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{{#Wiki_filter:i~UL Y INFORMATION DISTR JTI SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR: 8708180219 DOC.DATE: 87/08/14 NOTARIZED:
{{#Wiki_filter:i ~UL         Y INFORMATION   DISTR   JTI   SYSTEM   (RIDS)
NO FACIL: 50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Poeer Plant Unit ii Carolina AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SCHWABENBAUER Caro l ina Pacer 8..Li g h t Co.WATSON'.*.Carolina Poeer 5 Light Co.J REC IP.NAME R EC IP.I ENT AFFILIATION DOCKET 05000400
ACCESSION NBR: 8708180219             DOC. DATE: 87/08/14   NOTARIZED: NO           DOCKET FACIL: 50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Poeer Plant               Unit   ii Carolina   05000400 AUTH. NAME           AUTHOR AFFILIATION SCHWABENBAUER       Caro   l ina Pacer 8.. Lig h t Co.
WATSON'. *.         Carolina       Poeer 5 Light Co.                         J REC IP. NAME         R EC IP. I ENT AFFILIATION


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
LER 87-045-00:
LER 87-045-00: on 870716 RCS pressure fell beloe accumulator pressure initiating partial ingection of all three accumulators. Caused bg personnel error. Disciplinarg action for operating shift. W/870814 ltr.
on 870716 RCS pressure fellbeloe accumulator pressure initiating partial ingection of all three accumulators.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR                 ENCL       SIZE:
Caused bg personnel error.Disciplinarg action for operating shift.W/870814 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER)i Incident Rpti etc.NOTES: Application for permit renewal filed.05000400 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 LA BUCKLEY>B INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON AEOD/DOA*EOD/DSP/ROAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/*DS NRR/DEBT/ELB NRR/DEST/MEB NRR/DEST/PSB NRR/DEBT/SGB NRR/DLPG/GAB NRR/DREP/RAB NRR/PMAS/ILRB RES DEP Y G I RES/DE/E IB COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 PD*CRS MOELLER AEOD/DSP/NAS AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DEBT/ADE NRR/DEST/CEB NRR/DEST/ICSB NRR/DEBT/MTB NRR/DEST/RSB NRR/DLPG/HFB NRR/DOEA/EAB NR-PB EG F IL 02 ELFORDi J RGN2 FILE 01 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 EXTERNAL: EGS.G GROH.M LPDR NSIC HARRIS'5 H ST LOBBY 4lARD 1 NRC PDR 1 NSIC MAYST G 1 1 1 1 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 44 ENCL 42
TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report (LER) i Incident Rpti etc.
~~.)
NOTES: Application for permit renewal filed.                                         05000400 RECIPIENT               COPIES            RECIPIENT          COPIES ID CODE/NAME            LTTR ENCL      ID CODE/NAME         LTTR ENCL PD2-1 LA                     1    1    PD2-1 PD                1    1 BUCKLEY> B                   1    1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON                             *CRS MOELLER            2    2 AEOD/DOA                                AEOD/DSP/NAS            1    1
I i ro rSRC Form 355 (84)3)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERj US.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.31604104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (I)SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2)PA E 3 0 5 0 0 040 0>OF04''PERSONNEL ERROR CAUSED INJECTION OF SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATORS DURING PLANT COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION MONTH OAY YEAR EVENT DATE (5)LER NUMBER (6)BEVISIOIS Ipr/NUMBER YEAR 54/SEGUENSIAL 44 NUMBER REPORT DATE (7)DAY YEAR MONTH DOCKET NUMBER(SI 0 5 0 0 0 FACILITY NAMES OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)0 7 1 6 8 7 7 0 4 5 0 0 8 1787 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATING MODE (8)POWE R LEVEL$@>@>g'<" 20.402(a)20.405(~l(1)(0 20.405(e)(1)(Q I 20.405(~)(1)(ill)20A05(e)(l l(lv)20.405(e)(1)(v) 20A05(c)50.38(c)I I I 50.38(cl (2)50.73(e I (2)(II 50.73(e)(2)(5)50.73(e)(2)Bll)LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12I 60.73(el (2)llv)50.73(e)(2)(v) 50.73(s I (2)(vB)50.73(sl(2)(vill)IA)60.73(el(2)(vill)(BI 60.73(~I (21(s)0 THE REOUIAEMENTS OF 10 cFR (I:/Core@onr or moro o/thr/o/lors/np/
            *EOD/DSP/ROAB                           AEOD/DSP/TPAB            1    1 DEDRO                                   NRR/DEBT/ADE            1    0 NRR/DEST/*DS                             NRR/DEST/CEB            1    1 NRR/DEBT/ELB                             NRR/DEST/ ICSB          1    1 NRR/DEST/MEB                            NRR/DEBT/MTB            1    1 NRR/DEST/PSB                            NRR/DEST/RSB            1    1 NRR/DEBT/SGB                            NRR/DLPG/HFB            1     1 NRR/DLPG/GAB                            NRR/DOEA/EAB            1     1 NRR/DREP/RAB                            NR -       PB          2    2 NRR/PMAS/ ILRB                            EG F  IL        02      1    1 RES DEP Y  G I                                  ELFORDi J        1    1 RES/DE/E IB                              RGN2    FILE    01      1    1 EXTERNAL:  EGS.G GROH. M                      5    H ST LOBBY 4lARD        1    1 LPDR                              1     NRC PDR                  1   1 NSIC HARRIS'                      1     NSIC MAYST G              1   1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:             LTTR    44  ENCL    42
(11)THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT 7 73.7 I (Ii)73.71(c)OTHER/Sprciiy In Aostrrct Oriovvrnr/in Tres, NRC Form 3BSA/NAME R.SCHWABENBAUER
 
-REGULATORY COMPLIANCE TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 9 19 362-26 69 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILVAE OESCRIBEO IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEM , COMPONENT MANUFAC.+URER IIEPORTABLE
~ ~
~)j(4&#xc3;4jhW CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TURER TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPOAT EXPECTED (14)YES/I/yrs, comp/etc EXPECTED SUBM/SSION DATE/NO ABSTRACT/Limit to/ct/0 sprees, I.r., rpproeimrtriy
    .)
/i/tern sino/scorer typrvrrittrn
 
/ines/(15)ABSTRACT: EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15I MONTH n vs OAY YEAR The plant was at 0 percent reactor power in Mode 3, Hot Standby, on July 16, 1987.The plant was in a normal cooldown in preparation for a maintenance outage.General Operating Procedure (GP)-007, Normal Plant Cooldown (Mode 3 to Mode 5), requires the isolation of Cold Leg Accumulators prior to decreasing the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)pressure below that of the Accumulators.
I i
During the plant cooldown of approximately 90 degrees F per hour, the operator neglected to isolate the Cold Leg Accumulators prior to the RCS pressure decreasing to less than 900 psig.As a result at 1250 hours, the RCS pressure fell below Accumulator pressure, which initiated a partial injection of all three Accumulators.
ro rSRC Form 355                                                                                                                                      US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (84)3)                                                                                                                                                      APPROVED OMB NO. 31604104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERj DOCKET NUMBER (2)                               PA E  3 FACILITY NAME (I)
The operator then secured Pressurizer spray and energized all pressurizer heaters to increase RCS pressure.In approximately sixty seconds, the RCS pressure was increased above Accumulator pressure and the Accumulator injection was terminated.
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT                                          UNIT        1                                          0     5     0     0     040 0>OF04
Approximately eight percent level, or a total of 170 gallons, was injected during this event.The cause of the event was personnel error on the part of the reactor operator.The safety of the plant was not jeopardized because the reactor was subcritical and the boron concentration of the injected water was greater than the RCS boron concentration.
            '' PERSONNEL               ERROR CAUSED               INJECTION OF SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATORS DURING PLANT COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION EVENT DATE (5)                       LER NUMBER (6)                         REPORT DATE (7)                         OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) 54/    SEGUENSIAL        BEVISIOIS                                        FACILITYNAMES                            DOCKET NUMBER(SI MONTH        OAY        YEAR    YEAR    44        NUMBER    Ipr/ NUMBER MONTH DAY              YEAR 0  5    0      0 0 0 7         1   6     8 7           7         0       4 5       0         0 8           1787                                                             0   5   0       0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT 7 0          THE REOUIAEMENTS OF 10 cFR (I: /Core@ onr or moro      o/ thr /o/lors/np/  (11)
Corrective actions included disciplinary action for the operating shift, re-inforcement'to operating personnel of the requirements for pre-evolution shift briefings and retraining on each of these items.87DSi802i9 8708i4 PDR ADOCN, D5DDDODD NRC Fotm 3dd IBS3l NRC Form 3BBA (943)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROI/ED OMB NO.3150MIBE EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1)SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR PONER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2)YEAR LER NUMBER (5)SEOUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER PAGE (3)TEXT//P rrlro E/roco/I/Ir/kror/rrw////Ooo////IC%%drm 35543/(IT)o s o o o 40 087 0 4 5 00 02 oF0 4 DESCRIPTION:
OPERATING MODE (8)                      20.402(a)                                 20A05(c)                            60.73(el (2) llv)                               73.7 I (Ii)
The plant was at 0 percent reactor power in Mode 3, Hot Standby, on July 16, 1987.The plant was in the process of a normal cooldown and depressurization to 350 degrees F and 365 psig.Once this condition was reached the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)system (EIIS:AB)would be put into service.A cooldown rate of approximately 90'F/hr was being maintained.
POWE R                            20.405( ~ l(1)(0                          50.38(c) I I I                      50.73(e)(2)(v)                                  73.71(c)
General Operating Procedure (GP)-007, Normal Plant Cooldown (Mode 3 to Mode 5)requires the isolation of Cold Leg Accumulators (EIIS:BP)prior to decreasing the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)(EIIS:AB)pressure below that of the Accumulators.
LEVEL                                                                                                                                                            OTHER /Sprciiy In Aostrrct 20.405(e )(1)(Q I                        50.38(cl (2)                       50.73(s I (2) (vB)
The Accumulators are required to be maintained between 585 and 665 psig per Technical Specification 3.5.1.Accumulators are required to be operable only when the RCS pressure is greater than 1,000 psig.At 1200 hours, the reactor operator was instructed to review Operating Procedure (OP)-111, Residual Heat Removal System, in anticipation of placing the RHR system into service.At 1250 hours, while the operator was reviewing OP-ill, the'A'ccumulator low pressure alarm was received followed immediately by the'B'ccumulator low-pressure alarm.These alarms indicated that an injection of the Safety Injection Accumulators was initiated.
Oriovvrnr/in Tres, NRC Form 20.405( ~ ) (1)(ill)                     50.73(e I (2) (II                  50.73(sl(2) (vill)IA)                           3BSA/
The operator observed RCS pressure at 600 psig and Cold Leg Accumulator pressures were at 640 psig.The operator had neglected to isolate the Cold Leg Accumulators prior to decreasing RCS pressure below that of the accumulators as required by GP-007 and caused the injection of the Accumulators.
      $@>@>g'<"                                                                      50.73(e) (2) (5)                   60.73(el(2) (vill)(BI 20A05(e)(l l(lv) 20.405(e)(1)(v)                           50.73(e) (2) Bll)                   60.73( ~ I (21(s)
The operator then secured the Pressurizer spray valves and energized all Pressurizer heaters to increase RCS pressure above that of the Accumulators.
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12I NAME                                                                                                                                                          TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE R. SCHWABENBAUER  REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 9    19          362 -26 69 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILVAE OESCRIBEO IN THIS REPORT (13)
RCS pressure increased above that of the Accumulators in approximately sixty seconds and the injection was terminated.
CAUSE    SYSTEM      , COMPONENT MANUFAC.
During this time, approximately 8 percent indicated level, or a total of 170 gallons, was injected.The Accumulators were subsequently isolated and the cooldown and depressurization to RHR cut in conditions was resumed.CAUSE: The requirement to isolate the accumulators during the plant depressurization is clearly within the knowledge and training of licensed operators.
                                                      +URER IIEPORTABLE
Therefore, personnel error on the part of the reactor operator is the primary cause of the event.Additionally, there were several factors which contributed to the event, any of which may have prevented the personnel error'.1.A pre-evolution briefing was not held to review the evolution and the key operator actions that would be required.NRC FORM 3EBA (NQ)*U.S.GPO:19BB.O.B24 538/455 NRC Form 366A (983)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINU TION UA', NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.3150M)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/86 FACILITY NAM E (ll SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 TEXT/O'IIKEB EPBco lr/BEIIEa/, Irw////O/N////IC Forrrr 36643/((7)DOCKET NUMBER (2)YEAR p p p p p 40 087 LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 0 4 5 PAGE (3)REVISION NUMBER 0 0 0 3 OF 04 CAUSE: (continued) 2.The procedure did not include a caution when the depressurization is begun to alert the operator to the subsequent requirement to isolate the accumulators prior to decreasing pressure below 900 psig.3.The Senior Control Operator was reviewing the results of completed surveillance tests and thus was distracted during this phase of the cooldown.ANALYSIS: The Safety Injection Accumulators are a passive system for injection of water into the RCS during a large break loss of coolant accident.Under the circumstances, the Accumulators functioned as designed.The evolution of isolating the Accumulators is only done during the cooldown from Mode 3 to Mode 4.While in Modes 1&2 and Mode 3 (with RCS pressure greater than 1000 psig), injection of the Accumulators is prevented by the delta pressure across the Accumulator discharge check valve.No safety consequences resulted from this event, as the reactor was subcritical and depressurized at the time.The event caused the pressurizer water level to increase and borated water (2000 ppm boron)to enter the RCS.The event was terminated by the Reactor Operator when the low pressure alarms alerted the operator to the injection of Accumulator water.The event did not result in a challenge to the integrity of the RCS or require the actuation of other engineered safeguards.
                                                                                    ~)j(4                CAUSE SYSTEM    COMPONENT MANUFAC.
TURER              TO NPRDS
                                                                                    &#xc3;4jhW n
vs SUPPLEMENTAL REPOAT EXPECTED (14)                                                                                   MONTH      OAY    YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15I YES  /I/ yrs, comp/etc EXPECTED SUBM/SSION DATE/                                       NO ABSTRACT /Limit to /ct/0 sprees, I.r., rpproeimrtriy /i/tern sino/scorer typrvrrittrn /ines/ (15)
ABSTRACT:
The       plant       was     at       0   percent reactor power in                       Mode   3, Hot Standby, on July 16, 1987.
The       plant       was     in       a   normal cooldown                 in preparation for             a maintenance outage.
General Operating Procedure (GP)-007, Normal Plant Cooldown (Mode 3 to Mode 5),
requires the isolation of Cold Leg Accumulators prior to decreasing the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure below that of the Accumulators. During the plant cooldown of approximately 90 degrees F per hour, the operator neglected to isolate the Cold Leg Accumulators prior to the RCS pressure decreasing to less than 900 psig. As a result at 1250 hours, the RCS pressure fell below Accumulator pressure, which initiated a partial injection of all three Accumulators.
The       operator then secured Pressurizer spray and energized all pressurizer heaters to increase RCS pressure.                             In approximately sixty seconds, the RCS pressure was increased above Accumulator pressure and the Accumulator injection was terminated.
Approximately eight percent level, or a total of 170 gallons, was injected during this event.
The cause             of the event was personnel error on the part of the reactor operator. The safety of the plant was not jeopardized because the reactor was subcritical and the boron concentration of the injected water was greater than the RCS boron concentration. Corrective actions included disciplinary action for the operating shift, re-inforcement'to operating personnel of the requirements for pre-evolution shift briefings and retraining on each of these items.
87DSi802i9 8708i4             D5DDDODD NRC Fotm 3dd               PDR      ADOCN, IBS3l
 
NRC Form 3BBA                                                                                                       U.S, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (943)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION                               APPROI/ED OMB NO. 3150MIBE EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1)                                                         DOCKET NUMBER (2)               LER NUMBER (5)                                   PAGE (3)
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR PONER PLANT                                                                YEAR  SEOUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER UNIT      1 o  s  o  o    o  40 087          0    4 5                      00 02 oF0                4 TEXT //P rrlro E/roco /I /Ir/kror/ rrw ////Ooo/ ///IC %%drm 35543/ (IT)
DESCRIPTION:
The       plant         was       at 0 percent reactor power in Mode 3, Hot Standby, on July 16, 1987.
The       plant         was     in the process of a normal cooldown and depressurization to 350 degrees F and 365 psig. Once this condition was reached the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system (EIIS:AB) would be put into service.                                   A cooldown rate of approximately 90'F/hr was being maintained.
General Operating Procedure (GP)-007, Normal Plant Cooldown (Mode 3 to Mode 5) requires the isolation of Cold Leg Accumulators (EIIS:BP) prior to decreasing the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) (EIIS:AB) pressure below that of the Accumulators. The Accumulators are required to be maintained between 585 and 665 psig per Technical Specification 3.5.1. Accumulators are required to be operable only when the RCS pressure is greater than 1,000 psig.
At 1200 hours, the reactor operator was instructed to review Operating Procedure (OP)-111, Residual Heat Removal System, in anticipation of placing the RHR system into service. At 1250 hours, while the operator was reviewing OP-ill, the low pressure alarm was received followed immediately by the                                           'A'ccumulator low- pressure alarm. These alarms indicated that an injection of the                 'B'ccumulator Safety Injection Accumulators was initiated. The operator observed RCS pressure at 600 psig and Cold Leg Accumulator pressures were at 640 psig. The operator had neglected to isolate the Cold Leg Accumulators prior to decreasing RCS pressure below that of the accumulators as required by GP-007 and caused the injection of the Accumulators.
The       operator then secured the Pressurizer spray valves and energized all Pressurizer heaters to increase RCS pressure above that of the Accumulators. RCS pressure increased above that of the Accumulators in approximately sixty seconds and the injection was terminated. During this time, approximately 8 percent indicated level, or a total of 170 gallons, was injected.
The Accumulators were subsequently                           isolated   and   the cooldown and depressurization                               to RHR cut in conditions was resumed.
CAUSE:
The requirement                       to isolate the accumulators during the plant depressurization is clearly within the knowledge and training of licensed operators. Therefore, personnel error on the part of the reactor operator is the primary cause of the event. Additionally, there were several factors which contributed to the event, any of which may have prevented the personnel error'.
: 1.         A pre-evolution briefing was not held to review the evolution                             and the key operator actions that would be required.
NRC FORM 3EBA                                                                                                                             *U.S.GPO:19BB.O.B24 538/455 (NQ)
 
UA', NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC Form 366A (983)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINU TION                                       APPROVED OMB NO. 3150M)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/86 FACILITYNAME      (ll                                                           DOCKET NUMBER (2)            LER NUMBER (6)                    PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL        REVISION SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT                                                                     YEAR      NUMBER        NUMBER UNIT       1 p  p  p  p    p 40 087        0  4 5          0 0      0  3 OF      04 TEXT /O'IIKEB EPBco lr /BEIIEa/, Irw ////O/N/ ///IC Forrrr 36643/ ((7)
CAUSE:         (continued)
: 2.         The     procedure did not include a caution when the depressurization is begun to alert the operator to the subsequent requirement to isolate the accumulators prior to decreasing pressure below 900 psig.
: 3.         The       Senior Control Operator                   was   reviewing the results of completed surveillance tests                     and thus   was   distracted during this phase of the cooldown.
ANALYSIS:
The Safety               Injection Accumulators are a passive system for injection of water into the RCS during a large break loss of coolant accident. Under the circumstances, the Accumulators functioned as designed.
The     evolution of isolating the Accumulators is only done during the cooldown from Mode 3 to Mode 4. While in Modes 1 & 2 and Mode 3 (with RCS pressure greater than 1000 psig), injection of the Accumulators is prevented by the delta pressure across the Accumulator discharge check valve.
No   safety consequences resulted from this event, as the reactor was subcritical and depressurized at the time. The event caused the pressurizer water level to increase and borated water (2000 ppm boron) to enter the RCS. The event was terminated by the Reactor Operator when the low pressure alarms alerted the operator to the injection of Accumulator water. The event did not result in a challenge to the integrity of the RCS or require the actuation of other engineered safeguards.
This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).
This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).
No reportable events involving the Safety Injection Accumulators have occurred at the plant to date.CORRECTIVE ACTION: 1.General Operating Procedure (GP)-007, Normal Plant Cooldown (Mode 3 to Mode 5), has been revised to include a caution note prior to depressurization.
No     reportable events involving the Safety Injection Accumulators have occurred at the plant to date.
2.Procedure No.OMM-001, Conduct of Operations, section on Shift/Evolution briefings for off normal evolutions was re-inforced via a memo from the Operations Manager to the Operations Supervisor.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
3~Retraining on items 1 and 2 above has been done with emphasis on anticipating plant operations.
: 1.       General Operating Procedure                             (GP)-007, Normal Plant Cooldown (Mode 3 to                 Mode   5),
NRC FORM 366A 1983)*U.S.GPO:1986.0 624.538/455 NRC Form 358A ($83)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.3150W104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1)SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NUMBER (1)YEAR LER NUMBER (5)SEQUENTIAL NUMSER REV>>ION NUMBER PACE (3)TEXT//F/IKYo y>>co/T aqvkrd, ooo d/I/o/>>/HRC Fo/III 35549/(It)CORRECTIVE ACTION: (continued) o s o o o 4 0 0 7 045 0 004 QF 04 4.Senior Control Operators (SRO's)will be instructed on the requirement to maintain constant awareness of plant status during off normal evolutions.
has been             revised to include                 a caution note prior to depressurization.
5.Appropriate disciplinary action was taken with the operating shift involved.NRC FORM 3EEA (943)~*U.S.GPO:1988 0.82A 538/455  
: 2.         Procedure No. OMM-001, Conduct of Operations, section on Shift/Evolution briefings for off normal evolutions was re-inforced via a memo from the Operations Manager to the Operations Supervisor.
~4 Carolina Power 8 Light!Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O.Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 AUG I 4]987 File Number: SHF/10-13510C Letter Number.'O-870484 (0)U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO.50-400 LICENSE NO.NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-045-00 Gentlemen:
3 ~       Retraining on items                           1 and 2 above has been done     with emphasis   on     anticipating plant operations.
In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted.
NRC FORM 366A                                                                                                                       *U.S.GPO:1986.0 624.538/455 1983)
This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30)days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September, 1983.Very truly yours, RAW:skm R.A.Watson Vice President Harris Nuclear Project Enclosure cc: Dr.J.Nelson Grace (NRC-RII)Mr.B.Buckley (NRR)Mr.G.Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)MEM/HO-8704840/PAGE 1/Osl p+}}
 
NRC Form 358A                                                                                             U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
($ 83)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION                             APPROVED OMB NO. 3150W104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1)                                                 DOCKET NUMBER (1)             LER NUMBER (5)                     PACE (3)
SEQUENTIAL     REV>>ION SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT                                                        YEAR      NUMSER        NUMBER UNIT      1 o  s  o  o    o 4 0  0    7      045            0      004        QF    04 TEXT //F/IKYo y>>co /T aqvkrd, ooo d/I/o/>>/ HRC Fo/III 35549/ (It)
CORRECTIVE ACTION:                   (continued)
: 4.       Senior Control Operators (SRO's) will be instructed on the requirement to maintain constant awareness of plant status during off normal evolutions.
: 5.       Appropriate disciplinary action                 was taken       with the operating shift involved.
NRC FORM 3EEA                                                                                                         ~ *U.S.GPO:1988 0.82A 538/455 (943)
 
~ 4 Carolina Power 8 Light! Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 AUG I4  ]987 File Number: SHF/10-13510C Letter Number.'O-870484 (0)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:   NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT       UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-045-00 Gentlemen:
In accordance with   Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September, 1983.
Very   truly yours, R. A. Watson Vice President Harris Nuclear Project RAW:skm Enclosure cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC       RII)
Mr. B. Buckley (NRR)
Mr. G. Maxwell (NRC SHNPP) p+
MEM/HO-8704840/PAGE 1/Osl}}

Latest revision as of 07:03, 22 October 2019

LER 87-045-00:on 870716,RCS Pressure Fell Below Accumulator Pressure,Initiating Partial Injection of All Three Accumulators.Caused by Reactor Operator Error.Operating Shift Disciplined & Procedure revised.W/870814 Ltr
ML18004B900
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/17/1987
From: Schwabenbauer, Watson R
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
HO-870484-(O), LER-87-045, LER-87-45, NUDOCS 8708180219
Download: ML18004B900 (8)


Text

i ~UL Y INFORMATION DISTR JTI SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8708180219 DOC. DATE: 87/08/14 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL: 50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Poeer Plant Unit ii Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SCHWABENBAUER Caro l ina Pacer 8.. Lig h t Co.

WATSON'. *. Carolina Poeer 5 Light Co. J REC IP. NAME R EC IP. I ENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 87-045-00: on 870716 RCS pressure fell beloe accumulator pressure initiating partial ingection of all three accumulators. Caused bg personnel error. Disciplinarg action for operating shift. W/870814 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report (LER) i Incident Rpti etc.

NOTES: Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 LA 1 1 PD2-1 PD 1 1 BUCKLEY> B 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON *CRS MOELLER 2 2 AEOD/DOA AEOD/DSP/NAS 1 1

  • EOD/DSP/ROAB AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 DEDRO NRR/DEBT/ADE 1 0 NRR/DEST/*DS NRR/DEST/CEB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/ELB NRR/DEST/ ICSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB NRR/DEBT/MTB 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB NRR/DEST/RSB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/SGB NRR/DLPG/HFB 1 1 NRR/DLPG/GAB NRR/DOEA/EAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/RAB NR - PB 2 2 NRR/PMAS/ ILRB EG F IL 02 1 1 RES DEP Y G I ELFORDi J 1 1 RES/DE/E IB RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EGS.G GROH. M 5 H ST LOBBY 4lARD 1 1 LPDR 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC HARRIS' 1 NSIC MAYST G 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 44 ENCL 42

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ro rSRC Form 355 US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (84)3) APPROVED OMB NO. 31604104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERj DOCKET NUMBER (2) PA E 3 FACILITY NAME (I)

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 0 5 0 0 040 0>OF04

PERSONNEL ERROR CAUSED INJECTION OF SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATORS DURING PLANT COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) 54/ SEGUENSIAL BEVISIOIS FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(SI MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR 44 NUMBER Ipr/ NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR 0 5 0 0 0 0 7 1 6 8 7 7 0 4 5 0 0 8 1787 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT 7 0 THE REOUIAEMENTS OF 10 cFR (I: /Core@ onr or moro o/ thr /o/lors/np/ (11)

OPERATING MODE (8) 20.402(a) 20A05(c) 60.73(el (2) llv) 73.7 I (Ii)

POWE R 20.405( ~ l(1)(0 50.38(c) I I I 50.73(e)(2)(v) 73.71(c)

LEVEL OTHER /Sprciiy In Aostrrct 20.405(e )(1)(Q I 50.38(cl (2) 50.73(s I (2) (vB)

Oriovvrnr/in Tres, NRC Form 20.405( ~ ) (1)(ill) 50.73(e I (2) (II 50.73(sl(2) (vill)IA) 3BSA/

$@>@>g'<" 50.73(e) (2) (5) 60.73(el(2) (vill)(BI 20A05(e)(l l(lv) 20.405(e)(1)(v) 50.73(e) (2) Bll) 60.73( ~ I (21(s)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12I NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE R. SCHWABENBAUER REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 9 19 362 -26 69 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILVAE OESCRIBEO IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM , COMPONENT MANUFAC.

+URER IIEPORTABLE

~)j(4 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.

TURER TO NPRDS

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vs SUPPLEMENTAL REPOAT EXPECTED (14) MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15I YES /I/ yrs, comp/etc EXPECTED SUBM/SSION DATE/ NO ABSTRACT /Limit to /ct/0 sprees, I.r., rpproeimrtriy /i/tern sino/scorer typrvrrittrn /ines/ (15)

ABSTRACT:

The plant was at 0 percent reactor power in Mode 3, Hot Standby, on July 16, 1987.

The plant was in a normal cooldown in preparation for a maintenance outage.

General Operating Procedure (GP)-007, Normal Plant Cooldown (Mode 3 to Mode 5),

requires the isolation of Cold Leg Accumulators prior to decreasing the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure below that of the Accumulators. During the plant cooldown of approximately 90 degrees F per hour, the operator neglected to isolate the Cold Leg Accumulators prior to the RCS pressure decreasing to less than 900 psig. As a result at 1250 hours0.0145 days <br />0.347 hours <br />0.00207 weeks <br />4.75625e-4 months <br />, the RCS pressure fell below Accumulator pressure, which initiated a partial injection of all three Accumulators.

The operator then secured Pressurizer spray and energized all pressurizer heaters to increase RCS pressure. In approximately sixty seconds, the RCS pressure was increased above Accumulator pressure and the Accumulator injection was terminated.

Approximately eight percent level, or a total of 170 gallons, was injected during this event.

The cause of the event was personnel error on the part of the reactor operator. The safety of the plant was not jeopardized because the reactor was subcritical and the boron concentration of the injected water was greater than the RCS boron concentration. Corrective actions included disciplinary action for the operating shift, re-inforcement'to operating personnel of the requirements for pre-evolution shift briefings and retraining on each of these items.

87DSi802i9 8708i4 D5DDDODD NRC Fotm 3dd PDR ADOCN, IBS3l

NRC Form 3BBA U.S, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (943)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROI/ED OMB NO. 3150MIBE EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (5) PAGE (3)

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR PONER PLANT YEAR SEOUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER UNIT 1 o s o o o 40 087 0 4 5 00 02 oF0 4 TEXT //P rrlro E/roco /I /Ir/kror/ rrw ////Ooo/ ///IC %%drm 35543/ (IT)

DESCRIPTION:

The plant was at 0 percent reactor power in Mode 3, Hot Standby, on July 16, 1987.

The plant was in the process of a normal cooldown and depressurization to 350 degrees F and 365 psig. Once this condition was reached the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system (EIIS:AB) would be put into service. A cooldown rate of approximately 90'F/hr was being maintained.

General Operating Procedure (GP)-007, Normal Plant Cooldown (Mode 3 to Mode 5) requires the isolation of Cold Leg Accumulators (EIIS:BP) prior to decreasing the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) (EIIS:AB) pressure below that of the Accumulators. The Accumulators are required to be maintained between 585 and 665 psig per Technical Specification 3.5.1. Accumulators are required to be operable only when the RCS pressure is greater than 1,000 psig.

At 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br />, the reactor operator was instructed to review Operating Procedure (OP)-111, Residual Heat Removal System, in anticipation of placing the RHR system into service. At 1250 hours0.0145 days <br />0.347 hours <br />0.00207 weeks <br />4.75625e-4 months <br />, while the operator was reviewing OP-ill, the low pressure alarm was received followed immediately by the 'A'ccumulator low- pressure alarm. These alarms indicated that an injection of the 'B'ccumulator Safety Injection Accumulators was initiated. The operator observed RCS pressure at 600 psig and Cold Leg Accumulator pressures were at 640 psig. The operator had neglected to isolate the Cold Leg Accumulators prior to decreasing RCS pressure below that of the accumulators as required by GP-007 and caused the injection of the Accumulators.

The operator then secured the Pressurizer spray valves and energized all Pressurizer heaters to increase RCS pressure above that of the Accumulators. RCS pressure increased above that of the Accumulators in approximately sixty seconds and the injection was terminated. During this time, approximately 8 percent indicated level, or a total of 170 gallons, was injected.

The Accumulators were subsequently isolated and the cooldown and depressurization to RHR cut in conditions was resumed.

CAUSE:

The requirement to isolate the accumulators during the plant depressurization is clearly within the knowledge and training of licensed operators. Therefore, personnel error on the part of the reactor operator is the primary cause of the event. Additionally, there were several factors which contributed to the event, any of which may have prevented the personnel error'.

1. A pre-evolution briefing was not held to review the evolution and the key operator actions that would be required.

NRC FORM 3EBA *U.S.GPO:19BB.O.B24 538/455 (NQ)

UA', NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC Form 366A (983)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINU TION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150M)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/86 FACILITYNAME (ll DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT YEAR NUMBER NUMBER UNIT 1 p p p p p 40 087 0 4 5 0 0 0 3 OF 04 TEXT /O'IIKEB EPBco lr /BEIIEa/, Irw ////O/N/ ///IC Forrrr 36643/ ((7)

CAUSE: (continued)

2. The procedure did not include a caution when the depressurization is begun to alert the operator to the subsequent requirement to isolate the accumulators prior to decreasing pressure below 900 psig.
3. The Senior Control Operator was reviewing the results of completed surveillance tests and thus was distracted during this phase of the cooldown.

ANALYSIS:

The Safety Injection Accumulators are a passive system for injection of water into the RCS during a large break loss of coolant accident. Under the circumstances, the Accumulators functioned as designed.

The evolution of isolating the Accumulators is only done during the cooldown from Mode 3 to Mode 4. While in Modes 1 & 2 and Mode 3 (with RCS pressure greater than 1000 psig), injection of the Accumulators is prevented by the delta pressure across the Accumulator discharge check valve.

No safety consequences resulted from this event, as the reactor was subcritical and depressurized at the time. The event caused the pressurizer water level to increase and borated water (2000 ppm boron) to enter the RCS. The event was terminated by the Reactor Operator when the low pressure alarms alerted the operator to the injection of Accumulator water. The event did not result in a challenge to the integrity of the RCS or require the actuation of other engineered safeguards.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

No reportable events involving the Safety Injection Accumulators have occurred at the plant to date.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

1. General Operating Procedure (GP)-007, Normal Plant Cooldown (Mode 3 to Mode 5),

has been revised to include a caution note prior to depressurization.

2. Procedure No. OMM-001, Conduct of Operations, section on Shift/Evolution briefings for off normal evolutions was re-inforced via a memo from the Operations Manager to the Operations Supervisor.

3 ~ Retraining on items 1 and 2 above has been done with emphasis on anticipating plant operations.

NRC FORM 366A *U.S.GPO:1986.0 624.538/455 1983)

NRC Form 358A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

($ 83)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150W104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (1) LER NUMBER (5) PACE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REV>>ION SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT YEAR NUMSER NUMBER UNIT 1 o s o o o 4 0 0 7 045 0 004 QF 04 TEXT //F/IKYo y>>co /T aqvkrd, ooo d/I/o/>>/ HRC Fo/III 35549/ (It)

CORRECTIVE ACTION: (continued)

4. Senior Control Operators (SRO's) will be instructed on the requirement to maintain constant awareness of plant status during off normal evolutions.
5. Appropriate disciplinary action was taken with the operating shift involved.

NRC FORM 3EEA ~ *U.S.GPO:1988 0.82A 538/455 (943)

~ 4 Carolina Power 8 Light! Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 AUG I4 ]987 File Number: SHF/10-13510C Letter Number.'O-870484 (0)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-045-00 Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September, 1983.

Very truly yours, R. A. Watson Vice President Harris Nuclear Project RAW:skm Enclosure cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC RII)

Mr. B. Buckley (NRR)

Mr. G. Maxwell (NRC SHNPP) p+

MEM/HO-8704840/PAGE 1/Osl