ML17326A159
| ML17326A159 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 09/23/1999 |
| From: | INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17326A158 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9909280391 | |
| Download: ML17326A159 (16) | |
Text
ATTACHMENT2 TO CO999-10 PROPOSED T/S PAGES MARKEDUP PAGES UNIT 1 Page 3/4 9-8 UNIT2 Page 3/4 9-7 990928039i 990928 PDR ADQCK 050003i5 P
3/4 LIMITINGCONDITIONSFOR OPERATIONANDSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS 3/4.9 REFUELINGOPERATIONS
'CRANE TRAVEL-SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL BUILDINCT" LIMITINGCONDITIONFOR OPERATION 3.9.7 Loads in excess of 2,500 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over fuel assemblies in the storage pool.
Loads carried over the spent fuel pool and the heights at which they may be carried over racks containing fuel shall be limited in such a way as to preclude impact energies over 24,240 in.-lbs., if the loads are dropped from the crane.
APPLICABILITY:
With fuel assemblies in the storage pool.
ACTION:
With the requirementsof the above specificationnot satisfied, place the crane load in a safe condition. The provisions of Specification3.0.3 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCERE UIREMENTS 4.9.7.1 Crane interlocks which prevent crane travel with loads in emcee of 2,500 pounds over fuel assemblies shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 7 days prior to crane use and at least once per 7 days thereafter during crane operation.
posoi:
4.9.7.2 The potential impact energy due to dropping the crane's load shall be determined to beS 24,240 in.-lbs.
prior to moving each load over racks containing fuel.
Shared system with Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 COOK NUCLEARPLANT-UNIT1 Page 3/4 94 AMENDMENTS,4489 186
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3/4 LIMITINGCONDITIONSFOR OPERATIONANDSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS 3/4.9 REFUELINGOPERATIONS
'CRANE TRAVEL-SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL BUILDING*
LIMITINGCONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.7 Loads in excess of 2,500 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over fuel assemblies in the storage pool.
Loads carried over the spent fuel pool and the heights at which they may be carried over racks containing fuel shall be limited in such a way as to preclude impact energies over 24,240 in.-lbs., ifthe loads are dropped from the crane.
APPLICABILITY:
With fuel assemblies in the storage pool.
ACTION:
r With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, place the crane load in a safe condition.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCERE UIREMENTS 4.9.7.1 Crane interlocks which prevent crane travel with loads in excess of 2,500 pounds over fuel assemblies shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 7 days prior to crane use and at least once per 7 days thereafter during crane operation.
4.9.7.2 The potential impact energy due to dropping the crane's load shall be determined to be 5 24,240 in.-
lbs. prior to moving each load over racks containing fuel.
Shared system with Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1.
COOK NUCLEARPLANT-UNIT2 Page 3/4 9-7 AMENDMENTS'69 172
ATTACHMENT3 TO CO999-10 PROPOSED T/S PAGES CHANGES INCORPORATED UNIT 1 Page 3/4 9-8 UNIT2 Page 3/4 9-7
3/4 LIMITINGCONDITIONSFOR OPERATIONANDSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS 3/4.9 REFUELINGOPERATIONS
'CRANE TRAVEL-SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL BUILDINGS LIMITINGCONDITIONFOR OPERATION 3.9.7 Loads in excess of 2,500 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over fuel assemblies in the storage pool.
Loads carried over the spent fuel pool and the heights at which they may be carried over racks containing fuel shall be limited in such a way as to preclude impact energies over 24,240 in.-lbs., if the loads are dropped from the crane.
APPLICABILITY:
ACTION:
With fuel assemblies in the storage pool.
With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, place the crane load in a safe condition.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCERE UIREMENTS 4.9.7.1 Crane interlocks which prevent crane travel with loads in excess of 2,500 pounds over fuel assemblies shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 7 days prior to crane use and at least once per 7 days thereafter during crane operation.
This Surveillance Requirement is not required during the movement of steam generator sections in the auxiliary building for the Unit 1 steam generator replacement project.
When crane travel interlocks are disengaged, administrative controls shall be in place to prevent loads from passing over the spent fuel pool.
4.9.7.2 The potential impact energy due to dropping the crane's load shall be determined to beK 24,240 in.-
lbs. prior to moving each load over racks containing fuel.
Shared system with Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1.
COOK NUCLEARPLANT-UNIT2 Page 3/4 9-7 AMENDMENTSV, 96, kVR
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3/4 LIMITINGCONDITIONSFOR OPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS 3/4.9 REFUELINGOPERATIONS
'CRANE TRAVEL-SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL BUILDING*
LIMITINGCONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.7 Loads in excess of 2,500 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over fuel assemblies in the storage pool ~
Loads carried over the spent fuel pool and the heights at which they may be carried over racks containing fuel shall be limited in such a way as to preclude impact energies over 24,240 in.-lbs., if the loads are dropped from the crane.
APPLICABILITY:
With fuel assemblies in the storage pool.
ACTION:
With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, place the crane load in a safe condition.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCERE UIREMENTS 4.9.7.1 Crane interlocks which prevent crane travel with loads in excess of 2,500 pounds over fuel assemblies shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 7 days prior to crane use and at least once per 7 days thereafter during crane operation.
This Surveillance Requirement is not required during the movement of steam generator sections in the auxiliary building for the Unit 1 steam generator replacement project.
When crane travel interlocks are disengaged, administrative controls shall be in place to prevent loads from passing over the spent fuel pool.
4.9.7.2 The potential impact energy due to dropping the crane's load shall be determined to be5 24,240 in.-
lbs. prior to moving each load over racks containing fuel.
Shared system with Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1.
COOK NUCLEARPLANT-UNIT2 Page 3/4 9-7 AMENDMENTSV,96, IVY
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ATTACHMENT4 TO CO999-10 NO SIGNIFICANTHAZARDS CONSIDERATION EVALUATION Indiana Michigan Power Company (IAM) has evaluated this proposed amendment and determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration.
According to 10 CFR 50.92(c),
a proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards consideration if operation ofthe facilityin accordance with the proposed amendment does not:
1.
Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or 2.
Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated; or 3.
Involve a significant reduction in a margin ofsafety.
The proposed changes would allow movement ofsteam generator (SG) sections in support ofthe Unit 1
steam generator replacement project (SGRP) that exceeds the design basis seismic capability of the auxiliary building load handling equipment and structures.
Also, a license condition for DPR-58 and DPR-74 would be added to provide relief from performance of Technical Specifications (T/S) Surveillance Requirement 4.9.7.1 and to bypass crane travel interlocks during the SG lifts.
The determination that the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 are met for this amendment request is indicated below.
1.
Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences ofan accident previously evaluated' No. NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," generically evaluates the probabilities for a heavy load handling event that could result in consequences that exceed 25% of 10 CFR 100 limits. The NRC determined, assuming heavy load handling in accordance with NUREG-0612 guidelines, that the associated risks are acceptable based on the very low likelihood of a load drop.
The proposed activity will be performed in accordance with NUREG-0612 as approved for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) and willbe similar to the heavy loads program reviewed, approved, and demonstrated effective during the Unit 2 SGRP.
The cranes feature single-failure-proof hoisting and braking systems in accordance with NUREG-0554, "Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants," and are evaluated to safely retain the load in the unlikely event ofthe safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). As such, this change does not introduce any new accident precursors or initiators and there is not a significant increase in the probability of previously evaluated accidents.
to C0999;10 Page 2 Administrative controls substitute for crane travel interlocks during the liAs to prevent loads from being carried over spent fuel assemblies.
In addition, a load path evaluation has determined that, in the unlikely event of a load drop, requirements for safe shutdown ofthe operating unit, decay heat removal, and spent fuel pool cooling continue to be satisfied.
As a result, there is no significant increase in the consequences ofa load drop. Based on the above, the probability ofoccurrence and the consequences ofaccidents previously evaluated are not increased.
2.
Does the proposed change create the possibility ofa new or different kind ofaccident Rom any accident previously evaluated?
No. The potential accident involved in the proposed change is a design basis seismic event during load handling.
The NUREG-0554 guideline for crane seismic capability is safe retention of the load during an SSE.
A current engineering study demonstrates that the SG sections are safely retained by the cranes during load handling even in the unlikely event of an SSE. Although the crane travel interlocks are disengaged during the liAs, administrative controls prevent loads from being carried over the spent fuel pool. Furthermore, the load path, methods, and types ofloads are similar to those previously reviewed and approved for the Unit 2 SGRP.
That review also found that the possibility ofa new or different kind ofaccident was not created.
The current reviews and analyses for the Unit 1 SGRP have not identified a credible new kind of accident or one that is different from the evaluated load drop scenario.
Based on the above, the possibility of a new or different kind ofaccident from any previously evaluated is not created.
3.
Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin ofsafety.
J No. Handling ofheavy loads during the proposed activity willbe in accordance with the guidelines of NUREG-0612 (including appropriate codes and standards) as approved for CNP and will be similar to the heavy loads program previously approved for the Unit 2 SGRP. Administrative controls substitute for crane travel interlocks during the lifts to ensure that no loads are carried over spent fuel assemblies.
The loads will be lifted by cranes with the single-failure proof features specified by NUREG-0554.
For these loads, the design basis seismic capability of the load handling equipment and structures is exceeded.
However, the likelihood of a seismic event coincident with the limited lifttimes for these loads is very remote. 'Furthermore, an evaluation of these liAs that considers the conservatism inherent in the design basis calculations concludes that the loads are safely retained even in the event ofan SSE.
Based on the above, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin ofsafety.
7 In summary, based on the above evaluation, I&Mhas concluded that the proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.
/
ATTACHMENT5 TO C0999-10 ENVIRONMENTALASSESSMENT Indiana Michigan Power Company (1AM) has evaluated this license amendment request against the criteria for identification of licensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessment in accordance with 10 CFR 51.21. I&Mhas determined that this license amendment request meets the criteria for a categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR51.22(c)(9).
This determination is based on the fact that this change is being proposed as an amendment to a license issued pursuant to 10 CFR 50 that changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or that changes an inspection or a surveillance requirement, and the amendment meets the following specific criteria.
(i)
The amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.
As demonstrated in Attachment 5, this proposed amendment does not involve significant hazards consideration.
(ii)
There is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released offsite.
There will be no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents released offsite.
(iii)
There is no significant increase in individual or. cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The proposed changes willnot result in significant changes in the operation or configuration of the facility. There willbe no change in the level ofcontrols or methodology used for processing ofradioactive effluents or handling ofsolid radioactive waste, nor willthe proposal result in any change in the normal radiation levels within the plant. Therefore, there will be no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure resulting from this change.
ATTACHMENT6 TO CO999-10 UNIT2 SGRP CRANE ANDAUXILIARYBUILDINGMODIFICATIONSANDANALYSES The following items describe the modifications and associated analyses that were performed to support the handling ofsteam generator (SG) sections for the Unit 2 steam generator replacement project (SGRP) that are also applicable to the Unit 1 SGRP.
These modifications were evaluated by the NRC and found in Reference 1 to be acceptable for the loading conditions resulting from the, Unit 2 SGRP.
These same requirements will be in place for the proposed load handling of the SG sections.
1.
ModificationofOriginal AuxiliaryBuilding Crane (west auxiliary building crane)
The original auxiliary building crane was procured and erected prior to the guidelines of NUREG-0554, "Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants."
However, the NRC staff found in Reference 1 that the original auxiliary building crane did satisfy the criteria of NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants,"
and T/S3/4.9.7.
Modifications implemented for the Unit 2 SGRP included structural additions and a new trolley design.
The modified crane was determined to meet the single-failure-proof criteria of NUREG-0554. The original 150-ton design-rated load (DRL), a rating that does not consider seismic forces, was unchanged.
The maximum critical load (MCL), applicable when a crane can be a direct or indirect cause of radiological release, was established through an'alysis as 55 tons.
This rating accounts fo'r seismic forces including the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).
2.
Addition of Second AuxiliaryBuilding Crane (east auxiliary building crane)
A second single-failure-proof crane was installed in the auxiliary building to accommodate the heavy loads associated with the Unit 2 SGRP.
The east auxiliary building crane was designed, procured and installed to the single-failure-proof criteria ofNUREG-0554, with a DRL of 150 tons and MCLof 60 tons. This crane was used alone to handle the eight Unit 2 SG steam dome lifts.
Tandem AuxiliaryBuilding Crane Configuration The two auxiliary building cranes were modified for tandem configuration as a liftsystem to handle the eight heaviest liAs, the Unit 2 steam generator lower assemblies.
The tandem configuration retains the single-failure-'proof features of the individual cranes and provides a DRL of300 tons.
4.
Modificationofthe AuxiliaryBuilding In the auxiliary building, modifications to the crane runway girders and associated end columns were implemented in addition to the auxiliary building cranes to prepare for the to C0999-10 Page 2 Unit 2 SG section liAs. These modifications included the addition ofgirder web and bearing stiffeners, web splice bolts, rail splices, reinforcing and welding reinforcement, and horizontal connections to resist forces on the crane runway and runway girders.
5.
Structural Analyses Structural analyses performed by the crane supplier, Whiting Corporation, were provided for the modified west auxiliary building crane (Reference 3) and for the east auxiliary building crane (Reference 4).
Analyses were also performed on the auxiliary building columns, the secondary framing members between the columns, and on the girders that support the cranes'nd trolleys (Reference 5).
The following loading conditions were evaluated:
- 1) tandem crane, 300 ton liA, no seismic forces; 2) tandem crane, no lifted load, SSE; and 3) single
- crane, 60 ton lift, SSE.
These load cases indicate that the cranes were not qualified seismically for movement ofthe Unit 2 SG sections.
6.
Load Test Following the modifications described above and prior to the Unit 2 SGRP, a load test of the tandem crane was performed in accordance with American National Standards Institute (ANSI) B30.2.0-1976, "Overhead and Gantry Cranes."
The total lifted load was 375 tons, meeting the ANSI requirement for a 125% load test. The test was performed along the Unit 2 SGRP load path.
Following the load test, a visual inspection was completed by certified inspectors, including the welds on the support structure, to ensure that there were no signs of distress or distortion.
ATTACHMENT7 TO CO999-10 COMMITMENTS The followingtable identifies actions committed to by Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M) in this submittal.
Other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by I&M. They are described to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments.
Commitment The training for the crane operators used for the SG section liftswill include the guidance ofANSI 830.2, Chapter 2-3, "Conduct of Operators." Training willinclude orientation with the specific procedures to be used for the SG section lifts prior to beginning the corresponding crane operations.
The auxiliary building cranes willbe inspected to confirm consistency with the single-failure-proof guidelines ofNUREG-0554, "Single-Failure-Proof Cranes forNuclear Power Plants."
Prior to use for Unit 1 SGRP, special liftingdevices used for Unit 2 SGRP willbe ins ected and tested er ANSI N14.6-1978 re uirements.
Rigging being used to move SG sections in the auxiliary building will meet the single-failure-proof criteria ofNUREG-0554 Administrative controls willbe implemented to ensure that the requirements ofTS 3.9.7.1 are met during the time that the crane trav'el limitswitches are disengaged.
Complete auxiliary building and auxiliary building crane design basis calculation review to support engineering study on seismic adequacy of auxiliary building cranes and supporting structure.
Date Prior to moving SG sections in the auxiliary building Prior to moving SG sections in the auxiliary building Prior to use Prior to moving SG sections in the auxiliary building Prior to moving SG sections in the auxiliary building Prior to moving SG sections in the auxiliary building
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