ML17333A985

Proposed Tech Specs,Allowing Filling of ECCS Accumulators W/O Declaring ECCS Equipment Inoperable

ML17333A985
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	08/11/1997
From:	INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:
Shared Package
ML17333A984	List: ML17333A983 ML17333A985
References
NUDOCS 9708180222
Download: ML17333A985 (12)

Text

ATTACHMENT 2 TO AEP:NRC: 1265 CURRENT PAGES MARKED-UP TO REFLECT PROPOSED CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 9708i80222 9708ii PDR ADQCK 050003i5 P PDR I

NITIjttti CONOITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.t Two fndependent KCtS subsystem subsystem comprfsed of:

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One OPGNSLE centrifugal chariing peag, One OPERABLE safety fnfectfon c~ One OPERABLE res f dual heat pIFiilval ileat exchahgerq One OPERABLE resfdual heat removal pmp, and

e. An OPERABLE flm path capable of ref'uelfng ~ater storage tank on a takfngsafety suction fran the fQestfon sfqnal transferrfng suction to the containment sump. and durfng the phase of operation. recir'u1atfon A?PLICILITY: BODES 1 e ~ and 3.

ACTION:

ao fifth one ECCS subsystem fnoperable, restore 1

systen .o OPERABLK status Hthfn 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> orthebe inoperable fn sub-

~fthfn the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. HOT $ HVTDStH

b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects Reactor Coolant Systia, a Specfa1 Report shall m6r fnto the be prepatat and sunni tted to tho Coaadssfon pursuant to Specfffcatfon within 90 days descrfbfng the cfrc~astances of the actuation 5.0.g and the total accumu)ated actuation cyc1es to date.

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allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the rerpxfred plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant. systems.

If more than one accumulator is inoperable, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analyses; therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either subsystem operating in con5unction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peek cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during tho accident recovery period.

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COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-la mENDSENT NO. m 18<

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Insert "A" During accumulator fill evolutions, the safety injection pumps do not have to be declared inoperable. Analysis was performed to determine the potential impact of the additional flow through the accumulator fill line if evolution was in progress.

an accident should occur while the It was determined that the only fill accident scenario of concern was the large break LOCA. Under a specific and restricted set of conditions, it would be possible to experience runout of the in-service SI pump. However, the analysis determined that the probability of a large break LOCA occurring during the it fill evolution is not a credible event. Based on this, was determined that it was not necessary to reposition the SI and RHR crosstie valves, or declare ECCS pumps inoperable to perform the fill evolution.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS T c

~ 3S04F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

)

a. One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump,

b. One OPERABLE safety injection p p

c. One OPERABLE residual heat removal heat exchanger,

d. One OPERABLE residual heat removal pump,

e. AnOPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a safety injection signal and transferring

'uction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

f. All safety injection cross-tie valves open.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next,12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b. With a safety injection cross-tie valve closed, restore the cross-tie valve to the open position or reduce the core power level to less than or equal to 3250 MW within one hour. Specification 3.0.4 does not apply.

c ~ Xn the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to '

the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

execu,mu.(a. q ot< g]( <qofufram /lie Sa e -iv~lecdiw g ~briny

~ue +o &e. dec-lqfeK Ind+Pc COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 3/4 5-3 AMENDMENT NO. 167

(Continued) allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full pcwer conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

If more than ona accumulator is inoperable, the plant is in a condition outside tho accident analyses; therefore, LCO 3.0.3 aust be entered Qmuiiately.

'Ihe OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency coro cooling capability will be available in the event of a MCA assuming the loss of ono subsystem through any single failure consideration.

'Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient coro cooling to limit the. peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term coro cooling capability in the recirculation mode dur'ing the accident recovery period.

If a safety injection cross-tie valve is closed, safety injection would be limited to two lines assuming the loss of one safety injection subsystem through a single failure consideration. The resulting lowered flow requires a do'crease in THER.'1AL POKER to limit the peak clad temperature within acceptable limits in rhe event, of a postulated small break LOCh.

t gsggz "P COOK NUCLEAR FlhNT - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-la ANENDNENT NO. PP, N7 169,

Insert "A" During accumulator fill evolutions, the safety injection pumps do not have to be declared inoperable. Analysis was performed to determine the potential impact of the additional flow through the accumulator fill line if evolution was in progress.

an accident should occur while the It was determined that the only fill accident scenario of concern was the large break LOCA. Under a specific and restricted set of conditions, it would be possible to experience runout of the in-service SI pump. However, the analysis determined that the probability of a large break LOCA occurring during the it fill evolution is not a credible event. Based on this, was determined that it was not necessary to reposition the SI and RHR crosstie valves, or declare ECCS pumps inoperable to perform the fill evolution.

ATTACHMENT 3 TO AEP:NRC: 1265 PROPOSED CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

3/4 LIMITINGCONDITIONS I OR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS T v > 350 F LIMITINGCONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

a. One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump,

b. One OPERABLE safety injection pump*,

c. One OPERABLE residual heat removal heat exchanger, One OPERABLE residual heat removal pump, and An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a safety injection signal and transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into thc Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall bc prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of thc actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

During accumulator fill evolutions, the safety injection pumps do not have to be declared inoperable.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 1 Page 3/4 5-3 AMENDMENT80,

O.

3/4 BASES 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS Continued allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the retluircd plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Ifmore than one accumulator is inoperable, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analyses; therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITYof two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emcrgcncy core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming thc loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit thc peak cladding temperatures within acceptable i!mits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during thc accident recovery period.

During accumulator fillevolutions, the safety injection pumps do not have to be declared inoperable. Analysis was performed to determine the potential impact of the additional flow through the accumulator fill line if an accident should occur while the fill evolution was in progress. It was determined that the only accident scenario of concern was the large brcak LOCA. Under a specific and restricted sct of conditions, it would be possible to experience runout of the in-service SI pump. However, the analysis dctermincd that the probability of a large break LOCA occurring during the fillevolution is not a credible event. Based on this, it was determined that it was not necessary to reposition the SI and RHR crosstie valves, or declare ECCS pumps inoperable to perform the fill evolution.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT I Page 8 3/4 5-la AMENDMENT$3, 484,

3/4 LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS T v R 350 F LIMITINGCONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump,

b. One OPERABLE safety injection pump*,

One OPERABLE residual heat removal heat exchanger, One OPERABLE residual heat removal pump, An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a safety injection signal and transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

All safety injection cross-tie valves open.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With one ECCS subsystem inoperablc, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

With a safety injection cross-tic valve closed, restore the cross-tie valve to the open position or reduce the core power level to less than or equal to 3250 MW within one hour. Specification 3.0.4 does not apply.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prcparcd and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

During accumulator fill evolutions, the safety injection pumps do not have to be declared inoperable.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT2 Page 3/4 5-3 AMENDMENT ~,

3/4 BASES 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS Continued allowed completion times arc reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Ifmore than one accumulator is inoperable, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analyses; therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITYof two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be availablc in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

Ifa safety injection cross-tie valve is closed, safety injection would be limited to two lines assuming the loss of one safety injection subsystem through a single failure consideration. The resulting lowered flow requires a decrease in THERMALPOWER to limit the peak clad temperature within acceptable limits in the event of a postulated small break LOCA.

During accumulator fillevolutions, thc safety injection pumps do not have to be declared inoperable. Analysis was performed to determine the potential impact of the additional flow through the accumulator fill line if an accident should occur while the fill evolution was in progress. It was determined that the only accident scenario of concern was the large break LOCA. Under a specific and restricted set of conditions, it would be possible to experience runout of the in-service SI pump. However, the analysis determined that the probability of a large break LOCA occurring during the fillevolution is not a credible event. Based on this, it was determined that it was not necessary to reposition the SI and RHR crosstie valves, or declare ECCS pumps inoperablc to perform the fill evolution.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT2 Page B 3/4 5-la AMENDMENT%, 447, 449,