ML17270A063

Technical Specifications Bases, Manual

ML17270A063
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	09/18/2017
From:	Susquehanna
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Download: ML17270A063 (32)

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• MANUAL HARD COPY DISTRIBUTION DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL 2017-17558 USER INFORMATION:

GERLACH*ROSEY M EMPL#: 028401 CA#: 0363 Address: NUCSA2 Phone#: 542-3194 TRANSMITTAL INFORMATION:

TO: GERLACH*ROSEY M 09/18/2017 LOCATION: USNRC FROM.: NUCLEAR RECORDS DOCUMENT CONTROL CENTER (NUCSA-2)

THE FOLLOWING CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED TO THE HARDCOPY OR ELECTRONIC MANUAL ASSIGNED TO YOU. HARDCOPY USERS MUST ENSURE THE DOCUMENTS PROVIDED MATCH THE INFORMATION ON THIS TRANSMITTAL. WHEN REPLACING THIS MATERIAL IN YOUR HARDCOPY MANUAL,. ENSURE THE UPDATE DOCUMENT ID IS THE SAME DOCUMENT ID YOU'RE REMOVING FROM YOUR MANUAL . . TOOLS FROM THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE TOOL BAG SHOULD BE.UTILIZED TO ELIMINATE THE CHANCE OF ERRORS .

TENTION: "REPLACE" directions do not affect the Table of Contents, Therefore no

• C will be issued with the updated material.

TSB2 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL REMOVE MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS DATE: 07/18/2017 ADD MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS DATE: 09/15/2017 CATEGORY: DOCUMENTS TYPE: TSB2 ID: TEXT 3.6.4.3 REMOVE: REV:5 ADD:* REV: 6

• 1.,.H::;:J::-'* ..LU/

Page 2 of 2

• CATEGORY: DOCUMENTS ID: TEXT 3.7.3 ADD: REV: 3 TYPE: TSB2 REMOVE: REV:2 CATEGORY: DOCUMENTS TYPE: TSB2 ID: TEXT LOES ADD: REV: 131 REMOVE: REV:l30 ANY DISCREPANCIES WITH THE MATERIAL PROVIDED, CONTACT DCS@ X3107 OR X3171 FOR ASSISTANCE. UPDATES FOR HARDCOPY MANUALS WILL BE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN 3 DAYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEPARTMENT PROCEDURES. PLEASE MAKE ALL CHANGES AND ACKNOWLEDGE COMPLETE IN YOUR NIMS INBOX UPON COMPLETION OF UPDATES. FOR ELECTRONIC MANUAL USERS, ELECTRONICALLY REVIEW THE APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS AND ACKNOWLEDGE COMPLETE IN YOUR NIMS INBOX .

• SSES MANUAL

• . Manual Na:me: TSB2 Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL Table Of Contents Issue Date: 09/15/2017 Procedure Name Rev Issue Date Change ID Change Number TEXT LOES 131 09/15/2017

Title:

LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS TEXT TOC 23 03/01/2017

Title:

TABLE OF CONTENTS TEXT 2 .1.1 5 01/22/2015

Title:

SAFETY LIMITS (SLS) REACTOR CORE SLS TEXT 2 .1.2 1

-, - TEXTTi' t3 l. eo:

- LIMITING CONDITION FOR

.-

TEXT 3. 1.1 TEXT 3 .1.2 11/16/2016 TEXT 3 .1.4 5 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD SCRAM TIMES TEXT 3 .1.5 2 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD SCRAM ACCUMULATORS TEXT 3. 1. 6 4 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ROD PATTERN CONTROL

• Page 1 of §. Report Date: 09/18/17

SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSB2 Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL

• TEXT 3 .1. 7 4 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL (SLC) SYSTEM TEXT 3 .1.8 4 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME (SDV) VENT AND DRAIN VALVES TEXT 3.2.1 5 11/16/2016

Title:

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)

TEXT 3.2.2 4 11/16/2016

Title:

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)

TEXT 3.2.3 3 11/16/2016

Title:

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE LHGR TEXT 3.3.1.1 6 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3 . 3 . 1. 2 3 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION SOURCE RANGE MONITOR (SRM) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.2.1 4 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.2.2 3 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION FEEDWATER - MAIN TURBINE HIGH WATER LEVEL TRIP INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.3.l 9 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION POST ACCIDENT MONITORING (PAM) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.3.2 2 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM TEXT 3.3.4.1 2 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION END OF CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (EOC-RPT) INSTRUMENTATION Page~ of 8 Report Date: 09/18/17

.~----. )  ! -':-~ .*,. ~ .*.. ~-- ~:....t, ___ * ~ * ** l SSES MANUAL

• Manual Name: TSB2 Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL TEXT 3.3.4.2 1 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION,ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (ATWS-RPT) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.5.1 6 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.5.2 1 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.6.1 8 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.6.2 5 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION

• TEXT 3.3.7.1 3 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY (CREOAS) SYSTEM TEXT 3.3.8.1 INSTRUMENTATION 4 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION LOSS OF POWER (LOP) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.8.2 1 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) ELECTRIC POWER MONITORING TEXT 3.4.1 5 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RECIRCULATION LOOPS OPERATING TEXT 3.4.2 4 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) JET PUMPS TEXT 3.4.3 3 01/13/2012

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES (S/RVS) 11/16/2016

• TEXT 3.4.4 1

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE Pagel of ~ Report Date: 09/18/17

..*- ., - ~.:  : - 1 ' ~ * ;_ - *.~. -'

SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSB2 Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL

• TEXT 3.4.5 3 03/10/2010

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE (PIV) LEAKAGE TEXT 3.4.6 5 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS LEAKAGE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.4.7 3 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS SPECIFIC ACTIVITY TEXT 3.4.8 3 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM

- HOT SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.4.9 2 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM

- COLD SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.4.10 5 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE (P/T) LIMITS TEXT 3.4.11 1 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) REACTOR STEAM DOME PRESSURE TEXT 3.5.1 5 11/16/2016

Title:

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)

SYSTEM ECCS - OPERATING TEXT 3.5.2 3 11/16/2016

Title:

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)

SYSTEM ECCS - SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.5.3 5 05/31/2017

Title:

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)

SYSTEM RCIC SYSTEM TEXT 3 . 6 . l. 1 6 11/16/2016

Title:

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT TEXT 3.6.l.2 2 11/16/2016 Page i

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCK of 8 Report Date: 09/18/17

- ..:_ __ --- -- --- . ,, -~:... ... **--*-"-~ ,_ -c .._: _ _._.__ __,,:-.,- ** I SSES MANUAL

• Manual Name: TSB2 Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL TEXT 3.6.1.3 16 04/19/2017

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (PCIVS)

TEXT 3 . 6 . 1. 4 2 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT PRESSURE TEXT 3.6.1.5 2 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRYWELL AIR TEMPERATURE TEXT 3 . 6 . 1. 6 1 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION CHAMBER-TO-DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKERS TEXT 3.6.2.1 3 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION POOL AVERAGE TEMPERATURE

• TEXT 3.6.2.2 1 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.6.2.3 2 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING TEXT 3.6.2.4 1 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SUPPRESSION POOL SPRAY TEXT 3.6.3.1 2 06/13/2006

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS TEXT 3.6.3.2 2 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRYWELL AIR FLOW SYSTEM LDCN 5297 TEXT 3.6.3.3 2 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT OXYGEN CONCENTRATION LDCN 5297 TEXT 3.6.4.l 14 04/19/2017

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Page~ of 8 Report Date: 09/18/17

SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSB2 Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL

• TEXT 3.6.4.2 12 04/19/2017

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (SCIVS)

TEXT 3.6.4.3 6 09/15/2017

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS STANDBY GAS TREATMENT (SGT) SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.1 7 03/01/2017

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE WATER (RHRSW) SYSTEM AND THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (UHS)

TEXT 3.7.2 3 11/16/2016

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER (ESW) SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.3 3 09/15/2017

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY (CREOAS) SYSTEM

-,::__ TEXT 3 . 7 . 4 1 11/16/2016

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM FLOOR COOLING SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.5 2 11/16/2016

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN CONDENSER OFFGAS TEXT 3.7.6 4 11/16/2016

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.7 2 11/16/2016

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.7.8 1 11/16/2016

Title:

MAINE TURBINE PRESSURE REGULATION SYSTEM TEXT 3.8.1 10 11/16/2016

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES - OPERATING TEXT 3.8.2 0 11/18/2002 Page .§.

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES - SHUTDOWN of .§. Report Date: 09/18/17

• SSES MANUAL

• Manual Name: TSB2 Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL TEXT 3.8.3 5 11/16/2016

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DIESEL FUEL OIL LUBE OI.L AND STARTING AIR TEXT 3.8.4 4 11/16/2016

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DC SOURCES - OPERATING TEXT 3.8.5 1 12/14/2006

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DC SOURCES - SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.8.6 2 11/16/2016

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BATTERY CELL PARAMETERS TEXT 3.8.7 6 03/01/2017

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - OPERATING

• TEXT 3.8.8 1 11/16/2016

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.9.1 1 11/16/2016

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS REFUELING EQUIPMENT INTERLOCKS TEXT 3.9.2 2 11/16/2016

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS REFUEL POSITION ONE-ROD-OUT INTERLOCK TEXT 3.9.3 1 11/16/2016

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD POSITION TEXT 3.9.4 0 11/18/2002

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION TEXT 3.9.5 .1 11/16/2016

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY - REFUELING TEXT 3.9.6 2 11/16/2016

• Page 2

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) WATER LEVEL of 8 Report Date: 09/18/17

. -1 : * ~ <' I SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSB2 Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL

• TEXT 3.9.7 1 11/16/2016

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) - HIGH WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.9.8 1 11/16/2016

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) - LOW WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.10.1 1 01/23/2008

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS INSERVICE LEAK AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING OPERATION TEXT 3.10.2 1 11/16/2016

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS REACTOR MODE SWITCH INTERLOCK TESTING TEXT 3.10.3 1 11/16/2016

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - HOT SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.10.4 1 11/16/2016

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - COLD SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.10.5 1 11/16/2016

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD DRIVE (CRD) REMOVAL - REFUELING TEXT 3.10.6 l 11/16/2016

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS MULTIPLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - REFUELING TEXT 3.10.7 1 03/24/2005

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD TESTING - OPERATING TEXT 3.10.8 3 11/16/2016

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) TEST - REFUELING Page .§. of 8 Report Date: 09/18/17

• SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)

Section Title Revision TOC Table of Contents ................................................................................................ 23 B 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs)

B2.1.1 Reactor Core SLs ...........................................................................................:..... 5 B2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL ....................................................... 1 B 3.0 LCO AND SR APPLICABILITY BASES ............................................................... 3 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS B3.1.1 Shutd?.~m Margin _(SOM)*****************************************:.:-'").';;************************************ 2 B3.1.2 React1v1ty Anomalies .............................................,,..:*.. ~:... ::*:., .................................. 1 B3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY .............................. .:*<.< ........... \ ................................ 3 B3.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times ............................. :*:'..~:...... ....... :~ ............................. 5 B3.1.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators ......... :::: .........~A~.. . ..... : ........................... 2 B3.1.6 Rod Pattern Control. .......................,. .. :............ ****~1.>** ........_.,.~....................... 4 B3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System...... ... .....'":"'~*************************************** 3 B3.1.8 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent ~ , Ives._..: ................................. 4 B 3.2 POWER DISTRl~UTION LI~~, -~ _

B3.2.1 A~e.rage Pla_n_ar Linear Hei~~~)~~t1~n Rate (APLHGR) ................................... 5 B3.2.2 Minimum Cnt1_cal Powe -~if$.;.C R) ................................................................ 4 B3.2.3 Linear Heat.GeneraJie w~HGR),c..'............................................................... 3

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. -~

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION ... -""

B3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System.. (RPS) Instrumentation .............................................. 6 B3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitof(SRM) Instrumentation .................................................... 3 B3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation ........................................ .'.............................. 4 B3.3.2.2 Feedwater - Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation ..................... 3 B3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation ................................................. 9 B3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System ................................................................................... 2 B3.3.4.1 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation ................... 2 B3.3.4.2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation ............................................................. 1 B3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation ................................. 6 B3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation ........................ 1 B3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation ................................................... 8 B3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation ............................................... 5 B3.3.7.1 Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply (CREOAS)

System Instrumentation ........................................................................................ 3 B3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation .................................................................. 4 B3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring .............................. 1 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B LOES-1 Revision 131

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)

Section Title Revision 8 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 83.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating ............................................................................. 5 83.4.2 Jet Pumps ......................................................................................................... 4 83.4.3 Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs) ................................................................................ 4 83.4.4 RCS Operational LEAKAGE ................................................................................ 1 83.4.5 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage ...................................................... 4 83.4.6 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation ................................................. :........... 5 83.4.7 RCS Specific Activity ............................................................................................ 3 83.4.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Hot Shutdown ....................................................................................... 3 83.4.9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown ..................................................................................... 2 83.4.10 RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits ...................................................... 5 83.4.1'1 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure ........................................................................... 1 8 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 83.5.1 ECCS - Operating ................................................................................................ 5 83.5.2 ECCS - Shutdown ............................................................................................... 3

._,

83.5.3 RCIC System ........................................................................................................ 5 8 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 83.6.1.1 Primary Containment. ........................................................................................... 6 83.6.1.2 Primary Containment Air Lock .............................................................................. 2 83.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PC IVs) ................................................... 16 83.6.1.4 Containment Pressure .......................................................................................... 2 83.6.1.5 Drywell Air Temperature ....................................................................................... 2 83.6.1.6 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers ........................................... 1 83.6.2.1 Suppression Pool Average Temperature ............................................................. 3 83.6.2.2 Suppression Pool Water Level ............................................................................. 1 83.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling .................................. 2 83.6.2.4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray ..................................... 1 83.6.3.1 Not Used ......................................................................................................... 2 83.6.3.2 Drywell Air Flow System ....................................................................................... 2 83.6.3.3 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration ....................................................... 2 83.6.4.1 Secondary Containment. ..................................................................................... 14 83.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) .............................................. 12 83.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System .............................................................. 6 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B LOES-2 Revision 131

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)

• - .

. ---- -.

Section Title Revision 8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 83.7.1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System and the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) ........................................................................ 7 83.7.2 Emergency Service Water (ESW) System ........................................................... 3 83.7.3 Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply (CREOAS) System ............................................................................................... 3 83.7.4 Control Room Floor Cooling System .................................................................... 1 83.7.5 Main Condenser Offgas ....................................................................................... 2 83.7.6 Main Turbine Bypass System ............................................................................... 4 83.7.7 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level .................................................................. 2 B3.7.8 Main Turbine Pressure Regulation System .......................................................... 1 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM B3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating ..................................................................................... 1O B3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown ........ ~ ............................................................................. 0 B3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air ............................................................ 5 B3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating ...................................................................................... 4 B3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown ...................................................................................... 1 B3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters ....................................................................................... 2 83.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating ......................................................................... 6 B3.8.8 Distribution Systems - Shutdown ......................................................................... 1 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks ............................................................................ 1 B3.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock ................................................................ 1 83.9.3 Control Rod Position ............................................................................................ 1 B3.9.4 Control Rod Position Indication ............................................................................ 0 83.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling .............................................................. 1 B3.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level. ...................................................... 2 83.9.7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - High Water Level. ............................................ 1 83.9.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Low Water Level. ............................................. 1 B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS B3.10.1 lnservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation ............................................... 1 B3.10.2 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing ................................................................ 1 B3.10.3 Single Control Rod Withdrawal - Hot Shutdown .................................................. 1 B3.10.4 Single Control Rod Withdrawal - Cold Shutdown ................................................ 1 B3.10.5 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD) Removal - Refueling ........................................ 1 B3.10.6 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal - Refueling ....................................................... 1 B3.10.7 Control Rod Testing - Operating .......................................................................... 1 B3.10.8 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SOM) Test- Refueling .................................... :............. 3 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I 8 LOES-3 Revision 131

Rev. 6 SGT System B 3.6.4.3 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System BASES BACKGROUND The SGT System is required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41, *

"Containment Atmosphere Cleanup" (Ref. 1). The safety function of the SGT System is to ensure that radioactive materials that leak from the primary containment into the secondary containment following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) are filtered and adsorbed prior to exhausting to the environment.

The SGT System consists of two redundant subsystems, each with its own set of dampers, filter train, and a reactor building recirculation fan and associated dampers and controls.

Each filter train consists of (components listed in order of the direction of the air flow):

a. A demister;

-

b. An electric heater;

c. A prefilter;

d. A high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter;

e. A charcoal_ adsorber;

f. A second HEPA filter; and

g. A centrifugal fan.

The sizing of the SGT System equipment and components is based on handling an incoming air mixture at a maximum of 125°F. The internal pressure of the secondary containment is maintained at a negative pressure of 0.25 inches water gauge when the system is in operation. Maintenance of a negative pressure precludes direct outleakage.

The demister is provided to remove entrained water in the air, while the electric heater reduces the relative humidity of the airstream to less than 70%

(Ref. 2). The prefilter removes large particulate matter, while the HEPA filter (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-100 Revision 1

Rev.6 SGT System B 3.6.4.3 BASES BACKGROUND removes fine particulate matter and protects the charcoal from fouling. The (continued) charcoal adsorber removes gaseous elemental iodine and organic iodides, and the final HEPA filter collects any carbon fines exhausted from the charcoal adsorber.

The SGT System automatically starts and operates in response to actuation signals indicative of conditions or an accident that could require operation of the system. Following initiation in each division, the associated filter train fan starts. Upon verification that both subsystems are operating, the redundant subsystem may be shut down.

The SGT System also contains a cooling function to remove heat generated by fission product decay on the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers during shutdown of an SGT subsystem. The cooling function consists of two separate and independent filter cooling modes per SGT subsystem. The two cooling modes are:

1) Outside air damper and the filter cooling bypass damper open, allowing outside air to flow through the shutdown SGT subsystem's filter train and exit via the opposite SGT subsytem's exhaust fan.

2) Outside air damper opens and the SGT exhaust fan of the shutdown SGT subsystem starts. This configurations draws outside air through the shutdown SGT subsystem's filter train and exits via the associated SGT subsystem's exhaust fan.

APPLICABLE The design basis for the SGT System is to mitigate the consequences of a SAFETY loss of coolant accident and fuel handling accidents (Ref. 2). For all events ANALYSES analyzed, the SGT System is shown to be automatically initiated to reduce, via filtration and adsorption, the radioactive material released to the environment.

The SGT System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3).

LCO Following a OBA, a minimum of one SGT subsystem is required to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and to process gaseous releases. Meeting the LCO requirements for two OPERABLE subsystems ensures operation of at least (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-101 Revision 1

Rev.6 SGT System B 3.6.4.3 BASES LCO one SGT subsystem in the event of a single active failure. A SGT subsystem (continued) is considered OPERABLE when it has an OPERABLE set of dampers, filter train, one reactor building recirculation fan and associated dampers, and associated controls, including instrumentation. (The reactor building recirculation fans and associated dampers are not dedicated to either SGT subsystem. As a result, when any one reactor building recirculation division is not OPERABLE, one arbitrarily determined SGT subsystem is not operable. This interpretation only applies if both divisions of Secondary Containment Isolation logic are operable). This includes the components required for at least one of the two SGTS filter cooling modes.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a OBA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, SGT System OPERABILITY is required during these MODES.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES.

Therefore, maintaining the SGT System in OPERABLE status is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

ACTIONS A.1 With one SGT subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status in 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem is adequate to perform the required radioactivity release control function. However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT System and the low probability of a OBA occurring during this period.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-102 Revision 2

Rev.6 SGT System B 3.6.4.3 BASES ACTIONS B.1and8.2 (continued If the SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1. C.2.1. C.2.2, and C.2.3 During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, when Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE SGT filter train should immediately be placed in operation. This action ensures that the remaining filter train is OPERABLE, that no failures that could prevent automatic actuation have occurred, and that any other failure would be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities

• that represent a potential for releasing radioactive material to the secondary containment, thus placing the plant in a condition that minimizes risk. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must immediately be suspended. Suspension of these activities must not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs In order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are s1:1spended.

The Required Actions of Condition C have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-103 Revision 2

Rev.6 SGT System B 3.6.4.3 BASES ACTIONS . D.1 (continued)

If both SGT subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the SGT system may not be capable of supporting the required radioactivity release control function. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining the SGT System contribution to secondary containment during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring SGT OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where SGT is inoperable is minimal.

A temporary (one-time) Completion Time is connected to the Completion Time Requirements above (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) with an "OR" connector. The

• Temporary Completion Time is 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and applies to the replacement of the Reactor Building Recirculating Fan Damper Motors. The Temporary Completion Time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> may only be used once, and expires on December 31, 2005.

E.1 and E.2 If at least one SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> .

.r The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating

• experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F.1. F.2, and F.3 When two SGT subsystems are inoperable, if applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment must immediately be suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-104 Revision 3

Rev.6 SGT System B 3.6.4.3 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS F.1. F.2. and F.3 (continued)

Required Action F.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.3.1 REQUIREMENTS Operating each SGT filter train for::::: 15 continuous minutes with heaters on ensures that both filter trains are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.6.4.3.2 This SR verifies that the required SGT filter testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.6.4.3.3 This SR verifies that each SGT subsystem starts on receipt of an actual or simulated initiation signal. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-105 Revision 4

Rev.6 SGT System B 3.6.4.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.3.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR verifies that both cooling modes for each SGT subsystem are available. Although both cooling modes are tested, only one cooling mode for each SGT subsystem is required for an SGT subsystem to be considered OPERABLE. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41.

2. FSAR, Section 6.5.1

3. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).

4. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 1.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-106 Revision 4

Rev. 3 CREOAS System B 3.7.3

-~.:--;;- _.-: :*

B 3. 7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.3 Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply (CREOAS) System BASES BACKGROUND The CREOAS System provides a protected environment from which occupants can control the unit following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity, hazardous chemicals, or smoke. This radiologically controlled environment is termed the Control Room Envelope (CRE) and is comprised of Control Structure floor elevations 697'-0" through 783'-0" including the stairwells as described in FSAR Section 6.4 (Ref. 5).

The safety related function of the CREOAS System includes two independent and redundant high efficiency air filtration subsystems for emergency treatment of outside supply air and a CRE boundary that limits the inleakage of unfiltered air. Each CREOAS subsystem consists of an electric heater, a prefilter, an upstream high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, an activated charcoal adsorber section, a downstream HEPA filter, a CREOAS fan, a control structure heating and ventilation.fan, a control room floor cooling fan, a computer room floor cooling fan, and the associated ductwork, valves or dampers, doors, barriers, and instrumentation. Prefilters and HEPA filters remove particulate matter, which may be radioactive. The charcoal adsorbers provide a holdup I

period for gaseous iodine, allowing time for decay. With the exception of the CREOAS fan, all other CREOAS subsystem fans operate continuously to maintain the affected compartments environment. These other ventilation fans operate independently of the CREOAS fans and are required to operate to ensure a positive pressure in the control structure is maintained utilizing filtered outside air supplied by the CREOAS fans.

The CRE is the area within the confines of the CRE boundary that cpntaJns the sp?ces that control rqom occupants inhabit to contr9I the unit during normal and accident conditions. This area encompasses the control room, and may encompass other non-critical areas to which frequent personnel access or continuous occupancy is not necessary in the event of an accident. The CRE is protected during normal operation, natural events, and accident conditions. The CRE boundary is the combination of walls, floor, roof, ducting, doors, penetrations and (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS I B 3.7-12 Revision 2

Rev. 3 CREOAS System B 3.7.3

.,_..- BASES BACKGROUND *equipment that physically form the CRE. The OPERABILITY of the CRE (continued) boundary must be maintained to ensure that the inleakage of unfiltered air into the CRE will not exceed the inleakage assumed in the licensing basis analysis of design basis accident (OBA) consequences to CRE occupants.

The CRE and its boundary are defined in the Control Room Envelope Habitability Program.

Upon receipt of the initiation signal(s) (indicative of conditions that could result in radiation exposure to CRE occupants), the CREOAS System automatically switches to the pressurization/filtration mode of operation to minimize infiltration of contaminated air into the CRE. A system of dampers aligns the outside air intake to the CREOAS fan suction and filter train. Outside air is taken in at the normal ventilation intake and passed through one of the charcoal adsorber filter subsystems. The filtered air leaving the CREOAS filtration train is routed to the inlet of the other ventilation fans for distribution.

One of the CREOAS System design requirements is to maintain a habitable environment in the CRE for a 30 day continuous occupancy after a OBA without exceeding 5 rem whole body dose or its equivalent to any part of the body. A single CREOAS subsystem operating at a flow rate of::;; 581 O cfm with an intact CRE will pressurize the CRE (which includes the control room) to greater than or equal to 0.125 inches water gauge relative to external areas adjacent to the CRE boundary to minimize infiltration of air from all surrounding areas adjacent to the CRE boundary. CREOAS System operation in maintaining CRE habitability is discussed in the FSAR, Chapters 6 and 9, (Refs. 1 and 2, respectively).

APPLICABLE The ability of the CREOAS System to maintain the habitability of the CRE SAFETY ANALYSIS is an explicit assumption for the safety analyses presented in the FSAR, Chapters 6 and 15 (Refs. 1 and 3, respectively). The pressurization/

filtration mode of the CREOAS System is assumed to operate following a OBA as discussed in the FSAR, Section 6.4.1 (Ref. 4). The radiological doses to the CRE occupants as a result of the various DBAs are summarized in Reference 3. No single active failure will cause the loss of outside or recirculated air from the CRE.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS I B 3.7-13 Revision 2

Rev. 3 CREOAS System 8 3.7.3 BASES APPLICABLE The CREOAS System provides protection from smoke and hazardous SAFETY ANALYSES chemicals to the CRE occupants. The analysis of hazardous chemical (continued) releases demonstrates that the toxicity limits are not exceeded in the CRE following a hazardous chemical release (Ref. 5). The evaluation of a smoke challenge demonstrates that it will not result in the inability of the CRE occupants to control the reactor either from the control room or from the remote shutdown panels (Ref. 6).

The CREOAS System satisfies Criterion 3of10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO Two redundant subsystems of the CREOAS System are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, if a single active failure disables the other subsystem. Total CREOAS System failure, such as from a loss of both ventilations subsystems or from an inoperable CRE boundary, could result in exceeding a dose of 5 rem whole body or equivalent to the CRE occupants in the event of a OBA.

Each CREOAS subsystem is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to limit CRE occupant exposure are OPERABLE.

Both subsystems are considered OPERABLE when:

a. Both filter trains each consisting of a CREOAS fan, heater, a HEPA filter, and charcoal adsorber which is not excessively restricting flow is OPERABLE; and

b. Both Control Structure Heating and Ventilation fans, Computer Room Floor Cooling fans, and Control Room Floor Cooling fans are OPERABLE; and

c. Ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.

d. Neither Smoke Removal Fan (OV104NB) is in operation.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS I B 3.7-14 Revision 3

Rev. 3 CREOAS System B 3.7.3 BASES LCO One subsystem is considered OPERABLE when:

(continued)

a. One filter train consisting of a CREOAS fan, heater, a HEPA filter, and charcoal adsorber which is not excessively restricting flow is OPERABLE; and

b. The 'A' Control Structure Heating and Ventilationfan (OV103A) and the 'A' Computer Room Floor Cooling fan (OV115A) and the 'A' Control Room Floor Cooling fan (OV117A) are OPERABLE OR The 'B' Control Structure Heating and Ventilation fan (OV103B) and the 'B' Computer Room Floor Cooling fan (OV115B) and the 'B' Control Room Floor Cooling fan (OV117B) are OPERABLE (These fans are not dedicated to either CREOAS subsystem. As a result when any one set of fans is not OPERABLE, one arbitrarily determined CREOAS subsystem is not OPERABLE); and

c. Ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.

d. Neither Smoke Removal Fan (OV104A/B) is in operation.

In order for the CREAOS subsystems to be considered OPERABLE, the CRE boundary must be maintained such that the CRE occupant dose from a large radioactive release does not exceed the calculated dose in the licensing basis consequence analyses for DBAs, and that CRE occupants are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke. Note the CRE can not be maintained with a smoke removal fan (OV104A or OV1048) in operation.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.7-15 Revision 3

Rev. 3 CREOAS System B 3.7.3 BASES LCO The LCO is modified by a Note allowing the CRE boundary to be opened (continued) intermittently under administrative controls. This Note only applies to openings in the CRE boundary that can be rapidly restored to the design condition, such as doors, hatches, floor plugs, and access panels. For entry and exit through doors the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings, these controls should be proceduralized and consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with the operators in the CRE. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening and to restore the CRE boundary to a condition equivalent to the design condition when a need for CRE isolation is indicated.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the CREOAS System must be OPERABLE to ensure that the CRE will remain habitable during and following a OBA, since the OBA could lead to a fission product release.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a OBA are reduced because of the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the CREOAS System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated:

a. During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs);

b. During CORE ALTERATIONS; and

c. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.7-16 Revision 3

Rev. 3 CREOAS System B 3.7.3 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS With one CREOAS subsystem inoperable, for reasons other than an inoperable CRE boundary, the inoperable CREOAS subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREOAS subsystem is adequate to perform the CRE occupant protection function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of the CREOAS System function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a OBA occurring during this time period, and that the remaining subsystem can provide the required capabilities.

B.1. B.2. and 8.3 If the unfiltered inleakage of potentially contaminated air past the CRE boundary and into the CRE can result in CRE occupant radiological dose greater than the calculated dose of the licensing basis analyses of OBA consequences (allowed to be up to 5 rem whole body or its equivalent to any part of the body), or inadequate protection of CRE occupants from hazardous chemicals or smoke, the CRE boundary is inoperable. Actions must be taken to restore an OPERABLE CRE boundary within 90 days.

During the period that the CRE boundary is considered inoperable, action must be initiated to implement mitigating actions to lessen the effect on CRE occupants from the potential hazards of a radiological or chemical event or a challenge from smoke. *Actions must be taken within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to verify that in the event of a OBA, the mitigating actions will ensure that CRE occupant radiological exposures will not exceed the calculated dose of the licensing basis analyses of OBA consequences, and that CRE occupants are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke. These mitigating actions (i.e., actions that are taken to offset the consequences of the inoperable CRE boundary) should be preplanned for implementation upon entry into the condition, regardless of whether entry is intentional or unintentional. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a OBA occurring during this time period, and the use of mitigating actions. The 90 day Completion (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.7-17 Revision 3

Rev. 3 CREOAS System B 3.7.3 BASES ACTIONS B.1, 8.2. and B.3 (continued)

Time is reasonable based on the determination that the mitigating actions will ensure protection of CRE occupants within analyzed limits while limiting the probability that CRE occupants will have to implement protective measures that may adversely affect their ability to control the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a OBA.

In addition, the 90 day Completion Time is a reasonable time to diagnose, plan and possibly repair, and test most problems with the CRE boundary.

C.1 and C.2 In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable CREOAS subsystem or the CRE boundary cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the. required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes accident risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS/B3.7-18 Revision 3

Rev. 3 CREOAS System B 3.7.3 BASES ACTIONS D.1. D.2.1. D.2.2. and D.2.3 (continued)

The Required Actions of Condition D are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require either an entry into LCO 3.0.3 or a reactor shutdown in accordance with LCO 3.0.3.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, if the inoperable CREOAS subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE CREOAS subsystem may be placed in the pressurization/filtration mode. This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action D.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the CRE. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk.

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

If both CREOAS subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, for reasons other than an inoperable CRE boundary (i.e., Condition B) the CREOAS System may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside of the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.7-18a Revision 1

Rev. 3 CREOAS System B 3.7.3 BASES ACTIONS F.1. F.2. and F.3 (continued)

The Required Actions of Condition F are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require either an entry into LCO 3.0.3 or a reactor shutdown in accordance with LCO 3.0.3.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, with two CREOAS subsystems inoperable or with one or more CREOAS subsystems inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require pressurization of the CRE. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk.

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. If applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 REQUIREMENTS

'This SR verifies that a CREOAS fan in a standby mode starts on demand from the control room and continues to operate with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they start and function properly. As the environmental and normal operating conditions of this system are not severe, testing each subsystem once every month provides an adequate check on this system. Systems with heaters must be operated for 2:: 15 continuous minutes with the heaters energized. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS I B 3.7-18b Revision 2

Rev. 3 CREOAS System B 3.7.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR verifies that the required CREOAS testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test Frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.7.3.3 This SR verifies that on an actual or simulated initiation signal, each CREOAS subsystem starts and operates. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.7.1.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.7.3.4 This SR verifies the OPERABILITY of the CRE boundary by testing for unfiltered air inleakage past the CRE boundary and into the CRE. The details of the testing are specified in the Control Room Envelope Habitability Program.

The CRE is considered habitable when the radiological dose to CRE occupants calculated in the licensing basis analyses of OBA consequences is no more than 5 rem whole body or its equivalent to any part of the body and the CRE occupants are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke. This SR verifies that the unfiltered air inleakage into the CRE is no greater than the flow rate assumed in the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences. When unfiltered air inleakage is greater than the assumed flow rate, Condition B must be entered.

Required Action B.3 allows time to restore the CRE boundary to OPERABLE status provided mitigating actions can ensure that the CRE remains within the licensing basis habitability limits for the occupants following an accident. Compensatory measures are discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.196, Section C.2.7.3, (Ref. 7) which endorses, with exceptions, NEI 99-03, Section 8.4 and Appendix F (Ref. 8). These compensatory measures may also be used as mitigating actions as required by Required Action B.2.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS I B 3.7-18c Revision 1

Rev. 3 CREOAS System B 3.7.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE Temporary analytical methods may also be used as compensatory REQUIREMENTS measures to restore OPERABILITY (Ref. 9). Options for restoring the (continued) CRE boundary to OPERABLE status include changing the licensing basis OBA consequence analysis, repairing the CRE boundary, or a combination of these actions. Depending upon the nature of the problem and the corrective action, a full scope inleakage test may not be necessary to establish that the CRE boundary has been restored to OPERABLE status.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter 6.

2. FSAR, Chapter 9.

3. FSAR, Chapter 15.

4. FSAR, Section 6.4.1.

5. FSAR, Section 6.4.

6. FSAR, Section 9.5.

7. Regulatory Guide 1.196.

8. NEI 99-03, "Control Room Habitability Assessment," June 2001.

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS I B 3.7-18d Revision 0

Rev. 3 CREOAS System B 3.7.3 BASES REFERENCES 9. Letter from Eric J. Leeds (NRC) to James W. Davis (NEI) dated (continued) January 30, 2004, "NEI Draft White Paper, Use of Generic Letter 91-18 Process and Alternative Source Terms in the Context of Control Room Habitability." (ADAMS Accession No. ML040300694).

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.7-18e Revision O