ML062990041

IR 05000327-06-004 and IR 05000325-06-004, on 09/30/2006, Tennessee Valley Authority

ML062990041
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	10/25/2006
From:	Widmann M T Reactor Projects Region 2 Branch 6
To:	Singer K W Tennessee Valley Authority
References
IR-06-004
Download: ML062990041 (23)

See also: IR 05000325/2006004

Text

October 25, 2006Tennessee Valley AuthorityATTN:Mr. Karl W. SingerChief Nuclear Officer and

Executive Vice President6A Lookout Place

1101 Market Street

Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801SUBJECT:SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT05000327/2006004 AND 05000328/2006004Dear Mr. Singer:

On September 30, 2006, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed aninspection at your Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection

report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 12, 2006, with Mr.

R. Douet and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed

personnel.Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. However, alicensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is listed

in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with

Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy due to the very low safety significance of the

violation and because it is entered into your corrective action program. If you contest this

violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with

the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control

Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region II; theDirector, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,

D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the

NRC Public Document Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of

NRC's document system (ADAMS).

TVA2ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/html (thePublic Electronic Reading Room).Sincerely,/RA/Malcolm T. Widmann, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 6

Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.:50-327, 50-328License Nos.:DPR-77, DPR-79Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000327/2006004 and 05000328/2006004w/Attachment: Supplemental Informationcc: w/encl: (See page 3)

_________________________OFFICERII:DRPRII:DRPRII:DRPRII:DRPRII:DRSSIGNATUREMTWMSFMEP per emailMASNAMEMWidmannGWilliamsSFreemanMSpeckMScottDATE10/ /200610/ /200610/24/200610/24/200610/24/2006

E-MAIL COPY? YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO

TVA3cc w/encls:Ashok S. Bhatnagar

Senior Vice President

Nuclear Operations

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail DistributionPreston D. SwaffordSenior Vice President

Nuclear Support

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail DistributionLarry S. Bryant, Vice PresidentNuclear Engineering &

Technical Services

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail DistributionRandy DouetSite Vice President

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

Electronic Mail DistributionGeneral CounselTennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail DistributionJohn C. Fornicola, General ManagerNuclear Assurance

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail DistributionGlenn W. Morris, ManagerLicensing and Industry Affairs

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail DistributionRussell R. Thompson, Acting ManagerCorporate Nuclear Licensing and

Industry Affairs

Tennessee Valley Authority

4X Blue Ridge

1101 Market Street

Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801Robert H. Bryan, Jr., General ManagerLicensing and Industry Affairs

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

Tennessee Valley Authority

4X Blue Ridge

1101 Market Street

Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801David A. Kulisek, Plant ManagerSequoyah Nuclear Plant

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail DistributionLawrence E. Nanney, DirectorTN Dept. of Environment & Conservation

Division of Radiological Health

Electronic Mail DistributionCounty MayorHamilton County Courthouse

Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801Ann Harris341 Swing Loop

Rockwood, TN 37854

James H. Bassham, DirectorTennessee Emergency Management

Agency

Electronic Mail DistributionDistribution w/encl: (See page 4)

TVA4Letter to Karl W. Singer from Malcolm T. Widmann dated October 25, 2006SUBJECT:SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT05000327/2006004 AND 05000328/2006004Distribution w/encl

Bob Pascarelli, NRR

D. Pickett, NRR

C. Evans

L. Slack, RII EICS

RIDSNRRDIRS

PUBLIC

EnclosureU. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IIDocket Nos:50-327, 50-328

License Nos:DPR-77, DPR-79

Report No:05000327/2006004 and 05000328/2006004

Licensee:Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

Facility:Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

Location:Sequoyah Access RoadSoddy-Daisy, TN 37379Dates:July 1, 2006 - September 30, 2006

Inspectors:S. Freeman, Senior Resident InspectorM. Speck, Resident Inspector

M. Scott, Senior Reactor Inspector (Section 1R12)Approved by:M. Widmann, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6

Division of Reactor Projects

EnclosureSUMMARY OF FINDINGSIR 05000327/2006004, IR 05000328/2006004; 07/1/2006 - 09/30/2006; Sequoyah NuclearPlant, Units 1 & 2; resident inspector integrated inspection report.The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and anannounced inspection by one regional inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe

operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor

Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.A.NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

None.B. Licensee-Identified ViolationsA violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, wasreviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have

been entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This violation and corrective

actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

EnclosureREPORT DETAILSSummary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the period at 100% rated thermal power (RTP) and remained there for the entireinspection period.Unit 2 began the period at 100% RTP and remained there for the entire inspection period.1.REACTOR SAFETYCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R01Adverse Weather Protection a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the licensee's efforts to protect the ultimate heat sink from theeffects of high temperatures during the occurrence of the hottest part of the summer.

Specifically, in July 2006, the inspectors reviewed licensee procedures for monitoring

essential raw cooling water (ERCW) supply header temperature, reviewed instrument

calibrations records for the ERCW supply header temperature instruments, and

independently verified the temperature did not exceed the Technical Specifications (TS)

limit for the ultimate heat sink. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R04Equipment Alignment a.Inspection ScopePartial System Walkdowns. The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of thefollowing four systems to verify the operability of redundant or diverse trains and

components when safety equipment was inoperable. The inspectors attempted to

identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system, and, therefore,

potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures,

walked down control system components, and verified that selected breakers, valves,

and support equipment were in the correct position to support system operation. The

inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment

alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of

mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program

(CAP). Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

6EnclosureEmergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) 1A, 1B, and 2B during maintenance onEDG 2AAuxiliary Control Air Train A during maintenance on Train B

Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Train 1B during maintenance onResidual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump 1A room cooler ERCW flow control valveContainment Spray (CS) Train 2B during CS Train 2A OutageComplete System Walkdown. The inspectors performed a complete system walkdownof the Unit 1 RHR system to verify proper equipment alignment, to identify any

discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and increase risk, and to

verify that the licensee properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems

that could cause events or impact the functional capability of the system.The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), systemprocedures, system drawings, and system design documents to determine the correct

lineup and then examined system components and their configuration to identify any

discrepancies between the existing system equipment lineup and the correct lineup. In

addition, the inspectors reviewed outstanding maintenance work requests and design

issues on the system to determine whether any conditions described in those work

requests could adversely impact current system operability. Documents reviewed are

listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R05Fire Protection a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors conducted a tour of the nine areas listed below to assess the materialcondition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that

combustibles and ignition sources were controlled in accordance with the licensee's

administrative procedures, fire detection and suppression equipment was available for

use; that passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition; and that

compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection

equipment were implemented in accordance with the licensee's fire plan. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Control Building Elevation 706 (Cable Spreading Room)Auxiliary Building Elevation 669 (Unit 1 Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater[TDAFW] Room)Control Building Elevation 669 (Mechanical Equipment Room, 250-VDC Batteryand Battery Board Rooms)Control Building Elevation 685 (Auxiliary Instrument Rooms)

Auxiliary Building Elevation 690 (Corridor)

Auxiliary Building Elevation 714 (Corridor)

7EnclosureControl Building Elevation 732 (Mechanical Equipment Room and Relay Room)Auxiliary Building Elevation 749 (480V Board Rooms and Battery Rooms)

Auxiliary Building Elevation 734 (Shutdown Board and Battery Board Rooms) b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R06Flood Protection MeasuresExternal Flooding a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the design, material condition, and procedures for coping withthe design basis probable maximum flood. First, the inspectors reviewed the flooding

sections of the UFSAR and the individual plant examination for external events (IPEEE)to determine the barriers required to mitigate the flood. The inspectors then reviewed

site drawings for the ERCW intake structure and Units 1 & 2 shield buildings and walked

down portions of those structures to ensure that any penetrations below the flood level

were sufficiently maintained to prevent flood waters from entering the buildings. The

inspectors also reviewed the abnormal operating procedure for mitigating the design

basis flood to ensure that actions needed to seal off the ERCW intake structure and

shield buildings were specified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R11Licensed Operator Requalification Program a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors observed as-found simulator training on September 5, 2006. Thetraining consisted of two scenarios. The first scenario involved a steam generator tube

leak degrading to a tube rupture. A loss of off-site power occurred when the unit tripped

necessitating plant cooldown and depressurization on natural circulation. Additionalequipment malfunctions included a reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature

instrument failure, failure of a component cooling system pump to auto-start, and a

ruptured steam generator TDAFW pump steam supply valve failing to close. The

second scenario involved plant operators performing a rapid downpower due to grid

instability issues and a subsequent main feedwater controller failure requiring a manual

plant trip. A loss of off-site power and loss of both EDGs occurred with the trip.

Additional equipment malfunctions included failure of the main turbine to trip

automatically, failure of the TDAFW pump to start, and a pressurizer power-operated

relief valve failed partially open. The inspectors observed crew performance in terms of

communications; ability to take timely and proper actions; prioritizing, interpreting and

8Enclosureverifying alarms; correct use and implementation of procedures, including the alarmresponse procedures; timely control board operation and manipulation, including high

risk operator actions; oversight and direction provided by shift manager, including the

ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions; and group dynamics involved in

crew performance. The inspectors also observed the evaluators' critique and reviewed

simulator fidelity to verify that it matched actual plant response. Documents reviewed

are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R12Maintenance Effectiveness.1Triennial Periodic Evaluation Inspection

a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the licensee's Maintenance Rule (MR) periodic assessment,"Sequoyah Maintenance Rule Sixth Periodic Assessment Report Unit 1, 2, & Common,

August 1, 2004 through February 28, 2006," while on-site the week of August 28, 2006.

This report was issued to satisfy paragraph (a)(3) of 10 CFR 50.65, and covered the 18

month period ending March, 2006. The inspection was to determine the effectiveness of

the assessment and ensure it was issued in accordance with time requirements of the

MR and included an evaluation of: balancing reliability and unavailability, (a)(1)

activities, (a)(2) activities, and use of industry operating experience. The inspectors

reviewed selected MR activities covered by the assessment period for the following

maintenance rule component and attendant systems to verify compliance with 10 CFR 50.65, Heating and Ventilation, Safety Injection, 125 VDC Vital Power, ERCW, and

Plant Structures. Specific procedures and documents reviewed are listed in the

Attachment. During the inspection, the inspectors reviewed selected plant work order data,assessments, modifications, and site guidance implementing procedures. They

discussed and reviewed relevant corrective action issues (PERs), reviewed generic

operations event data, Maintenance Rule Implementation Monthly Status Reports,

system health reports, and discussed issues with system engineers. Operational event

information was evaluated by the inspectors for its use in MR functions. The inspectors

selected corrective action documents on systems recently removed from 10 CFR 50.65

a(1) status and those in a(2) status to assess the justification for their status. The

inspectors inspected repaired components and reviewed the major structural details.

The documents were compared to the site's MR program criteria, and the MR a(1)

evaluations and rule related data bases. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

9Enclosure.2Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection

a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the following two maintenance activities to verify theeffectiveness of the activities in terms of: 1) appropriate work practices; 2) identifying

and addressing common cause failures; 3) scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65

(b); 4) characterizing reliability issues for performance; 5) trending key parameters for

condition monitoring; 6) charging unavailability for performance; 7) classification in

accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2); 8) appropriateness of performance

criteria for structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and functions classified as

(a)(2); and 9) appropriateness of goals and corrective actions for SSCs and functions

classified as (a)(1). Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Methods for identifying gas in ECCS pipes125-VDC Vital Battery Power System b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the following seven activities to verify that the appropriate riskassessments were performed prior to removing equipment from service for

maintenance. The inspectors verified that risk assessments were performed as

required by 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4), and were accurate and complete. When emergent

work was performed, the inspectors verified that the plant risk was promptly reassessed

and managed. The inspectors verified the appropriate use of the licensee's risk

assessment tool and risk categories in accordance with Procedure SPP-7.1, On-Line

Work Management, Revision 8, and Instruction 0-TI-DSM-000-007.1, Risk Assessment

Guidelines, Revision 8. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Work for week of July 10, 2006, including common station service transformertap changer maintenance and Motor-driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pump

maintenanceAuxiliary Control Air B-Train removed from service for maintenance

Work for week of August 14, 2006, including 24-hour run on EDG 2A and WattsBar hydro plant 161kV line outageTrain week swap to inspect RHR pump 1A room cooler inlet valve

MDAFW Pump 2A removed from service for maintenance

Maintenance on common station service transformer-A tap changer relay andMoccasin 161kV line outage Unit 2 TDAFW pump planned unavailability

10Enclosure b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R15Operability Evaluations a.Inspection ScopeFor the six operability evaluations described in the problem evaluation reports (PERs)listed below, the inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to

ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the subject component or system

remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The

inspectors reviewed the UFSAR to verify that the system or component remained

available to perform its intended function. In addition, the inspectors reviewed

compensatory measures implemented to verify that the compensatory measures worked

as stated and the measures were adequately controlled. The inspectors also reviewed

a sampling of PERs to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any

deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in

the Attachment.PER 101708, Crack Indication on Unit 1 Low Pressure Turbine Disc Number 2PER 106582, Speed Droop Setting on EDG 1B2 Engine Not Set According toProcedurePER 107149, EDG 2A Inoperable Due to No Operable Exhaust Fan - UnplannedLCO EntryPER 108164, Main Control Room Chiller A-A Refrigerant Suction Check ValveBolted Connection Does Not Have Full Thread Engagement PER 101404, Pressurizer Heater Sleeves Cracked and Broken

PER 97396, 1A2 Diesel Engine As-Left Lead Wire Data b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R19Post-Maintenance Testing a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the five post-maintenance tests listed below to verify thatprocedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The

inspectors reviewed the licensee's test procedure to verify that the procedure

adequately tested the safety function(s) that may have been affected by the

maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure were consistent with

information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that

the procedure had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also

witnessed the test or reviewed the test data to verify that test results adequately

demonstrated restoration of the affected safety function(s). Documents reviewed are

listed in the Attachment.

11EnclosureWO 05-795530-000, Preventive Maintenance Auxiliary Control Air CompressorB-BWO 06-707840-000, Calibrate MDAFW Pump Time Delay Relay Calibration

WO 06-777441-000, Rework/Replace SSPS Slave Relay Test Pushbutton A

WO 06-778262-000, Adjust Impeller Clearance of ERCW Traveling ScreenWash Pump B-BWO 06-772631-000, Setpoint Verification and Calibration for Time Delay RelaysAssociated With Load Shedding Logic - Centrifugal Charging Pump 2A-A

TDR-CPAX b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R22Surveillance Testing a.Inspection ScopeFor the five surveillance tests identified below, by witnessing testing and/or reviewingthe test data, the inspectors verified that the SSCs involved in these tests satisfied the

requirements described in the TS surveillance requirements, the UFSAR, applicable

licensee procedures, and that the tests demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of

performing their intended safety functions. Documents reviewed are listed in the

Attachment. 0-SI-OPS-092-078.0, Power Range Neutron Flux Channel Calibration by HeatBalance Comparison2-SI-SXV-000-201.1, Full Stroking of Category A and B Valves Required in AllModes, Revision 4*0-SI-SLT-030-258.1, Containment Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate Test PurgeAir -Unit 2, Revision 5**0-SI-OPS-068-137.0, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory, Revision 19***

2-SI-OPS-082-024.A, 2A-A DG 24 Hour Run and Load Rejection Testing,Revision 11*This procedure included inservice testing requirements.**This procedure included testing of a large containment isolation valve.

• • • This procedure included an RCS leakage detection surveillance. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

12Enclosure1R23Temporary Plant Modifications a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed two temporary modifications described in Temporary AlterationControl Form (TACF) 1-06-017-099, Unit 1 A Train SSPS - Jumper Across Master/Slave

Relay Test Switch S603, Revision 1, and TACF 1-06-012-085, U1 Rod Position

Indication (Control Rod F2) Wetting Current Circuit, Revision 1. Inspectors also

reviewed associated 10 CFR 50.59 screenings, and compared them against the UFSAR

and TS to verify that the modifications did not affect the operability or availability of any

safety system. The inspectors walked down the TACFs to ensure they were installed in

accordance with the modification documents and reviewed post installation and removal

testing to verify the actual impact on permanent systems were adequately verified by the

tests. The inspectors also verified that permanent plant documents were updated to

reflect the TACFs to ensure that plant configuration control was maintained. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness1EP6Drill Evaluation a.Inspection ScopeResident inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine licensee emergency drill onAugust 2, 2006, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification,

notification, and protective action recommendation (PARs) development activities. The

inspectors observed emergency response operations in the simulated control room to

verify that event classification and notifications were done in accordance with licenseeprocedure EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Matrix, Revision 37. The inspectorsalso attended the licensee critique of the drill to compare any inspector-observedweaknesses with those identified by the licensee in order to verify whether the licensee

was properly identifying failures. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

13Enclosure4.OTHER ACTIVITIES4OA1Performance Indicator (PI) Verification a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the PI listed below for the period fromJanuary 1, 2005 through June 30, 2006. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported

during that period, PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, "Regulatory

Assessment Indicator Guideline", Revision 3, were used to verify the basis in reporting

for each data element.Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems Safety System Functional Failures

LERs issued during the referenced timeframe were reviewed and are listed in theAttachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems.1Daily Review

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems,and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance

issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the

licensee's corrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing the

description of each new PER and attending daily management review committee

meetings..2Annual Sample Review of Operator Workarounds a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the operator workaround program to verify that workaroundswere identified at an appropriate threshold, were entered into the CAP, and that

corrective actions were appropriate and timely. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the

licensee's workaround list and repair schedules, performed CAP word searches,

conducted tours and interviewed operators about required compensatory actions.

Additionally, they looked for undocumented workarounds, reviewed operator deficiency

lists, attended plant health meetings, reviewed appropriate system health documents,

reviewed PERs related to items on the workaround list and discussed the items with

engineering personnel. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Enclosure b.Findings and Observations No findings of significance were identified. However, inspectors noted that the licenseehad two workarounds requiring compensatory actions during accidents or transients.

The first was associated with the potential for air to accumulate in ERCW discharge

headers such that MDAFW pumps could lose suction under certain conditions.

Procedures were revised to alert operators to maintain sufficiently high system flow to

preclude air accumulation until a system design change incorporating a continuous vent

could be installed. The second is associated with a drifting controller for the Unit 2 B

Train Reactor Head Vent valve. The head vent was taken out of service as allowed by

TS and could have been placed back in service if needed. This is scheduled to be

corrected at the next outage. The licensee also had a workaround requiring significant

compensatory actions during normal operations associated with maintaining desired

hydrogen purity on the Unit 2 main generator. This workaround was first identified on

May 20, 2004, and is also scheduled to be corrected during the next outage. 4OA6Meetings, Including Exit.1Exit Meeting SummaryOn October 12, 2006, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. R.Douet and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors

asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should

be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.4OA7 Licensee-Identified ViolationsThe following violation of very low significance (green) was identified by the licensee andis a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC

Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as an NCV. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment.TS 6.8.1 requires that procedures be established, implemented, and maintainedcovering the activities specified in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33,

Revision 2. Paragraph 3s of the appendix requires procedures for operating

emergency power sources (e.g., diesel generators). Procedure 0-SO-82-2,

Diesel Generator 1B-B, Revision 26, specified the prestart rolling requirement for

the diesel. Contrary to this procedure, on August 8, 2006, operators failed to

reopen two of the air start valves that had earlier been closed. It was also

annotated on the procedure that the valves were open. This was documented in

PERs 108308 and 108309. This violation is of very low significance because the

inappropriate actions did not affect EDG start capability.ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

AttachmentSUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATIONKEY POINTS OF CONTACTLicensee personnel

J. Bajraszewski, Licensing EngineerD. Bodine, Chemistry/Environmental Manager

R. Douet, Site Vice President

Z. Kitts, Licensing Engineer

D. Kulisek, Plant Manager

G. Morris, Licensing and Industry Affairs Manager

M. A. Palmer, Radiation Protection Manager

M. H. Palmer, Operations Manager

K. Parker, Maintenance and Modifications Manager

J. Proffitt, (Acting) Site Licensing Supervisor

R. Reynolds, Site Security Manager

R. Rogers, Engineering Manager

K. Wilkes, Emergency Preparedness Manager

K. Jones, Engineering Manager

G. Morris, Site Licensing Manager

J. Barker, Site Chemistry

B. Dungan, Outage and Site Scheduling ManagerNRC personnel

R. Bernhard, Region II, Senior Reactor AnalystD. Pickett, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor RegulationLIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSEDOpened None.Opened and Closed

None.

Closed None.Discussed None.

A-2AttachmentLIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWEDSection R01: Adverse Weather ProtectionLicense Amendment No. 79 and No. 70 to Operating Licenses for Sequoyah Units 1 & 2,Respectively, dated August 14, 1988

1-SI-OPS-000-002.0, Shift Log, Revision 80

2-SI-OPS-000-002.0, Shift Log, Revision 72

2-T-67-425, Instrument Data Package for ERCW Supply Header 2A Temperature,

Performances dated August 31, 2000; January 24, 2002; August 18, 2003; September 2, 2004;

January 19, 2006

1-T-67-426, Instrument Data Package for ERCW Supply Header 1B Temperature,

Performances dated August 31, 2000; January 24, 2002; September 3, 2003; October 5, 2004;

December 27, 2005

PER 94634, 1-TM-67-426 Outside As-Found Tolerance

PER 95625, 2-TM-67-425 Outside As-Found ToleranceSection R04: Equipment Alignment1,2-47W839-1, Flow Diagram Diesel Starting Air System, Revision 512-TO-2006-0015 Tagout for Diesel Generator Room 2A-A Exhaust Fan 2

0-SI-OPS-082-007.W, AC Electrical Power Source Operability Verification, Revision 13

0-SO-32-2, Attachment 1, Auxiliary Compressed Air System Power Checklist, Revision 2

0-SO-32-2, Attachment 3, Auxiliary Compressed Air System Valve Checklist, Change 4

FSAR 9.3.1, Compressed Air System

1,2-47W848-1, Flow Diagram Compressed Air System, Revision 47

1-SO-63-5, Attachment 1, Emergency Core Cooling System Power Checklist, Change 18

1-SO-63-5, Attachment 2, Emergency Core Cooling System Valve Checklist, Change 30

1-SO-63-5, Emergency Core Cooling System, Revision 47

0-TI-OPS-000-012.64, Locked Valve List, Revision 18

1,2-47W810-1, Flow Diagram Residual Heat Removal System, Revision 48

PER 18616, Wrong Type Wiring Between 1-TIS-74-007 and Panel 1-L-12

PER 86331, No Local Position Indicator on Valve 2-FCV-74-32 Section R05: Fire ProtectionSequoyah Fire Protection Report, Revision 20SQN Drawing 1,2-47W494-2 Fire Protection Compartmentation-Fire Cells Plan El. 685 and

690, Revision 10

SQN-26-D054/EPM-ABB-IMPFHA, SQN Fire Hazards Analysis Calculation, Revision 36Section R06: Flood Protection MeasuresSequoyah Individual Plant Examination, Revision 11,2-44N285, Watertight Doors Arrangement & Details Sheet 1, Revision 2

1,2-44N286, Watertight Doors Arrangement & Details Sheet 2, Revision 0

A-3Attachment1-47W470-11, Mechanical Restrictor Plate - Shield Bldg, Revision 0AOP-N.03, Flooding, Revision 27

SQN-DC-V-36.0, Design Criteria for Mechanical Penetration Seal Assemblies for Category 1

StructuresSection R11: Licensed Operator RequalificationE-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 27E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Revision 16

ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, Revision 21Section R12: Maintenance Rule Implementation (Triennial)Maintenance Rule Sixth Periodic Assessment Report Units 1, 2, & Common, August 1, 2004through February 28, 2006, Revision 0Procedures0-PI-OPS-000-606, Appendix A, Unit Operator Rounds, BOP Temperature, Rev. 29MI-1.2-10, Installation and Level Setting of Trico Oilers, Rev. 21

TI-4, Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, trending, and Reportoing - 10 CFR

50.65, Rev. 19

0-TI-SBR-000-001.0, Breaker Testing and Maintenance Program, Rev. 4

PERs100525, EBR chillers temperature control connectors29333, information deficiency on new parts for the Durham Bush Chillers

65735, Westinghouse Bulletin TB-04-13, Replacement Solutions for Obsolete Classic Molded

Case Circuit Breakers

014811, defect No. ABO-017, transfer canal leak

109922, Trico Oiler PositionsMiscellaneousTechnical Requirement Manual 3/4.7/14 Heat, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Maintenance Rule Equipment, Rev. 32

SPP-6.2, Preventive Maintenance Appendix A, 125 V vital battery board, 7/10/6

Work Order (WO) 04778264000, Capacitor Replacement on Vital battery Charger 2-S

System Status Report Systems :250, Vital Instrument & Control Power, 6/1/6

Essential Raw Cooling Water, 6/12/6

HVAC Chillers, 6/5/6

Safety Injection, 6/2/6Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Meeting Minutes (sampled past two years)

WO for past several years (samples for Vital Instrument & Control Power, Safety Injection,

HVAC Chillers)

A-4AttachmentCalculation B87000619001, Maintenance Rule Structures Inspection, Rev. 2Tag-out 0-TO-2006-0013, Shutdown Board Room A & B Water Chiller Package B-B

UFSAR Section 2.5.5, ERCW Support Slab and Pump StationDrawings17W304-2, ERCW Supply Piping, Rev. 917W304-3, ERCW Supply Piping, Rev. 5

31W211-1, Concrete ERCW Pumping Station Outline, Rev. 5

10W314-18, Concrete Manholes & Miscellaneous Fooundation - Outline & Reinforcement, Rev.

10

10SN38. Excavation and Backfill Category I Structures, Sheet 1, Rev. 4Section R12: Maintenance Rule Implementation (Routine)0-PI-ISO-000-001.A, Periodic Check for Presence of Water in Various A Train ECCS PipingLocations, Revision 0

Regulatory Guide 1.160, Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,

Revision 2

TI-4, Maintenance Ruke Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting -

10CFR50.65, Revision 19

SPP 6.6, Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting,

Revision 8 Section R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work EvaluationSentinal Run for the Period July 4, 2006 to July 25, 20060-0XF-241-VM, CSST C Tap Changer Relay Calibration, Revision 19

Sentinel Run for the Period July 17, 2006 to August 6, 2006

PER 94909, Elevated Vibration Levels on Auxiliary Air Compressor A

Tagout 0-TO-2006-0013, Aux Air Compressor B-B

Sentinel Run for the Period August 7, 2006 to August 27, 2006

Sentinel Run for the Period August 14, 2006 to September 3, 2006

PER 108624, Rescheduled Activities Due to Grid Reliability Yellow

SPP-7.1, On-Line Work Management, Revision 8

Sentinel Run for the Period August 21, 2006 to September 10, 2006

Sentinel Run for the Period September 11, 2006 to October 1, 2006

IGA-6, Transmission/Power Supply Intergroup Agreement, Revision 10

E14-060914-001, SQN Grid Operating Guide, Revision 0

0-AR-DG-2B-LCL, Alarm Response-Diesel Generator 2B-B Local Panel, Revision 12Section R15: Operability Evaluations0-SO-82-3, Diesel Generator 2A-A, Revision 280-SI-OPS-082-007.0, Diesel Generator Operability Verification, Revision 9

WO 05-780656-000, Troubleshoot Emergency Diesel Generator 2A-A Exhaust Fan 1-A

Overloads Tripped

A-5AttachmentAttachmentSection R19: Post Maintenance Testing0-PI-SFT-032-001.B, Auxiliary Control Air Operability Test, Revision 12, Performances datedJanuary 24, 2006 and July 25, 2006

0-SI-SXV-032-200.B, Train B Auxiliary Air Compressor Cooling Water Inlet Valve Operability

Test, Performances dated January 24, 2006, Revision 0, and July 25, 2006, Revision 1

0-SO-32-2, Auxiliary Compressed Air System, Revision 16

SPP-6.3, Pre/Post-Maintenance Testing, Revision 2

2-SI-SXP-003-201.A, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A-A Performance Test,

Revision 14

2-SI-SXP-003-201.A, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A-A Performance Test,

performed May 9, 2006, Revision 13

2-SI-SXP-003-201.A, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A-A Performance Test,

performed December 3, 2003, Revision 9

1-SI-IFT-099-90.8A, Reactor Trip Instrumentation Monthly Functional Test (SSPS) Train A,

Revision 9 with one-time-only changeSection R22: Surveillance Testing0-SI-SXV-074-266.0, ASME Code Valve Testing, Revision 180-SI-SXV-062-266.0, ASME Section XI Valve Testing, Revision 14

0-SI-SXV-067-266.0, ASME Code Valve Testing, Revision 20

0-SI-SXV-068-266.0, ASME Code Valve Testing, Revision 9

2-SI-OPS-082-024.A, 2A-A DG 24 Hour Run and Load Rejection Test, Revision 11 with one-

time-only-changeSection R23: Temporary Plant ModificationsWO 06-775010-000, Install DC Wetting Current TACF for Unit 1 Rod F2, Revision 6Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator VerificationNEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 4LER 50-328/2006-001, Automatic Turbine and Reactor Trip

LER 50-327/2006-001, Potential Loss of Component Cooling Water During Appendix R FireSection 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of ProblemsNEDP-12, System and Component Health, Equipment Failure Trending, Revision 7OPDP-1, Conduct of Operations, Revision 5

FY2006 System Status and Health Report Cards for Generator Cooling, Main Generator, and

Reactor Coolant Systems

PER 96236, ERCW Air Accumulation

A-6AttachmentAttachmentSection 4OA7: Licensee-Identified Violations0-SO-82-2, Diesel Generator 1B-B, Revision 260-PI-SXV-082-202.A, Diesel Starting Air Valve for Diesel Generator Set 1B-B, Time Frame A,

Revision 7

1,2-47W839-1, Flow Diagram Diesel Starting Air System, Revision 51