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{{IR-Nav| site = 05000528 | year = 2002 | report number = 007 | url = https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/reports/palo_2002007.pdf }}
{{Adams
| number = ML022490282
| issue date = 09/04/2002
| title = IR 05000528-02-007, IR 05000529-02-007, IR 05000530-02-007, on 07/29/2002 - 08/16/2002, Arizona Public Service Company, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Regional Team Report
| author name = Marschall C
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DRS
| addressee name = Overbeck G
| addressee affiliation = Arizona Public Service Co
| docket = 05000528, 05000529, 05000530
| license number = NPF-041, NPF-051, NPF-074
| contact person =
| document report number = IR-02-007
| document type = Inspection Report, Letter
| page count = 20
}}
 
{{IR-Nav| site = 05000528 | year = 2002 | report number = 007 }}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:ber 4, 2002
 
==SUBJECT:==
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-528/02-07; 50-529/02-07; 50-530/02-07
 
==Dear Mr. Overbeck:==
On August 16, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on August 16, 2002, with you and other members of your staff.
 
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
 
Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
 
On the basis of the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
 
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
 
Sincerely,
/RA/
Charles S. Marschall, Chief Engineering and Maintenance Branch Division of Reactor Safety
 
Arizona Public Service Company -2-Dockets: 50-528; 50-529; 50-530 Licenses: NPF-41; NPF-51; NPF-74 cc w/enclosure:
Steve Olea Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Douglas K. Porter, Senior Counsel Southern California Edison Company Law Department, Generation Resources P.O. Box 800 Rosemead, California 91770 Chairman Maricopa County Board of Supervisors 301 W. Jefferson, 10th Floor Phoenix, Arizona 85003 Aubrey V. Godwin, Director Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency 4814 South 40 Street Phoenix, Arizona 85040 Craig K. Seaman, Director Regulatory Affairs/Nuclear Assurance Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Mail Station 7636 P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 Hector R. Puente Vice President, Power Generation El Paso Electric Company 2702 N. Third Street, Suite 3040 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 Terry Bassham, Esq.
 
General Counsel El Paso Electric Company 123 W. Mills El Paso, Texas 79901
 
Arizona Public Service Company -3-John W. Schumann Los Angeles Department of Water & Power Southern California Public Power Authority P.O. Box 51111, Room 1255-C Los Angeles, California 90051-0100 David Summers Public Service Company of New Mexico 414 Silver SW, #1206 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102 Jarlath Curran Southern California Edison Company 5000 Pacific Coast Hwy. Bldg. DIN San Clemente, California 92672 Robert Henry Salt River Project 6504 East Thomas Road Scottsdale, Arizona 85251 Brian Almon Public Utility Commission William B. Travis Building P.O. Box 13326 1701 North Congress Avenue Austin, Texas 78701-3326
 
Arizona Public Service Company  -4-Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (EWM)
DRP Director (KEB)
DRS Director (EEC)
Resident Inspector (GXW2)
Branch Chief, DRP/D (LJS)
Project Engineer, DRP/D (ELC1)
Staff Chief, DRP/TSS (PHH)
RITS Coordinator (NBH)
Scott Morris (SAM1)
PV Site Secretary (TLB4)
SRI:EMB RI:EMB SRI:EMB SRI:EMB C:EMB C:DRPD C:EMB MFRunyan/lmb GMiller PAGoldberg WMMcNeill CSMarschall LJSmith CSMarschall
/RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
8/27/02 9/03/02 9/03/02 08/27/02 09/03/02 09/04/02 09/04/02 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY  T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
 
ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 
==REGION IV==
Dockets: 50-528; 50-529; 50-530 Licenses: NPF-41; NPF-51; NPF-74 Report No: 50-528/02-07; 50-529/02-07; 50-530/02-07 Licensee: Arizona Public Service Company Facility: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Location: 5951 S. Wintersburg Road Tonopah, Arizona Dates: July 29 through August 16, 2002 Team Leader: M. F. Runyan, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Maintenance Branch Inspectors: P.A. Goldberg, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Maintenance Branch W. M. McNeill, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Maintenance Branch G. Miller, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Maintenance Branch Accompanying Personnel: J. Chiloyan, Beckman and Associates J. Diecker, Engineering Associate J. Wylam, Engineering Associate S. Rutenkroger, Engineering Associate Approved By: Charles S. Marschall, Chief Engineering Maintenance Branch Division of Reactor Safety
 
    -2-SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000528-02-07, IR 05000529-02-07, IR 05000530-02-07, Arizona Public Service Company; 7/29/02 - 8/16/02, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station; Units 1, 2, and 3, regional team report.
 
The inspection was conducted by four regional inspectors and one contractor. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
 
No findings of significance were identified.
 
Report Details 1 REACTOR SAFETY Introduction A team inspection was performed to verify that facility safety system design and performance capability were adequate and that the initial design and subsequent modifications have preserved the current design basis of the systems selected for review. The scope of the review also included any necessary nonsafety-related structures, systems, and components that provided functions to support safety functions. The inspection effort also reviewed the licensees programs and methods for monitoring the capability of the selected systems to perform the current design basis functions. This inspection verified aspects of the initiating events, mitigating systems, and barrier cornerstones.
 
The probabilistic risk assessment model for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station is based on the capability of the as-built safety systems to perform their intended safety functions successfully. The area and scope of the inspection were determined by reviewing the licensees probabilistic risk analysis models to identify the most risk significant systems, structures, and components according to their ranking and potential contribution to dominant accident sequences and/or initiators. Deterministic effort was also applied in the selection process by considering recent inspection history, recent problem area history, and all modifications developed and implemented.
 
The team reviewed in detail the 4.16 kV electrical distribution system, the high pressure safety injection system, the low pressure safety injection system, the safety injection tanks, and the charging system. The primary review prompted parallel review and examination of support systems, such as, electrical power, instrumentation, room cooling systems, and related structures and components.
 
The objective of this inspection was to assess the adequacy of calculations, analyses, engineering processes, and engineering and operating practices that were used to support the performance of the safety systems selected for review and the necessary support systems during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. Acceptance criteria utilized by the NRC inspection team included NRC regulations, the technical specifications, applicable sections of the Final Safety Analysis Report, applicable industry codes and standards, as well as, industry initiatives implemented by the licensees programs.
 
1R21 Safety System Design and Performance Capability (71111.21)
.1 System Requirements a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed the following attributes of the selected systems: (1) process medium (water, steam, and air), (2) energy sources, (3) control systems, and (4)
equipment protection. The team verified that procedural instructions to operators were consistent with operator actions required to meet, prevent, and/or mitigate design basis accidents. The review also considered requirements and commitments identified in the
 
    -2-Final Safety Analysis Report, technical specifications, design basis documents, and plant drawings.
 
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
 
.2 System Condition and Capability a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed the periodic testing procedures for the selected systems to verify that the design requirements were adequately demonstrated. The team reviewed the environmental qualification of a sample of system components to verify the capability to operate under design environmental conditions and the assumed operating parameters including: voltage, speed, power, flow, temperature, and pressure.
 
The team also reviewed the systems operations by conducting system walkdowns; reviewing normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures; and reviewing the Final Safety Analysis Report, technical specifications, design calculations, drawings, and procedures.
 
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
 
.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed a sample of problems identified by the licensee in the corrective action program to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions related to design issues. The sample included open and closed condition reports for the past 3 years that identified issues affecting the selected systems.
 
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
 
.4 System Walkdowns a. Inspection Scope The team performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the selected systems. The walkdowns focused on the installation and configuration of power supplies, piping, components, and instruments. During the walkdowns, the team assessed:
* The placement of protective barriers and systems,
 
    -3-
* The susceptibility to flooding, fire, or environmental conditions,
* The physical separation of trains and the provisions for seismic concerns,
* Accessibility and lighting for any required local operator action,
* The materiel condition and preservation of systems and equipment, and
* The conformance of the currently-installed system configurations to the design and licensing bases.
 
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
 
.5 Design Review a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed the current as-built instrument and control, electrical, and mechanical design of the selected systems. These reviews included a review of design assumptions, calculations, required system thermal-hydraulic performance, electrical power system performance, protective relaying, and instrument setpoints and uncertainties. The team also performed a single-failure review of individual components to determine the effects of such failures on the capability of the systems to perform their design safety functions.
 
The team reviewed calculations, drawings, specifications, vendor documents, Final Safety Analysis Report, technical specifications, emergency operating procedures, and temporary and permanent modifications.
 
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
 
.6 Safety System Inspection and Testing a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed the program and procedures for testing and inspecting components in the selected systems. The review included the results of surveillance tests required by the technical specifications.
 
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
 
-4-
.4 OTHER ACTIVITIES (ZA)
4OA3 Event Followup (71153)
.1 (Closed) LER 05000529/2001-002-00: Logic Board and Pin Connector Failure Causes Three of Four Main Steam Isolation Valves to Close.
 
This report discussed an event in which a logic board failure in the main steam and feedwater isolation system cabinet caused three main steam isolation valves to shut, resulting in a reactor trip from approximately 100 percent power. The valves closed as a result of a fire in the main steam and feedwater isolation system cabinet. Additional details of this event are discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-528, -529, -530/02-05.
 
The team reviewed the apparent cause of the event and the corrective actions detailed in Condition Report/Dispositions Request 2405660 and interviewed licensee engineers. No findings of significance were identified. This licensee event report is closed.
 
4OA6 Management Meetings Exit Meeting Summary The team leader presented the inspection results to Mr. G. Overbeck, Senior Vice President, Nuclear, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on August 16, 2002.
 
At the conclusion of this meeting, the team leader asked the licensees management whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
 
Some proprietary information was identified, but it was not discussed in the report.
 
ATTACHMENT Licensee Contacts :
R. Baker, I&C Design Engineer J. Brown, Senior Engineer, Mechanical Design M. Brutcher, Section Leader, Mechanical Design K. Clifton, Safety Injection System Engineer D. Fan, Department Leader, Design Engineering D. Hautala, Senior Engineer, Regulatory Affairs J. Hughey, System Engineer A. Krainik, Emergency Services Department S. Kwan, System Engineer D. Marks, Licensing Manager M. McEwan,- Maintenance Engineer H. Mortazavi, Design Engineer P. Murphey, Senior Engineer, Mechanical Design G. Overbeck, Senior Vice President, Nuclear D. Vogt, Lead Shift Technical Advisor NRC:
G. Warnick, Resident Inspector ITEMS CLOSED 05000529/2001-002-00 LER Logic Board and Pin Connector Failure Causes Three of Four Main Steam Isolation Valves to Close. (Section 4OA3)
 
  -2-Documents Reviewed:
CRDRs 35155  2340953 2404768 2440138 2493353 111467 (CRAI 113067) 2341398 2405660 2441255 2507393 117201  2345337 2406617 2448068 2508389 117493  2350799 2407845 2453561 2516093 118495  2359345 2415676 2459383 2516816 3-8-0336  2369750 2417254 2468293 2522080 3-9-0008  2381185 2427545 2470853 2529219 9-4-0096  2384134 2435085 2473816 2544757 971263  2390219 2436748 2481133 2546352 2303536  2392627 2437366 2490693 2548138 2307016  2404064 2438736 2492855 2548519 Procedures EQDF EQ-PM, Equipment Qualification Program Manual, Revision 12 01-E-ZZ1-004, Electrical Protection Data Base, Revision 4 12DP-0MC46, Receipt Inspection, Revision 1 12DP-0MC48, Quality Receiving Checklist Development, Revision 1 32ST-9ZZ03, Surveillance Test Procedure for the class 4160 Bus Undervoltage Protective Relays, Revision 13 32MT-9ZZ06, Testing and Calibration of the12IFC53A & 53Band the 77A & 77B Time overcurrent Relays, Revision 4 32MT-9ZZ74, Molded Case Circuit Breaker Test, Revision 19 40DP-0OP02, Relay Resetting, Revision 7 40OP-9CH01, CVCS Normal Operations, Revision 18 40OP-9PG01, 480V Class 1E Switchgear, Revision 10 40EP-9EO01, Standard Post Trip Actions, Revision 6 40EP-9EO02, Reactor Trip, Revision 3 40OP-9CH03, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Injection System, Revision 13 40EP-9EO03, Loss of Coolant Accident, Revision 11 40EP-9EO04, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Revision 13
 
  -3-40EP-9EO05, Excess Steam Demand, Revision 10 40EP-9EO06, Loss of All Feedwater, Revision 7 40ST-9SI07, High Pressure Safety Injection System Alignment Verification, Revision 6 40EP-9EO07, Loss of Offsite Power/Loss of Forced Circulation, Revision 8 40EP-9EO08, Blackout, Revision 3 40EP-9EO09, Functional Recovery Procedure, Revision 12 40EP-9EO10, Standard Appendices, Revision 24 40EP-9EO11, Lower Mode Functional Recovery, Revision 5 40AO-9ZZ12, Degraded Electrical Power, Revision 12 40DP-9OP19, Locked Valve, Breaker, and Component Tracking, Revision 62 40DP-9OP26, Operability Determination, Revision 11 73DP-0XI03, Check Valve Predictive Maintenance and Monitoring Program, Revision 5 73DP-0AP04 Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment Program Technical Specification 5.5.2; Revision 1 73ST-9SI03, Leak Test of SI/RCS Pressure Isolation Valves; Revision 22 73ST-9XI03, SI Train A Valves - InService Test, Revision 12 73ST-9CH04, Boron Injection Flow Test, Revision 0 73ST-9SI05, Leak Test of HPSI/LPSI Containment Isolation Check Valves; Revision 9.
 
73ST-9CH06, Charging Pumps-Inservice Test, Revision 12 73ST-9XI06, CH and SS Valves - Inservice Test, Revision 13 73ST-9XI09, Train A LPSI and HP Check Valves - InService Test; Revision 5 73ST-9SI11, Low Pressure Safety Injection Pumps Miniflow - Inservice Test, Revision 13 73ST-9SI14, LPSI Pumps Full Flow - InService Test, Revision 10 73DP-9ZZ14, Surveillance Testing, Revision 4 73ST-9XI22, CH Valves - Inservice Test, Revision 10 73ST-9XI26, NCE-V118, CHN-V835, and SI Train A Check Valves - Inservice Test, Revision 2
 
    -4-73ST-9XI27, CHA-HV-205, CHB-HV-203, and SI B Train Check Valves - Inservice Test, Revision 2 73ST-9XI29 LPSI/CS Suction and RWT Outlet Check Valves - Inservice Test, Revision 9 73ST-9XI33, HPSI Pump and Check Valve Full Flow Test, Revision 23 87DP-0MC09, Item Procurement Specification (IPS) Requirements, Revision 29 01-E-ZZ1-0003, Electrical Equipment Data Base, Revision 15 73ST-9X130, SIT Check Valve Exercise Test, Revision 9 Calculations 03-EC-PB-200, AC Overcurrent Protection Class 1E, Revision 8 01-EC-MA-0221, AC Distribution, Revision 7 13-EC-PB-204, AC Equipment Protection (4.16KV and 480V) Class 1E, Revision 3 13-EC-PE-120, Diesel Generator Neutral Grounding, Revision 0 13-MC-SI-502 ESF Pump Suction Lines Train B, Revision 11.
 
13-MC-SI-312, Evaluation of Cavitation Damage During HPSI Pump Full Flow Surveillance Testing, Revision 0 13-MC-SI-307, Evaluation of Safety Injection System Pump Interaction per NRC I&E Bulletin 88-04, Revision 0 13-MC-SI-316, HPSI Flow with Hot Leg Valve Fully Open, Revision 0 13-MC-SI-014, K Factor of Safety Injection Tank Discharge Piping, Revision 1 13-NC-ZY-205 Large Break LOCA, Radiological Consequences; Revision 7 13-EC-PB-0203, Motor Starting Times, Revision 3 13-EC-NA-221, Non-Class 1E 13.8KV Switchgear Protection, Revision 1 13-JC-CH-0209 Refueling Water Tank Level Instrument (Chx-L-203x, x = A,B,C,D) Setpoint and Uncertainty Calculation, Revision 5 13-MC-SI-210, Safety Injection Tank Pressure for SIT Check Valve Test, Revision 2 13-MC-SI-503 Safety Injection System Train A, Revision 15 TR-9609 Seal Piping Analysis of Low Pressure Safety Injection Pumps, Revision 3
 
  -5-EAS-TR-7701-ASR, Structural Integrity and Operability Analysis of High Pressure Safety Injection Pump, Revision 3 13-NC-ZC-238, System Design LOCA Analysis, Revision 0 13-EC-PB-0101, Undervoltage Protection, Revision 6 13-NC-CH-A001, Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray System Reliability Evaluation, Revision 0 13-MC-CH-0311, Chemical and Volume Control System (CH) Design Pressure and Temperature Calculation, Revision 0 with Engineering Document Change 98-00581 13-NC-CH-0101, CVCS (CH) Activities at Design and Normal Conditions, Revision 5 01-MC-CH-0501, CVCS - Charging Line, Revision 5 01-MC-CH-0535, CVCS - RCP Seal Injection, Revision 4 13-MA-CH-0951, CVCS System - Configuration Calculations, Revision 0 13-MC-CH-0202, Evaluation of Charging Pump NPSHA During Parallel Suction Alignment of the BAM Pumps from the RWT, Revision 0 13-MC -HA-052, Cooling Load Calculation for ESF Pump Rooms, Revision 5 13-EC-CH-A002, Qualified Life Reassessment of Charging Pump Plunger Packing Under Program PE-403, Revision 0 Drawings:
01-E-PBA-001, Single Line Diagram 4.16KV Class 1E Power System Switchgear 1E-PBA-SO3, Revision 4 01-E-PBA-002, Single Line Diagram 4.16KV Class 1E-Power System Switchgear 1E-PBB-SO4, Revision 7 01-E-PGA-001, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Power System Load Center 1E-PGA-31, Revision 6 01-E-PGA-002, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Power System Load Center 1E-PGB-L32, Revision 7 01-E-PGA-003, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Power System Load Center 1E-PGA-L33, Revision 6 01-E-PGB-004, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Power System Load Center 1E-PGB-L34, Revision 7 01-E-PGA-005, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Power System Load Center 1E-PGA-L35, Revision 2
 
  -6-01-E-PGA-006, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Power System Load Center 1E-PGB-L36, Revision 5 01-E-PHA-005, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Power System Motor Control Center 1E-PHA-M35, Revision 13 01-E-NHA-072, Single Line Diagram 480V Class non-1E Power System Motor Control Center 1E-NHN-M72, Revision 8 01-E-PBB-004, Elementary Diagram 4.16KV Class 1E Power System Switchgear 1E-PBA-SO3 and 1E-PBB-SO4 Bus Potential Transformers, Revision 10 01-E-PBB-001, Elementary Diagram 4.16KV Class 1E Power System Switchgear 1E-PBA-S03 and 1E-PBB-SO4 4.16KV Normal Supply Breaker, Revision 5 01-E-PBB-002, Elementary Diagram 4.16KV Class 1E Power System Switchgear 1E-PBA-SO3 and 1E-PBB-SO4 4.16KV Alternate Supply Breakers, Revision 6 01-E-PEB001, Elementary Diagram Stand-By Generation System Diesel Generators 1E-PEA-001 and 1E-PEB-002 4.16KV Breaker, Revision 14 G5-253-200, Control Schematic (Diesel Generators) En-Tronic Controls Cooper Energy Services, Revision 13 01-E-SIB-001, Elementary Diagram Safety Injection & Shutdown CLG System HP Safety Injection Pump 1M-SIB-P02, Revision 6 01-E-SIB-002, Elementary Diagram Safety Injection & Shutdown CLG System LP Safety Injection Pump IM-SIB-PS01, Revision 6 01-E-PGB-001, Elementary Diagram 480V Class 1E Power Sys Load-Center 1E-PGA-L31, 1E-PGB-L32 4.16KV Supply Breaker, Revision 5 01-E-PGB-006, Elementary Diagram 480V Class 1E Power Sys Load-Center 1E-PGA-L31 380V Main Feeder Breaker, Revision 5 0143D483, Indoor M26 Metalclad Switchgear (4.16KV Vendor Equipment arrangement drawings), Revision 7 Work Packages/Design Mods EDC 2001-00476 EDC 2001-00477 EWO (modification) 217593 WM 2393708 WM 2406650 WM 2492834 WO 241003 (ENG DM 13)
WO 903397 ENG DM 2446825
 
  -7-Work Orders 1055950 2306013 2327025 2350082 2374614 219575 2306022 2330056 2350366 2381078 2306009 2318369 233045 2374610 50.59 Evaluations 95-00066 97-00129 01-00055 SI System Health Reports 3Q00 4Q00 1Q01 2Q01 3Q01 4Q01 1Q02 2Q02 Operability Determination 2503356 Environmental Equipment Qualification Data Files EEQ-A610-001, System Component Evaluation Worksheet, Revision 11 EEQ-A610-001, EQ Maintenance Data Sheet, Revision 10 EEQ-L200-003, System Component Evaluation Worksheet, Revision 7 EEQ-L200-003, EQ Maintenance Data Sheet, Revision 7 EEQ-T020-001, System Component Evaluation Worksheet, Revision 8 EEQ-T020-001, EQ Maintenance Data Sheet, Revision 8 EEQ-T020-002, System Component Evaluation Worksheet, Revision 5 EEQ-T020-002, EQ Maintenance Data Sheet, Revision 5 EEQ-T020-003, System Component Evaluation Worksheet, Revision 8 EEQ-T020-003, EQ Maintenance Data Sheet, Revision 8 EEQ-V030-001, System Component Evaluation Worksheet, Revision 4 EEQ-V030-001, EQ Maintenance Data Sheet, Revision 3 Miscellaneous Documents 13-NS-B072, At-power PRA System Study for the Chemical and Volume Control System, Revision 0 NRC Letter March 23, 1999, Charging System Commitments for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (Tac. Nos. M91817, M911818, and M91819)
 
    -8-Component Performance Tracking and Trending Data Base Operations Training Department Simulator Scenario, NLR02S0204, S-047N 4 Loss of Class 1E 480 V Load Center, Revision 00 Item Procurement Specification IPS-G080 Material Logistics Information System Inspection Plan, 44410562 Material Logistics Information System Inspection Plan, 44410563 APS Purchase Order 500237616 with Change Notice A Receiving records for Purchase Order 500237616 VTM-I075-0001, Ingersoll-Dresser Pump Co. instruction manual for HPSI pump EAS-TR-7701-ASR, Structural Integrity & Operability Analysis of High Pressure Safety Injection Pump, Revision 3 VTD-I075-0007, Ingersoll-Rand Installation, Operation and Maintenance Instructions for 4X11 CA-8 High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps SKF Machine Reliability Assessment, Phase I, 3B HPSI Pump, dated May 3, 2002 Vibration Analysis Report for HPSI Pump 3MSIBP02 HPSI PUMP condition Overview dated July 31, 2002 13-EM-009, Appendix 5B Engineering Data for 13.8KV and 4.16KV Metal-Clad Switchgear, Revision 4 PB STM/Vol.28A, System Training Manual class 1E 4.16KV Power System (PB), Revision 2 PVNGS Design Basis, Class 1E 4.16KV Power System, Revision 7 PVNGS Design Basis, Class 1E 480V AC Power Switchgear System, Revision 6
}}

Latest revision as of 09:06, 26 March 2020

IR 05000528-02-007, IR 05000529-02-007, IR 05000530-02-007, on 07/29/2002 - 08/16/2002, Arizona Public Service Company, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Regional Team Report
ML022490282
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde  Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 09/04/2002
From: Marschall C
Division of Reactor Safety IV
To: Overbeck G
Arizona Public Service Co
References
IR-02-007
Download: ML022490282 (20)


Text

ber 4, 2002

SUBJECT:

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-528/02-07; 50-529/02-07; 50-530/02-07

Dear Mr. Overbeck:

On August 16, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on August 16, 2002, with you and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

On the basis of the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Charles S. Marschall, Chief Engineering and Maintenance Branch Division of Reactor Safety

Arizona Public Service Company -2-Dockets: 50-528; 50-529; 50-530 Licenses: NPF-41; NPF-51; NPF-74 cc w/enclosure:

Steve Olea Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Douglas K. Porter, Senior Counsel Southern California Edison Company Law Department, Generation Resources P.O. Box 800 Rosemead, California 91770 Chairman Maricopa County Board of Supervisors 301 W. Jefferson, 10th Floor Phoenix, Arizona 85003 Aubrey V. Godwin, Director Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency 4814 South 40 Street Phoenix, Arizona 85040 Craig K. Seaman, Director Regulatory Affairs/Nuclear Assurance Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Mail Station 7636 P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 Hector R. Puente Vice President, Power Generation El Paso Electric Company 2702 N. Third Street, Suite 3040 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 Terry Bassham, Esq.

General Counsel El Paso Electric Company 123 W. Mills El Paso, Texas 79901

Arizona Public Service Company -3-John W. Schumann Los Angeles Department of Water & Power Southern California Public Power Authority P.O. Box 51111, Room 1255-C Los Angeles, California 90051-0100 David Summers Public Service Company of New Mexico 414 Silver SW, #1206 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102 Jarlath Curran Southern California Edison Company 5000 Pacific Coast Hwy. Bldg. DIN San Clemente, California 92672 Robert Henry Salt River Project 6504 East Thomas Road Scottsdale, Arizona 85251 Brian Almon Public Utility Commission William B. Travis Building P.O. Box 13326 1701 North Congress Avenue Austin, Texas 78701-3326

Arizona Public Service Company -4-Electronic distribution by RIV:

Regional Administrator (EWM)

DRP Director (KEB)

DRS Director (EEC)

Resident Inspector (GXW2)

Branch Chief, DRP/D (LJS)

Project Engineer, DRP/D (ELC1)

Staff Chief, DRP/TSS (PHH)

RITS Coordinator (NBH)

Scott Morris (SAM1)

PV Site Secretary (TLB4)

SRI:EMB RI:EMB SRI:EMB SRI:EMB C:EMB C:DRPD C:EMB MFRunyan/lmb GMiller PAGoldberg WMMcNeill CSMarschall LJSmith CSMarschall

/RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/

8/27/02 9/03/02 9/03/02 08/27/02 09/03/02 09/04/02 09/04/02 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax

ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Dockets: 50-528; 50-529; 50-530 Licenses: NPF-41; NPF-51; NPF-74 Report No: 50-528/02-07; 50-529/02-07; 50-530/02-07 Licensee: Arizona Public Service Company Facility: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Location: 5951 S. Wintersburg Road Tonopah, Arizona Dates: July 29 through August 16, 2002 Team Leader: M. F. Runyan, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Maintenance Branch Inspectors: P.A. Goldberg, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Maintenance Branch W. M. McNeill, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Maintenance Branch G. Miller, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Maintenance Branch Accompanying Personnel: J. Chiloyan, Beckman and Associates J. Diecker, Engineering Associate J. Wylam, Engineering Associate S. Rutenkroger, Engineering Associate Approved By: Charles S. Marschall, Chief Engineering Maintenance Branch Division of Reactor Safety

-2-SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000528-02-07, IR 05000529-02-07, IR 05000530-02-07, Arizona Public Service Company; 7/29/02 - 8/16/02, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station; Units 1, 2, and 3, regional team report.

The inspection was conducted by four regional inspectors and one contractor. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

No findings of significance were identified.

Report Details 1 REACTOR SAFETY Introduction A team inspection was performed to verify that facility safety system design and performance capability were adequate and that the initial design and subsequent modifications have preserved the current design basis of the systems selected for review. The scope of the review also included any necessary nonsafety-related structures, systems, and components that provided functions to support safety functions. The inspection effort also reviewed the licensees programs and methods for monitoring the capability of the selected systems to perform the current design basis functions. This inspection verified aspects of the initiating events, mitigating systems, and barrier cornerstones.

The probabilistic risk assessment model for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station is based on the capability of the as-built safety systems to perform their intended safety functions successfully. The area and scope of the inspection were determined by reviewing the licensees probabilistic risk analysis models to identify the most risk significant systems, structures, and components according to their ranking and potential contribution to dominant accident sequences and/or initiators. Deterministic effort was also applied in the selection process by considering recent inspection history, recent problem area history, and all modifications developed and implemented.

The team reviewed in detail the 4.16 kV electrical distribution system, the high pressure safety injection system, the low pressure safety injection system, the safety injection tanks, and the charging system. The primary review prompted parallel review and examination of support systems, such as, electrical power, instrumentation, room cooling systems, and related structures and components.

The objective of this inspection was to assess the adequacy of calculations, analyses, engineering processes, and engineering and operating practices that were used to support the performance of the safety systems selected for review and the necessary support systems during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. Acceptance criteria utilized by the NRC inspection team included NRC regulations, the technical specifications, applicable sections of the Final Safety Analysis Report, applicable industry codes and standards, as well as, industry initiatives implemented by the licensees programs.

1R21 Safety System Design and Performance Capability (71111.21)

.1 System Requirements a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed the following attributes of the selected systems: (1) process medium (water, steam, and air), (2) energy sources, (3) control systems, and (4)

equipment protection. The team verified that procedural instructions to operators were consistent with operator actions required to meet, prevent, and/or mitigate design basis accidents. The review also considered requirements and commitments identified in the

-2-Final Safety Analysis Report, technical specifications, design basis documents, and plant drawings.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 System Condition and Capability a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed the periodic testing procedures for the selected systems to verify that the design requirements were adequately demonstrated. The team reviewed the environmental qualification of a sample of system components to verify the capability to operate under design environmental conditions and the assumed operating parameters including: voltage, speed, power, flow, temperature, and pressure.

The team also reviewed the systems operations by conducting system walkdowns; reviewing normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures; and reviewing the Final Safety Analysis Report, technical specifications, design calculations, drawings, and procedures.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed a sample of problems identified by the licensee in the corrective action program to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions related to design issues. The sample included open and closed condition reports for the past 3 years that identified issues affecting the selected systems.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.4 System Walkdowns a. Inspection Scope The team performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the selected systems. The walkdowns focused on the installation and configuration of power supplies, piping, components, and instruments. During the walkdowns, the team assessed:

  • The placement of protective barriers and systems,

-3-

  • The susceptibility to flooding, fire, or environmental conditions,
  • The physical separation of trains and the provisions for seismic concerns,
  • Accessibility and lighting for any required local operator action,
  • The materiel condition and preservation of systems and equipment, and
  • The conformance of the currently-installed system configurations to the design and licensing bases.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.5 Design Review a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed the current as-built instrument and control, electrical, and mechanical design of the selected systems. These reviews included a review of design assumptions, calculations, required system thermal-hydraulic performance, electrical power system performance, protective relaying, and instrument setpoints and uncertainties. The team also performed a single-failure review of individual components to determine the effects of such failures on the capability of the systems to perform their design safety functions.

The team reviewed calculations, drawings, specifications, vendor documents, Final Safety Analysis Report, technical specifications, emergency operating procedures, and temporary and permanent modifications.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.6 Safety System Inspection and Testing a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed the program and procedures for testing and inspecting components in the selected systems. The review included the results of surveillance tests required by the technical specifications.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

-4-

.4 OTHER ACTIVITIES (ZA)

4OA3 Event Followup (71153)

.1 (Closed) LER 05000529/2001-002-00: Logic Board and Pin Connector Failure Causes Three of Four Main Steam Isolation Valves to Close.

This report discussed an event in which a logic board failure in the main steam and feedwater isolation system cabinet caused three main steam isolation valves to shut, resulting in a reactor trip from approximately 100 percent power. The valves closed as a result of a fire in the main steam and feedwater isolation system cabinet. Additional details of this event are discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-528, -529, -530/02-05.

The team reviewed the apparent cause of the event and the corrective actions detailed in Condition Report/Dispositions Request 2405660 and interviewed licensee engineers. No findings of significance were identified. This licensee event report is closed.

4OA6 Management Meetings Exit Meeting Summary The team leader presented the inspection results to Mr. G. Overbeck, Senior Vice President, Nuclear, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on August 16, 2002.

At the conclusion of this meeting, the team leader asked the licensees management whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.

Some proprietary information was identified, but it was not discussed in the report.

ATTACHMENT Licensee Contacts :

R. Baker, I&C Design Engineer J. Brown, Senior Engineer, Mechanical Design M. Brutcher, Section Leader, Mechanical Design K. Clifton, Safety Injection System Engineer D. Fan, Department Leader, Design Engineering D. Hautala, Senior Engineer, Regulatory Affairs J. Hughey, System Engineer A. Krainik, Emergency Services Department S. Kwan, System Engineer D. Marks, Licensing Manager M. McEwan,- Maintenance Engineer H. Mortazavi, Design Engineer P. Murphey, Senior Engineer, Mechanical Design G. Overbeck, Senior Vice President, Nuclear D. Vogt, Lead Shift Technical Advisor NRC:

G. Warnick, Resident Inspector ITEMS CLOSED 05000529/2001-002-00 LER Logic Board and Pin Connector Failure Causes Three of Four Main Steam Isolation Valves to Close. (Section 4OA3)

-2-Documents Reviewed:

CRDRs 35155 2340953 2404768 2440138 2493353 111467 (CRAI 113067) 2341398 2405660 2441255 2507393 117201 2345337 2406617 2448068 2508389 117493 2350799 2407845 2453561 2516093 118495 2359345 2415676 2459383 2516816 3-8-0336 2369750 2417254 2468293 2522080 3-9-0008 2381185 2427545 2470853 2529219 9-4-0096 2384134 2435085 2473816 2544757 971263 2390219 2436748 2481133 2546352 2303536 2392627 2437366 2490693 2548138 2307016 2404064 2438736 2492855 2548519 Procedures EQDF EQ-PM, Equipment Qualification Program Manual, Revision 12 01-E-ZZ1-004, Electrical Protection Data Base, Revision 4 12DP-0MC46, Receipt Inspection, Revision 1 12DP-0MC48, Quality Receiving Checklist Development, Revision 1 32ST-9ZZ03, Surveillance Test Procedure for the class 4160 Bus Undervoltage Protective Relays, Revision 13 32MT-9ZZ06, Testing and Calibration of the12IFC53A & 53Band the 77A & 77B Time overcurrent Relays, Revision 4 32MT-9ZZ74, Molded Case Circuit Breaker Test, Revision 19 40DP-0OP02, Relay Resetting, Revision 7 40OP-9CH01, CVCS Normal Operations, Revision 18 40OP-9PG01, 480V Class 1E Switchgear, Revision 10 40EP-9EO01, Standard Post Trip Actions, Revision 6 40EP-9EO02, Reactor Trip, Revision 3 40OP-9CH03, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Injection System, Revision 13 40EP-9EO03, Loss of Coolant Accident, Revision 11 40EP-9EO04, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Revision 13

-3-40EP-9EO05, Excess Steam Demand, Revision 10 40EP-9EO06, Loss of All Feedwater, Revision 7 40ST-9SI07, High Pressure Safety Injection System Alignment Verification, Revision 6 40EP-9EO07, Loss of Offsite Power/Loss of Forced Circulation, Revision 8 40EP-9EO08, Blackout, Revision 3 40EP-9EO09, Functional Recovery Procedure, Revision 12 40EP-9EO10, Standard Appendices, Revision 24 40EP-9EO11, Lower Mode Functional Recovery, Revision 5 40AO-9ZZ12, Degraded Electrical Power, Revision 12 40DP-9OP19, Locked Valve, Breaker, and Component Tracking, Revision 62 40DP-9OP26, Operability Determination, Revision 11 73DP-0XI03, Check Valve Predictive Maintenance and Monitoring Program, Revision 5 73DP-0AP04 Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment Program Technical Specification 5.5.2; Revision 1 73ST-9SI03, Leak Test of SI/RCS Pressure Isolation Valves; Revision 22 73ST-9XI03, SI Train A Valves - InService Test, Revision 12 73ST-9CH04, Boron Injection Flow Test, Revision 0 73ST-9SI05, Leak Test of HPSI/LPSI Containment Isolation Check Valves; Revision 9.

73ST-9CH06, Charging Pumps-Inservice Test, Revision 12 73ST-9XI06, CH and SS Valves - Inservice Test, Revision 13 73ST-9XI09, Train A LPSI and HP Check Valves - InService Test; Revision 5 73ST-9SI11, Low Pressure Safety Injection Pumps Miniflow - Inservice Test, Revision 13 73ST-9SI14, LPSI Pumps Full Flow - InService Test, Revision 10 73DP-9ZZ14, Surveillance Testing, Revision 4 73ST-9XI22, CH Valves - Inservice Test, Revision 10 73ST-9XI26, NCE-V118, CHN-V835, and SI Train A Check Valves - Inservice Test, Revision 2

-4-73ST-9XI27, CHA-HV-205, CHB-HV-203, and SI B Train Check Valves - Inservice Test, Revision 2 73ST-9XI29 LPSI/CS Suction and RWT Outlet Check Valves - Inservice Test, Revision 9 73ST-9XI33, HPSI Pump and Check Valve Full Flow Test, Revision 23 87DP-0MC09, Item Procurement Specification (IPS) Requirements, Revision 29 01-E-ZZ1-0003, Electrical Equipment Data Base, Revision 15 73ST-9X130, SIT Check Valve Exercise Test, Revision 9 Calculations 03-EC-PB-200, AC Overcurrent Protection Class 1E, Revision 8 01-EC-MA-0221, AC Distribution, Revision 7 13-EC-PB-204, AC Equipment Protection (4.16KV and 480V) Class 1E, Revision 3 13-EC-PE-120, Diesel Generator Neutral Grounding, Revision 0 13-MC-SI-502 ESF Pump Suction Lines Train B, Revision 11.

13-MC-SI-312, Evaluation of Cavitation Damage During HPSI Pump Full Flow Surveillance Testing, Revision 0 13-MC-SI-307, Evaluation of Safety Injection System Pump Interaction per NRC I&E Bulletin 88-04, Revision 0 13-MC-SI-316, HPSI Flow with Hot Leg Valve Fully Open, Revision 0 13-MC-SI-014, K Factor of Safety Injection Tank Discharge Piping, Revision 1 13-NC-ZY-205 Large Break LOCA, Radiological Consequences; Revision 7 13-EC-PB-0203, Motor Starting Times, Revision 3 13-EC-NA-221, Non-Class 1E 13.8KV Switchgear Protection, Revision 1 13-JC-CH-0209 Refueling Water Tank Level Instrument (Chx-L-203x, x = A,B,C,D) Setpoint and Uncertainty Calculation, Revision 5 13-MC-SI-210, Safety Injection Tank Pressure for SIT Check Valve Test, Revision 2 13-MC-SI-503 Safety Injection System Train A, Revision 15 TR-9609 Seal Piping Analysis of Low Pressure Safety Injection Pumps, Revision 3

-5-EAS-TR-7701-ASR, Structural Integrity and Operability Analysis of High Pressure Safety Injection Pump, Revision 3 13-NC-ZC-238, System Design LOCA Analysis, Revision 0 13-EC-PB-0101, Undervoltage Protection, Revision 6 13-NC-CH-A001, Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray System Reliability Evaluation, Revision 0 13-MC-CH-0311, Chemical and Volume Control System (CH) Design Pressure and Temperature Calculation, Revision 0 with Engineering Document Change 98-00581 13-NC-CH-0101, CVCS (CH) Activities at Design and Normal Conditions, Revision 5 01-MC-CH-0501, CVCS - Charging Line, Revision 5 01-MC-CH-0535, CVCS - RCP Seal Injection, Revision 4 13-MA-CH-0951, CVCS System - Configuration Calculations, Revision 0 13-MC-CH-0202, Evaluation of Charging Pump NPSHA During Parallel Suction Alignment of the BAM Pumps from the RWT, Revision 0 13-MC -HA-052, Cooling Load Calculation for ESF Pump Rooms, Revision 5 13-EC-CH-A002, Qualified Life Reassessment of Charging Pump Plunger Packing Under Program PE-403, Revision 0 Drawings:

01-E-PBA-001, Single Line Diagram 4.16KV Class 1E Power System Switchgear 1E-PBA-SO3, Revision 4 01-E-PBA-002, Single Line Diagram 4.16KV Class 1E-Power System Switchgear 1E-PBB-SO4, Revision 7 01-E-PGA-001, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Power System Load Center 1E-PGA-31, Revision 6 01-E-PGA-002, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Power System Load Center 1E-PGB-L32, Revision 7 01-E-PGA-003, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Power System Load Center 1E-PGA-L33, Revision 6 01-E-PGB-004, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Power System Load Center 1E-PGB-L34, Revision 7 01-E-PGA-005, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Power System Load Center 1E-PGA-L35, Revision 2

-6-01-E-PGA-006, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Power System Load Center 1E-PGB-L36, Revision 5 01-E-PHA-005, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Power System Motor Control Center 1E-PHA-M35, Revision 13 01-E-NHA-072, Single Line Diagram 480V Class non-1E Power System Motor Control Center 1E-NHN-M72, Revision 8 01-E-PBB-004, Elementary Diagram 4.16KV Class 1E Power System Switchgear 1E-PBA-SO3 and 1E-PBB-SO4 Bus Potential Transformers, Revision 10 01-E-PBB-001, Elementary Diagram 4.16KV Class 1E Power System Switchgear 1E-PBA-S03 and 1E-PBB-SO4 4.16KV Normal Supply Breaker, Revision 5 01-E-PBB-002, Elementary Diagram 4.16KV Class 1E Power System Switchgear 1E-PBA-SO3 and 1E-PBB-SO4 4.16KV Alternate Supply Breakers, Revision 6 01-E-PEB001, Elementary Diagram Stand-By Generation System Diesel Generators 1E-PEA-001 and 1E-PEB-002 4.16KV Breaker, Revision 14 G5-253-200, Control Schematic (Diesel Generators) En-Tronic Controls Cooper Energy Services, Revision 13 01-E-SIB-001, Elementary Diagram Safety Injection & Shutdown CLG System HP Safety Injection Pump 1M-SIB-P02, Revision 6 01-E-SIB-002, Elementary Diagram Safety Injection & Shutdown CLG System LP Safety Injection Pump IM-SIB-PS01, Revision 6 01-E-PGB-001, Elementary Diagram 480V Class 1E Power Sys Load-Center 1E-PGA-L31, 1E-PGB-L32 4.16KV Supply Breaker, Revision 5 01-E-PGB-006, Elementary Diagram 480V Class 1E Power Sys Load-Center 1E-PGA-L31 380V Main Feeder Breaker, Revision 5 0143D483, Indoor M26 Metalclad Switchgear (4.16KV Vendor Equipment arrangement drawings), Revision 7 Work Packages/Design Mods EDC 2001-00476 EDC 2001-00477 EWO (modification) 217593 WM 2393708 WM 2406650 WM 2492834 WO 241003 (ENG DM 13)

WO 903397 ENG DM 2446825

-7-Work Orders 1055950 2306013 2327025 2350082 2374614 219575 2306022 2330056 2350366 2381078 2306009 2318369 233045 2374610 50.59 Evaluations 95-00066 97-00129 01-00055 SI System Health Reports 3Q00 4Q00 1Q01 2Q01 3Q01 4Q01 1Q02 2Q02 Operability Determination 2503356 Environmental Equipment Qualification Data Files EEQ-A610-001, System Component Evaluation Worksheet, Revision 11 EEQ-A610-001, EQ Maintenance Data Sheet, Revision 10 EEQ-L200-003, System Component Evaluation Worksheet, Revision 7 EEQ-L200-003, EQ Maintenance Data Sheet, Revision 7 EEQ-T020-001, System Component Evaluation Worksheet, Revision 8 EEQ-T020-001, EQ Maintenance Data Sheet, Revision 8 EEQ-T020-002, System Component Evaluation Worksheet, Revision 5 EEQ-T020-002, EQ Maintenance Data Sheet, Revision 5 EEQ-T020-003, System Component Evaluation Worksheet, Revision 8 EEQ-T020-003, EQ Maintenance Data Sheet, Revision 8 EEQ-V030-001, System Component Evaluation Worksheet, Revision 4 EEQ-V030-001, EQ Maintenance Data Sheet, Revision 3 Miscellaneous Documents 13-NS-B072, At-power PRA System Study for the Chemical and Volume Control System, Revision 0 NRC Letter March 23, 1999, Charging System Commitments for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (Tac. Nos. M91817, M911818, and M91819)

-8-Component Performance Tracking and Trending Data Base Operations Training Department Simulator Scenario, NLR02S0204, S-047N 4 Loss of Class 1E 480 V Load Center, Revision 00 Item Procurement Specification IPS-G080 Material Logistics Information System Inspection Plan, 44410562 Material Logistics Information System Inspection Plan, 44410563 APS Purchase Order 500237616 with Change Notice A Receiving records for Purchase Order 500237616 VTM-I075-0001, Ingersoll-Dresser Pump Co. instruction manual for HPSI pump EAS-TR-7701-ASR, Structural Integrity & Operability Analysis of High Pressure Safety Injection Pump, Revision 3 VTD-I075-0007, Ingersoll-Rand Installation, Operation and Maintenance Instructions for 4X11 CA-8 High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps SKF Machine Reliability Assessment, Phase I, 3B HPSI Pump, dated May 3, 2002 Vibration Analysis Report for HPSI Pump 3MSIBP02 HPSI PUMP condition Overview dated July 31, 2002 13-EM-009, Appendix 5B Engineering Data for 13.8KV and 4.16KV Metal-Clad Switchgear, Revision 4 PB STM/Vol.28A, System Training Manual class 1E 4.16KV Power System (PB), Revision 2 PVNGS Design Basis, Class 1E 4.16KV Power System, Revision 7 PVNGS Design Basis, Class 1E 480V AC Power Switchgear System, Revision 6