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| issue date = 05/07/1999
| issue date = 05/07/1999
| title = Rev 5 to PMP 7200.RST.004, Expanded Sys Readiness Review Program.
| title = Rev 5 to PMP 7200.RST.004, Expanded Sys Readiness Review Program.
| author name = FINISSI M, LARSON R E
| author name = Finissi M, Larson R
| author affiliation = INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
| author affiliation = INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
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=Text=
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{{#Wiki_filter:PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.SPage1of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMInformation RobertE.LarsonnterMichaelFinissiwnerEffective Date:NEogtuzantrgantzatton TABLEOFCONTENTS1PURPOSEANDSCOPEo~esses~esse~~~~~~oo~~~~~~~~~~ooooooo~~so32DEFIMTIONS ANDABBREVIATIONS
{{#Wiki_filter:PMP 7200.RST.004                                                     Rev.S                                    Page 1            of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Information                                                                                                                Effective Date:
................
Robert E. Larson                                Michael Finissi                                                                            NE nter                                                  wner                                                        ogtuzant            rgantzatton TABLE OF CONTENTS 1    PURPOSE AND SCOPE                  o~ esses ~ esse ~~~~~~     oo ~~~~~~~~~~       ooooooo                                                                               ~ ~ so 3 2    DEFIMTIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS................                                                                                                                               I~ ~ 06 3    RESPONSIBILITIES            o~~ oo ~~~~~   oooo ~ oo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ooooooo.     ~o ~
I~~063RESPONSIBILITIES o~~oo~~~~~oooo~oo~~~~~~~~~~ooooooo.~o~'o~~~.104DETAILS-~~~oo~~~~ooooe~~oeooo~~ooooooooo
                                                                                                        'o
~~~~~~~~oo~~oooo~~eooo~~ooooooo~~~~eoo~~~~ooooooeooo-13 4.14.24.34.44.54.6ScopeAndSelection OfSystemsForExpandedSystemReadiness Review...'......
                                                                                                            ~~ ~                                                                         .10 4    DETAILS-             ~~~ oo ~~~~   ooooe ~~ oeooo ~~ ooooooooo         ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ oo ~ ~ oooo ~ ~ eooo ~ ~ ooooooo             ~~~~ eoo   ~~ ~~   ooooooeooo-13 4.1    Scope And Selection Of Systems For Expanded System Readiness Review ...'......                                                                                             13 4.2    Use Of The System Assessment Matrix, SIDS, And The Assessment Data Base....                                                                                                 14 4.3    Phase 1 Initial Expanded System Readiness Review...........~.....................                                                                                           16 4.4    Phase 2 Restart Activities Monitoring..........                                     ...........................                                                           27 4.5    Phase 3 Final Expanded System Readiness                                        Review......................                                                                 32 4.6    Phase 4 Startup And Power A.,ensiOn.................'..............................                                                                                         37 47
13UseOfTheSystemAssessment Matrix,SIDS,AndTheAssessment DataBase....14Phase1-InitialExpandedSystemReadiness Review...........~.....................
          ~     Reports......,...,........~..........,...                                       ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~   41 5    FINAL CONDITIONS              e oo soooooeooo~ooooooee oo~eoo~~~~oe                     ~~ oooo   ~~~ooeooooooeoooooooooooooooooooeoooo~                                       42 6    REFERENCES          ~~oooooooooooooo~oooooo~~~~ooeooooooo~ooooooooeooooooo~~~~oooeoooo~eooooooo~oo~~~oo~                                                                       42 ATTACHMENT1            SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW BOARD (SRRB) CHARTER.. 44 ATTACHMENT2            21 LEVEL 1 SYSTEMS INCLUDED IN THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM RE ADINESS~RE~VIEW esses'oooooeooooooooooooooooooo ~ ~ eoooooooooooooeoooooo ooooooooo 46                                                      ~                   ~~
16Phase2-RestartActivities Monitoring..........
ATTACHMENT3            RATIONALEFOR SELECTION LEVEL 1 SYSTEMS FOR EXPANDED RE ADINESS REVIEW oo ooeooooooeoo so eoo sooooosoooooeooooooooooooooooeo.
...........................
                                                            ~                      ~     ~~     ~~~                                                                 ~~~   oo ~~~o    48 ATTACHMENT4            EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW LEVEL 1 SYSTEMS
27Phase3-FinalExpandedSystemReadiness Review......................
                                ~ ooooooe ~ oooo ~ oooo ~ ~ osooo ~ ooooooooooo               ~ ooooooooeooeooosoo                 ~~~   oooooooe       ~~ ooooe ~ ooooo         ~~~~~~o      49 ATTACHMENT5 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW TRAINING RE QUIREMENTS ooo oooooooooooooeoooo ooeoeoooooooo ooooooeeoooooooooooooooooo os oo
32Phase4-StartupAndPowerA.,ensiOn.................'..............................
                                                    ~                                 ~                        ~                                                   ~     ~     ~ ooo    51 ATTACHMENT6            SYSTEM'READINESS REVIEW DOCUMENTATIONAND DATA S OURCESoooooo        ~ ooooooosoeooooooooooooeeoooooooooeoooooooooooooooooooe                                           ~ eooooooooooooeo             ~~ esses      52 9905170136 9q0507 PDR  ADOCK    050003i5 f P                  PDR
374~7Reports......,...,........~..........,...
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~41FINALCONDITIONS eoosoooooeooo~ooooooeeoo~eoo~~~~oe~~oooo~~~ooeooooooeoooooooooooooooooooeoooo~425REFERENCES
~~oooooooooooooo~oooooo~~~~ooeooooooo~ooooooooeooooooo~~~~oooeoooo~eooooooo~oo~~~oo~426ATTACHMENT 1SYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWBOARD(SRRB)CHARTER..
44ATTACHMENT 221LEVEL1SYSTEMSINCLUDEDINTHEPREVIOUSSYSTEMADINESS~RE~VIEW esses'oooooeooooooooooooooooooo
~~eoooooooooooooeoooooo
~ooooooooo
~~46REATTACHMENT 3RATIONALE FORSELECTION LEVEL1SYSTEMSFOREXPANDEDADINESSREVIEWoo~ooeooooooeoo
~so~~eoo~~~sooooosoooooeooooooooooooooooeo.
~~~oo~~~o48REATTACHMENT 4EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWLEVEL1SYSTEMS~ooooooe~oooo~oooo~~osooo~ooooooooooo
~ooooooooeooeooosoo
~~~oooooooe~~ooooe~ooooo~~~~~~o49ATTACHMENT 5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWTRAININGQUIREMENTS ooo~oooooooooooooeoooo
~ooeoeoooooooo
~ooooooeeoooooooooooooooooo
~os~oo~ooo51REATTACHMENT 6SYSTEM'READINESS REVIEWDOCUMENTATION ANDDATAOURCESoooooo
~ooooooosoeooooooooooooeeoooooooooeoooooooooooooooooooe
~eooooooooooooeo
~~esses52Sf9905170136 9q0507PDRADOCK050003i5PPDR


Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage2of101ATTACHMENT 7SYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAM(SYSTEMWALKDOWNUIDELINES) o~~~~oo~~oo~oeoooooooo
Information               PMP 7200.RST.004                                                         Rev. 5                                Page 2      of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM ATTACHMENT7 SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM (SYSTEM WALKDOWN G UIDELINES)       o ~ ~ ~ ~ oo ~ ~ oo ~ oeoooooooo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ oo ~ ~ oo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~   ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ o      54 ATTACHMENT8        CRITERIA FOR WORK INCLUDED IN RESTART SCOPE.... 62 ATTACHMENT9        PHASE 2 OUTAGE SCOPE APPROVAL PROCESS............... 69 ATTACHMENT10        RESTART REQUIRED SCOPE DEFERRAL FORM............. 70 ATTACHMENT 11        EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW CLARIFICATION S HEET    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~             oe ~~~~~~~   oo ~ eo ~ oo ~~~o~~~~ ~~ ~~ ~~~~~~~e ~~o~e~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~                       71 ATTACHMENT 12        INITIALEXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW REPORT
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~oo~~oo~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~o54GATTACHMENT 8CRITERIAFORWORKINCLUDEDINRESTARTSCOPE....
                    ~~ e e~e e~~e ~~~e ~oe e o~e ~o~~e~~~~o~e ~o~e~e ~o~o~e ~e ~~e                           ~~~~e~~       e ~~~~o~e   ~oo~~o~~~~e ~e   ~e ~~~~ 72 ATTACHMENT13        FINAL EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS                                                                                      REVIEW REPORT
62ATTACHMENT 9PHASE2OUTAGESCOPEAPPROVALPROCESS...............
                    ~~ oooooo ~ eoooo       ~ oooooooo     ~~~ oo ~~~ oooooooooooo ~ ~ oo ~ eo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ooooooo               ~ ooeoo ~~~~ oooooo ~~ 75 ATTACHMENT14 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEWS INTEGRATED RES ULTS oooooooeooooo oo ooooooooooooooooeooooooooooooooooo
69ATTACHMENT 10RESTARTREQUIREDSCOPEDEFERRALFORM.............
                                          ~   ~                                                           ~ ~ oo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ oooooo ~ ~ ~   ooooo oo
70ATTACHMENT 11EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWCLARIFICATION SHEET~~~~~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~oe~~~~~~~oo~eo~oo~~~o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~e~~o~e~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~71ATTACHMENT 12INITIALEXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWREPORT~~ee~ee~~e~~~e~oeeo~e~o~~e~~~~o~e~o~e~e~o~o~e~e~~e~~~~e~~e~~~~o~e~oo~~o~~~~e~e~e~~~~72ATTACHMENT 13FINALEXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWREPORT~~oooooo~eoooo~oooooooo~~~oo~~~oooooooooooo
                                                                                                                                                            ~   ~~ 78 ATTACHMENT15        SYSTEM WALKDOWNREPORT .....................................                                                                                   83 ATTACHMENT 16        SYSTEM READINESS AFFIRMATIONREPORT ................ 84 FIGURE 1      SYSTEM ASSESSMENT MATRIXMAJOR TOPICS ........................ 85 FIGURE 2      SYSTEM ASSESSMENT MATRIXEXA'MPLE - AUXILIARYFEEDWATER S YSTEM  ~ ~ ~ ~ oooooo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ oooooo ~ ~ oo ~ ~ ooee ~ ~ oooo ~ oooo ~ oo ~ ~ oooooooooo               ~ ~   oooo ooo oo
~~oo~eo~~~~~~~~~ooooooo~ooeoo~~~~oooooo~~75ATTACHMENT 14EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWSINTEGRATED ULTSoooooooeooooo
                                                                                                                                            ~   ~   ~~~~~~~~ oo 95 FIGURE 3      READINESS REVIEW ATTRIBUTE ASSESSMENT FORM..............100 FIGURE 4      SAMPLE COMPLETED READINESS REVIEW ATTRIBUTE ASSESSMENT
~oo~ooooooooooooooooeooooooooooooooooo
        . F ORM    ~ oo ~~~~~   ooo ~~ o'o ~~ ooooooooooooooooooooooooeoo                     ~ oo oooeoooooooooooo
~~oo~~~~~~~~~~oooooo~~~ooooo~oo~~78RESATTACHMENT 15SYSTEMWALKDOWNREPORT.....................................
                                                                                                        ~                              ~ oo ~~~ oo ~~ oooooooeo101
83ATTACHMENT 16SYSTEMREADINESS AFFIRMATION REPORT................
84FIGURE1SYSTEMASSESSMENT MATRIXMAJORTOPICS........................
85FIGURE2SYSTEMASSESSMENT MATRIXEXA'MPLE-AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM~~~~oooooo~~~~~~~~~oooooo~~oo~~ooee~~oooo~oooo~oo~~oooooooooo
~~oooo~ooo~oo~~~~~~~~oo95FIGURE3READINESS REVIEWATTRIBUTE ASSESSMENT FORM..............100 FIGURE4SAMPLECOMPLETED READINESS REVIEWATTRIBUTE ASSESSMENT
.FORM~oo~~~~~ooo~~o'o~~ooooooooooooooooooooooooeoo
~oo~oooeoooooooooooo
~oo~~~oo~~oooooooeo101 Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage3of1011PURPOSEANDSCOPE[Ref.6.8]1.1ThepurposeofthisdocumentistodefinetheExpandedSystemReadiness Review(ESRR)Programandprovideguidanceinevaluating anddetermining systemrestartreadiness fortheCookplant.Thisdocumentalsodescribes theprocessforscopingworkitemsaseitherrequiredornotrequiredtosupportunitrestart.Theseguidelines supportstartupfromthecurrentextendedoutageinsupportofReference 6.1.1.2Severalindependent reviews,including aselfassessment oftheAuxiliary Feedwater
'ystemandanindependent Engineering IssuesReviewGroupreportidentified vulnerabilities inthepreservation oftheDesignandLicensing Basisthatsuggested aneedforamorerigorousreviewofoverallsystemreadiness, 1.3TheESRRwillprovidereasonable assurance that:~theplantsystemsarecapableofmeetingtheirsafetyandaccidentmitigation functions asdefinedintheirdesignandlicensing bases[Ref.6.11],and~inconjunction withotherongoingimprovement programsandresolution ofidentified issues,thattheplantismodified, tested,operatedandmaintained consistent withthedesignandlicensing bases.[Ref.6.12]1.4TheExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewconsistsoffourphasesPhase1:InitialExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewPhase2:RestartActivities Monitoring Phase3:FinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewPhase4:StartupandPowerAscension 1.4.1Phase1istoincludethefollowing:
a.Formation andtrainingofsystemteamsforreadiness reviewusingrepresentatives fromvariousstationdepartments.
b.Areviewofsystemdesignandlicensebasisdocumentation.
c.Reviewofsafetyandaccidentmitigation functions foreachsystem.d.Verification, inconjunction withotherongoingimprovement programsandresolution ofidentified issues,thattheplantismodified, tested,operatedandmaintained consistent withthedesignandlicensing bases.


Information PMP7200.RST.004
Information                 PMP 7200.RST.004                 Rev. 5            Page 3  of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 1      PURPOSE AND SCOPE              [Ref. 6.8]
.Rev.5Page4of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMe.Evaluation oftheextentofcondition foridentified problemsandidentification ofpotential programmatic orgenericissues.Performance ofmulti-disciplined systemwalkdowns.
1.1    The purpose of this document is to define the Expanded System Readiness Review (ESRR) Program and provide guidance in evaluating and determining system restart readiness for the Cook plant. This document also describes the process for scoping work items as either required or not required to support unit restart. These guidelines support startup from the current extended outage in support of Reference 6.1.
Evaluation ofopenitemsintheSystemIndexedDataBaseSystem(SIDS)(seedefinitions) againsttheRestartScreening Criteria.
1.2    Several independent reviews, including a self assessment of the Auxiliary Feedwater
NOTE:ThePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommittee (PNSRC)ismakingatransition tobeknownasPlantOperations ReviewCommittee (PORC).Thisdocumentusestheacronym,PORC,butdocuments suchastheUFSARandTechnical Specifications mayusePNSRCthatrepresents thesamegroup.h.Presentation oftheInitialExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReport'otheSystemReadiness ReviewBoard(SRRB)andthePlantOperations ReviewCommittee (PORC)./Beginscheduling restartworkintheRestartSchedule.
      'ystem    and an independent Engineering Issues Review Group report identified vulnerabilities in the preservation of the Design and Licensing Basis that suggested a need for a more rigorous review of overall system readiness, 1.3    The ESRR will provide reasonable assurance that:
1.4.2Phase2istoincludethefollowing:
      ~  the plant systems are capable of meeting their safety and accident mitigation functions as defined in their design and licensing bases [Ref. 6.11], and
aoContinued reviewofopencorrective actionitemsthroughclosure.b.Continued evaluation ofemergentactionitemsforunitrestartagainsttheRestartScreening Criteria.
      ~  in conjunction with other ongoing improvement programs and resolution of identified issues, that the plant is modified, tested, operated and maintained consistent with the design and licensing bases. [Ref. 6.12]
C.Scheduling ofrestartworkintotheappropriate SystemWorkWindow.d.Monitoring offield.work,including presenceatthejobsite,whenappropriate.
1.4    The Expanded System Readiness Review consists          of four phases Phase 1:  Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Phase 2: Restart Activities Monitoring Phase 3: Final Expanded System Readiness Review Phase 4: Startup and Power Ascension 1.4.1    Phase  1 is to include the following:
e.Development ofSystemTestPlans.Preparation forSystemWindowclosureandtheFinalExpandedSystemReadiness Reviews.g.Completion ofregularly scheduled walkdowns bytheSystemManager(Seedefinitions).
: a. Formation and training of system teams for readiness review using representatives from various station departments.
h.Management ofworkclosurethroughuseofperformance indicators andpriorities.
: b. A review of system design and license    basis documentation.
UpdateoftheSIDSdatabase,astheSystemManagerevaluates emergentandopenitems.  
: c. Review    of safety and accident mitigation functions  for each system.
: d. Verification, in conjunction with other ongoing improvement programs and resolution of identified issues, that the plant is modified, tested, operated and maintained consistent with the design and licensing bases.


Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage5of1011.4.3Phase3istoincludethefollowing:
Information             PMP 7200.RST.004       .          Rev. 5            Page 4   of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM
a...FinalSystemReadiness Walkdowncompleted bytheSystemManagerandanassignedOperations representative.
: e. Evaluation of the extent of condition for identified problems and identification of potential programmatic or generic issues.
b.Presentation oftheFinalSystemReadiness Report,priortorestart,totheSRRBandPORCbytheassignedoperations representative andtheSystemManager.c.Reviewworkthatisnotcompletepriortorestartandreviewtheaggregate impactofdeferredwork.d.FinalizetheSystemTestPlans.e.SystemManagerwilldevelopperformance monitoring baselineforsystemperformance trackingandtrending1.4APhase4istoincludethefollowing:
Performance    of multi-disciplined  system walkdowns.
a.Designated testresultsidentified bytheTestReviewBoard(TRB).b.SystemManagerwillimplement performance monitoring baselineforsystemperformance trackingandtrending.
Evaluation of open items in the System Indexed DataBase System (SIDS) (see definitions) against the Restart Screening Criteria.
c.SystemManagerwillmonitoranynewcorrective maintenance activities orcondition reports,andcontinuously monitorsystemreadiness.
NOTE:     The Plant Nuclear Safety Review Committee (PNSRC) is making a transition to be known as Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC). This document uses the acronym, PORC, but documents such as the UFSAR and Technical Specifications may use PNSRC that represents the same group.
d.Completion ofSystemReadiness Affirmation.
: h. Presentation of the Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Report          'o the System Readiness Review Board (SRRB) and the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC).
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage6of1012DEFINITIONS ANDABBREVIATIONS TermSystemAssessment MatrixAttribute TopicReviewAreaDiscrepancy GenericIssueAssessment DataBaseMeaningThematrixconsistsofattributes (rows)andtopicreviewareas(columns) thatdefinethescopeoftheworkandwhencompleted providesthesummarybasisoftheconclusions oftheExpandedSystemReadiness Review.Figure1providestheAssessment MatrixForm.Figure2providesasamplecompleted assessment matrix.Keysystemparameters, including systemsafetyandaccidentmitigation functions, thatwillbeevaluated againstvarioustopicreviewareas.Theattributes makeuptherowsofthematrixandareselectedbytheExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewTeamsusingguidanceprovidedinSection4.3.4.Consistsofdocuments andsourcesofinformation inthefollowing areas:Design,Licensing, Operations, Maintenance, Surveillance, PhysicalPlant,andPrograms, Processes andProcedures.
                                                                                      /
Thereviewareasmakeupthecolumnsoftheassessment matrix.TheaddendumtoFigure1providesguidanceontheevaluation tobeperformed foreachtopicarea.Afindinggenerated asaresultofanactivityperformed inaccordance withthisprocedure whichindicates apotential needforcorrective actionorprocessimprovement.
Begin scheduling restart work in the Restart Schedule.
Discrepancies identified duringtheExpandedSystemReadiness Reviewaredocumented viaCondition Reports(CRs)intheCookPlantCorrective ActionProgram(CAP)orasActionRequestsintheWorkControlSystem(NPM).ACondition ReportshallbeissuedforanyitemthatfallswithinthescopeoftheCorrective ActionProgram.Discrepancies identified inseveralsystemsforthesametopic..reviewareathatpotentially identifyaprocessorprogrammatic problem..
1.4.2   Phase 2 is to include the following:
ThedatabaseusedtodocumentExpandedSystemReadiness Reviewassessments, confirming consistent useofdesignandlicensing information, andidentifying discrepancies.
ao  Continued review    of open corrective action items through closure.
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage7of1012DEFINITIONS ANDABBREVIATIONS (Continued)
: b. Continued evaluation of emergent action items for unit restart against the Restart Screening Criteria.
TermSystemIndexedDataBaseSystemCurrentLicensing BasisDesignBasis(asDefinedby10CFR50.2)MeaningTheSIDSdatabaseisusedtotrackopenitemsidentified asrequiredforrestart.Openitemsinthisdatabaseincludeopenitemsfromexistingplantdatasources,anddiscrepancies identified bytheExpandedSystemReadiness Review.Thus,discrepancies identified duringtheExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewgenerateentriesintheSIDSDatabase.
C. Scheduling  of restart work into the appropriate  System Work Window.
ThesetofNRCinformation applicable toaspecificplantandalicensee's writtencommitments forensuringcompliance with,andoperating withinapplicable NRCrequirements andtheplantspecificdesignbasis,including allmodifications andadditions tosuchcommitments overthelifeofthelicense,thataredocketedandineffect.TheCLBincludesNRCregulations contained in10CFRParts2,19,20,21,26,30,40,50,51,54,55,70,72,73,100andappendices thereto:Orders,LicenseConditions, Exemptions, andTechnical Specifications (TSs).Italsoincludestheplantspecificdesignbasisinformation definedin10CFR50.2asdocumented inthemostrecentUFSARasrequiredby10CFR50.71andNRCcommitments remaining ineffectthatweremadeindocketedlicensing correspondence suchasresponses toNRCBulletins, GenericLettersandenforcement actions,aswellaslicenseecommitments documented intheNRCSafetyEvaluations orLicenseeEventReports.Information thatidentifies thespecificfunctions tobeperformed byastructure, systemorcomponent ofafacilityandthespecificvaluesorrangeofvalueschosenforcontrolling parameters asreference boundsfordesign.These.valuesmaybe(1)restraints derivedfromgenerally acceptedstate-of-the-art practices forachieving functional goalsor(2)requirements derivedfromanalysis(basedoncalculations and/orexperiments) oftheeffectofapostulated accidentforwhichastructure, systemorcomponent mustmeetfunctional goals.
: d. Monitoring of field. work, including presence at the job site, when appropriate.
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage8of1012DEFINITIONS ANDABBREVIATIONS (Continued)
: e. Development    of System Test  Plans.
TermEngineering DesignBasisVerticalSliceReviewHorizontal SliceReviewSystemReadiness ReviewBoard(SRRB)SystemManagerSystemManager"APPROVE" MeaningTheEngineering DesignBasisistheentiresetofdesign-restraints thatareimplemented, including (1)thosethatarepartofthecurrentlicensing basis,and(2)thosethatarenotpartofthecurrentlicensing basis,butareimplemented toachievecertain.economies ofoperation, maintenance, procurement, installation, orconstruction.
Preparation for System Window closure and the Final Expanded System Readiness Reviews.
(SeeReference 6.2forfurtherclarification, including definitions ofDesignBasisDocument, DesignRequirements andDesignOutputDocument).
: g. Completion of regularly scheduled walkdowns by the System Manager (See definitions).
Astructured reviewapproachderivedfromtheSafetySystemFunctionInspection (SSFI)methodology thatallowsanassessment ofspecificaspectsoftheplantphysicalconfiguration andoperation againstselectedaspectsoftheplantlicensing anddesignbasis.ThescopeoftheESRRverticalslicereviewforeachsystemisdefinedbytheSystemAssessment Matrix.Areviewofaprogrammatic issueorplantdocuments acrossmultipleplantsystems,suchasareviewoftheUFSAR,evaluation ofAppendixRfireprotection requirements, reviewandupgradeofcalculations, etc.Aboardofpersonnel conducting businessinaccordance withtheCharterinAttachment 1.TheleaderoftheExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewTeamandengineering ownerofassignedsystemsforpurposesofthisprocedure.
: h. Management of work closure through use        of performance indicators and priorities.
Indicates thefactthattheSystemManagerhasreviewedthescope(i.e.,thescreening oftheitemasrequiredornotrequiredtosupportunitrestart)ofaniteminSIDSandtheassociated commentsthatjustifytheitem'sscope.This"APPROVAL" isdenotedintheInitialSystemManagerApprovalboxinSIDSandisusedbytheSystemManagerduringallPhasesfornewitemsinSIDS,meaningthattheSystemManageragreeswiththescopeandjustification.
Update of the SIDS data base, as the System Manager evaluates emergent and open items.
fg%'\,
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage9of1012DEFINITIONS ANDABBREVIATIONS (Continued)
TermSystemManager"CONCUR"SystemManager"EXCEPT"SystemManager"PostRestartDeferred" SystemManager"RestartRequiredDeferred" MeaningDuringPhases3and4,"CONCURRENCE" isdenotedintheFinalSystemManagerApprovalboxinSIDSandisusedbytheSystemManagertomeanthatrestartitems,orpostrestartitemsthatarenotincludedintheaggregate impact,havebeencompleted tothesatisfaction oftheSystemManager.Indicates thatthisRestartscopedSIDSitemisnotcompleteandremainsanexception torestart(i.e.,completion oftheitemstillneededtoenterthemodeidentified inthemoderestraint boxinSIDS).This"EXCEPTION" isdenotedintheFinalSystemManagerApprovalboxinSIDSandisusedbytheSystemManagerduring.Phases3and4.Denotedonitemsassociated withacomponent thathas(2)or.morepostrestartdeferreditems,excluding PMpostrestartitems.Denotedonitemswithdeferredscopethatwereinitially
: approved, asrestartrequired.
Theseitemsmustbeaccompanied byaRestartRequiredScopeDeferralForm(Attachment 10).
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage10of1013RESPONSIBILITIES 3.1TheDirectorofEngineering Restartisresponsible foroverseeing Engineering preparations forrestart,fortheESRRProgramand,whenneeded,forchairingtheSystemReadiness ReviewBoard;ensuringthattherequisite membersareinattendance.
3.2TheSystemReadiness ReviewManagerisresponsible for:3.2.1ExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewProgramcontentandoversight.
3.2.2Determination ofthescopeofthereviewforESRRsystems.3.2.3Ensuringadequatetrainingandlogistics supportisprovidedtoparticipating'eam membersj3.2.4Reviewing theresultsoftheindividual systemreadiness reviews,identifying anygeneric.concernsanddefiningprogranunatic corrective action(ifany).3.2.5Reviewing theattribute selection andthecorresponding Assessment Matrixforeachsystem(Figure1).3.2.6Maintaining andrevisingthisprocedure ontheExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewProgram,annotating thechangesmade,andobtaining appropriate approvals.
3.2.7OwnsandmanagestheSIDSDatabase3.3TheSystemEngineering Managerisresponsible fortheassignment ofSystemManagerstosystemrbeing
: reviewed, andforproviding additional oversight fortheESRRProgram.3ATheSystemEngineering Supervisors areresponsible forsupervision andeffective implementation oftheExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewProgramthroughactivecoaching, counseling andoversight oftheSystemManager.TheSystemEngineering Supervisors jointlyowntheESRRresultswiththeSystemManagers.
3.5TheExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewProgramCoordinator isresponsible for:3.5.1ExpandedSystemReadiness Reviewprogramdevelopment andimplementation.
3.5,2Scheduleandcoordination Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage11of1013.5.3Reviewing andrecommending forapprovaltheattribute selection andthecorresponding Assessment Matrixforeachsystem.3.5.4ReviewtheAssessment DataBasetoidentifygenericissuesandtrends.3.6TheAssessment DataBaseCoordinator isresponsible for:3.6.1AssuringthattheAssessment DataBaseisoperational andavailable totheESRRteams.3.6.2Maintaining thedataintheAssessment DataBaseandproviding status.and summaryreportsregarding theESRR.3.7TheSIDSDataBaseCoordinator isresponsible for:3.7.1AssuringthattheSIDSDataBaseisoperational andavailable totheESRR.teams,andtoprogramownersandfunctional areamanagers(ordesignees).
3.7.2Makinganyrequiredchangesorimprovements totheSIDSDataBase.3.7.3EnsuringthatitemsrequiredtobescopedareenteredintotheSIDSDataBase.3.7.4Providing andmaintaining thequalityofSIDSreports.3.8SystemManagersareresponsible for:3.8.1Overallsystemhealthandperformance.
3.8.2Organizing andleadingeachESRRTeam.TheTeamwillbecomposedof'henecessary multi-discipline resources toconductPhase1oftheExpandedSystemRea'diness Reviews.TheSystemTeamswillincludethefollowing:
a.SystemManagerb.Operations Representative c.DesignEngineering Representative d.Maintenance Representative.
e.Licensing Representative f.Outsidemember(s) withvariedindustryexperience Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page12of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAM3.8.3Coordinating teamrequestsforsystemdesignandlicensing basisdocumentation fromtheappropriate sources.3.8.4Performing Phases1,2,and3,andsupporting Phase4oftheESRR.3.8.5Coordinating preparation oftheESRRInitialandFinalReports,andpresenting thesereportstotheSRRBandPORC.3.8.6Assembling ESRRreviewresultsandrestartactionitemsintotheSIDSDatabasefortracking.
3.8.7Maintaining astatusofrestartactionitemsandsubmitting statusupdatestoplantmanagement asrequired.
3.8.8Coordinating andconducting system.walkdowns withappropriate teammembers.3.8.9Organizing andleadingeachworkwindowteam(seeSection4.4.2b.1).
3.9TheExpandedSystem'Readiness ReviewTeamsareresponsible for:3.9.1Identifying attributes appropriate totheirspecificsystemforassessment.
3.9.23.9.3Selecting topicareasappropriate totheidentified attributes.
Performing systemattribute checksandwalkdowns anddocumenting theresults,including anynoteddiscrepancies, intheassessment database.3.9.4Reviewing itemsintheSIDSdatabaseandscopingtheitemsasdiscussed insection4,3.12.3.9.5Enteringthedeficiencies intheCookPlantCorrective ActionProgramand/orWorkControlSystemasappropriate.
3.9.6Providing assistance totheSystemManagerasrequired.
3.10TheOperations Managerisresponsible forassigning appropriate Operations representatives tosupporttheESRRProgram.3.11TheDirectorofRegulatory Affairsisresponsible forassigning appropriate Licensing representatives tosupporttheESRRProgram.3.12TheMaintenance Managerisresponsible forassigning appropriate maintenance representatives tosupporttheESRRProgram.
I,ik.$g Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage13of1013.13TheDesignEngineering Directorisresponsible forassigning appropriate DesignEngineering representatives tosupporttheESRRProgram.3.14TheSRRBw'illperformmanagement oversight andassessment oftheExpanded=-SystemReadiness ReviewProgramandwillbethefinalapprovalauthority overworkitemscreening.
TheSRRBwillperformactivities applicable tothisprocedure, including approvaloftheSystemAssessment Matrices.
TheSRRBCharterisincludedinAttachment l.AnexpectedproductoftheSRRBoversight isimprovedconsistency andtechnical depthoftheESRRresults.3.15ThePORCisresponsible toprovideacross-discipline oversight oftheESRRProgrambyreviewing ESRRreportsforeachsystemandtheIntegrated Readiness ReviewReport.3.16TheOutageScopeManagement Team(OSMT)willreviewemergentworkitemsfollowing Phase1todetermine whetherornottheyarerequiredtosupportUnitrestart.4DETAILS4.1ScopeAndSelection OfSystemsForExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewNOTE:Theterm"TBDL"whenusedinthisdocumentreferstodetailToBeDeveloped Laterandincorporated inasubsequent revisiontothisdocumentorinotherdocuments.
4.1.1Previously, aplantSystemReadiness Reviewwasconducted asdiscussed inReference 6.3.Agradedapproachwasusedinperforming theprevioussystemreadiness reviews,withhigh-risk systemsreceiving morethoroughreviews.Theprevioussystemreadiness reviewswerebrokendownintothreelevels-with.
thefollowing attributes:
a.Level1Systems.1.Risk-significant Maintenance Rulesystems2.Someimportant non-risksignificant standbymaintenance rulesystemsb.Level2Systems1.Remaining non-risksignificant Maintenance Rulesystemsc.Level3Systems Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage14of1011.Non-Maintenance Rulesystemsthatsupportpowergeneration 2.Systemsthatarerequiredforplantoperation, areeasilymonitored inservice,andpresentlittleornochallenge tosafety4.1.2The21Level1systemsincludedinthepreviousSystemReadiness ReviewarelistedinAttachment 2.4.1.3Subsequent tothecompletion ofthepreviousSystemReadiness Review,severalindependent reviewswereconducted, including aSafetySystemFunctional Inspection (SSFI)oftheAuxiliary Feedwater System(Reference 6.4)andanEngineering IssuesReviewGroupfinalreport(Reference 6.5).Thesereviewsidentified vulnerabilities withrespecttothescopeofsystemsreviewedduringthepreviousSystemReadiness Review,additional systemdesignbasisandlicensing basisissues,andweaknesses inengineering programsandprocesses.
4.1.4Theclassification ofLevel1,2,and3systemsutilizedduringthepreviously performed systemreadiness reviewswerebasedsolelyonMaintenance Ruleinput.TheLevel1systemswereMaintenance RuleRisk'ignificant systems.Level2systemswerenon-risksignificant systems,butsystemsthatwerestillincludedinthescopeoftheMaintenance Rule.Level3systemsweresystemsthatwerenotincludedinthescopeoftheMaintenance Rule.4.1.5Theclassification ofLevel1and2systemsutilizedduringtheESRRProgramisbasedonMaintenance Ruleinput,systemsrequiredforsafeshutdown, significant attendant/support systems,andsystemsidentified bytheSystemEngineering Managerthathaveexperienced anabnormalamountofcorrective maintenance.
Thebasisfortheselection ofLevel1systemsisfoundinAttachment 3.4.1.6ExpandedSystemReadiness Reviewsunderthisprocedure willbeconducted onallofthepreviousLevel1systems,plusadditional systemsthatweredetermined towarrantanExpandedSystemReadiness Review(RefertoAttachment 4).ExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewsforthenewLevel2Systemswillbeaddressed inaseparateprocedure.
4.2UseOfTheSystemAssessment Matrix,SIDS,AndTheAssessment DataBase4.2.1TheESRRemploysaverticalsliceapproachderivedfromthemethodology ofaSafetySystemFunctional Inspection (SSFI).Thisapproachevaluates systemsafetyimportant tosafeoperation andaccidentmitigation functions (Attributes) againstplantconfiguration anddesign,licensing, operations andmaintenance documents (TopicAreas).  


Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage15of1014.2.2Thescopeoftheverticalslicereviewperformed onasystemisshowninaSystemAssessment Matrix.Thesystemattributes selectedforeachsystem'sreviewformtherowsofthismatrix,asfurtherdiscussed insection4.3.4.Thesourcesofinformation ortopicareasthatareincludedintheverticalsliceformthecolumnsofthematrix.4.2.3TheSystemManager,accompanied bythecognizant SystemEngineering Supervisor, presentsadescription ofthesystemscopeandthesystemspecificAssessment MatrixtotheSRRBforapproval.
Information             PMP 7200.RST.004                 Rev. 5            Page 5 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 1.4.3   Phase 3 is to include the following:
ThishelpstheSRRBascertain thatattributes areappropriate.
a... Final System  Readiness Walkdown completed by the System Manager and an assigned Operations representative.
4.2;4Therequirements associated witheachoftheattributes areevaluated againstspecifictopicareasorsourcesofinformation.
: b. Presentation of the Final System Readiness Report, prior to restart, to the SRRB and PORC by the assigned operations representative and the System Manager.
4.2.5Theassessments includecomparison,and evaluation ofdocuments aswellasobservations ofplantcondition andconfiguration duringsystemwalkdowns.
: c. Review work that is not complete prior to restart and review the aggregate impact of deferred work.
TheESRRwillemphasize thoseattributes, topicareasandactivities necessary tosatisfytheprogrampurpose.4.2.6Theresultsaredocumented usingAttribute Assessment Forms(Figure3)intheAssessment DataBase.Discrepancies areenteredintotheCookPlantCorrective ActionProgramand/orWorkControlSystem(NPM).Assessment DataBasemanipulation andreporting capabilities assistinreporting, trackingandidentification ofgenericissuesandtrends.4.2.7Byassessing theresultsforalltopicareasacrossallthesystemsreviewed, theESRRcanassistindetermining theextentofcondition ofvulnerabilities inplantprogramsandprocesses alreadyidentified bypreviousinspections andreviews(e.g.,References 6.4and6.5).TheESRRwillalsobeusedtoidentifyotherpotential vulnerabilities andthepotential needforfurtherimprovement inplantprocesses andprograms.
: d. Finalize the System Test Plans.
4.2.8Insummary,theESRRsresultinaverticalsliceevaluation ofselecteddesignandlicensing basesfortheESRRsystems.Theseevaluations donotguarantee thatfutureexternalorinternalassessments willnotuncoveradditional problemreviews.However,inconjunction withotherongoinghorizontal slicerestartprogramsatCookPlantandresolution ofissuesthatarerecommended forrestart,theESRRsprovidereasonable assurance thatkeysystemsarecapableofmeetingtheirsafetyandaccidentmitigation functions asdefinedintheirdesignandlicensing basis.
: e. System Manager will develop performance monitoring baseline for system performance tracking and trending 1.4A    Phase 4 is to include the  following:
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage16of1014.2.9TheSIDSDataBaseisbeingusedtotrackitemsbeingevaluated, scopedandjustified aseitherRestartorPostRestartforbothUnits.Thisdatabaseisthecentralrepository forsuchitems.SIDSwillgeneratereportslistingRestartandPostRestartitemsforSRRBandPORCapproval.
: a. Designated test results identified by the Test Review Board (TRB).
Thisdatabasewillbemanagedandcontrolled bytheSystemManagerforhisparticular system(s).
: b. System Manager will implement performance monitoring baseline for system performance tracking and trending.
4.3Phase1-InitialExpandedSystemReadiness Review4.3.1ExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewTeamFormation a.TheSystemEngineering ManagerwillassignaSystemManagertoeachoftheExpandedSystemReadiness Reviewteams.b.TheSystemManagerwillleadtheExpandedSystemReadiness Review'eam comprised ofalicensedmemberfromOperations andmembers..fromDesignEngineering, Maintenance, Licensing, andoutsidememberswithstrongindustryexperience; 4.3.2Traininga.Priortoperforming thereviews,trainingwillbeconducted fortheAEPSystemManagersandtheESRRTeammembersonExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewProgramknowledge andskillneeds.Theseneedsaredefined-inAttachment 5.4.3.3b.ThetrainingfortheAEPSystemManagersandtheESRRTeamswasdetermined basedonanevaluation ofthetaskstobeperformed andlessonslearnedformtheoriginalSystemReadiness Reviews,theoriginalSystemEngineering ReviewBoard,andpreviously performed engineering andprogrammatic assessments.
: c. System Manager    will monitor any new corrective  maintenance activities or condition reports, and continuously monitor system readiness.
AReviewDesignandLicensing BasisDocumentation a.TheESRRTeamshallbecomefamiliarwiththedesignandlicensing basisofthesystemtogainanunderstanding ofthesystemfunctional andsafetyrequirements undernormaloperating andaccidentconditions.
: d. Completion of System Readiness Affirmation.
Thedesignandlicensebasisdocumentation listedinAttachment 6willbeavailable totheESRRTeam.b.Accesstothefollowing willbeprovidedtotheESRRTeams.1.EQinformation 2.AppendixRinformation Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage17of1013.StationBlackoutinformation 4.ISI/ISTProgramInformation 5;Seismicqualification information 6.Electrical designcriteria(separation, etc.)7.Maintenance RuleProgramInformation 8.Individual PlantExamination (IPE)Results9.HighEnergyLineBreakProgram'Information 10.GenericLettersGL89-13,GL83-28,GL96-01,andresponses thereto.11.GenericLetterGL89-10programinformation.
12.GenericLetterGL96-06information (asavailable) 13.LER97-021andassociated singlefailurecommitments 14.1998AFWSSFIReport15.1998Containment SpraySSFIReport16.Engineering IssuesReviewGroupReport(Reference 6.5)c.Theexpectation isthattheSystemManagerwillreviewtheaboveinformation todetermine itsimpactonhissystem.d.Licensing willprovidetheresultsofareviewoflicensing commitments onasystembasis.4.3.4DefineSystemSpecificAttributes a.Duringthereviewandevaluation ofdesignandlicensing information, eachESRRTeamwilldevelopalistofattributes tobeincludedintheassessment ontheSystemAssessment Matrix.
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage18of101b.Attributes willbeselectedbyathoroughreviewofthedesignand,licensing basistoidentifythesystemsafetyandaccidentmitigation functions.
Additional functional requirements ofthesystemandcriticalcomponents mayalsobeselected.
Information fromtheLicensing ReviewProgramwillbeconsidered aswillPRAinsightsonrisksignificant components andfunctions.
Functionality ofattendant/support systemsandimportant passiveequipment (e.g.,tanks,bladders, strainers) willalsobeconsidered inselection ofsystemattributes.
Genericrequirements suchasStationBlackout, EQ,AppendixR,etc.willalsobeselectedassystemattributes whenappropriate.
Adetailedexampleofandsomerequirements forattribute selection andtheirbasesareprovidedintheFigure2addendum.
4.3.5Establish ScopeofReviewa.EachESRRTeamwillperformaverticalslicereviewofitsassignedsystembyevaluating thesystemandcommonattributes againstspecifictopicreviewareasasdocumented inthesystemAssessment Matrix.Thetopicareastobeassessedforeachattribute willbedefinedinaninitialSystemAssessment MatrixatthestartoftheESRR,takingintoaccounttheresultsofpreviousevaluations atCookPlant.ThisinitialSystemAssessment Matrixwillbereviewedandrecommended bytheESRRProgramCoordinator orManagerandtheNuclearLicensing ManagerorDirectorofRegulatory Affairs,andapprovedbytheSRRB.ChangesmadeinresponsetoSRRBcommentsneednotbere-reviewed bytheotherpartieswhopreviously reviewedthematrix.Thesereviewsandapprovals willbebasedonthematrixandothersupporting materialasdictatedbytheboard.Typically, thisinformation willconsistof:~Alistingofthesystemsafetyandaccidentmitigation functions
~Thematrixitself,showingtheattributes chosenandthetopicstobereviewedforeach~Amarked-up systemflowdiagramorschematic depicting systemboundaries
<<u~4 Information PNIP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage19of101~Aseparateworddescription'of systemphysicalboundaries andfunctional boundaries.
Functional boundaries arethoseinterfaces withothersystemsortheenvironment thatmustbeproperinorderforthesystemtofunctionasdesigned.
Anexamplewouldbeacircuitbreakerinanon-safety relatedsystemthatmustopentoprotectaconnected safety-related systemiftheaon-safety relatedsystemincursafault.~Adescription oftheattributes chosenandthesub-attributes ofeachwhichtheteamintendstopursue.b.TheSystemAssessment MatrixwillbeusedbyeachESRRteamasa"guideline toensureadequatecoverageoftopicareasandallattributes.
c.Basedontheadditional knowledge andunderstanding gainedinthecourseofthereview,specifically including theresultsofthereviewoflicensing commitments, actualcoverageofspecifictopicareasforparticular attributes mayexpandanddeviatefromtheinitialmatrix,providedthatcoverageofappropriate topicareasandallattributes ismaintained.
Ifongoinglicensing orESRR'reviews identifytheneedtoadd,attributes totheassessment matrix,theseadditions willbeapprovedbytheESRRManagerortheESRRProgramCoordinator.
Suchadditions willbecommunicated inatimelymannerbetweenLicensing aadtheESRRManager.Actualcoveragewillbedocumented inthefinalSystemAssessment Matrix,whichwillbereviewedbytheESRRProgramManagerorProgramCoordinator andwillbeincludedintheInitialExpandedSystemReadiness Reviewreport."4.3.6ReviewSystemCondition Documeatation a.DatasourcesinSIDSwillbereviewedbytheESRRTeamstogainacomprehensive understanding ofthecurrentsystemcondition, toassessthesystemfunctional requirements forreadiness, andtoevaluatetheconformance ofthesystemcondition toitsdesignbasis.Aspecificfocusofthiseffortshallbetheidentification offundamental vulnerabilities inthesystem'sabilitytoperformitssafetyandaccidentmitigation functions asdefinedintheDesignandLicensing Basis.  


Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage20of101b.Duringthereviewandevaluation ofthesedatasources,theESRRteammaydevelopadditional specificrequirements tobechecked.For.example,ifapreviously conducted assessment identified adiscrepancy betweenacomponent capability andadesignrequirement, thisdesignrequirement wouldbeacandidate forinvestigation andthesatisfactory closureofthepreviously identified discrepancy wouldbeassessedaspartoftheESRR.Thesamestrategymaybeappliedtoassessthesatisfactory closureofopenitemsthatwereidentified whentheDesignBasisDocuments werecreated.4.3.7PerformAssessment ofSystemAttributes andTopicAreasa.Thechecksofspecificattributes againstthetopicareaswillassesstheinternalconsistency ofsystemdocuments, procedures, andplantconfiguration andtheirconformance withdesignandlicensing requirements.
Information       PMP 7200.RST.004                   Rev. 5            Page 6 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 2      DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS Term                        Meaning System Assessment Matrix    The matrix consists of attributes (rows) and topic review areas (columns) that define the scope of the work and when completed provides the summary basis of the conclusions of the Expanded System Readiness Review. Figure 1 provides the Assessment Matrix Form. Figure 2 provides a sample completed assessment matrix.
TheESRRTeamwilldocumentconformance withrequirements aswellasdiscrepancies onanAttribute Assessment Form.Anexampleofacompleted Attribute Assessment FormisprovidedinFigured(Actualformmayvaryslightlyasitwillbecomputergenerated).
Attribute                  Key system parameters, including system safety and accident mitigation functions, that will be evaluated against various topic review areas. The attributes make up the rows of the matrix and are selected by the Expanded System Readiness Review Teams using guidance provided in Section 4.3.4.
b.EachAttribute Assessment Formshalllistthedocumentation reviewedorwalkdownobservations madetoarriveattheassessment conclusions.
Topic Review Area          Consists of documents and sources of information in the following areas: Design, Licensing, Operations, Maintenance, Surveillance, Physical Plant, and Programs, Processes and Procedures. The review areas make up the columns of the assessment matrix. The addendum to Figure 1 provides guidance on the evaluation to be performed for each topic area.
Thelistofrevieweddocuments shallcontainrevisionnumbersand/ordateifapplicable.
Discrepancy                A finding generated as a result of an activity performed in accordance with this procedure which indicates a potential need for corrective action or process improvement. Discrepancies identified during the Expanded System Readiness Review are documented via Condition Reports (CRs) in the Cook Plant Corrective Action Program (CAP) or as Action Requests in the Work Control System (NPM). A Condition Report shall be issued for any item that falls within the scope of the Corrective Action Program.
Theassessment formsshalldescribetheassessment andindicatethenumberofattribute checkscoveredbytheassessment formandthenumberofattribute checkswhichresultedinidentification ofdiscrepancies.
Generic Issue              Discrepancies identified in several systems for the same topic
TheESRRteamshalldetermine theextentofcondition fordiscrepancies identified withintheirsystembyconducting additional checksasnecessary.
                          ..review area that potentially identify a process or programmatic problem..
c.Asummaryoftheevaluation foreachattribute willbedocumented intheInitialSystemReadiness Report.Thissumtnarywilldocumentthechecksmadetoverifythecapability ofthesystemtoperformitssafetyandaccidentmitigation functions.
Assessment Data Base      The data base used to document Expanded System Readiness Review assessments, confirming consistent use of design and licensing information, and identifying discrepancies.
4.3.8PerformWalkdownofSystem Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page21of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMaoTheSystemManagershalldevelopthewalkdownstrategyinaccordance withtheSystemWalkdownGuidelines andbrieftheESRRTeam(seeAttachment 7).Thewalkdowns conducted aspartofthepreviousSystemReadiness Reviewstendedtofocusonmaterialcondition.
TheESRRwalkdowns willincludeevaluation ofmaterialcondition, butwillalsofocusonconfiguration orenvironmental issuesthatcouldalsoimpactthedesignandlicensing basis.[Ref.6.13]Systemsafetyandaccidentmitigation functionflowpathsshouldbeindicated onsystemflowdiagrams.
ThemarkedupdrawingswillbeusedtoassisttheSystemManagertoverifythesystemsafetyandaccidentmitigation functions duringthesystemwalkdowns.
Otherdrawingsmaybeusedbyteamstocheckspecificconfiguration oras-builtdetailsagainstdrawingrequirements.
C.Participants inthewalkdowns willincludetheSystemManager,theOperations representative, aMaintenance representative, andoutsideteammember(s).
Participation byrepresentatives ofdesignengineering andlicensing mayalsobeobtainedwhenrequiredbytheSystemManager;d.Theassessment performed duringthewalkdownwillbedocumented, togetherwithdiscrepancies noted,intheassessment database.e.Corrective actionitemsidentified duringthewalkdowns shallbe.enteredintotheCorrective ActionProgramand/orWorkControlSystembyinitiating aCondition ReportorActionRequestrespectively.
Thesecorrective actionitemswillalsobecapturedintheSIDSdatabaseandtheAssessment DataBase.AWalkdownReport(Attachment 15)istobeassembled bytheSystemManager-and includedintheInitialExpandedSystemReadiness ReportThereportwilldiscussthefollowing:
1.Walkdownpurposeandscope2.Walkdownfindings3.Necessary corrective actionsidentified 4.Summarization ofsystemconcernsandcondition 5.Suinmarization andjustification forportionsofsystemsthatarenotwalkeddown.  


Information PMP'7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage22of101g.Duringthereviewandevaluation ofthewalkdowns, theSystemTeammaydevelopadditional checkstomakebeyondthoseontheWalkdown.Guidelines.
Information         PMP 7200.RST.004                   Rev. 5            Page 7 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 2    DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)
4.3.9IdentifyLongStandingorRecurring Equipment Performance Issuesa.EachESRRteamwillobtaininformation frompreviousReliability CenteredMaintenance (RCM)evaluations, theISTprogramselfassessment, andMaintenance Ruleevaluations toidentifypotential long-standing orrecurring equipment performance issues.Suchissues'hallbeidentified forfollow-up intheAssessment DataBaseandtheCorrective ActionProgramand/orWorkControlSystemandthe*resultswillbedocumented intheInitialExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReport.ACondition ReportshallbeissuedforanyitemthatfallswithinthescopeoftheCorrective ActionProgram.~4.3.10EvaluateExtentofCondition forIdentified Problemsa.Eachsystemteamshallassessrecurring issuestodetermine whetherfurtherextentofcondition determination isrequired(beyondtheplannedscopeasdocumented intheinitialsystemAssessment Matrix)anddocumentanysuchconditions intheInitialExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReport.[Ref.6.14]b.TheESRRProgramManagerandProgramCoordinator shallreviewtheresultsacrossallthereviewedsystemstoidentifypotential programmatic orgenericissues.Ifappropriate, thisinformation willbeusedtorecommend corrective actionsofaprogrammatic nature.Theresultswillbedocumented intheExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewIntegrated Results,described inAttachment 14.4.3.11Documen~view.results andenterdiscrepancies intoESRRAssessment DataBaseandtheCookPlantCorrective ActionProgramand/orWorkControlSystem.ACondition ReportshallbeissuedforanyitemsthatfallwithinthescopeoftheCorrective ActionProgram.a.Attribute checksperformed aswellasdiscrepancies foundinthisreviewaretobedocumented intheAssessment Data'ase.
Term                        Meaning System Indexed Data Base    The SIDS data base is used to track open items identified as System                      required for restart. Open items in this data base include open items from existing plant data sources, and discrepancies identified by the Expanded System Readiness Review. Thus, discrepancies identified during the Expanded System Readiness Review generate entries in the SIDS Database.
Discrepancies shallalsobeenteredintotheCookPlantCorrective ActionProgrambyCondition ReportortheWorkControlSystembyActionRequest.
Current Licensing Basis      The set of NRC information applicable to a specific plant and a licensee's written commitments for ensuring compliance with, and operating within applicable NRC requirements and the plant specific design basis, including all modifications and additions to such commitments over the life of the license, that are docketed and in effect. The CLB includes NRC regulations contained in 10CFR Parts 2, 19, 20, 21, 26, 30, 40, 50, 51, 54, 55, 70, 72, 73, 100 and appendices thereto: Orders, License Conditions, Exemptions, and Technical Specifications (TSs). It also includes the plant specific design basis information defined in 10CFR 50.2 as documented in the most recent UFSAR as required by 10CFR 50.71 and NRC commitments remaining in effect that were made in docketed licensing correspondence such as responses to NRC Bulletins, Generic Letters and enforcement actions, as well as licensee commitments documented in the NRC Safety Evaluations or Licensee Event Reports.
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage23of101b.Condition ReportsandActionRequestswillautomatically beloadedintotheSIDSdatabase.ThisSIDSdatabasewillallowtrackingof..openitemsrequiredforrestartandwillallowevaluation ofpotential aggregate effectsofthoseitemsnotrequiredtoberesolvedpriortorestart.NOTE:Programownersorfunctional areamanagers(ordesignee) performscoping,monitoring, andclosureofnonsystem-specific programmatic orfunctional areadiscrepancies asdiscussed furtherinPMP7200.RST.009 andPMP7200.RST.010.
Design Basis                Information that identifies the specific functions to be (as Defined by 10CFR 50.2) performed by a structure, system or component of a facility and the specific values or range of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for design. These
4.3.12Determine RestartWorkscope a.Allsystem-specific itemsintheSIDSdatabasewillbereviewedagainsttheRestartIssuesSelection/Screening Criteria(seeAttachment 8).TheSystemManagerisresponsible foraddinganyknownopencorrective actionitemsnotpresentinSIDSforhissystem.Theseitemsaretobeevaluated forRestartReadiness Scope.PRArisk-based insightsmaybehelpfulindecidingmarginalcases.b.Eachsystem-specific itemintheSIDSdatabasewillbeevaluated usingtheevaluation processoutlinedinAttachment 8.TheESRRTeamwillrecommend oneofthefollowing classifications foreachsuchiteminSIDSinordertoenablereturnoftheCookPlantUnitstooperation inasafeandreliablemanner:1.RESTART1-Activities requiredtobecompleted priortoenteringStartup/Power Ascension ofUnit1.Thisclassification includesnecessary restartandpowerascension testingactivities aswellasdefinition oftheapplicable moderestraint.
                            .values may be (1) restraints derived from generally accepted state-of-the-art practices for achieving functional goals or (2) requirements derived from analysis (based on calculations and/or experiments) of the effect of a postulated accident for which a structure, system or component must meet functional goals.
2.RESTART2-Activities requiredtobecompleted priortoenteringStartup/Power Ascension ofUnit2.Thisclassification includesnecessary restartandpowerascension testingactivities aswellasdefinition oftheapplicable moderestraint.
3.POSTRESTART1-Activities whichshouldbecompleted onascheduleconsistent withtheUnit1normalplantworkcontrolsprocess.4.POSTRESTART2-Activities whichshouldbecompleted onascheduleconsistent withtheUnit2normalplantworkcontrolsprocess.  


Info'rmation
Information        PMP 7200.RST.004                   Rev. 5            Page 8 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 2    DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)
<PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page24of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAM5.NOTAPPLICABLE
Term                      Meaning Engineering Design Basis  The Engineering Design Basis is the entire set of design-restraints that are implemented, including (1) those that are part of the current licensing basis, and (2) those that are not part of the current licensing basis, but are implemented to achieve certain. economies of operation, maintenance, procurement, installation, or construction. (See Reference 6.2 for further clarification, including definitions of Design Basis Document, Design Requirements and Design Output Document).
-Activities thatarenotrequiredtobecompleted.
Vertical Slice Review    A structured review approach derived from the Safety System Function Inspection (SSFI) methodology that allows an assessment of specific aspects of the plant physical configuration and operation against selected aspects of the plant licensing and design basis. The scope of the ESRR vertical slice review for each system is defined by the System Assessment Matrix.
c.Theseclassifications willbeusedtodetermine andscheduletheworkwithintheappropriate restarttimeframe;d.Preventive Maintenance activities areuniquesincetheyoftenprovideameansofenhancing equipment performance.
Horizontal Slice Review  A review of a programmatic issue or plant documents across multiple plant systems, such as a review of the UFSAR, evaluation of Appendix R fire protection requirements, review and upgrade of calculations, etc.
However,theequipment beingservicedmayrequirebeingremovedfromoperation.
System Readiness Review  A board of personnel conducting business in accordance with Board (SRRB)              the Charter in Attachment 1.
Asaresult,theESRRmusttaketheseactivities intoconsideration whenevaluating PMactivities.
System Manager            The leader of the Expanded System Readiness Review Team and engineering owner of assigned systems for purposes of this procedure.
Thefollowing expectations areassociated withtheevaluations ofPMactivities:
System Manager            Indicates the fact that the System Manager has reviewed the "APPROVE"                scope (i.e., the screening of the item as required or not required to support unit restart) of an item in SIDS and the associated comments that justify the item's scope. This "APPROVAL" is denoted in the Initial System Manager Approval box in SIDS and is used by the System Manager during all Phases for new items in SIDS, meaning that the System Manager agrees with the scope and justification.
~AllPMsscheduled forcompletion beforeAugust31,2001areto,bereviewed.
~PMsscheduled (nextrequireddate)priortoMarch31,2000aretobecategorized asRESTART1orRESTART2.
~PMsthatarescheduled orplannedduringtheoperating cycle,andrequireaunitoutagetocomplete, aretobecategorized asRESTART1orRESTART2's appropriate.
~PMsscheduled (nextrequireddate)priortoAugust31,2001thatarenotpartofon-linemaintenance oraFunctional Equipment Group(FEG)outage;andwillimpactasurveillance test,orinitiateanunplanned orunscheduled LCOduringtheoperating cycle,aretobecategorized asRESTART1orRESTART2.
~PMsthatarescheduled asafunctionofapre-planned orpre-sehedtQed FEGoutage,withorwithoutanensuingLCO,anddonotchallenge unit/system operability, aretobecategorized asPOSTRESTART1orPOSTRESTART2.
Somere-screening willbenecessary iftheassumeddatesabovechange.e.Allsystemleaksaretobeevaluated.
Scopedetermination guidelines areasfollows:ll~Anyleaklocationwithnoavailable isolation istobecategorized asRESTART1orRESTART2, unlessreasonable justification foradifferent categorization isprovided.  
'3 Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage25of101~AnyASMEcodecomponent/vessel/piping leakageistobecategorized asRESTART1orRESTART2.
"~Leakagethatcanonlybeisolatedbyusinga"freezeseal"istobecategorized asRESTART1orRESTART2.
~Anyleakageidentified withincontainment requiring corrective actionistobecategorized asRESTART1orRESTART2.
Leakageidentified onsystemsoutsidecontainment, onnon-ASMEcodecomponents/vessels/piping, thatisisolable, andwouldnotchallenge systemoperability orreliability ifworkednon-outage, istobecategorized asPOSTRESTART1orPOSTRESTART2.
Leakagefromsystemsoutsidecontainment thatwouldorcouldcontainradioactive fluidsthatcouldviolateleakagerequirements inSection14.3oftheUFSARistobecategorized RESTART1orRESTART2.
4.3.13Labeling~Anylabelingissuesthathavepotential impacttoworkcontroltaggingaretobecategorized asRESTART1orRESTART2withthemodeidentified.,
~Anylabelingissueswithanypotential impacttosystemoperability orreliability aretobecategorized asRESTART1orRESTART2.
~Onlylabelingissuesthathavenoimpactoncomponents/systems workcontroltaggingaretobecategorized asPOSTRESTART1orPOSTRESTART2.
4.3.14PrepareInitialExpandedSystemReadiness ReportandPresenttoTheSystemReadiness ReviewBoard.a.Theinformation gatheredthroughout thesystemreadiness reviewand.walkdown shallbecompiledbytheESRRTeamintoanInitialExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReport.Eachmemberofthereviewteam,including participants inthewalkdowns, willbeidentified inthereport.
Information PMP7200.RST.004
'ev.5Page26of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMb.TheSystemManagerwillensurethateachopencorrective actionitemidentified duringtheESRRandwalkdownisinitiated eitherasaCondition ReportorActionRequest,and,ifsystem-specific, isevaluated andscopedintheSIDSdatabasepriortotheSRRBpresentation.
C.ThereportcontentisasdepictedinAttachment 12andwillbepresented totheSRRBforapproval.
Minorchangesinthereportformatarepermitted withtheconcurrence oftheESSRprogrammanagerorcoordinator.
TheSystemManagerwillbeaccompanied bytheEngineering Supervisor cognizant overthesystem.d.WhentheInitialExpandedSystemReadiness ReportisapprovedbytheSRRB,theSystemManagerwillnextpresentthereporttothePORCforapproval.
IfthereportisapprovedbytheSRRBwithcomments, theSystemManagerwillresolveallSRRBcommentsandtheoriginalsigneesofthereportwillre-review thereportandapprovecommentresolution.
IftheSRRBdisapproves thereport,theSystemManagermustre-present thereporttotheSRRBuntilapprovalisobtained, obtaining re-reviews asnecessary.
e.f.Afterthereporthasbeenpresented totheSRRB,theSRRBSecretary willprovidethecognizant Engineering Supervisor withalistofallcommentstheSystemManagerneedstoaddress.Insomeinstances whenthenewtechnical issuesareidentified duringSRRBreviews,theSystemManagerwillberequiredtowriteaCondition Reportontheissue.Inthiscase,therespective Engineering Supervisor istodebrieftheSystemManager,andrecordthedebriefintheCR.ThedebriefwilladdressallcommentsrecordedattheSRRBpresentation.
WhenESRRprogramimplementation problemsareidentified, theSRRBsecretary willwriteaCondition Reportohtheissue.AfterSRRBapproval, theSystemManagerpresentstheInitialExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReporttothePORC.ThePORCwillapproveordisapprove thereport,fromanuclearsafetystandpoint, keepinganoverviewperspective thatfocusesonensuringthatinter-disciplinary concernswereadequately addressed.
PORCshouldnotnormallyfocusonapproving SRRBactiononeachdiscrepant condition butrathershouldprobeintomethodsandoverallresults.Ifapproved, theactionitemswillbeincludedintherestarteffort.Anychangestothescope(restart/post restart)ofindividual itemswillberecordedinthePORCmeetingminutes.Ifdisapproved, theSystemManagerwilltakeappropriate actionsandre-present thereporttothePORC.  


Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage27of101-g.Thecognizant Engineering Supervisor willensureincorporation ofPORCcommentswithinthereportandSIDSdatabase.PORCcommentsaretobeincorporated inSIDSbytheSIDSDataBase-Coordinator, andreviewedbytheSystemManager.PORCcommentswithinthereportaretobeincorporated bytheSystemManager.4.3.15Functional AreasandProgrammatic Issuesa.Openitemsassociated withfunctional areasandprogramswillbeloadedintotheSIDSdatabase.b.Iftheopenfunctional areaorprogrammatic itemsaffectspecificsystems,theseitemswillbetransferred totheappropriate system,withinSIDS,wheretheESRRTeamswillscopetheitems.c.TheSRRBwillreviewthescopingofprogrammatic andfunctional areaworkitemsthatarenotsystemspecificsubjecttoascheduleandprotocolestablished bytheDirectorofRestart.d.Functional areaandprogrammatic issueitemswillbereviewedandapprovedbySRRB.e.Foropenfunctional areaandprogrammatic itemsthatarenotsystemspecific, theappropriate functional areaorprogramownersareresponsible forensuringthatthefunctional areasandprogramsarereadytosupportrestartinaccordance withtheRestartPlan.4.4Phase2-RestartActivities Monitoring NOTE'rogram ownersorfunctional areamanagers(ordesignee) performscoping,monitoring, andclosureofnonsystem-specific programmatic orfunctional areadiscrepancies-as.
f g%'\,
discussed furtherinPMP7200.RST.009 andPMP7200.RST.OIO 4.4.1GeneralDescription ofPhase2Activities a.TheSystemManagerwilluseSIDStomonitorapprovedsystemworkscopeandidentifyanynewactionitems.Workactivities shouldbefrequently fieldverifiedandmonitored toinsurecorrective actionsarebeingtakenandnoadverseplantconditions develop.b.TheSystemManagerwillperformthefollowing activities:
Information       PMP 7200.RST.004                   Rev. 5           Page 9  of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 2    DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)
1.Monitorclosureofapprovedsystem-specific workscope itemsusingSIDSandavailable performance indicators.
Term                      Meaning System Manager            During Phases 3 and 4, "CONCURRENCE" is denoted in the "CONCUR"                 Final System Manager Approval box in SIDS and is used by the System Manager to mean that restart items, or post restart items that are not included in the aggregate impact, have been completed to the satisfaction of the System Manager.
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage28of1012.Identifyandevaluatenewemergentsystem-specific actionitemsforrestart;considerusingrisk-based insightswhereavailable toenhancedecision-making inmarginalcases.3.Performroutinefieldwalkdowns 4.Makepresentations totheSRRBasrequested 5.Reviewsystemworkwindowplanningandscheduling toensureworkisbeingproperlyscheduled 6.ProvideinputtoandreviewSystemTestPlans7.UpdateSIDStoreflectpropercompletion ofopensystem-specific itemsandtodocumentexceptions tocompleted workc.ForRestartRequireditemsthatarenotplannedtobecompleted priortorestart,thesystem-specific RestartRequiredScopeDeferralForm(Attachment 10)istobereviewedthroughthesamelevelofapprovalaswhentheitemwasoriginally approvedforrestart.d.Applicable RestartRequiredScopeDeferralFormsaretobecompleted priortoclosureoftheapplicable SystemWorkWindow.ForCondition Reportsnotassociated withcorrective maintenance, thedeferralformistobecompleted nolaterthantheFinalExpandedSystemReadiness Review.4.4.2Management ofWorkscope NOTE:Emergentitemsscopedasrestartmustbescheduled intheappropriate SystemWorkWindows.a.IdentifyandScopeEmerging(New)OpenItems1.Phase2workitemsthatareevaluated andscopedforaccomplishment priortorestartaftertheExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewInitialReportispreparedwillbereviewedusingthefollowing processinaccordance withAttachment 9.a)TheSystemManagerwillreview,evaluateandscopeneworemergentsystem-specific itemswithinSIDSinaccordance withAttachment 8,"Criteria forWorkIncludedinRestartScope,"
System Manager            Indicates that this Restart scoped SIDS item is not complete and "EXCEPT"                 remains an exception to restart (i.e., completion of the item still needed to enter the mode identified in the mode restraint box in SIDS). This "EXCEPTION" is denoted in the Final System Manager Approval box in SIDS and is used by the System Manager during. Phases 3 and 4.
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage29of101b)TheSystemManagerisalsoresponsible forreviewandevaluation ofanynewlyinitiated Operating Experience itemsimpacting hisrespective systems.ThenewOperating Experience itemsaretobescopedforapplicability totheunitrestart.TheSystemManageristoensurethatOperating Experience itemsthatarescopedasrestartitemsareresolvedandfollow-up actionscompleted priortorestart.c)System-specific itemsthatresultinnewlycreatedcorrective maintenance ornewdesignchangerequestsaretobemonitored forclosure.2.Phase2OutageScopeApprovalProcess-Additions a)Oncenewemergentfieldworkitems(ARs/JOs/JOAs) arescopedbytheSystemManager,theywillbepresented totheOSMTforreviewandapprovalbythecognizant Engineering Supervisor orhisdesigneeinordertobeaddedtotheRestartSchedule; Thesenewemergentworkitemsaresubsequently (usuallyweekly)presented totheSRRB(orsubcommittee thereof)forreviewandapprovalbytheSystemManager.PORCapprovalofrestartitemsisnotrequiredduringPhase2.b)Allotheremergentsystem-specific itemsthatarenotfieldworkrelated(broke/fix) arescopedbytheSystemManagerandpresented totheSRRB(orsubcommittee thereof)forreviewandapproval.
System Manager "Post      Denoted on items associated with a component that has (2) or.
PORCapprovaloftheseitemsisnotrequiredduringPhase2.3.Phase2OutageScopeApprovalProcess-Deletions a~Whendeferring itemsthathavebeenpreviously approvedbytheSRRBandPORCasrestartitems,TheRestartRequiredScopeDeferralFormistobeused.Theformwillbereviewedthroughthesamelevelofapprovalthattherestartitemoriginally received.
Restart Deferred"        more post restart deferred items, excluding PM post restart items.
b.SystemWindows-1.SystemWindowScheduling Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPOUNDED SYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage30of101a)TheSystemManagerandOperations personnel shouldensurethattheapplicable restartworkiscontained withintherespective systemworkwindowor'therappropriate workopportunity.
System Manager "Restart  Denoted on items with deferred scope that were initially Required Deferred"        approved, as restart required. These items must be accompanied by a Restart Required Scope Deferral Form (Attachment 10).
Actualsystemworkwindowsaredeveloped andscheduled usingaSystemWorkWindowTeamthatassiststhescheduling organization.
Systemwindowplanningandscheduling willbeaccomplished bytheteamunderthesupervision oftheSystemManagerasfollows:~Interface withtheappropriate plannerandscheduler andobtaintheplannedsystemwindowsforreview.~Reviewthesystemscheduleforcompletion.
TheSystemManagershouldrecordsystemscheduleadditions, changes,conflicts, andomissions withinaninternalmemorandum senttoPlanningandScheduling.
~ThroughSystemWorkWindowTeammeetingstheSystemManagerwillensurethattheSystemWorkWindowTeamisawareofrestarttaskrequirements tosupportSystemWorkWindowschedules.
2.SystemWindowWorkManagement a)Thefollowing issuesaretobemonitored onsystemswithonlyoneworkwindow,ormonitored duringthefinalsystemworkwindowofasystem:~EnsureRestartRequiredscopeitemsarecompleted.
The,SystemManagerwillreviewcompleted itemstoensuretheworkwascompleted tohissatisfaction.
~TheSystemManageristoassurethatthefinalcommentfieldinSIDSiscompleted.
~ForRestartRequireditems,themodefieldandthetestrestraints withintheissuefieldaretobecompleted inSIDSbytheSystemManager.
<'.
Information PMP/200.RST.004 Rev.5Page31of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAM~ClosedrestartscopeitemsaretobereviewedandapprovedbytheSystemManagerandcommentsenteredintotheFinalCommentsScreenofeachiteminSIDS.Anapprovaldesignates thattheresponsible department forcompleting theitemhasstatusedtheitemasclosedorcomplete.
b)Thefollowing issuesaretobemonitored bythesystemworkwindowteamonsystemswithmultiplesystemworkwindows.~Ensure"Evaluation Type"openitems(i.e.,CRs,AREvalsetc.)arecompleted.
~Corrective maintenance itemsgenerated from"Evaluation Type"activities arescopedwithinSIDS.~Ensureemergentworkitems'scoped asRestartare'cheduled forcompletion priortotheendofthelastavailable systemworkwindow.c.SystemTestPlans1.TheSystemManagersareresponsible forassisting inthedevelopment oftheStartupTestingProgramfortheirrespective systems.TheSystemManagerwillsupporttheStart-upandPowerAscension Organization/Operations organizations inthiscapacity.
2.TheSystemManagerwillstartdeveloping SystemTestPlansinaccordance withPMP-7200.RST.005 (whenapproved).
TestPlanswillbedeveloped forappropriate systemsbasedonthereviewsperformed inPhase1.3.ForsystemswheretheSystemManagerconcludes thatSystemTestPlansarenotappropriate, justification astowhyaSystemTestPlanisnotrequiredwillbedeveloped.
d..SystemWalkdown1.SystemManagershouldcompleteasystemwalkdownonaroutinebasis.Thepurposeofthesewalkdowns istomonitorsatisfactory completion ofworkandtoidentifyemergentdeficient conditions.
e.Interaction withtheSystemReadiness ReviewBoard


Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage32of1011.Anynewtechnical issuesidentified inasystembySRRBduringPhase2willbedocumented inaCondition Report.TheCondition Reportwillbegenerated bytheSRRBsecretary orindividual SystemManagerswillwritetheCondition Reportsiftheissuewasidentified duringaSRRBmeetingorpresentation atwhichtheyarepresent.4.5Phase3-FinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewNOTE:Programownersorfunctional areamanagers(ordesignee) performscoping,monitoring, andclosureofnonsystem-specific programmatic orfunctional areadiscrepancies asdiscussed furtherinPMP7200.RST.009 andPMP7200.RST.010.
Information               PMP 7200.RST.004                 Rev. 5          Page 10            of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 3      RESPONSIBILITIES 3.1    The Director of Engineering Restart is responsible for overseeing Engineering preparations for restart, for the ESRR Program and, when needed, for chairing the System Readiness Review Board; ensuring that the requisite members are in attendance.
4.5.1GeneralScope'.ForRestartRequireditemsthatarenotplannedtobecompleted priortorestart,theRestartRequiredScopeDeferralForm(Attachment 10)istobereviewedthroughthesamelevelofapprovalaswhentheitemwasoriginally approvedforrestart.b.Applicable RestartRequiredScopeDeferralFormsaretobecompleted priortoclosureoftheapplicable SystemWorkWindow.ForCondition Reportsnotassociated withcorrective maintenance, thedeferralformistobecompleted nolaterthantheFinalExpandedSystemReadiness Review.c.RestartActivities 1.SystemManagerswillreviewallitemsscopedRESTART1orRESTART2inSIDStoascertain theircompletion priorto"affirming finalsystemreadiness forRestart.2.Afinalsystemreadiness reviewwalkdownwillbecompleted bytheSystemManagerandalicensedoperations representative.
3.2   The System Readiness Review Manager is responsible for:
3.AFinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReportwillbedeveloped.
3.2.1      Expanded System Readiness Review Program content and oversight.
4.TheSystemTestPlanwillberevisedtoincludeallitemsapplicable toRestartandPowerAscension thatwerenotapprovedinpreviousrevisions oftheTestPlan.  
3.2.2     Determination of the scope of the review for ESRR systems.
~mr~,
3.2.3      Ensuring adequate training and logistics support is provided to participating'eam members                                                                          j 3.2.4     Reviewing the results of the individual system readiness reviews, identifying any generic. concerns and defining progranunatic corrective action (ifany).
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page33of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAM5.TheFinalExpandedSystemReadiness Reviewiscompleted whentheSystemTestPlanhasbeenrevisedandreceivedTestReviewBoard(TRB)(reference PMP-7200.RST.005 (whenapproved))
3.2.5     Reviewing the attribute selection and the corresponding Assessment Matrix for each system (Figure 1).
concurrence andtheFinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReporthasbeencompleted, presented totheSRRBandthePORC,andPORCapprovalhasbeengivenforsystemRestart.6.RestartRequiredsystem-specific itemsthatarenotcompleted aretobecodedasanException withinSIDS.RefertoAttachment 11,"FinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewClarification Sheet,"fordetailedinformation.
3.2.6      Maintaining and revising this procedure on the Expanded System Readiness Review Program, annotating the changes made, and obtaining appropriate approvals.
7,ItemsthatarecodedasanException donotrequirecommentsintheFinalCommentfieldinSIDS.8.RestartRequiredsystem-specific itemsthatarenotplannedtobe.completed priortorestartaretobecodedasRestartRequiredDeferredintheFinalSystemManagerApprovalboxwithinSIDS.RefertoAttachment 11,"FinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewClarification Sheet,"fordetailedinformation.
3.2.7      Owns and manages the SIDS Database 3.3  The System Engineering Manager is responsible for the assignment of System Managers to systemrbeing reviewed, and for providing additional oversight for the ESRR Program.
d.PostRestartActivities SystemManagerswillreviewallsystem-specific itemsscopedPostRestartlorPostRestart2asappropriate inSIDSforfinalapprovalforapplicability toRestart.TheythencompletetheFinalCommentfieldinSIDSforallPostRestartitems.2.Forcomponents thathavetwo(2)ormoreassociated PostRestartitems,thePostRestartitemsaretobecodedasPostRestartDeferredintheFinalSystemManagerApprovalboxwithinSIDS.Refer-.to Attachment 11,"FinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewClarification Sheet,"fordetailedinformation.
3A    The System Engineering Supervisors are responsible for supervision and effective implementation of the Expanded System Readiness Review Program through active coaching, counseling and oversight of the System Manager. The System Engineering Supervisors jointly own the ESRR results with the System Managers.
3.PostRestartitemsrelatedtocomponents withmultiple(twoormore)deferredissues,excluding postrestartPMs,aretohavetheFinalCommentsectioncompleted inSIDSproviding technical justification forrestartbyevaluating theaggregate impactofthemultipledeferredtasksonthecomponent.
3.5  The Expanded System Readiness Review Program Coordinator is responsible for:
Thesecommentsaretobereferenced intheFinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReport.
3.5.1      Expanded System Readiness Review program development and implementation.
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage'34of1014.Marked-up drawingsidentifying thecomponents withmultipledeferredissueswillbeincludedwiththeFinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReport.5;Theaggregate impactofalloutstanding itemsagainstagivencomponent willbereviewed, assessing theoperability ofthecomponent.
3.5,2      Schedule and coordination
Justification forexclusion oftheitemsforFinalSystemReadiness willbeincludedintheFinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReport.6.Theaggregate impactofallaffectedcomponents willbeevaluated againstthegivensystemassessing theoperability ofthesystem,andthisevaluation willalsobeincludedintheFinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReport.4.5.2FinalRestartWorkClosurea.Allsystem-specific RestartScopeitemswithinSIDSaretobereviewedandconcurred withbytheSystemManager.Anapprovaldesignates thattheresponsible department forcompleting anitemhasstatusedtheitemasWorkCompleteorClosed.Anyknownexceptions totheitemsaretobenotedasspecified inSection4.5.1c.6priortoSystemManagerapproval.
Itemsnotadministratively closedaretobeaddressed withinthefinalcommentsastohowtheseitemsaretobeclosed.b.TheSystemManagercollectstheRestartRequiredScopeDeferralFormscompleted oneachsystemandreviewstheDeferredRestartRequiredWorkandPostRestartScopedWork,excluding postrestartPMs,foraggregate impacttothesystem,andpreparestechnical justification forsystemoperability inaccordance withitsdesignbasisfunctions=This reviewistobeincludedwithintheFinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReportasdiscussed inSection4.5.4a.4.5.3FinalSystemWalkdownandWalkdownReporta.TheESRRTeam,undertheleadership oftheSystemManager,willconductafinalsystemwalkdowninaccordance withtheguidanceofAttachment 7.Thepu'rposeofthewalkdownistoascertain properaccomplishment ofidentified, workandtoidentifyanypreviously undocumented systemdeficiencies.
b.Minimumwalkdownattendance willrequiretheSystemManagel.andalicensedoperations representative.
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage35of101c.Uponcompletion oftheSystemTeamWalkdown, theSystemManagerwillcompleteaWalkdownReport.Thisreportwillcoverthetopicsidentified inAttachment 15andwillformapartoftheFinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReport.d.Discrepancies identified duringthiswalkdownwillbeenteredintotheCorrective ActionProgramand/orWorkControlSystem.4.5.4FinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReporta.TheFinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReportwillincludethefollowing items:1.FinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewSIDSReport.2.FinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewSystemWalkdownReport(Attachment 15).3.ThereportwillincludeacoversheetsimilartoAttachment 13,titledFinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReport.4.CopiesofallRestartRequiredScopeDeferralFormsforthesystemaretobeattached.
I5.Impactofdeferredworkassessment (See4.5.4bbelow).6.SystemTestPlanb.Theimpactofdeferredwork(workscopedasPost-restart) willbe~assessed, firstindividually, theninaggregate onindividual systemcomponents, thenonthesystemoverallreadiness forrestartasdiscussed'further below.1.Thefollowing itemswillbeevaluated individually regarding theimpactonacomponent basis,aggregate impactonacomponent basis,andaggregate impactonasystembasis:~PostRestartScope,systemcomponents withmultiple(Twoormore)deferredworkitems,excluding postrestartPMs.~AllRestartrequireddeferredscopeComponents.
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page36of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAM2.Theevaluation willfirstaddresssystemcomponents withmultipledeferredworkitems.Atthecomponent level,thedeferredworkissues,thentheaggregate impactofthedeferredworkforeachcomponent willbeaddressed.
3.Thisdiscussion willincludethetechnical justification allowingthecomponent toreturntoservicewiththeidentified deferredworkissue(s).
4Systemcomponents withmultiple(twoormore)PostRestartdeferredworkitems,oranycomponent withadeferredRestartRequiredworkitemaretobeidentified ontheapplicable drawing(s)
(FlowDiagrams, WiringDiagrams, GeneralArrangement Diagrams),
withthedeferredworkidentification number(s) notednexttotheaffectedcomponent.
Alternately, the-.component canbeidentified'on thedrawingandalistofthedeferredworkidentification numbersforeachaffectedcomponent attached.
5.Theaggregate impactevaluation willconcludewithadiscussion onsystemreadiness toreturntoservice.Theaggregate impactonthesystemanditscapacitytoperformitsdesignbasisfunctionistobediscussed, addressing thecumulative impactofsystemcomponents withdeferredwork.Astatement willbeincludedexplaining howthedeferredworkistobescheduled.,
c.FinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewPresentations TheFinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReportsaretobereviewedbytherespective Operations andLicensing representatives, Engineering Supervisor, thenscheduled forpresentation totheSRRB.4tL'LMlI2.llTheFinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReportistobepresented totheSRRBandPORCbytheSystemManager,thecognizant Engineering Supervisor andalicensedoperations representative.
SRRBorPORCcommentsoropenitemsaretobeaddressed asdiscussed inSections4.3.14ethrough4.3.14gfortheInitialExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReport.d.SystemTestPlans


Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage37of1011.SystemTestPlansaretobefinalized asspecified in(PMP-7200.RST.005 (whenapproved)).
Information             PMP 7200.RST.004                 Rev. 5          Page 11 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 3.5.3    Reviewing and recommending for approval the attribute selection and the corresponding Assessment Matrix for each system.
Theplanswillincludeallitemsapplicable toRestartandPowerAscension whichhavebeenfinalized subsequent topreviousrevisions oftheTestPlan.2.SystemTestPlansorJustifications fornothavingSystemTestPlanswillbereviewedandapprovedbytheTestReviewBoard.3.SystemTestPlanswillbeimplemented throughPhase3andPhase4oftheESRRProgram.4.5.5Phase3EmergentWorkManagement a.Emergentcorrective actionitemsaretobecontinuously scopedforrestartapplicability throughout Phase3.UseofPRArisk-based insightsmayhelpwithmarginalcases.b.Afterinitialcommentsandscopingonanemergentsystem-specific workitemisincorporated intheSIDSdatabase, theitemiscoded"APPROVE".
3.5.4    Review the Assessment Data Base to identify generic issues and trends.
TheSystemManageralsoreviewsthescopingoftheitemandifRestartrequired, thenannotates itintheSIDSdatabaseas"EXCEPT"(todesignate theitemasarestartexception ifnot.completed).
3.6    The Assessment Data Base Coordinator is responsible for:
c.Forasystem-specific itemscopedasPostRestart,commentsare,enteredintheFinalCommentsfieldandtheSystemManagercodestheitemasPostRestartDeferred.
3.6.1    Assuring that the Assessment Data Base is operational and available to the ESRR teams.
d.Foremergentsystem-specific fieldworkitems,refertoSection4.4.2a.2.a) fortheapprovalprocess.e.Forallotheremergentsystem-specific itemsthatarenotfieldworkrelated(broke/fix),
3.6.2  Maintaining the data in the Assessment Data Base and providing status.and summary reports regarding the ESRR.
refertosection4.4.2a.2.b) fortheapprovalprocess..
3.7    The SIDS Data Base Coordinator is responsible for:
f.Thesystem-specific Exception ListinSIDSistobecontinually managedbytheSystemManageruntilthesystemisturnedovertoOperations fortesting.g.Forthosesystemspecificitemsthatarecompleted andsatisfyrestartrequirements, changethe"EXCEPT"to"CONCUR"andcompletetheFinalCommentssectioninSIDS.4.6Phase4-StartupAndPowerAscension Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPMDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage38of101NOTE'rogram owners-or functional areamanagers(ordesignee) performscoping,monitoring, andclosureofnonsystem-specific programmatic orfunctional areadiscrepancies asdiscussed furtherinPMP7200.RST.009 andPMP7200.RST.010.
3.7.1  Assuring that the SIDS Data Base is operational and available to the ESRR.
4.6.1GeneralScopea.Phase4activities includethefollowing:
teams, and to program owners and functional area managers (or designees).
1.Phase4commences oneachsystemwiththePORCapprovalofFinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReportforthatsystem.2.TheSystemManageristomonitorthroughcompletion thosesystem-specific workitemsscopedException withinSIDS.3.Management ofemergentsystem-specific workitemsthroughthenormalworkcontrolprocessandScopeAddition/Deletion CoverSheet(TBDL).4.TheSystemManageristocompleteSystemReadiness Affirmation aftertheretestportionofthesystemworkwindowandpriortorestoration ofsystemoperability tosupportunitRestart.5.'ystemReadiness Affirmation andsubmittal oftheSystemReadiness Affirmation Report(Attachment 16).6.EachSystemManageristomonitortheconductoftheStationStartupandPowerAscension Planasitrelatestohissystem.7.TheSystemManageristoimplement thebaselinesystemperformance monitoring, trackingandtrending.
3.7.2  Making any required changes or improvements to the SIDS Data Base.
S.SystemWorkWindowTeamsaretocontinuetomeetonaregularbasis.TheSystemManagerwillleadtheteaminmanagingfuturesystemworkwindows,aswellasmonitoring opencorrective actionitems,operability issues,andreliability issuesonthesystem.9.Phase4iscompletewhenallpowerascension testingiscompleteandtherespective unitattains100%ratedunitloadfor-(TBDL)-days..4.6.2Phase4EmergentSystem-Specific WorkManagement, PriortoSystemAffirmation r0 Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage39of101a.Emergentissuesaretobereviewedtosupportthesystemworkwindowschedule.
3.7.3  Ensuring that items required to be scoped are entered into the SIDS Data Base.
b.Emergentcorrective actionitemsaretobepresented totheOSMTwithanattachedScopeAddition/Deletion CoverSheet(TBDL).c.EmergentitemsaretohaveinitialcommentsenteredintoSIDSandtobescopedasfollows:1,EmergentitemsthatarerequiredforrestartwillbescopedRestartlorRestart2, inaccordance withAttachment 8,"Criteria forWorkIncludedinRestartScope."2.Itemsthatareidentified tobeworkedinaccordance withthenormalWorkControlsystemrequirements aretobescopedasWORKCONTROLPROCESS(WCP).ItemsscopedasWCPwillincludethetechnical basisforwhentheitemshouldbecompleted.
3.7.4   Providing and maintaining the quality of SIDS reports.
Theseconditions shallsupportworkorderpriorities asdefinedinPMI-2291toensurecontinued systemreadiness.
3.8    System Managers are responsible for:
3.Anexplanation, providing technical justification (Reference item6onAttachment 8)istobeenteredintheInitialCommentsFieldinSIDS.4.TheSystemManageristo"APPROVE" itemsintheInitialSystemManagerApprovalboxinSIDSonceheissatisfied withthescopeoftheitem-.d.Corrective maintenance workitemsaretobepresented totheOSMTwithaScopeAddition/Deletion CoverSheet(TBDL).Engineering issuesthatmayimpactthesystemaffirmation processaretobeincludedandmanagedviatheRestartSchedule.
3.8.1  Overall system health and performance.
e.RestartRequireditemsthatarenotcompletearetobecome"Exceptions,"
3.8.2  Organizing and leading each ESRR Team. The Team will be composed of
andaddedtothe"Exceptions" list.Whenanitemiscompleted, theSystemManageristoreviewanddenoteas"CONCUR"withintheFinalSystemManagerApprovalboxinSIDS.4.6.3SystemReadiness Affirmation a.TheSystemManagerwillcompleteaSystemReadiness Affirmation Reportwhichwillincludethefollowing information:
            'he  necessary multi-discipline resources to conduct Phase 1 of the Expanded System Rea'diness Reviews. The System Teams will include the following:
1.CurrentsystemLicenseChangeRequest(s).
: a. System Manager
Information PMF7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage40of1012.Currentlistofoperatorworkarounds.
: b. Operations Representative
3.Currentcorrective actionsthatinvolveControlRoomequipment.
: c. Design Engineering Representative
4.Currently installed Temporary Modifications.
: d. Maintenance Representative.
5.ActiveOperability Determinations (ODs)andJustifications forContinued Operation (JCOs),withtheassociated 10CFR50.59 screenorevaluation foreachODorJCO.6.Theremaining opensystem-specific "Exceptions" itemsandanysystem-specific "Exceptions" identified duringtheaffirmation process.Exceptions areremaining openrestartrequireditems.7.Anyotheroperations focuslistconcernsinvolving thesystem.8.Reference totheInitialExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReport9.Reference tothesystemtestsspecified intheSystemTestPlan.b.TheSystemManagerandlicensedoperations representative willconductaSystemReadiness Affirmation walkdownanddocumentwalkdownonSystemWalkdownReport(Attachment 15).TheresultsofthewalkdownwillbeincludedintheSystemReadiness Affirmation Report.c.Thelicensedoperations representative willco-signtheSystemReadiness Affirmation ReportwiththeSystemManager.d.Anycorrective actionsidentified duringtheSystemReadiness Affirmation aretobeaddressed withintheworkcontrolprocessandidentifiedao theOutageControlCenterforresolution, Engineering actionitemsaretobeaddedtotheEngineering PriorityListwiththedesignated engineeridentified asthelead.toresolvetheissue.e.TheSystemManagerandthelicensedoperations representative willpresenttheSystemReadiness Affirmation ReporttoSRRBandPORC.f."AnycommentsreceivedfromSRRBduringthePhase4requireresolution andresponsewithinthreeweeksfromthedateoftheSRRBmeeting.g.Thesystemisturnedovertooperations afterPORCapprovaloftheSystemReadiness Affirmation Report.  
: e. Licensing Representative
~.
: f. Outside member(s) with varied industry experience
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page41of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAM4.6.4SystemTestPlansa.TheSystemManagersaretomonitortheresultsofeachrespective
 
'SystemTestPlan.TheSystemManagersaretofollow-through ondeficient testplanresultstheCorrective ActionProgramand/orWorkControlSystemasappropriate.
Information               PMP 7200.RST.004                 Rev. 5          Page 12  of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 3.8.3    Coordinating team requests for system design and licensing basis documentation from the appropriate sources.
ACondition ReportshallbeissuedforanyitemsthatfallwithinthescopeoftheCorrective ActionProgram.b.SystemTestPlanresultsaretobeselectively incorporated withintheSystemManagerPerformance Monitoring Program(TBDL).4.6.5EmergentSystem-Specific WorkManagement AfterSystemAffirmation a.Allemergentissuesaretobescopedas"WCP"or"WorkControlProcess"intheSIDSdatabase.
3.8.4     Performing Phases 1, 2, and 3, and supporting Phase 4 of the ESRR.
Emergentworkistobeaddressed withinthe'workcontrolprocessasdescribed withintheStationAdministrative Procedures.
3.8.5      Coordinating preparation of the ESRR Initial and Final Reports, and presenting these reports to the SRRB and PORC.
b.Emergentcorrective maintenance issuesaretobepresented totheOSMT.Emergentengineering issuesthatmayimpactunitstart-uparetobeaddressed withintheEngineering, PriorityList.4.7Reports4.7.1Phase1-InitialExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReport.a.TheInitialExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReportsaretobecompleted inaccordance withSection4.3.14andAttachment 12.4.7.2Phase3-FinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReporta.TheFinalExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReportsaretobecompleted inaccordance withSection4.5.4andAttachment 13.4.7.3Phase4-SystemReadiness Affirmation Reporta.TheSystemReadiness Affirmation Reportsaretobecompleted IAWSection4.6.3a.4.7.4Integrated SystemReadiness Reporta.TheESRRManagerorhisdesigneeshallprepareareportwhichintegrates theresultsoftheindividual systemESRRefforts.
3.8.6      Assembling ESRR review results and restart action items into the SIDS Database for tracking.
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXUDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage42of101b.Theintegrated report(seeAttachment 14)shallsummarize theresultsoftheESRRactivities inPhases1and2,andidentifythestatusofotherprograms, reviewsandupgradesthataresupportive oftheESRR'nproviding reasonable assurance ofbeinginconformance withlicensing anddesignbasis.c.Theintentofthisintegrated reportandassociated backupinformation istoprovideassurance thattheplantdesign,testing,maintenance, operation andconfiguration conformstothelicensing anddesignrequirements andthattheplantisinacondition tosupportplantoperation forthenextruncycle.d.Thefinalintegrated SystemReadiness Reportwillbepresented totheSRRBforreviewandtothePORCforapproval.
3.8.7    Maintaining a status of restart action items and submitting status updates to plant management as required.
5FINALCONDITIONS 5.1None6REFERENCES 6.1CookNuclearPlantRestartPlan6.26.3NUREG1397,AnAssessment ofDesignControlPractices andDesignReconstitution ProgramsintheNuclearPowerIndustryERestartStrategyforRestartIssue5455,PlantSystemsReadiness Assessment 6.4Auxiliary Feedwater SSFIReport(November 1998)6.56.6Engineering IssuesReviewGroupFinalReport(December 19,1998)PMP7200.RST.006, ExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewProgramForLevel2Systems6.7PMP-7200,RST.005 (whenapproved),
3.8.8    Coordinating and conducting system.walkdowns with appropriate team members.
RestartStartupPowerAscension Program Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMPage43of1016.8CR98-8122,SystemReadiness Reviewsfor21SystemsMayNotbeEffective inVerifying SystemOperability 6.9PMP-7200.RST.009, Functional AreaRestartReadiness 6.10PMP-7200.RST.010, Programmatic RestartReadiness
3.8.9    Organizing and leading each work window team (see Section 4.4.2b.1).
,6.11Commitment Management SystemCommitment 72806.12Commitment Management SystemCommitment 71976.13Commitment Management SystemCommitment 73036.14Commitment Management SystemCommitment 67836.1SCommitment Management SystemCommitment 7319 Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page44of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 1SYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWBOARD(SRRB)CHARTERPages:44-45SYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWBOARDSRRBCHARTERPURPOSE:Performasystem-based, multidisciplinary technical reviewofpotential restartissuesassociated withrisksignificant plantequipment.
3.9    The Expanded System'Readiness      Review Teams are responsible for:
Thisboardisintendedtoensureconsistent application oftherestartcriteriacontained intheCookNuclearPlantRestartPlanamongsystemmanagers, andthatrestartdecisions reflectthesharedconcernsofOperations, Maintenance andEngineering.
3.9.1    Identifying attributes appropriate to their specific system for assessment.
Theresultofthisreviewwillbetodefinetheequipment relatedworkthatisneededtoprovidereasonable assurance ofasafeandreliablestanupandachieveasafe,reliable, andefficient poststartupoperating cycle.MEMBERS:DirectorofEngineering Restart(Chair)DirectorofPlantEngineering (ViceChair)SystemEngineering Manager(ViceChair)VicePresident ofNuclearEngineering ManagerofSystemReadiness ReviewsDirectorofDesignEngineering (ViceChair)DirectorofNuclearFuels,SafetyandAnalysis(ViceChair)Operations representative
3.9.2    Selecting topic areas appropriate to the identified attributes.
-BobHeathcote (primary) orRodneyFoster(alternate)
3.9.3    Performing system attribute checks and walkdowns and documenting the results, including any noted discrepancies, in the assessment data base.
EOPProjectrepresentative
3.9.4    Reviewing items in the SIDS data base and scoping the items      as discussed  in section 4,3.12.
-KevinWhite(primary) orJimAbshire(alternate)
3.9.5    Entering the deficiencies in the Cook Plant Corrective Action Program and/or Work Control System as appropriate.
Externalconsultants:
3.9.6    Providing assistance to the System Manager    as required.
JohnDurham>>>>GregGibbs>>>>PhilHildebrandt>>>>
3.10  The Operations Manager is responsible for assigning appropriate Operations representatives to support the ESRR Program.
LarryDemick>>>>JeffBass>>>>(primary) orBiHBryant'(alternate)
3.11  The Director of Regulatory Affairs is responsible for assigning appropriate Licensing representatives to support the ESRR Program.
Westinghouse representative Systemengineering supervisors BoardSecretary Non-voting members:Additional occasional attendance bymembersofthePlantOperations ReviewCommittee, theRestartgroup,andtheEngineering Effectiveness organization isexpectedtoreinforce expectations andprovideoversight fortherestartissuereviewprocess=.Additionally, theSRRBChairmanmayinviteguest,non-voting memberstosupplement theboardwhenreviewing nonwngineering programorfunctional areaassessment resultsorSIDSissues.QUORUM:(ESRRRelatedBoard-Functions)
3.12  The Maintenance Manager is responsible for assigning appropriate maintenance representatives to support the ESRR Program.
Chair(orViceChair),anOperations andEOPProjectrepresentative, andaminimumoftwoofthedoubleasterisked namedmembers,andoneengineering supervisor, notassociated withthesystemordocument/program underreview.ASRRBSecretary shallalsobepresentbutmaybeoneoftheSRRBmembers.Noboardwillconsistofmorethansixvotingmembers.Othermembersmayparticipate attheirdiscretion asnon-voting membersinsuchcases.
 
55%QJ Information PMP'7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page45of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 1SYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWBOARD(SRRB)CHARTERPages:44-45QUORUM(Programmatic andFunctional AreaReadiness BoardFunctions)
I, ik.$ g Information                  PMP 7200.RST.004                Rev. 5          Page 13 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 3.13    The Design Engineering Director is responsible for assigning appropriate Design Engineering representatives to support the ESRR Program.
Chair(orViceChair),minimumoftwoofthedoubleasterisked membersandtwoothermembers.Oneoftheadditional membersshallbeanengineering representative forreviewsofengineering programs.
3.14    The SRRB w'ill perform management oversight and assessment of the Expanded
Noboardshallconsistofmorethanfivevotingmembers.AnSRRBSecretary shallalsobepresentbutmaybeoneoftheSRRBmembers.Othermembersmayparticipate attheirdiscretion asnon-votingmembersinsuchcases.ACTIONS:TheSRRBwill:l.Serveastheprimaryindependent engineering reviewbodyfor0350checklist itemrestartactionplansasrequiredbyPMP7200.RST.001'nd, asdelineated furtherinPMP7200.RST.004 andPMP7200.RST.006, expandedsystemreadiness reviewidentified issuesandreports.TheSRRBwillalsoperformfunctions relatedtoassuringproperdispositioning ofprogrammatic andfunctionareareadiness discrepancies asdetailedinPMP7200.RST.009 andPMP7200.RST.010.
      =-
TheSRRBaffirmsandapprovesthescopingofpotential deficient conditions aseitherrestartorpost-restart basedoncriteriadefinedintherestartplan.2.Initsreviews,enforcetechnical rigor,consistency ofapproach, andathoroughassessment ofsystemreadiness.
System Readiness Review Program and will be the final approval authority over work item screening. The SRRB will perform activities applicable to this procedure, including approval of the System Assessment Matrices. The SRRB Charter is included in Attachment l. An expected product of the SRRB oversight is improved consistency and technical depth of the ESRR results.
TheSRRBwillalsochallenge engineers toensuretheissuesarefullyunderstood.
3.15    The PORC is responsible to provide a cross-discipline oversight of the ESRR Program by reviewing ESRR reports for each system and the Integrated Readiness Review Report.
3.Ensurearecordofdecisions andconcernsraisedbytheSRRBreviewisdocumented forfuturereview.Programmatic implementation concernsraisedbytheSRRBwillbedocumented oncondition reportsinitiated bytheSRRBsecretary.
3.16    The Outage Scope Management Team (OSMT) will review emergent work items following Phase 1 to determine whether or not they are required to support Unit restart.
4.Ensurethatnuclearengineering principles andtheattributes ofgoodengineering aredemonstrated bytheengineering staff.5.Ensurethattheengineers understand theirrolesandresponsibilities.
4        DETAILS 4.1      Scope And Selection      Of Systems For Expanded System    Readiness Review NOTE:            The term "TBDL" when used in this document refers to detail To Be Developed Later and incorporated in a subsequent revision to this document or in other documents.
TheDirectorofEngineering Restartisresponsible formanagement oversight ofSRRBactivities andfordisbanding thisboardafterstartupwhendirectedbytheSiteVicePresident.
4.1.1      Previously, a plant System Readiness Review was conducted as discussed in Reference 6.3. A graded approach was used in performing the previous system readiness reviews, with high-risk systems receiving more thorough reviews. The previous system readiness reviews were broken down into three levels-with. the following attributes:
PORC=will'provide oversight oftheSRRBandapproveExpandedSystemReadiness Reportsasdiscussed inPMP.7200.RST.004 andPMP7200.RST.006 inthatoversight role.Thischarterbecomeseffective withtheissuanceofPMP7200.RST.004 REVISION5.  
: a. Level  1 Systems
                        .1. Risk-significant Maintenance Rule systems
: 2. Some important non-risk significant standby maintenance rule systems
: b. Level 2 Systems
: 1. Remaining non-risk significant Maintenance Rule systems
: c. Level 3 Systems
 
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: 1. Non-Maintenance Rule systems that support power generation
: 2. Systems that are required for plant operation, are easily monitored in service, and present little or no challenge to safety 4.1.2    The 21 Level 1 systems included in the previous System Readiness Review are listed in Attachment 2.
4.1.3    Subsequent to the completion of the previous System Readiness Review, several independent reviews were conducted, including a Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI) of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (Reference 6.4) and an Engineering Issues Review Group final report (Reference 6.5).
These reviews identified vulnerabilities with respect to the scope of systems reviewed during the previous System Readiness Review, additional system design basis and licensing basis issues, and weaknesses in engineering programs and processes.
4.1.4    The classification of Level 1, 2, and 3 systems utilized during the previously performed system readiness reviews were based solely on Maintenance Rule input. The Level 1 systems were Maintenance Rule Risk systems. Level 2 systems were non-risk significant systems, but      'ignificant systems that were still included in the scope of the Maintenance Rule.
Level 3 systems were systems that were not included in the scope of the Maintenance Rule.
4.1.5    The classification of Level 1 and 2 systems utilized during the ESRR Program is based on Maintenance Rule input, systems required for safe shutdown, significant attendant/support systems, and systems identified by the System Engineering Manager that have experienced an abnormal amount of corrective maintenance. The basis for the selection of Level 1 systems is found in Attachment 3.
4.1.6     Expanded System Readiness Reviews under this procedure will be conducted on all of the previous Level 1 systems, plus additional systems that were determined to warrant an Expanded System Readiness Review (Refer to Attachment 4). Expanded System Readiness Reviews for the new Level 2 Systems will be addressed in a separate procedure.
4.2  Use  Of The System    Assessment Matrix, SIDS, And The Assessment Data Base 4.2.1    The ESRR employs a vertical slice approach derived from the methodology of a Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI). This approach evaluates system safety important to safe operation and accident mitigation functions (Attributes) against plant configuration and design, licensing, operations and maintenance documents (Topic Areas).
 
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4.2.3  The System Manager, accompanied by the cognizant System Engineering Supervisor, presents a description of the system scope and the system specific Assessment Matrix to the SRRB for approval. This helps the SRRB ascertain that attributes are appropriate.
4.2;4  The requirements associated with each of the attributes are evaluated against specific topic areas or sources of information.
4.2.5  The assessments include comparison,and evaluation of documents as well as observations of plant condition and configuration during system walkdowns.
The ESRR will emphasize those attributes, topic areas and activities necessary to satisfy the program purpose.
4.2.6   The results are documented using Attribute Assessment Forms (Figure 3) in the Assessment Data Base. Discrepancies are entered into the Cook Plant Corrective Action Program and/or Work Control System (NPM).
Assessment Data Base manipulation and reporting capabilities assist in reporting, tracking and identification of generic issues and trends.
4.2.7  By assessing the results for all topic areas across all the systems reviewed, the ESRR can assist in determining the extent of condition of vulnerabilities in plant programs and processes already identified by previous inspections and reviews (e.g., References 6.4 and 6.5). The ESRR will also be used to identify other potential vulnerabilities and the potential need for further improvement in plant processes and programs.
4.2.8  In summary, the ESRRs result in a vertical slice evaluation of selected design and licensing bases for the ESRR systems. These evaluations do not guarantee that future external or internal assessments  will not uncover additional problem reviews. However, in conjunction with other ongoing horizontal slice restart programs at Cook Plant and resolution of issues that are recommended for restart, the ESRRs provide reasonable assurance that key systems are capable of meeting their safety and accident mitigation functions as defined in their design and licensing basis.
 
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4.3    Phase 1 Initial Expanded System Readiness Review 4.3.1  Expanded System Readiness Review Team Formation
: a. The System Engineering Manager will assign a System Manager to each of the Expanded System Readiness Review teams.
: b. The System Manager will lead the Expanded System Readiness        Review'eam comprised of a licensed member from Operations and members                ..
from Design Engineering, Maintenance, Licensing, and outside members with strong industry experience; 4.3.2  Training
: a. Prior to performing the reviews, training will be conducted for the AEP System Managers and the ESRR Team members on Expanded System Readiness Review Program knowledge and skill needs. These needs are defined- in Attachment 5.
: b. The training for the AEP System Managers and the ESRR Teams was determined based on an evaluation of the tasks to be performed and lessons learned form the original System Readiness Reviews, the original System Engineering Review Board, and previously performed engineering and programmatic assessments.
A 4.3.3  Review Design and Licensing Basis Documentation
: a. The ESRR Team shall become familiar with the design and licensing basis of the system to gain an understanding of the system functional and safety requirements under normal operating and accident conditions. The design and license basis documentation listed in Attachment 6 will be available to the ESRR Team.
: b. Access to the following will be provided to the ESRR Teams.
: 1. EQ information
: 2. Appendix R information
 
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: 3. Station Blackout information
: 4. ISI/IST Program Information 5;  Seismic qualification information
: 6. Electrical design criteria (separation, etc.)
: 7. Maintenance Rule Program Information
: 8. Individual Plant Examination (IPE) Results
: 9. High Energy Line Break Program'Information
: 10. Generic Letters GL89-13, GL83-28, GL96-01, and responses thereto.
: 11. Generic Letter GL89-10 program information.
: 12. Generic Letter GL96-06 information (as available)
: 13. LER 97-021 and associated single failure commitments
: 14. 1998  AFW SSFI Report
: 15. 1998 Containment Spray SSFI Report
: 16. Engineering Issues Review Group Report (Reference 6.5)
: c. The expectation is that the System Manager will review the above information to determine its impact on his system.
: d. Licensing will provide the results of a review of licensing commitments on a system basis.
4.3.4  Define System Specific Attributes
: a. During the review and evaluation of design and licensing information, each ESRR Team will develop a list of attributes to be included in the assessment on the System Assessment Matrix.
 
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: b. Attributes will be selected by a thorough review of the design and, licensing basis to identify the system safety and accident mitigation functions. Additional functional requirements of the system and critical components may also be selected. Information from the Licensing Review Program will be considered as will PRA insights on risk significant components and functions. Functionality of attendant/support systems and important passive equipment (e.g.,
tanks, bladders, strainers) will also be considered in selection of system attributes. Generic requirements such as Station Blackout, EQ, Appendix R, etc. will also be selected as system attributes when appropriate. A detailed example of and some requirements for attribute selection and their bases are provided in the Figure 2 addendum.
4.3.5  Establish Scope  of Review
: a. Each ESRR Team will perform a vertical slice review of its assigned system by evaluating the system and common attributes against specific topic review areas as documented in the system Assessment Matrix.
The topic areas to be assessed for each attribute will be defined in an initial System Assessment Matrix at the start of the ESRR, taking into account the results of previous evaluations at Cook Plant. This initial System Assessment Matrix will be reviewed and recommended by the ESRR Program Coordinator or Manager and the Nuclear Licensing Manager or Director of Regulatory Affairs, and approved by the SRRB. Changes made in response to SRRB comments need not be re-reviewed by the other parties who previously reviewed the matrix.
These reviews and approvals will be based on the matrix and other supporting material as dictated by the board. Typically, this information will consist of:
              ~    A listing of the system safety and accident mitigation functions
              ~    The matrix itself, showing the attributes chosen and the topics to be reviewed for each
              ~    A marked-up system flow diagram or schematic depicting system boundaries
 
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              ~  A separate word description'of system physical boundaries      and functional boundaries. Functional boundaries are those interfaces with other systems or the environment that must be proper in order for the system to function as designed. An example would be a circuit breaker in a non-safety related system that must open to protect a connected safety-related system if the aon-safety related system incurs a fault.
              ~  A description of the attributes chosen and the sub-attributes of each which the team intends to pursue.
: b. The System Assessment Matrix will be used by each ESRR team as a          "
guideline to ensure adequate coverage of topic areas and all attributes.
: c. Based on the additional knowledge and understanding gained in the course of the review, specifically including the results of the review of licensing commitments, actual coverage of specific topic areas for particular attributes may expand and deviate from the initial matrix, provided that coverage of appropriate topic areas and all attributes is maintained. If ongoing licensing or ESRR'reviews identify the need to add,attributes to the assessment matrix, these additions will be approved by the ESRR Manager or the ESRR Program Coordinator.
Such additions will be communicated in a timely manner between Licensing aad the ESRR Manager. Actual coverage will be documented in the final System Assessment Matrix, which will be reviewed by the ESRR Program Manager or Program Coordinator and will be included in the Initial Expanded System Readiness Review report.  "
4.3.6  Review System Condition Documeatation
: a. Data sources in SIDS will be reviewed by the ESRR Teams to gain a comprehensive understanding of the current system condition, to assess the system functional requirements for readiness, and to evaluate the conformance of the system condition to its design basis. A specific focus of this effort shall be the identification of fundamental vulnerabilities in the system's ability to perform its safety and accident mitigation functions as defined in the Design and Licensing Basis.
 
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: b. During the review and evaluation of these data sources, the ESRR team may develop additional specific requirements to be checked. For
              . example, if a previously conducted assessment identified a discrepancy between a component capability and a design requirement, this design requirement would be a candidate for investigation and the satisfactory closure of the previously identified discrepancy would be assessed as part of the ESRR. The same strategy may be applied to assess the satisfactory closure of open items that were identified when the Design Basis Documents were created.
4.3.7  Perform Assessment of System Attributes and Topic Areas
: a. The checks of specific attributes against the topic areas will assess the internal consistency of system documents, procedures, and plant configuration and their conformance with design and licensing requirements. The ESRR Team will document conformance with requirements as well as discrepancies on an Attribute Assessment Form. An example of a completed Attribute Assessment Form is provided in Figured (Actual form may vary slightly as it will be computer generated).
: b. Each Attribute Assessment Form shall list the documentation reviewed or walkdown observations made to arrive at the assessment conclusions. The list of reviewed documents shall contain revision numbers and/or date if applicable. The assessment forms shall describe the assessment and indicate the number of attribute checks covered by the assessment form and the number of attribute checks which resulted in identification of discrepancies. The ESRR team shall determine the extent of condition for discrepancies identified within their system by conducting additional checks as necessary.
: c. A summary of the evaluation for each attribute will be documented in the Initial System Readiness Report. This sumtnary will document the checks made to verify the capability of the system to perform its safety and accident mitigation functions.
4.3.8  Perform Walkdown of System
 
Information            PMP 7200.RST.004                  Rev. 5          Page 21  of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM ao The System Manager shall develop the walkdown strategy in accordance with the System Walkdown Guidelines and brief the ESRR Team (see Attachment 7). The walkdowns conducted as part of the previous System Readiness Reviews tended to focus on material condition. The ESRR walkdowns will include evaluation of material condition, but will also focus on configuration or environmental issues that could also impact the design and licensing basis. [Ref. 6.13]
System safety and accident mitigation function flow paths should be indicated on system flow diagrams. The marked up drawings will be used to assist the System Manager to verify the system safety and accident mitigation functions during the system walkdowns. Other drawings may be used by teams to check specific configuration or as-built details against drawing requirements.
C. Participants in the walkdowns will include the System Manager, the Operations representative, a Maintenance representative, and outside team member(s). Participation by representatives of design engineering and licensing may also be obtained when required by the System Manager;
: d. The assessment performed during the walkdown will be documented, together with discrepancies noted, in the assessment data base.
: e. Corrective action items identified during the walkdowns shall be.
entered into the Corrective Action Program and/or Work Control System by initiating a Condition Report or Action Request respectively.
These corrective action items will also be captured in the SIDS data base and the Assessment Data Base.
A Walkdown Report (Attachment      15) is to be assembled by the System Manager-and included in the Initial Expanded System Readiness Report The report will discuss the following:
: 1. Walkdown purpose and scope
: 2. Walkdown findings
: 3. Necessary corrective actions identified
: 4. Summarization    of system concerns and condition
: 5. Suinmarization and justification for portions of systems that are not walked down.
 
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: g. During the review and evaluation of the walkdowns, the System Team may develop additional checks to make beyond those on the Walkdown
              . Guidelines.
4.3.9  Identify Long Standing or Recurring Equipment Performance Issues
: a. Each ESRR team will obtain information from previous Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) evaluations, the IST program self assessment, and Maintenance Rule evaluations to identify potential long-standing or recurring equipment performance issues. Such issues be identified for follow-up in the Assessment Data Base and the      'hall Corrective Action Program and/or Work Control System and the results will be documented in the Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Report. A Condition Report shall be issued for any item that falls within the scope of the Corrective Action Program.  ~
4.3.10  Evaluate Extent  of Condition for Identified Problems
: a. Each system team shall assess recurring issues to determine whether further extent of condition determination is required (beyond the planned scope as documented in the initial system Assessment Matrix) and document any such conditions in the Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Report. [Ref. 6.14]
: b. The ESRR Program Manager and Program Coordinator shall review the results across all the reviewed systems to identify potential programmatic or generic issues. Ifappropriate, this information will be used to recommend corrective actions of a programmatic nature.
The results will be documented in the Expanded System Readiness Review Integrated Results, described in Attachment 14.
4.3.11 Documen~view.results and enter discrepancies into ESRR Assessment Data Base and the Cook Plant Corrective Action Program and/or Work Control System. A Condition Report shall be issued for any items that fall within the scope of the Corrective Action Program.
: a. Attribute checks performed as well as discrepancies found in this review are to be documented in the Assessment Data'ase.
Discrepancies shall also be entered into the Cook Plant Corrective Action Program by Condition Report or the Work Control System by Action Request.
 
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: b. Condition Reports and Action Requests will automatically be loaded into the SIDS data base. This SIDS data base will allow tracking of
                    .. open  items required for restart and will allow evaluation of potential aggregate effects of those items not required to be resolved prior to restart.
NOTE:        Program owners or functional area managers (or designee) perform scoping, monitoring, and closure of non system-specific programmatic or functional area discrepancies as discussed further in PMP 7200.RST.009 and PMP 7200.RST.010.
4.3.12    Determine Restart Workscope
: a. All system-specific    items in the SIDS data base will be reviewed against the Restart Issues Selection/Screening Criteria (see Attachment 8). The System Manager is responsible for adding any known open corrective action items not present in SIDS for his system. These items are to be evaluated for Restart Readiness Scope. PRA risk-based insights may be helpful in deciding marginal cases.
: b. Each system-specific item in the SIDS database will be evaluated using the evaluation process outlined in Attachment 8. The ESRR Team will recommend one of the following classifications for each such item in SIDS in order to enable return of the Cook Plant Units to operation in a safe and reliable manner:
: 1. RESTART1 - Activities required to be completed prior to entering Startup/Power Ascension of Unit 1. This classification includes necessary restart and power ascension testing activities as well as definition of the applicable mode restraint.
: 2. RESTART2 - Activities required to be completed prior to entering Startup/Power Ascension of Unit 2. This classification includes necessary restart and power ascension testing activities as well as definition of the applicable mode restraint.
: 3. POST RESTART1 - Activities which should be completed on a schedule consistent with the Unit 1 normal plant work controls process.
: 4. POST RESTART2 - Activities which should be completed on a schedule consistent with the Unit 2 normal plant work controls process.
 
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: 5. NOT APPLICABLE - Activities that are not required to be completed.
: c. These classifications will be used to determine and schedule the work within the appropriate restart time frame;
: d. Preventive Maintenance activities are unique since they often provide a means of enhancing equipment performance. However, the equipment being serviced may require being removed from operation. As a result, the ESRR must take these activities into consideration when evaluating PM activities. The following expectations are associated with the evaluations of PM activities:
              ~      All PMs  scheduled for completion before August 31, 2001 are to
                    , be reviewed.
              ~      PMs scheduled (next required date) prior to March 31, 2000 are to be categorized as RESTART1 or RESTART2.
              ~      PMs that are scheduled or planned during the operating cycle, and require a unit outage to complete, are to be categorized as RESTART1 or RESTART2's appropriate.
              ~      PMs scheduled (next required date) prior to August 31, 2001 that are not part of on-line maintenance or a Functional Equipment Group (FEG) outage; and will impact a surveillance test, or initiate an unplanned or unscheduled LCO during the operating cycle, are to be categorized as RESTART1 or RESTART2.
              ~      PMs that are scheduled as a function of a pre-planned or pre-sehedtQed FEG outage, with or without an ensuing LCO, and do not challenge unit/system operability, are to be categorized as POST RESTART1 or POST RESTART2.
Some re-screening      will be necessary ifthe assumed dates above change.
: e. All system    leaks are to be evaluated. Scope determination guidelines are as follows:
ll
              ~      Any leak location with no available isolation is to be categorized  as RESTART1 or RESTART2, unless reasonable justification for a different categorization is provided.
 
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                ~    Any ASME code component/vessel/piping leakage is to be categorized as RESTART1 or RESTART2.
              "~    Leakage that can only be isolated by using a "freeze seal" is to be categorized as RESTART1 or RESTART2.
                ~    Any leakage identified within containment requiring corrective action is to be categorized as RESTART1 or RESTART2.
Leakage identified on systems outside containment, on non-ASME code components/vessels/piping, that is isolable, and would not challenge system operability or reliability if worked non-outage, is to be categorized as POST RESTART1 or POST RESTART2.
Leakage from systems outside containment that would or could contain radioactive fluids that could violate leakage requirements in Section 14.3 of the UFSAR is to be categorized RESTART1 or RESTART2.
4.3.13  Labeling
                ~    Any labeling issues that have potential impact to work control tagging are to be categorized as RESTART1 or RESTART2 with the mode identified.,
                ~    Any labeling issues with any potential impact to system operability or reliability are to be categorized as RESTART1 or RESTART2.
                ~    Only labeling issues that have no impact on components/systems work control tagging are to be categorized    as POST RESTART1 or POST RESTART2.
4.3.14  Prepare Initial Expanded System Readiness Report and Present to The System Readiness Review Board.
: a. The information gathered throughout the system readiness review and
              .walkdown shall be compiled by the ESRR Team into an Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Report. Each member of the review team, including participants in the walkdowns, will be identified in the report.
 
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: b. The System Manager will ensure that each open corrective action item identified during the ESRR and walkdown is initiated either as a Condition Report or Action Request, and, ifsystem-specific, is evaluated and scoped in the SIDS data base prior to the SRRB presentation.
C. The report content is as depicted in Attachment 12 and will be presented to the SRRB for approval. Minor changes in the report format are permitted with the concurrence of the ESSR program manager or coordinator. The System Manager will be accompanied by the Engineering Supervisor cognizant over the system.
: d. When the Initial Expanded System Readiness Report is approved by the SRRB, the System Manager will next present the report to the PORC for approval. Ifthe report is approved by the SRRB with comments, the System Manager will resolve all SRRB comments and the original signees of the report will re-review the report and approve comment resolution. If the SRRB disapproves the report, the System Manager must re-present the report to the SRRB until approval is obtained, obtaining re-reviews as necessary.
: e. After the report  has been presented to the SRRB, the SRRB Secretary will provide the cognizant Engineering Supervisor with a list of all comments the System Manager needs to address. In some instances when the new technical issues are identified during SRRB reviews, the System Manager will be required to write a Condition Report on the issue. In this case, the respective Engineering Supervisor is to debrief the System Manager, and record the debrief in the CR. The debrief will address all comments recorded at the SRRB presentation. When ESRR program implementation problems are identified, the SRRB secretary will write a Condition Report oh the issue.
: f. After SRRB approval, the System Manager presents the Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Report to the PORC. The PORC will approve or disapprove the report, from a nuclear safety standpoint, keeping an overview perspective that focuses on ensuring that inter-disciplinary concerns were adequately addressed. PORC should not normally focus on approving SRRB action on each discrepant condition but rather should probe into methods and overall results. If approved, the action items will be included in the restart effort. Any changes to the scope (restart/post restart) of individual items will be recorded in the PORC meeting minutes. Ifdisapproved, the System Manager will take appropriate actions and re-present the report to the PORC.
 
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                - g. The cognizant Engineering Supervisor will ensure incorporation of PORC comments within the report and SIDS data base. PORC comments are to be incorporated in SIDS by the SIDS Data Base Coordinator, and reviewed by the System Manager. PORC comments within the report are to be incorporated by the System Manager.
4.3.15    Functional Areas and Programmatic Issues
: a. Open items associated with functional areas and programs    will be loaded into the SIDS data base.
: b. If the open  functional area or programmatic items affect specific systems, these items will be transferred to the appropriate system, within SIDS, where the ESRR Teams will scope the items.
: c. The SRRB will review the scoping of programmatic and functional area work items that are not system specific subject to a schedule and protocol established by the Director of Restart.
: d. Functional area and programmatic issue items will be reviewed and approved by SRRB.
: e. For open functional area and programmatic items that are not system specific, the appropriate functional area or program owners are responsible for ensuring that the functional areas and programs are ready to support restart in accordance with the Restart Plan.
4.4    Phase 2  - Restart Activities Monitoring NOTE'rogram              owners or functional area managers (or designee) perform scoping, monitoring, and closure of non system-specific programmatic or functional area discrepancies-as. discussed further in PMP 7200.RST.009 and PMP 7200.RST.OIO 4.4.1      General Description    of Phase 2 Activities
: a. The System Manager will use SIDS to monitor approved system work scope and identify any new action items. Work activities should be frequently field verified and monitored to insure corrective actions are being taken and no adverse plant conditions develop.
: b. The System Manager will perform the following activities:
: 1. Monitor closure of approved system-specific workscope items using SIDS and available performance indicators.
 
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: 2. Identify and evaluate new emergent system-specific action items for restart; consider using risk-based insights where available to enhance decision-making in marginal cases.
: 3. Perform routine field walkdowns
: 4. Make presentations to the SRRB as requested
: 5. Review system work window planning and scheduling to ensure work is being properly scheduled
: 6. Provide input to and review System Test Plans
: 7. Update SIDS to reflect proper completion of open system-specific items and to document exceptions to completed work
: c. For Restart Required items that are not planned to be completed prior to restart, the system-specific Restart Required Scope Deferral Form (Attachment 10) is to be reviewed through the same level of approval as when the item was originally approved for restart.
: d. Applicable Restart Required Scope Deferral Forms are to be completed prior to closure of the applicable System Work Window. For Condition Reports not associated with corrective maintenance, the deferral form is to be completed no later than the Final Expanded System Readiness Review.
4.4.2  Management    of Workscope NOTE:      Emergent items scoped as restart must be scheduled in the appropriate System Work Windows.
: a. Identify and Scope Emerging (New) Open Items
: 1. Phase 2  work items that are evaluated and scoped for accomplishment prior to restart after the Expanded System Readiness Review Initial Report is prepared will be reviewed using the following process in accordance with Attachment 9.
a)    The System Manager will review, evaluate and scope new or emergent system-specific items within SIDS in accordance with Attachment 8, "Criteria for Work Included in Restart Scope,"
 
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c)    System-specific items that result in newly created corrective maintenance or new design change requests are to be monitored for closure.
: 2. Phase 2 Outage Scope Approval Process      - Additions a)    Once new emergent field work items (ARs/JOs/JOAs) are scoped by the System Manager, they will be presented to the OSMT for review and approval by the cognizant Engineering Supervisor or his designee in order to be added to the Restart Schedule; These new emergent work items are subsequently (usually weekly) presented to the SRRB (or subcommittee thereof) for review and approval by the System Manager.
PORC approval of restart items is not required during Phase 2.
b)  All other  emergent system-specific items that are not field work related (broke/fix) are scoped by the System Manager and presented to the SRRB (or subcommittee thereof) for review and approval. PORC approval of these items is not required during Phase 2.
: 3. Phase 2 Outage Scope Approval Process      - Deletions a~When deferring      items that have been previously approved by the SRRB and PORC as restart items, The Restart Required Scope Deferral Form is to be used. The form will be reviewed through the same level of approval that the restart item originally received.
: b. System Windows
            -1. System Window Scheduling
 
Information        PMP 7200.RST.004                    Rev. 5          Page 30 of 101 EXPOUNDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM a)  The System Manager and Operations personnel should ensure that the applicable restart work is contained within the respective system work window or'ther appropriate work opportunity. Actual system work windows are developed and scheduled using a System Work Window Team that assists the scheduling organization. System window planning and scheduling will be accomplished by the team under the supervision of the System Manager as follows:
                    ~    Interface with the appropriate planner and scheduler and obtain the planned system windows for review.
                    ~    Review the system schedule for completion. The System Manager should record system schedule additions, changes, conflicts, and omissions within an internal memorandum sent to Planning and Scheduling.
                    ~    Through System Work Window Team meetings the System Manager will ensure that the System Work Window Team is aware of restart task requirements to support System Work Window schedules.
: 2. System Window Work Management a)  The following issues are to be monitored on systems with only one work window, or monitored during the final system work window of a system:
                    ~    Ensure Restart Required scope items are completed. The, System Manager will review completed items to ensure the work was completed to his satisfaction.
                    ~    The System Manager is to assure that the final comment field in SIDS is completed.
                    ~    For Restart Required items, the mode field and the test restraints within the issue field are to be completed in SIDS by the System Manager.
 
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                        ~    Closed restart scope items are to be reviewed and approved by the System Manager and comments entered into the Final Comments Screen of each item in SIDS.
An approval designates that the responsible department for completing the item has statused the item as closed or complete.
b)    The following issues are to be monitored by the system work window team on systems with multiple system work windows.
                        ~    Ensure "Evaluation Type" open items (i.e., CRs, AR Evals etc.) are completed.
                        ~    Corrective maintenance items generated from "Evaluation Type" activities are scoped within SIDS.
                        ~    Ensure emergent work items'scoped as Restart are
                            'cheduled for completion prior to the end of the last available system work window.
: c. System Test Plans
: 1. The System Managers are responsible for assisting in the development of the Startup Testing Program for their respective systems. The System Manager will support the Start-up and Power Ascension Organization/Operations organizations in this capacity.
: 2. The System Manager will start developing System Test Plans in accordance with PMP-7200.RST.005 (when approved). Test Plans will be developed for appropriate systems based on the reviews performed in Phase 1.
: 3. For systems where the System Manager concludes that System Test Plans are not appropriate, justification as to why a System Test Plan is not required  will be developed.
d.. System Walkdown
: 1. System Manager should complete a system walkdown on a routine basis. The purpose of these walkdowns is to monitor satisfactory completion of work and to identify emergent deficient conditions.
: e. Interaction with the System Readiness Review Board
 
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: 1. Any new technical issues identified in a system by SRRB during Phase 2 will be documented in a Condition Report. The Condition Report will be generated by the SRRB secretary or individual System Managers will write the Condition Reports if the issue was identified during a SRRB meeting or presentation at which they are present.
4.5    Phase 3  - Final Expanded System Readiness Review NOTE:        Program owners or functional area managers (or designee) perform scoping, monitoring, and closure of non system-specific programmatic or functional area discrepancies as discussed further in PMP 7200.RST.009 and PMP 7200.RST.010.
4.5.1    General Scope For Restart Required items that are not planned to be completed prior to restart, the Restart Required Scope Deferral Form (Attachment 10) is to be reviewed through the same level  of approval as when the  item was originally approved for restart.
: b. Applicable Restart Required Scope Deferral Forms are to be completed prior to closure of the applicable System Work Window. For Condition Reports not associated with corrective maintenance, the deferral form is to be completed no later than the Final Expanded System Readiness Review.
: c. Restart Activities
: 1. System Managers will review all items scoped RESTART1 or RESTART2 in SIDS to ascertain their completion prior to "affirming final system readiness for Restart.
: 2. A final system  readiness review walkdown will be completed by the System Manager and a licensed operations representative.
: 3. A Final Expanded    System Readiness Review Report  will be developed.
: 4. The System Test Plan will be revised to include all items applicable to Restart and Power Ascension that were not approved in previous revisions of the Test Plan.
 
~ mr~,
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: 5. The Final Expanded System Readiness Review is completed when the System Test Plan has been revised and received Test Review Board (TRB) (reference PMP-7200.RST.005 (when approved))
concurrence and the Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report has been completed, presented to the SRRB and the PORC, and PORC approval has been given for system Restart.
: 6. Restart Required system-specific items that are not completed are to be coded as an Exception within SIDS. Refer to Attachment 11, "Final Expanded System Readiness Review Clarification Sheet,"
for detailed information.
7,  Items that are coded as an Exception do not require comments in the Final Comment field in SIDS.
: 8. Restart Required system-specific items that are not planned to be .
completed prior to restart are to be coded as Restart Required Deferred in the Final System Manager Approval box within SIDS.
Refer to Attachment 11, "Final Expanded System Readiness Review Clarification Sheet," for detailed information.
: d. Post Restart Activities System Managers will review all system-specific items scoped Post Restartl or Post Restart2 as appropriate in SIDS for final approval for applicability to Restart. They then complete the Final Comment field in SIDS for all Post Restart items.
: 2. For components that have two (2) or more associated Post Restart items, the Post Restart items are to be coded as Post Restart Deferred in the Final System Manager Approval box within SIDS.
Refer-.to Attachment 11, "Final Expanded System Readiness Review Clarification Sheet," for detailed information.
: 3. Post Restart items related to components with multiple (two or more) deferred issues, excluding post restart PMs, are to have the Final Comment section completed in SIDS providing technical justification for restart by evaluating the aggregate impact of the multiple deferred tasks on the component. These comments are to be referenced in the Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report.
 
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: 4. Marked-up drawings identifying the components with multiple deferred issues will be included with the Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report.
5;  The aggregate impact of all outstanding items against a given component will be reviewed, assessing the operability of the component. Justification for exclusion of the items for Final System Readiness will be included in the Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report.
: 6. The aggregate impact of all affected components will be evaluated against the given system assessing the operability of the system, and this evaluation will also be included in the Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report.
4.5.2  Final Restart Work Closure
: a. All system-specific  Restart Scope items within SIDS are to be reviewed and concurred with by the System Manager. An approval designates that the responsible department for completing an item has statused the item as Work Complete or Closed. Any known exceptions to the items are to be noted as specified in Section 4.5.1c.6 prior to System Manager approval. Items not administratively closed are to be addressed within the final comments as to how these items are to be closed.
: b. The System Manager collects the Restart Required Scope Deferral Forms completed on each system and reviews the Deferred Restart Required Work and Post Restart Scoped Work, excluding post restart PMs, for aggregate impact to the system, and prepares technical justification for system operability in accordance with its design basis functions=This review is to be included within the Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report as discussed in Section 4.5.4a.
4.5.3  Final System Walkdown and Walkdown Report
: a. The ESRR Team, under the leadership of the System Manager, will conduct a final system walkdown in accordance with the guidance of Attachment 7. The pu'rpose of the walkdown is to ascertain proper accomplishment of identified, work and to identify any previously undocumented system deficiencies.
: b. Minimum walkdown attendance will require the System Managel. and        a licensed operations representative.
 
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: c. Upon completion of the System Team Walkdown, the System Manager will complete a Walkdown Report. This report will cover the topics identified in Attachment 15 and will form a part of the Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report.
: d. Discrepancies identified during this walkdown will be entered into the Corrective Action Program and/or Work Control System.
4.5.4  Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report
: a. The Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report will include the following items:
: 1. Final Expanded System Readiness Review SIDS Report.
: 2. Final Expanded System Readiness Review System Walkdown Report (Attachment 15).
: 3. The report  will include a cover sheet similar to Attachment 13, titled Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report.
: 4. Copies of all Restart Required Scope Deferral Forms for the system are to be attached.
I
: 5. Impact of deferred work assessment (See 4.5.4b below).
: 6. System Test Plan
: b. The impact    of deferred work (work scoped as Post-restart) will be
              ~
assessed,  first individually, then in aggregate on individual system components, then on the system overall readiness for restart as discussed'further below.
: 1. The following items will be evaluated individually regarding the impact on a component basis, aggregate impact on a component basis, and aggregate impact on a system basis:
                    ~    Post Restart Scope, system components with multiple (Two or more) deferred work items, excluding post restart PMs.
                    ~    All Restart required deferred  scope Components.
 
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: 2. The evaluation will first address system components with multiple deferred work items. At the component level, the deferred work issues, then the aggregate impact of the deferred work for each component will be addressed.
: 3. This discussion will include the technical justification allowing the component to return to service with the identified deferred work issue(s).
4    System components with multiple (two or more) Post Restart deferred work items, or any component with a deferred Restart Required work item are to be identified on the applicable drawing(s) (Flow Diagrams, Wiring Diagrams, General Arrangement Diagrams), with the deferred work identification number(s) noted next to the affected component. Alternately, the-.
component can be identified'on the drawing and a list of the deferred work identification numbers for each affected component attached.
: 5. The aggregate impact evaluation will conclude with a discussion on system readiness to return to service. The aggregate impact on the system and its capacity to perform its design basis function is to be discussed, addressing the cumulative impact of system components with deferred work. A statement will be included explaining how the deferred work is to be scheduled.,
: c. Final Expanded System Readiness Review Presentations The Final Expanded System Readiness Review Reports are to be reviewed by the respective Operations and Licensing representatives, Engineering Supervisor, then scheduled for presentation 4tL'L Ml I  to the SRRB.
: 2. The Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report is to be ll      presented to the SRRB and PORC by the System Manager, the cognizant Engineering Supervisor and a licensed operations representative. SRRB or PORC comments or open items are to be addressed as discussed in Sections 4.3. 14e through 4.3. 14g for the Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Report.
: d. System Test Plans
 
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: 1. System Test Plans are to be finalized as specified in (PMP-7200.RST.005 (when approved)). The plans will include all items applicable to Restart and Power Ascension which have been finalized subsequent to previous revisions of the Test Plan.
: 2. System Test Plans or Justifications for not having System Test Plans will be reviewed and approved by the Test Review Board.
: 3. System Test Plans will be implemented through Phase 3 and Phase 4 of the ESRR Program.
4.5.5    Phase 3 Emergent      Work Management
: a. Emergent corrective action items are to be continuously scoped for restart applicability throughout Phase 3. Use of PRA risk-based insights may help with marginal cases.
: b. After initial comments and scoping on an emergent system-specific work item is incorporated in the SIDS database, the item is coded "APPROVE". The System Manager also reviews the scoping of the item and if Restart required, then annotates it in the SIDS database as "EXCEPT" (to designate the item as a restart exception if not.
completed).
: c. For a system-specific item scoped as Post Restart, comments are
                  , entered in the Final Comments field and the System Manager codes the item as Post Restart Deferred.
: d. For emergent system-specific field work items, refer to Section 4.4.2a.2.a) for the approval process.
: e. For all other emergent system-specific items that are not field work related (broke/fix), refer to section 4.4.2a.2.b) for the approval process..
: f. The system-specific Exception List in SIDS is to be continually managed by the System Manager until the system is turned over to Operations for testing.
: g. For those system specific items that are completed and satisfy restart requirements, change the "EXCEPT" to "CONCUR" and complete the Final Comments section in SIDS.
4.6  Phase 4 - Startup And Power Ascension
 
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4.6.1    General Scope
: a. Phase 4 activities include the following:
: 1. Phase 4 commences on each system with the PORC approval of Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report for that system.
: 2. The System Manager is to monitor through completion those system-specific work items scoped Exception within SIDS.
: 3. Management of emergent system-specific work items through the normal work control process and Scope Addition/Deletion Cover Sheet (TBDL).
: 4. The System Manager is to complete System Readiness Affirmation after the retest portion of the system work window and prior to restoration of system operability to support unit Restart.
: 5.  'ystem    Readiness Affirmation and submittal of the System Readiness Affirmation Report (Attachment 16).
: 6. Each System Manager is to monitor the conduct of the Station Startup and Power Ascension Plan as it relates to his system.
: 7. The System Manager is to implement the baseline system performance monitoring, tracking and trending.
S. System Work Window Teams are to continue to meet on a regular basis. The System Manager will lead the team in managing future system work windows, as well as monitoring open corrective action items, operability issues, and reliability issues on the system.
: 9. Phase 4 is complete when all power ascension testing is complete and the respective unit attains 100% rated unit load for - (TBDL)-
days..
4.6.2    Phase 4 Emergent System-Specific        Work Management, Prior to System Affirmation
 
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: a. Emergent issues are to be reviewed to support the system work window schedule.
: b. Emergent corrective action items are to be presented to the OSMT with an attached Scope Addition/Deletion Cover Sheet (TBDL).
: c. Emergent items are to have initial comments entered into SIDS and to be scoped as follows:
1,  Emergent items that are required for restart will be scoped Restartl or Restart2, in accordance with Attachment 8, "Criteria for Work Included in Restart Scope."
: 2. Items that are identified to be worked in accordance with the normal Work Control system requirements are to be scoped as WORK CONTROL PROCESS (WCP). Items scoped as WCP will include the technical basis for when the item should be completed.
These conditions shall support work order priorities as defined in PMI-2291 to ensure continued system readiness.
: 3. An explanation, providing technical justification (Reference item 6 on Attachment 8) is to be entered in the Initial Comments Field in SIDS.
: 4. The System Manager is to "APPROVE" items in the Initial System Manager Approval box in SIDS once he is satisfied with the scope of the item-.
: d. Corrective maintenance work items are to be presented to the OSMT with a Scope Addition/Deletion Cover Sheet (TBDL). Engineering issues that may impact the system affirmation process are to be included and managed via the Restart Schedule.
: e. Restart Required items that are not complete are to become "Exceptions," and added to the "Exceptions" list. When an item is completed, the System Manager is to review and denote as "CONCUR" within the Final System Manager Approval box in SIDS.
4.6.3  System Readiness Affirmation
: a. The System Manager will complete a System Readiness Affirmation Report which will include the following information:
: 1. Current system License Change Request(s).
 
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: 2. Current list of operator workarounds.
: 3. Current corrective actions that involve Control Room equipment.
: 4. Currently installed Temporary Modifications.
: 5. Active Operability Determinations (ODs) and Justifications for Continued Operation (JCOs), with the associated 10CFR50.59 screen or evaluation for each OD or JCO.
: 6. The remaining open system-specific "Exceptions" items and any system-specific "Exceptions" identified during the affirmation process. Exceptions are remaining open restart required items.
: 7. Any other operations focus list concerns involving the system.
: 8. Reference to the Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Report
: 9. Reference to the system tests specified in the System Test Plan.
: b. The System Manager and licensed operations representative will conduct a System Readiness Affirmation walkdown and document walkdown on System Walkdown Report (Attachment 15). The results of the walkdown will be included in the System Readiness Affirmation Report.
: c. The licensed operations representative will co-sign the System Readiness Affirmation Report with the System Manager.
: d. Any corrective actions identified during the System Readiness Affirmation are to be addressed within the work control process and identifiedao the Outage Control Center for resolution, Engineering action items are to be added to the Engineering Priority List with the designated engineer identified as the lead.to resolve the issue.
: e. The System Manager and the licensed operations representative will present the System Readiness Affirmation Report to SRRB and PORC.
f." Any comments received from SRRB during the Phase 4 require resolution and response within three weeks from the date of the SRRB meeting.
: g. The system is turned over to operations after PORC approval of the System Readiness Affirmation Report.
 
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: a. The System Managers are to monitor the results of each respective Test Plan. The System Managers are to follow-through on      'System deficient test plan results the Corrective Action Program and/or Work Control System as appropriate. A Condition Report shall be issued for any items that fall within the scope of the Corrective Action Program.
: b. System Test Plan results are to be selectively incorporated within the System Manager Performance Monitoring Program (TBDL).
4.6.5    Emergent System-Specific Work Management After System Affirmation
: a. All emergent    issues are to be scoped as "WCP" or "Work Control Process" in the SIDS database. Emergent work is to be addressed within the'work control process as described within the Station Administrative Procedures.
: b. Emergent corrective maintenance issues are to be presented to the OSMT. Emergent engineering issues that may impact unit start-up are to be addressed within the Engineering, Priority List.
4.7    Reports 4.7.1  Phase  1 - Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Report.
: a. The Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Reports are to be completed in accordance with Section 4.3. 14 and Attachment 12.
4.7.2  Phase 3 Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report
: a. The Final Expanded System Readiness Review Reports are to be completed in accordance with Section 4.5.4 and Attachment 13.
4.7.3    Phase 4 System Readiness Affirmation Report
: a. The System Readiness Affirmation Reports are to be completed IAW Section 4.6.3a.
4.7.4    Integrated System Readiness Report
: a. The ESRR Manager or his designee shall prepare a report which integrates the results of the individual system ESRR efforts.
 
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: b. The integrated report (see Attachment 14) shall summarize the results of the ESRR activities in Phases 1 and 2, and identify the status of other programs, reviews and upgrades that are supportive of the ESRR
                    'n  providing reasonable assurance of being in conformance with licensing and design basis.
: c. The intent of this integrated report and associated backup information is to provide assurance that the plant design, testing, maintenance, operation and configuration conforms to the licensing and design requirements and that the plant is in a condition to support plant operation for the next run cycle.
: d. The final integrated System Readiness Report will be presented to the SRRB for review and to the PORC for approval.
5      FINAL CONDITIONS 5.1    None 6      REFERENCES 6.1    Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Plan 6.2    NUREG 1397, An Assessment of Design Control Practices and Design Reconstitution Programs in the Nuclear Power Industry E
6.3    Restart Strategy for Restart Issue 5455, Plant Systems Readiness Assessment 6.4    Auxiliary Feedwater SSFI Report (November 1998) 6.5    Engineering Issues Review Group Final Report (December 19, 1998) 6.6    PMP 7200.RST.006, Expanded System Readiness Review Program For Level 2 Systems 6.7    PMP-7200,RST.005 (when approved), Restart Startup Power Ascension Program
 
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, 6.11    Commitment Management System Commitment 7280
: 6. 12  Commitment Management System Commitment 7197 6.13    Commitment Management System Commitment 7303 6.14    Commitment Management System Commitment 6783 6.1S    Commitment Management System Commitment 7319
 
Information                PMP 7200.RST.004                          Rev. 5          Page 44    of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment  1 SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW BOARD                                      Pages:
(SRRB) CHARTER                                    44-45 SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW BOARD SRRB CHARTER PURPOSE:        Perform a system-based, multidisciplinary technical review of potential restart issues associated with risk significant plant equipment. This board is intended to ensure consistent application of the restart criteria contained in the Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Plan among system managers, and that restart decisions reflect the shared concerns of Operations, Maintenance and Engineering. The result of this review will be to define the equipment related work that is needed to provide reasonable assurance of a safe and reliable stanup and achieve a safe, reliable, and efficient post startup operating cycle.
MEMBERS:      Director of Engineering Restart (Chair)
Director of Plant Engineering (Vice Chair)
System Engineering Manager (Vice Chair)
Vice President of Nuclear Engineering Manager    of System  Readiness Reviews Director of Design Engineering (Vice Chair)
Director of Nuclear Fuels, Safety and Analysis (Vice Chair)
Operations representative - Bob Heathcote (primary) or Rodney Foster (alternate)
EOP Project representative - Kevin White (primary) or Jim Abshire (alternate)
External consultants:        John Durham>>>>
Greg Gibbs>>>>
Phil Hildebrandt>>>>
Larry Demick>>>>
Jeff Bass>>>> (primary) or BiH Bryant' (alternate) Westinghouse representative System engineering supervisors Board Secretary Non-voting members: Additional occasional attendance by members of the Plant Operations Review Committee, the Restart group, and the Engineering Effectiveness organization is expected to reinforce expectations and provide oversight for the restart issue review process=.Additionally, the SRRB Chairman may invite guest, non-voting members to supplement the board when reviewing nonwngineering program or functional area assessment results or SIDS issues.
QUORUM:      Chair (or Vice Chair), an Operations and EOP Project representative, and a (ESRR      minimum of two of the double asterisked named members, and one engineering Related    supervisor, not associated with the system or document/program under review. A Board    SRRB Secretary shall also be present but may be one of the SRRB members. No
-Functions)  board willconsist of more than six voting members. Other members may participate at their discretion as non-voting members in such cases.
 
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Attachment    1 (SRRB) CHARTER                                      44-45 QUORUM            Chair (or Vice Chair), minimum of two of the double asterisked members and two (Programmatic    other members. One of the additional members shall be an engineering and Functional    representative for reviews of engineering programs. No board shall consist of more Area Readiness    than five voting members. An SRRB Secretary shall also be present but may be one Board        of the SRRB members. Other members may participate at their discretion as non-Functions)      voting members in such cases.
ACTIONS:      The SRRB will:
: l. Serve as the primary independent engineering review body for 0350 checklist item restart action plans as required by PMP 7200.RST.001'nd, as delineated further in PMP 7200.RST.004 and PMP 7200.RST.006, expanded system readiness review identified issues and reports. The SRRB will also perform functions related to assuring proper dispositioning of programmatic and function area readiness discrepancies as detailed in PMP 7200.RST.009 and PMP 7200.RST.010. The SRRB affirms and approves the scoping of potential deficient conditions as either restart or post-restart based on criteria defined in the restart plan.
: 2. In its reviews, enforce technical rigor, consistency of approach, and a thorough assessment of system readiness. The SRRB      will also challenge engineers to ensure the issues are fully understood.
: 3. Ensure a record of decisions and concerns raised by the SRRB review is documented for future review. Programmatic implementation concerns raised by the SRRB willbe documented on condition reports initiated by the SRRB secretary.
: 4. Ensure that nuclear engineering principles and the attributes    of good engineering are demonstrated by the engineering staff.
: 5. Ensure that the engineers understand their roles and responsibilities.
The Director of Engineering Restart is responsible for management oversight of SRRB activities and for disbanding this board after startup when directed by the Site Vice President. PORC=will'provide oversight of the SRRB and approve Expanded System Readiness Reports as discussed in PMP. 7200.RST.004 and PMP 7200.RST.006 in that oversight role.
This charter becomes effective with the issuance of PMP 7200.RST.004 REVISION 5.
 
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Attachment 2 PREVIOUS SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW              46-47 THE 21 LEVEL 1,SYSTEMS FOR THE PREVIOUS EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW WERE 120 volt AC/CRID Inverters Air Recirculation/Hydrogen  Recombiner Auxiliary Feedwater 250 volt DC Station Batteries Component Cooling Water Containment Containment Spray Control Air ECCS Accumulators ECCS Charging/CVCS High Head Injection ECCS Residual Heat Removal ECCS Safety Injection Emergency Diesel Generators Essentiai Service Water Ice Condenser Main Steam Non-essential Service Water Plant Air Compressors
 
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PREVIOUS SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW                      46-47 Reactor Coolant System Reactor Protection System/Solid-state Protection/ESFAS Electrical Safety Buses 4000 volt and 600 volt
 
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SYSTEMS FOR EXPANDED SYSTEM 48-48 READINESS REVIEW The following rationale was used in selecting the 39 systems to be reviewed in accordance with this procedure. All selected systems are identified in Attachment 4.
Maintenance Rule Risk Si      ificant S stems All Cook Plant Maintenance Rule Risk Significant systems were included in the Level      1 ESRR.
S stems Re    uired to Su    ort Safe Shutdown The Cook Plant specific fire protection/Appendix R reports/documents were reviewed to identify systems required to support safe shutdown. All of these systems were included in t5e scope of the Level 1 ESSR.
Attendant/Su      ort S stems Attendant systems were considered during the identification of Level 1 systems being selected for the ESRR. Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning systems such as Control Area Ventilation, Switchgear Ventilation and Containment Ventilation were included in the scope of the ESRR. The Screenwash and Fire Protection Systems were also included as attendant/support system.
Historical Performance of Cook Plant      S stems The historical performance of Cook Plant systems was considered. Based on input from the System Engineering Manager and the Operations Manager additional systems such as Emergency Lighting, and Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) were included.
Third Pa      Review of the Sco The scope of the systems chosen for ESRR was reviewed by a peer group and an independent third party to ensure that successful completion of the ESRR on these systems would provide a reasonable assurance that the Cook Plant can be restarted safely and reliably.
 
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Attachment 4 LEVEL 1 SYSTEMS                                49-  50 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION            ABB  SYSTEM        RELATED SYSTEMS          RISK SIG SAFE SHUT SIG SUPPORT    SIG LEVEL                                            DOWN      SYSTEM    CORRECTIVE MAINT.
ECCS CHARGING                          CVCS          Includes Cha in  Letdown Boron Path and SINJ ECCS SI POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM        Ir PASS                                              N AUX BUILDINGVENT ESF                                  Includes ABV GEN  & AF/ESW V CONTROL ROOM COMPLEX VENTILATION        CRAC SWITCHGEAR VENTILATION                  SWGR                                              N 250 VDC STATION BATI'ERIES            250 VDC        Includes N TRN ICE CONDENSER                            ICE CONTROL ROD & CONTROL ROD DRIVE        CRDM          Includes RPI RPS/SSPS/ESFAS LOCAL SHUTDOWN INDICATIONSYSTEM          LSI                                            N RADIATIONMONITORING                      RMS RVLIS                                  RVLIS COMPONENT COOLING WATER                CCW CNTMT ISOLATION COMPONENTS                CIV SPENT FUEL PIT COOLING 120 VAC VITALBUSES & CRID INVERTER      CRID MAINSTEAM                                MS          Includes DUMP & N2 for PORVs AIR RECIRC/H2 SKIMMER                    ~CE CONTAINMENTVENTILATION                    CV VENTILATION- DIESEL GENERATOR        DG VENT EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS "S" in the "Safe Shutdown Column" indicates  a support system      for safe shutdown
 
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Attachment 4 LEVEL 1 SYSTEMS                                    49-50 SYSTEM DESCRIFTION            ABB  SYSTEM        RELATED SYSTEMS              RISK SIG SAFE SHUT SIG SUPPORT    SIG-LEVEL                                                DOWN      SYSTEM    CORRECTIVE MAINT.
ELECTRICAL SAFETY BUSES              T BUS        Includes 4KV & 600 V SCREENWASH                            SCRN          Includes Screcnhouse/Intake FIRE PROTECTION - HALON & CARDOX                    Includes RCP FP                        N AUXILIARYBUILDING TURBINE BUILDING CONTROL AIR                                        Includes Com ressed  Air Header &
CNTMT Control Air Header PLANT AIR COMPRESSOR                  PAC          Includes BAC CONTAINMENT                          CNTMT          Includes DIS & H2 REC    & HDS CONTAINMENTSPRAY AUX FEEDWATER SYSTEM                                Includes CST Includes MLMS ECCS ACCUMULATORS                    ACCUM RCS/RCS PRESSURE RELIEF EMERGENCY LIGHTING PACKS              E LTG                                                N OFFSITE POWER                        OFPW          Includes SWYD ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER                ESW NON ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER          NESW NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION                NI          Includes T/C                            N "S" in the "Safe Shutdown Column" indicates  a support system          for safe shutdown
 
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Attachment 5 TRAINING REQUIREMENTS                            51-51 1.0    TECHNICA'L TRAINING 1.1      Human Error Reduction Techniques for Engineers* (including record review and verification) 1.2      Electronic Corrective Action System
'.3        Folio Database*
1.4      Calculation Matrix 1.5    System Design and Licensing Basis~
1.6    SRO level self taught systems training with test and remediation*
1.7    Causal Analysis and effective problem solving techniques 1.8    Operability Determinations*
1.9    50.59 Screens and Evaluations*
1.10    PRA/Maintenance Rule 1.11    INPO Database/NRC Web Page~
1.12    Environmental*Qualification 1.13    Generic Letter 89-13 1.14    Generic Letter 89-10 1.15    High Energy Line Break Analysis 1.16    Appendix R 1.17    Station Blackout 1.18    Communications-Elevating Issues to Mgnt.
2.0      PROCESS TRAINING 2.1      The Enhanced System Readiness Review Program and Procedure 2.2      Use of the Assessment Database 2.3      Systems Indexed Database System (SIDS), access and data entry 2.4      Use of. computers 2.5      Lessons Learned and Vulnerabilities from previous independent inspections and reviews.
* For System    Managers only. Senunars to indoctrinate other team members in design and licensing basis fundamentals and key concepts and definitions related to operability determinations and 50.59 screens and evaluations will also be conducted for other team members.
 
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DOCUMENTATION AND DATA SOURCES                      52-53 DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTATION P&IDs Elementary and One Line Diagrams DBDs & Associated Notebooks Calculations Modifications Open and Closed Safety Evaluations and Screenings TMODS              ~
Com nent Evaluations Design Change Determinations LICENSE BASIS DOCUMENTS UFSAR, FSAR & SER including Amendments General Design Criteria & FSAR Q&A Licensing History Books Commitment Database Reg Guides LERs & NOVs Tech S ecs and Bases NRC 0 n Item List DATASOURCES Operating Procedures Abnormal 0 rating Procedures Emergency Operating Procedures Annunciator Response Procedure Preventive Maintenance Procedures/PMCR Surveillance Test Procedures s Training Lesson Plans Condition Reports 0 en and Closed Previously conducted audits, assessments (SSFIs, EDSFIs, QA/PA, 3    a reviews)
Results of relevant NRC & INPO ins      tions (Ins tion Re rts, etc.)
Generic Letters and Res nses IENs IEBs and Res onses SOERs SERs Part 21 Notifications Westinghouse Information Vendor Manuals JO/ARs including AR Evals rability Determinations &, TDMs Ops 0 n Item Log DATASOURCES (CONTINUED) 0    rator Workarounds/Concerns Restart Plan Strategies Engineering Evaluations S    ifications and Standards PRA Com onents Based and 0 rator Action Based Risk Ranking Engineering Memos
 
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Attachment 6 DOCUMENTATIONAND DATA SOURCES      52-53 Receipt Ins ection Procedures Relay Document Technical Data Book PMI 5023 Dedication Plans Long Standing Clearances/Caution Tags Operator Aids
 
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                          'SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM                          Pages:
Attachment 7 (SYSTEM WALKDOWNGUIDELINES)                          54-  61 1.0    PURPOSE
                    'his walkdown guideline is to be used as a reference while conducting the Expanded System Readiness Review Team (or individual) walkdowns. The completed walkdowns, during the initial SRR, should be taken into account in setting the scope of the ESRR walkdowns.
2.0    GENERAL METHODS 2.1    Define the purpose of the walkdown,'areas to be visited/observed, roles of the individual team members, and assistance from Health Physics or other departments to access areas.
2.2    Plan the walkdown execution and implementation. Pre-define how the walkdown will assess the conformance of the plant with design and licensing basis requirements (For example, piping and component configuration, electrical separation, etc.). Ensure remote electrical cabinets, tanks, etc. and instrumentation including control Room and Remote Shutdown Panel instruments are included in the walkdown plan. Contact Health Physics supervision to obtain any special ALARAreviews prior to actual system walkdowns.
2.3    Brief the team on the purpose and plan.
2.4    Conduct the walkdown. Focus the team on observation of equipment. Work independently and discuss concerns for clarity. Take concise and accurate notes to quantify and describe findings in sufficient detail to prevent having to walkdown the item twice.
2.5  Conduct a formal post walkdown briefing. Review the notes, discuss issues and document the results on the ESRR Assessment forms, entering the data into the ESRR Assessment database. Identify any impact on equipment or system operation. Immediate concerns are to be identified to the engineering supervisor and the operations Shift Manager.
2.6  Identify the items that need to be completed for the system to meet its intended design function. Assess each item against the restart criteria, Attachment 8. The items are to be documented for disposition and tracking in SIDS.


Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page46of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 221LEVEL1SYSTEMSINCLUDEDINTHEPREVIOUSSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPages:46-47THE21LEVEL1,SYSTEMS FORTHEPREVIOUSEXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWWERE120voltAC/CRIDInverters AirRecirculation/Hydrogen Recombiner Auxiliary Feedwater 250voltDCStationBatteries Component CoolingWaterContainment Containment SprayControlAirECCSAccumulators ECCSCharging/CVCS HighHeadInjection ECCSResidualHeatRemovalECCSSafetyInjection Emergency DieselGenerators Essentiai ServiceWaterIceCondenser MainSteamNon-essential ServiceWaterPlantAirCompressors J0 Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page47of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 221LEVEL1SYSTEMSINCLUDEDINTHEPREVIOUSSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPages:46-47ReactorCoolantSystemReactorProtection System/Solid-state Protection/ESFAS Electrical SafetyBuses4000voltand600volt Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page48of101"-EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 3RATIONALE FORSELECTING LEVEL1SYSTEMSFOREXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPages:48-48Thefollowing rationale wasusedinselecting the39systemstobereviewedinaccordance withthisprocedure.
Allselectedsystemsareidentified inAttachment 4.Maintenance RuleRiskSiificantSstemsAllCookPlantMaintenance RuleRiskSignificant systemswereincludedintheLevel1ESRR.SstemsReuiredtoSuortSafeShutdownTheCookPlantspecificfireprotection/Appendix Rreports/documents werereviewedtoidentifysystemsrequiredtosupportsafeshutdown.
Allofthesesystemswereincludedint5escopeoftheLevel1ESSR.Attendant/Su ortSstemsAttendant systemswereconsidered duringtheidentification ofLevel1systemsbeingselectedfortheESRR.Heating,Ventilation andAirConditioning systemssuchasControlAreaVentilation, Switchgear Ventilation andContainment Ventilation wereincludedinthescopeoftheESRR.TheScreenwash andFireProtection Systemswerealsoincludedasattendant/support system.Historical Performance ofCookPlantSstemsThehistorical performance ofCookPlantsystemswasconsidered.
BasedoninputfromtheSystemEngineering ManagerandtheOperations Manageradditional systemssuchasEmergency
: Lighting, andPostAccidentSamplingSystem(PASS)wereincluded.
ThirdPaReviewoftheScoThescopeofthesystemschosenforESRRwasreviewedbyapeergroupandanindependent thirdpartytoensurethatsuccessful completion oftheESRRonthesesystemswouldprovideareasonable assurance thattheCookPlantcanberestarted safelyandreliably.
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page49of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 4EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWLEVEL1SYSTEMSPages:49-50SYSTEMDESCRIPTION ECCSCHARGINGECCSSIPOSTACCIDENTSAMPLINGSYSTEMAUXBUILDINGVENTESFCONTROLROOMCOMPLEXVENTILATION SWITCHGEAR VENTILATION 250VDCSTATIONBATI'ERIES ICECONDENSER CONTROLROD&CONTROLRODDRIVERPS/SSPS/ESFAS LOCALSHUTDOWNINDICATION SYSTEMRADIATION MONITORING RVLISCOMPONENT COOLINGWATERCNTMTISOLATION COMPONENTS SPENTFUELPITCOOLING120VACVITALBUSES&CRIDINVERTERMAINSTEAMAIRRECIRC/H2 SKIMMERCONTAINMENT VENTILATION VENTILATION
-DIESELGENERATOR EMERGENCY DIESELGENERATORS ABBCVCSIrPASSCRACSWGR250VDCICECRDMLSIRMSRVLISCCWCIVCRIDMS~CECVDGVENTSYSTEMLEVELRELATEDSYSTEMSIncludesChainLetdownBoronPathandSINJIncludesABVGEN&AF/ESWVIncludesNTRNIncludesRPIIncludesDUMP&N2forPORVsRISKSIGNNNSAFESHUTDOWNSIGSUPPORTSYSTEMSIGCORRECTIVE MAINT."S"inthe"SafeShutdownColumn"indicates asupportsystemforsafeshutdown Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page50of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 4EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWLEVEL1SYSTEMSPages:49-50SYSTEMDESCRIFTION ELECTRICAL SAFETYBUSESSCREENWASH FIREPROTECTION
-HALON&CARDOXAUXILIARY BUILDINGTURBINEBUILDINGCONTROLAIRPLANTAIRCOMPRESSOR CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT SPRAYAUXFEEDWATER SYSTEMECCSACCUMULATORS RCS/RCSPRESSURERELIEFEMERGENCY LIGHTINGPACKSOFFSITEPOWERESSENTIAL SERVICEWATERNONESSENTIAL SERVICEWATERNUCLEARINSTRUMENTATION ABBTBUSSCRNPACCNTMTACCUMELTGOFPWESWNESWNISYSTEMLEVELRELATEDSYSTEMSIncludes4KV&600VIncludesScrecnhouse/Intake IncludesRCPFPIncludesComressedAirHeader&CNTMTControlAirHeaderIncludesBACIncludesDIS&H2REC&HDSIncludesCSTIncludesMLMSIncludesSWYDIncludesT/CRISKSIGSAFESHUTDOWNNNNSIGSUPPORTSYSTEMSIG-CORRECTIVE MAINT."S"inthe"SafeShutdownColumn"indicates asupportsystemforsafeshutdown Information PMP7200.RST.004
.Rev.5Page51of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 5EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWTRAININGREQUIREMENTS Pages:51-511.0TECHNICA'L TRAINING1.1HumanErrorReduction Techniques forEngineers*
(including recordreviewandverification) 1.2Electronic Corrective ActionSystem'.3FolioDatabase*
1.4Calculation Matrix1.5SystemDesignandLicensing Basis~1.6SROlevelselftaughtsystemstrainingwithtestandremediation*
1.7CausalAnalysisandeffective problemsolvingtechniques 1.8Operability Determinations*
1.950.59ScreensandEvaluations*
1.10PRA/Maintenance Rule1.11INPODatabase/NRC WebPage~1.12Environmental*Qualification 1.13GenericLetter89-131.14GenericLetter89-101.15HighEnergyLineBreakAnalysis1.16AppendixR1.17StationBlackout1.18Communications-Elevating IssuestoMgnt.2.0PROCESSTRAINING2.12.22.32.42.5TheEnhancedSystemReadiness ReviewProgramandProcedure UseoftheAssessment DatabaseSystemsIndexedDatabaseSystem(SIDS),accessanddataentryUseof.computers LessonsLearnedandVulnerabilities frompreviousindependent inspections andreviews.*ForSystemManagersonly.Senunarstoindoctrinate otherteammembersindesignandlicensing basisfundamentals andkeyconceptsanddefinitions relatedtooperability determinations and50.59screensandevaluations willalsobeconducted forotherteammembers.
0 Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page52of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 6SYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWDOCUMENTATION ANDDATASOURCESPages:52-53DESIGNBASISDOCUMENTATION P&IDsElementary andOneLineDiagramsDBDs&Associated Notebooks Calculations Modifications
-OpenandClosedSafetyEvaluations andScreenings TMODS-~ComnentEvaluations DesignChangeDeterminations LICENSEBASISDOCUMENTS UFSAR,FSAR&SERincluding Amendments GeneralDesignCriteria&FSARQ&ALicensing HistoryBooksCommitment DatabaseRegGuidesLERs&NOVsTechSecsandBasesNRC0nItemListDATASOURCESOperating Procedures Abnormal0ratingProcedures Emergency Operating Procedures Annunciator ResponseProcedure Preventive Maintenance Procedures/PMCR Surveillance TestProcedures sTrainingLessonPlansCondition Reports-0enandClosedPreviously conducted audits,assessments (SSFIs,EDSFIs,QA/PA,3areviews)ResultsofrelevantNRC&INPOinstions(InstionRerts,etc.)GenericLettersandResnsesIENsIEBsandResonsesSOERsSERsPart21Notifications Westinghouse Information VendorManualsJO/ARsincluding AREvalsrabilityDeterminations
&,TDMsOps0nItemLogDATASOURCES(CONTINUED) 0ratorWorkarounds/Concerns RestartPlanStrategies Engineering Evaluations Sifications andStandards PRAComonentsBasedand0ratorActionBasedRiskRankingEngineering Memos Information
.PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page53of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 6SYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWDOCUMENTATION ANDDATASOURCESPages:52-53ReceiptInsectionProcedures RelayDocumentTechnical DataBookPMI5023Dedication PlansLongStandingClearances/Caution TagsOperatorAids Information
'MP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page54of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 7'SYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAM(SYSTEMWALKDOWNGUIDELINES)
Pages:54-611.0PURPOSE'hiswalkdownguideline istobeusedasareference whileconducting theExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewTeam(orindividual) walkdowns.
Thecompleted walkdowns, duringtheinitialSRR,shouldbetakenintoaccountinsettingthescopeoftheESRRwalkdowns.
2.0GENERALMETHODS2.1Definethepurposeofthewalkdown,'areas tobevisited/observed, rolesoftheindividual teammembers,andassistance fromHealthPhysicsorotherdepartments toaccessareas.2.2Planthewalkdownexecution andimplementation.
Pre-define howthewalkdownwillassesstheconformance oftheplantwithdesignandlicensing basisrequirements (Forexample,pipingandcomponent configuration, electrical separation, etc.).Ensureremoteelectrical
: cabinets, tanks,etc.andinstrumentation including controlRoomandRemoteShutdownPanelinstruments areincludedinthewalkdownplan.ContactHealthPhysicssupervision toobtainanyspecialALARAreviewspriortoactualsystemwalkdowns.
2.3Brieftheteamonthepurposeandplan.2.4Conductthewalkdown.
Focustheteamonobservation ofequipment.
Workindependently anddiscussconcernsforclarity.Takeconciseandaccuratenotestoquantifyanddescribefindingsinsufficient detailtopreventhavingtowalkdowntheitemtwice.2.5Conductaformalpostwalkdownbriefing.
Reviewthenotes,discussissuesanddocumenttheresultsontheESRRAssessment forms,enteringthedataintotheESRRAssessment database.
Identifyanyimpactonequipment orsystemoperation.
Immediate concernsaretobeidentified totheengineering supervisor andtheoperations ShiftManager.2.6Identifytheitemsthatneedtobecompleted forthesystemtomeetitsintendeddesignfunction.
Assesseachitemagainsttherestartcriteria, Attachment 8.Theitemsaretobedocumented fordisposition andtrackinginSIDS.
~
~
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5,Page55of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 7SYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAM(SYSTEMWALKDOWNGUIDELINES)
Information               PMP 7200.RST.004 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Rev. 5,     Page 55  of 101 SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM                          Pages:
Pages:54-613.0GUIDELINES 3.1Theteam(leadbytheSystemManager)istooutlinethesystemwalkdownstrategy.
Attachment 7 (SYSTEM WALKDOWNGUIDELINES)                           54- 61 3.0    GUIDELINES 3.1  The team (lead by the System Manager) is to outline the system walkdown strategy. Key system components and system concerns are to be identified.
Keysystemcomponents andsystemconcernsaretobeidentified.
3.2  The team is to identify necessary operational or plant configuration drawings to accompany the team during the walkdown.
3.2Theteamistoidentifynecessary operational orplantconfiguration drawingstoaccompany theteamduringthewalkdown.
3.3  Throughout the walkdown, the team is to function as a cohesive unit, maintaining focus on either individual system coinponents or specific system areas.
3.3Throughout thewalkdown, theteamistofunctionasacohesiveunit,maintaining focusoneitherindividual systemcoinponents orspecificsystemareas.3.4Thewalkdownistofocusonoperability issuesaswellasconformance with-systemdesignconfiguration anddesignbasis.Otherconditions including potential impactonequipment reliability shouldbenotedduringthewalkdown.
3.4    The walkdown is to focus on operability issues as well as conformance with-system design configuration and design basis. Other conditions including potential impact on equipment reliability should be noted during the walkdown.
3.SEachTeammemberisexpectedtorecorddetailednotesidentified duringthewalkdown.
3.S    Each Team member is expected to record detailed notes identified during the walkdown. Any areas of the system that could not be walked down shall be noted and justified in the walkdown report.
Anyareasofthesystemthatcouldnotbewalkeddownshallbenotedandjustified inthewalkdownreport.3.6Examplesofteamfocusareasinclude:Condition ofsnubbers, pipesupports, hangersandfasteners Condition andplacement ofcoatingsandinsulation Evidenceofcorrosion Evidenceofboricacidorboricacidbuildupespecially oncarbonsteelcomponents, andmaterialwastageUnauthorized modifications, partialmodifications ortemporary modifications notinaccordance withstationprogramsSurfacecondition ofvisiblestructural weldsCondition ofbarrierorpenetration sealsUseofunauthorized chemicals oncomponents Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page56of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 7SYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAM(SYSTEMWALKDOWNGUIDELINES)
3.6    Examples    of team focus  areas include:
Pages:54-61~Evidenceofbolttorquerelaxation.
Condition of snubbers, pipe supports, hangers and fasteners Condition and placement of coatings and insulation Evidence  of corrosion Evidence of boric acid or boric acid buildup especially on carbon steel components, and material wastage Unauthorized modifications, partial modifications or temporary modifications not in accordance with station programs Surface condition  of visible structural welds Condition  of barrier or penetration  seals Use  of unauthorized chemicals on components
Evidenceofdiscoloration onrelays,cableinsulation orelectrical components Condition insideelectrical cabinetsUnauthorized orexpiredscaffolding inunauthorized locations orimpacting equipment performance Hosesorotherconnections forventsordrainsPresenceofabandoned equipment notclearlylabeled3.7Thefollowing isagenerallistofelectrical andmechanical equipment physicalplantinspection items:3.7.1Electrical PanelsEquipment
 
~-Identifymissingwaterplugsorholes/openings incabinets(waterormoistureintrusion candegradeordamageequipment).
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~Identifymissingorlooseboltsorthumbscrews(ifmissingcanviolateseismicevaluation anditisnotgoodworkpractice).
(SYSTEM WALKDOWNGUIDELINES)                               54- 61
~Identifyopendoorsorbackpanels(ensureproperlyclosedandlatched,otherwise canviolateseismicevaluation orallowdirt,,,water,etc.,toenterpanel).~Identifymis-positioned breakerswitches(anything thatisdifferent).
          ~       Evidence    of bolt torque relaxation.
Identifyimproperlabelingonkeycomponent breakers/switches (ensurethattheyareaccurateandlegiblepercontrolled drawings; alsoincludesmodules,relays,conduit).
Evidence of discoloration on relays, cable insulation or electrical components Condition inside electrical cabinets Unauthorized or expired scaffolding in unauthorized locations or impacting equipment performance Hoses or other connections for vents or drains Presence    of abandoned equipment not clearly    labeled 3.7    The following is a general list of electrical and mechanical equipment physical plant inspection items:
Identifydirtordebriscoveringcoolinggratingsorfilters(ifblocked,canpreventcoolingandcauseheatbuildupandsubsequent equipment degradation).
3.7.1    Electrical Panels Equipment
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                  ~   -
Pages:54-61Feelpanelsandequipment enclosures whereappropriate tocheckforexcessive heatbuildup(canbeanindication ofdegradedequipment; initiaterequestforthemography check).Checkcabletrays.(Cableshouldnotbehangingoutsideofcabletray;canoverstress cabletray).Checkcablesandconduitfordegradation (cracked, brittle,chafed,bendradius,etc.).CheckMCCsoverallforanythingthatisdifferent.
Identify missing water plugs or holes/openings in cabinets (water or moisture intrusion can degrade or damage equipment).
Noteanydeficiency tags,especially oldtagsnotbeingworked.Thesemayneedincreased priorityorhavehadworkcomplete'd butthetagshavenotbeenremoved.~Checkforanyabnormalsoundsorsmellscomingfromthe,cabinet(mayindicatedegradedequipment)
                  ~       Identify missing or loose bolts or thumb screws (ifmissing can violate seismic evaluation and it is not good work practice).
~Verifyequipment-grounding cableisconnected andintact.~Lookatgeneralmaterielcondition ofcabinet(rust,dirt,considerqualitative impactonheattransfer).
                  ~     Identify open doors or back panels (ensure properly closed and latched, otherwise can violate seismic evaluation or allow dirt,
~Inspectseismicsupportsandtrays.~sInspectoverallcondition ofterminalstripsandmechanical connections (luglandings).
                        ,,water, etc., to enter panel).
Inspectconduitandjunctionboxesforexternaldamage,looseconduitconnections andmissingpartsandfasteners.
                  ~     Identify mis-positioned breaker switches (anything that is different).
~Inspectsolenoidvalvesandmotorcoversforevidenceofdamageorequipment degradation.
Identify improper labeling on key component breakers/switches (ensure that they are accurate and legible per controlled drawings; also includes modules, relays, conduit).
3.7.2Mechanical Components
Identify dirt or debris covering cooling gratings or filters  (if blocked, can prevent cooling and cause heat buildup and subsequent equipment degradation).
~Identifyanyabnormalsoundsorsmellscomingfrompumpormotoroperation.
 
Bearinghousingsandmotorsandpumpsaretobeinspected forsignsofexcessive heator,vibration.
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f Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Pago58of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAM'ttachment 7SYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAM(SYSTEMWAIKDOWNGUIDELINES)
(SYSTEM WALKDOWNGUIDELINES)                              54-61 Feel panels and equipment enclosures where appropriate to check for excessive heat buildup (can be an indication of degraded equipment; initiate request for themography check).
Pages:54-61~Lookatgeneralmaterialcondition ofpumpormotorforsteam,oil,waterleaks,properlevelsinoilreservoirs orsightglasses(andproperlymarked),missinginsulation, properconduitinstallation.,
Check cable trays. (Cable should not be hanging outside    of cable tray; can overstress cable tray).
Identifypinnedhangers.Inspectsystemgaugesforproperoperation ortypicalvalues.Lookforpumprotationorreverserotationifpartofadualtraincommonheadersystem(couldindicatecheckvalvedegradation orisolation valvesleakingby)Identifydirtordebriscoveringcoolinggratingsorfilters(ifblockedcanpreventcoolingandcauseheatbuildupandsubsequent equipment degradation)
Check cables and conduit for degradation (cracked, brittle, chafed, bend radius, etc.).
Noteanydeficiency tags,especially oldtagsnotbeingworked.(Thesemayindicateaneedforincreased priorityortheymaybeanindication thattheworkwascompleted butthatthetagshavenotbeenremoved.)
Check MCCs overall for anything that is different.
Checkequipment/equipment skid/foundation bolting.,
Note any deficiency tags, especially old tags not being worked.
(Areallboltspresentwithproperthreadengagement'?)(minimum offlushorbetter)~Reviewtrendsofparameters onkeysystemequipment; visuallyinspectidentified equipment'with degraded.performance.
These may need increased priority or have had work complete'd but the tags have not been removed.
.~Visuallyinspectforoldleakrepairfittings, ensureTemporary Modifications existtorestorecomponents withleakrepairfittings.
                ~     Check for any abnormal sounds or smells coming from the, cabinet (may indicate degraded equipment)
~Inspectequipment labeling/tags (ensuretheyareaccurateandlegiblepercontrolled drawings).
                ~     Verify equipment-grounding cable is connected and intact.
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page59of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 7SYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAM(SYSTEMWALKDOWNGUIDELINES)
                ~     Look at general materiel condition of cabinet (rust, dirt, consider qualitative impact on heat transfer).
Pages:54-613.8Thefollowing listcontainsmaterialconditions indicating equipment operability issues:3.8.1Operability IssuesLeaks(water,steam,oil,air-packing, flanges,rustoncomponents orfloor).Lubrication (sightglasses,bull'seyes,greasecups,greasefittings, valvestems).Handwheels/valve operators (missing, keyorpinmissing,unlocked, notlabeled).
                ~     Inspect seismic supports and trays.
HFilters,screenorlouvers(clogged, dirty,missing).
                ~   s  Inspect overall condition of terminal strips and mechanical connections (lug landings).
Instruments orgauges(outofcalibration, inoperable, bentpointers).
Inspect conduit and junction boxes for external damage, loose conduit connections and missing parts and fasteners.
Drainsordrainholes(clogged, blocked,full,screensorgratingmissing).
                ~     Inspect solenoid valves and motor covers for evidence  of damage or equipment degradation.
Linesorpipes(loose,unbracketed, vibrating, insulation missingordamaged,notproperlysloped).Fasteners/bolts (loose,stripped,
3.7.2 Mechanical Components
: corroded, missing).
                ~     Identify any abnormal sounds or smells coming from pump or motor operation.
Indicating lamps(missing, burnedout,missingcovers).Controlroomannunciators.
Bearing housings and motors and pumps are to be inspected for signs of excessive heat or, vibration.
Panels(coversmissing,boltmissingornottightened, dirtanddebrisinside).Arealighting(bulbsmissingorburnedout,inadequate tosupportactivities).
 
Lookforconsistency betweensimilarparameters.
f Information           PMP 7200.RST.004                   Rev. 5            Pago 58          of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 7
Packing(bottomed out,outofadjustment, dirtyorrustedglands).
SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM                                      Pages:
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page60of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 7SYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAM(SYSTEMWALKDOWNGUIDELINES)
                                                                            'ttachment (SYSTEM WAI KDOWN GUIDELINES)                                 54-   61
Pages:54-61~-Cablesorleads(unsecured, wornorfrayedinsulation, improperterminations).
                  ~     Look at general material condition of pump or motor for steam, oil, water leaks, proper levels in oil reservoirs or sight glasses (and properly marked), missing insulation, proper conduit installation.,
Motorsorgenerators (dirty,brushriggingpigtailsbroken,carbondust,excessive noiseorvibration, groundstrapslooseormissing).
Identify pinned hangers.
Preservation (rust,corrosion, missingordamagedinsulation or-lagging).
Inspect system gauges for proper operation or typical values.
Checkvalves(oscillating lever,banging,stuckopen).MOVs(lubricant leaks,missingT-Drains).
Look for pump rotation or reverse rotation if part of a dual train common header system (could indicate check valve degradation or isolation valves leaking by)
Valves(driedgreasecakedonstem,packingorstemleaks,bentstem).3.9Thefollowing isagenerallistofadditional inspection itemsthatapplytobothmechanical andelectrical equipment:
Identify dirt or debris covering cooling gratings or filters          (if blocked can prevent cooling and cause heat buildup and subsequent equipment degradation)
3.9.1Mechanical orElectrical Equipment
Note any deficiency tags, especially old tags not being worked. (These may indicate a need for increased priority or they may be an indication that the work was completed but that the tags have not been removed.)
~Identifyinadequate ordegradedstructural components.
Check equipment/equipment skid/foundation bolting., (Are all bolts present with proper thread engagement'?)(minimum of flush or better)
~Inspectsystempipingforevidenceofwaterhammer,severetransients, orimproperventing.Damagedsupports, baseplategrouting, anchors(pulled-out ordeformed) aretobeidentified forfurtherrootcauseanalysis.
                ~     Review trends of parameters on key system equipment; visually inspect identified equipment'with degraded
~Inspectfor,unauthorized loadssupported fromcabletrays,coiiduits orpipingsystems,~Identifyundocumented systemmodifications.
                      .performance.
~Identifydamagedheattraceanddamagedormissinginsulation.
              . ~     Visually inspect for old leak repair fittings, ensure Temporary Modifications exist to restore components with leak repair fittings.
Notepipingexhibiting cyclicalvibration forpossiblehighcyclefatigueconcerns.
                ~     Inspect equipment labeling/tags (ensure they are accurate and legible per controlled drawings).
Safetypostings, radiological postings(properly positioned, legibleandunderstandable).
 
4 Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page61of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAM..Attachment 7SYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAM(SYSTEMWALKDOWNGUIDELINES)
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Pages:54-613.10TheSystemManageristoensurethatteammembersrecordidentified walkdownissuesinWalkdownReports,andduringPhase1ontheAttribute Assessment forms.TheSystemManagerisresponsible toensurethatanydiscrepancies haveappropriate follow-up corrective actionsinitiated toresolveanyidentified issues.
(SYSTEM WALKDOWNGUIDELINES)                             54-   61 3.8  The following list contains material conditions indicating equipment operability issues:
Information
3.8.1    Operability Issues Leaks (water, steam, oil, air-packing, flanges, rust on components or floor).
~PMP7200.RST;004 Rev.5Page62of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 8CRITERIAFORWORKINCLUDEDIN.RESTARTSCOPEPages:62-68NOTECHANGESTOTHERESTARTCRITERIAREQUIRETHEAPPROVALOFTHESENIORMANAGEMENT REVIEWTEAM(SMRT)1.Reviewtheopencorrective actionitemagainsttheRestartScreening Criteria.
Lubrication (sight glasses, bull's eyes, grease cups, grease fittings, valve stems).
TheRestartScreening CriteriaisusedtoidentifyscopeofitemsreviewedduringPhases1,2,and3.Ifnoneofthecriteriaapply,thentheactionitemisnotapplicable totherestarteffort.Iftherestartscreening criteriaappliestheSystemManagershoulddetermine whentheactionitemmustbecompleted tosupportsafeandeventfreerestartandreliablepoweroperation.
Handwheels/valve operators (missing, key or pin missing, unlocked, not labeled).
Programownersandfunctional areamanagers(ortheirdesignees) shallalsofollowtheguidanceinthisattachment forscopingnonsystem-specific programmatic andfunctional areaSIDSitemswhendirectedbytheDirectorofRestart.Inthiscapacity; theseowners/managers/designees
H Filters, screen or louvers (clogged, dirty, missing).
: function, ineffect,astheSystemManagerfortheseitems.Restartl-Activities requiredtobecompleted priortoenteringStartup/Power Ascension ofUnit1.Thisclassification includesnecessary restartandpowerascension testingactivities Restart2-Activities requiredtobecompleted priortoenteringStartup/Power Ascension ofUnit2.Thisclassification includesnecessary restartandpowerascension testingactivities.
Instruments or gauges (out  of calibration, inoperable, bent pointers).
PostRestartl-Activities whichshouldbecompleted onascheduleconsistent withtheUnit1normalplantworkcontrolsprocess.PostRestart2-Activities whichshouldbecompleted onascheduleconsistent withtheUnit2normalplantworkcontrolsprocess.NotApplicable
Drains or drain holes (clogged, blocked, full, screens or grating missing).
-Activities thatarenotrequiredtobecompleted.
Lines or pipes (loose, unbracketed, vibrating, insulation missing or damaged, not properly sloped).
2.Enterdescriptive textthatdescribes aspecificissueintheISSUESbox.Thisisasearchable textfieldofupto255characters andisdesignedtoassisttheSystemManagersinreadilyretrieving information onassociated issues.Someexamplesarepackingleaks,oilleaks,housekeeping, etc.
Fasteners/bolts (loose, stripped, corroded, missing).
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page63of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 8CRITERIAFORWORKINCLUDEDINRESTARTSCOPEPages:62-683Iftheissueissystem-specific butalsoisrelatedtoanexistingstationprogram,consideridentifying thePROGRAMbyscrolling, thenselecting themostappropriate programsourceanddraggingtheappropriate program(s) intotheRELATEDPROGRAMbox.Thisinformation mayhelpprogramownersidentifyprogrammatic weaknesses.
Indicating lamps (missing, burned out, missing covers).
Examplesofprograms'ourcesincludeHighEnergyLineBreak,AppendixR,StationBlackout, etc.Fornewitemsplacedinthe"Nosystementered"bininSIDS,theESRRgroupwillreviewtheitemandassignittoasystemorprogrammatic and/orfunctional area.Ifaneededprogramisnotlisted,contacttheSIDSdatabasecoordinator.
Control room annunciators.
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page64of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 8CRITERIAFORWORKINCLUDEDINRESTARTSCOPEPages:62-684.Identifytheapplicable RestartScreening Criteriaasoutlinedinthisattachment.
Panels (covers missing, bolt missing or not tightened,   dirt and debris inside).
EnterthiscriteriainSIDSbyscrolling andselecting themostappropriate criteria(e.g.RESTART1A, RESTART2A, RESTART2B, etc.).5.Identifytheapplicable moderestraint fortheitembyscrolling, thenselecting theappropriate mode(e.g.,1,2,3,4,etc.).6CompletetheINITIALCOMMENTfieldintheINITIALREVIEWscreen.Thecommentfieldshouldcontainspecificreasonsfortheitembeingincludedorexcludedfromtherestarteffort.Ensurethattheinformation isaccurateandconcise,technically justifying fromadesignbasisviewpoint,theSCOPEandRESTARTCRITERIAselected.
Area lighting (bulbs missing or burned out, inadequate to support activities).
TheCOMMENTfieldmustbecomple'ted priortoSystemManagerapproval.
Look for consistency between similar parameters.
Note:TheFINALCOMMENTfieldontheFINALREVIEWscreenistobecompleted priortothefinalreadiness reviewpresentations.
Packing (bottomed out, out    of adjustment, dirty or rusted glands).
Thisfieldistojustifythattheworkcompleted willsupportrestartreadiness.
 
7.DuringPhases1,2,and3,theSystemManagerwillapproveSIDSitemsasRestartl,
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: Restart2, PostRestartl, PostRestart2, orN/A.TheSystemManagerwillsignifyhisapprovalofthescopeby"Approving" thescopeandjustification commentsintheInitialSystemManagerApprovalBoxinSIDS.Later,duringPhase3,ifarestartitemisnotcompleted, theSystemManagerwilldenotetheitemasan"Exception" intheFinalSystemManagerApprovalBoxinSIDS.Ifanitemissatisfactorily completed, theSystemManagerwilldenotehis"Concurrence" intheFinalSystemManagerApprovalBoxinSIDS.8.DuringPhase4,itemswillbescopedasWCPorRESTART1orRESTART2.
(SYSTEM WALKDOWNGUIDELINES)                             54- 61
9.Additional information isavailable intheSystemsIndexedDataBaseSystemsOperator's Manual.
          ~     -   Cables or leads (unsecured, worn or frayed insulation, improper terminations).
J Information PMP7200.RST.004Rev.5Page65of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 8CRITERIA.
Motors or generators (dirty, brush rigging pigtails broken, carbon dust, excessive noise or vibration, ground straps loose or missing).
FORWORKINCLUDEDINRESTARTSCOPEPages:62-68RESTARTSCREENING CRITERIAIssueswillbeevaluated againstcriteria1through9.Ifcriteria1through7donotapply,thencategorize theissueusingcriteria8or9.Issuesshallberesolvedpriortorestartiftheyare:.1)NuclearSafetyRequiredtoaddressanuclearsafetyissue.Issuesmaybeclassified asfollows:a)Itemsthatcouldresultinsignificant personnel radiation
Preservation (rust, corrosion, missing or damaged insulation or lagging).
: exposure, radioactivity releaseoreffluentdischarge, inexcessoflimits.b)Reducescumulative deficiencies, backlogsorconditions that,intheaggregate, areevaluated tohavesignificant negativeimpactonnuclearsafety.(Notapplicable toindividual workissues).2)Operability Requiredtoaddressanoperability issue.Issuesmaybeclassified asfollows:a)Eliminates anexistingcomponent failure,deficiency, orcondition thatcouldresultmoperation in,orentryto,anLCOactionstatement ifleftuncorrected.
Check valves (oscillating lever, banging, stuck open).
b)Wouldresultinfailureorinability toperformarequiredsurveillance testduringthecurrentoutageorthefollowing operating cycleinaccordance withtheplanttechnical specifications.
MOVs (lubricant leaks, missing T-Drains).
c)Wouldincreasetherisktooperation orsafetyassociated withperforming asurveillance.
Valves (dried grease caked on stem, packing or stem leaks, bent stem).
Information
3.9    The following is a general list of additional inspection items that apply to both mechanical and electrical equipment:
'MP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page66of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 8CRITERIAFORWORKINCLUDEDIN'ESTARTSCOPEPages:62-68d)Testingorretesting thatmustbeperformed tocertify'system orcomponent operability, including testingonsystemsorcomponents duringpowerascension thatresultinbreeching asystemregardless oftheworkbeingclassified asarestartissueornot.e)Reducescumulative deficiencies, backlogsorconditions that,intheaggregate, areevaluated tohavesignificant negativeimpactonoperability.
3.9.1    Mechanical or Electrical Equipment
(Notapplicable toindividual workissues).3)DesignBasisRequiredtorestoreacceptable designmarginorconformance.
                    ~     Identify inadequate or degraded structural components.
withthedesignbasis.Issuesmaybeclassified asfollows:a)Correctsdesignbasisdeficiencies; i.e.,deficiencies insafety-related ortechnical specification equipment notinconformance withdesignbasisdocuments.
                    ~     Inspect system piping for evidence of water hammer, severe transients, or improper venting. Damaged supports, base plate grouting, anchors (pulled-out or deformed) are to be identified for further root cause analysis.
4)LicenseandLicensing BasisRequiredtoresolveunreviewed safetyquestions (USQs)ortorestoreconformance withthelicense,licenseconditions orlicensing basis.Issuesmaybeclassified asfollows:a)Restoreslicensing basisdeficiencies toconforming conditions.
                    ~     Inspect for,unauthorized loads supported from cable trays, coiiduits or piping systems,
b)TechmcaISpecification changestosupportsafeplantoperation.
                    ~     Identify undocumented system modifications.
5)Licensing Commitments Requiredtomeetrestartlicensing commitments suchasA/Einspection andrelatedprogrammatic issues,andconfirmatory actionletterissues.Issuesmaybeclassified asfollows:a)Resolvesexistingdeficiencies orconditions thatwouldresultinthefailuretomeetalicenserequirement orarestartcommitment toanoutsideagency.
                    ~     Identify damaged heat trace and damaged or missing insulation.
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page67of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 8CRITERIAFORWORKINCLUDEDINRESTART'SCOPE Pages:62-686)Configuration Management Requiredtoaddressanorganizational, programmatic, orprocessdeficiency thatcouldpreventmaintenance ofadequatedesignmarginsorconformance withthedesignorlicensing basis.Issuesmaybeclassified asfollows:a)Correctsdeficiencies inconfiguration management
Note piping exhibiting cyclical vibration for possible high cycle fatigue concerns.
: programs, processes, engineering analysiscodes,oroperating, maintenance, ortestprocedures thathaveareasonable probability ofaffecting equipment OPERABILITY.
Safety postings, radiological postings (properly positioned, legible and understandable).
7)Reliability Requiredtoaddresssignificant equipment materialcondition deficiencies singlyorinaggregate; orrepetitive failuresthatcouldaffectsafetysystemavailability, impactplantreliability, orreducetheabilityofoperators tooperatetheplantsafely.Issuesmaybeclassified asfollows:a)Reducescumulative deficiencies, backlogsorconditions that,intheaggregate, areevaluated tohavesignificant negativeimpactonsafetysystemavailability orreliableplantoperation.
4
(Notapplicable toindividual workissues).b)Restoresdegradedcriticalcomponents orconditions thatcouldresultinaplanttransient, powerreduction orshutdown.
 
c)Resolves"conditions thathaveresultedinrepetitive safetysystemorequipment failures.
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Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5.Page68of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 8CRITERIAFORWORKINCLUDEDINRESTARTSCOPEPages:62-68Issuesthatarenotclassified asrestartshouldbeclassified asfollows:8)PostRestartIssuesa)Issuecanbescheduled forasubsequent outage.b)Issuecanbereadilyworkedonline,doesnotaffectsafeandreliableoperation, doesnotrepresent asignificant challenge toMaintenance RuleGoalsorLCOallowedoutagetime,anddoesnotimpairoperations necessary toperformsurveillance ormonitoring.
..Attachment 7 (SYSTEM WALKDOWNGUIDELINES)                           54-   61 3.10  The System Manager is to ensure that team members record identified walkdown issues in Walkdown Reports, and during Phase 1 on the Attribute Assessment forms. The System Manager is responsible to ensure that any discrepancies have appropriate follow-up corrective actions initiated to resolve any identified issues.
c)Issueisclassified asminormaintenance, orhousekeeping, anddoesnotaffectplantoperation.
 
d)Issueisanadministrative issue.e)Issueisadocumentation deficiency thathasnosafetyimpact.9)Industrial SafetyConcernNOTE:Industrial safetyconcernswillnotbeclassified as"restart" becausethepriorityandresolution oftheseconcernswillbeaddressed undertheestablished workcontrolprocesspriorities andscheduling.
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Althoughanindustrial safetyissueisnotclassified asrestart,itwillbeworkedpromptly, commensurate withthesafetyrisk.~td~
RESTART SCOPE                              62-68 NOTE CHANGES TO THE RESTART CRITERIA REQUIRE THE APPROVAL OF THE SENIOR MANAGEMENTREVIEW TEAM (SMRT)
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page69of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 9PHASE2OUTAGESCOPEAPPROVALPROCESSPages:69-69NEWWORKSYSTEMMANAGERENGINEERING SUPERVISOR AllothernewworkFieldworkitems-SystemReadiness ReviewBoarde.g.ARs/JOsOutageScopeManagement Team(SeeNote)SIDSupdatetoNPMScheduling NOTE:SRRB(orsubcommittee thereof)reviewsthescopingoftheseitemsseparately.
: 1. Review the open corrective action item against the Restart Screening Criteria. The Restart Screening Criteria is used to identify scope of items reviewed during Phases 1, 2, and 3. If none of the criteria apply, then the action item is not applicable to the restart effort. If the restart screening criteria applies the System Manager should determine when the action item must be completed to support safe and event free restart and reliable power operation. Program owners and functional area managers (or their designees) shall also follow the guidance in this attachment for scoping non system-specific programmatic and functional area SIDS items when directed by the Director of Restart. In this capacity; these owners/managers/designees       function, in effect, as the System Manager for these items.
SIDSisthenupdatedtoreflectSRRBcommentsbytheSystemManager.
Restartl Activities required to be completed prior to entering Startup/Power Ascension of Unit 1. This classification includes necessary restart and power ascension testing activities Restart2 Activities required to be completed prior to entering Startup/Power Ascension of Unit 2. This classification includes necessary restart and power ascension testing activities.
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page70of101"EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 10RESTARTREQUIREDSCOPEDEFERRALFORMPages:70-70UNIT:DATE:SYSTEM:DOCUMENTTYPE:(e.g.,Condition Report,ActionRequest)KEYI.D:(e.g.,Condition ReportorActionRequestNumber)ItemDescription:
Post Restartl Activities which should be completed on a schedule consistent with the Unit 1 normal plant work controls process.
InitialTechnical Justification forRestartScopeDesignation (ensuretheoriginalbasisforscopingtheitemasrequiredforrestartisaddressed);
Post Restart2 Activities which should be completed on a schedule consistent with the Unit 2 normal plant work controls process.
Technical Justification forRestartDeferral:
Not Applicable Activities that are not required to be completed.
NewScheduled Completion Date:(ScopeAddition/Deletion formattachedifapplicable)
: 2. Enter descriptive text that describes a specific issue in the ISSUES box. This is a searchable text field of up to 255 characters and is designed to assist the System Managers in readily retrieving information on associated issues. Some examples are packing leaks, oil leaks, housekeeping, etc.
Originator Date:SystemManagerDate:Designated Ops.Rep.Engineering Supervisor Date:Date:NuclearLicensing Manager/DirectorofRegulatory AffairsDate:SystemEngineerManagerDate:Date:PORCMtg.&#xb9;Date:
 
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page71of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAM.Attachment 11EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWCLARIFICATION SHEETPages:71-71SstemManaerAroyalConcurItemclosedandworkcompleted satisfies restartrequirements, orforthosepostrestartitemsthatarenotincludedintheaggregate impact.ExceptOpenrestartitems(including thoseitemsthatare"workcomplete" butnotadministratively closed),oritemsthatareclosedbutdonotsatisfyrestartrequirements..
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PostRestartDeferredDenotedonitemsassociated withacomponent thathastwo(2)ormorepostrestartdeferreditems,excluding PMpostrestartitems.RestartRequiredDeferredDenotedonitemswithdeferredscopethatwereinitially
Attachment 8 RESTART SCOPE                                62-68 3 Ifthe  issue is system-specific but also is related to an existing station program, consider identifying the PROGRAM by scrolling, then selecting the most appropriate program source and dragging the appropriate program(s) into the RELATED PROGRAM box.
: approved, asrestartrequired.
This information may help program owners identify programmatic weaknesses.
Theseitemsmustbeaccompanied byaRestartRequiredScopeDeferralForm(Attachment 10).
Examples of program s'ources include High Energy Line Break, Appendix R, Station Blackout, etc. For new items placed in the "No system entered" bin in SIDS, the ESRR group will review the item and assign it to a system or programmatic and/or functional area. Ifa needed program is not listed, contact the SIDS data base coordinator.
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page72of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 12INITIALEXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWREPORTPages:72-74INITIALEXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REPORTCOVERSHEETSYSTEMTITLESYSTEMREVIEWERS SystemManagerSignature
 
/DateOperations Representative
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*Signature./
RESTART SCOPE                              62-68
DateLicensing Representative
: 4. Identify the applicable Restart Screening Criteria as outlined in this attachment. Enter this criteria in SIDS by scrolling and selecting the most appropriate criteria (e.g.
~Signature
RESTART1A, RESTART2A, RESTART2B, etc.).
/DateEngineering Supervisor Signature
: 5. Identify the applicable mode restraint for the item by scrolling, then selecting the appropriate mode (e.g., 1, 2, 3, 4, etc.).
/DateESRRManager/Coordinator
6    Complete the INITIALCOMMENT field in the INITIALREVIEW screen. The comment field should contain specific reasons for the item being included or excluded from the restart effort. Ensure that the information is accurate and concise, technically justifying from a design basis view point, the SCOPE and RESTART CRITERIA selected. The COMMENT field must be comple'ted prior to System Manager approval.
.--Signature
Note: The FINAL COMMENT field on the FINAL REVIEW screen is to be completed prior to the final readiness review presentations. This field is to justify that the work completed will support restart readiness.
/DateSystemReadiness ReviewBoard.Signature
: 7. During Phases 1, 2, and 3, the System Manager will approve SIDS items as Restartl, Restart2, Post Restartl, Post Restart2, or N/A. The System Manager will signify his approval of the scope by "Approving" the scope and justification comments in the Initial System Manager Approval Box in SIDS. Later, during Phase 3, if a restart item is not completed, the System Manager will denote the item as an "Exception" in the Final System Manager Approval Box in SIDS. If an item is satisfactorily completed, the System Manager will denote his "Concurrence" in the Final System Manager Approval Box in SIDS.
/DatePlantOperations ReviewCommittee PORCMTG.&#xb9;Chairman, Signature
: 8. During Phase 4, items will be scoped    as WCP or RESTART1 or RESTART2.
/Date,~Thesesignatures maybeobtainedbyroutingthereporttobothindividuals simultaneously.
: 9. Additional information is available in the Systems Indexed Data Base Systems Operator's Manual.
Retaincopiesofbothsignatures withtheoriginalofthereportintheSRRBmeetingminutes.  
 
'
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Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page73of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 12INITIALEXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWREPORTPages:72-74INITIALEXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWREPORTFORMATEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
RESTART SCOPE                            62-68 RESTART SCREENING CRITERIA Issues  will be evaluated against criteria 1 through 9. Ifcriteria 1 through 7 do not apply, then categorize the issue using criteria 8 or 9.
Issues shall be resolved  prior to restart if they are:.
: 1)       Nuclear Safety Required to address a nuclear safety issue.
Issues may be classified as follows:
a)     Items that could result in significant personnel radiation exposure, radioactivity release or effluent discharge, in excess of limits.
b)     Reduces cumulative deficiencies, backlogs or conditions that, in the aggregate, are evaluated to have significant negative impact on nuclear safety. (Not applicable to individual work issues).
: 2)     Operability Required to address an operability issue.
Issues may be classified as follows:
a)   Eliminates an existing component failure, deficiency, or condition that could result m operation in, or entry to, an LCO action statement if left uncorrected.
b)   Would result in failure or inability to perform a required surveillance test during the current outage or the following operating cycle in accordance with the plant technical specifications.
c)   Would increase the risk to operation or safety associated with performing a surveillance.
 
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                                  'ESTART SCOPE                                62- 68 d)     Testing or retesting that must be performed to certify'system or component operability, including testing on systems or components during power ascension that result in breeching a system regardless    of the work being classified as a restart issue or not.
e)     Reduces cumulative deficiencies, backlogs or conditions that, in the aggregate, are evaluated to have significant negative impact on operability. (Not applicable to individual work issues).
: 3)   Design Basis Required to restore acceptable design margin or conformance. with the design basis.
Issues may be classified as follows:
a)   Corrects design basis deficiencies; i.e., deficiencies in safety-related or technical specification equipment not in conformance with design basis documents.
: 4)   License and Licensing Basis Required to resolve unreviewed safety questions (USQs) or to restore conformance with the license, license conditions or licensing basis.
Issues may be classified as follows:
a)   Restores licensing basis deficiencies to conforming conditions.
b)     TechmcaI Specification changes to support safe plant operation.
: 5)   Licensing Commitments Required to meet restart licensing commitments such as A/E inspection and related programmatic issues, and confirmatory action letter issues.
Issues may be classified as follows:
a)   Resolves existing deficiencies or conditions that would result in the failure to meet a license requirement or a restart commitment to an outside agency.
 
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RESTART'SCOPE                               62-68
: 6)   Configuration Management Required to address an organizational, programmatic, or process deficiency that could prevent maintenance of adequate design margins or conformance with the design or licensing basis.
Issues may be classified as follows:
a)   Corrects deficiencies in configuration management programs, processes, engineering analysis codes, or operating, maintenance, or test procedures that have a reasonable probability of affecting equipment OPERABILITY.
: 7)     Reliability Required to address significant equipment material condition deficiencies singly or in aggregate; or repetitive failures that could affect safety system availability, impact plant reliability, or reduce the ability of operators to operate the plant safely.
Issues may be classified as follows:
a)   Reduces cumulative deficiencies, backlogs or conditions that, in the aggregate, are evaluated to have significant negative impact on safety system availability or reliable plant operation. (Not applicable to individual work issues).
b)     Restores degraded critical components or conditions that could result in a plant transient, power reduction  or shutdown.
c)     Resolves"conditions that have resulted in repetitive safety system or equipment failures.
 
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Attachment 8 RESTART SCOPE                              62-68 Issues that are not classified as restart should be classified as follows:
: 8)   Post Restart Issues a)     Issue can be scheduled  for a subsequent outage.
b)     Issue can be readily worked on line, does not affect safe and reliable operation, does not represent a significant challenge to Maintenance Rule Goals or LCO allowed outage time, and does not impair operations necessary to perform surveillance or monitoring.
c)     Issue is classified as minor maintenance, or housekeeping, and does not affect plant operation.
d)     Issue is an administrative issue.
e)   Issue is a documentation deficiency that has no safety impact.
: 9)   Industrial Safety Concern NOTE:     Industrial safety concerns will not be classified as "restart" because the priority and resolution of these concerns will be addressed under the established work control process priorities and scheduling. Although an industrial safety issue is not classified as restart, it will be worked promptly, commensurate     ~
                        ~td with the safety risk.
 
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Attachment 9 PROCESS                              69-69 NEW WORK SYSTEM MANAGER ENGINEERING SUPERVISOR All other  new work        Field work items-e.g. AR s/JO s System Readiness                                      Outage Scope Review Board                                        Management Team (See Note)
SIDS update to NPM Scheduling NOTE: SRRB (or subcommittee thereof ) reviews the scoping of these items separately.
SIDS is then updated to reflect SRRB comments by the System Manager.
 
Information               PMP 7200.RST.004               Rev. 5          Page 70 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment 10 RESTART REQUIRED SCOPE DEFERRAL                          Pages:
FORM                              70- 70 UNIT:                                                             DATE:
SYSTEM:
DOCUMENT TYPE:
(e.g., Condition Report, Action Request)
KEY I. D:
(e.g., Condition Report or Action Request Number)
Item
 
== Description:==
 
Initial Technical Justification for Restart Scope Designation (ensure the original basis for scoping the item as required for restart is addressed);
Technical Justification for Restart Deferral:
New Scheduled Completion Date:
(Scope Addition/Deletion form attached      if applicable)
Originator                                                       Date:
System Manager                                                  Date:
Designated Ops. Rep.                                             Date:
Engineering Supervisor                                           Date:
Nuclear Licensing Manager/
Director of Regulatory Affairs                                  Date:
System Engineer Manager                                         Date:
Date:
PORC                                    Mtg.   &#xb9;               Date:
 
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  . Attachment 11 CLARIFICATIONSHEET                                71-71 S stem  Mana er A      royal Concur          Item closed and work completed satisfies restart requirements, or for those post restart items that are not included in the aggregate impact.
Except          Open restart items (including those items that are "work complete" but not administratively closed), or items that are closed but do not satisfy restart requirements..
Post Restart Deferred      Denoted on items associated with a component that has two (2) or more post restart deferred items, excluding PM post restart items.
Restart Required Deferred      Denoted on items with deferred scope that were initially approved, as restart required. These items must be accompanied by a Restart Required Scope Deferral Form (Attachment 10).
 
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REVIEW REPORT                                    72-74 INITIALEXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REPORT COVER SHEET SYSTEM TITLE SYSTEM REVIEWERS System Manager Signature  / Date Operations Representative
* Signature./ Date Licensing Representative ~
Signature   / Date Engineering Supervisor Signature   / Date ESRR Manager/Coordinator
                                . Signature / Date System Readiness Review Board.
Signature / Date Plant Operations Review Committee Chairman, Signature     / Date, PORC MTG.        &#xb9;
~ These signatures maybe  obtained by routing the report to both individuals simultaneously. Retain copies  of both signatures with the original of the report in the SRRB meeting minutes.
 
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REVIEW REPORT                              72-74 INITIALEXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW REPORT FORMAT EXECUTIVE
 
==SUMMARY==
 
==1.0      INTRODUCTION==
 
1.1    Purpose 1.2    Scope and Approach (Include specific identification  of the system's safety and accident mitigation functions) 2.0    RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 2.1    Summary of Attribute Assessments 2.2    Suimnary  of Review of SIDS  Items 2.3    Summary    of Open Items 2.4    Observations and Conclusions (including recurring items judged to need further extent of condition determination) (see step 4.3.10a) 3.0      ATIRIBUTEASSESSMENTS 3.1    Assessment Matrix 3.2  .-
Attribute Assessments and review of system functions.
3.3    Discrepancies 4.0      WALKDOWNRESULTS 4.1    Walkdown Scope 4.2    Observations 5.0      REVIEW OF SIDS ITEMS 5.1    Review  of Open Items (Summary Information)
 
0 Information            PMP 7200.RST.004                Rev. 5      Page 74  of 101
            ~,
EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment 12 INITIALEXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS                      Pages:
REVIEW REPORT                          72-  74 5.2    Revie'w of Closed Items (Summary Information)


==1.0INTRODUCTION==
==6.0    REFERENCES==


1.1Purpose1.2ScopeandApproach(Includespecificidentification ofthesystem'ssafetyandaccidentmitigation functions)
===6.1 ENCLOSURES===
Enclosure 1:    Attribute Assessment Forms Enclosure 2:    Restart Items (SIDS)
Enclosure 3:    Post-restart Open Items (SIDS)
Enclosure 4:    Review of Closed Items From SIDS Enclosure 5:    System Boundaries Enclosure 6:    Walkdown Plan 6.2    FIGURES AND TABLES Figure 1:    System Boundaries Table 1:    Final System Readiness Review Assessment Matrix Table 2:      Attribute Assessment Summary Table 3:    Assessment Discrepancies Recommended for Corrective Action Prior to Restart Table 4:      Assessment Discrepancies Recommended  for Closure Post Restart


==2.0 RESULTSANDCONCLUSIONS==
Information                 PMP 7200. RST.004                     Rev. 5            Page 75    of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM A~ichment 13 FINAL EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS                                    Pages:
2.1SummaryofAttribute Assessments 2.2SuimnaryofReviewofSIDSItems2.3SummaryofOpenItems2.4Observations andConclusions (including recurring itemsjudgedtoneedfurtherextentofcondition determination)
REVIEW REPORT                                    75-77 FINALEXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REPORT COVER SHEET SYSTEM TITLE DATE SYSTEM REVIE%ERS System Manager                                                          Date Operations Representative ~                                              Date Licensing Representative ~                                              Date Engineering Supervisor                                                    Date ESRR Manager/Coordinator                                                    Date System Readiness Review Board                                                Date Plant Operations Review Committee                                            Date PORC MTG.        &#xb9;
(seestep4.3.10a)3.0ATIRIBUTE ASSESSMENTS 3.1Assessment Matrix3.2.-Attribute Assessments andreviewofsystemfunctions.
~ These signatures  maybe obtained by routing the report to both individuals simultaneously. Retain copies of both signatures with the original of the report in the SRRB meeting minutes.
3.3Discrepancies
'"4.0WALKDOWNRESULTS4.1WalkdownScope4.2Observations 5.0REVIEWOFSIDSITEMS5.1ReviewofOpenItems(SummaryInformation) 0 Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page74of101~,EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 12INITIALEXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWREPORTPages:72-745.2Revie'wofClosedItems(SummaryInformation)


==6.0REFERENCES==
*A< g L Information            PMP 7200.RST.004                  Rev. 5    Page 76  of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment 13 FINAL EXPA'NDED SYSTEM READINESS                    Pages:
REVIEW REPORT                          75-77 FINAL EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW REPORT FORMAT 1.0    OVERVIEW 1.1    Summary  of items closed since the initial report issuance 91-18 Operability Determinations (list each item)
Engineering Evaluations (list each item)
DCPs (list each item)
I Action Requests (list each item)
Condition Reports (list each item)
NRC Commitment Data Base items (list each item)
Operator Workarounds (list each item)
Outage Required PMs 2.0    OPEN ITEM REVIEW 2.1  Items 91-18 Operability Reviews (list each item)
Engineering Evaluations (list each item)
DCPs (list each item)
Work Requests (list each item)
Condition Reports (list each item)
Commitment Data Base (list each item)
Operator Workarounds (list each item) k


6.1ENCLOSURES:
'I Information             PMP 7200.RST.004       "
Enclosure 1:Attribute Assessment FormsEnclosure 2:Enclosure 3:RestartItems(SIDS)Post-restart OpenItems(SIDS)Enclosure 4:ReviewofClosedItemsFromSIDSEnclosure 5:SystemBoundaries Enclosure 6:WalkdownPlan6.2FIGURESANDTABLESFigure1:SystemBoundaries Table1:FinalSystemReadiness ReviewAssessment MatrixTable2:Attribute Assessment SummaryTable3:Assessment Discrepancies Recommended forCorrective ActionPriortoRestartTable4:Assessment Discrepancies Recommended forClosurePostRestart Information PMP7200.RST.004Rev.5Page75of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMA~ichment 13FINALEXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWREPORTPages:75-77FINALEXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REPORTCOVERSHEETSYSTEMTITLEDATESYSTEMREVIE%ERS SystemManagerDateOperations Representative
Rev. 5          Page 77  of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment 13 FINAL EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS                          Pages:
~DateLicensing Representative
75-77 REVIEW REPORT 2.1    Items (Continued)
~DateEngineering Supervisor DateESRRManager/Coordinator DateSystemReadiness ReviewBoardDatePlantOperations ReviewCommittee DatePORCMTG.&#xb9;~Thesesignatures maybeobtainedbyroutingthereporttobothindividuals simultaneously.
Outage Required PM's that    will become overdue prior to next planned outage 2.2    Restart Scoping 2.3    Schedule for Resolution    of Open Items 3.0      DESIGN AND LICENSE BASIS ISSUES
Retaincopiesofbothsignatures withtheoriginalofthereportintheSRRBmeetingminutes.
 
*A<gL Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page76of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 13FINALEXPA'NDED SYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWREPORTPages:75-77FINALEXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWREPORTFORMAT1.0OVERVIEW1.1Summaryofitemsclosedsincetheinitialreportissuance91-18Operability Determinations (listeachitem)Engineering Evaluations (listeachitem)DCPs(listeachitem)IActionRequests(listeachitem)Condition Reports(listeachitem)NRCCommitment DataBaseitems(listeachitem)OperatorWorkarounds (listeachitem)OutageRequiredPMs2.0OPENITEMREVIEW2.1Items91-18Operability Reviews(listeachitem)Engineering Evaluations (listeachitem)DCPs(listeachitem)WorkRequests(listeachitem)Condition Reports(listeachitem)Commitment DataBase(listeachitem)OperatorWorkarounds (listeachitem)k
==SUMMARY==
'I Information PMP7200.RST.004 "Rev.5Page77of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAM,Attachment 13FINALEXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWREPORTPages:75-772.1Items(Continued)
 
OutageRequiredPM'sthatwillbecomeoverduepriortonextplannedoutage2.2RestartScoping2.3ScheduleforResolution ofOpenItems3.0DESIGNANDLICENSEBASISISSUESSUMMARYExplainthesignificance ofeachissue(oneortwosentences onsafety,risk,orsystemoperability/reliability impact.Discusswhatplans(s)isinplaceforresolution ofeachissue.Includewhentheissueisscheduled toberesolved.
Explain the significance of each issue (one or two sentences on safety, risk, or system operability/reliability impact.
4.0WALEDOWN4.1Walkdownpurposeandscope4.2WalkdownTeam4.3WalkdownResults4.4,Conclusions 4.5RestartScoping5.0AGGREGATE IMPACTOFDEFERREDWORK
Discuss what plans(s) is in place for resolution of each issue.
Include when the issue is scheduled to be resolved.
4.0      WALEDOWN 4.1    Walkdown purpose and scope 4.2    Walkdown Team 4.3    Walkdown Results 4.4,Conclusions 4.5    Restart Scoping 5.0      AGGREGATE IMPACT OF DEFERRED WORK


==Attachment:==
==Attachment:==
Marked up drawings showing components with multiple (two or more) Post-restart or restart deferred work items.


Markedupdrawingsshowingcomponents withmultiple(twoormore)Post-restart orrestartdeferredworkitems.
Information           PMP 7200.RST.004       Rev. 5 Page 78  of 101
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page78of101'XPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 14EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWSINTEGRATED RESULTSPages:78-82ESRRProgramCoordinator DateESRRProgramManagerDateDirector, Engineering RestartDateSystemReadiness ReviewBoardDatePlantOperations ReviewCommittee PORCMtg.&#xb9;Date Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page79of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 14EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWSINTEGRATED RESULTSPages:78-82EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWSINTEGRATED RESULTSFORMAT
              'XPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment 14 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS        Pages:
REVIEWS INTEGRATED RESULTS      78-82 ESRR Program Coordinator                Date ESRR Program Manager                    Date Director, Engineering Restart            Date System Readiness Review Board          Date Plant Operations Review Committee            Date PORC Mtg.   &#xb9;


==1.0INTRODUCTION==
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REVIEWS INTEGRATED RESULTS                78-  82 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEWS INTEGRATED RESULTS FORMAT


ANDPURPOSE1.1Introduction 1.2Purpose2.0SCOPEANDSTRUCTURE FORLEVEL1ESRRs2.1OverallApproachandScope2.2SystemPrioritization 2.3Structure ofLevel1ESRRTeams2.4VerticalSliceMethodology 2.5Screening ofOpenItemsforRestartRequirements 2.6ReviewsandSelf-Assessments 3.0SUMMARYOFPHASE1RESULTS3.1VerticalSliceResultsandCharacterization ofFindings3.2Screening ofOpenItems3.3WalkdownResults4.0ASSESSMENT OFRESULTSBYTOPICAREA4.1LessonslearnedtobeincludedinLevel2ESRR4.2Identification ofPotential Programmatic Issues Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5:Page80of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 14EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWSINTEGRATED RESULTSPages:78-8
==1.0    INTRODUCTION==
AND PURPOSE 1.1  Introduction 1.2  Purpose 2.0    SCOPE AND STRUCTURE FOR LEVEL 1 ESRRs 2.1  Overall Approach and Scope 2.2  System Prioritization 2.3  Structure  of Level 1 ESRR Teams 2.4  Vertical Slice Methodology 2.5  Screening  of Open Items for Restart Requirements 2.6  Reviews and Self-Assessments 3.0   


==25.0CONCLUSION==
==SUMMARY==
S 5.1SystemReadiness 5.2Potential Programmatic Issues
OF PHASE          1  RESULTS 3.1  Vertical Slice Results and Characterization of Findings 3.2  Screening  of Open  Items 3.3  Walkdown Results 4.0    ASSESSMENT OF RESULTS BY TOPIC AREA 4.1  Lessons learned to be included in Level 2 ESRR 4.2  Identification of Potential Programmatic Issues


==6.0REFERENCES==
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REVIEWS INTEGRATED RESULTS                        78-82
 
==5.0    CONCLUSION==
S 5.1  System Readiness 5.2  Potential Programmatic Issues
 
==6.0    REFERENCES==
 
APPENDICES A      RESTART ISSUES, SELECTION/SCREENING CRITERIA B      EVALUATIONOF DISCREPANCIES BY TOPIC AREA Topic Area 1: Electrical Calculations and Analysis Topic Area 2: I&C Calculations and Analysis Topic Area 3: Mechanical & Structural Calculations and Analysis Topic Area 4: Accident Analysis Topic Area 5: Drawings Topic Area 6: Logic Diagrams Topic Area 7: Configuration Management Topic Area 8: Specifications Topic Area 9: DBD Topic Area 10: Change Documentation/50.59 Reviews Topic Area 11: Temporary Modifications/Bypasses Topic Area 12: FSAR Review Topic Area 13: TS and Bases
 
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                    ~P Topic Area 28: QA Audits and Self Assessments Topic Area 29: Training Lesson Plans Topic Area 30: Open Items (Backlog)
Topic Area 31: Strategy Documents
 
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REVIEWS INTEGRATED RESULTS                            78-82 C      GROUPING OF ESRR-IDENTIFIED ITEMS BY TOPIC AREA FIGURES 2.1    Graded Approach for Enh'anced System Readiness Review 2.2    Typical Topic Areas for Enhanced System Readiness Review Vertical Slices 2.3    Enhanced System Readiness Review Plan 2.4    Level  1 Enhanced System Readiness Reviews 2.5    Typical System Assessment Matrix 4.1    Topic Review Sutmnary - Level      1 Systems Checks and Discrepancies 4.2    Topic Revjew Summary - Level        1 Systems Discrepancies as Percent of Checks 4.3    Issues by Topic Areas  - Level  1  Systems by severity-4A      Issues by Topic Area  - Level  1  Systems (Restart Recommended Issues Only)
TABLES 3-1    Summary Statistics for Level  1  System Reviews 3-2    Summary  of Areas Covered During the Walkdowns
 
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Attachment 15            SYSTEM WALKDOWNREPORT 83-83 Date  of Walkdown:  .
System Manager/Team Leader:
~Setem:
Pu    ose of Walkdown:
Provide a brief description of the purpose of the walkdown.
Walkdown Sco e:
Provide an overall synopsis as to the scope of the walkdown, primary objectives, time    spent'n the walkdown, total number of all deficiencies noted as well as noting if any operability concerns were noted.
Walkdown Tea Provide a listing of the walkdown team members as well as their respective organizations.
Walkdown Results:
Provide an overall characterization as to the items identified, and safety or operability concerns, etc.
 
==
Conclusions:==
 
Provide an overall assessment of the system condition based on observations. Summarize any specific need for improvements and all follow-up actions being pursued.
 
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REPORT                                84-  84 1.0    THE READINESS AFFIRMATIONREPORT WILLINCLUDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION 1.1  Current system License Change Request(s).
1.2  Current operator workarounds.
1.3  Current corrective actions required of control room equipment.
1.4  Currently installed T-Mods.
1.5  Active operability determinations and JCOs, with the 10CFR50.59 for each OD or JCO.
1.6  The remaining open "Exceptions" items and any "Exceptions" identified during the affirmation process. Exceptions are remaining open restart required items.
1.7  An Operations priorities list compiled from or identical to the Focus List or Operations Priorities Addendum List (but not necessarily limited to these lists) for the system.
1.8  Reference Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Report 1.9  Reference Final Expanded System Readiness Review report.
1.10  Reference the system tests per the System Test Plan.
 
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Figure 1 MAJOR TOPICS                                85-94 SYSIKM ASSESShKNT hIATRIX MAJOR TOPICS DESIGN BASIS            LICENSING      OPERATIONS  mi~~~NCP. SURV          'ROGRAMS, PHYSICAL DOCUMENTS                                      PLANT      PROCESS 4 PROCEDURES 5  6  7  8 9  10  11 12      14  15  16  17  18  19 20  21 22  23  24 25  26 27 28 29 30 K                                              K ASSESShKNT ATTRIUTES                                                              0                                                0
 
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Figure  1 Addendum MAJOR TOPICS                                85-94 OVERVIEW The following guidance for each of the 31 major topics in Figure 1 is provided regarding the types of documents and sources of information to be used and to provide a consistent definition of the topic areas for grouping and documenting the results. Individual reviewers will use their experience and that of the ESRR Team to determine the specific documents and sources of information to be assessed. Completed scope of the previous System Readiness Reviews should be taken into account.
DESIGN BASIS Electrical Calcs/Analysis:,Calculations related to motors, electrical devices, circuits, and associated power supplies for system components shall be reviewed. The reviews should assess the appropriateness of design inputs, assumptions, consistency with as-built configuration, and general approach. Also, calculation results should be verified for appropriate use in other design basis documents. The potential effect of modifications on the emergency electrical load calculation, including load sequencing, should be considered. In addition, fuse coordination shall be addressed against the requirements of IEEE 308.
2      I&C Calcs/Analysis: Calculations related to the performance,      set points, and stability of I&C components and loops for system components shall be reviewed. The scope of the reviews should be
            . similar to the electrical calculations. In addition, reference 6.5 identifies a potential concern with instrument uncertainty calculations, such as due to dynamic fiow effects, and with lack of trending of instrument drift and use of unverified drift values provided by the equipment vendors.
3        Mech and Struct Calcs/Analysis: Calculations related to hydraulics, heat transfer, equipment/support loads, equipment/pipe stresses, and other mechanical performance issues related to system components shall be reviewed. The scope of the reviews should be similar to the electrical calculations.
 
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Figure 1  Addendum MAJOR TOPICS                              85 -94
: 4.      Accident Analysis: Analysis of UFSAR Chapter 14 events shall be reviewed for assumptions regarding system configuration, performance and conditions.
: 5.      Drawings: Controlled drawings documenting system design, configuration, layout, and conformance to programs (e.g.,
Appendix R, testing, and EQ) shall be reviewed for system design basis information and system interaction/dependency information.
Drawings that are excluded from this topic are logic diagrams (covered in Topic 6), Control Room drawings (covered in Topic 25), and vendor drawings (covered in Topic 20).
: 6.      Logic Diagrams: The logic diagrams shall be reviewed for system design basis information and system interaction/dependency information.
: 7.      Configuration Management: Cross-referenced documents shall be verified to be current, applicable, and appropriate. In particular, ESRR teams shall specifically review several input changes looking for a lack of integration between calculations, accident analysis assumptions, design values, design basis documents, system description and normal and emergency operating procedures.
Additionally, the facility data base should be checked for accuracy and consistency with design requirements.
: 8.      Specifications: Equipment design, procurement, and installation
              .specifications shall be reviewed for consistency of system design basis information and for adherence to code and safety requirements. General design specifications shall also be reviewed for system design basis information.
: 9.      DBD: Related design basis documents shall be reviewed for system design basis requirements, identification of possible cross-referenced documents, and appropriate applicability. Potential vulnerabilities include identification of and compliance with single failure criteria. Adequate closure of open items identified during preparation of the DBDs should be considered. Based on the results in reference 6.5, this topic area should be a focus area for the ESRR.
 
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MAJOR TOPICS                              85 -94
: 10. Change Documents/50.59 Reviews: Change documents, including DCPs, Component Evaluations (CEs) and UFSAR changes, shall be assessed for completeness, consistency with the system safety and accident mitigation functions as defined in the design and licensing basis, appropriate consideration of interdisciplinary impact/input, and effective follow through (changes made or posted against the appropriate documents). 50.59 screens and 50.59 safety reviews shall be reviewed to assess whether the change may have resulted in a current plant configuration or operation that is outside the design or licensing basis, Cook Plant has, in the past, not performed some 50.59 screens when required because station personnel did not recognize that they were changing the facility as described in the UFSAR. As part of the ESRR, teams should review past 50.59 screens associated with change documents being reviewed to ensure that an excessively liberal interpretation of the words "system as described in the UFSAR" was not used. See NEI 9647 for additional guidance and current industry standards.
 
L a el+
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Figure  1 MAJOR TOPICS                              85-94
: 11. Temporary Modifications/Bypasses: Temporary modifications and "bypasses" shall be reviewed to verify that they were evaluated against appropriate design basis information and do not result in an unreviewed safety question. Based on the results of reference 6.5, "Bypasses" should be a focus area for the ESRR. Additionally, teams should be alert for engineering evaluations, action requests, partially installed modifications, and other changes to ensure that necessary screenings were done in each case, Cook Plant has identified 23 specific processes with a potential to bypass the 50.59 process as follows:
Engineering Specifications        ~  Design Change Addenda Action Request/Job Orders          ~  Setpoints Drawing changes                    ~  DCDIRs Operability determinations        ~  Technical data books Technical Direction Memos          ~  PMI-5023 addressing plant NPM (Engineering)                      fabrication and repairs Evaluations                        ~  Dedication Plans Mechanical Engineering Memo        ~  Old clearances/Caution Tags Electrical Engineering Memos        ~  Open Items Log Design Change Determination        ~  Work Arounds/Watch List Condition Report                    ~  Temporary Operator Aids Receipt Inspection Practices        ~  Permanent Operator Aids Design Standards These items should be reviewed in assessing the health of the 50.59 process for the system. Also, the temporary modification shall be assessed to assure the duration is not excessive. 50.59 applicability evaluations and 50.59 reviews shall be reviewed to assess whether the temporary modifications may have resulted in a current plant configuration or operation that is outside the regulatory design basis or licensing basis.
Abandoned Equipment without a 50.59 should also be considered.
 
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Figure  1 Addendum MAJOR TOPICS                              85-94 LICENSING DOCUMENTS-
: 12. UFSAR Review: Chapters related to the system, interfacing systems (e.g., power distribution, I&C, and support systems),
accident analysis, and applicable design criteria shall be reviewed for regulatory design basis and licensing basis information. Scope of this review should take into account the ongoing UFSAR validation effort (which was initially restricted to 21 systems of the original SRR). Pending UFSAR changes should be assessed and selected UFSAR questions and requirements should be validated against installed equipment specifications and operational/test procedures as applicable.
: 13. TS/Bases: LCOs, Surveillance requirements, and their bases for the      .
system and its components shall be reviewed for regulatory design basis and licensing requirements    Other appropriate sections (e.g.,
for interfacing systems, EQ-related, and containment isolation-related) should also be reviewed for system/component regulatory design requirements.
: 14.      Licensing Commitments: Open items from NRC inspections, commitments in the license (and not in the UFSAR or TS), and other commitments made to the NRC by docketed correspondence shall be reviewed for additional licensing basis requirements. For example, reference 6.5 notes that not all systems may meet the criteria of the response to LER 97-021-01 regarding single failure interpretation. A list of system specific licensing commitments will be provided to the ESRR by the Licensing Basis Review Group.
: 15. Notices/Bulletins/Generic Letters: NRC generic communications and evaluations and responses to them related to the system shall be reviewed for additional regulatory design basis requirements and information.
 
~ t ~
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Figure  1 Addendum MAJOR TOPICS                            85 -94 OPERATIONS
: 16.      Procedures: Operating and emergency operating procedures related to the system shall be reviewed for conformance with design basis information. Based on the results of reference 6.5, Emergency Operating Procedures should be a focus of the ESRR.
: 17.      Operator Workarounds: Operator workarounds shall be reviewed for impact on system operation or performance. The impact should be assessed for conformance with the design basis information.
: 18.      Industry Operating Experience Reviews: Industry experience reviews related to the system shall be assessed and compared to current design basis information. Specifically, Operating Experience information from the INPO Industry Database and generic NRC information shall be reviewed and effectiveness of application/consideration reviewed. Based on the results of reference 6.5, industry operating experience should be a focus of the ESRR. [Ref. 6.15t MAIN'IKNANCE'aintenance Procedures: Procedures for the overhaul of or general repair of system components shall be reviewed for appropriate use of and conformance with design basis information. Also,
              . completed work documentation, including any applicable data sheets, should. be. assessed for adequacy of the use of the procedure. This topic does not cover preventive maintenance activities (covered in item 21) and surveillance type procedures (covered in item 22).
: 20.      Vendor Technical Information: Vendor technical manuals, vendor drawings, and design data forwarded by the vendor related to system components shall be reviewed for conformance with design basis information. Based on the results of reference 6.5, vendor technical information should be a focus area of the ESRR.
 
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MAJOR TOPICS                                85-94
: 21. Preventive Maintenance: Regularly scheduled maintenance work items to assure proper equipment operation, including calibrations, lubrication, and filter flushing/changing, shall be reviewed for appropriate schedules, timeliness of performing the activity, and appropriate use of materials, Procedures for preventive maintenance scheduling and documentation shall also be reviewed.
SURVEILLANCE
: 22.      Surveillance and Periodic Tests & Inspections: Each ESRR team shall, in the course of its assessment, verify that design basis safety and accident mitigation functions of the system are validated and verified, either by periodic testing or by engineering calculation for those portions of the system that cannot be tested periodically.
Procedures for tests and inspections required to verify compliance with TS Surveillance Requirements for system components shall be reviewed to assess compliance with the TS and its Bases, appropriate methodology, and consistency with other design basis information. Results of the most recent surveillance and periodic performance tests shall also be reviewed for compliance with design basis information and for the presence of adverse trends that have not been addressed.
: 23. ISI and Section XI IST: Procedures for Inservice Inspection and Inservice testing of system pumps and valves and other performance tests (e.g., heat exchanger performance tests, MOV tests, special pump/system performance tests) shall be reviewed for
            . appropriate use of and conformance with design basis information.
Results of. the. most recent tests shall also be reviewed for compliance with design basis information.
 
~ ~ += I N~
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Figure 1 Addendum MAJOR TOPICS                                85-94 PHYSICAL PLANT
: 24. As-Built Verifications: Walkdowns of the system to verify conformance with design basis information, system layout against the drawings, system condition, component configuration, interactions with other systems, and other characteristics shall be performed based on checklists developed from the documentation reviews. These walkdowns should consider the adequacy of "
system vent provisions and how the provisions are incorporated into system procedures.
: 25. Control Room Drawings (i.e. the OP-series and the 9800 series drawings) shall be reviewed for conformance with design basis information. Also, the timeliness of the incorporation of changes to the current drawings should be assessed.
: 26. Surveillance Programs: Surveillances not associated with Items 22 and 23, such as Erosion/Corrosion, Fire Protection, or HELB, shall be reviewed for direct or indirect applicability to the system and its components and conformance with design basis. Results of the most recent surveillances should be assessed against design basis information.
 
                                                            'ev. 5 C
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Figure  1 MAJOR TOPICS                                85-94 PROGRAMS, PROCESS AND PROCEDURES
: 27. Corrective Actions: Closed Condition Reports (CRs), Maintenance Action Requests, NPM Engineering Evaluation Requests, and other corrective action type reports related to the system shall be assessed for appropriate evaluation of problem against design basis, generic considerations, appropriate resolution, timeliness of resolution, and adverse trends. Included in this review shall be an assessment to determine ifany existing conditions should be the subject of an operability Determination, 50.59 screen or justification for continued operation. (See Generic Letter 91-18 for further details).
: 28. PA Audits and other Assessments: PA audits, EDSFIs, SSFIs, and other completed similar system or program assessments related to the system including Maintenance Rule Risk Significance determination shall be reviewed to assess effectiveness of the audit, appropriate resolution, including addressing extent of condition, timeliness of resolution, and adverse trends. Implementation of any generic lessons learned from system - specific SSFIs and the 9/97 IST self assessment should be evaluated.
: 29. Training Lesson Plans: Operations and engineering training lesson plans for the system shall be reviewed for consistency with design basis information and operating procedures.
30.. Open Items (Backlog): Maintenance,        engineering, and operations open itemsxelated to the system shall be evaluated with respect to the current Restart Criteria within the SIDS data base;
: 31. Strategy Documents: Some Cook Plant systems had specific strategy documents prepared to articulate actions taken in response to NRC Identified Issues., ESRR teams shall review these documents and mark them up to refiect any changes needed to fully address issues of extent of condition, t'ransportability to the other unit, or to ensure a technically accurate and thorough approach to resolving the issue. This markup should be brief but should focus on identifying major unaddressed or unresolved issues in the system that may impact on resolution of the issue addressed by the strategy document.
 
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EXAMPLE - AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM                      95 -99 SYSrEM ASSESSMENT MATRIX EXAMPLE - AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM MAJOR TOPlCS DESIGN BASIS            LICENSING      OPERATIONS  MAINTENANCE  SURV    PHYSICAL  PROGRAMS, PROCESS DOCUMENTS                                        PLANT      Ec PROCEDURES I  2        5  6        9  10  11  12 13  14  15  16  17  18 19  20  21 22  23  24 25  26 27 28 29 30 31 Cl 9
E K
ASSESSMENT    ATIRIBVIKS                                                              0 AFW01  WATERSUIHY                                              X  X                                                          X  X AFW02  l4JKRDUVEHANDTD.AFWmIS X                                X  X AFW03                                                                                                          X  X
      'lURHNEANDSIEAM SURD                                                      X  X      X  X  X        X  X AFWOS  AFWIMWCKNIKLVALVES                                                                                      X  X AFWC01 HHNGDBXiN AFWC02 CX&#xc3;l'AINMENrKXAlKN HKiHHIERGYIJNEBREAKS BA1KCblBIPALQIALRKhlKN                                                                    X  X        X  X AHE&#xc3;mR                                                                                    X  X AFWC07 AFWC08 AFWC09                                                                            X  X AFWC10 SNGZ FAILURECRIIERIAICMF                  X  X AFWCl1 (%&0                                                                                                    X  X    X AFWC12 'IEMP. HRCIS CNSYS(XBIAB8LTY AFWC13  HCIHINALHA7AKS
 
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EXAMPLE - AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM                      95-99 ATTRIBUTE SELECTION GUIDANCE (typical example only - not    a complete treatment  of the AFW system critical attributes or design considerations)
Note: System attributes are selected based on a thorough research of the system design basis.
Attributes chosen for detailed review should be those vital to accomplishing the various safety and accident mitigation functions as defined in the design and licensing basis for the specified mission times (where applicable) and in the design plant conditions. Cook Plant has sometimes overlooked the critical functions of passive components (such as tanks, strainers, spray headers) to assure that appropriate performance has been demonstrated by testing, calculatioh.
or analysis. Additionally, such passive components have sometimes not received thorough materiel condition inspections to assure that the component contains the heat tracing, instrumentation, and other necessary features are functional such that the component remains operable in all required modes. ESRR teams shall assess obvious passive components for these types of issues.
SYSTEM FUNCTIONS BEING ASSESSED AFW01              Water Supply: An adequate water supply inventory is required for the AFW system to remove decay heat from the reactor coolant system (RCS) following events resulting in a loss of main feedwater; Issues related to water volume and level'indication, switchover to other sources, and overpressure/vacuum pressure are to be assessed. Included in this assessment should be a review of the capability of backup water supplies to function as designed.
AFW02            ~
Motor-driven and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (list component IDs): the AFW-pumps are critical components for delivery of the required AFW flow. Issues related to pump performance, NPSH, mitiitnum flow requirements, motor and power supplies, power supply reliability, and design
                'equirements are to be assessed.
AFW03              Initiation and control: The auxiliary feedwater system initiation and control circuitry is required to automatically initiate the system and assure adequate decay heat removal and to allow control of cooldown rates. Issues related to initiation and control setpoints, instrumentation, flow, and level control are to be assessed.
 
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EXAMPLE - AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM                      95 -99 Turbine and steam supply: The turbine driver for the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (component IDs) and its steam supply and exhaust critical components for the operation of the pump. These components
                                                                                                      're have a negative industry operating experience history, and at Cook Plant have a seismic classification (in part) that has been questioned in the past. Issues related to steam line warming and draining, trip and governor valve design, operation, and maintenance, speed controls, overspeed protection, and pump alignment are to be assessed.
AFW05            AFW flow control valves (FMO-212, 222,232,242,211,221,231,241). The flow control valves are critical to limit flow to specified limits to achieve adequate decay heat removal and to miiumize overcooling of the RCS. Issues related to valve and actuator design requirements, power supplies, and positioning capability are to be assessed.
Generic Attributes to be    a  lied where a  licable b all ESRR teams
~
Note: The below listed generic or common attributes, including items AFWC01 to AFWC13, are broadly applicable based on Cook Plant operating history, experience, and issues and, as such, each ESRR team shall be aware of potential effects of these attributes on functionality of their system.
AFWC01            Piping design: Changes in piping design criteria since original plant design MAYresult in confusion in piping design, installation,    and inspection for existing piping and new piping installation. Other examples include material condition of buried pipe, ASME Code classification boundaries, and design temperature and pressures.
Containment isolation: Example of potential concerns are modification, maintenance, and testing (Appendix J) of containment isolation features.
AFWC03            Station blackout operation: Significant effort has been made by the industry to address rules regarding loss of all AC power. The AFW system is an important mitigator for this event.. Example issues include water supply, flow control and manual actions for the AFW system under station blackout conditions.


APPENDICES ARESTARTISSUES,SELECTION/SCREENING CRITERIABEVALUATION OFDISCREPANCIES BYTOPICAREATopicArea1:Electrical Calculations andAnalysisTopicArea2:I&CCalculations andAnalysisTopicArea3:Mechanical
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&Structural Calculations andAnalysisTopicArea4:AccidentAnalysisTopicArea5:DrawingsTopicArea6:LogicDiagramsTopicArea7:Configuration Management TopicArea8:Specifications TopicArea9:DBDTopicArea10:ChangeDocumentation/50.59 ReviewsTopicArea11:Temporary Modifications/Bypasses TopicArea12:FSARReviewTopicArea13:TSandBases
EXAMPLE - AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM                        95-99 High Energy line breaks: Cook Plant systems should be protected against the effects of high energy line breaks. Line break issues are interdisciplinary, involving piping design, environmental qualification, fiooding, bamer design, and accident analyses. Walkdown of physical barriers intended to ensure protection against such line breaks shall be considered to verify their mitigation capability. Additionally, consider test verification of detection and mitigation schemes.
AFWC05            Environmental qualification: EQ is a highly regulated program to assure system operation during adverse environmental conditions associated with design basis accident conditions. The EQ program is being assessed independently of this review. Potential issues from that review affecting system functions important to safe operation and accident mitigation should be considered.
AFWC06            Appendix R: Appendix R is a highly regulated program that required significant utility effort to address. The Appendix R program is being assessed independently of this review. Potential issues from that review affecting system functions important to safe operation and accident mitigation should be considered. Specific consideration should also be given to fire barriers and equipment required for safe shutdown.
AFWC07          Electrical separation: Redundant electrical trains and instrument channels are required to be separated by Regulatory Guide 1.75. Compliance with these requirements should be considered in the system walkdowns.
AFWC08          Seismic qualification: The AFW system is generally classified as seismic Category'.in. accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.29. Compliance with the requirements and the impact on design basis should be verified to the extent that the seismic classification and calculational basis are consistent.
AFWC09.          Year 2000 (Y2K): Considerable industry effort is being expended to ensure the reliable operation of microprocessor-based control and indication systems will not be vulnerable to year 2000 related problems. Identify microprocessor based controls within the system, confirm they are within the Y2K scope, and identify outstanding work remaining.


Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page81of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 14EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWSINTEGRATED RESULTSPages:78-82TopicArea14:Licensing Commitments TopicArea15:Notices/Bulletins/Generic LettersTopicArea16:Procedures TopicArea17:OperatorWorkarounds TopicArea18:IndustryOperating Experience ReviewsTopicArea19:Maintenance Procedures TopicArea20:VendorTechnical Information TopicArea21:Preventive Maintenance TopicArea22:Surveillance andPeriodicTestsandInspections TopicArea23:ISVSection XIISTTopicArea24:As-BuiltVerification TopicArea25:ControlRoomDrawingsTopicArea26:Surveillance ProgramsTopicArea27:Corrective Actions~PTopicArea28:QAAuditsandSelfAssessments TopicArea29:TrainingLessonPlansTopicArea30:OpenItems(Backlog)
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TopicArea31:StrategyDocuments
EXAMPLE - AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM                      95-99 AFWC10          Single Failure Criteria/Common Mode Failure (CMF): The Cook Plant single failure design basis is not straightforward and misunderstanding or misapplication has led to issues of nonconformance in the past.
Additionally, some events at Cook Plant have been related to a failure to adequately consider possible failure modes of both system and supporting or attendant system components, ESRR teams must clearly understand the design basis in these areas and should evaluate whether possible failure modes of both the system and attending systems have been assessed to ensure the design is robust. (see LER 97-021) Additionally, ESRR teams should be alert for and identify common mode failure mechanisms (if encountered) during their reviews. These mechanisms include inappropriate-operations, maintenance, testing, or procurement priorities or poor material condition..
AFWCII          Generic Letter 89-13 (GL 89-13): Cook Plant has had problems
                ,implementing Generic Letter 89-13 on service water cooling systems. The GL 89-13 program is being assessed independently of this review. Potential.
issues from the review affecting system functions important to safe operation and accident mitigation should be considered. ESRR teams should also be alert for instances where service water system dead legs are not properly or effectively addressed under the program or where Cook operating experience shows that, the existing provisions are insufficient.
AFWC12          Temperature Effects on System Operability: Cook Plant has not yet properly accounted for lake temperature variations in all system design bases. ESRR teams shall specifically assess, where applicable, whether the design basis for the system or system components is at odds with the maximum seasonal lake temperature expected, which could be as high as 87.5 degrees during certain summer months. Where such instances are found, the effect on system operability shall be assessed.
AFWC13          External Hazards: Potential external hazards that may be applicable include flooding from both external and internal sources, missiles from both internal and external potential sources, wind loading, tornado and electric storm effects.


Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page82of101EXPA'NDED SYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 14EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWSINTEGRATED RESULTSPages:78-82CGROUPINGOFESRR-IDENTIFIED ITEMSBYTOPICAREAFIGURES2.1GradedApproachforEnh'anced SystemReadiness Review2.2TypicalTopicAreasforEnhancedSystemReadiness ReviewVerticalSlices2.3EnhancedSystemReadiness ReviewPlan2.4Level1EnhancedSystemReadiness Reviews2.5TypicalSystemAssessment Matrix4.1TopicReviewSutmnary-Level1SystemsChecksandDiscrepancies 4.2TopicRevjewSummary-Level1SystemsDiscrepancies asPercentofChecks4.3IssuesbyTopicAreas-Level1Systemsbyseverity-4AIssuesbyTopicArea-Level1Systems(RestartRecommended IssuesOnly)TABLES3-1SummaryStatistics forLevel1SystemReviews3-2SummaryofAreasCoveredDuringtheWalkdowns Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page83of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 15SYSTEMWALKDOWNREPORTPages:83-83DateofWalkdown:
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.SystemManager/Team Leader:~Setem:PuoseofWalkdown:
Figure 3 ASSESSMENT FORM                              100 - 100
Provideabriefdescription ofthepurposeofthewalkdown.
                      ~
WalkdownScoe:Provideanoverallsynopsisastothescopeofthewalkdown, primaryobjectives, timespent'nthewalkdown, totalnumberofalldeficiencies notedaswellasnotingifanyoperability concernswerenoted.WalkdownTeaProvidealistingofthewalkdownteammembersaswellastheirrespective organizations.
Readiness Review Attribute Assessment Form s
WalkdownResults:Provideanoverallcharacterization astotheitemsidentified, andsafetyoroperability
Reviewer:                           Date:                           Item Number Reviewer Number:                   System                          Attribute Number Attribute Description Major topic                        Attribute        Major Topic                          Attribute Checks    CRs                                          Checks    CRs Electrical Calcs/analysis    1                     Operating Procedures            16 1&C Calcs/Analysis           2                      Operator Work Arounds          17 Mech./struct Calcs/Analysis   3                      Industry Op Exp Reviews        18 Accident Analysis             4                      Maintenance Procedures          19 Drawings                      5                     Vendor/Technical Info          20 Logic Diagrams.               6                     Preventive Maintenance          21 Config. Management Info.     7                     Surveillance and Periodic      22 Specifications DBDs 8
: concerns, etc.Conclusions:
9 ISUSection XI    IST'3 Tests & inspections As-Built Verification          24 Change Docs/50.59 Reviews. 10                    Control Room Drawings,         25 Temporary Mods/Bypasses       11                    Surveillance Programs          26 UFSAR Reviews TS/Bases Licensing Commitments 13  12 14 Correction Action Program PA Audits/Other Assessments Training Lesson Plans 27 28 29 Notices, Bulletins and GLs. 15                    Open Items (Backlog)           30 Strategy Documents              31 CR Number:
Provideanoverallassessment ofthesystemcondition basedonobservations.
Documents Reviewed Attribute Assessment
Summarize anyspecificneedforimprovements andallfollow-up actionsbeingpursued.
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page84of101EXPA'NDED SYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMAttachment 16SYSTEMREADINESS AFFIRMATION REPORTPages:84-841.0THEREADINESS AFFIRMATION REPORTWILLINCLUDETHEFOLLOWING INFORMATION 1.1CurrentsystemLicenseChangeRequest(s).
1.2Currentoperatorworkarounds.
1.3Currentcorrective actionsrequiredofcontrolroomequipment.
1.4Currently installed T-Mods.1.5Activeoperability determinations andJCOs,withthe10CFR50.59 foreachODorJCO.1.6Theremaining open"Exceptions" itemsandany"Exceptions" identified duringtheaffirmation process.Exceptions areremaining openrestartrequireditems.1.7AnOperations priorities listcompiledfromoridentical totheFocusListorOperations Priorities AddendumList(butnotnecessarily limitedtotheselists)forthesystem.1.8Reference InitialExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewReport1.9Reference FinalExpandedSystemReadiness Reviewreport.1.10Reference thesystemtestspertheSystemTestPlan.
0 Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page85of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMFigure1SYSTEMASSESSMENT MATRIXMAJORTOPICSPages:85-94SYSIKMASSESShKNT hIATRIXMAJORTOPICSDESIGNBASISLICENSING DOCUMENTS OPERATIONS mi~~~NCP.
SURVPHYSICALPLANT'ROGRAMS, PROCESS4PROCEDURES 567891011121415161718192021222324252627282930ASSESShKNT ATTRIUTES K0K0 Information PMP7200,RST.004 Rev.5Page86of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMFigure1AddendumSYSTEMASSESSMENT MATRIXMAJORTOPICSPages:85-94OVERVIEWThefollowing guidanceforeachofthe31majortopicsinFigure1isprovidedregarding thetypesofdocuments andsourcesofinformation tobeusedandtoprovideaconsistent definition ofthetopicareasforgroupinganddocumenting theresults.Individual reviewers willusetheirexperience andthatoftheESRRTeamtodetermine thespecificdocuments andsourcesofinformation tobeassessed.
Completed scopeofthepreviousSystemReadiness Reviewsshouldbetakenintoaccount.DESIGNBASISElectrical Calcs/Analysis:,Calculations relatedtomotors,electrical devices,circuits, andassociated powersuppliesforsystemcomponents shallbereviewed.
Thereviewsshouldassesstheappropriateness ofdesigninputs,assumptions, consistency withas-builtconfiguration, andgeneralapproach.
Also,calculation resultsshouldbeverifiedforappropriate useinotherdesignbasisdocuments.
Thepotential effectofmodifications ontheemergency electrical loadcalculation, including loadsequencing, shouldbeconsidered.
Inaddition, fusecoordination shallbeaddressed againsttherequirements ofIEEE308.2I&CCalcs/Analysis:
Calculations relatedtotheperformance, setpoints,andstability ofI&Ccomponents andloopsforsystemcomponents shallbereviewed.
Thescopeofthereviewsshouldbe.similartotheelectrical calculations.
Inaddition, reference 6.5identifies apotential concernwithinstrument uncertainty calculations, suchasduetodynamicfioweffects,andwithlackoftrendingofinstrument driftanduseofunverified driftvaluesprovidedbytheequipment vendors.3MechandStructCalcs/Analysis:
Calculations relatedtohydraulics, heattransfer, equipment/support loads,equipment/pipe
: stresses, andothermechanical performance issuesrelatedtosystemcomponents shallbereviewed.
Thescopeofthereviewsshouldbesimilartotheelectrical calculations.
ot' Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page87of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMFigure1AddendumSYSTEMASSESSMENT MATRIXMAJORTOPICSPages:85-944.AccidentAnalysis:
AnalysisofUFSARChapter14eventsshallbereviewedforassumptions regarding systemconfiguration, performance andconditions.
5.Drawings:
Controlled drawingsdocumenting systemdesign,configuration, layout,andconformance toprograms(e.g.,AppendixR,testing,andEQ)shallbereviewedforsystemdesignbasisinformation andsysteminteraction/dependency information.
Drawingsthatareexcludedfromthistopicarelogicdiagrams(coveredinTopic6),ControlRoomdrawings(coveredinTopic25),andvendordrawings(coveredinTopic20).6.LogicDiagrams:
Thelogicdiagramsshallbereviewedforsystemdesignbasisinformation andsysteminteraction/dependency information.
7.Configuration Management:
Cross-referenced documents shallbeverifiedtobecurrent,applicable, andappropriate.
Inparticular, ESRRteamsshallspecifically reviewseveralinputchangeslookingforalackofintegration betweencalculations, accidentanalysisassumptions, designvalues,designbasisdocuments, systemdescription andnormalandemergency operating procedures.
Additionally, thefacilitydatabaseshouldbecheckedforaccuracyandconsistency withdesignrequirements.
8.Specifications:
Equipment design,procurement, andinstallation
.specifications shallbereviewedforconsistency ofsystemdesignbasisinformation andforadherence tocodeandsafetyrequirements.
Generaldesignspecifications shallalsobereviewedforsystemdesignbasisinformation.
9.DBD:Relateddesignbasisdocuments shallbereviewedforsystemdesignbasisrequirements, identification ofpossiblecross-referenced documents, andappropriate applicability.
Potential vulnerabilities includeidentification ofandcompliance withsinglefailurecriteria.
Adequateclosureofopenitemsidentified duringpreparation oftheDBDsshouldbeconsidered.
Basedontheresultsinreference 6.5,thistopicareashouldbeafocusareafortheESRR.
Information
',PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page88of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMSYSTEMASSESSMENT MATRIXMAJORTOPICS"Pages:85-9410.ChangeDocuments/50.59 Reviews:Changedocuments, including DCPs,Component Evaluations (CEs)andUFSARchanges,shallbeassessedforcompleteness, consistency withthesystemsafetyandaccidentmitigation functions asdefinedinthedesignandlicensing basis,appropriate consideration ofinterdisciplinary impact/input, andeffective followthrough(changesmadeorpostedagainsttheappropriate documents).
50.59screensand50.59safetyreviewsshallbereviewedtoassesswhetherthechangemayhaveresultedinacurrentplantconfiguration oroperation thatisoutsidethedesignorlicensing basis,CookPlanthas,inthepast,notperformed some50.59screenswhenrequiredbecausestationpersonnel didnotrecognize thattheywerechangingthefacilityasdescribed intheUFSAR.AspartoftheESRR,teamsshouldreviewpast50.59screensassociated withchangedocuments beingreviewedtoensurethatanexcessively liberalinterpretation ofthewords"systemasdescribed intheUFSAR"wasnotused.SeeNEI9647foradditional guidanceandcurrentindustrystandards.
Lael+
Information
'PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page89of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMFigure1AddendumSYSTEMASSESSMENT MATRIXMAJORTOPICSPages:85-9411.Temporary Modifications/Bypasses:
Temporary modifications and"bypasses" shallbereviewedtoverifythattheywereevaluated againstappropriate designbasisinformation anddonotresultinanunreviewed safetyquestion.
Basedontheresultsofreference 6.5,"Bypasses" shouldbeafocusareafortheESRR.Additionally, teamsshouldbealertforengineering evaluations, actionrequests, partially installed modifications, andotherchangestoensurethatnecessary screenings weredoneineachcase,CookPlanthasidentified 23specificprocesses withapotential tobypassthe50.59processasfollows:Engineering Specifications ActionRequest/Job OrdersDrawingchangesOperability determinations Technical Direction MemosNPM(Engineering)
Evaluations Mechanical Engineering MemoElectrical Engineering MemosDesignChangeDetermination Condition ReportReceiptInspection Practices DesignStandards
~DesignChangeAddenda~Setpoints
~DCDIRs~Technical databooks~PMI-5023addressing plantfabrication andrepairs~Dedication Plans~Oldclearances/Caution Tags~OpenItemsLog~WorkArounds/Watch List~Temporary OperatorAids~Permanent OperatorAidsTheseitemsshouldbereviewedinassessing thehealthofthe50.59processforthesystem.Also,thetemporary modification shallbeassessedtoassurethedurationisnotexcessive.
50.59applicability evaluations and50.59reviewsshallbereviewedtoassesswhetherthetemporary modifications mayhaveresultedinacurrentplantconfiguration oroperation thatisoutsidetheregulatory designbasisorlicensing basis.Abandoned Equipment withouta50.59shouldalsobeconsidered.
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page90of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMFigure1AddendumSYSTEMASSESSMENT MATRIXMAJORTOPICSPages:85-94LICENSING DOCUMENTS-12.UFSARReview:Chaptersrelatedtothesystem,interfacing systems(e.g.,powerdistribution, I&C,andsupportsystems),
accidentanalysis, andapplicable designcriteriashallbereviewedforregulatory designbasisandlicensing basisinformation.
ScopeofthisreviewshouldtakeintoaccounttheongoingUFSARvalidation effort(whichwasinitially restricted to21systemsoftheoriginalSRR).PendingUFSARchangesshouldbeassessedandselectedUFSARquestions andrequirements shouldbevalidated againstinstalled equipment specifications andoperational/test procedures asapplicable.
13.TS/Bases:
LCOs,Surveillance requirements, andtheirbasesforthe.systemanditscomponents shallbereviewedforregulatory designbasisandlicensing requirements Otherappropriate sections(e.g.,forinterfacing systems,EQ-related, andcontainment isolation-related)shouldalsobereviewedforsystem/component regulatory designrequirements.
14.Licensing Commitments:
OpenitemsfromNRCinspections, commitments inthelicense(andnotintheUFSARorTS),andothercommitments madetotheNRCbydocketedcorrespondence shallbereviewedforadditional licensing basisrequirements.
Forexample,reference 6.5notesthatnotallsystemsmaymeetthecriteriaoftheresponsetoLER97-021-01 regarding singlefailureinterpretation.
Alistofsystemspecificlicensing commitments willbeprovidedtotheESRRbytheLicensing BasisReviewGroup.15.Notices/Bulletins/Generic Letters:NRCgenericcommunications andevaluations andresponses tothemrelatedtothesystemshallbereviewedforadditional regulatory designbasisrequirements andinformation.
~t~
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page91of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMFigure1AddendumSYSTEMASSESSMENT MA'i'RIXMAJORTOPICSPages:85-94OPERATIONS 16.Procedures:
Operating andemergency operating procedures relatedtothesystemshallbereviewedforconformance withdesignbasisinformation.
Basedontheresultsofreference 6.5,Emergency Operating Procedures shouldbeafocusoftheESRR.17.OperatorWorkarounds:
Operatorworkarounds shallbereviewedforimpactonsystemoperation orperformance.
Theimpactshouldbeassessedforconformance withthedesignbasisinformation.
18.IndustryOperating Experience Reviews:Industryexperience reviewsrelatedtothesystemshallbeassessedandcomparedtocurrentdesignbasisinformation.
Specifically, Operating Experience information fromtheINPOIndustryDatabaseandgenericNRCinformation shallbereviewedandeffectiveness ofapplication/consideration reviewed.
Basedontheresultsofreference 6.5,industryoperating experience shouldbeafocusoftheESRR.[Ref.6.15tMAIN'IKNANCE'aintenance Procedures:
Procedures fortheoverhauloforgeneralrepairofsystemcomponents shallbereviewedforappropriate useofandconformance withdesignbasisinformation.
Also,.completed workdocumentation, including anyapplicable datasheets,should.be.assessedforadequacyoftheuseoftheprocedure.
Thistopicdoesnotcoverpreventive maintenance activities (coveredinitem21)andsurveillance typeprocedures (coveredinitem22).20.VendorTechnical Information:
Vendortechnical manuals,vendordrawings, anddesigndataforwarded bythevendorrelatedtosystemcomponents shallbereviewedforconformance withdesignbasisinformation.
Basedontheresultsofreference 6.5,vendortechnical information shouldbeafocusareaoftheESRR.
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5.,Page92of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMFigure1AddendumSYSTEMASSESSMENT MATRIXMAJORTOPICSPages:85-9421.Preventive Maintenance:
Regularly scheduled maintenance workitemstoassureproperequipment operation, including calibrations, lubrication, andfilterflushing/changing, shallbereviewedforappropriate schedules, timeliness ofperforming theactivity, andappropriate useofmaterials, Procedures forpreventive maintenance scheduling anddocumentation shallalsobereviewed.
SURVEILLANCE 22.Surveillance andPeriodicTests&Inspections:
EachESRRteamshall,inthecourseofitsassessment, verifythatdesignbasissafetyandaccidentmitigation functions ofthesystemarevalidated andverified, eitherbyperiodictestingorbyengineering calculation forthoseportionsofthesystemthatcannotbetestedperiodically.
Procedures fortestsandinspections requiredtoverifycompliance withTSSurveillance Requirements forsystemcomponents shallbereviewedtoassesscompliance withtheTSanditsBases,appropriate methodology, andconsistency withotherdesignbasisinformation.
Resultsofthemostrecentsurveillance andperiodicperformance testsshallalsobereviewedforcompliance withdesignbasisinformation andforthepresenceofadversetrendsthathavenotbeenaddressed.
23.ISIandSectionXIIST:Procedures forInservice Inspection andInservice testingofsystempumpsandvalvesandotherperformance tests(e.g.,heatexchanger performance tests,MOVtests,specialpump/system performance tests)shallbereviewedfor.appropriate useofandconformance withdesignbasisinformation.
Resultsof.the.mostrecenttestsshallalsobereviewedforcompliance withdesignbasisinformation.
~~+=IN~
Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page93of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMFigure1AddendumSYSTEMASSESSMENT MATRIXMAJORTOPICSPages:85-94PHYSICALPLANT24.As-BuiltVerifications:
Walkdowns ofthesystemtoverifyconformance withdesignbasisinformation, systemlayoutagainstthedrawings, systemcondition, component configuration, interactions withothersystems,andothercharacteristics shallbeperformed basedonchecklists developed fromthedocumentation reviews.Thesewalkdowns shouldconsidertheadequacyof"systemventprovisions andhowtheprovisions areincorporated intosystemprocedures.
25.ControlRoomDrawings(i.e.theOP-series andthe9800seriesdrawings) shallbereviewedforconformance withdesignbasisinformation.
Also,thetimeliness oftheincorporation ofchangestothecurrentdrawingsshouldbeassessed.
26.Surveillance Programs:
Surveillances notassociated withItems22and23,suchasErosion/Corrosion, FireProtection, orHELB,shallbereviewedfordirectorindirectapplicability tothesystemanditscomponents andconformance withdesignbasis.Resultsofthemostrecentsurveillances shouldbeassessedagainstdesignbasisinformation.
CInformation PMP7200.RST.004
'ev.5Page94of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMFigure1AddendumSYSTEMASSESSMENT MATRIXMAJORTOPICSPages:85-94PROGRAMS, PROCESSANDPROCEDURES 27.Corrective Actions:ClosedCondition Reports(CRs),Maintenance ActionRequests, NPMEngineering Evaluation
: Requests, andothercorrective actiontypereportsrelatedtothesystemshallbeassessedforappropriate evaluation ofproblemagainstdesignbasis,genericconsiderations, appropriate resolution, timeliness ofresolution, andadversetrends.Includedinthisreviewshallbeanassessment todetermine ifanyexistingconditions shouldbethesubjectofanoperability Determination, 50.59screenorjustification forcontinued operation.
(SeeGenericLetter91-18forfurtherdetails).
28.PAAuditsandotherAssessments:
PAaudits,EDSFIs,SSFIs,andothercompleted similarsystemorprogramassessments relatedtothesystemincluding Maintenance RuleRiskSignificance determination shallbereviewedtoassesseffectiveness oftheaudit,appropriate resolution, including addressing extentofcondition, timeliness ofresolution, andadversetrends.Implementation ofanygenericlessonslearnedfromsystem-specificSSFIsandthe9/97ISTselfassessment shouldbeevaluated.
29.TrainingLessonPlans:Operations andengineering traininglessonplansforthesystemshallbereviewedforconsistency withdesignbasisinformation andoperating procedures.
30..OpenItems(Backlog):
Maintenance, engineering, andoperations openitemsxelated tothesystemshallbeevaluated withrespecttothecurrentRestartCriteriawithintheSIDSdatabase;31.StrategyDocuments:
SomeCookPlantsystemshadspecificstrategydocuments preparedtoarticulate actionstakeninresponsetoNRCIdentified Issues.,ESRRteamsshallreviewthesedocuments andmarkthemuptorefiectanychangesneededtofullyaddressissuesofextentofcondition, t'ransportability totheotherunit,ortoensureatechnically accurateandthoroughapproachtoresolving theissue.Thismarkupshouldbebriefbutshouldfocusonidentifying majorunaddressed orunresolved issuesinthesystemthatmayimpactonresolution oftheissueaddressed bythestrategydocument.


Information PMP7200.RST.
Information,                PMP 7200.RST.004                        Rev. 5            Page 101      of 101 EXPA'NDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM SAMPLE COMPLETED READINESS REVIEW                                    Pages:
Rev.5Page95of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIE%PROGRAMFigure2SYSTEMASSESSMENT MATRIXEXAMPLE-AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMPages:95-99SYSrEMASSESSMENT MATRIXEXAMPLE-AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMMAJORTOPlCSDESIGNBASISLICENSING DOCUMENTS OPERATIONS MAINTENANCE SURVPHYSICALPROGRAMS, PROCESSPLANTEcPROCEDURES I256910111213141516171819202122232425262728293031Cl9AFW01AFW02AFW03AFWOSAFWC01AFWC02ASSESSMENT ATIRIBVIKS WATERSUIH Yl4JKRDUVEHANDTD.AFWmIS X'lURHNEANDSIEAM SURDAFWIMWCKNIKLVALVES HHNGDBXiN CX&#xc3;l'AINMENrKXAlKN XXXXXXEK0XXXXXXXXXXXAFWC07AFWC08AFWC09AFWC10AFWCl1AFWC12AFWC13HKiHHIERGYIJNEBREAKS BA1KCblBIPALQIALRKhlKN AHE&#xc3;mRSNGZFAILURECRIIERIAICMF
Figure 4 ATTRIBUTE ASSESSMENT FORM                                    101- 101 Readiness Review Attribute Assessment Form Reviewer:      Russell                Date:     2/5/99                    Item Number Reviewer Number: ~ABROi              System      ~AFW                      Attribute Number      AFWO1 Attribute Description    CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK DESIGN BASIS Major topic,                         Attribute              Major Topic                            Attribute Checks      CRs                                                Checks Electrical Calcs/analysis                                    Operating Procedures              16              . 0 1&C Calcs/Analysis                                          Operator Work Arounds            "
(%&0'IEMP.HRCISCNSYS(XBIAB8LTY HCIHINALHA7AKS XXXXXXXXXXXXX Information
17                0 Mech/struct Calcs/Analysis                                  Industry Op Exp Reviews            18                0 Accident Analysis                                            Maintenance Procedures            19                0 Drawings                                                    Vendor/Technical Info              20    0          0 Logic Diagrams,                                              Preventive Maintenance            21                0 Config. Management info.                                     Surveillance and Periodic          22    0          0 Test & Inspections Specifications                  8                  0        Section XI IST/Perf. Tests        23 DBDs                            9                  1        As-Built Verification              24 Change Docs/50.59 Reviews      10                0        Control Room Drawings              25 Temporary Mods/Bypasses        11                0        Surveillance Programs              26 UFSAR Reviews                  12                0        Correction Action Program          27 ITS/Bases                      13                0        PA Audits/Other Assessments        28 Licensing Commitments          14                0        Training Lesson Plans,            29 Notices, Bulletins and GLs      15                0        Open Items (Backlog)               30 Strategy Documents                31 CR Number:
.PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page96of101EXPA'NDED SYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMFigure2AddendumSYSTEMASSESSMENT MATRIXEXAMPLE-AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMATTRIBUTE SELECTION GUIDANCEPages:95-99(typicalexampleonly-notacompletetreatment oftheAFWsystemcriticalattributes ordesignconsiderations)
CR 4 984000 to provide basis for the statement that 174,451 gallons is sufficient to remove decay heat.
Note:Systemattributes areselectedbasedonathoroughresearchofthesystemdesignbasis.Attributes chosenfordetailedreviewshouldbethosevitaltoaccomplishing thevarioussafetyandaccidentmitigation functions asdefinedinthedesignandlicensing basisforthespecified missiontimes(whereapplicable) andinthedesignplantconditions.
Documents Reviewed
CookPlanthassometimes overlooked thecriticalfunctions ofpassivecomponents (suchastanks,strainers, sprayheaders)toassurethatappropriate performance hasbeendemonstrated bytesting,calculatioh.
: 1. DBD - DB-12, AFWS, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Rev. 0, Change 6, Section 3.0.
oranalysis.
: 2. UFSAR 10.5.2, Rev.
Additionally, suchpassivecomponents havesometimes notreceivedthoroughmaterielcondition inspections toassurethatthecomponent containstheheattracing,instrumentation, andothernecessary featuresarefunctional suchthatthecomponent remainsoperableinallrequiredmodes.ESRRteamsshallassessobviouspassivecomponents forthesetypesofissues.SYSTEMFUNCTIONS BEINGASSESSEDAFW01WaterSupply:Anadequatewatersupplyinventory isrequiredfortheAFWsystemtoremovedecayheatfromthereactorcoolantsystem(RCS)following eventsresulting inalossofmainfeedwater; Issuesrelatedtowatervolumeandlevel'indication, switchover toothersources,andoverpressure/vacuum pressurearetobeassessed.
: 3. TS 3.7.6 and Bases; Attribute Assessment No Calculation or other documentation or data could be found to establish the basis for this minimum value. The basis for the 9 hour decay heat cooling capacity needs to be established
Includedinthisassessment shouldbeareviewofthecapability ofbackupwatersuppliestofunctionasdesigned.
AFW02~Motor-driven andturbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps(listcomponent IDs):theAFW-pumps arecriticalcomponents fordeliveryoftherequiredAFWflow.Issuesrelatedtopumpperformance, NPSH,mitiitnum flowrequirements, motorandpowersupplies, powersupplyreliability, anddesign'equirements aretobeassessed.
AFW03Initiation andcontrol:Theauxiliary feedwater systeminitiation andcontrolcircuitry isrequiredtoautomatically initiatethesystemandassureadequatedecayheatremovalandtoallowcontrolofcooldownrates.Issuesrelatedtoinitiation andcontrolsetpoints, instrumentation, flow,andlevelcontrolaretobeassessed.  


Information PMP/200.RST.004 Rev.5Page97of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMFigure2AddendumSYSTEMASSESSMENT MATRIXEXAMPLE-AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMPages:95-99Turbineandsteamsupply:Theturbinedriverfortheturbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps(component IDs)anditssteamsupplyandexhaust'recriticalcomponents fortheoperation ofthepump.Thesecomponents haveanegativeindustryoperating experience history,andatCookPlanthaveaseismicclassification (inpart)thathasbeenquestioned inthepast.Issuesrelatedtosteamlinewarminganddraining, tripandgovernorvalvedesign,operation, andmaintenance, speedcontrols, overspeed protection, andpumpalignment aretobeassessed.
Attachment  2 Expanded System Readiness Review Procedure For Level 2 Systems PMP  7200.RST.006,   Rev. 1}}
AFW05AFWflowcontrolvalves(FMO-212, 222,232,242,211,221,231,241).
Theflowcontrolvalvesarecriticaltolimitflowtospecified limitstoachieveadequatedecayheatremovalandtomiiumizeovercooling oftheRCS.Issuesrelatedtovalveandactuatordesignrequirements, powersupplies, andpositioning capability aretobeassessed.
GenericAttributes tobealiedwherealicableballESRRteams~Note:Thebelowlistedgenericorcommonattributes, including itemsAFWC01toAFWC13,arebroadlyapplicable basedonCookPlantoperating history,experience, andissuesand,assuch,eachESRRteamshallbeawareofpotential effectsoftheseattributes onfunctionality oftheirsystem.AFWC01Pipingdesign:ChangesinpipingdesigncriteriasinceoriginalplantdesignMAYresultinconfusion inpipingdesign,installation, andinspection forexistingpipingandnewpipinginstallation.
Otherexamplesincludematerialcondition ofburiedpipe,ASMECodeclassification boundaries, anddesigntemperature andpressures.
Containment isolation:
Exampleofpotential concernsaremodification, maintenance, andtesting(Appendix J)ofcontainment isolation features.
AFWC03Stationblackoutoperation:
Significant efforthasbeenmadebytheindustrytoaddressrulesregarding lossofallACpower.TheAFWsystemisanimportant mitigator forthisevent..Exampleissuesincludewatersupply,flowcontrolandmanualactionsfortheAFWsystemunderstationblackoutconditions.
-Information PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page98of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMFigure2AddendumSYSTEMASSESSMENT MATRIXEXAMPLE-AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMPages:95-99HighEnergylinebreaks:CookPlantsystemsshouldbeprotected againsttheeffectsofhighenergylinebreaks.Linebreakissuesareinterdisciplinary, involving pipingdesign,environmental qualification,
: fiooding, bamerdesign,andaccidentanalyses.
Walkdownofphysicalbarriersintendedtoensureprotection againstsuchlinebreaksshallbeconsidered toverifytheirmitigation capability.
Additionally, considertestverification ofdetection andmitigation schemes.AFWC05Environmental qualification:
EQisahighlyregulated programtoassuresystemoperation duringadverseenvironmental conditions associated withdesignbasisaccidentconditions.
TheEQprogramisbeingassessedindependently ofthisreview.Potential issuesfromthatreviewaffecting systemfunctions important tosafeoperation andaccidentmitigation shouldbeconsidered.
AFWC06AppendixR:AppendixRisahighlyregulated programthatrequiredsignificant utilityefforttoaddress.TheAppendixRprogramisbeingassessedindependently ofthisreview.Potential issuesfromthatreviewaffecting systemfunctions important tosafeoperation andaccidentmitigation shouldbeconsidered.
Specificconsideration shouldalsobegiventofirebarriersandequipment requiredforsafeshutdown.
AFWC07Electrical separation:
Redundant electrical trainsandinstrument channelsarerequiredtobeseparated byRegulatory Guide1.75.Compliance withtheserequirements shouldbeconsidered inthesystemwalkdowns.
AFWC08Seismicqualification:
TheAFWsystemisgenerally classified asseismicCategory'.in.
accordance withRegulatory Guide1.29.Compliance withtherequirements andtheimpactondesignbasisshouldbeverifiedtotheextentthattheseismicclassification andcalculational basisareconsistent.
AFWC09.Year2000(Y2K):Considerable industryeffortisbeingexpendedtoensurethereliableoperation ofmicroprocessor-based controlandindication systemswillnotbevulnerable toyear2000relatedproblems.
Identifymicroprocessor basedcontrolswithinthesystem,confirmtheyarewithintheY2Kscope,andidentifyoutstanding workremaining.
Information'IMP 7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page99of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMFigure2AddendumSYSTEMASSESSMENT MATRIXEXAMPLE-AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMPages:95-99AFWC10SingleFailureCriteria/Common ModeFailure(CMF):TheCookPlantsinglefailuredesignbasisisnotstraightforward andmisunderstanding ormisapplication hasledtoissuesofnonconformance inthepast.Additionally, someeventsatCookPlanthavebeenrelatedtoafailuretoadequately considerpossiblefailuremodesofbothsystemandsupporting orattendant systemcomponents, ESRRteamsmustclearlyunderstand thedesignbasisintheseareasandshouldevaluatewhetherpossiblefailuremodesofboththesystemandattending systemshavebeenassessedtoensurethedesignisrobust.(seeLER97-021)Additionally, ESRRteamsshouldbealertforandidentifycommonmodefailuremechanisms (ifencountered) duringtheirreviews.Thesemechanisms includeinappropriate-operations, maintenance, testing,orprocurement priorities orpoormaterialcondition..
AFWCIIGenericLetter89-13(GL89-13):CookPlanthashadproblems,implementing GenericLetter89-13onservicewatercoolingsystems.TheGL89-13programisbeingassessedindependently ofthisreview.Potential.
issuesfromthereviewaffecting systemfunctions important tosafeoperation andaccidentmitigation shouldbeconsidered.
ESRRteamsshouldalsobealertforinstances whereservicewatersystemdeadlegsarenotproperlyoreffectively addressed undertheprogramorwhereCookoperating experience showsthat,theexistingprovisions areinsufficient.
AFWC12Temperature EffectsonSystemOperability:
CookPlanthasnotyetproperlyaccounted forlaketemperature variations inallsystemdesignbases.ESRRteamsshallspecifically assess,whereapplicable, whetherthedesignbasisforthesystemorsystemcomponents isatoddswiththemaximumseasonallaketemperature
: expected, whichcouldbeashighas87.5degreesduringcertainsummermonths.Wheresuchinstances arefound,theeffectonsystemoperability shallbeassessed.
AFWC13ExternalHazards:Potential externalhazardsthatmaybeapplicable includefloodingfrombothexternalandinternalsources,missilesfrombothinternalandexternalpotential sources,windloading,tornadoandelectricstormeffects.
Information PjVIP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page100of101EXPANDEDSYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMFigure3READINESS REVIEWATTRIBUTE ASSESSMENT FORMPages:100-100Readiness ReviewAttribute Assessment FormsReviewer:
ReviewerNumber:~Attribute Description MajortopicDate:SystemAttribute ChecksCRsMajorTopicItemNumberAttribute NumberAttribute ChecksCRsElectrical Calcs/analysis 11&CCalcs/Analysis 2Mech./struct Calcs/Analysis 3AccidentAnalysis4Drawings5LogicDiagrams.
6Config.Management Info.7Specifications 8DBDs9ChangeDocs/50.59 Reviews.10Temporary Mods/Bypasses 11UFSARReviews12TS/Bases13Licensing Commitments 14Notices,Bulletins andGLs.1516171819202122Operating Procedures OperatorWorkAroundsIndustryOpExpReviewsMaintenance Procedures Vendor/Technical InfoPreventive Maintenance Surveillance andPeriodicTests&inspections ISUSection XIIST'3As-BuiltVerification 24ControlRoomDrawings, 25Surveillance Programs26Correction ActionProgram27PAAudits/Other Assessments 28TrainingLessonPlans29OpenItems(Backlog) 30StrategyDocuments 31CRNumber:Documents ReviewedAttribute Assessment Information, PMP7200.RST.004 Rev.5Page101of101EXPA'NDED SYSTEMREADINESS REVIEWPROGRAMFigure4SAMPLECOMPLETED READINESS REVIEWATTRIBUTE ASSESSMENT FORMPages:101-101Readiness ReviewAttribute Assessment FormReviewer:
RussellDate:2/5/99ReviewerNumber:~ABROiSystem~AFWItemNumberAttribute NumberAFWO1Attribute Description CONDENSATE STORAGETANKDESIGNBASISMajortopic,Attribute ChecksCRsMajorTopicAttribute ChecksElectrical Calcs/analysis 1&CCalcs/Analysis Mech/struct Calcs/Analysis AccidentAnalysisDrawingsLogicDiagrams, Config.Management info.Specifications DBDsChangeDocs/50.59 ReviewsTemporary Mods/Bypasses UFSARReviewsITS/Bases Licensing Commitments Notices,Bulletins andGLs8910111213141501000000Operating Procedures OperatorWorkAroundsIndustryOpExpReviewsMaintenance Procedures Vendor/Technical InfoPreventive Maintenance Surveillance andPeriodicTest&Inspections SectionXIIST/Perf.
TestsAs-BuiltVerification ControlRoomDrawingsSurveillance ProgramsCorrection ActionProgramPAAudits/Other Assessments TrainingLessonPlans,OpenItems(Backlog)
StrategyDocuments 16"17181920212223242526272829303100.0000000CRNumber:CR4984000toprovidebasisforthestatement that174,451gallonsissufficient toremovedecayheat.Documents Reviewed1.DBD-DB-12,AFWS,Auxiliary Feedwater System,Rev.0,Change6,Section3.0.2.UFSAR10.5.2,Rev.3.TS3.7.6andBases;Attribute Assessment NoCalculation orotherdocumentation ordatacouldbefoundtoestablish thebasisforthisminimumvalue.Thebasisforthe9hourdecayheatcoolingcapacityneedstobeestablished Attachment 2ExpandedSystemReadiness ReviewProcedure ForLevel2SystemsPMP7200.RST.006, Rev.1}}

Latest revision as of 02:13, 4 February 2020

Rev 5 to PMP 7200.RST.004, Expanded Sys Readiness Review Program.
ML17325B589
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 05/07/1999
From: Finissi M, Larson R
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17325B588 List:
References
PMP-7200.RST., PMP-7200.RST.00, NUDOCS 9905170136
Download: ML17325B589 (140)


Text

PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev.S Page 1 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Information Effective Date:

Robert E. Larson Michael Finissi NE nter wner ogtuzant rgantzatton TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE o~ esses ~ esse ~~~~~~ oo ~~~~~~~~~~ ooooooo ~ ~ so 3 2 DEFIMTIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS................ I~ ~ 06 3 RESPONSIBILITIES o~~ oo ~~~~~ oooo ~ oo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ooooooo. ~o ~

'o

~~ ~ .10 4 DETAILS- ~~~ oo ~~~~ ooooe ~~ oeooo ~~ ooooooooo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ oo ~ ~ oooo ~ ~ eooo ~ ~ ooooooo ~~~~ eoo ~~ ~~ ooooooeooo-13 4.1 Scope And Selection Of Systems For Expanded System Readiness Review ...'...... 13 4.2 Use Of The System Assessment Matrix, SIDS, And The Assessment Data Base.... 14 4.3 Phase 1 Initial Expanded System Readiness Review...........~..................... 16 4.4 Phase 2 Restart Activities Monitoring.......... ........................... 27 4.5 Phase 3 Final Expanded System Readiness Review...................... 32 4.6 Phase 4 Startup And Power A.,ensiOn.................'.............................. 37 47

~ Reports......,...,........~..........,... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 41 5 FINAL CONDITIONS e oo soooooeooo~ooooooee oo~eoo~~~~oe ~~ oooo ~~~ooeooooooeoooooooooooooooooooeoooo~ 42 6 REFERENCES ~~oooooooooooooo~oooooo~~~~ooeooooooo~ooooooooeooooooo~~~~oooeoooo~eooooooo~oo~~~oo~ 42 ATTACHMENT1 SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW BOARD (SRRB) CHARTER.. 44 ATTACHMENT2 21 LEVEL 1 SYSTEMS INCLUDED IN THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM RE ADINESS~RE~VIEW esses'oooooeooooooooooooooooooo ~ ~ eoooooooooooooeoooooo ooooooooo 46 ~ ~~

ATTACHMENT3 RATIONALEFOR SELECTION LEVEL 1 SYSTEMS FOR EXPANDED RE ADINESS REVIEW oo ooeooooooeoo so eoo sooooosoooooeooooooooooooooooeo.

~ ~ ~~ ~~~ ~~~ oo ~~~o 48 ATTACHMENT4 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW LEVEL 1 SYSTEMS

~ ooooooe ~ oooo ~ oooo ~ ~ osooo ~ ooooooooooo ~ ooooooooeooeooosoo ~~~ oooooooe ~~ ooooe ~ ooooo ~~~~~~o 49 ATTACHMENT5 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW TRAINING RE QUIREMENTS ooo oooooooooooooeoooo ooeoeoooooooo ooooooeeoooooooooooooooooo os oo

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ooo 51 ATTACHMENT6 SYSTEM'READINESS REVIEW DOCUMENTATIONAND DATA S OURCESoooooo ~ ooooooosoeooooooooooooeeoooooooooeoooooooooooooooooooe ~ eooooooooooooeo ~~ esses 52 9905170136 9q0507 PDR ADOCK 050003i5 f P PDR

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 2 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM ATTACHMENT7 SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM (SYSTEM WALKDOWN G UIDELINES) o ~ ~ ~ ~ oo ~ ~ oo ~ oeoooooooo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ oo ~ ~ oo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ o 54 ATTACHMENT8 CRITERIA FOR WORK INCLUDED IN RESTART SCOPE.... 62 ATTACHMENT9 PHASE 2 OUTAGE SCOPE APPROVAL PROCESS............... 69 ATTACHMENT10 RESTART REQUIRED SCOPE DEFERRAL FORM............. 70 ATTACHMENT 11 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW CLARIFICATION S HEET ~~~~~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~ oe ~~~~~~~ oo ~ eo ~ oo ~~~o~~~~ ~~ ~~ ~~~~~~~e ~~o~e~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 71 ATTACHMENT 12 INITIALEXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW REPORT

~~ e e~e e~~e ~~~e ~oe e o~e ~o~~e~~~~o~e ~o~e~e ~o~o~e ~e ~~e ~~~~e~~ e ~~~~o~e ~oo~~o~~~~e ~e ~e ~~~~ 72 ATTACHMENT13 FINAL EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW REPORT

~~ oooooo ~ eoooo ~ oooooooo ~~~ oo ~~~ oooooooooooo ~ ~ oo ~ eo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ooooooo ~ ooeoo ~~~~ oooooo ~~ 75 ATTACHMENT14 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEWS INTEGRATED RES ULTS oooooooeooooo oo ooooooooooooooooeooooooooooooooooo

~ ~ ~ ~ oo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ oooooo ~ ~ ~ ooooo oo

~ ~~ 78 ATTACHMENT15 SYSTEM WALKDOWNREPORT ..................................... 83 ATTACHMENT 16 SYSTEM READINESS AFFIRMATIONREPORT ................ 84 FIGURE 1 SYSTEM ASSESSMENT MATRIXMAJOR TOPICS ........................ 85 FIGURE 2 SYSTEM ASSESSMENT MATRIXEXA'MPLE - AUXILIARYFEEDWATER S YSTEM ~ ~ ~ ~ oooooo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ oooooo ~ ~ oo ~ ~ ooee ~ ~ oooo ~ oooo ~ oo ~ ~ oooooooooo ~ ~ oooo ooo oo

~ ~ ~~~~~~~~ oo 95 FIGURE 3 READINESS REVIEW ATTRIBUTE ASSESSMENT FORM..............100 FIGURE 4 SAMPLE COMPLETED READINESS REVIEW ATTRIBUTE ASSESSMENT

. F ORM ~ oo ~~~~~ ooo ~~ o'o ~~ ooooooooooooooooooooooooeoo ~ oo oooeoooooooooooo

~ ~ oo ~~~ oo ~~ oooooooeo101

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 3 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE [Ref. 6.8]

1.1 The purpose of this document is to define the Expanded System Readiness Review (ESRR) Program and provide guidance in evaluating and determining system restart readiness for the Cook plant. This document also describes the process for scoping work items as either required or not required to support unit restart. These guidelines support startup from the current extended outage in support of Reference 6.1.

1.2 Several independent reviews, including a self assessment of the Auxiliary Feedwater

'ystem and an independent Engineering Issues Review Group report identified vulnerabilities in the preservation of the Design and Licensing Basis that suggested a need for a more rigorous review of overall system readiness, 1.3 The ESRR will provide reasonable assurance that:

~ the plant systems are capable of meeting their safety and accident mitigation functions as defined in their design and licensing bases [Ref. 6.11], and

~ in conjunction with other ongoing improvement programs and resolution of identified issues, that the plant is modified, tested, operated and maintained consistent with the design and licensing bases. [Ref. 6.12]

1.4 The Expanded System Readiness Review consists of four phases Phase 1: Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Phase 2: Restart Activities Monitoring Phase 3: Final Expanded System Readiness Review Phase 4: Startup and Power Ascension 1.4.1 Phase 1 is to include the following:

a. Formation and training of system teams for readiness review using representatives from various station departments.
b. A review of system design and license basis documentation.
c. Review of safety and accident mitigation functions for each system.
d. Verification, in conjunction with other ongoing improvement programs and resolution of identified issues, that the plant is modified, tested, operated and maintained consistent with the design and licensing bases.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 . Rev. 5 Page 4 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM

e. Evaluation of the extent of condition for identified problems and identification of potential programmatic or generic issues.

Performance of multi-disciplined system walkdowns.

Evaluation of open items in the System Indexed DataBase System (SIDS) (see definitions) against the Restart Screening Criteria.

NOTE: The Plant Nuclear Safety Review Committee (PNSRC) is making a transition to be known as Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC). This document uses the acronym, PORC, but documents such as the UFSAR and Technical Specifications may use PNSRC that represents the same group.

h. Presentation of the Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Report 'o the System Readiness Review Board (SRRB) and the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC).

/

Begin scheduling restart work in the Restart Schedule.

1.4.2 Phase 2 is to include the following:

ao Continued review of open corrective action items through closure.

b. Continued evaluation of emergent action items for unit restart against the Restart Screening Criteria.

C. Scheduling of restart work into the appropriate System Work Window.

d. Monitoring of field. work, including presence at the job site, when appropriate.
e. Development of System Test Plans.

Preparation for System Window closure and the Final Expanded System Readiness Reviews.

g. Completion of regularly scheduled walkdowns by the System Manager (See definitions).
h. Management of work closure through use of performance indicators and priorities.

Update of the SIDS data base, as the System Manager evaluates emergent and open items.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 5 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 1.4.3 Phase 3 is to include the following:

a... Final System Readiness Walkdown completed by the System Manager and an assigned Operations representative.

b. Presentation of the Final System Readiness Report, prior to restart, to the SRRB and PORC by the assigned operations representative and the System Manager.
c. Review work that is not complete prior to restart and review the aggregate impact of deferred work.
d. Finalize the System Test Plans.
e. System Manager will develop performance monitoring baseline for system performance tracking and trending 1.4A Phase 4 is to include the following:
a. Designated test results identified by the Test Review Board (TRB).
b. System Manager will implement performance monitoring baseline for system performance tracking and trending.
c. System Manager will monitor any new corrective maintenance activities or condition reports, and continuously monitor system readiness.
d. Completion of System Readiness Affirmation.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 6 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 2 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS Term Meaning System Assessment Matrix The matrix consists of attributes (rows) and topic review areas (columns) that define the scope of the work and when completed provides the summary basis of the conclusions of the Expanded System Readiness Review. Figure 1 provides the Assessment Matrix Form. Figure 2 provides a sample completed assessment matrix.

Attribute Key system parameters, including system safety and accident mitigation functions, that will be evaluated against various topic review areas. The attributes make up the rows of the matrix and are selected by the Expanded System Readiness Review Teams using guidance provided in Section 4.3.4.

Topic Review Area Consists of documents and sources of information in the following areas: Design, Licensing, Operations, Maintenance, Surveillance, Physical Plant, and Programs, Processes and Procedures. The review areas make up the columns of the assessment matrix. The addendum to Figure 1 provides guidance on the evaluation to be performed for each topic area.

Discrepancy A finding generated as a result of an activity performed in accordance with this procedure which indicates a potential need for corrective action or process improvement. Discrepancies identified during the Expanded System Readiness Review are documented via Condition Reports (CRs) in the Cook Plant Corrective Action Program (CAP) or as Action Requests in the Work Control System (NPM). A Condition Report shall be issued for any item that falls within the scope of the Corrective Action Program.

Generic Issue Discrepancies identified in several systems for the same topic

..review area that potentially identify a process or programmatic problem..

Assessment Data Base The data base used to document Expanded System Readiness Review assessments, confirming consistent use of design and licensing information, and identifying discrepancies.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 7 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 2 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)

Term Meaning System Indexed Data Base The SIDS data base is used to track open items identified as System required for restart. Open items in this data base include open items from existing plant data sources, and discrepancies identified by the Expanded System Readiness Review. Thus, discrepancies identified during the Expanded System Readiness Review generate entries in the SIDS Database.

Current Licensing Basis The set of NRC information applicable to a specific plant and a licensee's written commitments for ensuring compliance with, and operating within applicable NRC requirements and the plant specific design basis, including all modifications and additions to such commitments over the life of the license, that are docketed and in effect. The CLB includes NRC regulations contained in 10CFR Parts 2, 19, 20, 21, 26, 30, 40, 50, 51, 54, 55, 70, 72, 73, 100 and appendices thereto: Orders, License Conditions, Exemptions, and Technical Specifications (TSs). It also includes the plant specific design basis information defined in 10CFR 50.2 as documented in the most recent UFSAR as required by 10CFR 50.71 and NRC commitments remaining in effect that were made in docketed licensing correspondence such as responses to NRC Bulletins, Generic Letters and enforcement actions, as well as licensee commitments documented in the NRC Safety Evaluations or Licensee Event Reports.

Design Basis Information that identifies the specific functions to be (as Defined by 10CFR 50.2) performed by a structure, system or component of a facility and the specific values or range of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for design. These

.values may be (1) restraints derived from generally accepted state-of-the-art practices for achieving functional goals or (2) requirements derived from analysis (based on calculations and/or experiments) of the effect of a postulated accident for which a structure, system or component must meet functional goals.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 8 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 2 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)

Term Meaning Engineering Design Basis The Engineering Design Basis is the entire set of design-restraints that are implemented, including (1) those that are part of the current licensing basis, and (2) those that are not part of the current licensing basis, but are implemented to achieve certain. economies of operation, maintenance, procurement, installation, or construction. (See Reference 6.2 for further clarification, including definitions of Design Basis Document, Design Requirements and Design Output Document).

Vertical Slice Review A structured review approach derived from the Safety System Function Inspection (SSFI) methodology that allows an assessment of specific aspects of the plant physical configuration and operation against selected aspects of the plant licensing and design basis. The scope of the ESRR vertical slice review for each system is defined by the System Assessment Matrix.

Horizontal Slice Review A review of a programmatic issue or plant documents across multiple plant systems, such as a review of the UFSAR, evaluation of Appendix R fire protection requirements, review and upgrade of calculations, etc.

System Readiness Review A board of personnel conducting business in accordance with Board (SRRB) the Charter in Attachment 1.

System Manager The leader of the Expanded System Readiness Review Team and engineering owner of assigned systems for purposes of this procedure.

System Manager Indicates the fact that the System Manager has reviewed the "APPROVE" scope (i.e., the screening of the item as required or not required to support unit restart) of an item in SIDS and the associated comments that justify the item's scope. This "APPROVAL" is denoted in the Initial System Manager Approval box in SIDS and is used by the System Manager during all Phases for new items in SIDS, meaning that the System Manager agrees with the scope and justification.

f g%'\,

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 9 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 2 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)

Term Meaning System Manager During Phases 3 and 4, "CONCURRENCE" is denoted in the "CONCUR" Final System Manager Approval box in SIDS and is used by the System Manager to mean that restart items, or post restart items that are not included in the aggregate impact, have been completed to the satisfaction of the System Manager.

System Manager Indicates that this Restart scoped SIDS item is not complete and "EXCEPT" remains an exception to restart (i.e., completion of the item still needed to enter the mode identified in the mode restraint box in SIDS). This "EXCEPTION" is denoted in the Final System Manager Approval box in SIDS and is used by the System Manager during. Phases 3 and 4.

System Manager "Post Denoted on items associated with a component that has (2) or.

Restart Deferred" more post restart deferred items, excluding PM post restart items.

System Manager "Restart Denoted on items with deferred scope that were initially Required Deferred" approved, as restart required. These items must be accompanied by a Restart Required Scope Deferral Form (Attachment 10).

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 10 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 3 RESPONSIBILITIES 3.1 The Director of Engineering Restart is responsible for overseeing Engineering preparations for restart, for the ESRR Program and, when needed, for chairing the System Readiness Review Board; ensuring that the requisite members are in attendance.

3.2 The System Readiness Review Manager is responsible for:

3.2.1 Expanded System Readiness Review Program content and oversight.

3.2.2 Determination of the scope of the review for ESRR systems.

3.2.3 Ensuring adequate training and logistics support is provided to participating'eam members j 3.2.4 Reviewing the results of the individual system readiness reviews, identifying any generic. concerns and defining progranunatic corrective action (ifany).

3.2.5 Reviewing the attribute selection and the corresponding Assessment Matrix for each system (Figure 1).

3.2.6 Maintaining and revising this procedure on the Expanded System Readiness Review Program, annotating the changes made, and obtaining appropriate approvals.

3.2.7 Owns and manages the SIDS Database 3.3 The System Engineering Manager is responsible for the assignment of System Managers to systemrbeing reviewed, and for providing additional oversight for the ESRR Program.

3A The System Engineering Supervisors are responsible for supervision and effective implementation of the Expanded System Readiness Review Program through active coaching, counseling and oversight of the System Manager. The System Engineering Supervisors jointly own the ESRR results with the System Managers.

3.5 The Expanded System Readiness Review Program Coordinator is responsible for:

3.5.1 Expanded System Readiness Review program development and implementation.

3.5,2 Schedule and coordination

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 11 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 3.5.3 Reviewing and recommending for approval the attribute selection and the corresponding Assessment Matrix for each system.

3.5.4 Review the Assessment Data Base to identify generic issues and trends.

3.6 The Assessment Data Base Coordinator is responsible for:

3.6.1 Assuring that the Assessment Data Base is operational and available to the ESRR teams.

3.6.2 Maintaining the data in the Assessment Data Base and providing status.and summary reports regarding the ESRR.

3.7 The SIDS Data Base Coordinator is responsible for:

3.7.1 Assuring that the SIDS Data Base is operational and available to the ESRR.

teams, and to program owners and functional area managers (or designees).

3.7.2 Making any required changes or improvements to the SIDS Data Base.

3.7.3 Ensuring that items required to be scoped are entered into the SIDS Data Base.

3.7.4 Providing and maintaining the quality of SIDS reports.

3.8 System Managers are responsible for:

3.8.1 Overall system health and performance.

3.8.2 Organizing and leading each ESRR Team. The Team will be composed of

'he necessary multi-discipline resources to conduct Phase 1 of the Expanded System Rea'diness Reviews. The System Teams will include the following:

a. System Manager
b. Operations Representative
c. Design Engineering Representative
d. Maintenance Representative.
e. Licensing Representative
f. Outside member(s) with varied industry experience

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 12 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 3.8.3 Coordinating team requests for system design and licensing basis documentation from the appropriate sources.

3.8.4 Performing Phases 1, 2, and 3, and supporting Phase 4 of the ESRR.

3.8.5 Coordinating preparation of the ESRR Initial and Final Reports, and presenting these reports to the SRRB and PORC.

3.8.6 Assembling ESRR review results and restart action items into the SIDS Database for tracking.

3.8.7 Maintaining a status of restart action items and submitting status updates to plant management as required.

3.8.8 Coordinating and conducting system.walkdowns with appropriate team members.

3.8.9 Organizing and leading each work window team (see Section 4.4.2b.1).

3.9 The Expanded System'Readiness Review Teams are responsible for:

3.9.1 Identifying attributes appropriate to their specific system for assessment.

3.9.2 Selecting topic areas appropriate to the identified attributes.

3.9.3 Performing system attribute checks and walkdowns and documenting the results, including any noted discrepancies, in the assessment data base.

3.9.4 Reviewing items in the SIDS data base and scoping the items as discussed in section 4,3.12.

3.9.5 Entering the deficiencies in the Cook Plant Corrective Action Program and/or Work Control System as appropriate.

3.9.6 Providing assistance to the System Manager as required.

3.10 The Operations Manager is responsible for assigning appropriate Operations representatives to support the ESRR Program.

3.11 The Director of Regulatory Affairs is responsible for assigning appropriate Licensing representatives to support the ESRR Program.

3.12 The Maintenance Manager is responsible for assigning appropriate maintenance representatives to support the ESRR Program.

I, ik.$ g Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 13 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 3.13 The Design Engineering Director is responsible for assigning appropriate Design Engineering representatives to support the ESRR Program.

3.14 The SRRB w'ill perform management oversight and assessment of the Expanded

=-

System Readiness Review Program and will be the final approval authority over work item screening. The SRRB will perform activities applicable to this procedure, including approval of the System Assessment Matrices. The SRRB Charter is included in Attachment l. An expected product of the SRRB oversight is improved consistency and technical depth of the ESRR results.

3.15 The PORC is responsible to provide a cross-discipline oversight of the ESRR Program by reviewing ESRR reports for each system and the Integrated Readiness Review Report.

3.16 The Outage Scope Management Team (OSMT) will review emergent work items following Phase 1 to determine whether or not they are required to support Unit restart.

4 DETAILS 4.1 Scope And Selection Of Systems For Expanded System Readiness Review NOTE: The term "TBDL" when used in this document refers to detail To Be Developed Later and incorporated in a subsequent revision to this document or in other documents.

4.1.1 Previously, a plant System Readiness Review was conducted as discussed in Reference 6.3. A graded approach was used in performing the previous system readiness reviews, with high-risk systems receiving more thorough reviews. The previous system readiness reviews were broken down into three levels-with. the following attributes:

a. Level 1 Systems

.1. Risk-significant Maintenance Rule systems

2. Some important non-risk significant standby maintenance rule systems
b. Level 2 Systems
1. Remaining non-risk significant Maintenance Rule systems
c. Level 3 Systems

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1. Non-Maintenance Rule systems that support power generation
2. Systems that are required for plant operation, are easily monitored in service, and present little or no challenge to safety 4.1.2 The 21 Level 1 systems included in the previous System Readiness Review are listed in Attachment 2.

4.1.3 Subsequent to the completion of the previous System Readiness Review, several independent reviews were conducted, including a Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI) of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (Reference 6.4) and an Engineering Issues Review Group final report (Reference 6.5).

These reviews identified vulnerabilities with respect to the scope of systems reviewed during the previous System Readiness Review, additional system design basis and licensing basis issues, and weaknesses in engineering programs and processes.

4.1.4 The classification of Level 1, 2, and 3 systems utilized during the previously performed system readiness reviews were based solely on Maintenance Rule input. The Level 1 systems were Maintenance Rule Risk systems. Level 2 systems were non-risk significant systems, but 'ignificant systems that were still included in the scope of the Maintenance Rule.

Level 3 systems were systems that were not included in the scope of the Maintenance Rule.

4.1.5 The classification of Level 1 and 2 systems utilized during the ESRR Program is based on Maintenance Rule input, systems required for safe shutdown, significant attendant/support systems, and systems identified by the System Engineering Manager that have experienced an abnormal amount of corrective maintenance. The basis for the selection of Level 1 systems is found in Attachment 3.

4.1.6 Expanded System Readiness Reviews under this procedure will be conducted on all of the previous Level 1 systems, plus additional systems that were determined to warrant an Expanded System Readiness Review (Refer to Attachment 4). Expanded System Readiness Reviews for the new Level 2 Systems will be addressed in a separate procedure.

4.2 Use Of The System Assessment Matrix, SIDS, And The Assessment Data Base 4.2.1 The ESRR employs a vertical slice approach derived from the methodology of a Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI). This approach evaluates system safety important to safe operation and accident mitigation functions (Attributes) against plant configuration and design, licensing, operations and maintenance documents (Topic Areas).

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 15 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 4.2.2 The scope of the vertical slice review performed on a system is shown in a System Assessment Matrix. The system attributes selected for each system's review form the rows of this matrix, as further discussed in section 4.3.4. The sources of information or topic areas that are included in the vertical slice form the columns of the matrix.

4.2.3 The System Manager, accompanied by the cognizant System Engineering Supervisor, presents a description of the system scope and the system specific Assessment Matrix to the SRRB for approval. This helps the SRRB ascertain that attributes are appropriate.

4.2;4 The requirements associated with each of the attributes are evaluated against specific topic areas or sources of information.

4.2.5 The assessments include comparison,and evaluation of documents as well as observations of plant condition and configuration during system walkdowns.

The ESRR will emphasize those attributes, topic areas and activities necessary to satisfy the program purpose.

4.2.6 The results are documented using Attribute Assessment Forms (Figure 3) in the Assessment Data Base. Discrepancies are entered into the Cook Plant Corrective Action Program and/or Work Control System (NPM).

Assessment Data Base manipulation and reporting capabilities assist in reporting, tracking and identification of generic issues and trends.

4.2.7 By assessing the results for all topic areas across all the systems reviewed, the ESRR can assist in determining the extent of condition of vulnerabilities in plant programs and processes already identified by previous inspections and reviews (e.g., References 6.4 and 6.5). The ESRR will also be used to identify other potential vulnerabilities and the potential need for further improvement in plant processes and programs.

4.2.8 In summary, the ESRRs result in a vertical slice evaluation of selected design and licensing bases for the ESRR systems. These evaluations do not guarantee that future external or internal assessments will not uncover additional problem reviews. However, in conjunction with other ongoing horizontal slice restart programs at Cook Plant and resolution of issues that are recommended for restart, the ESRRs provide reasonable assurance that key systems are capable of meeting their safety and accident mitigation functions as defined in their design and licensing basis.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 16 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 4.2.9 The SIDS Data Base is being used to track items being evaluated, scoped and justified as either Restart or Post Restart for both Units. This data base is the central repository for such items. SIDS will generate reports listing Restart and Post Restart items for SRRB and PORC approval. This data base will be managed and controlled by the System Manager for his particular system(s).

4.3 Phase 1 Initial Expanded System Readiness Review 4.3.1 Expanded System Readiness Review Team Formation

a. The System Engineering Manager will assign a System Manager to each of the Expanded System Readiness Review teams.
b. The System Manager will lead the Expanded System Readiness Review'eam comprised of a licensed member from Operations and members ..

from Design Engineering, Maintenance, Licensing, and outside members with strong industry experience; 4.3.2 Training

a. Prior to performing the reviews, training will be conducted for the AEP System Managers and the ESRR Team members on Expanded System Readiness Review Program knowledge and skill needs. These needs are defined- in Attachment 5.
b. The training for the AEP System Managers and the ESRR Teams was determined based on an evaluation of the tasks to be performed and lessons learned form the original System Readiness Reviews, the original System Engineering Review Board, and previously performed engineering and programmatic assessments.

A 4.3.3 Review Design and Licensing Basis Documentation

a. The ESRR Team shall become familiar with the design and licensing basis of the system to gain an understanding of the system functional and safety requirements under normal operating and accident conditions. The design and license basis documentation listed in Attachment 6 will be available to the ESRR Team.
b. Access to the following will be provided to the ESRR Teams.
1. EQ information
2. Appendix R information

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 17 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM

3. Station Blackout information
4. ISI/IST Program Information 5; Seismic qualification information
6. Electrical design criteria (separation, etc.)
7. Maintenance Rule Program Information
8. Individual Plant Examination (IPE) Results
9. High Energy Line Break Program'Information
10. Generic Letters GL89-13, GL83-28, GL96-01, and responses thereto.
11. Generic Letter GL89-10 program information.
12. Generic Letter GL96-06 information (as available)
13. LER 97-021 and associated single failure commitments
14. 1998 AFW SSFI Report
15. 1998 Containment Spray SSFI Report
16. Engineering Issues Review Group Report (Reference 6.5)
c. The expectation is that the System Manager will review the above information to determine its impact on his system.
d. Licensing will provide the results of a review of licensing commitments on a system basis.

4.3.4 Define System Specific Attributes

a. During the review and evaluation of design and licensing information, each ESRR Team will develop a list of attributes to be included in the assessment on the System Assessment Matrix.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 18 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM

b. Attributes will be selected by a thorough review of the design and, licensing basis to identify the system safety and accident mitigation functions. Additional functional requirements of the system and critical components may also be selected. Information from the Licensing Review Program will be considered as will PRA insights on risk significant components and functions. Functionality of attendant/support systems and important passive equipment (e.g.,

tanks, bladders, strainers) will also be considered in selection of system attributes. Generic requirements such as Station Blackout, EQ, Appendix R, etc. will also be selected as system attributes when appropriate. A detailed example of and some requirements for attribute selection and their bases are provided in the Figure 2 addendum.

4.3.5 Establish Scope of Review

a. Each ESRR Team will perform a vertical slice review of its assigned system by evaluating the system and common attributes against specific topic review areas as documented in the system Assessment Matrix.

The topic areas to be assessed for each attribute will be defined in an initial System Assessment Matrix at the start of the ESRR, taking into account the results of previous evaluations at Cook Plant. This initial System Assessment Matrix will be reviewed and recommended by the ESRR Program Coordinator or Manager and the Nuclear Licensing Manager or Director of Regulatory Affairs, and approved by the SRRB. Changes made in response to SRRB comments need not be re-reviewed by the other parties who previously reviewed the matrix.

These reviews and approvals will be based on the matrix and other supporting material as dictated by the board. Typically, this information will consist of:

~ A listing of the system safety and accident mitigation functions

~ The matrix itself, showing the attributes chosen and the topics to be reviewed for each

~ A marked-up system flow diagram or schematic depicting system boundaries

<<u ~ 4 Information PNIP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 19 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM

~ A separate word description'of system physical boundaries and functional boundaries. Functional boundaries are those interfaces with other systems or the environment that must be proper in order for the system to function as designed. An example would be a circuit breaker in a non-safety related system that must open to protect a connected safety-related system if the aon-safety related system incurs a fault.

~ A description of the attributes chosen and the sub-attributes of each which the team intends to pursue.

b. The System Assessment Matrix will be used by each ESRR team as a "

guideline to ensure adequate coverage of topic areas and all attributes.

c. Based on the additional knowledge and understanding gained in the course of the review, specifically including the results of the review of licensing commitments, actual coverage of specific topic areas for particular attributes may expand and deviate from the initial matrix, provided that coverage of appropriate topic areas and all attributes is maintained. If ongoing licensing or ESRR'reviews identify the need to add,attributes to the assessment matrix, these additions will be approved by the ESRR Manager or the ESRR Program Coordinator.

Such additions will be communicated in a timely manner between Licensing aad the ESRR Manager. Actual coverage will be documented in the final System Assessment Matrix, which will be reviewed by the ESRR Program Manager or Program Coordinator and will be included in the Initial Expanded System Readiness Review report. "

4.3.6 Review System Condition Documeatation

a. Data sources in SIDS will be reviewed by the ESRR Teams to gain a comprehensive understanding of the current system condition, to assess the system functional requirements for readiness, and to evaluate the conformance of the system condition to its design basis. A specific focus of this effort shall be the identification of fundamental vulnerabilities in the system's ability to perform its safety and accident mitigation functions as defined in the Design and Licensing Basis.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 20 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM

b. During the review and evaluation of these data sources, the ESRR team may develop additional specific requirements to be checked. For

. example, if a previously conducted assessment identified a discrepancy between a component capability and a design requirement, this design requirement would be a candidate for investigation and the satisfactory closure of the previously identified discrepancy would be assessed as part of the ESRR. The same strategy may be applied to assess the satisfactory closure of open items that were identified when the Design Basis Documents were created.

4.3.7 Perform Assessment of System Attributes and Topic Areas

a. The checks of specific attributes against the topic areas will assess the internal consistency of system documents, procedures, and plant configuration and their conformance with design and licensing requirements. The ESRR Team will document conformance with requirements as well as discrepancies on an Attribute Assessment Form. An example of a completed Attribute Assessment Form is provided in Figured (Actual form may vary slightly as it will be computer generated).
b. Each Attribute Assessment Form shall list the documentation reviewed or walkdown observations made to arrive at the assessment conclusions. The list of reviewed documents shall contain revision numbers and/or date if applicable. The assessment forms shall describe the assessment and indicate the number of attribute checks covered by the assessment form and the number of attribute checks which resulted in identification of discrepancies. The ESRR team shall determine the extent of condition for discrepancies identified within their system by conducting additional checks as necessary.
c. A summary of the evaluation for each attribute will be documented in the Initial System Readiness Report. This sumtnary will document the checks made to verify the capability of the system to perform its safety and accident mitigation functions.

4.3.8 Perform Walkdown of System

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 21 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM ao The System Manager shall develop the walkdown strategy in accordance with the System Walkdown Guidelines and brief the ESRR Team (see Attachment 7). The walkdowns conducted as part of the previous System Readiness Reviews tended to focus on material condition. The ESRR walkdowns will include evaluation of material condition, but will also focus on configuration or environmental issues that could also impact the design and licensing basis. [Ref. 6.13]

System safety and accident mitigation function flow paths should be indicated on system flow diagrams. The marked up drawings will be used to assist the System Manager to verify the system safety and accident mitigation functions during the system walkdowns. Other drawings may be used by teams to check specific configuration or as-built details against drawing requirements.

C. Participants in the walkdowns will include the System Manager, the Operations representative, a Maintenance representative, and outside team member(s). Participation by representatives of design engineering and licensing may also be obtained when required by the System Manager;

d. The assessment performed during the walkdown will be documented, together with discrepancies noted, in the assessment data base.
e. Corrective action items identified during the walkdowns shall be.

entered into the Corrective Action Program and/or Work Control System by initiating a Condition Report or Action Request respectively.

These corrective action items will also be captured in the SIDS data base and the Assessment Data Base.

A Walkdown Report (Attachment 15) is to be assembled by the System Manager-and included in the Initial Expanded System Readiness Report The report will discuss the following:

1. Walkdown purpose and scope
2. Walkdown findings
3. Necessary corrective actions identified
4. Summarization of system concerns and condition
5. Suinmarization and justification for portions of systems that are not walked down.

Information PMP '7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 22 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM

g. During the review and evaluation of the walkdowns, the System Team may develop additional checks to make beyond those on the Walkdown

. Guidelines.

4.3.9 Identify Long Standing or Recurring Equipment Performance Issues

a. Each ESRR team will obtain information from previous Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) evaluations, the IST program self assessment, and Maintenance Rule evaluations to identify potential long-standing or recurring equipment performance issues. Such issues be identified for follow-up in the Assessment Data Base and the 'hall Corrective Action Program and/or Work Control System and the results will be documented in the Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Report. A Condition Report shall be issued for any item that falls within the scope of the Corrective Action Program. ~

4.3.10 Evaluate Extent of Condition for Identified Problems

a. Each system team shall assess recurring issues to determine whether further extent of condition determination is required (beyond the planned scope as documented in the initial system Assessment Matrix) and document any such conditions in the Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Report. [Ref. 6.14]
b. The ESRR Program Manager and Program Coordinator shall review the results across all the reviewed systems to identify potential programmatic or generic issues. Ifappropriate, this information will be used to recommend corrective actions of a programmatic nature.

The results will be documented in the Expanded System Readiness Review Integrated Results, described in Attachment 14.

4.3.11 Documen~view.results and enter discrepancies into ESRR Assessment Data Base and the Cook Plant Corrective Action Program and/or Work Control System. A Condition Report shall be issued for any items that fall within the scope of the Corrective Action Program.

a. Attribute checks performed as well as discrepancies found in this review are to be documented in the Assessment Data'ase.

Discrepancies shall also be entered into the Cook Plant Corrective Action Program by Condition Report or the Work Control System by Action Request.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 23 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM

b. Condition Reports and Action Requests will automatically be loaded into the SIDS data base. This SIDS data base will allow tracking of

.. open items required for restart and will allow evaluation of potential aggregate effects of those items not required to be resolved prior to restart.

NOTE: Program owners or functional area managers (or designee) perform scoping, monitoring, and closure of non system-specific programmatic or functional area discrepancies as discussed further in PMP 7200.RST.009 and PMP 7200.RST.010.

4.3.12 Determine Restart Workscope

a. All system-specific items in the SIDS data base will be reviewed against the Restart Issues Selection/Screening Criteria (see Attachment 8). The System Manager is responsible for adding any known open corrective action items not present in SIDS for his system. These items are to be evaluated for Restart Readiness Scope. PRA risk-based insights may be helpful in deciding marginal cases.
b. Each system-specific item in the SIDS database will be evaluated using the evaluation process outlined in Attachment 8. The ESRR Team will recommend one of the following classifications for each such item in SIDS in order to enable return of the Cook Plant Units to operation in a safe and reliable manner:
1. RESTART1 - Activities required to be completed prior to entering Startup/Power Ascension of Unit 1. This classification includes necessary restart and power ascension testing activities as well as definition of the applicable mode restraint.
2. RESTART2 - Activities required to be completed prior to entering Startup/Power Ascension of Unit 2. This classification includes necessary restart and power ascension testing activities as well as definition of the applicable mode restraint.
3. POST RESTART1 - Activities which should be completed on a schedule consistent with the Unit 1 normal plant work controls process.
4. POST RESTART2 - Activities which should be completed on a schedule consistent with the Unit 2 normal plant work controls process.

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5. NOT APPLICABLE - Activities that are not required to be completed.
c. These classifications will be used to determine and schedule the work within the appropriate restart time frame;
d. Preventive Maintenance activities are unique since they often provide a means of enhancing equipment performance. However, the equipment being serviced may require being removed from operation. As a result, the ESRR must take these activities into consideration when evaluating PM activities. The following expectations are associated with the evaluations of PM activities:

~ All PMs scheduled for completion before August 31, 2001 are to

, be reviewed.

~ PMs scheduled (next required date) prior to March 31, 2000 are to be categorized as RESTART1 or RESTART2.

~ PMs that are scheduled or planned during the operating cycle, and require a unit outage to complete, are to be categorized as RESTART1 or RESTART2's appropriate.

~ PMs scheduled (next required date) prior to August 31, 2001 that are not part of on-line maintenance or a Functional Equipment Group (FEG) outage; and will impact a surveillance test, or initiate an unplanned or unscheduled LCO during the operating cycle, are to be categorized as RESTART1 or RESTART2.

~ PMs that are scheduled as a function of a pre-planned or pre-sehedtQed FEG outage, with or without an ensuing LCO, and do not challenge unit/system operability, are to be categorized as POST RESTART1 or POST RESTART2.

Some re-screening will be necessary ifthe assumed dates above change.

e. All system leaks are to be evaluated. Scope determination guidelines are as follows:

ll

~ Any leak location with no available isolation is to be categorized as RESTART1 or RESTART2, unless reasonable justification for a different categorization is provided.

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~ Any ASME code component/vessel/piping leakage is to be categorized as RESTART1 or RESTART2.

"~ Leakage that can only be isolated by using a "freeze seal" is to be categorized as RESTART1 or RESTART2.

~ Any leakage identified within containment requiring corrective action is to be categorized as RESTART1 or RESTART2.

Leakage identified on systems outside containment, on non-ASME code components/vessels/piping, that is isolable, and would not challenge system operability or reliability if worked non-outage, is to be categorized as POST RESTART1 or POST RESTART2.

Leakage from systems outside containment that would or could contain radioactive fluids that could violate leakage requirements in Section 14.3 of the UFSAR is to be categorized RESTART1 or RESTART2.

4.3.13 Labeling

~ Any labeling issues that have potential impact to work control tagging are to be categorized as RESTART1 or RESTART2 with the mode identified.,

~ Any labeling issues with any potential impact to system operability or reliability are to be categorized as RESTART1 or RESTART2.

~ Only labeling issues that have no impact on components/systems work control tagging are to be categorized as POST RESTART1 or POST RESTART2.

4.3.14 Prepare Initial Expanded System Readiness Report and Present to The System Readiness Review Board.

a. The information gathered throughout the system readiness review and

.walkdown shall be compiled by the ESRR Team into an Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Report. Each member of the review team, including participants in the walkdowns, will be identified in the report.

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EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 5 Page 26 of 101

b. The System Manager will ensure that each open corrective action item identified during the ESRR and walkdown is initiated either as a Condition Report or Action Request, and, ifsystem-specific, is evaluated and scoped in the SIDS data base prior to the SRRB presentation.

C. The report content is as depicted in Attachment 12 and will be presented to the SRRB for approval. Minor changes in the report format are permitted with the concurrence of the ESSR program manager or coordinator. The System Manager will be accompanied by the Engineering Supervisor cognizant over the system.

d. When the Initial Expanded System Readiness Report is approved by the SRRB, the System Manager will next present the report to the PORC for approval. Ifthe report is approved by the SRRB with comments, the System Manager will resolve all SRRB comments and the original signees of the report will re-review the report and approve comment resolution. If the SRRB disapproves the report, the System Manager must re-present the report to the SRRB until approval is obtained, obtaining re-reviews as necessary.
e. After the report has been presented to the SRRB, the SRRB Secretary will provide the cognizant Engineering Supervisor with a list of all comments the System Manager needs to address. In some instances when the new technical issues are identified during SRRB reviews, the System Manager will be required to write a Condition Report on the issue. In this case, the respective Engineering Supervisor is to debrief the System Manager, and record the debrief in the CR. The debrief will address all comments recorded at the SRRB presentation. When ESRR program implementation problems are identified, the SRRB secretary will write a Condition Report oh the issue.
f. After SRRB approval, the System Manager presents the Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Report to the PORC. The PORC will approve or disapprove the report, from a nuclear safety standpoint, keeping an overview perspective that focuses on ensuring that inter-disciplinary concerns were adequately addressed. PORC should not normally focus on approving SRRB action on each discrepant condition but rather should probe into methods and overall results. If approved, the action items will be included in the restart effort. Any changes to the scope (restart/post restart) of individual items will be recorded in the PORC meeting minutes. Ifdisapproved, the System Manager will take appropriate actions and re-present the report to the PORC.

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- g. The cognizant Engineering Supervisor will ensure incorporation of PORC comments within the report and SIDS data base. PORC comments are to be incorporated in SIDS by the SIDS Data Base Coordinator, and reviewed by the System Manager. PORC comments within the report are to be incorporated by the System Manager.

4.3.15 Functional Areas and Programmatic Issues

a. Open items associated with functional areas and programs will be loaded into the SIDS data base.
b. If the open functional area or programmatic items affect specific systems, these items will be transferred to the appropriate system, within SIDS, where the ESRR Teams will scope the items.
c. The SRRB will review the scoping of programmatic and functional area work items that are not system specific subject to a schedule and protocol established by the Director of Restart.
d. Functional area and programmatic issue items will be reviewed and approved by SRRB.
e. For open functional area and programmatic items that are not system specific, the appropriate functional area or program owners are responsible for ensuring that the functional areas and programs are ready to support restart in accordance with the Restart Plan.

4.4 Phase 2 - Restart Activities Monitoring NOTE'rogram owners or functional area managers (or designee) perform scoping, monitoring, and closure of non system-specific programmatic or functional area discrepancies-as. discussed further in PMP 7200.RST.009 and PMP 7200.RST.OIO 4.4.1 General Description of Phase 2 Activities

a. The System Manager will use SIDS to monitor approved system work scope and identify any new action items. Work activities should be frequently field verified and monitored to insure corrective actions are being taken and no adverse plant conditions develop.
b. The System Manager will perform the following activities:
1. Monitor closure of approved system-specific workscope items using SIDS and available performance indicators.

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2. Identify and evaluate new emergent system-specific action items for restart; consider using risk-based insights where available to enhance decision-making in marginal cases.
3. Perform routine field walkdowns
4. Make presentations to the SRRB as requested
5. Review system work window planning and scheduling to ensure work is being properly scheduled
6. Provide input to and review System Test Plans
7. Update SIDS to reflect proper completion of open system-specific items and to document exceptions to completed work
c. For Restart Required items that are not planned to be completed prior to restart, the system-specific Restart Required Scope Deferral Form (Attachment 10) is to be reviewed through the same level of approval as when the item was originally approved for restart.
d. Applicable Restart Required Scope Deferral Forms are to be completed prior to closure of the applicable System Work Window. For Condition Reports not associated with corrective maintenance, the deferral form is to be completed no later than the Final Expanded System Readiness Review.

4.4.2 Management of Workscope NOTE: Emergent items scoped as restart must be scheduled in the appropriate System Work Windows.

a. Identify and Scope Emerging (New) Open Items
1. Phase 2 work items that are evaluated and scoped for accomplishment prior to restart after the Expanded System Readiness Review Initial Report is prepared will be reviewed using the following process in accordance with Attachment 9.

a) The System Manager will review, evaluate and scope new or emergent system-specific items within SIDS in accordance with Attachment 8, "Criteria for Work Included in Restart Scope,"

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 29 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM b) The System Manager is also responsible for review and evaluation of any newly initiated Operating Experience items impacting his respective systems. The new Operating Experience items are to be scoped for applicability to the unit restart. The System Manager is to ensure that Operating Experience items that are scoped as restart items are resolved and follow-up actions completed prior to restart.

c) System-specific items that result in newly created corrective maintenance or new design change requests are to be monitored for closure.

2. Phase 2 Outage Scope Approval Process - Additions a) Once new emergent field work items (ARs/JOs/JOAs) are scoped by the System Manager, they will be presented to the OSMT for review and approval by the cognizant Engineering Supervisor or his designee in order to be added to the Restart Schedule; These new emergent work items are subsequently (usually weekly) presented to the SRRB (or subcommittee thereof) for review and approval by the System Manager.

PORC approval of restart items is not required during Phase 2.

b) All other emergent system-specific items that are not field work related (broke/fix) are scoped by the System Manager and presented to the SRRB (or subcommittee thereof) for review and approval. PORC approval of these items is not required during Phase 2.

3. Phase 2 Outage Scope Approval Process - Deletions a~When deferring items that have been previously approved by the SRRB and PORC as restart items, The Restart Required Scope Deferral Form is to be used. The form will be reviewed through the same level of approval that the restart item originally received.
b. System Windows

-1. System Window Scheduling

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 30 of 101 EXPOUNDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM a) The System Manager and Operations personnel should ensure that the applicable restart work is contained within the respective system work window or'ther appropriate work opportunity. Actual system work windows are developed and scheduled using a System Work Window Team that assists the scheduling organization. System window planning and scheduling will be accomplished by the team under the supervision of the System Manager as follows:

~ Interface with the appropriate planner and scheduler and obtain the planned system windows for review.

~ Review the system schedule for completion. The System Manager should record system schedule additions, changes, conflicts, and omissions within an internal memorandum sent to Planning and Scheduling.

~ Through System Work Window Team meetings the System Manager will ensure that the System Work Window Team is aware of restart task requirements to support System Work Window schedules.

2. System Window Work Management a) The following issues are to be monitored on systems with only one work window, or monitored during the final system work window of a system:

~ Ensure Restart Required scope items are completed. The, System Manager will review completed items to ensure the work was completed to his satisfaction.

~ The System Manager is to assure that the final comment field in SIDS is completed.

~ For Restart Required items, the mode field and the test restraints within the issue field are to be completed in SIDS by the System Manager.

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~ Closed restart scope items are to be reviewed and approved by the System Manager and comments entered into the Final Comments Screen of each item in SIDS.

An approval designates that the responsible department for completing the item has statused the item as closed or complete.

b) The following issues are to be monitored by the system work window team on systems with multiple system work windows.

~ Ensure "Evaluation Type" open items (i.e., CRs, AR Evals etc.) are completed.

~ Corrective maintenance items generated from "Evaluation Type" activities are scoped within SIDS.

~ Ensure emergent work items'scoped as Restart are

'cheduled for completion prior to the end of the last available system work window.

c. System Test Plans
1. The System Managers are responsible for assisting in the development of the Startup Testing Program for their respective systems. The System Manager will support the Start-up and Power Ascension Organization/Operations organizations in this capacity.
2. The System Manager will start developing System Test Plans in accordance with PMP-7200.RST.005 (when approved). Test Plans will be developed for appropriate systems based on the reviews performed in Phase 1.
3. For systems where the System Manager concludes that System Test Plans are not appropriate, justification as to why a System Test Plan is not required will be developed.

d.. System Walkdown

1. System Manager should complete a system walkdown on a routine basis. The purpose of these walkdowns is to monitor satisfactory completion of work and to identify emergent deficient conditions.
e. Interaction with the System Readiness Review Board

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1. Any new technical issues identified in a system by SRRB during Phase 2 will be documented in a Condition Report. The Condition Report will be generated by the SRRB secretary or individual System Managers will write the Condition Reports if the issue was identified during a SRRB meeting or presentation at which they are present.

4.5 Phase 3 - Final Expanded System Readiness Review NOTE: Program owners or functional area managers (or designee) perform scoping, monitoring, and closure of non system-specific programmatic or functional area discrepancies as discussed further in PMP 7200.RST.009 and PMP 7200.RST.010.

4.5.1 General Scope For Restart Required items that are not planned to be completed prior to restart, the Restart Required Scope Deferral Form (Attachment 10) is to be reviewed through the same level of approval as when the item was originally approved for restart.

b. Applicable Restart Required Scope Deferral Forms are to be completed prior to closure of the applicable System Work Window. For Condition Reports not associated with corrective maintenance, the deferral form is to be completed no later than the Final Expanded System Readiness Review.
c. Restart Activities
1. System Managers will review all items scoped RESTART1 or RESTART2 in SIDS to ascertain their completion prior to "affirming final system readiness for Restart.
2. A final system readiness review walkdown will be completed by the System Manager and a licensed operations representative.
3. A Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report will be developed.
4. The System Test Plan will be revised to include all items applicable to Restart and Power Ascension that were not approved in previous revisions of the Test Plan.

~ mr~,

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5. The Final Expanded System Readiness Review is completed when the System Test Plan has been revised and received Test Review Board (TRB) (reference PMP-7200.RST.005 (when approved))

concurrence and the Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report has been completed, presented to the SRRB and the PORC, and PORC approval has been given for system Restart.

6. Restart Required system-specific items that are not completed are to be coded as an Exception within SIDS. Refer to Attachment 11, "Final Expanded System Readiness Review Clarification Sheet,"

for detailed information.

7, Items that are coded as an Exception do not require comments in the Final Comment field in SIDS.

8. Restart Required system-specific items that are not planned to be .

completed prior to restart are to be coded as Restart Required Deferred in the Final System Manager Approval box within SIDS.

Refer to Attachment 11, "Final Expanded System Readiness Review Clarification Sheet," for detailed information.

d. Post Restart Activities System Managers will review all system-specific items scoped Post Restartl or Post Restart2 as appropriate in SIDS for final approval for applicability to Restart. They then complete the Final Comment field in SIDS for all Post Restart items.
2. For components that have two (2) or more associated Post Restart items, the Post Restart items are to be coded as Post Restart Deferred in the Final System Manager Approval box within SIDS.

Refer-.to Attachment 11, "Final Expanded System Readiness Review Clarification Sheet," for detailed information.

3. Post Restart items related to components with multiple (two or more) deferred issues, excluding post restart PMs, are to have the Final Comment section completed in SIDS providing technical justification for restart by evaluating the aggregate impact of the multiple deferred tasks on the component. These comments are to be referenced in the Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report.

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4. Marked-up drawings identifying the components with multiple deferred issues will be included with the Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report.

5; The aggregate impact of all outstanding items against a given component will be reviewed, assessing the operability of the component. Justification for exclusion of the items for Final System Readiness will be included in the Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report.

6. The aggregate impact of all affected components will be evaluated against the given system assessing the operability of the system, and this evaluation will also be included in the Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report.

4.5.2 Final Restart Work Closure

a. All system-specific Restart Scope items within SIDS are to be reviewed and concurred with by the System Manager. An approval designates that the responsible department for completing an item has statused the item as Work Complete or Closed. Any known exceptions to the items are to be noted as specified in Section 4.5.1c.6 prior to System Manager approval. Items not administratively closed are to be addressed within the final comments as to how these items are to be closed.
b. The System Manager collects the Restart Required Scope Deferral Forms completed on each system and reviews the Deferred Restart Required Work and Post Restart Scoped Work, excluding post restart PMs, for aggregate impact to the system, and prepares technical justification for system operability in accordance with its design basis functions=This review is to be included within the Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report as discussed in Section 4.5.4a.

4.5.3 Final System Walkdown and Walkdown Report

a. The ESRR Team, under the leadership of the System Manager, will conduct a final system walkdown in accordance with the guidance of Attachment 7. The pu'rpose of the walkdown is to ascertain proper accomplishment of identified, work and to identify any previously undocumented system deficiencies.
b. Minimum walkdown attendance will require the System Managel. and a licensed operations representative.

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c. Upon completion of the System Team Walkdown, the System Manager will complete a Walkdown Report. This report will cover the topics identified in Attachment 15 and will form a part of the Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report.
d. Discrepancies identified during this walkdown will be entered into the Corrective Action Program and/or Work Control System.

4.5.4 Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report

a. The Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report will include the following items:
1. Final Expanded System Readiness Review SIDS Report.
2. Final Expanded System Readiness Review System Walkdown Report (Attachment 15).
3. The report will include a cover sheet similar to Attachment 13, titled Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report.
4. Copies of all Restart Required Scope Deferral Forms for the system are to be attached.

I

5. Impact of deferred work assessment (See 4.5.4b below).
6. System Test Plan
b. The impact of deferred work (work scoped as Post-restart) will be

~

assessed, first individually, then in aggregate on individual system components, then on the system overall readiness for restart as discussed'further below.

1. The following items will be evaluated individually regarding the impact on a component basis, aggregate impact on a component basis, and aggregate impact on a system basis:

~ Post Restart Scope, system components with multiple (Two or more) deferred work items, excluding post restart PMs.

~ All Restart required deferred scope Components.

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2. The evaluation will first address system components with multiple deferred work items. At the component level, the deferred work issues, then the aggregate impact of the deferred work for each component will be addressed.
3. This discussion will include the technical justification allowing the component to return to service with the identified deferred work issue(s).

4 System components with multiple (two or more) Post Restart deferred work items, or any component with a deferred Restart Required work item are to be identified on the applicable drawing(s) (Flow Diagrams, Wiring Diagrams, General Arrangement Diagrams), with the deferred work identification number(s) noted next to the affected component. Alternately, the-.

component can be identified'on the drawing and a list of the deferred work identification numbers for each affected component attached.

5. The aggregate impact evaluation will conclude with a discussion on system readiness to return to service. The aggregate impact on the system and its capacity to perform its design basis function is to be discussed, addressing the cumulative impact of system components with deferred work. A statement will be included explaining how the deferred work is to be scheduled.,
c. Final Expanded System Readiness Review Presentations The Final Expanded System Readiness Review Reports are to be reviewed by the respective Operations and Licensing representatives, Engineering Supervisor, then scheduled for presentation 4tL'L Ml I to the SRRB.
2. The Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report is to be ll presented to the SRRB and PORC by the System Manager, the cognizant Engineering Supervisor and a licensed operations representative. SRRB or PORC comments or open items are to be addressed as discussed in Sections 4.3. 14e through 4.3. 14g for the Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Report.
d. System Test Plans

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1. System Test Plans are to be finalized as specified in (PMP-7200.RST.005 (when approved)). The plans will include all items applicable to Restart and Power Ascension which have been finalized subsequent to previous revisions of the Test Plan.
2. System Test Plans or Justifications for not having System Test Plans will be reviewed and approved by the Test Review Board.
3. System Test Plans will be implemented through Phase 3 and Phase 4 of the ESRR Program.

4.5.5 Phase 3 Emergent Work Management

a. Emergent corrective action items are to be continuously scoped for restart applicability throughout Phase 3. Use of PRA risk-based insights may help with marginal cases.
b. After initial comments and scoping on an emergent system-specific work item is incorporated in the SIDS database, the item is coded "APPROVE". The System Manager also reviews the scoping of the item and if Restart required, then annotates it in the SIDS database as "EXCEPT" (to designate the item as a restart exception if not.

completed).

c. For a system-specific item scoped as Post Restart, comments are

, entered in the Final Comments field and the System Manager codes the item as Post Restart Deferred.

d. For emergent system-specific field work items, refer to Section 4.4.2a.2.a) for the approval process.
e. For all other emergent system-specific items that are not field work related (broke/fix), refer to section 4.4.2a.2.b) for the approval process..
f. The system-specific Exception List in SIDS is to be continually managed by the System Manager until the system is turned over to Operations for testing.
g. For those system specific items that are completed and satisfy restart requirements, change the "EXCEPT" to "CONCUR" and complete the Final Comments section in SIDS.

4.6 Phase 4 - Startup And Power Ascension

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 38 of 101 EXPMDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM NOTE'rogram owners-or functional area managers (or designee) perform scoping, monitoring, and closure of non system-specific programmatic or functional area discrepancies as discussed further in PMP 7200.RST.009 and PMP 7200.RST.010.

4.6.1 General Scope

a. Phase 4 activities include the following:
1. Phase 4 commences on each system with the PORC approval of Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report for that system.
2. The System Manager is to monitor through completion those system-specific work items scoped Exception within SIDS.
3. Management of emergent system-specific work items through the normal work control process and Scope Addition/Deletion Cover Sheet (TBDL).
4. The System Manager is to complete System Readiness Affirmation after the retest portion of the system work window and prior to restoration of system operability to support unit Restart.
5. 'ystem Readiness Affirmation and submittal of the System Readiness Affirmation Report (Attachment 16).
6. Each System Manager is to monitor the conduct of the Station Startup and Power Ascension Plan as it relates to his system.
7. The System Manager is to implement the baseline system performance monitoring, tracking and trending.

S. System Work Window Teams are to continue to meet on a regular basis. The System Manager will lead the team in managing future system work windows, as well as monitoring open corrective action items, operability issues, and reliability issues on the system.

9. Phase 4 is complete when all power ascension testing is complete and the respective unit attains 100% rated unit load for - (TBDL)-

days..

4.6.2 Phase 4 Emergent System-Specific Work Management, Prior to System Affirmation

r 0

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a. Emergent issues are to be reviewed to support the system work window schedule.
b. Emergent corrective action items are to be presented to the OSMT with an attached Scope Addition/Deletion Cover Sheet (TBDL).
c. Emergent items are to have initial comments entered into SIDS and to be scoped as follows:

1, Emergent items that are required for restart will be scoped Restartl or Restart2, in accordance with Attachment 8, "Criteria for Work Included in Restart Scope."

2. Items that are identified to be worked in accordance with the normal Work Control system requirements are to be scoped as WORK CONTROL PROCESS (WCP). Items scoped as WCP will include the technical basis for when the item should be completed.

These conditions shall support work order priorities as defined in PMI-2291 to ensure continued system readiness.

3. An explanation, providing technical justification (Reference item 6 on Attachment 8) is to be entered in the Initial Comments Field in SIDS.
4. The System Manager is to "APPROVE" items in the Initial System Manager Approval box in SIDS once he is satisfied with the scope of the item-.
d. Corrective maintenance work items are to be presented to the OSMT with a Scope Addition/Deletion Cover Sheet (TBDL). Engineering issues that may impact the system affirmation process are to be included and managed via the Restart Schedule.
e. Restart Required items that are not complete are to become "Exceptions," and added to the "Exceptions" list. When an item is completed, the System Manager is to review and denote as "CONCUR" within the Final System Manager Approval box in SIDS.

4.6.3 System Readiness Affirmation

a. The System Manager will complete a System Readiness Affirmation Report which will include the following information:
1. Current system License Change Request(s).

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2. Current list of operator workarounds.
3. Current corrective actions that involve Control Room equipment.
4. Currently installed Temporary Modifications.
5. Active Operability Determinations (ODs) and Justifications for Continued Operation (JCOs), with the associated 10CFR50.59 screen or evaluation for each OD or JCO.
6. The remaining open system-specific "Exceptions" items and any system-specific "Exceptions" identified during the affirmation process. Exceptions are remaining open restart required items.
7. Any other operations focus list concerns involving the system.
8. Reference to the Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Report
9. Reference to the system tests specified in the System Test Plan.
b. The System Manager and licensed operations representative will conduct a System Readiness Affirmation walkdown and document walkdown on System Walkdown Report (Attachment 15). The results of the walkdown will be included in the System Readiness Affirmation Report.
c. The licensed operations representative will co-sign the System Readiness Affirmation Report with the System Manager.
d. Any corrective actions identified during the System Readiness Affirmation are to be addressed within the work control process and identifiedao the Outage Control Center for resolution, Engineering action items are to be added to the Engineering Priority List with the designated engineer identified as the lead.to resolve the issue.
e. The System Manager and the licensed operations representative will present the System Readiness Affirmation Report to SRRB and PORC.

f." Any comments received from SRRB during the Phase 4 require resolution and response within three weeks from the date of the SRRB meeting.

g. The system is turned over to operations after PORC approval of the System Readiness Affirmation Report.

~ .

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a. The System Managers are to monitor the results of each respective Test Plan. The System Managers are to follow-through on 'System deficient test plan results the Corrective Action Program and/or Work Control System as appropriate. A Condition Report shall be issued for any items that fall within the scope of the Corrective Action Program.
b. System Test Plan results are to be selectively incorporated within the System Manager Performance Monitoring Program (TBDL).

4.6.5 Emergent System-Specific Work Management After System Affirmation

a. All emergent issues are to be scoped as "WCP" or "Work Control Process" in the SIDS database. Emergent work is to be addressed within the'work control process as described within the Station Administrative Procedures.
b. Emergent corrective maintenance issues are to be presented to the OSMT. Emergent engineering issues that may impact unit start-up are to be addressed within the Engineering, Priority List.

4.7 Reports 4.7.1 Phase 1 - Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Report.

a. The Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Reports are to be completed in accordance with Section 4.3. 14 and Attachment 12.

4.7.2 Phase 3 Final Expanded System Readiness Review Report

a. The Final Expanded System Readiness Review Reports are to be completed in accordance with Section 4.5.4 and Attachment 13.

4.7.3 Phase 4 System Readiness Affirmation Report

a. The System Readiness Affirmation Reports are to be completed IAW Section 4.6.3a.

4.7.4 Integrated System Readiness Report

a. The ESRR Manager or his designee shall prepare a report which integrates the results of the individual system ESRR efforts.

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b. The integrated report (see Attachment 14) shall summarize the results of the ESRR activities in Phases 1 and 2, and identify the status of other programs, reviews and upgrades that are supportive of the ESRR

'n providing reasonable assurance of being in conformance with licensing and design basis.

c. The intent of this integrated report and associated backup information is to provide assurance that the plant design, testing, maintenance, operation and configuration conforms to the licensing and design requirements and that the plant is in a condition to support plant operation for the next run cycle.
d. The final integrated System Readiness Report will be presented to the SRRB for review and to the PORC for approval.

5 FINAL CONDITIONS 5.1 None 6 REFERENCES 6.1 Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Plan 6.2 NUREG 1397, An Assessment of Design Control Practices and Design Reconstitution Programs in the Nuclear Power Industry E

6.3 Restart Strategy for Restart Issue 5455, Plant Systems Readiness Assessment 6.4 Auxiliary Feedwater SSFI Report (November 1998) 6.5 Engineering Issues Review Group Final Report (December 19, 1998) 6.6 PMP 7200.RST.006, Expanded System Readiness Review Program For Level 2 Systems 6.7 PMP-7200,RST.005 (when approved), Restart Startup Power Ascension Program

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 43 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 6.8 CR 98-8122, System Readiness Reviews for 21 Systems May Not be Effective in Verifying System Operability 6.9 PMP-7200.RST.009, Functional Area Restart Readiness 6.10 PMP-7200.RST.010, Programmatic Restart Readiness

, 6.11 Commitment Management System Commitment 7280

6. 12 Commitment Management System Commitment 7197 6.13 Commitment Management System Commitment 7303 6.14 Commitment Management System Commitment 6783 6.1S Commitment Management System Commitment 7319

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 44 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment 1 SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW BOARD Pages:

(SRRB) CHARTER 44-45 SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW BOARD SRRB CHARTER PURPOSE: Perform a system-based, multidisciplinary technical review of potential restart issues associated with risk significant plant equipment. This board is intended to ensure consistent application of the restart criteria contained in the Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Plan among system managers, and that restart decisions reflect the shared concerns of Operations, Maintenance and Engineering. The result of this review will be to define the equipment related work that is needed to provide reasonable assurance of a safe and reliable stanup and achieve a safe, reliable, and efficient post startup operating cycle.

MEMBERS: Director of Engineering Restart (Chair)

Director of Plant Engineering (Vice Chair)

System Engineering Manager (Vice Chair)

Vice President of Nuclear Engineering Manager of System Readiness Reviews Director of Design Engineering (Vice Chair)

Director of Nuclear Fuels, Safety and Analysis (Vice Chair)

Operations representative - Bob Heathcote (primary) or Rodney Foster (alternate)

EOP Project representative - Kevin White (primary) or Jim Abshire (alternate)

External consultants: John Durham>>>>

Greg Gibbs>>>>

Phil Hildebrandt>>>>

Larry Demick>>>>

Jeff Bass>>>> (primary) or BiH Bryant' (alternate) Westinghouse representative System engineering supervisors Board Secretary Non-voting members: Additional occasional attendance by members of the Plant Operations Review Committee, the Restart group, and the Engineering Effectiveness organization is expected to reinforce expectations and provide oversight for the restart issue review process=.Additionally, the SRRB Chairman may invite guest, non-voting members to supplement the board when reviewing nonwngineering program or functional area assessment results or SIDS issues.

QUORUM: Chair (or Vice Chair), an Operations and EOP Project representative, and a (ESRR minimum of two of the double asterisked named members, and one engineering Related supervisor, not associated with the system or document/program under review. A Board SRRB Secretary shall also be present but may be one of the SRRB members. No

-Functions) board willconsist of more than six voting members. Other members may participate at their discretion as non-voting members in such cases.

5 5 % QJ Information PMP '7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 45 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW BOARD Pages:

Attachment 1 (SRRB) CHARTER 44-45 QUORUM Chair (or Vice Chair), minimum of two of the double asterisked members and two (Programmatic other members. One of the additional members shall be an engineering and Functional representative for reviews of engineering programs. No board shall consist of more Area Readiness than five voting members. An SRRB Secretary shall also be present but may be one Board of the SRRB members. Other members may participate at their discretion as non-Functions) voting members in such cases.

ACTIONS: The SRRB will:

l. Serve as the primary independent engineering review body for 0350 checklist item restart action plans as required by PMP 7200.RST.001'nd, as delineated further in PMP 7200.RST.004 and PMP 7200.RST.006, expanded system readiness review identified issues and reports. The SRRB will also perform functions related to assuring proper dispositioning of programmatic and function area readiness discrepancies as detailed in PMP 7200.RST.009 and PMP 7200.RST.010. The SRRB affirms and approves the scoping of potential deficient conditions as either restart or post-restart based on criteria defined in the restart plan.
2. In its reviews, enforce technical rigor, consistency of approach, and a thorough assessment of system readiness. The SRRB will also challenge engineers to ensure the issues are fully understood.
3. Ensure a record of decisions and concerns raised by the SRRB review is documented for future review. Programmatic implementation concerns raised by the SRRB willbe documented on condition reports initiated by the SRRB secretary.
4. Ensure that nuclear engineering principles and the attributes of good engineering are demonstrated by the engineering staff.
5. Ensure that the engineers understand their roles and responsibilities.

The Director of Engineering Restart is responsible for management oversight of SRRB activities and for disbanding this board after startup when directed by the Site Vice President. PORC=will'provide oversight of the SRRB and approve Expanded System Readiness Reports as discussed in PMP. 7200.RST.004 and PMP 7200.RST.006 in that oversight role.

This charter becomes effective with the issuance of PMP 7200.RST.004 REVISION 5.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 46 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 21 LEVEL 1 SYSTEMS INCLUDED IN THE Pages:

Attachment 2 PREVIOUS SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW 46-47 THE 21 LEVEL 1,SYSTEMS FOR THE PREVIOUS EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW WERE 120 volt AC/CRID Inverters Air Recirculation/Hydrogen Recombiner Auxiliary Feedwater 250 volt DC Station Batteries Component Cooling Water Containment Containment Spray Control Air ECCS Accumulators ECCS Charging/CVCS High Head Injection ECCS Residual Heat Removal ECCS Safety Injection Emergency Diesel Generators Essentiai Service Water Ice Condenser Main Steam Non-essential Service Water Plant Air Compressors

J 0

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 47 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 21 LEVEL 1 SYSTEMS INCLUDED IN THE Pages:

PREVIOUS SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW 46-47 Reactor Coolant System Reactor Protection System/Solid-state Protection/ESFAS Electrical Safety Buses 4000 volt and 600 volt

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 48 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM RATIONALEFOR SELECTING LEVEL 1 Attachment 3 Pages:

SYSTEMS FOR EXPANDED SYSTEM 48-48 READINESS REVIEW The following rationale was used in selecting the 39 systems to be reviewed in accordance with this procedure. All selected systems are identified in Attachment 4.

Maintenance Rule Risk Si ificant S stems All Cook Plant Maintenance Rule Risk Significant systems were included in the Level 1 ESRR.

S stems Re uired to Su ort Safe Shutdown The Cook Plant specific fire protection/Appendix R reports/documents were reviewed to identify systems required to support safe shutdown. All of these systems were included in t5e scope of the Level 1 ESSR.

Attendant/Su ort S stems Attendant systems were considered during the identification of Level 1 systems being selected for the ESRR. Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning systems such as Control Area Ventilation, Switchgear Ventilation and Containment Ventilation were included in the scope of the ESRR. The Screenwash and Fire Protection Systems were also included as attendant/support system.

Historical Performance of Cook Plant S stems The historical performance of Cook Plant systems was considered. Based on input from the System Engineering Manager and the Operations Manager additional systems such as Emergency Lighting, and Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) were included.

Third Pa Review of the Sco The scope of the systems chosen for ESRR was reviewed by a peer group and an independent third party to ensure that successful completion of the ESRR on these systems would provide a reasonable assurance that the Cook Plant can be restarted safely and reliably.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 49 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW Pages:

Attachment 4 LEVEL 1 SYSTEMS 49- 50 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ABB SYSTEM RELATED SYSTEMS RISK SIG SAFE SHUT SIG SUPPORT SIG LEVEL DOWN SYSTEM CORRECTIVE MAINT.

ECCS CHARGING CVCS Includes Cha in Letdown Boron Path and SINJ ECCS SI POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM Ir PASS N AUX BUILDINGVENT ESF Includes ABV GEN & AF/ESW V CONTROL ROOM COMPLEX VENTILATION CRAC SWITCHGEAR VENTILATION SWGR N 250 VDC STATION BATI'ERIES 250 VDC Includes N TRN ICE CONDENSER ICE CONTROL ROD & CONTROL ROD DRIVE CRDM Includes RPI RPS/SSPS/ESFAS LOCAL SHUTDOWN INDICATIONSYSTEM LSI N RADIATIONMONITORING RMS RVLIS RVLIS COMPONENT COOLING WATER CCW CNTMT ISOLATION COMPONENTS CIV SPENT FUEL PIT COOLING 120 VAC VITALBUSES & CRID INVERTER CRID MAINSTEAM MS Includes DUMP & N2 for PORVs AIR RECIRC/H2 SKIMMER ~CE CONTAINMENTVENTILATION CV VENTILATION- DIESEL GENERATOR DG VENT EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS "S" in the "Safe Shutdown Column" indicates a support system for safe shutdown

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 50 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW Pages:

Attachment 4 LEVEL 1 SYSTEMS 49-50 SYSTEM DESCRIFTION ABB SYSTEM RELATED SYSTEMS RISK SIG SAFE SHUT SIG SUPPORT SIG-LEVEL DOWN SYSTEM CORRECTIVE MAINT.

ELECTRICAL SAFETY BUSES T BUS Includes 4KV & 600 V SCREENWASH SCRN Includes Screcnhouse/Intake FIRE PROTECTION - HALON & CARDOX Includes RCP FP N AUXILIARYBUILDING TURBINE BUILDING CONTROL AIR Includes Com ressed Air Header &

CNTMT Control Air Header PLANT AIR COMPRESSOR PAC Includes BAC CONTAINMENT CNTMT Includes DIS & H2 REC & HDS CONTAINMENTSPRAY AUX FEEDWATER SYSTEM Includes CST Includes MLMS ECCS ACCUMULATORS ACCUM RCS/RCS PRESSURE RELIEF EMERGENCY LIGHTING PACKS E LTG N OFFSITE POWER OFPW Includes SWYD ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER ESW NON ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER NESW NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION NI Includes T/C N "S" in the "Safe Shutdown Column" indicates a support system for safe shutdown

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 . Rev. 5 Page 51 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW Pages:

Attachment 5 TRAINING REQUIREMENTS 51-51 1.0 TECHNICA'L TRAINING 1.1 Human Error Reduction Techniques for Engineers* (including record review and verification) 1.2 Electronic Corrective Action System

'.3 Folio Database*

1.4 Calculation Matrix 1.5 System Design and Licensing Basis~

1.6 SRO level self taught systems training with test and remediation*

1.7 Causal Analysis and effective problem solving techniques 1.8 Operability Determinations*

1.9 50.59 Screens and Evaluations*

1.10 PRA/Maintenance Rule 1.11 INPO Database/NRC Web Page~

1.12 Environmental*Qualification 1.13 Generic Letter 89-13 1.14 Generic Letter 89-10 1.15 High Energy Line Break Analysis 1.16 Appendix R 1.17 Station Blackout 1.18 Communications-Elevating Issues to Mgnt.

2.0 PROCESS TRAINING 2.1 The Enhanced System Readiness Review Program and Procedure 2.2 Use of the Assessment Database 2.3 Systems Indexed Database System (SIDS), access and data entry 2.4 Use of. computers 2.5 Lessons Learned and Vulnerabilities from previous independent inspections and reviews.

  • For System Managers only. Senunars to indoctrinate other team members in design and licensing basis fundamentals and key concepts and definitions related to operability determinations and 50.59 screens and evaluations will also be conducted for other team members.

0 Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 52 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment 6 SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW Pages:

DOCUMENTATION AND DATA SOURCES 52-53 DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTATION P&IDs Elementary and One Line Diagrams DBDs & Associated Notebooks Calculations Modifications Open and Closed Safety Evaluations and Screenings TMODS ~

Com nent Evaluations Design Change Determinations LICENSE BASIS DOCUMENTS UFSAR, FSAR & SER including Amendments General Design Criteria & FSAR Q&A Licensing History Books Commitment Database Reg Guides LERs & NOVs Tech S ecs and Bases NRC 0 n Item List DATASOURCES Operating Procedures Abnormal 0 rating Procedures Emergency Operating Procedures Annunciator Response Procedure Preventive Maintenance Procedures/PMCR Surveillance Test Procedures s Training Lesson Plans Condition Reports 0 en and Closed Previously conducted audits, assessments (SSFIs, EDSFIs, QA/PA, 3 a reviews)

Results of relevant NRC & INPO ins tions (Ins tion Re rts, etc.)

Generic Letters and Res nses IENs IEBs and Res onses SOERs SERs Part 21 Notifications Westinghouse Information Vendor Manuals JO/ARs including AR Evals rability Determinations &, TDMs Ops 0 n Item Log DATASOURCES (CONTINUED) 0 rator Workarounds/Concerns Restart Plan Strategies Engineering Evaluations S ifications and Standards PRA Com onents Based and 0 rator Action Based Risk Ranking Engineering Memos

Information .

PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 53 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW Pages:

Attachment 6 DOCUMENTATIONAND DATA SOURCES 52-53 Receipt Ins ection Procedures Relay Document Technical Data Book PMI 5023 Dedication Plans Long Standing Clearances/Caution Tags Operator Aids

Information 'MP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 54 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM

'SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Pages:

Attachment 7 (SYSTEM WALKDOWNGUIDELINES) 54- 61 1.0 PURPOSE

'his walkdown guideline is to be used as a reference while conducting the Expanded System Readiness Review Team (or individual) walkdowns. The completed walkdowns, during the initial SRR, should be taken into account in setting the scope of the ESRR walkdowns.

2.0 GENERAL METHODS 2.1 Define the purpose of the walkdown,'areas to be visited/observed, roles of the individual team members, and assistance from Health Physics or other departments to access areas.

2.2 Plan the walkdown execution and implementation. Pre-define how the walkdown will assess the conformance of the plant with design and licensing basis requirements (For example, piping and component configuration, electrical separation, etc.). Ensure remote electrical cabinets, tanks, etc. and instrumentation including control Room and Remote Shutdown Panel instruments are included in the walkdown plan. Contact Health Physics supervision to obtain any special ALARAreviews prior to actual system walkdowns.

2.3 Brief the team on the purpose and plan.

2.4 Conduct the walkdown. Focus the team on observation of equipment. Work independently and discuss concerns for clarity. Take concise and accurate notes to quantify and describe findings in sufficient detail to prevent having to walkdown the item twice.

2.5 Conduct a formal post walkdown briefing. Review the notes, discuss issues and document the results on the ESRR Assessment forms, entering the data into the ESRR Assessment database. Identify any impact on equipment or system operation. Immediate concerns are to be identified to the engineering supervisor and the operations Shift Manager.

2.6 Identify the items that need to be completed for the system to meet its intended design function. Assess each item against the restart criteria, Attachment 8. The items are to be documented for disposition and tracking in SIDS.

~

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Rev. 5, Page 55 of 101 SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Pages:

Attachment 7 (SYSTEM WALKDOWNGUIDELINES) 54- 61 3.0 GUIDELINES 3.1 The team (lead by the System Manager) is to outline the system walkdown strategy. Key system components and system concerns are to be identified.

3.2 The team is to identify necessary operational or plant configuration drawings to accompany the team during the walkdown.

3.3 Throughout the walkdown, the team is to function as a cohesive unit, maintaining focus on either individual system coinponents or specific system areas.

3.4 The walkdown is to focus on operability issues as well as conformance with-system design configuration and design basis. Other conditions including potential impact on equipment reliability should be noted during the walkdown.

3.S Each Team member is expected to record detailed notes identified during the walkdown. Any areas of the system that could not be walked down shall be noted and justified in the walkdown report.

3.6 Examples of team focus areas include:

Condition of snubbers, pipe supports, hangers and fasteners Condition and placement of coatings and insulation Evidence of corrosion Evidence of boric acid or boric acid buildup especially on carbon steel components, and material wastage Unauthorized modifications, partial modifications or temporary modifications not in accordance with station programs Surface condition of visible structural welds Condition of barrier or penetration seals Use of unauthorized chemicals on components

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 56 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Pages:

(SYSTEM WALKDOWNGUIDELINES) 54- 61

~ Evidence of bolt torque relaxation.

Evidence of discoloration on relays, cable insulation or electrical components Condition inside electrical cabinets Unauthorized or expired scaffolding in unauthorized locations or impacting equipment performance Hoses or other connections for vents or drains Presence of abandoned equipment not clearly labeled 3.7 The following is a general list of electrical and mechanical equipment physical plant inspection items:

3.7.1 Electrical Panels Equipment

~ -

Identify missing water plugs or holes/openings in cabinets (water or moisture intrusion can degrade or damage equipment).

~ Identify missing or loose bolts or thumb screws (ifmissing can violate seismic evaluation and it is not good work practice).

~ Identify open doors or back panels (ensure properly closed and latched, otherwise can violate seismic evaluation or allow dirt,

,,water, etc., to enter panel).

~ Identify mis-positioned breaker switches (anything that is different).

Identify improper labeling on key component breakers/switches (ensure that they are accurate and legible per controlled drawings; also includes modules, relays, conduit).

Identify dirt or debris covering cooling gratings or filters (if blocked, can prevent cooling and cause heat buildup and subsequent equipment degradation).

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5,', Page 57 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Pages:

(SYSTEM WALKDOWNGUIDELINES) 54-61 Feel panels and equipment enclosures where appropriate to check for excessive heat buildup (can be an indication of degraded equipment; initiate request for themography check).

Check cable trays. (Cable should not be hanging outside of cable tray; can overstress cable tray).

Check cables and conduit for degradation (cracked, brittle, chafed, bend radius, etc.).

Check MCCs overall for anything that is different.

Note any deficiency tags, especially old tags not being worked.

These may need increased priority or have had work complete'd but the tags have not been removed.

~ Check for any abnormal sounds or smells coming from the, cabinet (may indicate degraded equipment)

~ Verify equipment-grounding cable is connected and intact.

~ Look at general materiel condition of cabinet (rust, dirt, consider qualitative impact on heat transfer).

~ Inspect seismic supports and trays.

~ s Inspect overall condition of terminal strips and mechanical connections (lug landings).

Inspect conduit and junction boxes for external damage, loose conduit connections and missing parts and fasteners.

~ Inspect solenoid valves and motor covers for evidence of damage or equipment degradation.

3.7.2 Mechanical Components

~ Identify any abnormal sounds or smells coming from pump or motor operation.

Bearing housings and motors and pumps are to be inspected for signs of excessive heat or, vibration.

f Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Pago 58 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM 7

SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Pages:

'ttachment (SYSTEM WAI KDOWN GUIDELINES) 54- 61

~ Look at general material condition of pump or motor for steam, oil, water leaks, proper levels in oil reservoirs or sight glasses (and properly marked), missing insulation, proper conduit installation.,

Identify pinned hangers.

Inspect system gauges for proper operation or typical values.

Look for pump rotation or reverse rotation if part of a dual train common header system (could indicate check valve degradation or isolation valves leaking by)

Identify dirt or debris covering cooling gratings or filters (if blocked can prevent cooling and cause heat buildup and subsequent equipment degradation)

Note any deficiency tags, especially old tags not being worked. (These may indicate a need for increased priority or they may be an indication that the work was completed but that the tags have not been removed.)

Check equipment/equipment skid/foundation bolting., (Are all bolts present with proper thread engagement'?)(minimum of flush or better)

~ Review trends of parameters on key system equipment; visually inspect identified equipment'with degraded

.performance.

. ~ Visually inspect for old leak repair fittings, ensure Temporary Modifications exist to restore components with leak repair fittings.

~ Inspect equipment labeling/tags (ensure they are accurate and legible per controlled drawings).

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 59 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Pages:

(SYSTEM WALKDOWNGUIDELINES) 54- 61 3.8 The following list contains material conditions indicating equipment operability issues:

3.8.1 Operability Issues Leaks (water, steam, oil, air-packing, flanges, rust on components or floor).

Lubrication (sight glasses, bull's eyes, grease cups, grease fittings, valve stems).

Handwheels/valve operators (missing, key or pin missing, unlocked, not labeled).

H Filters, screen or louvers (clogged, dirty, missing).

Instruments or gauges (out of calibration, inoperable, bent pointers).

Drains or drain holes (clogged, blocked, full, screens or grating missing).

Lines or pipes (loose, unbracketed, vibrating, insulation missing or damaged, not properly sloped).

Fasteners/bolts (loose, stripped, corroded, missing).

Indicating lamps (missing, burned out, missing covers).

Control room annunciators.

Panels (covers missing, bolt missing or not tightened, dirt and debris inside).

Area lighting (bulbs missing or burned out, inadequate to support activities).

Look for consistency between similar parameters.

Packing (bottomed out, out of adjustment, dirty or rusted glands).

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 60 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Pages:

(SYSTEM WALKDOWNGUIDELINES) 54- 61

~ - Cables or leads (unsecured, worn or frayed insulation, improper terminations).

Motors or generators (dirty, brush rigging pigtails broken, carbon dust, excessive noise or vibration, ground straps loose or missing).

Preservation (rust, corrosion, missing or damaged insulation or lagging).

Check valves (oscillating lever, banging, stuck open).

MOVs (lubricant leaks, missing T-Drains).

Valves (dried grease caked on stem, packing or stem leaks, bent stem).

3.9 The following is a general list of additional inspection items that apply to both mechanical and electrical equipment:

3.9.1 Mechanical or Electrical Equipment

~ Identify inadequate or degraded structural components.

~ Inspect system piping for evidence of water hammer, severe transients, or improper venting. Damaged supports, base plate grouting, anchors (pulled-out or deformed) are to be identified for further root cause analysis.

~ Inspect for,unauthorized loads supported from cable trays, coiiduits or piping systems,

~ Identify undocumented system modifications.

~ Identify damaged heat trace and damaged or missing insulation.

Note piping exhibiting cyclical vibration for possible high cycle fatigue concerns.

Safety postings, radiological postings (properly positioned, legible and understandable).

4

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 61 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Pages:

..Attachment 7 (SYSTEM WALKDOWNGUIDELINES) 54- 61 3.10 The System Manager is to ensure that team members record identified walkdown issues in Walkdown Reports, and during Phase 1 on the Attribute Assessment forms. The System Manager is responsible to ensure that any discrepancies have appropriate follow-up corrective actions initiated to resolve any identified issues.

Information ~ PMP 7200.RST;004 Rev. 5 Page 62 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment 8 CRITERIA FOR WORK INCLUDED IN . Pages:

RESTART SCOPE 62-68 NOTE CHANGES TO THE RESTART CRITERIA REQUIRE THE APPROVAL OF THE SENIOR MANAGEMENTREVIEW TEAM (SMRT)

1. Review the open corrective action item against the Restart Screening Criteria. The Restart Screening Criteria is used to identify scope of items reviewed during Phases 1, 2, and 3. If none of the criteria apply, then the action item is not applicable to the restart effort. If the restart screening criteria applies the System Manager should determine when the action item must be completed to support safe and event free restart and reliable power operation. Program owners and functional area managers (or their designees) shall also follow the guidance in this attachment for scoping non system-specific programmatic and functional area SIDS items when directed by the Director of Restart. In this capacity; these owners/managers/designees function, in effect, as the System Manager for these items.

Restartl Activities required to be completed prior to entering Startup/Power Ascension of Unit 1. This classification includes necessary restart and power ascension testing activities Restart2 Activities required to be completed prior to entering Startup/Power Ascension of Unit 2. This classification includes necessary restart and power ascension testing activities.

Post Restartl Activities which should be completed on a schedule consistent with the Unit 1 normal plant work controls process.

Post Restart2 Activities which should be completed on a schedule consistent with the Unit 2 normal plant work controls process.

Not Applicable Activities that are not required to be completed.

2. Enter descriptive text that describes a specific issue in the ISSUES box. This is a searchable text field of up to 255 characters and is designed to assist the System Managers in readily retrieving information on associated issues. Some examples are packing leaks, oil leaks, housekeeping, etc.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 63 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM CRITERIA FOR WORK INCLUDED IN Pages:

Attachment 8 RESTART SCOPE 62-68 3 Ifthe issue is system-specific but also is related to an existing station program, consider identifying the PROGRAM by scrolling, then selecting the most appropriate program source and dragging the appropriate program(s) into the RELATED PROGRAM box.

This information may help program owners identify programmatic weaknesses.

Examples of program s'ources include High Energy Line Break, Appendix R, Station Blackout, etc. For new items placed in the "No system entered" bin in SIDS, the ESRR group will review the item and assign it to a system or programmatic and/or functional area. Ifa needed program is not listed, contact the SIDS data base coordinator.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 64 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment 8 CRITERIA FOR WORK INCLUDED IN Pages:

RESTART SCOPE 62-68

4. Identify the applicable Restart Screening Criteria as outlined in this attachment. Enter this criteria in SIDS by scrolling and selecting the most appropriate criteria (e.g.

RESTART1A, RESTART2A, RESTART2B, etc.).

5. Identify the applicable mode restraint for the item by scrolling, then selecting the appropriate mode (e.g., 1, 2, 3, 4, etc.).

6 Complete the INITIALCOMMENT field in the INITIALREVIEW screen. The comment field should contain specific reasons for the item being included or excluded from the restart effort. Ensure that the information is accurate and concise, technically justifying from a design basis view point, the SCOPE and RESTART CRITERIA selected. The COMMENT field must be comple'ted prior to System Manager approval.

Note: The FINAL COMMENT field on the FINAL REVIEW screen is to be completed prior to the final readiness review presentations. This field is to justify that the work completed will support restart readiness.

7. During Phases 1, 2, and 3, the System Manager will approve SIDS items as Restartl, Restart2, Post Restartl, Post Restart2, or N/A. The System Manager will signify his approval of the scope by "Approving" the scope and justification comments in the Initial System Manager Approval Box in SIDS. Later, during Phase 3, if a restart item is not completed, the System Manager will denote the item as an "Exception" in the Final System Manager Approval Box in SIDS. If an item is satisfactorily completed, the System Manager will denote his "Concurrence" in the Final System Manager Approval Box in SIDS.
8. During Phase 4, items will be scoped as WCP or RESTART1 or RESTART2.
9. Additional information is available in the Systems Indexed Data Base Systems Operator's Manual.

J Information PMP 7200. RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 65 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment 8 CRITERIA. FOR WORK INCLUDED IN Pages:

RESTART SCOPE 62-68 RESTART SCREENING CRITERIA Issues will be evaluated against criteria 1 through 9. Ifcriteria 1 through 7 do not apply, then categorize the issue using criteria 8 or 9.

Issues shall be resolved prior to restart if they are:.

1) Nuclear Safety Required to address a nuclear safety issue.

Issues may be classified as follows:

a) Items that could result in significant personnel radiation exposure, radioactivity release or effluent discharge, in excess of limits.

b) Reduces cumulative deficiencies, backlogs or conditions that, in the aggregate, are evaluated to have significant negative impact on nuclear safety. (Not applicable to individual work issues).

2) Operability Required to address an operability issue.

Issues may be classified as follows:

a) Eliminates an existing component failure, deficiency, or condition that could result m operation in, or entry to, an LCO action statement if left uncorrected.

b) Would result in failure or inability to perform a required surveillance test during the current outage or the following operating cycle in accordance with the plant technical specifications.

c) Would increase the risk to operation or safety associated with performing a surveillance.

Information 'MP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 66 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM CRITERIA FOR WORK INCLUDED IN Pages:

'ESTART SCOPE 62- 68 d) Testing or retesting that must be performed to certify'system or component operability, including testing on systems or components during power ascension that result in breeching a system regardless of the work being classified as a restart issue or not.

e) Reduces cumulative deficiencies, backlogs or conditions that, in the aggregate, are evaluated to have significant negative impact on operability. (Not applicable to individual work issues).

3) Design Basis Required to restore acceptable design margin or conformance. with the design basis.

Issues may be classified as follows:

a) Corrects design basis deficiencies; i.e., deficiencies in safety-related or technical specification equipment not in conformance with design basis documents.

4) License and Licensing Basis Required to resolve unreviewed safety questions (USQs) or to restore conformance with the license, license conditions or licensing basis.

Issues may be classified as follows:

a) Restores licensing basis deficiencies to conforming conditions.

b) TechmcaI Specification changes to support safe plant operation.

5) Licensing Commitments Required to meet restart licensing commitments such as A/E inspection and related programmatic issues, and confirmatory action letter issues.

Issues may be classified as follows:

a) Resolves existing deficiencies or conditions that would result in the failure to meet a license requirement or a restart commitment to an outside agency.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 67 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM CRITERIA FOR WORK INCLUDED IN Pages:

RESTART'SCOPE 62-68

6) Configuration Management Required to address an organizational, programmatic, or process deficiency that could prevent maintenance of adequate design margins or conformance with the design or licensing basis.

Issues may be classified as follows:

a) Corrects deficiencies in configuration management programs, processes, engineering analysis codes, or operating, maintenance, or test procedures that have a reasonable probability of affecting equipment OPERABILITY.

7) Reliability Required to address significant equipment material condition deficiencies singly or in aggregate; or repetitive failures that could affect safety system availability, impact plant reliability, or reduce the ability of operators to operate the plant safely.

Issues may be classified as follows:

a) Reduces cumulative deficiencies, backlogs or conditions that, in the aggregate, are evaluated to have significant negative impact on safety system availability or reliable plant operation. (Not applicable to individual work issues).

b) Restores degraded critical components or conditions that could result in a plant transient, power reduction or shutdown.

c) Resolves"conditions that have resulted in repetitive safety system or equipment failures.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 . Page 68 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM CRITERIA FOR WORK INCLUDED IN Pages:

Attachment 8 RESTART SCOPE 62-68 Issues that are not classified as restart should be classified as follows:

8) Post Restart Issues a) Issue can be scheduled for a subsequent outage.

b) Issue can be readily worked on line, does not affect safe and reliable operation, does not represent a significant challenge to Maintenance Rule Goals or LCO allowed outage time, and does not impair operations necessary to perform surveillance or monitoring.

c) Issue is classified as minor maintenance, or housekeeping, and does not affect plant operation.

d) Issue is an administrative issue.

e) Issue is a documentation deficiency that has no safety impact.

9) Industrial Safety Concern NOTE: Industrial safety concerns will not be classified as "restart" because the priority and resolution of these concerns will be addressed under the established work control process priorities and scheduling. Although an industrial safety issue is not classified as restart, it will be worked promptly, commensurate ~

~td with the safety risk.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 69 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM PHASE 2 OUTAGE SCOPE APPROVAL Pages:

Attachment 9 PROCESS 69-69 NEW WORK SYSTEM MANAGER ENGINEERING SUPERVISOR All other new work Field work items-e.g. AR s/JO s System Readiness Outage Scope Review Board Management Team (See Note)

SIDS update to NPM Scheduling NOTE: SRRB (or subcommittee thereof ) reviews the scoping of these items separately.

SIDS is then updated to reflect SRRB comments by the System Manager.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 70 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment 10 RESTART REQUIRED SCOPE DEFERRAL Pages:

FORM 70- 70 UNIT: DATE:

SYSTEM:

DOCUMENT TYPE:

(e.g., Condition Report, Action Request)

KEY I. D:

(e.g., Condition Report or Action Request Number)

Item

Description:

Initial Technical Justification for Restart Scope Designation (ensure the original basis for scoping the item as required for restart is addressed);

Technical Justification for Restart Deferral:

New Scheduled Completion Date:

(Scope Addition/Deletion form attached if applicable)

Originator Date:

System Manager Date:

Designated Ops. Rep. Date:

Engineering Supervisor Date:

Nuclear Licensing Manager/

Director of Regulatory Affairs Date:

System Engineer Manager Date:

Date:

PORC Mtg. ¹ Date:

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 71 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW Pages:

. Attachment 11 CLARIFICATIONSHEET 71-71 S stem Mana er A royal Concur Item closed and work completed satisfies restart requirements, or for those post restart items that are not included in the aggregate impact.

Except Open restart items (including those items that are "work complete" but not administratively closed), or items that are closed but do not satisfy restart requirements..

Post Restart Deferred Denoted on items associated with a component that has two (2) or more post restart deferred items, excluding PM post restart items.

Restart Required Deferred Denoted on items with deferred scope that were initially approved, as restart required. These items must be accompanied by a Restart Required Scope Deferral Form (Attachment 10).

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 72 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment 12 INITIALEXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS Pages:

REVIEW REPORT 72-74 INITIALEXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REPORT COVER SHEET SYSTEM TITLE SYSTEM REVIEWERS System Manager Signature / Date Operations Representative

  • Signature./ Date Licensing Representative ~

Signature / Date Engineering Supervisor Signature / Date ESRR Manager/Coordinator

. Signature / Date System Readiness Review Board.

Signature / Date Plant Operations Review Committee Chairman, Signature / Date, PORC MTG. ¹

~ These signatures maybe obtained by routing the report to both individuals simultaneously. Retain copies of both signatures with the original of the report in the SRRB meeting minutes.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 73 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment 12 INITIALEXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS Pages:

REVIEW REPORT 72-74 INITIALEXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW REPORT FORMAT EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose 1.2 Scope and Approach (Include specific identification of the system's safety and accident mitigation functions) 2.0 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 2.1 Summary of Attribute Assessments 2.2 Suimnary of Review of SIDS Items 2.3 Summary of Open Items 2.4 Observations and Conclusions (including recurring items judged to need further extent of condition determination) (see step 4.3.10a) 3.0 ATIRIBUTEASSESSMENTS 3.1 Assessment Matrix 3.2 .-

Attribute Assessments and review of system functions.

3.3 Discrepancies 4.0 WALKDOWNRESULTS 4.1 Walkdown Scope 4.2 Observations 5.0 REVIEW OF SIDS ITEMS 5.1 Review of Open Items (Summary Information)

0 Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 74 of 101

~,

EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment 12 INITIALEXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS Pages:

REVIEW REPORT 72- 74 5.2 Revie'w of Closed Items (Summary Information)

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 ENCLOSURES

Enclosure 1: Attribute Assessment Forms Enclosure 2: Restart Items (SIDS)

Enclosure 3: Post-restart Open Items (SIDS)

Enclosure 4: Review of Closed Items From SIDS Enclosure 5: System Boundaries Enclosure 6: Walkdown Plan 6.2 FIGURES AND TABLES Figure 1: System Boundaries Table 1: Final System Readiness Review Assessment Matrix Table 2: Attribute Assessment Summary Table 3: Assessment Discrepancies Recommended for Corrective Action Prior to Restart Table 4: Assessment Discrepancies Recommended for Closure Post Restart

Information PMP 7200. RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 75 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM A~ichment 13 FINAL EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS Pages:

REVIEW REPORT 75-77 FINALEXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REPORT COVER SHEET SYSTEM TITLE DATE SYSTEM REVIE%ERS System Manager Date Operations Representative ~ Date Licensing Representative ~ Date Engineering Supervisor Date ESRR Manager/Coordinator Date System Readiness Review Board Date Plant Operations Review Committee Date PORC MTG. ¹

~ These signatures maybe obtained by routing the report to both individuals simultaneously. Retain copies of both signatures with the original of the report in the SRRB meeting minutes.

  • A< g L Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 76 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment 13 FINAL EXPA'NDED SYSTEM READINESS Pages:

REVIEW REPORT 75-77 FINAL EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW REPORT FORMAT 1.0 OVERVIEW 1.1 Summary of items closed since the initial report issuance 91-18 Operability Determinations (list each item)

Engineering Evaluations (list each item)

DCPs (list each item)

I Action Requests (list each item)

Condition Reports (list each item)

NRC Commitment Data Base items (list each item)

Operator Workarounds (list each item)

Outage Required PMs 2.0 OPEN ITEM REVIEW 2.1 Items 91-18 Operability Reviews (list each item)

Engineering Evaluations (list each item)

DCPs (list each item)

Work Requests (list each item)

Condition Reports (list each item)

Commitment Data Base (list each item)

Operator Workarounds (list each item) k

'I Information PMP 7200.RST.004 "

Rev. 5 Page 77 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment 13 FINAL EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS Pages:

75-77 REVIEW REPORT 2.1 Items (Continued)

Outage Required PM's that will become overdue prior to next planned outage 2.2 Restart Scoping 2.3 Schedule for Resolution of Open Items 3.0 DESIGN AND LICENSE BASIS ISSUES

SUMMARY

Explain the significance of each issue (one or two sentences on safety, risk, or system operability/reliability impact.

Discuss what plans(s) is in place for resolution of each issue.

Include when the issue is scheduled to be resolved.

4.0 WALEDOWN 4.1 Walkdown purpose and scope 4.2 Walkdown Team 4.3 Walkdown Results 4.4,Conclusions 4.5 Restart Scoping 5.0 AGGREGATE IMPACT OF DEFERRED WORK

Attachment:

Marked up drawings showing components with multiple (two or more) Post-restart or restart deferred work items.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 78 of 101

'XPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment 14 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS Pages:

REVIEWS INTEGRATED RESULTS 78-82 ESRR Program Coordinator Date ESRR Program Manager Date Director, Engineering Restart Date System Readiness Review Board Date Plant Operations Review Committee Date PORC Mtg. ¹

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 79 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment 14 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS Pages:

REVIEWS INTEGRATED RESULTS 78- 82 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEWS INTEGRATED RESULTS FORMAT

1.0 INTRODUCTION

AND PURPOSE 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Purpose 2.0 SCOPE AND STRUCTURE FOR LEVEL 1 ESRRs 2.1 Overall Approach and Scope 2.2 System Prioritization 2.3 Structure of Level 1 ESRR Teams 2.4 Vertical Slice Methodology 2.5 Screening of Open Items for Restart Requirements 2.6 Reviews and Self-Assessments 3.0

SUMMARY

OF PHASE 1 RESULTS 3.1 Vertical Slice Results and Characterization of Findings 3.2 Screening of Open Items 3.3 Walkdown Results 4.0 ASSESSMENT OF RESULTS BY TOPIC AREA 4.1 Lessons learned to be included in Level 2 ESRR 4.2 Identification of Potential Programmatic Issues

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REVIEWS INTEGRATED RESULTS 78-82

5.0 CONCLUSION

S 5.1 System Readiness 5.2 Potential Programmatic Issues

6.0 REFERENCES

APPENDICES A RESTART ISSUES, SELECTION/SCREENING CRITERIA B EVALUATIONOF DISCREPANCIES BY TOPIC AREA Topic Area 1: Electrical Calculations and Analysis Topic Area 2: I&C Calculations and Analysis Topic Area 3: Mechanical & Structural Calculations and Analysis Topic Area 4: Accident Analysis Topic Area 5: Drawings Topic Area 6: Logic Diagrams Topic Area 7: Configuration Management Topic Area 8: Specifications Topic Area 9: DBD Topic Area 10: Change Documentation/50.59 Reviews Topic Area 11: Temporary Modifications/Bypasses Topic Area 12: FSAR Review Topic Area 13: TS and Bases

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 81 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS Pages: 4 REVIEWS INTEGRATED RESULTS 78-82 Topic Area 14: Licensing Commitments Topic Area 15: Notices / Bulletins/Generic Letters Topic Area 16: Procedures Topic Area 17: Operator Workarounds Topic Area 18: Industry Operating Experience Reviews Topic Area 19: Maintenance Procedures Topic Area 20: Vendor Technical Information Topic Area 21: Preventive Maintenance Topic Area 22: Surveillance and Periodic Tests and Inspections Topic Area 23: ISVSection XI IST Topic Area 24: As-Built Verification Topic Area 25: Control Room Drawings Topic Area 26: Surveillance Programs Topic Area 27: Corrective Actions

~P Topic Area 28: QA Audits and Self Assessments Topic Area 29: Training Lesson Plans Topic Area 30: Open Items (Backlog)

Topic Area 31: Strategy Documents

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 82 of 101 EXPA'NDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment 14 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS Pages:

REVIEWS INTEGRATED RESULTS 78-82 C GROUPING OF ESRR-IDENTIFIED ITEMS BY TOPIC AREA FIGURES 2.1 Graded Approach for Enh'anced System Readiness Review 2.2 Typical Topic Areas for Enhanced System Readiness Review Vertical Slices 2.3 Enhanced System Readiness Review Plan 2.4 Level 1 Enhanced System Readiness Reviews 2.5 Typical System Assessment Matrix 4.1 Topic Review Sutmnary - Level 1 Systems Checks and Discrepancies 4.2 Topic Revjew Summary - Level 1 Systems Discrepancies as Percent of Checks 4.3 Issues by Topic Areas - Level 1 Systems by severity-4A Issues by Topic Area - Level 1 Systems (Restart Recommended Issues Only)

TABLES 3-1 Summary Statistics for Level 1 System Reviews 3-2 Summary of Areas Covered During the Walkdowns

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 83 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Pages:

Attachment 15 SYSTEM WALKDOWNREPORT 83-83 Date of Walkdown: .

System Manager/Team Leader:

~Setem:

Pu ose of Walkdown:

Provide a brief description of the purpose of the walkdown.

Walkdown Sco e:

Provide an overall synopsis as to the scope of the walkdown, primary objectives, time spent'n the walkdown, total number of all deficiencies noted as well as noting if any operability concerns were noted.

Walkdown Tea Provide a listing of the walkdown team members as well as their respective organizations.

Walkdown Results:

Provide an overall characterization as to the items identified, and safety or operability concerns, etc.

==

Conclusions:==

Provide an overall assessment of the system condition based on observations. Summarize any specific need for improvements and all follow-up actions being pursued.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 84 of 101 EXPA'NDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Attachment 16 SYSTEM READINESS AFFIRMATION Pages:

REPORT 84- 84 1.0 THE READINESS AFFIRMATIONREPORT WILLINCLUDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION 1.1 Current system License Change Request(s).

1.2 Current operator workarounds.

1.3 Current corrective actions required of control room equipment.

1.4 Currently installed T-Mods.

1.5 Active operability determinations and JCOs, with the 10CFR50.59 for each OD or JCO.

1.6 The remaining open "Exceptions" items and any "Exceptions" identified during the affirmation process. Exceptions are remaining open restart required items.

1.7 An Operations priorities list compiled from or identical to the Focus List or Operations Priorities Addendum List (but not necessarily limited to these lists) for the system.

1.8 Reference Initial Expanded System Readiness Review Report 1.9 Reference Final Expanded System Readiness Review report.

1.10 Reference the system tests per the System Test Plan.

0 Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 85 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM SYSTEM ASSESSMENT MATRIX Pages:

Figure 1 MAJOR TOPICS 85-94 SYSIKM ASSESShKNT hIATRIX MAJOR TOPICS DESIGN BASIS LICENSING OPERATIONS mi~~~NCP. SURV 'ROGRAMS, PHYSICAL DOCUMENTS PLANT PROCESS 4 PROCEDURES 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 K K ASSESShKNT ATTRIUTES 0 0

Information PMP 7200,RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 86 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM SYSTEM ASSESSMENT MATRIX Pages:

Figure 1 Addendum MAJOR TOPICS 85-94 OVERVIEW The following guidance for each of the 31 major topics in Figure 1 is provided regarding the types of documents and sources of information to be used and to provide a consistent definition of the topic areas for grouping and documenting the results. Individual reviewers will use their experience and that of the ESRR Team to determine the specific documents and sources of information to be assessed. Completed scope of the previous System Readiness Reviews should be taken into account.

DESIGN BASIS Electrical Calcs/Analysis:,Calculations related to motors, electrical devices, circuits, and associated power supplies for system components shall be reviewed. The reviews should assess the appropriateness of design inputs, assumptions, consistency with as-built configuration, and general approach. Also, calculation results should be verified for appropriate use in other design basis documents. The potential effect of modifications on the emergency electrical load calculation, including load sequencing, should be considered. In addition, fuse coordination shall be addressed against the requirements of IEEE 308.

2 I&C Calcs/Analysis: Calculations related to the performance, set points, and stability of I&C components and loops for system components shall be reviewed. The scope of the reviews should be

. similar to the electrical calculations. In addition, reference 6.5 identifies a potential concern with instrument uncertainty calculations, such as due to dynamic fiow effects, and with lack of trending of instrument drift and use of unverified drift values provided by the equipment vendors.

3 Mech and Struct Calcs/Analysis: Calculations related to hydraulics, heat transfer, equipment/support loads, equipment/pipe stresses, and other mechanical performance issues related to system components shall be reviewed. The scope of the reviews should be similar to the electrical calculations.

ot' Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 87 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM SYSTEM ASSESSMENT MATRIX Pages:

Figure 1 Addendum MAJOR TOPICS 85 -94

4. Accident Analysis: Analysis of UFSAR Chapter 14 events shall be reviewed for assumptions regarding system configuration, performance and conditions.
5. Drawings: Controlled drawings documenting system design, configuration, layout, and conformance to programs (e.g.,

Appendix R, testing, and EQ) shall be reviewed for system design basis information and system interaction/dependency information.

Drawings that are excluded from this topic are logic diagrams (covered in Topic 6), Control Room drawings (covered in Topic 25), and vendor drawings (covered in Topic 20).

6. Logic Diagrams: The logic diagrams shall be reviewed for system design basis information and system interaction/dependency information.
7. Configuration Management: Cross-referenced documents shall be verified to be current, applicable, and appropriate. In particular, ESRR teams shall specifically review several input changes looking for a lack of integration between calculations, accident analysis assumptions, design values, design basis documents, system description and normal and emergency operating procedures.

Additionally, the facility data base should be checked for accuracy and consistency with design requirements.

8. Specifications: Equipment design, procurement, and installation

.specifications shall be reviewed for consistency of system design basis information and for adherence to code and safety requirements. General design specifications shall also be reviewed for system design basis information.

9. DBD: Related design basis documents shall be reviewed for system design basis requirements, identification of possible cross-referenced documents, and appropriate applicability. Potential vulnerabilities include identification of and compliance with single failure criteria. Adequate closure of open items identified during preparation of the DBDs should be considered. Based on the results in reference 6.5, this topic area should be a focus area for the ESRR.

Information ', PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 88 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM SYSTEM ASSESSMENT MATRIX "Pages:

MAJOR TOPICS 85 -94

10. Change Documents/50.59 Reviews: Change documents, including DCPs, Component Evaluations (CEs) and UFSAR changes, shall be assessed for completeness, consistency with the system safety and accident mitigation functions as defined in the design and licensing basis, appropriate consideration of interdisciplinary impact/input, and effective follow through (changes made or posted against the appropriate documents). 50.59 screens and 50.59 safety reviews shall be reviewed to assess whether the change may have resulted in a current plant configuration or operation that is outside the design or licensing basis, Cook Plant has, in the past, not performed some 50.59 screens when required because station personnel did not recognize that they were changing the facility as described in the UFSAR. As part of the ESRR, teams should review past 50.59 screens associated with change documents being reviewed to ensure that an excessively liberal interpretation of the words "system as described in the UFSAR" was not used. See NEI 9647 for additional guidance and current industry standards.

L a el+

Information 'PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 89 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Addendum SYSTEM ASSESSMENT MATRIX Pages:

Figure 1 MAJOR TOPICS 85-94

11. Temporary Modifications/Bypasses: Temporary modifications and "bypasses" shall be reviewed to verify that they were evaluated against appropriate design basis information and do not result in an unreviewed safety question. Based on the results of reference 6.5, "Bypasses" should be a focus area for the ESRR. Additionally, teams should be alert for engineering evaluations, action requests, partially installed modifications, and other changes to ensure that necessary screenings were done in each case, Cook Plant has identified 23 specific processes with a potential to bypass the 50.59 process as follows:

Engineering Specifications ~ Design Change Addenda Action Request/Job Orders ~ Setpoints Drawing changes ~ DCDIRs Operability determinations ~ Technical data books Technical Direction Memos ~ PMI-5023 addressing plant NPM (Engineering) fabrication and repairs Evaluations ~ Dedication Plans Mechanical Engineering Memo ~ Old clearances/Caution Tags Electrical Engineering Memos ~ Open Items Log Design Change Determination ~ Work Arounds/Watch List Condition Report ~ Temporary Operator Aids Receipt Inspection Practices ~ Permanent Operator Aids Design Standards These items should be reviewed in assessing the health of the 50.59 process for the system. Also, the temporary modification shall be assessed to assure the duration is not excessive. 50.59 applicability evaluations and 50.59 reviews shall be reviewed to assess whether the temporary modifications may have resulted in a current plant configuration or operation that is outside the regulatory design basis or licensing basis.

Abandoned Equipment without a 50.59 should also be considered.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 90 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM SYSTEM ASSESSMENT MATRIX Pages:

Figure 1 Addendum MAJOR TOPICS 85-94 LICENSING DOCUMENTS-

12. UFSAR Review: Chapters related to the system, interfacing systems (e.g., power distribution, I&C, and support systems),

accident analysis, and applicable design criteria shall be reviewed for regulatory design basis and licensing basis information. Scope of this review should take into account the ongoing UFSAR validation effort (which was initially restricted to 21 systems of the original SRR). Pending UFSAR changes should be assessed and selected UFSAR questions and requirements should be validated against installed equipment specifications and operational/test procedures as applicable.

13. TS/Bases: LCOs, Surveillance requirements, and their bases for the .

system and its components shall be reviewed for regulatory design basis and licensing requirements Other appropriate sections (e.g.,

for interfacing systems, EQ-related, and containment isolation-related) should also be reviewed for system/component regulatory design requirements.

14. Licensing Commitments: Open items from NRC inspections, commitments in the license (and not in the UFSAR or TS), and other commitments made to the NRC by docketed correspondence shall be reviewed for additional licensing basis requirements. For example, reference 6.5 notes that not all systems may meet the criteria of the response to LER 97-021-01 regarding single failure interpretation. A list of system specific licensing commitments will be provided to the ESRR by the Licensing Basis Review Group.
15. Notices/Bulletins/Generic Letters: NRC generic communications and evaluations and responses to them related to the system shall be reviewed for additional regulatory design basis requirements and information.

~ t ~

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 91 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM SYSTEM ASSESSMENT MA'i'RIX Pages:

Figure 1 Addendum MAJOR TOPICS 85 -94 OPERATIONS

16. Procedures: Operating and emergency operating procedures related to the system shall be reviewed for conformance with design basis information. Based on the results of reference 6.5, Emergency Operating Procedures should be a focus of the ESRR.
17. Operator Workarounds: Operator workarounds shall be reviewed for impact on system operation or performance. The impact should be assessed for conformance with the design basis information.
18. Industry Operating Experience Reviews: Industry experience reviews related to the system shall be assessed and compared to current design basis information. Specifically, Operating Experience information from the INPO Industry Database and generic NRC information shall be reviewed and effectiveness of application/consideration reviewed. Based on the results of reference 6.5, industry operating experience should be a focus of the ESRR. [Ref. 6.15t MAIN'IKNANCE'aintenance Procedures: Procedures for the overhaul of or general repair of system components shall be reviewed for appropriate use of and conformance with design basis information. Also,

. completed work documentation, including any applicable data sheets, should. be. assessed for adequacy of the use of the procedure. This topic does not cover preventive maintenance activities (covered in item 21) and surveillance type procedures (covered in item 22).

20. Vendor Technical Information: Vendor technical manuals, vendor drawings, and design data forwarded by the vendor related to system components shall be reviewed for conformance with design basis information. Based on the results of reference 6.5, vendor technical information should be a focus area of the ESRR.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5., Page 92 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Figure 1 Addendum SYSTEM ASSESSMENT MATRIX Pages:

MAJOR TOPICS 85-94

21. Preventive Maintenance: Regularly scheduled maintenance work items to assure proper equipment operation, including calibrations, lubrication, and filter flushing/changing, shall be reviewed for appropriate schedules, timeliness of performing the activity, and appropriate use of materials, Procedures for preventive maintenance scheduling and documentation shall also be reviewed.

SURVEILLANCE

22. Surveillance and Periodic Tests & Inspections: Each ESRR team shall, in the course of its assessment, verify that design basis safety and accident mitigation functions of the system are validated and verified, either by periodic testing or by engineering calculation for those portions of the system that cannot be tested periodically.

Procedures for tests and inspections required to verify compliance with TS Surveillance Requirements for system components shall be reviewed to assess compliance with the TS and its Bases, appropriate methodology, and consistency with other design basis information. Results of the most recent surveillance and periodic performance tests shall also be reviewed for compliance with design basis information and for the presence of adverse trends that have not been addressed.

23. ISI and Section XI IST: Procedures for Inservice Inspection and Inservice testing of system pumps and valves and other performance tests (e.g., heat exchanger performance tests, MOV tests, special pump/system performance tests) shall be reviewed for

. appropriate use of and conformance with design basis information.

Results of. the. most recent tests shall also be reviewed for compliance with design basis information.

~ ~ += I N~

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 93 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM SYSTEM ASSESSMENT MATRIX Pages:

Figure 1 Addendum MAJOR TOPICS 85-94 PHYSICAL PLANT

24. As-Built Verifications: Walkdowns of the system to verify conformance with design basis information, system layout against the drawings, system condition, component configuration, interactions with other systems, and other characteristics shall be performed based on checklists developed from the documentation reviews. These walkdowns should consider the adequacy of "

system vent provisions and how the provisions are incorporated into system procedures.

25. Control Room Drawings (i.e. the OP-series and the 9800 series drawings) shall be reviewed for conformance with design basis information. Also, the timeliness of the incorporation of changes to the current drawings should be assessed.
26. Surveillance Programs: Surveillances not associated with Items 22 and 23, such as Erosion/Corrosion, Fire Protection, or HELB, shall be reviewed for direct or indirect applicability to the system and its components and conformance with design basis. Results of the most recent surveillances should be assessed against design basis information.

'ev. 5 C

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Page 94 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Addendum SYSTEM ASSESSMENT MATRIX Pages:

Figure 1 MAJOR TOPICS 85-94 PROGRAMS, PROCESS AND PROCEDURES

27. Corrective Actions: Closed Condition Reports (CRs), Maintenance Action Requests, NPM Engineering Evaluation Requests, and other corrective action type reports related to the system shall be assessed for appropriate evaluation of problem against design basis, generic considerations, appropriate resolution, timeliness of resolution, and adverse trends. Included in this review shall be an assessment to determine ifany existing conditions should be the subject of an operability Determination, 50.59 screen or justification for continued operation. (See Generic Letter 91-18 for further details).
28. PA Audits and other Assessments: PA audits, EDSFIs, SSFIs, and other completed similar system or program assessments related to the system including Maintenance Rule Risk Significance determination shall be reviewed to assess effectiveness of the audit, appropriate resolution, including addressing extent of condition, timeliness of resolution, and adverse trends. Implementation of any generic lessons learned from system - specific SSFIs and the 9/97 IST self assessment should be evaluated.
29. Training Lesson Plans: Operations and engineering training lesson plans for the system shall be reviewed for consistency with design basis information and operating procedures.

30.. Open Items (Backlog): Maintenance, engineering, and operations open itemsxelated to the system shall be evaluated with respect to the current Restart Criteria within the SIDS data base;

31. Strategy Documents: Some Cook Plant systems had specific strategy documents prepared to articulate actions taken in response to NRC Identified Issues., ESRR teams shall review these documents and mark them up to refiect any changes needed to fully address issues of extent of condition, t'ransportability to the other unit, or to ensure a technically accurate and thorough approach to resolving the issue. This markup should be brief but should focus on identifying major unaddressed or unresolved issues in the system that may impact on resolution of the issue addressed by the strategy document.

Information PMP 7200.RST. Rev. 5 Page 95 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIE% PROGRAM Figure 2 SYSTEM ASSESSMENT MATRIX Pages:

EXAMPLE - AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM 95 -99 SYSrEM ASSESSMENT MATRIX EXAMPLE - AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM MAJOR TOPlCS DESIGN BASIS LICENSING OPERATIONS MAINTENANCE SURV PHYSICAL PROGRAMS, PROCESS DOCUMENTS PLANT Ec PROCEDURES I 2 5 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Cl 9

E K

ASSESSMENT ATIRIBVIKS 0 AFW01 WATERSUIHY X X X X AFW02 l4JKRDUVEHANDTD.AFWmIS X X X AFW03 X X

'lURHNEANDSIEAM SURD X X X X X X X AFWOS AFWIMWCKNIKLVALVES X X AFWC01 HHNGDBXiN AFWC02 CXÃl'AINMENrKXAlKN HKiHHIERGYIJNEBREAKS BA1KCblBIPALQIALRKhlKN X X X X AHEÃmR X X AFWC07 AFWC08 AFWC09 X X AFWC10 SNGZ FAILURECRIIERIAICMF X X AFWCl1 (%&0 X X X AFWC12 'IEMP. HRCIS CNSYS(XBIAB8LTY AFWC13 HCIHINALHA7AKS

Information . PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 96 of 101 EXPA'NDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Figure 2 Addendum SYSTEM ASSESSMENT MATRIX Pages:

EXAMPLE - AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM 95-99 ATTRIBUTE SELECTION GUIDANCE (typical example only - not a complete treatment of the AFW system critical attributes or design considerations)

Note: System attributes are selected based on a thorough research of the system design basis.

Attributes chosen for detailed review should be those vital to accomplishing the various safety and accident mitigation functions as defined in the design and licensing basis for the specified mission times (where applicable) and in the design plant conditions. Cook Plant has sometimes overlooked the critical functions of passive components (such as tanks, strainers, spray headers) to assure that appropriate performance has been demonstrated by testing, calculatioh.

or analysis. Additionally, such passive components have sometimes not received thorough materiel condition inspections to assure that the component contains the heat tracing, instrumentation, and other necessary features are functional such that the component remains operable in all required modes. ESRR teams shall assess obvious passive components for these types of issues.

SYSTEM FUNCTIONS BEING ASSESSED AFW01 Water Supply: An adequate water supply inventory is required for the AFW system to remove decay heat from the reactor coolant system (RCS) following events resulting in a loss of main feedwater; Issues related to water volume and level'indication, switchover to other sources, and overpressure/vacuum pressure are to be assessed. Included in this assessment should be a review of the capability of backup water supplies to function as designed.

AFW02 ~

Motor-driven and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (list component IDs): the AFW-pumps are critical components for delivery of the required AFW flow. Issues related to pump performance, NPSH, mitiitnum flow requirements, motor and power supplies, power supply reliability, and design

'equirements are to be assessed.

AFW03 Initiation and control: The auxiliary feedwater system initiation and control circuitry is required to automatically initiate the system and assure adequate decay heat removal and to allow control of cooldown rates. Issues related to initiation and control setpoints, instrumentation, flow, and level control are to be assessed.

Information PMP /200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 97 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Figure 2 Addendum SYSTEM ASSESSMENT MATRIX Pages:

EXAMPLE - AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM 95 -99 Turbine and steam supply: The turbine driver for the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (component IDs) and its steam supply and exhaust critical components for the operation of the pump. These components

're have a negative industry operating experience history, and at Cook Plant have a seismic classification (in part) that has been questioned in the past. Issues related to steam line warming and draining, trip and governor valve design, operation, and maintenance, speed controls, overspeed protection, and pump alignment are to be assessed.

AFW05 AFW flow control valves (FMO-212, 222,232,242,211,221,231,241). The flow control valves are critical to limit flow to specified limits to achieve adequate decay heat removal and to miiumize overcooling of the RCS. Issues related to valve and actuator design requirements, power supplies, and positioning capability are to be assessed.

Generic Attributes to be a lied where a licable b all ESRR teams

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Note: The below listed generic or common attributes, including items AFWC01 to AFWC13, are broadly applicable based on Cook Plant operating history, experience, and issues and, as such, each ESRR team shall be aware of potential effects of these attributes on functionality of their system.

AFWC01 Piping design: Changes in piping design criteria since original plant design MAYresult in confusion in piping design, installation, and inspection for existing piping and new piping installation. Other examples include material condition of buried pipe, ASME Code classification boundaries, and design temperature and pressures.

Containment isolation: Example of potential concerns are modification, maintenance, and testing (Appendix J) of containment isolation features.

AFWC03 Station blackout operation: Significant effort has been made by the industry to address rules regarding loss of all AC power. The AFW system is an important mitigator for this event.. Example issues include water supply, flow control and manual actions for the AFW system under station blackout conditions.

Information PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 98 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Figure 2 Addendum SYSTEM ASSESSMENT MATRIX Pages:

EXAMPLE - AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM 95-99 High Energy line breaks: Cook Plant systems should be protected against the effects of high energy line breaks. Line break issues are interdisciplinary, involving piping design, environmental qualification, fiooding, bamer design, and accident analyses. Walkdown of physical barriers intended to ensure protection against such line breaks shall be considered to verify their mitigation capability. Additionally, consider test verification of detection and mitigation schemes.

AFWC05 Environmental qualification: EQ is a highly regulated program to assure system operation during adverse environmental conditions associated with design basis accident conditions. The EQ program is being assessed independently of this review. Potential issues from that review affecting system functions important to safe operation and accident mitigation should be considered.

AFWC06 Appendix R: Appendix R is a highly regulated program that required significant utility effort to address. The Appendix R program is being assessed independently of this review. Potential issues from that review affecting system functions important to safe operation and accident mitigation should be considered. Specific consideration should also be given to fire barriers and equipment required for safe shutdown.

AFWC07 Electrical separation: Redundant electrical trains and instrument channels are required to be separated by Regulatory Guide 1.75. Compliance with these requirements should be considered in the system walkdowns.

AFWC08 Seismic qualification: The AFW system is generally classified as seismic Category'.in. accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.29. Compliance with the requirements and the impact on design basis should be verified to the extent that the seismic classification and calculational basis are consistent.

AFWC09. Year 2000 (Y2K): Considerable industry effort is being expended to ensure the reliable operation of microprocessor-based control and indication systems will not be vulnerable to year 2000 related problems. Identify microprocessor based controls within the system, confirm they are within the Y2K scope, and identify outstanding work remaining.

Information'IMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 99 of 101 EXPANDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM Figure 2 Addendum SYSTEM ASSESSMENT MATRIX Pages:

EXAMPLE - AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM 95-99 AFWC10 Single Failure Criteria/Common Mode Failure (CMF): The Cook Plant single failure design basis is not straightforward and misunderstanding or misapplication has led to issues of nonconformance in the past.

Additionally, some events at Cook Plant have been related to a failure to adequately consider possible failure modes of both system and supporting or attendant system components, ESRR teams must clearly understand the design basis in these areas and should evaluate whether possible failure modes of both the system and attending systems have been assessed to ensure the design is robust. (see LER 97-021) Additionally, ESRR teams should be alert for and identify common mode failure mechanisms (if encountered) during their reviews. These mechanisms include inappropriate-operations, maintenance, testing, or procurement priorities or poor material condition..

AFWCII Generic Letter 89-13 (GL 89-13): Cook Plant has had problems

,implementing Generic Letter 89-13 on service water cooling systems. The GL 89-13 program is being assessed independently of this review. Potential.

issues from the review affecting system functions important to safe operation and accident mitigation should be considered. ESRR teams should also be alert for instances where service water system dead legs are not properly or effectively addressed under the program or where Cook operating experience shows that, the existing provisions are insufficient.

AFWC12 Temperature Effects on System Operability: Cook Plant has not yet properly accounted for lake temperature variations in all system design bases. ESRR teams shall specifically assess, where applicable, whether the design basis for the system or system components is at odds with the maximum seasonal lake temperature expected, which could be as high as 87.5 degrees during certain summer months. Where such instances are found, the effect on system operability shall be assessed.

AFWC13 External Hazards: Potential external hazards that may be applicable include flooding from both external and internal sources, missiles from both internal and external potential sources, wind loading, tornado and electric storm effects.

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Figure 3 ASSESSMENT FORM 100 - 100

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Readiness Review Attribute Assessment Form s

Reviewer: Date: Item Number Reviewer Number: System Attribute Number Attribute Description Major topic Attribute Major Topic Attribute Checks CRs Checks CRs Electrical Calcs/analysis 1 Operating Procedures 16 1&C Calcs/Analysis 2 Operator Work Arounds 17 Mech./struct Calcs/Analysis 3 Industry Op Exp Reviews 18 Accident Analysis 4 Maintenance Procedures 19 Drawings 5 Vendor/Technical Info 20 Logic Diagrams. 6 Preventive Maintenance 21 Config. Management Info. 7 Surveillance and Periodic 22 Specifications DBDs 8

9 ISUSection XI IST'3 Tests & inspections As-Built Verification 24 Change Docs/50.59 Reviews. 10 Control Room Drawings, 25 Temporary Mods/Bypasses 11 Surveillance Programs 26 UFSAR Reviews TS/Bases Licensing Commitments 13 12 14 Correction Action Program PA Audits/Other Assessments Training Lesson Plans 27 28 29 Notices, Bulletins and GLs. 15 Open Items (Backlog) 30 Strategy Documents 31 CR Number:

Documents Reviewed Attribute Assessment

Information, PMP 7200.RST.004 Rev. 5 Page 101 of 101 EXPA'NDED SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM SAMPLE COMPLETED READINESS REVIEW Pages:

Figure 4 ATTRIBUTE ASSESSMENT FORM 101- 101 Readiness Review Attribute Assessment Form Reviewer: Russell Date: 2/5/99 Item Number Reviewer Number: ~ABROi System ~AFW Attribute Number AFWO1 Attribute Description CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK DESIGN BASIS Major topic, Attribute Major Topic Attribute Checks CRs Checks Electrical Calcs/analysis Operating Procedures 16 . 0 1&C Calcs/Analysis Operator Work Arounds "

17 0 Mech/struct Calcs/Analysis Industry Op Exp Reviews 18 0 Accident Analysis Maintenance Procedures 19 0 Drawings Vendor/Technical Info 20 0 0 Logic Diagrams, Preventive Maintenance 21 0 Config. Management info. Surveillance and Periodic 22 0 0 Test & Inspections Specifications 8 0 Section XI IST/Perf. Tests 23 DBDs 9 1 As-Built Verification 24 Change Docs/50.59 Reviews 10 0 Control Room Drawings 25 Temporary Mods/Bypasses 11 0 Surveillance Programs 26 UFSAR Reviews 12 0 Correction Action Program 27 ITS/Bases 13 0 PA Audits/Other Assessments 28 Licensing Commitments 14 0 Training Lesson Plans, 29 Notices, Bulletins and GLs 15 0 Open Items (Backlog) 30 Strategy Documents 31 CR Number:

CR 4 984000 to provide basis for the statement that 174,451 gallons is sufficient to remove decay heat.

Documents Reviewed

1. DBD - DB-12, AFWS, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Rev. 0, Change 6, Section 3.0.
2. UFSAR 10.5.2, Rev.
3. TS 3.7.6 and Bases; Attribute Assessment No Calculation or other documentation or data could be found to establish the basis for this minimum value. The basis for the 9 hour1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> decay heat cooling capacity needs to be established

Attachment 2 Expanded System Readiness Review Procedure For Level 2 Systems PMP 7200.RST.006, Rev. 1