ML20198E899
| ML20198E899 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 11/08/1985 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198E883 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-85-37, NUDOCS 8511140182 | |
| Download: ML20198E899 (3) | |
See also: IR 05000341/1985037
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- F. Agosti, Manager, Nuclear Operations
S. Booker, Assistant Maintenance Engineer
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- L. Bregni, Compliance Engineer
- J. Conen, Licensing Engineer
J. DuBay, Director, Computer Service & Information Systems
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0. Earle, Supervisor, Licensing
R. Eberhardt, Rad-Chem Engineer
P. Fessler, Maintenance Engineer
- E. Griffing, Assistant Manager, Regulation & Compliance
- W. Jens, Vice-President, Nuclear Operations
S. Leach, Director, Nuclear Security
J. Leman, Superintendent, Maintenance and Modification Engineer
- L. Lessor, Consultant to the Assistant Manager, Nuclear Production
- R. Lenart, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Production
R. Mays, Outage Management Engineer
- W. Miller, Supervisor, Operational Assurance
S. Noetzel, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Engineering
J. Nyquist, Supervisor, Independent Safety Engineering Group
T. O'Keefe, Supervisor, Mechanical Civil Engineering
- G. Overbeck, Assistant Plant Superintendent, Startup
J. Plona, Technical Engineer
E. Preston, Operations Engineer
W. Ripley, Assistant Operations Engineer - Administrative
C. P. Sexauer, Nuclear Production Administrator
- G. Trahey, Director, Quality Assurance
- R. Wooley, Acting Supervisor, Licensing
- Denotes those who attended the exit meetings.
The inspectors also interviewed others of the licensee's staff during
this inspection.
2.
Followup on Inspector Identified Items (92701)
a.
(Closed) Open Item (341/84-47-01(DRP)):
Failure of CR8 Rectifier in
Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs).
During the 24-hour test of EDG
No. 12 at 3250 kw, rectifier CR8 overheated.
In earlier tests of
EDGs 13 and 14, the same component (CR8) also overheated.
The CR8
rectifier protected the EDGs from certain EDG output bus faults.
The licensee's investigation of the CR8 rectifier failures concluded
that the rectifiers were undersized and should be replaced by larger
units.
The licensee issued Nonconformance Report No. 84-1199 which
calls for the replacement of the present rectifiers with new
selenium surge suppressors (rectifiers) which have thirty-two, 6"x8"
plates each.
The inspectors verified completion of replacement by
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12.
Independent Inspection (92706)
a.
Valve Accessibility
License Condition Attachment 1, B.1.a, required the licensee to
provide accessibility to safety-related valves for manual operation.
Compensatory measures were subsequently implemented and the item was
closed.
The corrective action included placing portable stands, air
hoists, and ladders in strategic locations.
These accessibility
aids were to be locked in their established storage areas and all
operators would have keys and be briefed on the operation and
locations of these devices.
It was believed that since only
operators have the correct key to unlock these devices, adequate
control would be maintained providing the operators properly
returned the devices after use.
However, the inspectors have
identified several instances of air hoists and ladders missing from
their storage location.
After further investigation it is believed
that Operations may be unlocking the devices for use by other
departments, using the devices themselves and not returning them to
the storage area, and there may also be keys held by unauthorized
personnel.
This is an open item (50-341/85037-03(DRP)) pending
review of licensee corrective action for maintaining control of
valve accessibility aids.
b.
Open PN-21s (Work Orders)
The licensee has consistently had a large number of open PN-21s
(Work Orders) in the control room.
There were 423 open orders as
of June 30, 1985, and the number peaked to 481 on July 28, 1985.
The inspectors consider that the magnitude of open PN-21s contributed
to some of the recent problems such as the status of equipment. The
inspectors also consider the number of the open PN-21s to be
unacceptable.
The inspectors have observed several PN-21s that
were still open three months after the work had been completed.
The inspectors brought their concerns to the licensee who took
corrective action by making a concertive ef fort to complete the
required actions and to closeout the PN-21s.
The licensee had 345 open PN-21s on September 29, 1985, and work
had been completed on 198 of these.
This results in 147 actual
open PN-21s. The licensee's goal is to have a maximum of 120
active PN-21s with half being preventative maintenance items.
The licensee is including the control of open PN-21s in their
Operations Improvement Program.
The inspectors believe that the
licensee must make the effort to successfully control the number of
open PN-21s in order to reduce the probability of equipment status
problems.
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additional inspections, there was an overlap between the DECO review
and that performed by the NRC resulting in approximately 85% of the
concerns reviewed and inspected by the NRC being previously reviewed
by DECO.
The inspection identified some problems in the system which are
believed to be isolated examples and not programmatic in nature. They
included the following:
Inadequate interviews (unable to channel the problem; vague
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generic concerns)
- Packages did not address the whole concern
Packages incomplete (inadequate documentation)
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Packages should have been provided with additional closure
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information (i.e. 50.55(e)'s, NRC Inspection Reports, Duke
Inspection Reports, DECO Reports)
Investigators unable to receive engineering support
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Although some flaws were identified in the SAFETEAM, an overall good
effort went into the SAFETEAM project.
With the supplemented and
augmented inspection effort by both DECO and the NRC, we were able
to reach the same conclusions, although the inspectors found it
difficult for the SAFETEAM to reach their conclusions on some
concerns based upon the originally available documentation in
the packages.
Overall the inspectors believe the packages were complete and well
documented and the concerns were adequately addressed. The licensee
has since committed to improve the weaknesses identified in the NRC
and Deco inspections.
The results of this inspection and DECO inspection were provided to
NRC Region III and were used as the basis for regional input to the
Commission briefing on July 9, 1985.
See paragraph 4.b. for
additional information on the Commission briefing.
f.
Bypass Crack Piping
The licensee observed leakage in the East Steam Bypass line on
September 17, 1985, while operating at 4.1%.
The licensee removed
insulation and observed cracks in the 30-inch bypass line and cracks
in hanger retainer and lug welds.
Damage appeared to be restricted
to locations to which hangers or snubbers were attached.
Subsequent
investigation by the licensee revealed similar occurrences in the
West Steam Bypass Line.
Licensee actions are being monitored by
Region III specialists and additional information will be documented
in a subsequent inspection report.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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