriate, considering the significance of the issues being evaluated. A variety of formal causal-analysis techniques were used depending on the type and complexity of the issue consistent with procedures.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

Based on a review of corrective action documents, interviews with licensee staff, and verification of completed corrective actions, the inspectors determined that overall, corrective actions were timely, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues, and effective, in that conditions adverse to quality were corrected and non-recurring. For significant conditions adverse to quality, the corrective actions directly addressed the cause and effectively prevented recurrence in that a review of performance indicators, CRs, and effectiveness reviews demonstrated that the significant conditions adverse to quality had not recurred. Effectiveness reviews for corrective actions to prevent recurrence were sufficient to ensure corrective actions were properly implemented and were effective.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors examined the licensee's use of industry OE to assess the effectiveness of the plant. In addition, the inspectors selected OE documents (e.g., NRC generic communications, 10 CFR Part 21 reports, licensee event reports, vendor notifications, and plant internal OE items, etc.) which had been issued since June 2015, to verify whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated each notification for applicability to the North Anna Power Station, and whether issues identified through these reviews were entered into the CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Assessment Based on a review of selected documentation related to operating experience issues, the inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in screening operating experience for applicability to the plant. Industry OE was evaluated at either the corporate or plant level depending on the source and type of the document. Relevant information was then forwarded to the applicable department for further action or informational purposes. OE issues requiring action were entered into the CAP for tracking and closure. In addition, operating experience was included in all root cause evaluations in accordance with licensee procedure PI-AA-300-3001, "Root Cause

Evaluation."

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed audit reports and self-assessment reports, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution, to assess the thoroughness and self-criticism of the licensee's audits and self-assessments, and to verify that problems identified through those activities were appropriately prioritized and entered into the CAP for resolution in accordance with licensee procedure PI-AA-100-1004, "Self Assessments."

b. Assessment The inspectors determined that the scopes of assessments and audits were adequate.

Self-assessments were generally detailed and critical, as evidenced by findings consistent with the inspector's independent review. The inspectors verified that CRs were created to document areas for improvement and findings resulting from the self-assessments, and verified that actions had been completed consistent with those recommendations. Generally, the licensee performed evaluations that were technically accurate.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

During the course of the inspection, the inspectors assessed the station's safety-conscious work environment through review of the stations Employee Concerns Program (ECP) and interviews with various departmental personnel. The inspectors reviewed a sample of ECP issues to verify that concerns were being properly reviewed and identified deficiencies were being resolved and entered into the CAP when appropriate.

b. Assessment Based on the interviews conducted and the CRs reviewed, the inspectors determined that licensee management emphasized the need for all employees to identify and report problems using the appropriate methods established within the administrative programs, including the CAP and ECP. These methods were readily accessible to all employees.

Based on discussions conducted with a samp le of plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that employees felt free to raise issues, and that management encouraged employees to place issues into the CAP for resolution. The inspectors did not identify any reluctance on the part of the licensee staff to report safety concerns.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On July 27, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Ms. Lisa Hilbert and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

W. Belcher, ECP Specialist
J. Tew, Engineering
D. McGinnis, Station Licensing
L. Hembree, Engineering
J. Schleser, Manager Organization Effectiveness
F. Errico, CAP Supervisor
P. Harper, CAP Coordinator
L. Hilbert, Plant Manager
B. Standley, Director Station Safety and Licensing
C. Staub, System Engineer - SI
A. Dowell, System Engineer - 7300 System
C. Allmond, Buried Piping Engineer
A. McEnroe, Maintenance Rule Engineer
M. Bordeau, Maintenance Rule Engineer

NRC personnel

G.Eatmon, Resident Inspector

LIST OF REPORT ITEMS

Opened and Closed

None

Closed

None

Discussed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures

0-MCM-0412-02, Mechanical Corrective Maintenance, Repair of the Terry Turbine Governor
Valve, Rev.12
1-FCA-11, Safeguards/Quench Spray Pump House/MSVH Fire (with Eight Attachments), Rev. 8
1-MPM-0412-02, Mechanical Preventive Maintenance, Disconnecting and Stroking the Unit 1
Terry Turbine Governor Valve Stem, Rev.
2-MPM-0412-02, Mechanical Preventive Maintenance, Disconnecting and Stroking the Unit 2
Terry Turbine Governor Valve Stem, Rev
5.
ER-AA-MRL-10, Maintenance Rule Program, Rev. 4, 6
ER-AA-MRL-100, Implementing Maintenance Rule, Rev. 11
ER-AA-PRS-1002, Equipment Reliability Health Report, Rev. 8
ER-AA-PRS-1003, Equipment Reliability Component Classification, Rev. 8
ER-AA-PRS-1005, Single Point Vulnerability Reviews, Rev. 5
ER-AA-PRS-1010, Preventative Maintenance Task Basis & Maintenance Strategy, Rev. 10
ER-AA-SYS-1001, System Health Report, Rev. 11
ER-AA-SYS-1003, System Perfor mance Monitoring, Rev. 6
ER-AA-5003, Life Cycle Management Planning, Rev. 8
NCRODP-77-NA Module, Reactor Protection Systems, dated 01/27/14
OP-AA-102, Operability Determination, Rev. 15
PI-AA-100-1004, Self-Assessments, Rev.14
PI-AA-100-1007, Operating Experience Program, Rev. 11
PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Rev. 33
PI-AA-300-3001, Root Cause Evaluation, Rev. 4
PI-AA-300-3004, Cause Evaluation Methods, Rev. 14
PI-AA-300-3006, Equipment Apparent Cause Evaluation (E-ACE), Rev. 2

Condition Reports

Reviewed
1066672
1066043
1065665
1063116
1061681
1060157
1059499
1058694
1058146
1058021
1057678
1057271
1057083
1057028
1057008
1056808
1056668
1056445
1056261
1054993
1053945
1053945
1053159
1052562
1051150
1051148
1050193
1050034
1049899
1049360
1049138
1049083
1048545
1046790
1046295
1043540
1043504
1036687
1036685
1036685
1035531
1035524
1035423
1035092
1034958
1034362
1033334
1032774
1032635
1032194
1032073
1030340
1030226
29740
29600
28572
1026841
1026762
26761
26760
22542
21404
1018274
1018149
1018121
1018070
1017291
1017291
1017083
1016138
1014249
1013669
1013471
1012468
1012062
1010887
1010787
1010424
1009815
1006865
1005386
1005293
1003896
1000248
1045674
1039593
1039545
1046659
1017083
1064702
1065752
1065817
558708
2760
2757
581157
580183
579372
578896
578841
572760
577601
575828
575498
575447
575433
575430
575429
575390
575223
575035
574869
574800
574429
573729
573617
573505
573491
573349
2803
2803
572768
572760
2757
571983
571591
570769
568000
567185
567122
560854
559591
553025
540937
532383
001138
001135

Condition Reports

Generated
1074281, CAPR Effectiveness

Work Orders

Reviewed
59102953486
59103009068
59102858264
59102971001
59102971021
59103045083
59102858264
59102962896
59102644515
59103032787
59102850984
59102851277
59102888162
Self-Assessments Audit 16-04, Nuclear Oversight Audit Report, RP/Chemistry/PCP/Millstone Refueling, dated
June 22, 2016
ACE 019889,
PI-AA-300-3002, Attachment 1, CR#572803, 1-FW-P-2 governor did not maintain speed during PT, event dated 12/27/2015
ACE 019889,
PI-AA-200-202, Attachment 2, Apparent Cause Evaluation Effectiveness Review,
1-FW-P-2 governor did not maintain speed during PT, review date 3/27/15 E-ACE/CR #1049899,
PI-AA-300-3006, Equipment Cause Evaluation Checklist, Attachment 1, validated 10/31/2016
Self-Assessment, PIR Number
1019503, Radiological Protection -Chemistry Quality Control,
Performance Improvement, Report Due Date 4/30/2016
Self-Assessment, PIR Number
1010037, Diesel Fuel Oil Program, Report Due Date 11/30/2015 Self-Assessment PIR Number
1059147, Respiratory Protection Program, Report Due Date
06-30-2017
Self-Assessment PIR Number
1064399, Radiological Protection, dated Feb. 2017
Self-Assessment PIR1008212, North Anna Maintenance Rule (a) (3) Periodic Assessment, report due date 12/17/2015 Self-Assessment PIR1020781, Pre-PI&R Assessment, report due date
7/22/16
RCE001135, Root Cause Evaluation, U-1 Voltage Regulator Failed High Resulting in U1
Manual Reactor Trip, North Anna Power Station/Unit 1, 07/15/2015

Other Documents

Calc
ME-0584, Addendum ODA, Maximum AFW Pump Flow and NPSH Analysis Calc
ME-0572, Addendum D, TDAFW Pump Operation at the Point the RHR System is Placed in Service OD: 2-SI-P-1A Seal Leakage Operability Determination
RCE001134, Unit 1 Reactor Trip on 'B' Steam Generator Low-Low Level Due to 'B' Main Feed Regulating Valve Failing Closed System Health Report - Safety Injection Q4-2016
SAR PIR1008212 - NAPS Maintenance Rule (a)(3) Self-Assessment
Trip Report N1-02-26-15, North Anna Unit 1 Trip 02-26-15
DOM-QA-1, Dominion Energy, Nuclear Facility Quality Assurance Program Description,
Topical Report, Rev. 25
SDBD-NAPS-RPS, System Design Basis Document for Reactor Protection System, Rev. 17
LER 2015-002-00, Manual Reactor Trip Due to Inability to Maintain Main Generator Voltage in Specification, report date 05/22/2015
LER 2015-002-01, Manual Reactor Trip Due to Inability to Maintain Main Generator Voltage in
Specification, report date 09/03/2015 CA3012691, CR Assignment Details, North Anna Design to create an ETE to formally document results so they may be added to the AP, complete 02/19/2016
CA3015121, CR Assignment Details, During the 2015 TFPI, a discrepancy was noted in
Appendix R procedure 2-FCA-11 (SG/QS/MSVH Fire), complete 11/19/2015 CA3016110, Implement revisions to procedure 1 / 2-FCA-11, complete 02/16/2016 CA3017882, Perform MRule Functional Failure evaluation for TSC UPS UV transfer light lite,

complete 12/17/2015

CA303242,
ER-AA-PRS-1003, Criticality Classification Revision Request, Attachment 1, page 1, approval date 8/3/15
CA3035136, Perform MRule Functional Failure evaluation-TSC UPS Battery Ground, complete 08/11/2016 CA3036784, Perform MRule Functional Failure evaluation (1-EP-27C-1NNSF05-RELAY-F

(0B-C), complete 08/11/2016

CA3047691, Perform MRule Functional Failure evaluation TSC UPS "Bypass Breaker Closed" & "UPS OFF" Alarms on 1, complete 01/25/2017
ETE-NA-2016-0013, Vital Bus Appendix R Evaluation of Associated Circuits for 1/2 cycle instantaneous faults, Rev. 0
MRE 017888, Unit 2 SSPS train "A" power supply 2 has excessive noise, Rev. 0
MRE 018459, Perform Maintenance Rule Functional Failure evaluation (1-RPS-PS-2B), Rev.0
MRE 018427, 1-FW-P-2 (Steam Driven AFW pump) governor did not maintain speed, Rev. 0
NCRODP-77-NA, Nuclear Training Module, Reactor Protection Systems N1-04-02-15, Trip Report, North Anna Unit 1 Trip, review date 04/30/15
RP-AA-221, Map Number 8, Auxiliary Building 244', review date 10/14/15
RP-AA-221, Map Number 8J, Demin Alley Weekly Dose Rate Trending Survey, review date
10/17/15
RP-AA-221, Map Number 8, Auxiliary Building 244', review date 10/17/15
RP-AA-221, Map Number 8i, Auxiliary Building 244', weekly Dose Rate Trending Survey, date 10/17/15
TR-AA-100 - Attachment 1, Training Request and Needs Analysis,
ACE 19889, date 5/5/2015
PI-AA-5003, CR number
1036687, Engineering Personnel identified that 1-CH-P-1C, Unit 1 "C"
Charging pump, had exceeded its unavailability performance criteria back in December 2015, completed 5/11/16
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