ML20198E899

Corrected Pages 2,13 & 15 to Safety Insp Rept 50-341/85-37 on 850701-0930 Re Followup on Inspector Identified Items & Independent Insp

ML20198E899
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	11/08/1985
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198E883	List: IR 05000341/1985037 ML20198E876 ML20198E899
References
50-341-85-37, NUDOCS 8511140182
Download: ML20198E899 (3)

See also: IR 05000341/1985037

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

• F. Agosti, Manager, Nuclear Operations l

S. Booker, Assistant Maintenance Engineer j

• L. Bregni, Compliance Engineer  :

• J. Conen, Licensing Engineer l

J. DuBay, Director, Computer Service & Information Systems j

0. Earle, Supervisor, Licensing

R. Eberhardt, Rad-Chem Engineer

P. Fessler, Maintenance Engineer

• E. Griffing, Assistant Manager, Regulation & Compliance

• W. Jens, Vice-President, Nuclear Operations

S. Leach, Director, Nuclear Security

J. Leman, Superintendent, Maintenance and Modification Engineer

• L. Lessor, Consultant to the Assistant Manager, Nuclear Production

• R. Lenart, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Production

R. Mays, Outage Management Engineer

• W. Miller, Supervisor, Operational Assurance

S. Noetzel, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Engineering

J. Nyquist, Supervisor, Independent Safety Engineering Group

T. O'Keefe, Supervisor, Mechanical Civil Engineering

• G. Overbeck, Assistant Plant Superintendent, Startup

J. Plona, Technical Engineer

E. Preston, Operations Engineer

W. Ripley, Assistant Operations Engineer - Administrative

C. P. Sexauer, Nuclear Production Administrator

• G. Trahey, Director, Quality Assurance

• R. Wooley, Acting Supervisor, Licensing

• Denotes those who attended the exit meetings.

The inspectors also interviewed others of the licensee's staff during

this inspection.

2. Followup on Inspector Identified Items (92701)

a. (Closed) Open Item (341/84-47-01(DRP)): Failure of CR8 Rectifier in

Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs). During the 24-hour test of EDG

No. 12 at 3250 kw, rectifier CR8 overheated. In earlier tests of

EDGs 13 and 14, the same component (CR8) also overheated. The CR8

rectifier protected the EDGs from certain EDG output bus faults.

The licensee's investigation of the CR8 rectifier failures concluded

that the rectifiers were undersized and should be replaced by larger

units. The licensee issued Nonconformance Report No. 84-1199 which

calls for the replacement of the present rectifiers with new

selenium surge suppressors (rectifiers) which have thirty-two, 6"x8"

plates each. The inspectors verified completion of replacement by

8511140182 851100

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12. Independent Inspection (92706)

a. Valve Accessibility

License Condition Attachment 1, B.1.a, required the licensee to

provide accessibility to safety-related valves for manual operation.

Compensatory measures were subsequently implemented and the item was

closed. The corrective action included placing portable stands, air

hoists, and ladders in strategic locations. These accessibility

aids were to be locked in their established storage areas and all

operators would have keys and be briefed on the operation and

locations of these devices. It was believed that since only

operators have the correct key to unlock these devices, adequate

control would be maintained providing the operators properly

returned the devices after use. However, the inspectors have

identified several instances of air hoists and ladders missing from

their storage location. After further investigation it is believed

that Operations may be unlocking the devices for use by other

departments, using the devices themselves and not returning them to

the storage area, and there may also be keys held by unauthorized

personnel. This is an open item (50-341/85037-03(DRP)) pending

review of licensee corrective action for maintaining control of

valve accessibility aids.

b. Open PN-21s (Work Orders)

The licensee has consistently had a large number of open PN-21s

(Work Orders) in the control room. There were 423 open orders as

of June 30, 1985, and the number peaked to 481 on July 28, 1985.

The inspectors consider that the magnitude of open PN-21s contributed

to some of the recent problems such as the status of equipment. The

inspectors also consider the number of the open PN-21s to be

unacceptable. The inspectors have observed several PN-21s that

were still open three months after the work had been completed.

The inspectors brought their concerns to the licensee who took

corrective action by making a concertive ef fort to complete the

required actions and to closeout the PN-21s.

The licensee had 345 open PN-21s on September 29, 1985, and work

had been completed on 198 of these. This results in 147 actual

open PN-21s. The licensee's goal is to have a maximum of 120

active PN-21s with half being preventative maintenance items.

The licensee is including the control of open PN-21s in their

Operations Improvement Program. The inspectors believe that the

licensee must make the effort to successfully control the number of

open PN-21s in order to reduce the probability of equipment status

problems.

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additional inspections, there was an overlap between the DECO review

and that performed by the NRC resulting in approximately 85% of the

concerns reviewed and inspected by the NRC being previously reviewed

by DECO.

The inspection identified some problems in the system which are

believed to be isolated examples and not programmatic in nature. They

included the following:

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Inadequate interviews (unable to channel the problem; vague

generic concerns)

- Packages did not address the whole concern

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Packages incomplete (inadequate documentation)

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Packages should have been provided with additional closure

information (i.e. 50.55(e)'s, NRC Inspection Reports, Duke

Inspection Reports, DECO Reports)

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Investigators unable to receive engineering support

Although some flaws were identified in the SAFETEAM, an overall good

effort went into the SAFETEAM project. With the supplemented and

augmented inspection effort by both DECO and the NRC, we were able

to reach the same conclusions, although the inspectors found it

difficult for the SAFETEAM to reach their conclusions on some

concerns based upon the originally available documentation in

the packages.

Overall the inspectors believe the packages were complete and well

documented and the concerns were adequately addressed. The licensee

has since committed to improve the weaknesses identified in the NRC

and Deco inspections.

The results of this inspection and DECO inspection were provided to

NRC Region III and were used as the basis for regional input to the

Commission briefing on July 9, 1985. See paragraph 4.b. for

additional information on the Commission briefing.

f. Bypass Crack Piping

The licensee observed leakage in the East Steam Bypass line on

September 17, 1985, while operating at 4.1%. The licensee removed

insulation and observed cracks in the 30-inch bypass line and cracks

in hanger retainer and lug welds. Damage appeared to be restricted

to locations to which hangers or snubbers were attached. Subsequent

investigation by the licensee revealed similar occurrences in the

West Steam Bypass Line. Licensee actions are being monitored by

Region III specialists and additional information will be documented

in a subsequent inspection report.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

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