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{{#Wiki_filter:i~UL Y INFORMATION DISTR JTI SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR: 8708180219 DOC.DATE: 87/08/14 NOTARIZED: | {{#Wiki_filter:i ~UL Y INFORMATION DISTR JTI SYSTEM (RIDS) | ||
NO FACIL: 50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Poeer Plant Unit ii Carolina AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SCHWABENBAUER Caro l ina Pacer 8.. | ACCESSION NBR: 8708180219 DOC. DATE: 87/08/14 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL: 50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Poeer Plant Unit ii Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SCHWABENBAUER Caro l ina Pacer 8.. Lig h t Co. | ||
WATSON'. *. Carolina Poeer 5 Light Co. J REC IP. NAME R EC IP. I ENT AFFILIATION | |||
==SUBJECT:== | ==SUBJECT:== | ||
LER 87-045-00: | LER 87-045-00: on 870716 RCS pressure fell beloe accumulator pressure initiating partial ingection of all three accumulators. Caused bg personnel error. Disciplinarg action for operating shift. W/870814 ltr. | ||
on 870716 RCS pressure | DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SIZE: | ||
Caused bg personnel error.Disciplinarg action for operating shift.W/870814 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER)i Incident Rpti etc.NOTES: Application for permit renewal filed.05000400 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 LA BUCKLEY>B INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON | TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report (LER) i Incident Rpti etc. | ||
NOTES: Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 LA 1 1 PD2-1 PD 1 1 BUCKLEY> B 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON *CRS MOELLER 2 2 AEOD/DOA AEOD/DSP/NAS 1 1 | |||
*EOD/DSP/ROAB AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 DEDRO NRR/DEBT/ADE 1 0 NRR/DEST/*DS NRR/DEST/CEB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/ELB NRR/DEST/ ICSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB NRR/DEBT/MTB 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB NRR/DEST/RSB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/SGB NRR/DLPG/HFB 1 1 NRR/DLPG/GAB NRR/DOEA/EAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/RAB NR - PB 2 2 NRR/PMAS/ ILRB EG F IL 02 1 1 RES DEP Y G I ELFORDi J 1 1 RES/DE/E IB RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EGS.G GROH. M 5 H ST LOBBY 4lARD 1 1 LPDR 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC HARRIS' 1 NSIC MAYST G 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 44 ENCL 42 | |||
~ ~ | |||
.) | |||
/i/tern sino/scorer typrvrrittrn | |||
/ines/(15)ABSTRACT: | I i | ||
During the plant cooldown of approximately 90 degrees F per hour, the operator neglected to isolate the Cold Leg Accumulators prior to the RCS pressure decreasing to less than 900 psig.As a result at 1250 hours, the RCS pressure fell below Accumulator pressure, which initiated a partial injection of all three Accumulators. | ro rSRC Form 355 US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (84)3) APPROVED OMB NO. 31604104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERj DOCKET NUMBER (2) PA E 3 FACILITY NAME (I) | ||
The operator then secured Pressurizer spray and energized all pressurizer heaters to increase RCS pressure.In approximately sixty seconds, the RCS pressure was increased above Accumulator pressure and the Accumulator injection was terminated. | SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 0 5 0 0 040 0>OF04 | ||
Approximately eight percent level, or a total of 170 gallons, was injected during this event.The cause of the event was personnel error on the part of the reactor operator.The safety of the plant was not jeopardized because the reactor was subcritical and the boron concentration of the injected water was greater than the RCS boron concentration. | '' PERSONNEL ERROR CAUSED INJECTION OF SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATORS DURING PLANT COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) 54/ SEGUENSIAL BEVISIOIS FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(SI MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR 44 NUMBER Ipr/ NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR 0 5 0 0 0 0 7 1 6 8 7 7 0 4 5 0 0 8 1787 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT 7 0 THE REOUIAEMENTS OF 10 cFR (I: /Core@ onr or moro o/ thr /o/lors/np/ (11) | ||
Corrective actions included disciplinary action for the operating shift, re-inforcement'to operating personnel of the requirements for pre-evolution shift briefings and retraining on each of these items.87DSi802i9 8708i4 | OPERATING MODE (8) 20.402(a) 20A05(c) 60.73(el (2) llv) 73.7 I (Ii) | ||
The plant was at 0 percent reactor power in Mode 3, Hot Standby, on July 16, 1987.The plant was in the process of a normal cooldown and depressurization to 350 degrees F and 365 psig.Once this condition was reached the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)system (EIIS:AB)would be put into service.A cooldown rate of approximately 90'F/hr was being maintained. | POWE R 20.405( ~ l(1)(0 50.38(c) I I I 50.73(e)(2)(v) 73.71(c) | ||
General Operating Procedure (GP)-007, Normal Plant Cooldown (Mode 3 to Mode 5)requires the isolation of Cold Leg Accumulators (EIIS:BP)prior to decreasing the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)(EIIS:AB)pressure below that of the Accumulators. | LEVEL OTHER /Sprciiy In Aostrrct 20.405(e )(1)(Q I 50.38(cl (2) 50.73(s I (2) (vB) | ||
The Accumulators are required to be maintained between 585 and 665 psig per Technical Specification 3.5.1.Accumulators are required to be operable only when the RCS pressure is greater than 1,000 psig.At 1200 hours, the reactor operator was instructed to review Operating Procedure (OP)-111, Residual Heat Removal System, in anticipation of placing the RHR system into service.At 1250 hours, while the operator was reviewing OP-ill, the | Oriovvrnr/in Tres, NRC Form 20.405( ~ ) (1)(ill) 50.73(e I (2) (II 50.73(sl(2) (vill)IA) 3BSA/ | ||
The operator observed RCS pressure at 600 psig and Cold Leg Accumulator pressures were at 640 psig.The operator had neglected to isolate the Cold Leg Accumulators prior to decreasing RCS pressure below that of the accumulators as required by GP-007 and caused the injection of the Accumulators. | $@>@>g'<" 50.73(e) (2) (5) 60.73(el(2) (vill)(BI 20A05(e)(l l(lv) 20.405(e)(1)(v) 50.73(e) (2) Bll) 60.73( ~ I (21(s) | ||
The operator then secured the Pressurizer spray valves and energized all Pressurizer heaters to increase RCS pressure above that of the Accumulators. | LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12I NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE R. SCHWABENBAUER REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 9 19 362 -26 69 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILVAE OESCRIBEO IN THIS REPORT (13) | ||
RCS pressure increased above that of the Accumulators in approximately sixty seconds and the injection was terminated. | CAUSE SYSTEM , COMPONENT MANUFAC. | ||
During this time, approximately 8 percent indicated level, or a total of 170 gallons, was injected.The Accumulators were subsequently isolated and the cooldown and depressurization to RHR cut in conditions was resumed.CAUSE: The requirement to isolate the accumulators during the plant depressurization is clearly within the knowledge and training of licensed operators. | +URER IIEPORTABLE | ||
Therefore, personnel error on the part of the reactor operator is the primary cause of the event.Additionally, there were several factors which contributed to the event, any of which may have prevented the personnel error'.1.A pre-evolution briefing was not held to review the evolution and the key operator actions that would be required.NRC FORM 3EBA | ~)j(4 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC. | ||
TURER TO NPRDS | |||
Ã4jhW n | |||
vs SUPPLEMENTAL REPOAT EXPECTED (14) MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15I YES /I/ yrs, comp/etc EXPECTED SUBM/SSION DATE/ NO ABSTRACT /Limit to /ct/0 sprees, I.r., rpproeimrtriy /i/tern sino/scorer typrvrrittrn /ines/ (15) | |||
ABSTRACT: | |||
The plant was at 0 percent reactor power in Mode 3, Hot Standby, on July 16, 1987. | |||
The plant was in a normal cooldown in preparation for a maintenance outage. | |||
General Operating Procedure (GP)-007, Normal Plant Cooldown (Mode 3 to Mode 5), | |||
requires the isolation of Cold Leg Accumulators prior to decreasing the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure below that of the Accumulators. During the plant cooldown of approximately 90 degrees F per hour, the operator neglected to isolate the Cold Leg Accumulators prior to the RCS pressure decreasing to less than 900 psig. As a result at 1250 hours, the RCS pressure fell below Accumulator pressure, which initiated a partial injection of all three Accumulators. | |||
The operator then secured Pressurizer spray and energized all pressurizer heaters to increase RCS pressure. In approximately sixty seconds, the RCS pressure was increased above Accumulator pressure and the Accumulator injection was terminated. | |||
Approximately eight percent level, or a total of 170 gallons, was injected during this event. | |||
The cause of the event was personnel error on the part of the reactor operator. The safety of the plant was not jeopardized because the reactor was subcritical and the boron concentration of the injected water was greater than the RCS boron concentration. Corrective actions included disciplinary action for the operating shift, re-inforcement'to operating personnel of the requirements for pre-evolution shift briefings and retraining on each of these items. | |||
87DSi802i9 8708i4 D5DDDODD NRC Fotm 3dd PDR ADOCN, IBS3l | |||
NRC Form 3BBA U.S, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (943) | |||
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROI/ED OMB NO. 3150MIBE EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (5) PAGE (3) | |||
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR PONER PLANT YEAR SEOUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER UNIT 1 o s o o o 40 087 0 4 5 00 02 oF0 4 TEXT //P rrlro E/roco /I /Ir/kror/ rrw ////Ooo/ ///IC %%drm 35543/ (IT) | |||
DESCRIPTION: | |||
The plant was at 0 percent reactor power in Mode 3, Hot Standby, on July 16, 1987. | |||
The plant was in the process of a normal cooldown and depressurization to 350 degrees F and 365 psig. Once this condition was reached the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system (EIIS:AB) would be put into service. A cooldown rate of approximately 90'F/hr was being maintained. | |||
General Operating Procedure (GP)-007, Normal Plant Cooldown (Mode 3 to Mode 5) requires the isolation of Cold Leg Accumulators (EIIS:BP) prior to decreasing the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) (EIIS:AB) pressure below that of the Accumulators. The Accumulators are required to be maintained between 585 and 665 psig per Technical Specification 3.5.1. Accumulators are required to be operable only when the RCS pressure is greater than 1,000 psig. | |||
At 1200 hours, the reactor operator was instructed to review Operating Procedure (OP)-111, Residual Heat Removal System, in anticipation of placing the RHR system into service. At 1250 hours, while the operator was reviewing OP-ill, the low pressure alarm was received followed immediately by the 'A'ccumulator low- pressure alarm. These alarms indicated that an injection of the 'B'ccumulator Safety Injection Accumulators was initiated. The operator observed RCS pressure at 600 psig and Cold Leg Accumulator pressures were at 640 psig. The operator had neglected to isolate the Cold Leg Accumulators prior to decreasing RCS pressure below that of the accumulators as required by GP-007 and caused the injection of the Accumulators. | |||
The operator then secured the Pressurizer spray valves and energized all Pressurizer heaters to increase RCS pressure above that of the Accumulators. RCS pressure increased above that of the Accumulators in approximately sixty seconds and the injection was terminated. During this time, approximately 8 percent indicated level, or a total of 170 gallons, was injected. | |||
The Accumulators were subsequently isolated and the cooldown and depressurization to RHR cut in conditions was resumed. | |||
CAUSE: | |||
The requirement to isolate the accumulators during the plant depressurization is clearly within the knowledge and training of licensed operators. Therefore, personnel error on the part of the reactor operator is the primary cause of the event. Additionally, there were several factors which contributed to the event, any of which may have prevented the personnel error'. | |||
: 1. A pre-evolution briefing was not held to review the evolution and the key operator actions that would be required. | |||
NRC FORM 3EBA *U.S.GPO:19BB.O.B24 538/455 (NQ) | |||
UA', NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC Form 366A (983) | |||
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINU TION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150M)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/86 FACILITYNAME (ll DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) | |||
SEQUENTIAL REVISION SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT YEAR NUMBER NUMBER UNIT 1 p p p p p 40 087 0 4 5 0 0 0 3 OF 04 TEXT /O'IIKEB EPBco lr /BEIIEa/, Irw ////O/N/ ///IC Forrrr 36643/ ((7) | |||
CAUSE: (continued) | |||
: 2. The procedure did not include a caution when the depressurization is begun to alert the operator to the subsequent requirement to isolate the accumulators prior to decreasing pressure below 900 psig. | |||
: 3. The Senior Control Operator was reviewing the results of completed surveillance tests and thus was distracted during this phase of the cooldown. | |||
ANALYSIS: | |||
The Safety Injection Accumulators are a passive system for injection of water into the RCS during a large break loss of coolant accident. Under the circumstances, the Accumulators functioned as designed. | |||
The evolution of isolating the Accumulators is only done during the cooldown from Mode 3 to Mode 4. While in Modes 1 & 2 and Mode 3 (with RCS pressure greater than 1000 psig), injection of the Accumulators is prevented by the delta pressure across the Accumulator discharge check valve. | |||
No safety consequences resulted from this event, as the reactor was subcritical and depressurized at the time. The event caused the pressurizer water level to increase and borated water (2000 ppm boron) to enter the RCS. The event was terminated by the Reactor Operator when the low pressure alarms alerted the operator to the injection of Accumulator water. The event did not result in a challenge to the integrity of the RCS or require the actuation of other engineered safeguards. | |||
This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). | This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). | ||
No reportable events involving the Safety Injection Accumulators have occurred at the plant to date.CORRECTIVE ACTION: 1.General Operating Procedure (GP)-007, Normal Plant Cooldown (Mode 3 to Mode 5), has been revised to include a caution note prior to depressurization. | No reportable events involving the Safety Injection Accumulators have occurred at the plant to date. | ||
2.Procedure No.OMM-001, Conduct of Operations, section on Shift/Evolution briefings for off normal evolutions was re-inforced via a memo from the Operations Manager to the Operations Supervisor. | CORRECTIVE ACTION: | ||
3~Retraining on items 1 and 2 above has been done with emphasis on anticipating plant operations. | : 1. General Operating Procedure (GP)-007, Normal Plant Cooldown (Mode 3 to Mode 5), | ||
NRC FORM 366A | has been revised to include a caution note prior to depressurization. | ||
5.Appropriate disciplinary action was taken with the operating shift involved.NRC FORM 3EEA | : 2. Procedure No. OMM-001, Conduct of Operations, section on Shift/Evolution briefings for off normal evolutions was re-inforced via a memo from the Operations Manager to the Operations Supervisor. | ||
~4 Carolina Power 8 Light!Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O.Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 AUG | 3 ~ Retraining on items 1 and 2 above has been done with emphasis on anticipating plant operations. | ||
In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. | NRC FORM 366A *U.S.GPO:1986.0 624.538/455 1983) | ||
This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30)days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September, 1983.Very truly yours, | |||
NRC Form 358A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | |||
($ 83) | |||
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150W104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (1) LER NUMBER (5) PACE (3) | |||
SEQUENTIAL REV>>ION SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT YEAR NUMSER NUMBER UNIT 1 o s o o o 4 0 0 7 045 0 004 QF 04 TEXT //F/IKYo y>>co /T aqvkrd, ooo d/I/o/>>/ HRC Fo/III 35549/ (It) | |||
CORRECTIVE ACTION: (continued) | |||
: 4. Senior Control Operators (SRO's) will be instructed on the requirement to maintain constant awareness of plant status during off normal evolutions. | |||
: 5. Appropriate disciplinary action was taken with the operating shift involved. | |||
NRC FORM 3EEA ~ *U.S.GPO:1988 0.82A 538/455 (943) | |||
~ 4 Carolina Power 8 Light! Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 AUG I4 ]987 File Number: SHF/10-13510C Letter Number.'O-870484 (0) | |||
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-045-00 Gentlemen: | |||
In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September, 1983. | |||
Very truly yours, R. A. Watson Vice President Harris Nuclear Project RAW:skm Enclosure cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC RII) | |||
Mr. B. Buckley (NRR) | |||
Mr. G. Maxwell (NRC SHNPP) p+ | |||
MEM/HO-8704840/PAGE 1/Osl}} |
Latest revision as of 07:03, 22 October 2019
ML18004B900 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Harris |
Issue date: | 08/17/1987 |
From: | Schwabenbauer, Watson R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
References | |
HO-870484-(O), LER-87-045, LER-87-45, NUDOCS 8708180219 | |
Download: ML18004B900 (8) | |
Text
i ~UL Y INFORMATION DISTR JTI SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR: 8708180219 DOC. DATE: 87/08/14 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL: 50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Poeer Plant Unit ii Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SCHWABENBAUER Caro l ina Pacer 8.. Lig h t Co.
WATSON'. *. Carolina Poeer 5 Light Co. J REC IP. NAME R EC IP. I ENT AFFILIATION
SUBJECT:
LER 87-045-00: on 870716 RCS pressure fell beloe accumulator pressure initiating partial ingection of all three accumulators. Caused bg personnel error. Disciplinarg action for operating shift. W/870814 ltr.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report (LER) i Incident Rpti etc.
NOTES: Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 LA 1 1 PD2-1 PD 1 1 BUCKLEY> B 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON *CRS MOELLER 2 2 AEOD/DOA AEOD/DSP/NAS 1 1
- EOD/DSP/ROAB AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 DEDRO NRR/DEBT/ADE 1 0 NRR/DEST/*DS NRR/DEST/CEB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/ELB NRR/DEST/ ICSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB NRR/DEBT/MTB 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB NRR/DEST/RSB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/SGB NRR/DLPG/HFB 1 1 NRR/DLPG/GAB NRR/DOEA/EAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/RAB NR - PB 2 2 NRR/PMAS/ ILRB EG F IL 02 1 1 RES DEP Y G I ELFORDi J 1 1 RES/DE/E IB RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EGS.G GROH. M 5 H ST LOBBY 4lARD 1 1 LPDR 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC HARRIS' 1 NSIC MAYST G 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 44 ENCL 42
~ ~
.)
I i
ro rSRC Form 355 US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (84)3) APPROVED OMB NO. 31604104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERj DOCKET NUMBER (2) PA E 3 FACILITY NAME (I)
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 0 5 0 0 040 0>OF04
PERSONNEL ERROR CAUSED INJECTION OF SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATORS DURING PLANT COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) 54/ SEGUENSIAL BEVISIOIS FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(SI MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR 44 NUMBER Ipr/ NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR 0 5 0 0 0 0 7 1 6 8 7 7 0 4 5 0 0 8 1787 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT 7 0 THE REOUIAEMENTS OF 10 cFR (I: /Core@ onr or moro o/ thr /o/lors/np/ (11)
OPERATING MODE (8) 20.402(a) 20A05(c) 60.73(el (2) llv) 73.7 I (Ii)
POWE R 20.405( ~ l(1)(0 50.38(c) I I I 50.73(e)(2)(v) 73.71(c)
LEVEL OTHER /Sprciiy In Aostrrct 20.405(e )(1)(Q I 50.38(cl (2) 50.73(s I (2) (vB)
Oriovvrnr/in Tres, NRC Form 20.405( ~ ) (1)(ill) 50.73(e I (2) (II 50.73(sl(2) (vill)IA) 3BSA/
$@>@>g'<" 50.73(e) (2) (5) 60.73(el(2) (vill)(BI 20A05(e)(l l(lv) 20.405(e)(1)(v) 50.73(e) (2) Bll) 60.73( ~ I (21(s)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12I NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE R. SCHWABENBAUER REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 9 19 362 -26 69 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILVAE OESCRIBEO IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE SYSTEM , COMPONENT MANUFAC.
+URER IIEPORTABLE
~)j(4 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.
TURER TO NPRDS
Ã4jhW n
vs SUPPLEMENTAL REPOAT EXPECTED (14) MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15I YES /I/ yrs, comp/etc EXPECTED SUBM/SSION DATE/ NO ABSTRACT /Limit to /ct/0 sprees, I.r., rpproeimrtriy /i/tern sino/scorer typrvrrittrn /ines/ (15)
ABSTRACT:
The plant was at 0 percent reactor power in Mode 3, Hot Standby, on July 16, 1987.
The plant was in a normal cooldown in preparation for a maintenance outage.
General Operating Procedure (GP)-007, Normal Plant Cooldown (Mode 3 to Mode 5),
requires the isolation of Cold Leg Accumulators prior to decreasing the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure below that of the Accumulators. During the plant cooldown of approximately 90 degrees F per hour, the operator neglected to isolate the Cold Leg Accumulators prior to the RCS pressure decreasing to less than 900 psig. As a result at 1250 hours0.0145 days <br />0.347 hours <br />0.00207 weeks <br />4.75625e-4 months <br />, the RCS pressure fell below Accumulator pressure, which initiated a partial injection of all three Accumulators.
The operator then secured Pressurizer spray and energized all pressurizer heaters to increase RCS pressure. In approximately sixty seconds, the RCS pressure was increased above Accumulator pressure and the Accumulator injection was terminated.
Approximately eight percent level, or a total of 170 gallons, was injected during this event.
The cause of the event was personnel error on the part of the reactor operator. The safety of the plant was not jeopardized because the reactor was subcritical and the boron concentration of the injected water was greater than the RCS boron concentration. Corrective actions included disciplinary action for the operating shift, re-inforcement'to operating personnel of the requirements for pre-evolution shift briefings and retraining on each of these items.
87DSi802i9 8708i4 D5DDDODD NRC Fotm 3dd PDR ADOCN, IBS3l
NRC Form 3BBA U.S, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (943)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROI/ED OMB NO. 3150MIBE EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (5) PAGE (3)
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR PONER PLANT YEAR SEOUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER UNIT 1 o s o o o 40 087 0 4 5 00 02 oF0 4 TEXT //P rrlro E/roco /I /Ir/kror/ rrw ////Ooo/ ///IC %%drm 35543/ (IT)
DESCRIPTION:
The plant was at 0 percent reactor power in Mode 3, Hot Standby, on July 16, 1987.
The plant was in the process of a normal cooldown and depressurization to 350 degrees F and 365 psig. Once this condition was reached the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system (EIIS:AB) would be put into service. A cooldown rate of approximately 90'F/hr was being maintained.
General Operating Procedure (GP)-007, Normal Plant Cooldown (Mode 3 to Mode 5) requires the isolation of Cold Leg Accumulators (EIIS:BP) prior to decreasing the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) (EIIS:AB) pressure below that of the Accumulators. The Accumulators are required to be maintained between 585 and 665 psig per Technical Specification 3.5.1. Accumulators are required to be operable only when the RCS pressure is greater than 1,000 psig.
At 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br />, the reactor operator was instructed to review Operating Procedure (OP)-111, Residual Heat Removal System, in anticipation of placing the RHR system into service. At 1250 hours0.0145 days <br />0.347 hours <br />0.00207 weeks <br />4.75625e-4 months <br />, while the operator was reviewing OP-ill, the low pressure alarm was received followed immediately by the 'A'ccumulator low- pressure alarm. These alarms indicated that an injection of the 'B'ccumulator Safety Injection Accumulators was initiated. The operator observed RCS pressure at 600 psig and Cold Leg Accumulator pressures were at 640 psig. The operator had neglected to isolate the Cold Leg Accumulators prior to decreasing RCS pressure below that of the accumulators as required by GP-007 and caused the injection of the Accumulators.
The operator then secured the Pressurizer spray valves and energized all Pressurizer heaters to increase RCS pressure above that of the Accumulators. RCS pressure increased above that of the Accumulators in approximately sixty seconds and the injection was terminated. During this time, approximately 8 percent indicated level, or a total of 170 gallons, was injected.
The Accumulators were subsequently isolated and the cooldown and depressurization to RHR cut in conditions was resumed.
CAUSE:
The requirement to isolate the accumulators during the plant depressurization is clearly within the knowledge and training of licensed operators. Therefore, personnel error on the part of the reactor operator is the primary cause of the event. Additionally, there were several factors which contributed to the event, any of which may have prevented the personnel error'.
- 1. A pre-evolution briefing was not held to review the evolution and the key operator actions that would be required.
NRC FORM 3EBA *U.S.GPO:19BB.O.B24 538/455 (NQ)
UA', NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC Form 366A (983)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINU TION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150M)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/86 FACILITYNAME (ll DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REVISION SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT YEAR NUMBER NUMBER UNIT 1 p p p p p 40 087 0 4 5 0 0 0 3 OF 04 TEXT /O'IIKEB EPBco lr /BEIIEa/, Irw ////O/N/ ///IC Forrrr 36643/ ((7)
CAUSE: (continued)
- 2. The procedure did not include a caution when the depressurization is begun to alert the operator to the subsequent requirement to isolate the accumulators prior to decreasing pressure below 900 psig.
- 3. The Senior Control Operator was reviewing the results of completed surveillance tests and thus was distracted during this phase of the cooldown.
ANALYSIS:
The Safety Injection Accumulators are a passive system for injection of water into the RCS during a large break loss of coolant accident. Under the circumstances, the Accumulators functioned as designed.
The evolution of isolating the Accumulators is only done during the cooldown from Mode 3 to Mode 4. While in Modes 1 & 2 and Mode 3 (with RCS pressure greater than 1000 psig), injection of the Accumulators is prevented by the delta pressure across the Accumulator discharge check valve.
No safety consequences resulted from this event, as the reactor was subcritical and depressurized at the time. The event caused the pressurizer water level to increase and borated water (2000 ppm boron) to enter the RCS. The event was terminated by the Reactor Operator when the low pressure alarms alerted the operator to the injection of Accumulator water. The event did not result in a challenge to the integrity of the RCS or require the actuation of other engineered safeguards.
This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).
No reportable events involving the Safety Injection Accumulators have occurred at the plant to date.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
- 1. General Operating Procedure (GP)-007, Normal Plant Cooldown (Mode 3 to Mode 5),
has been revised to include a caution note prior to depressurization.
- 2. Procedure No. OMM-001, Conduct of Operations, section on Shift/Evolution briefings for off normal evolutions was re-inforced via a memo from the Operations Manager to the Operations Supervisor.
3 ~ Retraining on items 1 and 2 above has been done with emphasis on anticipating plant operations.
NRC FORM 366A *U.S.GPO:1986.0 624.538/455 1983)
NRC Form 358A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
($ 83)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150W104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (1) LER NUMBER (5) PACE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REV>>ION SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT YEAR NUMSER NUMBER UNIT 1 o s o o o 4 0 0 7 045 0 004 QF 04 TEXT //F/IKYo y>>co /T aqvkrd, ooo d/I/o/>>/ HRC Fo/III 35549/ (It)
CORRECTIVE ACTION: (continued)
- 4. Senior Control Operators (SRO's) will be instructed on the requirement to maintain constant awareness of plant status during off normal evolutions.
- 5. Appropriate disciplinary action was taken with the operating shift involved.
NRC FORM 3EEA ~ *U.S.GPO:1988 0.82A 538/455 (943)
~ 4 Carolina Power 8 Light! Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 AUG I4 ]987 File Number: SHF/10-13510C Letter Number.'O-870484 (0)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-045-00 Gentlemen:
In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September, 1983.
Very truly yours, R. A. Watson Vice President Harris Nuclear Project RAW:skm Enclosure cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC RII)
Mr. B. Buckley (NRR)
Mr. G. Maxwell (NRC SHNPP) p+
MEM/HO-8704840/PAGE 1/Osl