ML17335A278

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Proposed Tech Specs Sections 3.3.3.8 & 3.3.3.6,placing Tighter Restrictions on Amount of Time RWST Water Level Instrumentation Can Be Out of Svc Before Compensatory Actions Are Required
ML17335A278
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 10/08/1998
From:
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:
Shared Package
ML17335A277 List:
References
NUDOCS 9810140060
Download: ML17335A278 (12)


Text

ATTACHMENT 2 TO AEP:NRC:1284 CURRENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS MARKED UP TO REFLECT PROPOSED CHANGES

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INSTRUMENTATION POST-ACCIDENT INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.8 The post-accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-11 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a.

b.p'..

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With the number of OPERABLE post-a ident monitoring channels less than required by Table 3.3-11,, either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days, or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.'he provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3:3.8-Each post-accident monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies s~awn in Table 4.3-7.

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COOK NUCLEAR PIANT - UNIT 1 3/4 3-54 AMENDMENT NO.)g,gP),]4/

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3/4 BASES 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3 4 3, 5 REM TE S WN INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITYofthe remote shutdown instriunentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT SI'ANDBYof the facility from locations outside of the control room.

This capability is reqiiired in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criteria 19 of 10 CFR 50.

3/4 3..5.1 APPENDIX R REM TE WN IN UME ATI N The OPERABILITYof the Appendix R remote shutdown instrumentation ensures that suIIicient instrumentation is available to permit shutdown ofthe facilityto COLD SHUTDOWNconditions at the local shutdown indication (LSI) panel.

In the event ofa fire, normal power to the LSI panels may be lost. As a result, capability to repair the LSI panels from Unit 2 has been provided.

If the alternate power supply is not available, fire watches will be established in those fire areas where loss of normal power to the LSI panels could occur-in the event of fire. This will consist of either establishing continuous fire watches or verifying OPERABILITY of fire detectors per Specification 4.3.3.7 and establishing hourly fire watches.

The details of how these fire watches are to be implemetited are included in a plant procedure.

ATI N

'Hm OPERABILITYofthe post-accident instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables during and followingan accident.

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COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT1 Page B 3/4 34 AMENDMENTV4, 468, 486, 208

INSTRUMENTATIOH POST-ACCIOENT INSTRUMENTATION LIHITING COHO ITIOH FOR'PERATION 3.3.3.6 The post-accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown'in Table 3.3-10 sha11 be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MOOES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

pk. 4.

s) e.

Ntth the number af OPERA8L8 past a -afdent manitaring ahsnne'Is less than required by Table 3.3-1, either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days, or be in HOT SHUTOOt'N within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

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b.

P;c.

The provisions of'pecification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLA'iCE REOUIREHENTS 4.3.3.6 Each post-accident monitoring:nstrumentation.channel shall be denonstrated OPERABLE by oerformance of the CHA-NEL ~-:i'CY and CHAt(HEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-10.

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0. C. COK - UNIT 2 3(4 3-45

3/4 BASES 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

/4.

3.6 POST-A IDENT INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITYofthe post-accident instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables durmg and followmg an accident 3/4 3 EXPLOSIVE GA MONIT RIN INSTR NTATI N This instrumentation includes provisions for monitoring the concentrations of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the Waste Gas Holdup System.

The OPERABILITY and use of this instrutnentation is consistent with the rettuirements ofGeneral Design Criteria specified in Section 11.3 ofthe Final Safety Analysis Report for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.

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COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT2 Page B 3/4 3-3 AMENDMENT64, 446, 440, XV', QS, 192

ATTACHMENT 3 TO AEP:NRC:1284 PROPOSED REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES

3/4 LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION POST-ACCIDENT INSTRUMENTATION LIMITINGCONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.8 The post-accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-11 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, a!id 3.

ACTION:

With the number of OPERABLE post-accident monitoring channels less than required by Table 3.3-11 (except item 8), either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days, or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b.

With the number of OPERABLE post-accident monitoring channels one less than required by Table 3.3-11, item 8, Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level:

1.

Either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and Within one hour, by-pass the Residual Heat Removal Pump trip function from the Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level for the pump associated with the out-of-service instrument.

c.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCERE UIREMENTS 4.3.3.8 Each post-accident monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATIONoperations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-7.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT1 Page 3/4 3-54 AMENDMENT4Q, ~, 444,

3/4 BASES 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITYof the remote shutdown instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT STANDBYof the facility from locations outside of the control room.

This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criteria 19 of 10 CFR 50.

3/4.3.3.5.1 APPENDIX R REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITYof the Appendix R remote shutdown instrumentation ensures that sufficient instrumentation is available to permit shutdown ofthe facilityto COLD SHUTDOWN conditions at the local shutdown indication (LSI) panel.

In the event of a fire, normal power to the LSI panels may be lost. As a result, capability to repair the LSI panels from Unit 2 has been provided.

If the alternate power supply is not available, fire watches will be established in those fire areas where loss of normal power to the LSI panels could occur in the event of fire. This will consist of either establishing continuous fire watches or verifying OPERABILITY of fire detectors per Specification 4.3.3.7 and establishing hourly fire watches.

The details of how these fire watches are to be implemented are included in a plant procedure.

3/4.3.3.8 POST-ACCIDENT INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITYofthe post-accident instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables during and following an accident.

The allowable out-of-service time for the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) level channels is required to provide the overall reliability to support the manual transfer from injection to recirculation following an accident.

The bypassing of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump trip from the RWST low level, with a level channel out-of-service, ensures that RHR pump willbe available to meet its Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Function of injecting water into the core.

The loss of the RHR pump protection willbe mitigated by the operator's action to switch from injection to recirculation using the approved Emergency Operating Procedure which causes the RHR pump suction to be realigned well before the RHR pump trip setpoint.

The associated RHR pump can be considered OPERABLE with the RWST level channel out-of-service once the trip function has been by-passed since the pump would be available to fulfillits ESF function.

COOK NUCLEARPLANT-UNIT1 Page B 3/4 3-6 AMENDMENTV4, 4$8, 486, AS,

3/4 LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION POST-A'CCIDENT INSTRUMENTATION LIMITINGCONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.6 The post-accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With the number of OPERABLE post-accident monitoring channels less than required by Table 3.3-10 (except item 8), either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within30 days, or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b.

With the number of OPERABLE post-accident monitoring channels one less than required by Table 3.3-10, item 8, Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level:

1.

Either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and Within one hour, by-pass the Residual Heat Removal Pump trip function from the Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level for the pump associated with the out-of-service instrument.

c.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCERE UIREMENTS 4.3.3.6 Each post-accident monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATIONoperations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-10.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT2 Page 3/4 345

3/4 BASES 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3.6 POS'F-ACCIDENT INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITYofthe post-accident instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables during and following an accident.

The allowable out-of-service time for the Refueling'Water Storage Tank (RWST) level channels is required to provide the overall reliability to support the manual transfer from injection to recirculation following an accident.

The bypassing of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump trip from the RWST low level, with a level channel out-of-service, ensures that the RHR pump willbe available to meet it Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Function of injecting water into the core.

The loss of RHR pump protection willbe mitigated by the operator's action to switch from injection to recirculation using the approved Emergency Operating Procedure which causes the RHR pump suction to be realigned well before the RHR pump trip setpoint.

The associated RHR pump can be considered OPERABLE with the RWST level channel out-of-service once the trip function has been by-passed since the pump would be available to fulfillits ESF function.

3/4.3.3.7 Deleted.

3/4.3.3.9 EXPLOSIVE GAS MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION This instrumentation includes provisions for monitoring the concentrations ofpotentially explosive gas mixtures in the Waste Gas Holdup System.

The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements ofGeneral Design Criteria specified in Section 11.3 ofthe Final Safety Analysis Report for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT2 Page B 3/4 3-3 AMENDMENTA., 44$, 440, 478, 48$,

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