ML17325B527
ML17325B527 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Cook ![]() |
Issue date: | 04/07/1998 |
From: | Sampson J INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML17325B525 | List: |
References | |
PROC-980407, NUDOCS 9904130178 | |
Download: ML17325B527 (38) | |
Text
'ook Nuclear Plant Restart Plan c~c7 98 Revision 1 S. R. Sampson Date Site Vice President 9'P04i30i7B 990405 PDR ADOCK 050003iS P PDR
I Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Plan
- l. Introduction and Overview 1.1 Purpose 1.2 Background 1.3 Roles and Responsibilities Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Process Overview
- 2. Restart Work Scope Determination 2.1 Restart Work Scope Determination Process 2.2 Plant System Reviews 2.3 Redefined Restart Work Scope
- 3. Restart Work Scope Performance 3.1 Work Scope Performance
- 4. Restart Readiness Assessment 4.1 System Readiness 4.2 Functional Area Readiness 4.3 Programmatic Readiness 4.4 Containment Readiness
- 5. Restart Authorization 5.1 Restart Oversight Committee (ROC) Review and Approval 5.2 Senior Manager Review Team (SMRT) Review and Approval 5.3 Executive Vice President Restart Authorization
- 6. Startup and Power Ascension 6.1 Management Oversight and Organizational Support 6.2 Operating Proficiency and Experience Review Attachments:
A system engineer review board (SERB) charter B restart oversight committee (ROC) charter C criteria for work included in restart scope D plant systems to be reviewed by ROC E restart process map Revision Block
1.0 Introduction and Overview 1.1 Purpose The Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Plan describes the activities and controls that will be implemented to ensure the facility is ready to safely start up and operate in an event free manner. To provide us with the assurance that this can be accomplished we must determine that our people, plant and programs are ready to meet this challenge. The plan will assess these areas and identify any needed action to ensure we can safely startup and operate reliably in an event free manner.
The plan will assess the following:
~ People Have we adequately prepared our people such that they are trained on the changes in our programs and procedures and understand the issues involved in restarting and operating the plant? Are the functional areas staffed, organized and functioning at a level to support safe startup and reliable operation in an event free manner?
~ Programs Have our programs and procedures been adjusted to include the lessons learned?
Are they adequate to allow us to return to operation and prevent future nonconforming conditions?
~ Plant Are our materiel condition, configurations, restart readiness of systems and ability to meet design function while complying with applicable regulations adequate to allow us to return to service?
This plan provides a map to conduct the assessments needed to assure ourselves that we are ready to restart. The actions and activities needed to do this and any corrective actions 'will be performed in accordance with approved procedures.
1.2 Background During the July - September, 1997, time&arne, the NRC conducted an architect engineering inspection at Cook Nuclear Plant The AE inspection focused primarily on two safety systems, ECCS and CCW. Six weeks into the AE inspection, a question surfaced regarding our ability to sustain long-term cooling of the core during a design basis accident. As a conservative measure, both units were shut down on September 9 and cooled to cold shut down until this question could be properly answered.
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On September 12, the NRC concluded the AE inspection with a public exit meeting. Following this meeting, Cook Nuclear Plant committed to addressing and resolving seven (7) specific issues identified during the inspection prior to restart of the units. It was believed that these seven issues could be resolved within a few weeks. Subsequent to our letter to the NRC committing to these actions, the NRC issued a confirmatory action letter (CAL) identifying their approval would be required prior to restarting the units. The NRC CAL also identified two additional actions to be taken as a condition for restarting the units.
The unit 2 reactor was scheduled for a refueling to begin in late September, 1997.
The unit 2 core was within two weeks of normal burn up window at the time of the unscheduled shut down. Our objective was to resolve the CAL items, and restart unit 2 for the remaining two weeks of fuel burn up, then commence the refueling outage.
Over the next several weeks, it became apparent that a restart would not be achievable in the near term, and a decision was made to begin the unit 2 refueling outage and its scheduled work on October 20, 1997. In parallel with the outage our organization worked through the many AE inspection/CAL issues. It". 'ork, appeared that a January 1998 restart of both units would be feasible.
During the time period of January - February 1998, the Cook Nuclear Plant senior management team had several meetings with the NRC, and the CAL issues were nearing resolution. It was during this time period that several new issues arose, concerning or relating to our containment systems that would require significant resources and focus to reconcile.
Given the significant period that both units had been shut down up to this point, and the uncertainty for a near-term start up date, it was decided that the scope of both units'utages needed to be re-evaluated, and a more rigorous assessment of plant readiness was required prior to any restart These steps are necessary in order to achieve the objectives described in Section 1.1. The key factors that led to this decision are:
Design basis concerns and equipment performance and testing issues which have come to light in recent months raised the concern that additional hardware and non-hardware activities may need to be completed during this extended shut down.
Confirmation is required that procedure inadequacies or equipment deficiencies that may challenge plant operators during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions have been adequately identified and addressed.
Lessons learned from other nuclear utilities in the implementation of an integrated assessment of readiness to restart following an extended shutdown
period are being adopted and applied to Cook Nuclear Plant on a pilot basis during this outage.
1.3 Roles and Responsibilities Roles and responsibilities for the execution of this plan are as follows:
1.3.1 All Nuclear Generation Employees Responsible for supporting the restart activities by focusing on safe operations and continuous improvement. All employees are obligated to raise any and all quality concerns to management's action through the corrective action program.
1.3.2 System Engineers Responsible for successful completion of restart work on selected system's, performing an assessment of system readiness to support unity restart arid safe, reliable power operations, implementing necessary corrective actions and providing aFirmation of readiness.
1.3.3 System Engineering Review Board (SERB)
Board internal to the engineering organization responsible for assessing the readiness of plant systems and providing recommendations for additional restart scope to the ROC. The SERB charter is provided in attachment A.
1.3.4 Restart Oversight Committee (ROC)
Responsible for determining the restart scope of work using consistent standards and criteria approved by the senior management review team (SMRT) and assessing the readiness of Cook Nuclear Plant to restart and resume power operations, using the process approved by the SMRT in this procedure. The ROC charter is provided in attachment B.
1.3.5 Senior Management Review Team (SMRT)
Members: Site Vice President (Chairman)
Vice President Nuclear Engineering Director Performance Assurance
~Independent Safety Review Committee Member
- This member will actively participate as available, and willperform a continuous oversight role. Routine communication with this member may
be accomplished ttuuugh review of meeting minutes, phone conferencing and follow up interviews with the SMRT members.
The SMRT is responsible for generation and approvals of:
(a) criteria for screening work items required for completion of restart; and, (b)
'fmonitoring and oversight of the process for affirmation and approval plant and staff readiness for restart 1.3.6 Plant Manager, Engineering Managers and Department Superintendents Responsibility for successful completion of the restart work, performing an assessment of functional area readiness to support unit restart and safe, reliable power operations, implementing necessary corrective actions and providing affirmation of readiness to the ROC.
1.3.7 Restart Manager Responsibility for the management and control of restart work activities'.-
including the scheduling of activities and coordination of resources.
1.3.8 Site Vice President Overall responsibility for the management and implementation of the restart plan to achieve the purpose described in section 1.1. Serves as chairman of the (SMRT).
1.3.9 Executive Vice President Nuclear Generation Responsible for authorizing startup and power ascension, and providing senior management oversight of the restart process.
1.4 Cook Nudear Hant Restart Process Overview The restart plan consists of the following major activities:
(1) scope determination (2) work performance (3) readiness assessment (4) startup authorization
'5) startup and power ascension Following is a process map and summary of the activities with more detailed information presented in later sections of this document.
Cook Plant Restart Plan Overview 1 1 Sys nnrnoeers 1.4 SEAII a1 l4e4rlQsnager 4 1 crscsesc e.l . slsrr e1 i EaoceneoRoaarc 4 1 i e
Ooerosone Perform System Recommend Restart ApprOre Reet4rt Wcrk Perform Frnal Renew Restart And Power Perform Restart Work Reconsnend Restan Autrrorrte Restan Readrness Rem<<we Work Scope Scope Reconsnend Startup Oper<<tron Final Review Perform FunctNnal Area Readrness Reviews 14 Monnsers R~
Perform Programmatrc Renews 1,S O<<Phrr04neeAe
Restart Readiness Assessments The objective of the restart readiness assessment is to ensure that the integrated set of plant equipment, human resources and work programs are capable of supporting safe and reliable 1.1 i Sys engineers power operations. The restart readiness assessment will be initiated in parallel with the execution and completion of restart Perform System work.
Readiness Reviews The restart readiness assessment will focus on the following areas:
1.2 Manages
~ plant system readiness Perform Functional Area Readiness ~ functional area readiness Reviews ~ programmatic readiness
~ containment readiness 1.3 Managers Perform Programmatic Readiness Reviews 1.4 Oir Piant Engineenng Perform Containment Readiness Reviews 1.5 sERB The restart work scope may be increased as a result of the plant system assessments or other ongoing work The system Recommend Restart engineers will recommend the restart work scope to the System Work Scope Engineer Review Board (SERB).
1.6 i ROC All restart scope additions will be approved by the Restart Oversight Committee (ROC).
Approve Restart Work Scope 2.1," Restart Manager Following determination of the restart work scope by the ROC, the restart manager is responsible for coordinating the planning, Perform Restart Work scheduling and completion of the work.
3.1 ROC, PNSRC Results of the restart assessment will be presented to the Restart Oversight Committee (ROC) with an affirmation by lhe
. Perform Final Review responsible system engineer or engineering manager, and the Recommend Startup functional area superintendent of the readiness of the system-or organization to support plant startup and safe, reliable power operations.
4.1 SMRT Following presentation and acceptance of the assessment results by the ROC, the Site Vice President will convene the SMRT to perform an integrated review of the affirmations, verify Recommend Restart compliance with regulatory commitments and any other special criteria that may impact the initiation of startup activities.
4.2 Exec Vice Pres Based on the results of this review, the Executive Vice President Nuclear Generation will authorize startup and power ascension.
Authorize Restart 5.1 ops Startup and power ascension following the completion of startup work will follow a deliberate and controlled approach that ensures Startup and Power operational and personnel safety. The normal startup process Ascension defined in Cook Nuclear Plant procedures will be supplemented with appropriate management oversight and support from engineering and maintenance orgaruzation such that issues or concerns are promptly addressed and the startup can be accomplished in a safe, controlled manner.
2.0 Restart %'ork Scope Determination 2.1 Restart Work Scope Determination Process The restart work scope is being defined through a determination process driven by the ROC consistent with their charter. Outstanding work items and selected programmatic issues are reviewed against defined criteria to determine which items should be included in the restart scope. System engineers have the largest role in this process, but there is also considerable involvement from other organizations including operations, design engineering, and maintenance. The restart work scope determination process is outlined in attachment E.
2.2 Plant System Review Plant systems are reviewed by the system engineer using the plant system review instructions with results and recommendations presented to the ROC.
4 The plant system review process consists of four primary elements as described .,
below.
2.2.1 Selection of Plant Systems Plant systems have been selected for a detailed review and affirmation based on the historical performance and risk significance of the system.
This review will be performed in accordance with the plant system readiness review instructions. Results of the assessment of selected systems willbe presented first to the SERB and, upon approval, to the ROC with appropriate recommendations for additional actions to be performed after restart. The systems are listed in attachment D.
The remaining systems willbe assessed and evaluated as part of the line responsibility of the engineering organization through the use of the SERB.
Issues that affect restart scope on these systems willbe presented to the ROC on a case basis.
2.2.2 Restart Work Scope Additions The restart work scope addition for plant systems is focused on those items not already included in the restart work scope. Items already scheduled for completion prior to restart are not evaluated against the criteria provided in attachment C unless there is a proposal to delete them. The goal of the system review and work scope addition process is to define the work for completion prior to restart such that the system is capable of
'ecessary supporting safe and reliable power operation. This review will include the following:
(a) the magnitude, significance and risk of items which willbe resolved after restart should be defined and evaluated; (b) assurance that recurring problems on the system that could acct safe and reliable operations are being fixed; (c) assurance that any design basis and licensing issues on the system are being addressed within a time frame that is appropriate for the issue; and (d) assurance that operators will not be unnecessarily challenged in the operation of the system during normal, abnormal; or emergency conditions.
Based on the review of open work items against the criteria presented in attachment C, the system engineer is to provide recommendations for the restart scope changes for the selected systems in attachment D to the SERB and upon approval to the ROC. Items recommended for addition to the restart scope for remaining plant systems willbe handled on an item specific basis by the ROC following an initial review by line management It should be noted that it was not the intent of this program to resolve all design basis issues. We are committed to a long range program to accomplish this resolution.
2.2.3 Monitoring Restart Work, Addressing Emergent Issues and Performing a More Detailed Assessment of System Readiness System engineering is to monitor the progress of work on assigned system and address emergent issues as required. Any major restart scope impacts defined by emergent issues should be brought to the ROC following line management review. Allother emergent issues are assessed daily by the engineering managers.
Also, the system engineer is to use this period to complete the assessment and evaluation of system readiness in preparation for the final system .
readiness review and affirmation of readiness for restart 2.2.4 Final System Readiness Review and ABumation This aspect of the system readiness review pmcess is summarized in section 4.1. Although it is not expected that any significant restart work scope issues willbe identified during this final review, ifany are identified, they are to be brought to the immediate attention of the ROC (following line management review).
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2.3 Redefined Restart Work Scope The restart work scope may be redefined based on the evaluation process described above. Decisions made by the ROC regarding the restart work scope are documented in meeting minutes and work item status is tracked.
3.0 Restart Work Scope Performance 3.1 Work Scope Performance Following determination of the restart work scope by the ROC, the restart manager is responsible for coordinating the planning, scheduling and completion of the work, including the implementation of programmatic changes. The restart work scope performance process is outlined in attachment E.
4.0 Restart Readiness Assessment The restart readiness assessment is an integrated line management assessment that assists station management in determining the readiness to initiate startup and achieve safe, reliable power operation through the next operating cycle. The restart readiness assessment process is outlined in attachment E. This form of assessment is one element of a comprehensive plant assessment program that is the foundation of our continuous improvement philosophy. Implementation of this action is consistent with the experience and lessons learned of other nuclear utilities. The restart readiness assessment is being implemented at Cook Nuclear Plant based on lessons leained and willbe captured such that this process can be implemented on a routine basis in the future.
The restart readiness assessment for restart willverify the completion of all defined restart work and the affirmation of system, department and restart readiness for startup and power operations. Results of the assessment and affirmation of readiness willbe presented to the ROC by the responsible system engineer, functional area manager and operations shift supervisor. Following acceptance by the ROC, the site vice president will convene an SMRT meeting to review these affirmations and verify compliance with regulatory commitments and any other applicable criteria. The site vice president will recommend start up of the units based on this review, and assurance regarding the readiness of the station to initiate startup and safely, reliably operate through the next operating cycle.
Following is a summiny of the key elements of the piogram.
4.1 System Readiness r
System readiness affirmations by the system engineer are to confirm that plant systems meet functional design requirements, have been suitably tested and are ready to support safe and reliable startup and operation through the next cycle. This affirmation is based on the work completed as described in section 2.2, and is to 11
include a coordinated system walkdown of the system with operations and maintenance personnel on systems defined by the plant engineering manager.
Where necessary, compensatory actions for rescheduled work or other areas of performance risk are to be defined and addressed.
System readiness affirmations are to be presented by the system engineer to the SERB and upon its approval to the ROC for the systems identified in attachment D.
Affiimation of system readiness is documented with the signature of the system engineer and manager. Affirmation of individual system readiness for the remaining plant systems willbe addressed as part of the system engineering line management responsibility and will be one element of the functional area readiness evaluation.
4.2 Functional Area Readiness Functional area readiness by selected functional areas is an aftomation that the department is in an appropriate state of readiness to support startup and safe and reliable power operation through the next cycle. Functional area readiness will:
include items such as:
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(a) adequacy of staffing levels, personnel experience and qualifications to demonstrate compliance with regulatory requirements and commitments; (b) completion of personnel training on normal startup evaluations, power ascension requirements, industry operating experience including extended shutdown and unusual events at similar plants, emergency preparedness, changes in plant configuration, changes in plant operating and emergency procedures, and changes in key administrative procedures and processes; (c) resolution of significant performance deficiencies and reduction of backlogs (coirective action, corrective maintenance etc. ) to manageable levels; and (d) establishment of goals and priorities for the continued improvement of the department including use of critical assessment methods.
Functional Area readiness willbe affirmed to the ROC by the following functional areas:
~ OPcfatlons outage management
~ maliltcnaQcc ~ 11ccnslng plant engineering ~ fuels design engineering plant pmtection
~ production engineering ~ information management chemistry ~ plan't pcIfolinancc assurance radiation protection Affirmation of functional area readiness is documented with the signature of the functional area manager.
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4.3 Programmatic Readiness Programmatic readiness review will confirm that programs are in place to support identification and correction of problems. Programmatic issues identified during the unit shutdown have been evaluated and necessary corrective or preventive actions have been completed. Programs in place at the time of unit start-up will ensure that the plant will be operated in conformance with its design bases and in accordance with the AEP quality assurance program.
A/E programmatic issues potential bypass of 50.59 safety evaluations 50.59 safety evaluation quality corrective action program improvements surveillance program assessment 4.4 Containment Readiness The containment readiness review will focus on the ability of the containment system to meet the intended functional design requirements. The critical points of the review willfocus on the system materiel condition, adequate surveillance testing, and the system configuration control.
5.0 Restart Authorization The restart authorization process is outlined in attachment E.
5.1 Restart Oversight Committee (ROC) Review and Approval The ROC will review and accept the assessment a6irmations in 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. A restart recommendation willbe made to the SMRT based on the results of the functional area assessments. h 52 Senior Manager Review Team (SMRT) Review and Approval Upon review and acceptance of the assessment aQirmations in 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 by the ROC, the site vice president will convene an SMRT meeting to perform an integrated review and approval.
5.3 Executive Vice President Restart Authorization Based on this review the executive vice president nuclear generation will provide the authorization for restart and power ascension.
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6.0 Startup and Power Ascension Startup and power ascension, following the completion of the restart'work will follow a deliberate and controlled approach that ensures operational and personnel safety. The normal startup management team will be augmented with a shift plant manager and shift engineering manager such that issues or concerns are promptly addressed and the status can be accomplished in a safe, controlled manner. The startup and power ascension actions summarized in this section do not change or alter any requirements of the startup procedures defined above.
6.1 Management Oversight and Organizational Support The Cook Nuclear Plant management structure will be supplemented with a shift plant manager and shift engineering manager to compliment the shift maintenance manager during the startup and power ascension phase, The responsibilities of these positions are as follows:
6.1.1 Shift Plant Manager The shift plant manager provides on-shift (24-hour) presence as a direct-representative of the plant manager and is responsible for maintaining an-overall perspective of the startup process. Ifnecessary, the shift plant manager is authorized to request operations to delay the startup, reduce power, or shutdown to make necessary repairs.
6.1.2 Shift Engineering Manager The shift engineering manager provides on-shift {24-hour) presence as a direct representative of the plant engineering manager and is responsible for maintaining an overall perspective of engineering support of the startup process. The shift engineering manager willcontrol on-shift engineering resources as necessary to support scheduled startup testing activities, resolve emergent operability issues, support maintenance and manage necessary reactor engineering test activities.
6.1.3 Shift Maintenance Manager The shift maintenance manager provides on-shift (24-hour) presence as a direct representative of the maintenance manager and is responsible for maintaining an overall perspective of maintenance support of the startup process. The shift maintenance manager willcontrol on-shift maintenance resources as necessary to support scheduled startup testing activities, resolve emergent equipment issues, and support operations.
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0 This organization will be implemented as directed by the plant manager at critical evolutions during startup such as change to mode 4, initial criticality, turbine roll, and parallel to grid. The organization will be disbanded as directed by the plant manager but not before mode 4 to 30% power.
6.2 Operating Proficiency and Experience Review To minimize the potential for performance errors during the plant startup, the following actions willbe taken:
operations personnel willutilize the simulator to practice the startup evolution and ensure understanding and proficiency with applicable startup procedures and special requirements; a review of past Cook Nuclear Plant startup issues relevant industry operating experience willbe performed during the functional area reviews to ensure understanding of past experience and lessons learned; department communication meetings willbe conducted with each plant department to discuss management expectations regarding the startup-and power ascension processes, schedule, and responsibilities. These meetings will be completed prior to initiating the startup evolution.,=
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t Jl ATTACHMENTA SYSTEM ENGINEERING REVIEW BOARD SERB HARTER PURPOSE: Perform a system-based, multi-disciplinary technical review of potential restart issues associated with risk significant plant equipment. This board will ensure consistent application of the restart criteria contained in Attachment C of the Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Plan among system engineers, and ensure that restart decisions reflect the shared concerns of Operations, Maintenance and Engineering. The result of this review will be to define the equipment related work which is needed to ensure a safe and event free startup and achieve a reliable post startup operating cycle.
Director Plant Engineering (Chair)
Mechanical Component Manager Electrical System Manager.
Safety and Analysis Manager I&C Manager Performance Testing Manager Board Secretary Non-Member: Additional attendance by members of Restart Oversight Committee is expected to reinforce expectations and provide oversight for the restart Issue review process.
Alternate chair: Site Engineering Managers Alternate safety and analysis manager: Engineers in the Safety and Analysis Section, subject to acceptance of the SERB chair or alternate chair.
QUORUM: Chair (or alternate), two Onsite Managers, Safety and Analysis Manager (or alternate), and Secretary.
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ACTIONS:
Review all potential restart items identified by System Engineers based on criteria defined in the restart plan; the System Engineer will present the proposed restart items for discussion. A representative of Operations and Maintenance knowledgeable of the system's restart issues will support the system engineer and ensure the perspective of the other production groups is considered. The Operations representative will normally be an SS or a US of the Operations crew responsible for the system, but can be an SS assigned to the Work Control Center.
Designate systems that are required to be presented to the SERB by system engineer, Maintenance and Operations.
The SERB will review all items identified as potential restart issues by the system engineer system readiness review. The system engineer, Operations or Maintenance representatives will also identify other issues.
which are not identified as potential restart issues but may be questioned.
A complete list of open issues on each system will be available during ':
SERB meetings. The SERB will review and question additional items as desired to determine ifthey should be restart issues.
- 5. Ensure a record of all decisions and concerns raised by the SERB review is documented for future review.
- 6. As a result of the review, recommend specific potential restart items for approval by the ROC.
- 7. Review and approve the charter and any revisions needed to support th' restart plan. Disband this board after startup when directed by the Site Vice President.
D. R. Hafer Director of Plant Engineetitig 17
ATTACHMENTB RESTART OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ROC CHARTER PURPOSE: Exercise management oversight and approval of physical and programmatic work scope necessary to ensure a safe and uneventful unit startup, and achieve a reliable operating cycle.
MEMBERS:
Position Primary Alternate Plant Manager, Chair Doug Cooper Bob Gillespie Operations Superintendent Vice Chair Bob Gillespie Guy Tollas Production Engineering Director Ken Baker Alberto Verteramo '.
Plant Engineering Director Don Hafer Mike Finissi Maintenance Superintendent John Boesch Mark Stark Licensing Manager Mark Ackerman Gordon Arent Chemistry Superintendent Dave Morey Bob Claes Radiation Protection Superintendent Doug Noble Paul Holland Training Superintendent Dennis Loope Dennis Willemin Manager 'estart John Stubblefield Dick Strasser Restart Plan Project Phil Gora, Manager'ecretary~
Betty Clark Sandy McClintock
~Indicates non-voting members QUORUM Chairperson or vice chairperson, and three (3) additional voting members, two of which must be primary members. Attendance from Performance Assurance and Business Performance is strongly encouraged to perform an active oversight role.
ACTIONS:
Set and communicate expectations for the organization to evaluate work items against the restart scope criteria.
'nsure screening criteria are consistently applied via the restart oversight committee review, meeting and approval process.
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Some items that meet one or more of the criteria may be deferred until after restart ifthere is special consideration that provides the basis for this decision. Examples may include items that are only a concern during certain seasons, reduced risk of performing the work during a system outage, or implementation of adequate compensatory actions until a long-term solution is defined. A clear basis for deferral of these items is to be provided.
- 3. - Review and approve:
A. Restart action items to be completed prior to startup.
B. Station readiness to initiate until startup and power ascension as determined by the results of the assessment of readiness to start up.
Maintain a record of presentations, discussions, deliberations and basis for decisions and recommendations.
Review charter as necessary to accommodate changing conditions.
Convene as necessary to accomplish this charter prior to and during startup.
Disband after unit startup when directed by the site vice president.
w (ZAN j/7 /9I Site i President Date 19
ATTACHMENTC CRITERIA FOR WORK INCLUDED IN RESTART SCOPE 1'o be included in the plant restart work scope, items must meet the following criteria:
- 1. Level 1 Screening Resolves an immediate industrial or nuclear safety issue. These issues will be mandatory restart items.
- 1. Necessary to address the voluntary shutdown for the A/E inspection and related programmatic issues.
- 2. Necessary to address the confirmatory action letter.
- 3. Required to return an INOPERABLE system, subsystem or component to OPERABLE status.
- 4. Required to resolve an immediate industrial or nuclear safety concern.
- 2. Level 2 Screening Not an immediate industrial or nuclear safety or operability issue. These issues will be considered for addition to the restart item list based on the review and recommendations of plant engineering, operations, and maintenance ifthe action:
- l. Eliminates an existing component failure, deficiency, or condition that could result in operation in, or entry to, an LCO action statement.
- 2. Resolves existing deficiencies or conditions that:
- a. would result in failure or inability to perform a required surveillance test during the current outage or the following operating cycle in accordance with the plant technical specifications;
- b. would increase the risk to operation for safety associated with performing a surveillance; or
- c. would result in the failure to meet a license requirement or a restart commitment to an outside agency.
3: Restores degraded critical components or conditions that could result in a plant transient, power reduction or shutdown.
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- 4. Resolves conditions that have resulted in repetitive safety system or equipment failures.
- 5. Restor es licensing basis deficiencies to conforming conditions (extended programmatic reviews and scheduled corrective actions may be completed post-restart with the proper justification of no safety impact, a satisfactory OPERABILITY determination, and appropriate regulatory communication).
- 6. Corrects equipment with design basis deficiencies; i.e., deficiencies in safety-related or technical specification equipment not in conformance with design basis documents such as the FSAR (extended programmatic reviews and scheduled corrective actions may be completed post-restart with justification of no safety impact, a satisfactory OPERABILITYdetermination and appropriate regulatory communication).
- 7. Corrects deficiencies in configuration management programs, processes, engineering analysis codes, or operating, maintenance, or test procedures that have a reasonable probability of affecting equipment OPERABILITY(documentation deficiencies, which have no safety impact, may be completed post-restart).
- 8. Eliminates conditions that create a potential for personnel radiation exposure, radioactivity release, or efQuent discharge in excess of limits.
- 9. Reduces cumulative deficiencies, backlogs or conditions that, in the aggregate, are evaluated to have significant negative impact on safety, operability or reliable plant operation. (Not applicable to individual work items).
Approved:
Site V'esident 21
ATTACHMENTD SELE TI N F PLANT YSTKM 120 Vac/CRID Inverters Air Recirculation/Hydrogen Skimmer Auxiliary Feedwater 250 Vdc Station Batteries Component Cooling Water Containment Containment Spray Control Air ECCS Accumulators ECCS Charging Modes l, 2, 3/CVCS Kgh-head Injection ECCS RHR ECCS SI Electrical Safety Busses (4000 V/600 V)
Emergency Diesel Generators Essential Service Water Ice Condenser Main Steam Non-essential Service'Water Plant Air Compressors Reactor Coolant System/RCS Pressure Relief Reactor Protection System/Solid-state Protection/ESFAS 22
A, XCHMENTE Restart Process Map (1) Restart Work Scope Determination
- 1. 1 Plant Setetstc 1.3 ROC 1.3 SYS ENO. OPS. W Select Plant Systems Approve Plant Systems Perform System Additional Work Scope Perform Readiness For Review For Review Reviews Required'7 Assessment YS t3) Readiness Assessment 31 YES 1.2 I.s SERB Validate Existing R SER8 Review And Work Scope Approval 1.S ROC Approve Restart Work Scope Additions Approved Restart Scope Adchtions Es SYS ENGR Monitor Work, Address Emergent Perform Work Scope Issues
/F Approved Restart Work Scope (2 )Restart Work Scope Performance g 2.1 lir, IS 2.2 Restatt Qanacer 2.3 AS Orgs
~ ~ s ~ 3 ~ .
, Perform Readiness 'F.
Plan Restart Work Schedule Restart Work Conduct Restart Work Assessment t3 Reanniss Assessment J3 IO 23
XCHMENTE Restart Process Map
{3} Readiness Assessment 3.1 Sra Eng~
Affirm Plant System SER8 Confirma Plant Syatem Ready?
Roadtnoaa Roadtneaa Reatart Work Scope Dotennlnathn 1 Darannna5an 1 a 3a Wnsgon AffirmFuncthnal Area Functhnal Aroaa Ready Roadtnoaa Reatart Work Scope Determtnathn 3.10
'I Darannh arian I.a Complile And Proaent 3'a ORGS Reautta (a jRaaaan AuONrtraacn a 1 Affirm Programmath Programa Ready?
Readlneaa Roatart Work Scopo Dotormlnatlon 1 Daaannna iran 1.4 33 na oRGs AffirmContalnmont Contalnmont Ready?
Roadinea la 24
'.CHMENT E Restart Process Map ATTACHMENTE Restart Process Map (4) Restart Authorization (5) Power Operation 4.1 42 ROC, Pt4SRC 4.S SQRT 44 Bac Vice PseeeCecr 5.1 Perform Final Readiness Perform Final Review Start up and Power Authortze Restart Review Recommend Startup Ascension 25 .
A Revision Block Restart Plan Revisions Revision Description Date Number Page 26: New page. Added Revision Block Page 8 "Authorize Restart": Deleted Executive Vice President Nuclear 4/7/98 Engineering. Added Executive Vice President Nuclear Generation.
Pages 20 and 21: Added reference numbers to restart criteria.
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