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| {{Adams | | {{Adams |
| | number = ML20206U416 | | | number = ML20210H194 |
| | issue date = 05/10/1999 | | | issue date = 07/22/1999 |
| | title = Insp Repts 50-413/99-10 & 50-414/99-10 on 990314-0424. Violation Being Considered for Escalated Enforcement Action Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations | | | title = Discusses Insp Rept 50-413/99-10 & 50-414/99-10 on 990314- 0424 & Forwards Notice of Violation Re Failure to Comply with TS 3.7.13,when Misalignment of Two Electrical Breakers Rendered SSS Inoperable from 981216-29 |
| | author name = | | | author name = Reyes L |
| | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) | | | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = Peterson G |
| | addressee affiliation = | | | addressee affiliation = DUKE POWER CO. |
| | docket = 05000413, 05000414 | | | docket = 05000413, 05000414 |
| | license number = | | | license number = |
| | contact person = | | | contact person = |
| | document report number = 50-413-99-10, 50-414-99-10, NUDOCS 9905250204 | | | document report number = 50-413-99-10, 50-414-99-10, EA-99-094, NUDOCS 9908030299 |
| | package number = ML20206U413 | | | package number = ML20210H199 |
| | document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS | | | document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE |
| | page count = 7 | | | page count = 5 |
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| | I July 22,1999 EA 99-094 Duke Energy Corporation ATTN: Mr. G. . Site Vice President Catawba Nuclear Station 4800 Concord Road York, SC 29745 SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-413/99-10 AND 50-414/99-10) |
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| U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
| | ==Dear Mr. Peterson:== |
| | This refers to a specialinspection conducted on March 14 through April 24,1999, at the Catawba Nuclear Station. The purpose of this inspection was to followup on an earlier configuration control problem that rendered the Standby Shutdown System (SSS) inoperable. |
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| ==REGION II==
| | The results of the inspection, including one apparent violation, were discussed with members of your staff at an exit meeting on May 3,1999, and formally transmitted to you by letter dated May 10,1999. An open, predecisional enforcement conference was conducted at the NRC |
| Docket Nos: 50-413, 50-414 License Nos: NPF-35, NPF-52
| | - Region ll office in Atlanta, Georgia, on July 12,1999, to discuss the apparent violation, the root cause, and your corrective actions. A list of conference attendees, copies of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) slides, and Duke Energy Corporation's (DEC) presentation materials are enclosed. |
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| Report Nos.: 50-413/99-10,50-414/99-10 Licensee: Duke Energy Corporation System: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Dates: March 14 through April 24,1999 Inspectors: D. Roberts, Senior Resident inspector R. Franovich, Resident inspector Approved by: C. Ogle, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
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| 9905250204 990510 PDR ADOCK 05000413 G PDR
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| | Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information you provided during the conference, we have determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The violation involved the failure to comply with Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.13, when the rnisalignment of two electrical breakers rendered the SSS inoperable from December 16 through 29,1998. On December 16,1998, in preparation for scheduled SSS maintenance, the two breakers were tagged and placed in the "off" (open) position. Upon completion of scheduled maintenance on December 18, plant personnel failed to return the two breakers to the normally "on" (closed) |
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| | position. The misaligned breakers were discovered by DEC personnel on December 29,1998, while' conducting a plant procedure validation. Upon discovery of the open breakers, DEC personnel promptly positioned the breakers to their correct position to restore the SSS to operable status. TS 3.7.13 required that with the SSS inoperable, restore the inoperable equipment to operable status within seven days or be in at least hot standby within the next six hours and in at least hot shutdown within the following six hours; however, the SSS was inoperable for a total of 13 days and required actions were not taken to place the units in at least hot standby within the six hours and in at least hot shutdown within the following six hours. The root cause of the breaker misalignment was an oversight by DEC personnelin not referring to plant procedure OP/1/A/6350/001, Normal Power Checklist, to determine proper breaker |
| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-413/99-10,50-414/99-10 This specialinspection focused on the integrated efforts of the Catawba Nuclear Station staff to evaluate, determine the root cause of, and correct a licensee-identified configuration control problem affecting the Standby Shutdown System from December 16 through 29,1998. The report covers the resident inspection period from March 14 to April 24,1999. [ Applicable template codes and the assessment for items inspected are provided below.)
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| An apparent violation of previous Technical Specification 3.7.13 [now Selected Licensee Commitment item 16.7-9 (Standby Shutdown System)] was identified concerning two mispositioned electrical circuit breakers that rendered the Standby Shutdown System inoperable from December 16 through 29,1998. This issue affected both Catawba unit (Section 02.1; [1 A - eel])
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| Upon discovery of the mispositioned breakers, licensee personnel promptly restored the Standby Shutdown System to operable status and made appropriate notifications to the NRC in the time period required. (Section O2.1; [1 A, 5A - POS])
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| The licensee's procedures for operating the Standby Shutdown System during certain flood, power, fire, and security events were adequate to maintain equipment protection and perform their intended functions. Only minor enhancements were neede Licensee personnel interviewed were knowledgeable of these procedures and how to implement them. (Section O3.1; [1C,38 - POS))
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| The licensee's root cause evaluation provided in Licensee Event Report (LER) i 50-413/98-19 sufficiently developed human performance issues that resulted in the j mispositioned Standby Shutdown System breakers. The licensee adequately addressed possible contributing factors in its corrective action program. (Section 08.1; [5B - POS])
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| .c Report Details Summary of Plant Status During the period of this event (December 16 through 29,1998) both units were at approximately 100 percent reactor powe . Operations 02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Standby Shutdown SystemlSSS) Inocerable Due to Personnel Error Durina Eauipment Restoration Process Inspection Scope (71707) | | . |
| The inspectors reviewed the circumstances associated with LER 50413/98-19 (previously discussed in inspection Report 50-413,414/98-12), in which the SSS was determined to be inoperable for nearly two weeks because two circuit breakers in a SSS motor control center were misaligned. The inspectors discussed this issue with plant personnel, reviewed SSS operating and test procedures, reviewed the restoration procedure associated with SSS maintenance activities on December 16,1998, and reviewed the licensee's immediate corrective actions for restoring system operabilit Observations and Findinas On December 29,1998, the licensee discovered that two breakers associated with the SSS were open when they should have been closed. The breakers were F02C, Motor Control Center 1EMXS Attemate Supply, and R03D, Motor Control Center 2EMXS Alternate Supply. With the two breakers open, the SSS was inoperable for Units 1 and 2. The licensee determined that the two breakers had been in the incorrect position for 13 days, which exceeded the allowed outage time of seven days before action to initiate a unit shutdown to Mode 3 (hot standby) was required within the following six hour SSS Backaround information The SSS is a non-safety-related system that is used to cope with certain flood, power, fire, and security events in order to achieve and maintain hot standby condition for one or both units. The SSS is utilized for certain events that may result in the loss of normal reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal injection. This involves a time-critical task to provide sealinjection with the associated unit's standby makeup pump (which can be powered from 1SLXG using the SSS diesel) within 10 minutes in order to maintain RCP seal integrity. Some of the SSS loads are supplied from 1(2)EMXS, which is normally aligned to the A train 4160 volt alternating current (VAC) vital electrical bus. Procedure OP/0/B/6100/013, Standby Shutdown System Operations, Revision 41, directs operators to open breaker 1(2) F01 A associated with 1(2)EMXA, which is powered from 1(2) ETA (the A train 4160 VAC vital bus), and close breaker 1(2)F03A associated with 1SLXG, the auxiliary power supply, during postulated events. If power to 1SLXG is lost, the SSS diesel engine will be manually started to power the SSS loads, assuming the required breaker alignment is in place. The standby makeup pump suction and discharge isolation valves are powered from 1(2)EMXS. These valves are normally closed and would not be capable of opening and providing RCP sealinjection with breakers F02C and R03D open since they are in series with breaker 1(2)F03A, respectivel .,
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| | position after the completion of maintenance, and in not specifying the correct position on system restoration procedures. |
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| | c Although the SSS is not considered a safety-related system, its design basis is to provide an alternate means for achieving and maintaining a hot standby condition for 72 hours during ; |
| | certain events, including station blackout (SBO) events. During a postulated SBO, the SSS I provides e_lectrical power via a dedicated diesel generator to the standby makeup pump.and its suction and discharge valves (one pump and two valves for each unit), such that the ptimp can provide seal coolinD flow to the reactor coolant pumps (RCPl. The facility design requires restoration.of RCP seal cooling flow in the event of an SBO within ten minutes to prevent seal damage and loss of sealintegrity. However, with the two breakem in the incorrect position, the ability of the SSS to provide electrical power to open the standby makeup pump suction and discharge valves in a timely manner to provide RCP seal cooling flow within ten minutes could not be ensured. Although this condition did not result in any actual safety consequences, the , |
| | potential existed for this condition to cause a loss of RCP sealintegrity, had an actual SBO l |
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| To ensure that the time-critical task of providing RCP seal injection can be performed within 10 minutes, the licensee has procedurally minimized the number of breakers that need to be manipulated (only F01 A and F03A) to transfer power to 1SLXG. With no procedural steps provided to verify that the third breaker (F02C for Unit 1 and R03D for Unit 2) was closed, the ability to provide reactor coolant pump seal injection within 10 l minutes could not be ensure Personnel Error Durino Eouioment Restoration Procedure Devetooment The licensee determined that breakers F02C and R03D had been left in the open position following preventive maintenance on December 16,1998. The normally closed breakers were tagged and placed in the OFF (open) position in support of the maintenance. Following completion of the maintenance activities, the tags were removed from the breakers, but the breakers were left in the OFF position in accordance with the system restoration procedure, Tag-Out 08-2811. The system restoration procedure incorrectly specified that the breakers be restored in the open position. The licensee determined that a senior reactor operator (SRO) who generated the restoration procedure assumed that, since the breaker was associated with an alternate power supply, then the normal position of the breaker was OFF. This SRO failed to reference applicable procedures to verify the normal breaker position. A second SRO reviewed and approved the tag-out procedure and missed the error. The misaligned breakers were identified and questioned by another operator on December 29,1998, who was performing an unrelated procedure validation walk-throug Operation Management Procedure (OMP) 2-18, Tagout Removal and Restoration Procedure, Revision 50, Step 6.2, Restoration / Partial Restore Record Sheet, item AA, states that equipment is to be normally returned to the position specified by a governing operating procedure checklist, the body of a goveming procedure, or as specified by the approving SRO based on plant conditions. The i.ispectors determined that the governing operating checklists for the two SSS breakers were not reviewed when the operators determined the required restored positions. Discussions with licensee personnel and review of assot nd Problem Investigation Process report (PIP)
| | A violation that causes a system designed to prevent or mitigate serious safety events to be unable to perform its intended safety function is generally characterized as a Severity Level ll violation in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for Enforcement Actions"(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. During the enforcement conference, you , |
| O-C98-4935, revealed that othen possible contributing factors included the fact that the restoration procedure did not reference OP/1/A/6350/001, Normal Power Checklist, which specifies the normal operating positions of the breakers; and station drawings did not accurately depict the breakers' normal operating positions. The inspectors concluded that these contributors did not cause the human performance error when the clearance restoration procedure was being developed and approved by the SROs in support of the December 16,1998, maintenance activities. These items were, however, properly included in the licensee's corrective action progra Root Cause Determination The licensee determined that the root cause for this event was inadequate work practices. Operations personnel failed to follow the established practice of reviewing OP/1/A/6350/001, Normal Power Checklist, to determine the correct normal (restored)
| | presented the results of your bounding risk analysis, assuming RCP pump seal damage after |
| position of breakers F02C and R03D. Based on the breakers' labels, operations personnel wrongly assumed that the normal position of the breakers was open. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's root cause determination, as well as its development of possible contributing factors in the corrective action program, was
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| | ten minutes. Your analysis concluded that the increase in core damage frequency was small and below the accident precursor threshold of 1E-6 per year. Based on your analysis, we , |
| | determined that this violation would not be properly characterized at Severity Level 11 However, l we have determined that this violation represents a significant failure to comply with the Action Statement of a TS Limiting Condition for Operation where the appropriate action was not taken within the required time. Therefore, this violation has been characterized in accordance with the Enforcement Policy as a Severity Level lli violation. |
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| | I in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of S55,000 is considered for a Severity Level lli violation. Because your facility has been the subject of an ; |
| | escalated enforcement action within the last two years', we considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Actipn in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit for identification is warranted because the violation was identified by DEC personnel while conducting a plant procedure validation. Credit also is warranted for Corrective Acjt on because of your immediate corrective action to restore the SSS to operable status and because of long-term corrective actions to preclude recurrence. These corrective actions included: discussions with plant operators to reinforce plant requirements to refer to procedures to determine breaker restoration positions and to maintain independence between plant personnelin the removal and restoration process; placement of permanent waming labels on the two breakers; and other corrective |
| | - actions that were discussed at the co,nference. |
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| comprehensive. Several short- and long-term corrective actions were specified to restore operability and prevent recurrence. These included specifying, in the equipment data base and locally at the breakers, that having them in the OFF (open) position would render the SSS inoperable. Other actions were taken to address the human performance issue Safety Sianificance
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| The SSS is not considered safety-related. However, the SSS provides an alternate and independent means for maintaining the plant in a safe shutdown (for the SSS this is Hot .
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| Standby [ Mode 3]) condition following certain loss of power, flooding, fire, and security events that result in the loss of normal RCP seal injection. These events are not ,
| | I A Severity Level 111 problem was issued on June 11,1998, for violations associated with the Unit 2 auxiliary building filtered exhaust system. |
| assumed to be concurrent with a design basis accident. Safe shutdown is achieved when: (1) the reactor is prevented from achieving criticality; and (2) adequate heat sink is provided to ensure reactor coolant system pressure and temperature design and safety limits are not exceeded. Upon a loss of normal RCP sealinjection, the SSS is placed in service and the associated unit's standby makeup pump is started to provide seal injection. This is to be accomplished within 10 minutes to ensure that significant RCP seal damage and a resultant small break loss of coolant accident do not occu With breakers F02C and R03D in the wrong positions and not referenced in the SSS operating procedure, the SSS's ability to perform its intended safety function of maintaining RCP seal integrity could not be ensure Reculatory Sianificance The inspectors concluded that the SSS was inoperable from December 16 through 29, 1998, without appropriate actions being taken to restore operability within seven days or perform a plant shutdown within the following six hours as required by Technical Specifications (TS). [As of January 16,1999, following the licensee's conversion to improved TS, this requirement was transferred to the Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) document (item 16.7-9), considered Chapter 16 of the Catawba Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.) The licensee's failure to restore SSS operabiity or perform a plant shutdown within allowed outage times is considered an apparent violation of previous TS 3.7.13. This is identified as apparent violation (eel) 50-413,414/99-10-01:
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| Standby Shutdown System Inoperable in Excess of TS Limits Due to Mispositioned Circuit Breaker c. Conclusions An apparent violation of previous Technical Specification 3.7.13 [now Selected Licensee Commitment item 16.7-9 (Standby Shutdown System)) was identified concerning two mispositioned electrical circuit breakers that rendered the Standby Shutdown System inoperable from December 16 through 29,1998. This issue affected both Catawba unit Upon discovery of the mispositioned breakers, licensee personnel promptly restored the Standby Shutdown System to operable status and made appropriate notifications to the NRC in the time period require j J
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| | Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations, I have been authorized by the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this t |
| | case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty. |
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| | The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation and the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence is already ; |
| | adequately addressed on the docket in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-413,414/99-10, Licensee |
| | - Event Report 50-413/98-019 dated January 28,1999, and in the materials you presented at the . |
| | conference. Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter unless the description . |
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| | therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you I choose to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice. |
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| | In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (should you choose to provide one) will be placed in the Public Document Room (PDR) To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction, if you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact Loren Plisco, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, at (404) 562-4501. |
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| 03 Operations Procedures and Documentation O3.1 SSS Operatina Procedures and Plant Staff Knowledae - General Comments (71707)
| | Sincerely, Original signed by LAR Luis A. Reyes i Regional Administrator j i |
| The inspectors reviewed procedures associated with the operation of the SSS for loss of nuclear service water, loss of component cooling water, and station blackout events (i.e., events resulting in loss of normal RCP seal injection), and interviewed operations and security personnel responsible for implementation. One minor discrepancy was identified in OP/0/B/6100/013, Standby Shutdown System Operations, Revision 4 Procedural steps goveming the transfer to the SSS referenced a wrong structural
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| ' column identification number in describing a critical terminal box location. This item was communicated to station personnel for correctio Otherwise, the licensee's procedures for operating the SSS during certain flood, power,
| | Enclosures: 1. Notice of Violation 2. Conference Attendees I 3. Material Presented by NRC ; |
| . fire, and security events were adequate to maintain equipment protection and perform their intended functions. Licensee personnel interviewed were knowledgeable of these procedures and how to implement the Miscellaneous Operations issues (40500, 92901)
| | 4. Material Presented by DEC ' |
| - 08.1 - (Closed) LER 50-413/98-19-00: Standby Shutdown System inoperable in Excess of Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time due to Mispositioned Breakers Caused by Personnel Error The licensee's root cause evaluation provided in this LER sufficiently developed human -
| | Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52 l |
| performance issues that resulted in the mispositioned breakers. The licensee adequately addressed possible contributing factors in its corrective action progra Based on the inspectors' review of the subject event, as described in Sections 02 and
| | cc w/encis'. (see page 4) l |
| ' 03 of this inspection report, this LER is close V. Management Meetmgs X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 3,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identife .
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| | WTravers, EDO FMiraglia, DEDR MKnapp, DEDE |
| | , DDambly, OGC l |
| | EJulian, SECY 8 Keeling, CA Enforcement Coordinators Rl, Rlli, RIV JLieberman, OE GCaputo, O! |
| | WBeecher, OPA HBell, OlG CEvans, Ril SSparks, Ril MSatorius, OEDO LPlisco, Ril BMallett, Ril COgle, Ril HBerkow, NRR PTam, NRR DNelson, OE RCarroll, Ril VOrdaz, NRR OE:EA File (BSummers, OE)(2 letterhead) |
| | PUBLIC NRC Resident inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulator Commission 4830 Concord Road York, SC 29745 s N |
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| | SENDTdPUBLICDOCUMENTR00M7 YES / ll OFFICE Mll:EICS Rll:DRP RII:DRS Ril:0RA RII:0g / |
| | Signature $' g gf NW , g NAME SSPARKS LISCO BMALLETT CEVANS ! JOHN DATE "I/72/99 N / \L~ /99 M $ /99 w 5 /99 '7/ A/99 / /99 COPYt VES NO \ES NO ' |
| | YYESI NO 6ESl NO YE/NO ) YES NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAM 64*f:\ENf 0RCE\99 CASES \99094 CAT.DIR\F NAt@PD |
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| | [ DEC- 4 cc w/encis: Peggy Force G. D. Gilbert Assistant Attorney General Regulatory Compliance Manager N. C. Department of Justice Duke Energy Corporation P. Box 629 4800 Concord Road Raleigh, NC 27602 York, SC 29745-9635 Saluda River Electric Lisa Vaughn Cooperative, Inc. ff |
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| | Legal Department (PB05E) P. O. Box 929 Duke Energy Corporation Laurens, SC 129360 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 County Manager of York County York County Courthouse - |
| | Anne Cottingham . York, SC 29745 Winston and Strawn 1400 L Street, NW Piedmont Municipal Power Agency Washington, D. C. 20005 121 Village Drive Greer, SC 29651 North Carolina MPA-1 Suite 600 L. A. Keller, Manager P. O. Box 29513 Nuclear Regulatory Licensing Raleigh, NC 27626-0513 Duke Energy Corporation - |
| | 526 S. Church Street Virgil R. Autry, Director Charlotte, NC 28201-0006 Div. of Radioactive Waste Mgmt. |
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| | S. C. Department of Health j Steven P. Shaver and Environmental Control Senior Sales Engineer 2600 Bull Street Westinghouse Electric Company Columbia, SC 29201 5929 Carnegie Boulevard, Suite 500 Charlotte, NC 28209 Richard P. Wilson, Esq. |
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| PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R. Beagles, Safety Assurance Manager M. Boyle, Radiation Protection Manager S. Bradshaw, Safety Assurance Manager G. Gilbert, Regulatory Compliance Manager *
| | Assistant Attorney General S. C. Attorney General's Office P. O. Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211 Michael Hirsch ~ |
| R. Glover, Operations Superintendent P. Herran, Engineering Manager R. Jones, Station Manager G. Peterson, Catawba Site Vice-President F. Smith, Chemistry Manager R. Parker, Maintenance Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 92901: Followup - Operations ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-413,414/99-10-01 eel Standby Shutdown System inoperable in Excess of TS Liro;ts Due to Mispositioned Circuit Breakers (Secuon O2.1)
| | Federal Emergency Management Agency 500 C Street, SW, Room 840 |
| Qloped 50-413/98-19-00 LER Standby Shutdown System inoperable in Excess of Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time due to Mispositioned Breakers Caused by Personnel Error (Section 08.1)
| | . Washington, D. C. 20472 North Carolina Electric |
| LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CFR - - Code of Federal Regulations eel -
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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217F8231999-10-13013 October 1999
Informs That on 990930,NRC Completed mid-cycle PPR of Catawba Nuclear Station.Based on Review,Nrc Did Not Identify Any New Areas That Warranted More than Core Insp Program Over Next Five Months.Historical Listing of Issues,Encl
ML20217H0041999-10-13013 October 1999
Forwards MOR for Sept 1999 & Revised MOR for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20217F1301999-10-0707 October 1999
Forwards Rev 1 to Request for Relief 99-03 from Requirements of ASME B&PV Code,In Order to Seek Relief from Performing Individual Valve Testing for Certain Valves in DG Starting (Vg) Sys
ML20212J3011999-10-0101 October 1999
Forwards Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR54.17(c) Re Schedule for Submitting Application for Operating License Renewal.Se Also Encl
ML20217K2651999-10-0101 October 1999
Forwards Retake Exams Repts 50-413/99-302 & 50-414/99-302 on 990921-23.Two of Three ROs & One SRO Who Received Administrative Section of Exam Passed Retake Exam, Representing 75 Percent Pass Rate
05000414/LER-1999-004, Forwards LER 99-004-01,providing Correction to Info Previously Provided in Rev 0 of Rept.Planned Corrective Actions Contain Commitments1999-09-27027 September 1999
Forwards LER 99-004-01,providing Correction to Info Previously Provided in Rev 0 of Rept.Planned Corrective Actions Contain Commitments
05000413/LER-1999-015, Forwards LER 99-015-00 Re Inoperability of Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Sys That Exceeded TS Limits Due to Improperly Positioned Vortex Damper.Commitments Are Contained in Corrective Actions Section of Encl Rept1999-09-27027 September 1999
Forwards LER 99-015-00 Re Inoperability of Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Sys That Exceeded TS Limits Due to Improperly Positioned Vortex Damper.Commitments Are Contained in Corrective Actions Section of Encl Rept
ML20217A7911999-09-24024 September 1999
Forwards Insp Repts 50-413/99-05 & 50-414/99-05 on 990718- 0828 at Catawba Facility.Nine NCVs Identified Involving Inadequate Corrective Actions Associated with Degraded Svc Water Supply Piping to Auxiliary Feedwater Sys
ML20212E6471999-09-24024 September 1999
Discusses GL 98-01 Issued by NRC on 980511 & DPC Responses for Catawba NPP & 990615.Informs That NRC Reviewed Response for Catawba & Concluded That All Requested Info Provided.Considers GL 98-01 to Be Closed for Catawba
ML20212F0941999-09-21021 September 1999
Discusses Closeout of GL 97-06, Degradation of Steam Generator Internals for Cns,Units 1 & 2
ML20212M2001999-09-20020 September 1999
Confirms 990913 Telcon Between M Purser & R Carroll Re Management Meeting to Be Conducted on 991026 in Atlanta,Ga to Discuss Operator Licensing Issues
05000414/LER-1999-005, Forwards LER 99-005-00 Re Missed EDG TS Surveillance Concerning Verification of Availability of Offsite Power Sources Resulted from Defective Procedure.Planned Corrective Actions Stated in Rept Represent Regulatory Commitments1999-09-20020 September 1999
Forwards LER 99-005-00 Re Missed EDG TS Surveillance Concerning Verification of Availability of Offsite Power Sources Resulted from Defective Procedure.Planned Corrective Actions Stated in Rept Represent Regulatory Commitments
ML20212D5321999-09-15015 September 1999
Informs That Duke Energy Corp Agrees to Restrict Max Fuel Rod Average Burnup to 60,000 Mwd/Mtu,In Order to Support NRC Final Approval & Issuance of Requested Amend
ML20212B4641999-09-14014 September 1999
Forwards Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 & Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20212A4131999-09-14014 September 1999
Informs That TR DPC-NE-2009P Submitted in 990817 Affidavit, Marked Proprietary,Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure, Pursuant to 10CFR2.709(b) & Section 103(b) of Atomic Energy Act of 1954,as Amended
ML20212M1931999-09-13013 September 1999
Refers to 990909 Meeting Conducted at Region II Office Re Presentation of Licensee self-assessment of Catawba Nuclear Station Performance.List of Attendees & Licensee Presentation Handout Encl
ML20212A3751999-09-10010 September 1999
Informs That Postponing Implementation of New Conditions Improved by RG 1.147,rev 12,acceptable Since Evaluation on Relief Based on Implementation Code Case for Duration of Insp Interval
ML20212A5191999-09-0808 September 1999
Requests NRC Approval for Relief from Requirements of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI,1989 Edition,App VI,VI-2430(c) & 2440(b).Approval of 99-GO-002 Is Requested by 000301
05000413/LER-1999-014, Forwards LER 99-014-00, Missed Surveillance & Operation Prohibited by TS Occurred as Result of Defective Procedures or Program & Inappropriate TS Requirements. Planned Corrective Action Stated in Rept Represents Commitment1999-09-0101 September 1999
Forwards LER 99-014-00, Missed Surveillance & Operation Prohibited by TS Occurred as Result of Defective Procedures or Program & Inappropriate TS Requirements. Planned Corrective Action Stated in Rept Represents Commitment
05000414/LER-1999-003, Forwards LER 99-003-01, Unplanned Actuation of ESFAS Due to a SG High Level Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance. Suppl Rept Provides Info Re Root Cause & Corrective Actions Associated with Event Developed Subsequent to Rev1999-08-31031 August 1999
Forwards LER 99-003-01, Unplanned Actuation of ESFAS Due to a SG High Level Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance. Suppl Rept Provides Info Re Root Cause & Corrective Actions Associated with Event Developed Subsequent to Rev 0 of LER
ML20211H1741999-08-30030 August 1999
Forwards Comments on Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2 & McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 Specific Reactor Vessel Info Contained in Rvid.Ltr Dtd 990107,rept ATI-98-012-T005 & Partial marked-up Rept WCAP-14995 Encl
ML20211M4451999-08-30030 August 1999
Forwards Summary of Util Conclusions Re Outstanding Compliance Issue Re Staff Interpretation of TS SR 3.0.1,per Insp Repts 50-369/99-03 & 50-370/99-03,as Discussed with NRC During 990618 Meeting
05000413/LER-1999-013, Forwards LER 99-013-00,re RHR Heat Exchanger Bypass Valves Not Verified Per TS Surveillance.Surveillance Procedures Have Been Revised & There Are No Further Planned Corrective Actions or Commitments in LER1999-08-25025 August 1999
Forwards LER 99-013-00,re RHR Heat Exchanger Bypass Valves Not Verified Per TS Surveillance.Surveillance Procedures Have Been Revised & There Are No Further Planned Corrective Actions or Commitments in LER
ML20211M8191999-08-25025 August 1999
Confirms 990825 Telcon Between G Gilbert & R Carroll Re Mgt Meeting to Be Held on 990909 in Atlanta,Ga,To Allow Licensee to Present self-assessment of Catawba Nuclear Station Performance
ML20211A9641999-08-20020 August 1999
Forwards SE Authorizing Licensee 990118 Request for Approval of Proposed Relief from Volumetric Exam Requirements of ASME B&PV Code,Section XI for Plant,Units 2
ML20211C1191999-08-18018 August 1999
Forwards ISI Rept Unit 1 Catawba 1999 RFO 11, Providing Results of ISI Effort Associated with End of Cycle 11
ML20211B9471999-08-18018 August 1999
Forwards Request for Relief 99-02,associated with Limited Exam Results for Welds Which Were Inspected During Unit 1 End of Cycle 11 RFO
ML20211C3651999-08-17017 August 1999
Forwards Rev 25 to Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2 Pump & Valve Inservice Testing Program, Which Includes Reformatting of Manual & Addl Changes as Noted in Attached Summary of Changes
ML20211F2971999-08-17017 August 1999
Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Updated Pages for DPC-NE-2009,submitted 980722.Pages Modify Fuel Design & thermal-hydraulic Analysis Sections of DPC-NE-2009. Proprietary Page 2-4 Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790
05000413/LER-1999-011, Forwards LER 99-011-00,re Missed Surveillance on Both Trains of CR Area Ventilation Sys Resulting in TS Violation.Planned Corrective Actions Stated in LER Represent Regulatory Commitment1999-08-16016 August 1999
Forwards LER 99-011-00,re Missed Surveillance on Both Trains of CR Area Ventilation Sys Resulting in TS Violation.Planned Corrective Actions Stated in LER Represent Regulatory Commitment
ML20211B1121999-08-16016 August 1999
Forwards Topical Rept DPC-NE-2012, Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Using Casmo/Simulate, Describing Results of Six Drwm Benchmark Cycles at Catawba & McGuire & Discusses Qualification to Use Drwm at Catawba & McGuire
ML20210V0321999-08-13013 August 1999
Forwards Insp Repts 50-413/99-04 & 50-414/99-04 on 990606- 0717.Six Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as non-cited Violations,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy
ML20210S2751999-08-12012 August 1999
Forwards Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2.Revised Rept for June 1999,encl
ML20210Q3751999-08-0505 August 1999
Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Authorized Representative of Facility Must Submit Ltr as Listed,Thirty Days Before Exam Date,In Order to Register Individuals for Exam
ML20210N9521999-08-0404 August 1999
Forwards Changes to Catawba Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Manual.Documents Constitutes Chapter 16 of Ufsar.With List of Effective Pages
IR 05000413/19980131999-08-0202 August 1999
Discusses Integrated Insp Repts 50-413/98-13,50-414/98-13, 50-413/98-16,50-414/98-16 & NRC Special Repts 50/413/99-11 & 50-414/99-11 Conducted Between Aug 1998 & May 1999.Six Violations Occurred,Based on OI Investigation & Insp
ML20210M6411999-07-29029 July 1999
Forwards Request for Relief 99-03 from Requirements of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,In Order to Seek Relief from Performing Individual Valve Testing for Certain Valves in DG Starting Air (Vg) Sys
05000413/LER-1999-010, Forwards LER 99-010-01 Which Replaces LER 99-002.Rept Number Has Been Changed in Order to Conform to Numbering Convention Specified in NUREG-1022,since Primary Event Involved Both Units1999-07-22022 July 1999
Forwards LER 99-010-01 Which Replaces LER 99-002.Rept Number Has Been Changed in Order to Conform to Numbering Convention Specified in NUREG-1022,since Primary Event Involved Both Units
IR 05000413/19990101999-07-22022 July 1999
Discusses Insp Rept 50-413/99-10 & 50-414/99-10 on 990314- 0424 & Forwards Notice of Violation Re Failure to Comply with TS 3.7.13,when Misalignment of Two Electrical Breakers Rendered SSS Inoperable from 981216-29
ML20217G5241999-07-20020 July 1999
Forwards Exam Repts 50-413/99-301 & 50-414/99-301 on 990524- 27,0603,07-10 & 16.Of Fourteen SRO & RO Applicants Who Received Written Exams & Operating Tests,Eight Applicants Passed & Six Failed Exam
05000413/LER-1999-009, Forwards LER 99-009-00,re Inoperability of Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Valve in Excess of TS Limits.Root Cause & Corrective Actions Associated with Event Are Being Finalized & Will Be Provided in Supplement to Rept1999-07-19019 July 1999
Forwards LER 99-009-00,re Inoperability of Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Valve in Excess of TS Limits.Root Cause & Corrective Actions Associated with Event Are Being Finalized & Will Be Provided in Supplement to Rept
05000414/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-01 Re Unanalyzed Condition Associated with Relay Failure in Auxiliary Feedwater Sys,Due to Inadequate Single Failure Analysis.Rev Is Being Submitted to Include Results of Failure Analysis Which Was Performed1999-07-15015 July 1999
Forwards LER 99-001-01 Re Unanalyzed Condition Associated with Relay Failure in Auxiliary Feedwater Sys,Due to Inadequate Single Failure Analysis.Rev Is Being Submitted to Include Results of Failure Analysis Which Was Performed
ML20209H4431999-07-14014 July 1999
Forwards Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2.Revised Rept for May 1999 on Unit Shutdowns Also Encl
ML20210A5771999-07-14014 July 1999
Forwards Revsied Catawba Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Manual, Per 10CFR50.71(e),changing Sections 16.7-5,16.8-5,16.9-1,16.9-3,16.9-5 & 16.11-7.Manual Constitute Chapter 16 of UFSAR
ML20216D3941999-07-14014 July 1999
Forwards Revs to Catawba Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Manual
NUREG-1431, Forwards SER Agreeing with Util General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation1999-07-0909 July 1999
Forwards SER Agreeing with Util General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation
ML20196L0371999-07-0808 July 1999
Approves Requested Schedule Change of Current two-year Requalification Examinations to non-outage dates.Two-year Cycle Will Start on 991001 & Will End on 020930
05000413/LER-1999-008, Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Operation Prohibited by TS 3.5.2. Rev to LER Will Be Submitted by 990812 Which Will Include All Required Info About Ventilation Sys Pressure Boundry Breach1999-07-0808 July 1999
Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Operation Prohibited by TS 3.5.2. Rev to LER Will Be Submitted by 990812 Which Will Include All Required Info About Ventilation Sys Pressure Boundry Breach
ML20196J9001999-07-0606 July 1999
Informs That 990520 Submittal of Rept DPC-NE-3004-PA,Rev 1, Mass & Energy Release & Containment Response Methodology, Marked Proprietary Will Be Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(b)(5) & Section 103(b) of AEA of 1954
IR 05000413/19990031999-07-0101 July 1999
Discusses Insp Repts 50-413/99-03 & 50-414/99-03 Completed on 990605 & Transmitted by Ltr .Results of Delibrations for Violation Re Discovery of Potentially More Limiting Single Failure Affecting SGTS Analysis Provided
1999-09-08
[Table view]
Category:OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217F8231999-10-13013 October 1999
Informs That on 990930,NRC Completed mid-cycle PPR of Catawba Nuclear Station.Based on Review,Nrc Did Not Identify Any New Areas That Warranted More than Core Insp Program Over Next Five Months.Historical Listing of Issues,Encl
ML20217K2651999-10-0101 October 1999
Forwards Retake Exams Repts 50-413/99-302 & 50-414/99-302 on 990921-23.Two of Three ROs & One SRO Who Received Administrative Section of Exam Passed Retake Exam, Representing 75 Percent Pass Rate
ML20212J3011999-10-0101 October 1999
Forwards Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR54.17(c) Re Schedule for Submitting Application for Operating License Renewal.Se Also Encl
ML20212E6471999-09-24024 September 1999
Discusses GL 98-01 Issued by NRC on 980511 & DPC Responses for Catawba NPP & 990615.Informs That NRC Reviewed Response for Catawba & Concluded That All Requested Info Provided.Considers GL 98-01 to Be Closed for Catawba
ML20217A7911999-09-24024 September 1999
Forwards Insp Repts 50-413/99-05 & 50-414/99-05 on 990718- 0828 at Catawba Facility.Nine NCVs Identified Involving Inadequate Corrective Actions Associated with Degraded Svc Water Supply Piping to Auxiliary Feedwater Sys
ML20212F0941999-09-21021 September 1999
Discusses Closeout of GL 97-06, Degradation of Steam Generator Internals for Cns,Units 1 & 2
ML20212M2001999-09-20020 September 1999
Confirms 990913 Telcon Between M Purser & R Carroll Re Management Meeting to Be Conducted on 991026 in Atlanta,Ga to Discuss Operator Licensing Issues
ML20212A4131999-09-14014 September 1999
Informs That TR DPC-NE-2009P Submitted in 990817 Affidavit, Marked Proprietary,Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure, Pursuant to 10CFR2.709(b) & Section 103(b) of Atomic Energy Act of 1954,as Amended
ML20212M1931999-09-13013 September 1999
Refers to 990909 Meeting Conducted at Region II Office Re Presentation of Licensee self-assessment of Catawba Nuclear Station Performance.List of Attendees & Licensee Presentation Handout Encl
ML20212A3751999-09-10010 September 1999
Informs That Postponing Implementation of New Conditions Improved by RG 1.147,rev 12,acceptable Since Evaluation on Relief Based on Implementation Code Case for Duration of Insp Interval
ML20211M8191999-08-25025 August 1999
Confirms 990825 Telcon Between G Gilbert & R Carroll Re Mgt Meeting to Be Held on 990909 in Atlanta,Ga,To Allow Licensee to Present self-assessment of Catawba Nuclear Station Performance
ML20211A9641999-08-20020 August 1999
Forwards SE Authorizing Licensee 990118 Request for Approval of Proposed Relief from Volumetric Exam Requirements of ASME B&PV Code,Section XI for Plant,Units 2
ML20210V0321999-08-13013 August 1999
Forwards Insp Repts 50-413/99-04 & 50-414/99-04 on 990606- 0717.Six Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as non-cited Violations,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy
ML20210Q3751999-08-0505 August 1999
Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Authorized Representative of Facility Must Submit Ltr as Listed,Thirty Days Before Exam Date,In Order to Register Individuals for Exam
IR 05000413/19980131999-08-0202 August 1999
Discusses Integrated Insp Repts 50-413/98-13,50-414/98-13, 50-413/98-16,50-414/98-16 & NRC Special Repts 50/413/99-11 & 50-414/99-11 Conducted Between Aug 1998 & May 1999.Six Violations Occurred,Based on OI Investigation & Insp
IR 05000413/19990101999-07-22022 July 1999
Discusses Insp Rept 50-413/99-10 & 50-414/99-10 on 990314- 0424 & Forwards Notice of Violation Re Failure to Comply with TS 3.7.13,when Misalignment of Two Electrical Breakers Rendered SSS Inoperable from 981216-29
ML20217G5241999-07-20020 July 1999
Forwards Exam Repts 50-413/99-301 & 50-414/99-301 on 990524- 27,0603,07-10 & 16.Of Fourteen SRO & RO Applicants Who Received Written Exams & Operating Tests,Eight Applicants Passed & Six Failed Exam
NUREG-1431, Forwards SER Agreeing with Util General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation1999-07-0909 July 1999
Forwards SER Agreeing with Util General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation
ML20196L0371999-07-0808 July 1999
Approves Requested Schedule Change of Current two-year Requalification Examinations to non-outage dates.Two-year Cycle Will Start on 991001 & Will End on 020930
ML20196J9001999-07-0606 July 1999
Informs That 990520 Submittal of Rept DPC-NE-3004-PA,Rev 1, Mass & Energy Release & Containment Response Methodology, Marked Proprietary Will Be Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(b)(5) & Section 103(b) of AEA of 1954
IR 05000413/19990031999-07-0101 July 1999
Discusses Insp Repts 50-413/99-03 & 50-414/99-03 Completed on 990605 & Transmitted by Ltr .Results of Delibrations for Violation Re Discovery of Potentially More Limiting Single Failure Affecting SGTS Analysis Provided
ML20209E2701999-07-0101 July 1999
Forwards Insp Repts 50-413/99-03 & 50-414/99-03 on 990425- 0605.Six Violations of NRC Requirements Occurred & Being Treated as non-cited Violations Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy
ML20209E3931999-06-28028 June 1999
Informs of 990618 Meeting Conducted at Facility to Present Results of Most Recent Periodic Plant Performance Review for Plant.List of Attendees Encl
ML20196G8861999-06-24024 June 1999
Discusses GL 92-01,Rev 1,Suppl 1, Reactor Vessel Structrual Integrity 950816 & 960729 Responses.Rvid,Version 2 Released as Result of Review.Rvid Should Be Reviewed & Comments Should Be Received by 990901 If Not Acceptable for Plant
ML20196G6541999-06-17017 June 1999
Confirms 990614 Telephone Conversation Re Rescheduling of Two Predecisional Enforcement Conferences Originally Scheduled for 990623.SSS Conference Rescheduled for 990712 & Ice Condenser Conference Rescheduled for 990720
ML20196A5781999-06-14014 June 1999
Discusses Notice of Enforcement Discretion for Duke Energy Corp Re Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 TSs 3.5.2 & 3.7.12
ML20195E9171999-06-0303 June 1999
Confirms Conversation with Bradshaw on 990526 Re Rescheduling 990607 Predecisional Enforcement Conference to Discuss Apparent Violation in Insp Repts 50-413/99-10 & 50-414/99-10.Conference Will Be on 990623 in Atlanta,Ga
ML20195F4141999-06-0202 June 1999
Forwards Insp Repts 50-413/99-11 & 50-414/99-11 on 990422-23 & 0503.Apparent Violation Identified & Being Considered for Escalated Enforcement Action.Violation Involved Failure to Maintain Unit 1 Ice Condenser Lower Inlet Door Operable
ML20207D0671999-05-20020 May 1999
Informs That During Meeting on 990512,arrangements Modified for Administration of Licensing Exams at Catawba Nuclear Station During Weeks of 990524 & 0607,respectively
ML20207C8721999-05-20020 May 1999
Forwards Insp Repts 50-413/99-02 & 50-414/99-02 on 990314-0424.Three Violations Occurred & Being Treated as non-cited Violations.Activities Generally Characterized by Safety Conscious Operations & Sound Engineering & Maint
ML20207C8061999-05-19019 May 1999
Confirms 990510 Telcon with R Jones Re Predecisional Enforcement Conference Requested by NRC & Scheduled for 990607 in Atlanta,Ga to Discuss Apparent Violation Associated with Potential Inoperability of SSS
ML20207C7761999-05-19019 May 1999
Informs That on 990618,NRC Will Meet with Mgt of Duke Energy Corp to Discuss Performance of Catawba Facility & Extends Invitation to Attend Meeting as Observer
ML20206P4911999-05-14014 May 1999
Forwards Safety Evaluation Accepting GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves
ML20206M4201999-05-11011 May 1999
Informs That NRC Ofc of Nuclear Regulation (NRR) Reorganized Effective 990328.As Part of Reorganization,Div of Licensing Project Mgt (DLPM) Created.Reorganization Chart Encl
ML20206U4091999-05-10010 May 1999
Forwards Insp Repts 50-413/99-10 & 50-414/99-10 on 990314-0424.One Violation Occurred & Being Considered for Escalated Enforcement Action Involving Inoperability of Standby Shutdown Sys from 981216-29
ML20206N4191999-05-0606 May 1999
Informs That Team Will Inspect Dam at Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond on 990609.Purpose of Insp Will Be to Confirm That Structure Conforms with Design Documents & Capability of Performing Design Functions
ML20205S5491999-04-21021 April 1999
Forwards SE Discussing DPC Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions. Response Acceptable
ML20206B7941999-04-16016 April 1999
Confirms 990331 Telcon Between M Purser of Util & R Franovich of NRC Re Public Meeting Scheduled for 990618 in York,Sc to Discuss Results of NRC Recent Plant Performance Review for Catawba Nuclear Station
ML20205N3471999-04-12012 April 1999
Forwards Safety Evaluation & Eri/Nrc 95-506, Technical Evaluation Rept on Submittal Only Review of IPE of External Events at Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20205T3491999-04-0909 April 1999
Informs That on 990317,T Beedle & Ho Christensen Confirmed Initial Operator Licensing Exam Schedule for Catawba Nuclear Station for Y2K.No Y2K Exam Scheduled.Initial Exam Requested for Apr 2001 for Approx 18 Candidates
ML20205N0531999-04-0606 April 1999
Forwards Insp Repts 50-413/99-01 & 50-414/99-01 on 990124-0313.DPC Conduct of Activities at Catawba Facility Generally Characterized by Safety Conscious Operations & Sound Engineering.Five Violations Noted & Treated as NCVs
ML20196K9961999-03-30030 March 1999
Forwards Synopsis of NRC OI Completed Rept Re Alleged Compromise of Initial Licensed Operator Exam at Cns.Oi Did Not Substantiate Allegation That Initial Operator Exam Compromised.Plans No Further Action Re Matter
ML20205M2651999-03-25025 March 1999
Discusses PPR Completed 990201.Advises of Planned Insp Effort Resulting from Catawba PPR Review.Forwards Plant Issues Matrix & Insp Plan
ML20207L7741999-03-15015 March 1999
Requests That NRC Exercise Discretion Not to Enforce Compliance with Actions Required by Plant,Units 1 & 2 Re TS Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.3.7 & 3.3.8
ML20207M9091999-03-0505 March 1999
Informs That Info Submitted by Application, Marked as Proprietary Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR2.790(b)(5) & Section 103(b) of AEA of 1954,as Amended
ML20207A5821999-02-17017 February 1999
Forwards Insp Repts 50-413/98-12 & 50-414/98-12 & Notice of Violation.One Violation Being Considered for Escalated Enforcement Action
ML20203G5161999-02-0505 February 1999
Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Generic Fundamentals Exam Section of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 990407. Representative of Facility Must Submit Either Ltr Indicating No Candidates or Listing of Candidates for Exam
ML20203A2421999-02-0505 February 1999
Forwards SE Accepting Proposal to Revise Methodology in TR DPC-NE-3002-A,to Permit Use of single-node Model,Instead of multi-node Model,To Represent SG Secondary Sys for post-trip Phase of Loss of Normal Feedwater Analysis for Plant,Unit 2
ML20202J4751999-01-29029 January 1999
Responds to Concern Raised on 981020 Re Appropriateness of Interaction of NRC Headquarters Operations Officer with on-shift Operations Staff During Event
ML20202C2511999-01-27027 January 1999
Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Util 980331 Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs, for Catawba Nuclear Station. Response Requested within 60 Days of Date of Ltr
1999-09-24
[Table view] |
Inspection Report - Catawba - 1999010 |
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I July 22,1999 EA 99-094 Duke Energy Corporation ATTN: Mr. G. . Site Vice President Catawba Nuclear Station 4800 Concord Road York, SC 29745 SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-413/99-10 AND 50-414/99-10)
Dear Mr. Peterson:
This refers to a specialinspection conducted on March 14 through April 24,1999, at the Catawba Nuclear Station. The purpose of this inspection was to followup on an earlier configuration control problem that rendered the Standby Shutdown System (SSS) inoperable.
The results of the inspection, including one apparent violation, were discussed with members of your staff at an exit meeting on May 3,1999, and formally transmitted to you by letter dated May 10,1999. An open, predecisional enforcement conference was conducted at the NRC
- Region ll office in Atlanta, Georgia, on July 12,1999, to discuss the apparent violation, the root cause, and your corrective actions. A list of conference attendees, copies of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) slides, and Duke Energy Corporation's (DEC) presentation materials are enclosed.
Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information you provided during the conference, we have determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The violation involved the failure to comply with Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.13, when the rnisalignment of two electrical breakers rendered the SSS inoperable from December 16 through 29,1998. On December 16,1998, in preparation for scheduled SSS maintenance, the two breakers were tagged and placed in the "off" (open) position. Upon completion of scheduled maintenance on December 18, plant personnel failed to return the two breakers to the normally "on" (closed)
position. The misaligned breakers were discovered by DEC personnel on December 29,1998, while' conducting a plant procedure validation. Upon discovery of the open breakers, DEC personnel promptly positioned the breakers to their correct position to restore the SSS to operable status. TS 3.7.13 required that with the SSS inoperable, restore the inoperable equipment to operable status within seven days or be in at least hot standby within the next six hours and in at least hot shutdown within the following six hours; however, the SSS was inoperable for a total of 13 days and required actions were not taken to place the units in at least hot standby within the six hours and in at least hot shutdown within the following six hours. The root cause of the breaker misalignment was an oversight by DEC personnelin not referring to plant procedure OP/1/A/6350/001, Normal Power Checklist, to determine proper breaker
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position after the completion of maintenance, and in not specifying the correct position on system restoration procedures.
c Although the SSS is not considered a safety-related system, its design basis is to provide an alternate means for achieving and maintaining a hot standby condition for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> during ;
certain events, including station blackout (SBO) events. During a postulated SBO, the SSS I provides e_lectrical power via a dedicated diesel generator to the standby makeup pump.and its suction and discharge valves (one pump and two valves for each unit), such that the ptimp can provide seal coolinD flow to the reactor coolant pumps (RCPl. The facility design requires restoration.of RCP seal cooling flow in the event of an SBO within ten minutes to prevent seal damage and loss of sealintegrity. However, with the two breakem in the incorrect position, the ability of the SSS to provide electrical power to open the standby makeup pump suction and discharge valves in a timely manner to provide RCP seal cooling flow within ten minutes could not be ensured. Although this condition did not result in any actual safety consequences, the ,
potential existed for this condition to cause a loss of RCP sealintegrity, had an actual SBO l
occurred.
A violation that causes a system designed to prevent or mitigate serious safety events to be unable to perform its intended safety function is generally characterized as a Severity Level ll violation in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for Enforcement Actions"(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. During the enforcement conference, you ,
presented the results of your bounding risk analysis, assuming RCP pump seal damage after
'
ten minutes. Your analysis concluded that the increase in core damage frequency was small and below the accident precursor threshold of 1E-6 per year. Based on your analysis, we ,
determined that this violation would not be properly characterized at Severity Level 11 However, l we have determined that this violation represents a significant failure to comply with the Action Statement of a TS Limiting Condition for Operation where the appropriate action was not taken within the required time. Therefore, this violation has been characterized in accordance with the Enforcement Policy as a Severity Level lli violation.
.
I in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of S55,000 is considered for a Severity Level lli violation. Because your facility has been the subject of an ;
escalated enforcement action within the last two years', we considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Actipn in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit for identification is warranted because the violation was identified by DEC personnel while conducting a plant procedure validation. Credit also is warranted for Corrective Acjt on because of your immediate corrective action to restore the SSS to operable status and because of long-term corrective actions to preclude recurrence. These corrective actions included: discussions with plant operators to reinforce plant requirements to refer to procedures to determine breaker restoration positions and to maintain independence between plant personnelin the removal and restoration process; placement of permanent waming labels on the two breakers; and other corrective
- actions that were discussed at the co,nference.
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I A Severity Level 111 problem was issued on June 11,1998, for violations associated with the Unit 2 auxiliary building filtered exhaust system.
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DEC 3
Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations, I have been authorized by the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this t
case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty.
The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation and the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence is already ;
adequately addressed on the docket in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-413,414/99-10, Licensee
- Event Report 50-413/98-019 dated January 28,1999, and in the materials you presented at the .
conference. Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter unless the description .
~
therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you I choose to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (should you choose to provide one) will be placed in the Public Document Room (PDR) To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction, if you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact Loren Plisco, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, at (404) 562-4501.
Sincerely, Original signed by LAR Luis A. Reyes i Regional Administrator j i
.
Enclosures: 1. Notice of Violation 2. Conference Attendees I 3. Material Presented by NRC ;
4. Material Presented by DEC '
Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52 l
cc w/encis'. (see page 4) l
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Distribution w/encis:
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WTravers, EDO FMiraglia, DEDR MKnapp, DEDE
, DDambly, OGC l
EJulian, SECY 8 Keeling, CA Enforcement Coordinators Rl, Rlli, RIV JLieberman, OE GCaputo, O!
WBeecher, OPA HBell, OlG CEvans, Ril SSparks, Ril MSatorius, OEDO LPlisco, Ril BMallett, Ril COgle, Ril HBerkow, NRR PTam, NRR DNelson, OE RCarroll, Ril VOrdaz, NRR OE:EA File (BSummers, OE)(2 letterhead)
PUBLIC NRC Resident inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulator Commission 4830 Concord Road York, SC 29745 s N
/ u. -9.?Np
SENDTdPUBLICDOCUMENTR00M7 YES / ll OFFICE Mll:EICS Rll:DRP RII:DRS Ril:0RA RII:0g /
Signature $' g gf NW , g NAME SSPARKS LISCO BMALLETT CEVANS ! JOHN DATE "I/72/99 N / \L~ /99 M $ /99 w 5 /99 '7/ A/99 / /99 COPYt VES NO \ES NO '
YYESI NO 6ESl NO YE/NO ) YES NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAM 64*f:\ENf 0RCE\99 CASES \99094 CAT.DIR\F NAt@PD
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[ DEC- 4 cc w/encis: Peggy Force G. D. Gilbert Assistant Attorney General Regulatory Compliance Manager N. C. Department of Justice Duke Energy Corporation P. Box 629 4800 Concord Road Raleigh, NC 27602 York, SC 29745-9635 Saluda River Electric Lisa Vaughn Cooperative, Inc. ff
,
Legal Department (PB05E) P. O. Box 929 Duke Energy Corporation Laurens, SC 129360 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 County Manager of York County York County Courthouse -
Anne Cottingham . York, SC 29745 Winston and Strawn 1400 L Street, NW Piedmont Municipal Power Agency Washington, D. C. 20005 121 Village Drive Greer, SC 29651 North Carolina MPA-1 Suite 600 L. A. Keller, Manager P. O. Box 29513 Nuclear Regulatory Licensing Raleigh, NC 27626-0513 Duke Energy Corporation -
526 S. Church Street Virgil R. Autry, Director Charlotte, NC 28201-0006 Div. of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.
S. C. Department of Health j Steven P. Shaver and Environmental Control Senior Sales Engineer 2600 Bull Street Westinghouse Electric Company Columbia, SC 29201 5929 Carnegie Boulevard, Suite 500 Charlotte, NC 28209 Richard P. Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General S. C. Attorney General's Office P. O. Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211 Michael Hirsch ~
Federal Emergency Management Agency 500 C Street, SW, Room 840
. Washington, D. C. 20472 North Carolina Electric
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Membership Corporation P. O. Box 27306 Raleigh, NC 27611 ,
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