ML17334B659

Petition Per 10CFR2.206 Requesting That OLs Be Modified, Revoked or Suspended Until Reasonable Assurance That Sys in Conformance W/Design & Licensing Bases Requirements

ML17334B659
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	10/09/1997
From:	LOCHBAUM D A UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
To:	CALLAN L J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
References
2.206, DD-99-03, DD-99-3, NUDOCS 9711180014
Download: ML17334B659 (30)

Text

NOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME INTERNAFILECENTEREXTERNAL:

NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL1111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME NUDOCS-ABSTRACT NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL1111CATEGORY2REGULA~.YINFORMATION.DISTRIBUTIO YSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSXON NBR:9711180014 DOC.DATE:

97/10/09NOTARIZED:

NODOCKETFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM0500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION LOCHBAUM,D.A.

UnionofConcerned Scientists RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

'CALLAN,L.J.

OfcoftheExecutive DirectorforOperations

SUBJECT:

Submitspetitionper10CFR2.206 recgxesting thatoperating licensesbemodified, revokedorsuspended untilreasonable assurance thatsysinconformance w/designslicensing recgxirements.

DISTRIBUTION CODE:DF01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:DirectFlowDistribution:

50Docket(PDRAvail)EQ0DUNNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR4ENCL4

~\UNIONOFCONCERNED SCIENTISTS October9,1997Mr.L.JosephCallanExecutive DirectorforOperations UnitedStatesNuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, DC20555-0001 SUBJECTiPETITIONPURSUANTTO10CFR'2.206, DONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTSUNITS1AND2,DOCKETNOS.50-315AND50-316

DearMr.Callan:

TheUnionofConcerned Scientists submitsthispetitionpursuantto10CFR2.206requesting thattheoperating licensesforDonaldC.CookUnits1and2bemodified, revoked,orsuspended untilthereisreasonable assurance thattheirsystemsareinconformance withdesignandlicensing basesrequirements.

Aprocesscomparable tothesystemcertifications recentlyusedbytheSalemandMillstone licensees wouldprovidethisnecessary levelofassurance.

UCSadditionally requeststhatapublichearingintothismatter'eheldintheWashington, DCareapriortothefirstunitatDCCookbeingauthorized torestart.Atthishearing,wewillpresentinformation supporting thecontentions inthispetition.

BBackBroundhOnOctober9,1996,theNRCrequested thatitspowerreactorlicensees provideinformation pursuantto10CFR50.54(f)regarding theadequacyandavailability ofdesignbasesinformation.

TheNRC'sissuedthisrequestasaresultofitsinvestigations attheMillstone PowerStation.ThelicenseefortheDCCookplantresponded withaletterdatedFebruary6,1997,describing theadministrative controlsitusestoprovideassurance thattheCookNuclearPlantisoperatedandmaintained withintheestablished designbases.AnNRCteamrecentlyconducted anarchitect/engineer designinspection atDCCook.According totheNRC'sProjectManagerfor9CCook,thisNRCteamexaminedtwosafetysystemsandtheirsupporting systems.Theteam'sfindingsforcedthelicenseetoshutdownbothunitsonSeptember 10,1997.TheNRCissuedaconfirmatory actionlettertothelicenseedatedSeptember 19,1997,specifying issuesarisingfromthedesigninspection thatmustberesolvedpriortorestarting theunits.Theseissues(listedinAttachment 1)includephysicalmodifications totheplantsandrevisions totheplants',operating licenses.

NumerousNRCDailyEventReports(listedinAttachment 2)described thefindings&omdesigninspection asreportedbythelicensee.

TheNRChasnotyetreleasedthedesigninspection reportandwehavebeentoldthatitwillnotbeissueduntilnextweekattheearliest.

PDRnoOCi0Sao03XSHPDRllllllliilllllllllllllllllllllllllllliilI.,

['.~~~Washington Office:1616PStreetNWSuite310~Washington, DC20036-1495

~202-332-0900

~FAX:202-332-0905 Cambridge Headquarters:

TwoBrattleSquare~Cambridge, MA02238-9105

~617-547-5552

~FAX:617-864-9405 California Office:2397ShattuckAvenueSuite203~Berkeley, CA94704-1567

~510-843-1872

~FAX:510-843-3785

'II~~'

i~~~~October9,1997Page2of4BasisforRuestedActionTheNRCconducte'd architect/engineer designinspections atonlysixofitsnearly70operating powerreactorlicenseesites.Thesedesigninspections examinedonlyoneorhvosafetysystemsalongwiththeirsupporting systemsateachsite.TheNRCProjectManagerreportedthatthedesigninspection atDCCookexaminedtheresidualheatremovalandcomponent coolingwatersystemsalongwiththeirsupporting systems.Thesedesigninspections focusedonthefacilities'riginal designandthelicensees'onformance withthesafetyanalysisreports.ThesystemsexaminedbytheNRCatDCCookhadalreadybeencoveredbythelicensee's designbasisdocumentation reconstitution pr'ogram.

Designbasisdocuments (DBDs)forthecontainment, containment structure, containment spray,emergency corecooling,component coolingwater,andresidualheatremovalsystemshadbeenapprovedbythelicenseepriortotheNRCteam'sarrival.ThelicenseeinformedtheNRCthatits'BDprogramhadnotidentified anydeficiencie involving equipment operability.

ThefindingsbytheNRCdesigninspection teampromptedthelicenseetodeclarebothtrainsoftheemergency corecoolingsystemsandthecontainment spraysysteminoperable.

TheunitswereshutdownonSeptember 8and9,1997.Thelicenseereportedmakingphysicalchangestotheplanttocorrectsomeoftheproblemsandindicated thatadditional physicalchangesmayberequired.

Thelicenseehasproposedfixingthespecificoperability issuesidentified duringtheNRCdesigninspection andthenrestarting theunits.Confining thescopeoftherestartactivities inthiswaywouldbetreatingthesymptomsratherthanthecauseoftheproblems.

TheNRCdesigninspection revealedseriousdeficiencies inthelicensee's designcontrolprograms.

Thesedeficiencie crcatcdthespecificproblemsthatforcedtheplantstobeshutdown.Thesedeficiencies

>ayalsoberesponsible forsimilarproblemsinothersafetysystemswhichwerenotexaminedbytheNRC.Itisimportant tonotethattheNRCidentified significant operability problemsinsystemsthatthelicenseehadcoveredinrecentlyapprovedDBDs.ThelicenseestatedinitsFebruary6,1997,submittal that.itverifiesandvalidates theinformation initsDBDsviareviewsandphysicalplantwalkdowns priortotheirapproval.

Thus,theNRCdiscovered significant problemsinsystemswhichhadbeencloselyscrutinized bythelicensee.

HadtheNRC'sfindingsinvolvedsystemswhichhavenotyetbeencoveredunderthelicensees'BD program,itmightbereasonable toassumethatthelicenseewouldhaveidentifiicd thematthatlaterdate.However,thereislittlereasontobelievethattheseproblemswouldhave.beenresolvedunlesstheNRChadidentified them.Attachment 2listsNRCDailyEventReports(DERs)involving issuesidentified bytheNRCdesigninspection atDCCook.DERNos.32740,32806,32822,32839,32843,32875,32890,32904,32914,32915,32921,32948,and329S8describepotential deficiencies thatappeartohaveexistedatDCCookpriortotheinitiation ofitsdesignbasisdocumentation reconstitution effortin1992.Thateffortwastherefore apparently unabletodetectthesepotential deficiencies.

DERNos.32823,32824,32903,32939,and3294Sdescribepotential deficiencies thatappeartohavebeenintroduced since1992.Thus,thelicensee's designcontrolandqualityassurance programsareapparently unabletoensurethatthefacilityismaintained withinitsdesignbases.

00I~r,fh't,~

~~~QOctober9,1997Page3of4IUCSfeelsthatthedesignbasisdocumentation reconstitution andUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)validation programsasdescribed inthelicensee's responsetotheNRC's50.54(f)letterlacktherigorandfocusnecessary toidentifypotential design-related operability issues.Ourconviction issupported bythefindings&omtheNRCdesigninspection.

Sincethecorrections totheNRC'sfindingswerenotlimitedtomerepaperwork fixesbutincludedactualchangestotheplant'sphysicalconfiguration, thesafetysignificance oftheseandpotentially otherundetected problemscannotbeunderstated.

I~Thefiawsinthelicensee's designcontrolprogramsmustbecorrected.

ThesystemsatDCCook,atleastthosewithasafetyfunction, mustbecertified tobecapableofperforming theirrequiredactionsunderalldesignconditions.

Then,andonlythen,cantheunitsbcrestarted withreasonable assurance thatpublicsafetywillbeadequately protected.

Itwouldbeirresponsible torestarttheseunitsknowingthattheprogrammatic failuresthatcausedthesafetyproblemsidentified bytheNRCteammayhaveproducedcomparable problemsaffecting theoperability ofothersafety'systems.

Thelegalprecedent forourpositionisstatedbytheNRC'sAtomicSafetyandLicensing AppealBoardin'heMatterofVermontYankeeNuclearPowerCorporation, Memorandum andOrder(ALAB-138),

datedJuly31,1973:"Asageneralrulc,theCommission's regulations precludeachallenge toapplicable regulations inanindividual licensing proceeding.

10CFR2.758.Thisrulehasbeenfrequently appliedinsuchproceedings toprecludechallenges byintervenors toCommission regulations.

Generally, then,anintervenor cannotvalidlyargueonsafetygroundsthatareactorwhichmeetsapplicable standards shouldnotbelicensed.

Bythesametoken,neithertheapplicant northestaffshouldbepermitted to=-challenge applicable regulations, eitherdirectlyorindirectly..

Thus,thosepartiesshouldnotgenerally bepermitted toseekorjustifythelicensing ofareactorwhichdoesnotcomplywithapplicable standards.

Norcantheyavoidcompliance byarguingthat,althoughanapplicable, regulation isnotmet,thepublichealthandsafetywillstillbe'protected.

For,oncearegulation isadopted,thestandards itembodiesrepresent theCommission's definition ofwhatisrequiredtoprotectthepublichealthandsafety."[emphasis added]"Inshort,inorder'for afacilitytobelicensedtooperate,theapplicant mustestablish thatthe'acilitycomplicswithallapplicable regulations.

Ifthefacilitydoesnotcomply,oiiftherehasbeennoshowingthatitdoescomply,itmaynotbelicensed."

[emphasis added]TheNRCdesigninspection atDCCookidentified significant issueswhichcausedbothunitstobeshutdown.Theseissueswerecausedbyprogrammatic deficiencies inthelicensee's designcontrolpi'ograms.

Acontributing factorfortheseissuesisthefailureofthelicensee's qualityassurance andself-assessment programstodetecttheseproblems.

Nothinginthereportedfindingsfromthedesigninspection supportsaconclusion thatthesefindingsareisolatedconsequences.

TheNRC'sdesigninspection invalidates anyshowingthatthisfacilitycomplieswithallapplicable'regulations.

Therefore, thedesigncontroldeficiencies mustbecorrected topreventfuturenon-compliances withsafetyregulations.

Andjustasimportantly, a.thoroughreviewofallsystemswithsafetyfunctions mustbe'completed priortorestarttodetectandcorrectpastnon-compliances.

PJ~Ptlt'I VOctober9,1997Page4of41hrUCS.isnotadvocating thattheNRCapply-ahigherstandardatDCCook.-Instead, wearerequesting thattheNRCensurethattheDCCookfacilityisinaccordance withtheminimumsafetystandards whichconstitute thelegalgroundsfo'rallowingtheunitstooperate.Ourrequestisconsistent withthemeasuresrequiredbytheNRCwhenothersamplinginspections findproblems.

WeasktheNRCtoexpandtheinspection scope.basedupontheidentified problemsjustaswouldberequiredwhensnubber(e.g.,piperestraint) andreactorvesselinternals inspections foundproblems:

'uestedActions*~I'CSpetitions theNRCtoprotectpublichealthandsafetybypreventing theunitsatDCCookfromoperating untilsuchtimethatthereisreasonable assurance thatallsignificant non-compliances havebeenidentified andcorrected.

Thesystemcertification processrecentlyusedattheSalemGenerating StationandtheMillstone PowerStationwouldprovidesuchreasonable assurance.

WerequestapublichearingonthismatterbeheldintheWashington, DCareabeforeanyunitatDCCookisauthorized torestart.Sincerely, auiug'DavidA.LochaumNuclearSafetyEngineerCC:ChairmanShirleyAnnJackson.UnitedStatesNuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, DC20555-0001.

Honorable SpencerAbrahamUnitedStatesSen'ateWashington, DC20510-2203 Mr.A.B.Beach,RegionalAdministrator UnitedStatesNuclearRegulatory Commission

.801Warrenville RoadLisle,IL60532-4351 Honorable CarlLevinUnitedStatesSenate.Washington, DC20510-2202

.Honorable FredUptonUnitedStatesHouseofRepresentatives Washington, DC,20515-2206

~Attachments:

1)DesignInspection Issues,ThatWillBeResolvedPriortoDCCookRestart2)NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDe'signInspection Findings=VIg 0JI~SIn'l/Jvs/lP,I'IIrphrIII

~~PyAttachment 1DesignInspection IssuesThatWillBeResolvedPriortoDCCookRestart1Thefollowing issues,quotedverbatim, werespecified ontheNRC'sConfirmatory ActionLetterdated,September 19,1997,asrequiring resolution priortorestartofanyDCCookunit:.1.Recirculation SumpInventor'y/Containment DeadEndedCompartnients IssueAnalyseswillbeperformed todemonstrate thattherecirculation sumplevelisadequatetoprevent'ortexing,"

orappropriate modifications willbemade.[SeealsoAttachment 2-PowerReactorEventNumber32890],Recirculation Sump-Venting Issue'rr!IIVentingwillbere-installed intherecirculation sumpcover.Thedesignwill-incorporate foreignmaterialexclusion requirements forthesump.[See'alsoAttachment 2-PowerReactorEventNumbers32875and32903]Thirty-six HourCooldown, withOneTrainofCooling4Analyseswillbeperformed thatwilldemonstrate thecapability tocooldowntheunitsconsistent withdesignbasisrequirements andnecessary changestoprocedures willbecompleted; ES-1.3(Switchover toRecirculation Sump)Procedure 6.Changestotheemergency procedure usedforswitchover oftheemergency corecooling-and containment spraypumpstotherecirculation sumpwillbeimplemented.

Thesechangeswillprovideassurance therewillbeadequatesumpvolume,withpr'opercorisideration ofinstrument biasandsinglefailurecriteria.

[SeealsoAtt.2-PowerReactorEventNumbers32806and32904]hll,Compressed AirOverpressure IssueOverpressure protection willbeprovideddownstream ofthe20psig,50psig,andS5psigcontrolairregulators tomitigatetheeffectsofapostulated failedregulator.

[SeealsoAttachment 2-PowerReactorEventNumbers32939and32988]IResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)SuctionValveInterlock Issue'technical specification changetoallowoperation inmode4withtheRHRsuctionvalvesopenandpowerremovedisbeingprocessed.

Approval.

ofthischangebytheNRCwillberequiredprior'orestart.[SeealsoAttachment 2-PowerReactorEventNumbers32914and32921]-FibrousMaterialinContainment Removaloffibrousmaterialfromcontainment thatcouldclog.therecirculation sumpwillbecorn'pleted.

[SeealsoAttachment 2-PowerReactorEventNumber3294S]

0lI~'

Attachment 2NRCDailyEventReportson'CCookDesignInspection FindingsThefollowing summaries weretakenfromthedailyeventreportsavailable ontheNRC'swcbsite(mvw.nrc.gov).

~Theonlyeditinginvolveddclctionofunnecessary detail,suchaswhowasnotifiedabouttheevents,'andtheadditionofclarification foracronyms.

Othcrivisc, thesenarratives areverbatim.

1POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32890UNUSUALEVENT,DECLARED4TECHNICAL SPECIFlCAITON REQUIREDSHUTDOWNONBOTHUNITSDUETOINOPERABLE CONTAINMENTS

+aresultofissuesraisedduringtheongoingarchitect/engi'neer designinspection, theliccnscewasreviewing thedesignaspectsofthecontainmcnts (bothunits,havesimilarcontainmcnts).

Aflcrconsulting withthenuclearsteamsupplysystemsupplier(Westinghouse) thelicenseedetermined thatconcernsexistedaboutwhetheradequatecommunication (flowpaths)existsbetweentheactiveandinactiveportioris ofthecontainmcnt sump.Duringcertainscenario, thevolumeofwaterflowbacktothecontainment recirculation sumpmaynotbeadequatetosupportlong-term emergency corecooling(ECC)systems(RHR[residual heatremoval]system,safetyinjection system,chargingsystem)orcontainment spraypumpoperation duringthcrecirculation phaseofalargeorsmall.brcakLOCA.Thccontainmcnt drainagesystemisdesignedtoensurethatwateren'tering thccontainment fromthebreachintliereactorcoolantsystem,ECCsystems-injection, andicecondenser meltflowsbackintothe.containment recirculation sumpviadrains.Licenseeanalysiswasunabletoconfirmthatsuflicient communication

-'xistedbctwccninactiveandactivevolumesofthecontainment toensureadequatedrainagetotherecirculation sump.-Withoutadequatedrainageintothesump,alowsumplevelwillresult,whichjeopardizes longtermoperation oftheECCSystemsandcontainment spraypumpsduetovortcxing andairentrainment.

Asaconservative measurebecauseoftheseconcerns, thelicensccdeclaredbothtrainsofthcECCSystemsandthe,containment spraysysteminoperable forbothunitsandenteredTcchnical SpcciTication limitingcondition foroperation actionstatement 3.0.3toshutdownbothunits.Theliccnscecommenced shuttingUnit1downfrom100%powerat1655aildUill't2downfi'om100%powerat1728.At2000,thelicenseedcclarcdanunusualeventonbothunitsduetothe'potential lossofcontainmcnt barrier,onbothunits.Thelicensccplanstoperformfurtheranalysistodetermine theextentofthcexistingcommunication betweentheportionsofthesumpsandwhetherplantmodifications willbenecessary.

~~~Update 0311EDTon09/10/97byTillytakenbyMacKinnon*~~

IThcunusualcvcntwastcrminatcd andexitedat0303EDTwhen.Unit 1cntcrcdmode5(coldshutdown).

Unit2cntcredmode5at0015EDT(coldshutdown).

fPOWERREACTOREVENT.NUMBER:32875FAILURETOMAINTAINTHECONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SUMP1/4"PARTICULATE RETENTION REQUIREMENT (HISTORICAL ISSUE)Ik.A1/4"particulate retention requirement forthecontainment recirculation sumpwasnotproperlyestablished in1979following sumpmodifications.

Thecontainment recirculation sumprcquircment toretain1/4"particles istoensurethatcontainment spray,nozzlesdonotbecomeplugged.Thccontainmcnt spraysystemtakessuctionfromthecontainment recirculation sumpfollowing injection oftherefueling'water storagetanksupplyduringalossofcoolantaccident.

~~llr1 IAttachment 2(continued)

NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDesignInspection FindingsIIIn1979,modifications wereperformed onthecontainment recirculation sump.Oneofthemodifications involvedmovinga1/4"rctcntion elementfrominsidetherecirculation sumptotheentranceofthesump.Whenthe'retention elementwasmoved,thc1/4"retention requirement ivasnotfullyaddressed, andpathwaysexcccding the1/4"requirement, wereinadvertently established.

Thcinadvcrtcnt pathwaysestablished included:

3/4",vents intheroofoftherecirculation sumpentrance, thecontainment sumpdrainlinefromtherecirculation sump,andsmallgapsaroundthesumpentrance.

Thesepathwayshavesincebeenelimi'nated orthe1/4"requirement hasbeenestablished.'

.Thclicenseeisreporting thefactthatsince1979,until the1/4"requirement wasestablished orthepathwaywaseliminated, thecontainment recirculation sumpdidnotmeetitsdesignrcquircment.

Thccontainment recirculation sumpcurrently meetsthe1/4"requircmcnt.

Acondition rcporthas,beenwrittentoinitiateinvestigation intotluseventanddetermine appropriate preventive actions.Thiseventwasdctcrmined tobcreportable at0856onSeptember 5,1997.l~~~Updateat1905on09/10/97byRandyPtacckenteredbyJolliQ'e~**'IMerfurtherreviewoftheabovecondition, thelicenseeconcluded thatthcemergency corecooling(ECC)systemwasoutsideitsdesignbasisasaresultofthe1/4"rcquircmcnt notbeingmctfollowing thc1979plantmodifications.

Bynotadequately coveringthe1/4"particulate retention requirement, largerparticles hadthepotential toenterthcrecirculation sump.ThcECCSystemhasnotbeenanalyzedfortheselargerparticles norisitwithintliedesignoftheECCSystemtohandletheselargerparticles.

Thelicenseehasconcluded thatthiseventisalsorcportablc tothcNRCinaccordance withtherequirements of'0CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(a) unanalyzed condition, and10CF50.72(b)(2)(iii)(d)accident mitigation.

IPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32903'ONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SUMPVENTHOLESHAVESEENFILLEDWITHCONCRETErIAsaresultofquestions posedbytheNRCarchitect/engineer designinspection team,thelicenseedetcrmincd that~thcinletventingrequirement forthccontainmcnt recirculation sumpswasnotproperlymaintained following modifications tothcUnit2.sumpin1996andtheUnit1sumpin1997(bothunitshavesimilarcontainmcnts).

'hecontainment recirculation sumpventingrcquircment wascstablishcd in1979aspartoftheoriginalsumpdesigntoreducethepotential forairentrainment throughthesump.Theventingrequirement wIasmetthroughthe,additionoffive3/4-inchdiameterholesdrilledinthcroofofthcsumpinlet.(Theholesdidnotmeetthe1/4-inch~

diamctcrrequirement asreportedinEvent¹32875.)Whentheseholeswercdiscovered duringtheUnit21996refueling outageandtheUnit11997refueling outage,theywereclassified asabandoned equipment holesthatexceededthe1/4-inchparticulate retention rcquiremcnt forthcsumpsandtheywerefilledwithconcrete.

0'I/II IAttachment 2(c'ontinued)

NRCDailyXventReportsonDCCookDesignInspection FindingsPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER;32806~INSTRUMENTATION INDICATIONS USEDTODETERMINE WHENREFUELING WATER'TORAGETANKTOCONTAINMENT SWITCHOVER IS'REQUIRED MAYNOTHAVEBEENCORRECTTOPREVENTVORTEXING INTHECONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SUMP.*IDuringtheevaluation ofaproposedprocedure changethataGectsmvitchover fromtherefueling waterstoragetank(RWST)tothecontainment sumpduringaloss-of-coolant, accident(LOCA),itwasdctermincd thattheinstrumentation indications usedtodetermine whentheswitchover isrequiredmaynothavebccncorrect.to preventvortcxing inthecontainmcnt recirculation sump.IToaddressthissituation, procedures associated withthemvitchover (onbothunits)havebeenconservatively changedtoaccommodate therelatedinstrument inaccuracies.

ThesechangesassureadequateRWSTwaterisincontainment beforemvitchover toeliminate concernsthatvorteungwouldoccurinthccontainmcnt sumpafterswitchover.

TheproblemisthattheRWSTwaterlevelindicators areconnected totlicsuctionlincthatgoestotheresidualheatrcmov'al(RHR)pumps.Duetothcflowintheselines,theindicated waterlevelatwinchtheswitchover wouldbeinitiated wouldbelessthantheactualwaterleveloftheRWST(thclicenseewouldbcputtinglesswaterintothecontainmcnt thaner~ted).Also,thclicensccsaidthattheyliadsomeinaccuracies associated witlitheircontainmcnt sumpinstrumentation.

Thelicenseeadjustedthccontainmcnt sumpindication toassurethattheyhaveanadequatevolumeinthecontainment topreventvortexing.

Thelicenseereliesupontwoindications formvitchover, RWSTwaterlevelandcontainmcnt waterlevel.POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32904.SINGLEFAILUREDURINGRECIRCSUMPSWITCHOVER COULDBEUNANALYZED CONDITION I'IAsaresultofquestions posedbytheNRCarclutect/engineer designinspection team,thelicenseedetermined thatthcpossibility ofasinglefailureduringanaccidentwlulcperforming switchover oftheemergency corecooling~systempumpsfromtherefueling waterstoragetank(RWST)suctiontotherecirculation sumpsuctioncouldhaveresultedinthcplantbeinginanunanalyzed condition.

Tluscondition isoutsidethcplantdesignbasis,anditpotentially couldhaveprevented thefulfillment ofasafetyfunctionofstructures orsystems.Theplantemergency, operating procedures (EOPs)ascurrently writtenrequirethatthewestresidualheatremoval(BHR)pumpbcthefirstpumpmvitchcdfromthcRWSTsuctiontotherccircsumpsuction.Oncethisis*accomplished, thecentrifugal charging(CC)pumps'uctions andthesafetyinjection (Sl)pumps'uctions arcthenswapped'from theRWSTsupplytothedischarge ofthewestRHRpump.IfthcwestRHRpumpwerctofailatthis.,pointwhenallCCandSIpumpswerebeingsuppliedfromitsdischarge, priortothceastRHRpumpsuctionbeingtransferred fromtheRWSTtothcrccircsump,allCCandSIpumpscouldalsofailductothclossofsuctionflow.Thiswouldresultinthelossofallhighandmediumheadinjection withonlytheflowfromtheeastRHRpumpavailable forinjection intothereactorcoolantsystem.Thcliccnseciscurrently reviewing thcEOPstodetermine analternate mvitchovcr sequencethatwouldeliminate thecondition asdescribed above.l

~~IAt 1Attachment 2(continued)

NRCDailyEventReports.onDCCookDesignInspection FindingsPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32939INSTALLED PLANT.MODIFICATION INTRODUCED THEPOSSIBILITY.

OFASINGLEFAILUREWHICHCOULDRESULTINTHELOSSOFBOTHTRAINSOFTHEESFVENTILATION SYSTEM.At1620on09/16/97, thelicenseedetermined thataplantmodiTication installed behveenDecember1996andAugust1997introduced thepossibility ofasinglefailurewhichcouldresultinthelossofbothtrainsoftheengincercd safetyfeatures(ESF)ventilation systemif'the85-psiairheaderwastobelost.Priortothcinstallation ofthe'plant modification, theESFventilation systemcharcoalinletandbypassdampersbothutilizeda20-'psiairheaderandwercpositioned suchthatthecharcoalbypassdampcrswercnormallyopenandwouldfailclosed;andthccharcoalinletdamperswerenormallyclosedandwouldfailopen.Theplantmodification installed ncwbypassdamperswhichrequiredhigherairprcssuretooperateandwere,thercforc, transferred tothc85-psiheader.Ifthe,~85-psiairheaderwaslost,itwouldresultinthc,rcpositioning ofthenormallyopenbypassdampersivithoutthe,,openingofthecharcoalinletdampersonbothtrains.Thiswouldresultindeadheadingofthcfiltertrainfansand-lossofcoolingtoemergency corecoolingsystem(ECCS)equipment.

"POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32988NON-SAFETY~RELATED AIRHEADERSLACKOVERPRESSURE PROTECTION f.'uringanarclutectural engineering inspection aquestionwasraisedregarding thelackofovcrpressurc protcction-onthc20,50and85psigcontrolairheaders.Thcspecificconcernisthepotential forcommonmodefailureofbothtrainsofsafetyrelatedequipmcnt servedbythc,airhcadcrs'.

Theovcrprcssurc condition is'ostulated'to becausedbyregulator failure.Althoughsystemrcvicwshavefoundno,component failuremodewhichwouldresultinthedevicesbeingincapable ofgoingtotheirfail-safe

position, adesignchangepackagehasbeenpreparedtoprovideovcrprcssure protection, onthe20,50and85psigheaders.If-POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32914LICENSEEIDENTIFIED THATBOTHUNITSHADOPERATEDTHEIRRHRSYSTEMCONTRARYTOTHEDESCRIPTION INTHEFSAR.'CAt1615EDT,withUnits1and2shutdowninmode5,itwasdctcrmined thatbothunitshaveoperatedcontrarytothcdesignbasisfortheresidualheatremoval(RHR)systemasdescribed intheFinaLSafetyAnalysisrcport(FSAR).FSARChapter9,Section9.3,describes theinterlocks associated withtheresiduallicatremoval(RHR)suctionvalvesfromthcreactorcoolantsystem(RCS).Thesuctionlincvalvesarcinterlocked throughseparate, channelsoftheRCSsystemprcssuresignalstoprovideautomatic closureofbothvalveswheneverRCSprcssurecxccedsRHRdesignprcssure..Thc FSARstatesthattheinterlock maybedcfcatcdwhenthcRCSisopentoatmosphere.

However,foranumberofyearsthisinterlock hasbeenprocedurally'defeated onbothunitstopreventinadvertent closureandlossofRHRsuctionduringshutdowncoolingoperation byopeningthevalvesandracking'uttheir.breakersinmode4.'Thcovcrpressurc protection affordedbythcautomatic closurefunctiondcscribcd intheFSARwasdefeatedwithoutasafetyevaluation beingpcrformcd.

Thislossofautomatic closurefunctionrepresents anunanalyzed condition andis,thcrcforc, reportable.

0J41

~~~~'ttachment 2(continued)

,NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDesignInspection.Fin'dings IPlansaretodegas,dcpressurizc, andopentheRCSonbothunitstoatmosphere.

DegaswillstartonUnit1,andwhencompleted, thcunitwillproceedtodepressurize whileUnit2startsdegasprocedures.

WhentheRCSisopentoatmosphere onbothunits,theplantwillbeincompliance withtheFSAR.Thiscondition wasidentified bythe1iccnsee duringanongoingNRCarchitect/engineer inspection.

II*~~Updateat2130EDTon9/13/97fiomRobertBlythtoS.Sandin~**Thelicenseehascompleted itssafetyevaluation formode5operation andconcluded thatthcrcwasnounreviewcd safetyquestionorchangeofoperation asdescribed inthcFSAR.Conscqucntly, degasofUnit1hasbeen"'erminated, andneitherunitwillbcventedtoatmosphere.

POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32921THELICENSEEIDENTIFIED THATBOTHRHRPUMPSHADBEENOPERATEDWHENTHERCSWASDEPRESSURIZED, WHICHISCONTRARYTOTHEDESCRIPTION INTHEFSAR.Chapter9oftheFinalSafety'nalysis Rcport(FSAR)states:'Onlyoneresidualheatremoval'(RHR) pumpwillbe"operatedwhenthereactorcoolantsystemisopentoatmosphere topreventdamagingbothpumpsintheunlikely" eventthatsuctionshouldbelost.'perating proccdurcs for,theRHRsystemdonotpreventoperation ofbothRHRpumpswhenthcreactorcoolant'system (RCS)isopentoatmosphere, andinthcpast,bothRHRpumpshavebeenrunwhentheRCSwasvcntcdtoatmosphere.

IPlantoperating proccdurcs arebeingreviewedtodetermine theimpact.Procedure changeswillbeimplemented asnecessary toaddresstheFSARrcquircmcnt.

Acondition rcporthasbccninitiated toinvestigate'and determine appropriate preventative actions.HPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32948ITWASDETERMINED THATFIBROUSMATERIALISPRESENTINBOTHUNIT1ANDUNIT2-CONTAINMENT INENOUGHQUANTITYTOPOTENTIALLY CAUSEEXCESSIVE BLOCKAGEOFTHECONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SUMPSCREENDURINGTHERECIRCULATION PHASEOFALOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT.

In1985,1986,,and 1995"Fiberfrax" refractory insulation materials inbulk,blanketorboardformwercusedasdammingmaterialwheninstalling firestopsincabletraysinbothcontainments.

Thcspecification governing installation ofthefirestopsdidnotrequireremovalofthcmaterial, only.statingthatitshouldberemoved"ifnecessary."

Thematerialwasnotremoved.Thematerialisprcscntin12cable,traysinUnit1and15cabletraysinUnit2.rWhentheFiberfrax isexposedtowaterorsteam/water environment itcouldpotentially, breakintosmallpieces',whichcouldbetransported totherecirculation sumpbythe-water, flowincontainment duringalossofcoolantaccident.

Onceitreachestherecirculation sumpithasthepotential toclogthescrccnsinexcessoftlicdesignvalue.Excessive screenblockagecouldresultinECCSinoperability duringtherecirculation mode.TheFibcrfrax material,is currently beingremovedfromthecontainmcnts, andremovalwillbccompleted priorto,restartoftheunits.Thepossibility thatthelicensee's worke'ontrol"processalloweduncncapsulatcd fibrousmaterialtobeinstalled inotherlocations insidecontainment isbeinginvestigated.

AK'PhIJlrktIIPIV 1,Attachment 2(continued)

NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDesignInspection FindingsPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32740UNITS1&2OPERATEDOUTSIDETHEDESIGN BASISFORSERVICEWATERINLETTEMP'saresultofquestions posedbymembersoftheongoingNRCdesigninspection team,thclicenseehas'etermined thatUnits1&2haveoperatedoutsidetheplantdesignbasisforservicewaterinlettemperature.

/'tTheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR),Table9.5-3,listsservicewaterinlettemperature designvalueas76'F.Thisvalueisusedasinputtoanalysessuchascontainment peakprcssureandcontrolroomhabitability.

Althoughengineering analyseswereperformed in1988'raising thetemperature to87.5'FaslistedintheplantTcdmicalSpecifications, a10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation wasneverperformed, norwasthcUFSARproperly'evised:

Plantservicewaterinlettemperature isthcsameasLakeMichiganwatertcmpcraturc.

Areviewofhistorical dataindicates thatduringJuly'andAugustofanyyear,LakeMichigan"water temperature islikelytoexceedthc76'Fvalue.Specificdatafor1997showsthatLakeMichiganwatertemperature, andthcrcforc plantservicewaterinlet'emperature, wasgreaterthan76'FonJuly17,July18,andAugust4,1997.Allplantsystemswhichutilizeservicewaterasacoolingmediumhavebccndctcrmincd tobcoperable.

A10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation willbe-p'erformed andappropriate changeswillbeincorporated intothcUFSAR.Thisreportisintendedtocoveranytemperature exclusions above76'Fandbelowthe87.5'FvaluelistedintheplantTechnical Specifications thatmayoccurpriortothecompletion ofthc10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation.

POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32822*DISCOVERY THATANORMALOPERATING PROCEDURE ALLOWEDPLANTOPERATION WITHCOMPONENT COOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANGER OUTLETTEMPERATURES GREATERTHANTHEDESIGNLIMITSPECIFIED INTHEFINALSAFETYANALYSISREPORTDuringthe'ongoing NRCarchitect/engineer designinspection, aquestion,was askedrelativetoastatement usedinthenormaloperating procedure forthecomponent coolingwater(CCW)system.Thestatement allowsforaheat-exchanger outlettemperature forCCWtoreach120'Fforaperiodof3hoursduringnormalcooldownontheresidualheatremovalsystem.Investigation revealedthatthisstatement divasintheoriginalissueoftheprocedure in1976.However,no10CFR50.59unreyicwed safetyevaluation determination documentation couldbefoundtosuppoittlusdesignparameter.

Thclicensee's FinalSafety-Analysis Rcport(FSAR)statesthatthcCCWheatexchanger outletdesigntemperature

's95'F.BasedontheFSARrequiring the93'Foutlettemperature andthe.lackofanunrcvicwed safetyquestiondctcrmination tojustifyoperation cxcceding 95'F,theunitswereinacondition thatallowedoperation outsidethedesignbasisbecausethcprocedure allowedoperation upto120'Fforaperiodof3hoursduringnormalcooldownontheresidualheatremovalsystem.Theunitsarcn'otcuncntlyinaTechnical Specification limitingcondition foroperation asaresultoftinsissue.II'Procedure changeshavebeenmadetoremovethcinappropriate statement.

Acondition rcporthasalsobeenwrittentoinitiateaninvestigation intothiseventanddetermine appropriate preventive actions.

0V/4S41lI

~)~~IAttachment 2(continued)

NRCDailyEventReportson'DC-CookDesignInspection FindingsPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32823FAILUREOFASAFETYREVIEWTOADDRESSFINALSAFETYANALYSISATTRIBUTES ON,ASSOCIATED COMPONENT COOLINGWATERCOOLINGREQUIREMENTS During,theongoingNRCarchitect/engineer designinspection, aquestionwasaskedrelativetodualtraincomponent coolingwater(CCW)systemoutages.DuringdualtrainCCWoutagcs,CCWcoolingissuppliedtothcspentfuelpool(SFP)heatexchanger onlyfromtheoppositeunit.Ifthatunithasalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),CCWtotheSFPheatexchanger willisolate.FinalSafetyAnalysisRcport(FSAR)Table9:5-2,footnote3,indicates thattheSFPheatexchanger isassumedtobconthenon-accident unit.hThelicenseereportedthefollowing inspection questions:

r,1)Doesadualtrain-CCW outagerepresent acondition outsidethcplantdesignbasis22)WasthisreviewedaspartoftheprocessofallowingadualtrainCCWoutage2'ased onareviewofFSARTable9.5-2,itwasconcluded thatfootnote3wasestablished toclarifywhynovaluesforSFPheatexchanger flowforthcunitundergoing theLOCAarelistedinthetable.Footnote3reflectnormal'FPcoolingsystemdesignandoperation.

IAreviewwasperformed ofthesafetyevaluation pcrformcd fortheUnit2fullcoreoflloadwithonetrainofspent--'uelcooling.ThissafetyreviewcoveredtheUnit2refueling outageschedulewhichincludedadualtrainCCWoutage.1'ootnote3ofTable9.5-2reprcscnts thenormaldesignofthcSFPcoolingsystem,thatis,theSFPcoolingsystemisdesignedtorcmovethe.heatgenerated bystoredspentfuelelementsintlic[SFP].Thesystemincorporates twoseparatetrains.ThesafetyreviewfortheUnit2full.coreoflloadxvithonetrainofspentfuelcoolingaddressed thcFSARsection9.4attribute oftheSFP,coolingdealingwithtimetoboileventsandbulkpooltcmpcraturc requirements; however,thesafetyreviewfailedtoaddressESARsection9.5attributes associated CCWcoolingrcquiremcnts asgiveninTable9.5-2.t'hisissueimpactsbothunits.However,theunitsarenotcurrently inaTcchnical Specification limitingcondition foroperation asaresultofthisissue.,POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32824FAILURETOPERFORMA10CFR50.59EVALUATION FORAPROCEDURE CHANGEINVOLVING COMPONENT COOLINGWATERHEAT.EXCHANGER OUTLETTEMPERATURE LIMITS~DuringtheongoingNRCarchitect/engineer'esign inspection, aquestionwasaskedrelativetothcfactthatduringthclastUnit2refueling outage;anadininistrative limitof90'Fwasplacedonthecomponent coolingwater(CCW)system.Thethermalanalysisindicated thatamaxiinumCCWtempcraturc of90'Fwouldeliminate allmarginassociated withthcspentfuelpool(SFP)designassumingadesignflowof3,000.gpm.

+w't'ttllIt Attachment 2(continued),,

".NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDesignInspection FindingsThefollowing inspection questionwasasked:SinceachangeinCCWtcmpcraturc wasrequiredtomeettheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)valueof160'FfortheSFP,wasa10CFR50.59unrevicwcd safetyevaluation perfoimed?

I'helicenseereviewedtliccliangetotheprocedure tolimitCCWtcmperaturc to90'F.Thelicenseeconsidered this~changetobcanadniinistrative changeonlytolowertheallowable tcmperaturc totheSFPcoolingheatexchanger.'

10CFR50.59evaluation wasnotperformed becauseitwasnotrccognizcd thatthe95'Frequirement wasessentially beingchanged.IWithoutthecompletion ofanunrevicwcd safetyquestiondetermination, thcplantwasi'nacondition outsidethe"designbasis.Theunitsarcnotcurrently inatechnical specification limitingcondition foroperation asaresultofthisissue.1Il'condition rcporthasbeenwrittentoinitiateactionstoinvestigate thiseventandprovideprcventivc actions.The90'Flimitisnolongerintheoperating proccdurcs.

'POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32839AVAILABLE WATERVOLUMEINRWSTNOTADEQUATEINMODES5AND6DuringtheongoingNRCarchitect/engineer design.inspection, NRCinspectors askedaquestionaboutthcreactor,coolantmakeuprcquircdaAcra10CFR50,AppendixRfire.Torcsporidtothcquestion, thelicenseereviewedtwoassociated designcalculations.

Themorerestrictive calculation wasdetermined tobcthecalculation ofrrccordtomcctthercquircment.

Thiscalculation.requires 87,000gallonsofavatertobcavailable inthcrefueling waterstoragetank(RWST).Thevalueof87,000gallonswasapproved,on 02/20/90:

Duringmodes1through4,plantproccdurcs adequately ensurethatthisrequirement ismet.Duringmodes5and6,plantprocedures arcnot'dcquatctoensurethatthisrequirement ismet.rIThcplanthasbeeninmodes5and6manytimessincethisrcquircmcnt becameeffective on02/20/90.

Basedontlus,theplanthasbeeninanunanalyzed condition severaltimessince02/20/90.

rCurrently bothunitsarcinmode1.Thelicensccisreviewing plantoperating procedures todetermine'impact and'illimplement procedure chancesasneededpriortoeitherunitenteringmodes5or6.Thelicenseeiscontinuing toevaluatethesubjectcalculations andplanstosubmitaliccnsceeventrcporttotheNRContinssubject.POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:,32843 LAKEMICHIGANTEMPERATURE EXCEEDEDPLANTDESIGNBASISLIMITINAUGUST1988'Asaresultofquestions posedbymembersoftheongoingNRCarchitect/enginccr designinspection team,thelicenseehas'dctcrmined thatthewatertemperature ofLakeMichigan, thcplant'sultimateheatsink,cxcccdedtheplantdesignbasislaketemperature limitof76'Ffor22daysduringAugust1988.I 0~flI1 Attachment 2(continued)

NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDesignInspection FindingsThecontrolroomisnormallycooledbyanairconditioning systemwhichutilizesnon-safety relatedclullers.

Thesafetyrelatedportionofthecontrolroomairconditioning systemutilizeswaterfromLakeMichiganasthecoolingmedium.Thiswaterwouldbcsupplieddirectlytothecoolingcoilsfollowing manualrealignment.

Atanaveragelaketemperature of81'Fthatexistedduringthe22dayperiodin>ugust1988,thetemperature inside'he controlroomcouldhavereached110.4'Fhadthenon-safety relatedchillersnotfunctioned.

Atatemperature of110.4'F,thelifetimeofsomeinstrumentation insidethecontrolroom,thesolidstateprotection,system, andthenuclearinstrumentation, isestimated tobeat150hoursor6.25days.Theimpactofthisshortened instrument lifespanonplantoperation hadnotbeencvaluatcd.

/Atthetimeofthisevent,theplantTechnical Specifications allowedcontinuous operation withcontrolroomtcmpcraturcs upto120'F.TheTechnical Specifications havesincebeenrcviscdsuchthatcontinued operation withcontrolroomtemperatures incxccssof95'Fisnotpermitted.

Operation ofthcplantduringthctimeperiodwhenlaketemperature exceededthedesignbasislimit,withoutanalysisindicating acceptable controlroomcoolingcouldbcmaintained abovethistemperature limit,'and withoutprocedures toalertpersonnel ofthesituation, isconsidered asoperation inanunanalyzed condition.

Thcinstrumentation wasnotadversely impactedbythclughlaketempcraturcs asthenon-safety relatedchillcrscontinued tofunctionandmaintainacceptable control,roomtemperatures.

POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32915OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION OFTHECOMPONENT COOLINGWATERSYSTEMPIPINGNOTINACCORDANCE WITHTHEANSICODEREQUIREMENTS iChapter9.5oftheFSARsta'tes:Thcreliefvalveonthecomponent

[coolingwater]surgetankissizedtorelievethemaximumflowrate,ofwaterthatwouldenterthcsurgetankfollowing aruptureofareactorcoolantthermalbamercoolingcoil.Thesetprcssureassuresthatthcdesignpressureofthccomponent coolingsystemisnotexceeded.'he pipingdesigncodeatthcCookplantisB31.1.B31.1statesthatanintercepting stopvalvecannotbelocatedbetweenthesourceofpressureandtheprcssurereliefdcvicccreditedforprotecting thepipe.Inthisinstance, theprcssuresourceistherupturedthermalbarrier,theprcssurereliefdeviceisasafetyreliefvalveonthesurgetank.Contrarytothecoderequirement, thcrcaremanualvalvesmaintained openbehveenthetwo.Thesevalveswerenotcontrolled inaccordance withorexemptedfromB31.1,Anevaluation isbeingperformed todetermine themostcQcctivemethodofestablishing andmaintaining thccode'cquircmcnt.

Acondition reporthasbeenwrittentoinitiateaninvestigation intothiseventanddetermine theappropriate preventative actions."

Tluscondition wasidentified inresponseto'anongoingNRCarchitect/engineer designinspection.

0'IiWE+lWfV,IIIIilr1P\ls1EI'