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{{#Wiki_filter:NOTES: | {{#Wiki_filter:NOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME INTERNAFILECENTEREXTERNAL: | ||
NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL1111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME NUDOCS-ABSTRACT NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL1111CATEGORY2REGULA~.YINFORMATION.DISTRIBUTIO YSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSXON NBR:9711180014 DOC.DATE: | |||
97/10/09NOTARIZED: | |||
NODOCKETFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM0500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION LOCHBAUM,D.A. | |||
UnionofConcerned Scientists RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION | |||
'CALLAN,L.J. | |||
OfcoftheExecutive DirectorforOperations | |||
==SUBJECT:== | ==SUBJECT:== | ||
Submitspetitionper10CFR2. | Submitspetitionper10CFR2.206 recgxesting thatoperating licensesbemodified, revokedorsuspended untilreasonable assurance thatsysinconformance w/designslicensing recgxirements. | ||
DISTRIBUTION CODE:DF01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:DirectFlowDistribution: | |||
50Docket(PDRAvail)EQ0DUNNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS: | |||
PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED: | |||
LTTR4ENCL4 | |||
~\ | ~\UNIONOFCONCERNED SCIENTISTS October9,1997Mr.L.JosephCallanExecutive DirectorforOperations UnitedStatesNuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, DC20555-0001 SUBJECTiPETITIONPURSUANTTO10CFR'2.206, DONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTSUNITS1AND2,DOCKETNOS.50-315AND50-316 | ||
==DearMr.Callan:== | ==DearMr.Callan:== | ||
TheUnionofConcerned Scientists submitsthispetitionpursuantto10CFR2.206requesting thattheoperating licensesforDonaldC.CookUnits1and2bemodified, revoked,orsuspended untilthereisreasonable assurance thattheirsystemsareinconformance withdesignandlicensing basesrequirements. | |||
Aprocesscomparable tothesystemcertifications recentlyusedbytheSalemandMillstone licensees wouldprovidethisnecessary levelofassurance. | |||
UCSadditionally requeststhatapublichearingintothismatter'eheldintheWashington, DCareapriortothefirstunitatDCCookbeingauthorized torestart.Atthishearing,wewillpresentinformation supporting thecontentions inthispetition. | |||
BBackBroundhOnOctober9,1996,theNRCrequested thatitspowerreactorlicensees provideinformation pursuantto10CFR50.54(f)regarding theadequacyandavailability ofdesignbasesinformation. | |||
TheNRC'sissuedthisrequestasaresultofitsinvestigations attheMillstone PowerStation.ThelicenseefortheDCCookplantresponded withaletterdatedFebruary6,1997,describing theadministrative controlsitusestoprovideassurance thattheCookNuclearPlantisoperatedandmaintained withintheestablished designbases.AnNRCteamrecentlyconducted anarchitect/engineer designinspection atDCCook.According totheNRC'sProjectManagerfor9CCook,thisNRCteamexaminedtwosafetysystemsandtheirsupporting systems.Theteam'sfindingsforcedthelicenseetoshutdownbothunitsonSeptember 10,1997.TheNRCissuedaconfirmatory actionlettertothelicenseedatedSeptember 19,1997,specifying issuesarisingfromthedesigninspection thatmustberesolvedpriortorestarting theunits.Theseissues(listedinAttachment 1)includephysicalmodifications totheplantsandrevisions totheplants',operating licenses. | |||
NumerousNRCDailyEventReports(listedinAttachment 2)described thefindings&omdesigninspection asreportedbythelicensee. | |||
TheNRChasnotyetreleasedthedesigninspection reportandwehavebeentoldthatitwillnotbeissueduntilnextweekattheearliest. | |||
PDRnoOCi0Sao03XSHPDRllllllliilllllllllllllllllllllllllllliilI., | |||
['.~~~Washington Office:1616PStreetNWSuite310~Washington, DC20036-1495 | |||
~202-332-0900 | |||
~FAX:202-332-0905 Cambridge Headquarters: | |||
TwoBrattleSquare~Cambridge, MA02238-9105 | |||
~617-547-5552 | |||
~FAX:617-864-9405 California Office:2397ShattuckAvenueSuite203~Berkeley, CA94704-1567 | |||
~510-843-1872 | |||
~FAX:510-843-3785 | |||
'II~~' | 'II~~' | ||
i~~~~October9,1997Page2of4BasisforRuestedActionTheNRCconducte' | i~~~~October9,1997Page2of4BasisforRuestedActionTheNRCconducte'd architect/engineer designinspections atonlysixofitsnearly70operating powerreactorlicenseesites.Thesedesigninspections examinedonlyoneorhvosafetysystemsalongwiththeirsupporting systemsateachsite.TheNRCProjectManagerreportedthatthedesigninspection atDCCookexaminedtheresidualheatremovalandcomponent coolingwatersystemsalongwiththeirsupporting systems.Thesedesigninspections focusedonthefacilities'riginal designandthelicensees'onformance withthesafetyanalysisreports.ThesystemsexaminedbytheNRCatDCCookhadalreadybeencoveredbythelicensee's designbasisdocumentation reconstitution pr'ogram. | ||
Designbasisdocuments (DBDs)forthecontainment, containment structure, containment spray,emergency corecooling,component coolingwater,andresidualheatremovalsystemshadbeenapprovedbythelicenseepriortotheNRCteam'sarrival.ThelicenseeinformedtheNRCthatits'BDprogramhadnotidentified anydeficiencie involving equipment operability. | |||
ThefindingsbytheNRCdesigninspection teampromptedthelicenseetodeclarebothtrainsoftheemergency corecoolingsystemsandthecontainment spraysysteminoperable. | |||
TheunitswereshutdownonSeptember 8and9,1997.Thelicenseereportedmakingphysicalchangestotheplanttocorrectsomeoftheproblemsandindicated thatadditional physicalchangesmayberequired. | |||
Thelicenseehasproposedfixingthespecificoperability issuesidentified duringtheNRCdesigninspection andthenrestarting theunits.Confining thescopeoftherestartactivities inthiswaywouldbetreatingthesymptomsratherthanthecauseoftheproblems. | |||
TheNRCdesigninspection revealedseriousdeficiencies inthelicensee's designcontrolprograms. | |||
Thesedeficiencie crcatcdthespecificproblemsthatforcedtheplantstobeshutdown.Thesedeficiencies | |||
>ayalsoberesponsible forsimilarproblemsinothersafetysystemswhichwerenotexaminedbytheNRC.Itisimportant tonotethattheNRCidentified significant operability problemsinsystemsthatthelicenseehadcoveredinrecentlyapprovedDBDs.ThelicenseestatedinitsFebruary6,1997,submittal that.itverifiesandvalidates theinformation initsDBDsviareviewsandphysicalplantwalkdowns priortotheirapproval. | |||
Thus,theNRCdiscovered significant problemsinsystemswhichhadbeencloselyscrutinized bythelicensee. | |||
HadtheNRC'sfindingsinvolvedsystemswhichhavenotyetbeencoveredunderthelicensees'BD program,itmightbereasonable toassumethatthelicenseewouldhaveidentifiicd thematthatlaterdate.However,thereislittlereasontobelievethattheseproblemswouldhave.beenresolvedunlesstheNRChadidentified them.Attachment 2listsNRCDailyEventReports(DERs)involving issuesidentified bytheNRCdesigninspection atDCCook.DERNos.32740,32806,32822,32839,32843,32875,32890,32904,32914,32915,32921,32948,and329S8describepotential deficiencies thatappeartohaveexistedatDCCookpriortotheinitiation ofitsdesignbasisdocumentation reconstitution effortin1992.Thateffortwastherefore apparently unabletodetectthesepotential deficiencies. | |||
DERNos.32823,32824,32903,32939,and3294Sdescribepotential deficiencies thatappeartohavebeenintroduced since1992.Thus,thelicensee's designcontrolandqualityassurance programsareapparently unabletoensurethatthefacilityismaintained withinitsdesignbases. | |||
00I~r,fh't,~ | 00I~r,fh't,~ | ||
~~~QOctober9, | ~~~QOctober9,1997Page3of4IUCSfeelsthatthedesignbasisdocumentation reconstitution andUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)validation programsasdescribed inthelicensee's responsetotheNRC's50.54(f)letterlacktherigorandfocusnecessary toidentifypotential design-related operability issues.Ourconviction issupported bythefindings&omtheNRCdesigninspection. | ||
PJ~Ptlt'I VOctober9,1997Page4of41hrUCS. | Sincethecorrections totheNRC'sfindingswerenotlimitedtomerepaperwork fixesbutincludedactualchangestotheplant'sphysicalconfiguration, thesafetysignificance oftheseandpotentially otherundetected problemscannotbeunderstated. | ||
~~ | I~Thefiawsinthelicensee's designcontrolprogramsmustbecorrected. | ||
ThesystemsatDCCook,atleastthosewithasafetyfunction, mustbecertified tobecapableofperforming theirrequiredactionsunderalldesignconditions. | |||
Then,andonlythen,cantheunitsbcrestarted withreasonable assurance thatpublicsafetywillbeadequately protected. | |||
Itwouldbeirresponsible torestarttheseunitsknowingthattheprogrammatic failuresthatcausedthesafetyproblemsidentified bytheNRCteammayhaveproducedcomparable problemsaffecting theoperability ofothersafety'systems. | |||
Thelegalprecedent forourpositionisstatedbytheNRC'sAtomicSafetyandLicensing AppealBoardin'heMatterofVermontYankeeNuclearPowerCorporation, Memorandum andOrder(ALAB-138), | |||
datedJuly31,1973:"Asageneralrulc,theCommission's regulations precludeachallenge toapplicable regulations inanindividual licensing proceeding. | |||
10CFR2.758.Thisrulehasbeenfrequently appliedinsuchproceedings toprecludechallenges byintervenors toCommission regulations. | |||
Generally, then,anintervenor cannotvalidlyargueonsafetygroundsthatareactorwhichmeetsapplicable standards shouldnotbelicensed. | |||
Bythesametoken,neithertheapplicant northestaffshouldbepermitted to=-challenge applicable regulations, eitherdirectlyorindirectly.. | |||
Thus,thosepartiesshouldnotgenerally bepermitted toseekorjustifythelicensing ofareactorwhichdoesnotcomplywithapplicable standards. | |||
Norcantheyavoidcompliance byarguingthat,althoughanapplicable, regulation isnotmet,thepublichealthandsafetywillstillbe'protected. | |||
For,oncearegulation isadopted,thestandards itembodiesrepresent theCommission's definition ofwhatisrequiredtoprotectthepublichealthandsafety."[emphasis added]"Inshort,inorder'for afacilitytobelicensedtooperate,theapplicant mustestablish thatthe'acilitycomplicswithallapplicable regulations. | |||
Ifthefacilitydoesnotcomply,oiiftherehasbeennoshowingthatitdoescomply,itmaynotbelicensed." | |||
[emphasis added]TheNRCdesigninspection atDCCookidentified significant issueswhichcausedbothunitstobeshutdown.Theseissueswerecausedbyprogrammatic deficiencies inthelicensee's designcontrolpi'ograms. | |||
Acontributing factorfortheseissuesisthefailureofthelicensee's qualityassurance andself-assessment programstodetecttheseproblems. | |||
Nothinginthereportedfindingsfromthedesigninspection supportsaconclusion thatthesefindingsareisolatedconsequences. | |||
TheNRC'sdesigninspection invalidates anyshowingthatthisfacilitycomplieswithallapplicable'regulations. | |||
Therefore, thedesigncontroldeficiencies mustbecorrected topreventfuturenon-compliances withsafetyregulations. | |||
Andjustasimportantly, a.thoroughreviewofallsystemswithsafetyfunctions mustbe'completed priortorestarttodetectandcorrectpastnon-compliances. | |||
PJ~Ptlt'I VOctober9,1997Page4of41hrUCS.isnotadvocating thattheNRCapply-ahigherstandardatDCCook.-Instead, wearerequesting thattheNRCensurethattheDCCookfacilityisinaccordance withtheminimumsafetystandards whichconstitute thelegalgroundsfo'rallowingtheunitstooperate.Ourrequestisconsistent withthemeasuresrequiredbytheNRCwhenothersamplinginspections findproblems. | |||
WeasktheNRCtoexpandtheinspection scope.basedupontheidentified problemsjustaswouldberequiredwhensnubber(e.g.,piperestraint) andreactorvesselinternals inspections foundproblems: | |||
'uestedActions*~I'CSpetitions theNRCtoprotectpublichealthandsafetybypreventing theunitsatDCCookfromoperating untilsuchtimethatthereisreasonable assurance thatallsignificant non-compliances havebeenidentified andcorrected. | |||
Thesystemcertification processrecentlyusedattheSalemGenerating StationandtheMillstone PowerStationwouldprovidesuchreasonable assurance. | |||
WerequestapublichearingonthismatterbeheldintheWashington, DCareabeforeanyunitatDCCookisauthorized torestart.Sincerely, auiug'DavidA.LochaumNuclearSafetyEngineerCC:ChairmanShirleyAnnJackson.UnitedStatesNuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, DC20555-0001. | |||
Honorable SpencerAbrahamUnitedStatesSen'ateWashington, DC20510-2203 Mr.A.B.Beach,RegionalAdministrator UnitedStatesNuclearRegulatory Commission | |||
.801Warrenville RoadLisle,IL60532-4351 Honorable CarlLevinUnitedStatesSenate.Washington, DC20510-2202 | |||
.Honorable FredUptonUnitedStatesHouseofRepresentatives Washington, DC,20515-2206 | |||
~Attachments: | |||
1)DesignInspection Issues,ThatWillBeResolvedPriortoDCCookRestart2)NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDe'signInspection Findings=VIg 0JI~SIn'l/Jvs/lP,I'IIrphrIII | |||
~~PyAttachment 1DesignInspection IssuesThatWillBeResolvedPriortoDCCookRestart1Thefollowing issues,quotedverbatim, werespecified ontheNRC'sConfirmatory ActionLetterdated,September 19,1997,asrequiring resolution priortorestartofanyDCCookunit:.1.Recirculation SumpInventor'y/Containment DeadEndedCompartnients IssueAnalyseswillbeperformed todemonstrate thattherecirculation sumplevelisadequatetoprevent'ortexing," | |||
orappropriate modifications willbemade.[SeealsoAttachment 2-PowerReactorEventNumber32890],Recirculation Sump-Venting Issue'rr!IIVentingwillbere-installed intherecirculation sumpcover.Thedesignwill-incorporate foreignmaterialexclusion requirements forthesump.[See'alsoAttachment 2-PowerReactorEventNumbers32875and32903]Thirty-six HourCooldown, withOneTrainofCooling4Analyseswillbeperformed thatwilldemonstrate thecapability tocooldowntheunitsconsistent withdesignbasisrequirements andnecessary changestoprocedures willbecompleted; ES-1.3(Switchover toRecirculation Sump)Procedure 6.Changestotheemergency procedure usedforswitchover oftheemergency corecooling-and containment spraypumpstotherecirculation sumpwillbeimplemented. | |||
Thesechangeswillprovideassurance therewillbeadequatesumpvolume,withpr'opercorisideration ofinstrument biasandsinglefailurecriteria. | |||
[SeealsoAtt.2-PowerReactorEventNumbers32806and32904]hll,Compressed AirOverpressure IssueOverpressure protection willbeprovideddownstream ofthe20psig,50psig,andS5psigcontrolairregulators tomitigatetheeffectsofapostulated failedregulator. | |||
[SeealsoAttachment 2-PowerReactorEventNumbers32939and32988]IResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)SuctionValveInterlock Issue'technical specification changetoallowoperation inmode4withtheRHRsuctionvalvesopenandpowerremovedisbeingprocessed. | |||
Approval. | |||
ofthischangebytheNRCwillberequiredprior'orestart.[SeealsoAttachment 2-PowerReactorEventNumbers32914and32921]-FibrousMaterialinContainment Removaloffibrousmaterialfromcontainment thatcouldclog.therecirculation sumpwillbecorn'pleted. | |||
[SeealsoAttachment 2-PowerReactorEventNumber3294S] | |||
0lI~' | 0lI~' | ||
Attachment 2NRCDailyEventReportson'CCookDesignInspection FindingsThefollowing summaries weretakenfromthedailyeventreportsavailable ontheNRC'swcbsite(mvw.nrc.gov). | |||
~~llr1 | ~Theonlyeditinginvolveddclctionofunnecessary detail,suchaswhowasnotifiedabouttheevents,'andtheadditionofclarification foracronyms. | ||
0'I/II | Othcrivisc, thesenarratives areverbatim. | ||
~~IAt | 1POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32890UNUSUALEVENT,DECLARED4TECHNICAL SPECIFlCAITON REQUIREDSHUTDOWNONBOTHUNITSDUETOINOPERABLE CONTAINMENTS | ||
+aresultofissuesraisedduringtheongoingarchitect/engi'neer designinspection, theliccnscewasreviewing thedesignaspectsofthecontainmcnts (bothunits,havesimilarcontainmcnts). | |||
Aflcrconsulting withthenuclearsteamsupplysystemsupplier(Westinghouse) thelicenseedetermined thatconcernsexistedaboutwhetheradequatecommunication (flowpaths)existsbetweentheactiveandinactiveportioris ofthecontainmcnt sump.Duringcertainscenario, thevolumeofwaterflowbacktothecontainment recirculation sumpmaynotbeadequatetosupportlong-term emergency corecooling(ECC)systems(RHR[residual heatremoval]system,safetyinjection system,chargingsystem)orcontainment spraypumpoperation duringthcrecirculation phaseofalargeorsmall.brcakLOCA.Thccontainmcnt drainagesystemisdesignedtoensurethatwateren'tering thccontainment fromthebreachintliereactorcoolantsystem,ECCsystems-injection, andicecondenser meltflowsbackintothe.containment recirculation sumpviadrains.Licenseeanalysiswasunabletoconfirmthatsuflicient communication | |||
-'xistedbctwccninactiveandactivevolumesofthecontainment toensureadequatedrainagetotherecirculation sump.-Withoutadequatedrainageintothesump,alowsumplevelwillresult,whichjeopardizes longtermoperation oftheECCSystemsandcontainment spraypumpsduetovortcxing andairentrainment. | |||
Asaconservative measurebecauseoftheseconcerns, thelicensccdeclaredbothtrainsofthcECCSystemsandthe,containment spraysysteminoperable forbothunitsandenteredTcchnical SpcciTication limitingcondition foroperation actionstatement 3.0.3toshutdownbothunits.Theliccnscecommenced shuttingUnit1downfrom100%powerat1655aildUill't2downfi'om100%powerat1728.At2000,thelicenseedcclarcdanunusualeventonbothunitsduetothe'potential lossofcontainmcnt barrier,onbothunits.Thelicensccplanstoperformfurtheranalysistodetermine theextentofthcexistingcommunication betweentheportionsofthesumpsandwhetherplantmodifications willbenecessary. | |||
~~~Update 0311EDTon09/10/97byTillytakenbyMacKinnon*~~ | |||
IThcunusualcvcntwastcrminatcd andexitedat0303EDTwhen.Unit 1cntcrcdmode5(coldshutdown). | |||
Unit2cntcredmode5at0015EDT(coldshutdown). | |||
fPOWERREACTOREVENT.NUMBER:32875FAILURETOMAINTAINTHECONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SUMP1/4"PARTICULATE RETENTION REQUIREMENT (HISTORICAL ISSUE)Ik.A1/4"particulate retention requirement forthecontainment recirculation sumpwasnotproperlyestablished in1979following sumpmodifications. | |||
Thecontainment recirculation sumprcquircment toretain1/4"particles istoensurethatcontainment spray,nozzlesdonotbecomeplugged.Thccontainmcnt spraysystemtakessuctionfromthecontainment recirculation sumpfollowing injection oftherefueling'water storagetanksupplyduringalossofcoolantaccident. | |||
~~llr1 IAttachment 2(continued) | |||
NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDesignInspection FindingsIIIn1979,modifications wereperformed onthecontainment recirculation sump.Oneofthemodifications involvedmovinga1/4"rctcntion elementfrominsidetherecirculation sumptotheentranceofthesump.Whenthe'retention elementwasmoved,thc1/4"retention requirement ivasnotfullyaddressed, andpathwaysexcccding the1/4"requirement, wereinadvertently established. | |||
Thcinadvcrtcnt pathwaysestablished included: | |||
3/4",vents intheroofoftherecirculation sumpentrance, thecontainment sumpdrainlinefromtherecirculation sump,andsmallgapsaroundthesumpentrance. | |||
Thesepathwayshavesincebeenelimi'nated orthe1/4"requirement hasbeenestablished.' | |||
.Thclicenseeisreporting thefactthatsince1979,until the1/4"requirement wasestablished orthepathwaywaseliminated, thecontainment recirculation sumpdidnotmeetitsdesignrcquircment. | |||
Thccontainment recirculation sumpcurrently meetsthe1/4"requircmcnt. | |||
Acondition rcporthas,beenwrittentoinitiateinvestigation intotluseventanddetermine appropriate preventive actions.Thiseventwasdctcrmined tobcreportable at0856onSeptember 5,1997.l~~~Updateat1905on09/10/97byRandyPtacckenteredbyJolliQ'e~**'IMerfurtherreviewoftheabovecondition, thelicenseeconcluded thatthcemergency corecooling(ECC)systemwasoutsideitsdesignbasisasaresultofthe1/4"rcquircmcnt notbeingmctfollowing thc1979plantmodifications. | |||
Bynotadequately coveringthe1/4"particulate retention requirement, largerparticles hadthepotential toenterthcrecirculation sump.ThcECCSystemhasnotbeenanalyzedfortheselargerparticles norisitwithintliedesignoftheECCSystemtohandletheselargerparticles. | |||
Thelicenseehasconcluded thatthiseventisalsorcportablc tothcNRCinaccordance withtherequirements of'0CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(a) unanalyzed condition, and10CF50.72(b)(2)(iii)(d)accident mitigation. | |||
IPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32903'ONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SUMPVENTHOLESHAVESEENFILLEDWITHCONCRETErIAsaresultofquestions posedbytheNRCarchitect/engineer designinspection team,thelicenseedetcrmincd that~thcinletventingrequirement forthccontainmcnt recirculation sumpswasnotproperlymaintained following modifications tothcUnit2.sumpin1996andtheUnit1sumpin1997(bothunitshavesimilarcontainmcnts). | |||
'hecontainment recirculation sumpventingrcquircment wascstablishcd in1979aspartoftheoriginalsumpdesigntoreducethepotential forairentrainment throughthesump.Theventingrequirement wIasmetthroughthe,additionoffive3/4-inchdiameterholesdrilledinthcroofofthcsumpinlet.(Theholesdidnotmeetthe1/4-inch~ | |||
diamctcrrequirement asreportedinEvent¹32875.)Whentheseholeswercdiscovered duringtheUnit21996refueling outageandtheUnit11997refueling outage,theywereclassified asabandoned equipment holesthatexceededthe1/4-inchparticulate retention rcquiremcnt forthcsumpsandtheywerefilledwithconcrete. | |||
0'I/II IAttachment 2(c'ontinued) | |||
NRCDailyXventReportsonDCCookDesignInspection FindingsPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER;32806~INSTRUMENTATION INDICATIONS USEDTODETERMINE WHENREFUELING WATER'TORAGETANKTOCONTAINMENT SWITCHOVER IS'REQUIRED MAYNOTHAVEBEENCORRECTTOPREVENTVORTEXING INTHECONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SUMP.*IDuringtheevaluation ofaproposedprocedure changethataGectsmvitchover fromtherefueling waterstoragetank(RWST)tothecontainment sumpduringaloss-of-coolant, accident(LOCA),itwasdctermincd thattheinstrumentation indications usedtodetermine whentheswitchover isrequiredmaynothavebccncorrect.to preventvortcxing inthecontainmcnt recirculation sump.IToaddressthissituation, procedures associated withthemvitchover (onbothunits)havebeenconservatively changedtoaccommodate therelatedinstrument inaccuracies. | |||
ThesechangesassureadequateRWSTwaterisincontainment beforemvitchover toeliminate concernsthatvorteungwouldoccurinthccontainmcnt sumpafterswitchover. | |||
TheproblemisthattheRWSTwaterlevelindicators areconnected totlicsuctionlincthatgoestotheresidualheatrcmov'al(RHR)pumps.Duetothcflowintheselines,theindicated waterlevelatwinchtheswitchover wouldbeinitiated wouldbelessthantheactualwaterleveloftheRWST(thclicenseewouldbcputtinglesswaterintothecontainmcnt thaner~ted).Also,thclicensccsaidthattheyliadsomeinaccuracies associated witlitheircontainmcnt sumpinstrumentation. | |||
Thelicenseeadjustedthccontainmcnt sumpindication toassurethattheyhaveanadequatevolumeinthecontainment topreventvortexing. | |||
Thelicenseereliesupontwoindications formvitchover, RWSTwaterlevelandcontainmcnt waterlevel.POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32904.SINGLEFAILUREDURINGRECIRCSUMPSWITCHOVER COULDBEUNANALYZED CONDITION I'IAsaresultofquestions posedbytheNRCarclutect/engineer designinspection team,thelicenseedetermined thatthcpossibility ofasinglefailureduringanaccidentwlulcperforming switchover oftheemergency corecooling~systempumpsfromtherefueling waterstoragetank(RWST)suctiontotherecirculation sumpsuctioncouldhaveresultedinthcplantbeinginanunanalyzed condition. | |||
Tluscondition isoutsidethcplantdesignbasis,anditpotentially couldhaveprevented thefulfillment ofasafetyfunctionofstructures orsystems.Theplantemergency, operating procedures (EOPs)ascurrently writtenrequirethatthewestresidualheatremoval(BHR)pumpbcthefirstpumpmvitchcdfromthcRWSTsuctiontotherccircsumpsuction.Oncethisis*accomplished, thecentrifugal charging(CC)pumps'uctions andthesafetyinjection (Sl)pumps'uctions arcthenswapped'from theRWSTsupplytothedischarge ofthewestRHRpump.IfthcwestRHRpumpwerctofailatthis.,pointwhenallCCandSIpumpswerebeingsuppliedfromitsdischarge, priortothceastRHRpumpsuctionbeingtransferred fromtheRWSTtothcrccircsump,allCCandSIpumpscouldalsofailductothclossofsuctionflow.Thiswouldresultinthelossofallhighandmediumheadinjection withonlytheflowfromtheeastRHRpumpavailable forinjection intothereactorcoolantsystem.Thcliccnseciscurrently reviewing thcEOPstodetermine analternate mvitchovcr sequencethatwouldeliminate thecondition asdescribed above.l | |||
~~IAt 1Attachment 2(continued) | |||
NRCDailyEventReports.onDCCookDesignInspection FindingsPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32939INSTALLED PLANT.MODIFICATION INTRODUCED THEPOSSIBILITY. | |||
OFASINGLEFAILUREWHICHCOULDRESULTINTHELOSSOFBOTHTRAINSOFTHEESFVENTILATION SYSTEM.At1620on09/16/97, thelicenseedetermined thataplantmodiTication installed behveenDecember1996andAugust1997introduced thepossibility ofasinglefailurewhichcouldresultinthelossofbothtrainsoftheengincercd safetyfeatures(ESF)ventilation systemif'the85-psiairheaderwastobelost.Priortothcinstallation ofthe'plant modification, theESFventilation systemcharcoalinletandbypassdampersbothutilizeda20-'psiairheaderandwercpositioned suchthatthecharcoalbypassdampcrswercnormallyopenandwouldfailclosed;andthccharcoalinletdamperswerenormallyclosedandwouldfailopen.Theplantmodification installed ncwbypassdamperswhichrequiredhigherairprcssuretooperateandwere,thercforc, transferred tothc85-psiheader.Ifthe,~85-psiairheaderwaslost,itwouldresultinthc,rcpositioning ofthenormallyopenbypassdampersivithoutthe,,openingofthecharcoalinletdampersonbothtrains.Thiswouldresultindeadheadingofthcfiltertrainfansand-lossofcoolingtoemergency corecoolingsystem(ECCS)equipment. | |||
"POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32988NON-SAFETY~RELATED AIRHEADERSLACKOVERPRESSURE PROTECTION f.'uringanarclutectural engineering inspection aquestionwasraisedregarding thelackofovcrpressurc protcction-onthc20,50and85psigcontrolairheaders.Thcspecificconcernisthepotential forcommonmodefailureofbothtrainsofsafetyrelatedequipmcnt servedbythc,airhcadcrs'. | |||
Theovcrprcssurc condition is'ostulated'to becausedbyregulator failure.Althoughsystemrcvicwshavefoundno,component failuremodewhichwouldresultinthedevicesbeingincapable ofgoingtotheirfail-safe | |||
: position, adesignchangepackagehasbeenpreparedtoprovideovcrprcssure protection, onthe20,50and85psigheaders.If-POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32914LICENSEEIDENTIFIED THATBOTHUNITSHADOPERATEDTHEIRRHRSYSTEMCONTRARYTOTHEDESCRIPTION INTHEFSAR.'CAt1615EDT,withUnits1and2shutdowninmode5,itwasdctcrmined thatbothunitshaveoperatedcontrarytothcdesignbasisfortheresidualheatremoval(RHR)systemasdescribed intheFinaLSafetyAnalysisrcport(FSAR).FSARChapter9,Section9.3,describes theinterlocks associated withtheresiduallicatremoval(RHR)suctionvalvesfromthcreactorcoolantsystem(RCS).Thesuctionlincvalvesarcinterlocked throughseparate, channelsoftheRCSsystemprcssuresignalstoprovideautomatic closureofbothvalveswheneverRCSprcssurecxccedsRHRdesignprcssure..Thc FSARstatesthattheinterlock maybedcfcatcdwhenthcRCSisopentoatmosphere. | |||
However,foranumberofyearsthisinterlock hasbeenprocedurally'defeated onbothunitstopreventinadvertent closureandlossofRHRsuctionduringshutdowncoolingoperation byopeningthevalvesandracking'uttheir.breakersinmode4.'Thcovcrpressurc protection affordedbythcautomatic closurefunctiondcscribcd intheFSARwasdefeatedwithoutasafetyevaluation beingpcrformcd. | |||
Thislossofautomatic closurefunctionrepresents anunanalyzed condition andis,thcrcforc, reportable. | |||
0J41 | 0J41 | ||
~~~~' | ~~~~'ttachment 2(continued) | ||
AK'PhIJlrktIIPIV 1, | ,NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDesignInspection.Fin'dings IPlansaretodegas,dcpressurizc, andopentheRCSonbothunitstoatmosphere. | ||
DegaswillstartonUnit1,andwhencompleted, thcunitwillproceedtodepressurize whileUnit2startsdegasprocedures. | |||
WhentheRCSisopentoatmosphere onbothunits,theplantwillbeincompliance withtheFSAR.Thiscondition wasidentified bythe1iccnsee duringanongoingNRCarchitect/engineer inspection. | |||
II*~~Updateat2130EDTon9/13/97fiomRobertBlythtoS.Sandin~**Thelicenseehascompleted itssafetyevaluation formode5operation andconcluded thatthcrcwasnounreviewcd safetyquestionorchangeofoperation asdescribed inthcFSAR.Conscqucntly, degasofUnit1hasbeen"'erminated, andneitherunitwillbcventedtoatmosphere. | |||
POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32921THELICENSEEIDENTIFIED THATBOTHRHRPUMPSHADBEENOPERATEDWHENTHERCSWASDEPRESSURIZED, WHICHISCONTRARYTOTHEDESCRIPTION INTHEFSAR.Chapter9oftheFinalSafety'nalysis Rcport(FSAR)states:'Onlyoneresidualheatremoval'(RHR) pumpwillbe"operatedwhenthereactorcoolantsystemisopentoatmosphere topreventdamagingbothpumpsintheunlikely" eventthatsuctionshouldbelost.'perating proccdurcs for,theRHRsystemdonotpreventoperation ofbothRHRpumpswhenthcreactorcoolant'system (RCS)isopentoatmosphere, andinthcpast,bothRHRpumpshavebeenrunwhentheRCSwasvcntcdtoatmosphere. | |||
IPlantoperating proccdurcs arebeingreviewedtodetermine theimpact.Procedure changeswillbeimplemented asnecessary toaddresstheFSARrcquircmcnt. | |||
Acondition rcporthasbccninitiated toinvestigate'and determine appropriate preventative actions.HPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32948ITWASDETERMINED THATFIBROUSMATERIALISPRESENTINBOTHUNIT1ANDUNIT2-CONTAINMENT INENOUGHQUANTITYTOPOTENTIALLY CAUSEEXCESSIVE BLOCKAGEOFTHECONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SUMPSCREENDURINGTHERECIRCULATION PHASEOFALOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT. | |||
In1985,1986,,and 1995"Fiberfrax" refractory insulation materials inbulk,blanketorboardformwercusedasdammingmaterialwheninstalling firestopsincabletraysinbothcontainments. | |||
Thcspecification governing installation ofthefirestopsdidnotrequireremovalofthcmaterial, only.statingthatitshouldberemoved"ifnecessary." | |||
Thematerialwasnotremoved.Thematerialisprcscntin12cable,traysinUnit1and15cabletraysinUnit2.rWhentheFiberfrax isexposedtowaterorsteam/water environment itcouldpotentially, breakintosmallpieces',whichcouldbetransported totherecirculation sumpbythe-water, flowincontainment duringalossofcoolantaccident. | |||
Onceitreachestherecirculation sumpithasthepotential toclogthescrccnsinexcessoftlicdesignvalue.Excessive screenblockagecouldresultinECCSinoperability duringtherecirculation mode.TheFibcrfrax material,is currently beingremovedfromthecontainmcnts, andremovalwillbccompleted priorto,restartoftheunits.Thepossibility thatthelicensee's worke'ontrol"processalloweduncncapsulatcd fibrousmaterialtobeinstalled inotherlocations insidecontainment isbeinginvestigated. | |||
AK'PhIJlrktIIPIV 1,Attachment 2(continued) | |||
NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDesignInspection FindingsPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32740UNITS1&2OPERATEDOUTSIDETHEDESIGN BASISFORSERVICEWATERINLETTEMP'saresultofquestions posedbymembersoftheongoingNRCdesigninspection team,thclicenseehas'etermined thatUnits1&2haveoperatedoutsidetheplantdesignbasisforservicewaterinlettemperature. | |||
/'tTheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR),Table9.5-3,listsservicewaterinlettemperature designvalueas76'F.Thisvalueisusedasinputtoanalysessuchascontainment peakprcssureandcontrolroomhabitability. | |||
Althoughengineering analyseswereperformed in1988'raising thetemperature to87.5'FaslistedintheplantTcdmicalSpecifications, a10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation wasneverperformed, norwasthcUFSARproperly'evised: | |||
Plantservicewaterinlettemperature isthcsameasLakeMichiganwatertcmpcraturc. | |||
Areviewofhistorical dataindicates thatduringJuly'andAugustofanyyear,LakeMichigan"water temperature islikelytoexceedthc76'Fvalue.Specificdatafor1997showsthatLakeMichiganwatertemperature, andthcrcforc plantservicewaterinlet'emperature, wasgreaterthan76'FonJuly17,July18,andAugust4,1997.Allplantsystemswhichutilizeservicewaterasacoolingmediumhavebccndctcrmincd tobcoperable. | |||
A10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation willbe-p'erformed andappropriate changeswillbeincorporated intothcUFSAR.Thisreportisintendedtocoveranytemperature exclusions above76'Fandbelowthe87.5'FvaluelistedintheplantTechnical Specifications thatmayoccurpriortothecompletion ofthc10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation. | |||
POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32822*DISCOVERY THATANORMALOPERATING PROCEDURE ALLOWEDPLANTOPERATION WITHCOMPONENT COOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANGER OUTLETTEMPERATURES GREATERTHANTHEDESIGNLIMITSPECIFIED INTHEFINALSAFETYANALYSISREPORTDuringthe'ongoing NRCarchitect/engineer designinspection, aquestion,was askedrelativetoastatement usedinthenormaloperating procedure forthecomponent coolingwater(CCW)system.Thestatement allowsforaheat-exchanger outlettemperature forCCWtoreach120'Fforaperiodof3hoursduringnormalcooldownontheresidualheatremovalsystem.Investigation revealedthatthisstatement divasintheoriginalissueoftheprocedure in1976.However,no10CFR50.59unreyicwed safetyevaluation determination documentation couldbefoundtosuppoittlusdesignparameter. | |||
Thclicensee's FinalSafety-Analysis Rcport(FSAR)statesthatthcCCWheatexchanger outletdesigntemperature | |||
's95'F.BasedontheFSARrequiring the93'Foutlettemperature andthe.lackofanunrcvicwed safetyquestiondctcrmination tojustifyoperation cxcceding 95'F,theunitswereinacondition thatallowedoperation outsidethedesignbasisbecausethcprocedure allowedoperation upto120'Fforaperiodof3hoursduringnormalcooldownontheresidualheatremovalsystem.Theunitsarcn'otcuncntlyinaTechnical Specification limitingcondition foroperation asaresultoftinsissue.II'Procedure changeshavebeenmadetoremovethcinappropriate statement. | |||
Acondition rcporthasalsobeenwrittentoinitiateaninvestigation intothiseventanddetermine appropriate preventive actions. | |||
0V/4S41lI | 0V/4S41lI | ||
~)~~ | ~)~~IAttachment 2(continued) | ||
+w't'ttllIt | NRCDailyEventReportson'DC-CookDesignInspection FindingsPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32823FAILUREOFASAFETYREVIEWTOADDRESSFINALSAFETYANALYSISATTRIBUTES ON,ASSOCIATED COMPONENT COOLINGWATERCOOLINGREQUIREMENTS During,theongoingNRCarchitect/engineer designinspection, aquestionwasaskedrelativetodualtraincomponent coolingwater(CCW)systemoutages.DuringdualtrainCCWoutagcs,CCWcoolingissuppliedtothcspentfuelpool(SFP)heatexchanger onlyfromtheoppositeunit.Ifthatunithasalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),CCWtotheSFPheatexchanger willisolate.FinalSafetyAnalysisRcport(FSAR)Table9:5-2,footnote3,indicates thattheSFPheatexchanger isassumedtobconthenon-accident unit.hThelicenseereportedthefollowing inspection questions: | ||
r,1)Doesadualtrain-CCW outagerepresent acondition outsidethcplantdesignbasis22)WasthisreviewedaspartoftheprocessofallowingadualtrainCCWoutage2'ased onareviewofFSARTable9.5-2,itwasconcluded thatfootnote3wasestablished toclarifywhynovaluesforSFPheatexchanger flowforthcunitundergoing theLOCAarelistedinthetable.Footnote3reflectnormal'FPcoolingsystemdesignandoperation. | |||
IAreviewwasperformed ofthesafetyevaluation pcrformcd fortheUnit2fullcoreoflloadwithonetrainofspent--'uelcooling.ThissafetyreviewcoveredtheUnit2refueling outageschedulewhichincludedadualtrainCCWoutage.1'ootnote3ofTable9.5-2reprcscnts thenormaldesignofthcSFPcoolingsystem,thatis,theSFPcoolingsystemisdesignedtorcmovethe.heatgenerated bystoredspentfuelelementsintlic[SFP].Thesystemincorporates twoseparatetrains.ThesafetyreviewfortheUnit2full.coreoflloadxvithonetrainofspentfuelcoolingaddressed thcFSARsection9.4attribute oftheSFP,coolingdealingwithtimetoboileventsandbulkpooltcmpcraturc requirements; however,thesafetyreviewfailedtoaddressESARsection9.5attributes associated CCWcoolingrcquiremcnts asgiveninTable9.5-2.t'hisissueimpactsbothunits.However,theunitsarenotcurrently inaTcchnical Specification limitingcondition foroperation asaresultofthisissue.,POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32824FAILURETOPERFORMA10CFR50.59EVALUATION FORAPROCEDURE CHANGEINVOLVING COMPONENT COOLINGWATERHEAT.EXCHANGER OUTLETTEMPERATURE LIMITS~DuringtheongoingNRCarchitect/engineer'esign inspection, aquestionwasaskedrelativetothcfactthatduringthclastUnit2refueling outage;anadininistrative limitof90'Fwasplacedonthecomponent coolingwater(CCW)system.Thethermalanalysisindicated thatamaxiinumCCWtempcraturc of90'Fwouldeliminate allmarginassociated withthcspentfuelpool(SFP)designassumingadesignflowof3,000.gpm. | |||
+w't'ttllIt Attachment 2(continued),, | |||
".NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDesignInspection FindingsThefollowing inspection questionwasasked:SinceachangeinCCWtcmpcraturc wasrequiredtomeettheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)valueof160'FfortheSFP,wasa10CFR50.59unrevicwcd safetyevaluation perfoimed? | |||
I'helicenseereviewedtliccliangetotheprocedure tolimitCCWtcmperaturc to90'F.Thelicenseeconsidered this~changetobcanadniinistrative changeonlytolowertheallowable tcmperaturc totheSFPcoolingheatexchanger.' | |||
10CFR50.59evaluation wasnotperformed becauseitwasnotrccognizcd thatthe95'Frequirement wasessentially beingchanged.IWithoutthecompletion ofanunrevicwcd safetyquestiondetermination, thcplantwasi'nacondition outsidethe"designbasis.Theunitsarcnotcurrently inatechnical specification limitingcondition foroperation asaresultofthisissue.1Il'condition rcporthasbeenwrittentoinitiateactionstoinvestigate thiseventandprovideprcventivc actions.The90'Flimitisnolongerintheoperating proccdurcs. | |||
'POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32839AVAILABLE WATERVOLUMEINRWSTNOTADEQUATEINMODES5AND6DuringtheongoingNRCarchitect/engineer design.inspection, NRCinspectors askedaquestionaboutthcreactor,coolantmakeuprcquircdaAcra10CFR50,AppendixRfire.Torcsporidtothcquestion, thelicenseereviewedtwoassociated designcalculations. | |||
Themorerestrictive calculation wasdetermined tobcthecalculation ofrrccordtomcctthercquircment. | |||
Thiscalculation.requires 87,000gallonsofavatertobcavailable inthcrefueling waterstoragetank(RWST).Thevalueof87,000gallonswasapproved,on 02/20/90: | |||
Duringmodes1through4,plantproccdurcs adequately ensurethatthisrequirement ismet.Duringmodes5and6,plantprocedures arcnot'dcquatctoensurethatthisrequirement ismet.rIThcplanthasbeeninmodes5and6manytimessincethisrcquircmcnt becameeffective on02/20/90. | |||
Basedontlus,theplanthasbeeninanunanalyzed condition severaltimessince02/20/90. | |||
rCurrently bothunitsarcinmode1.Thelicensccisreviewing plantoperating procedures todetermine'impact and'illimplement procedure chancesasneededpriortoeitherunitenteringmodes5or6.Thelicenseeiscontinuing toevaluatethesubjectcalculations andplanstosubmitaliccnsceeventrcporttotheNRContinssubject.POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:,32843 LAKEMICHIGANTEMPERATURE EXCEEDEDPLANTDESIGNBASISLIMITINAUGUST1988'Asaresultofquestions posedbymembersoftheongoingNRCarchitect/enginccr designinspection team,thelicenseehas'dctcrmined thatthewatertemperature ofLakeMichigan, thcplant'sultimateheatsink,cxcccdedtheplantdesignbasislaketemperature limitof76'Ffor22daysduringAugust1988.I 0~flI1 Attachment 2(continued) | |||
NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDesignInspection FindingsThecontrolroomisnormallycooledbyanairconditioning systemwhichutilizesnon-safety relatedclullers. | |||
Thesafetyrelatedportionofthecontrolroomairconditioning systemutilizeswaterfromLakeMichiganasthecoolingmedium.Thiswaterwouldbcsupplieddirectlytothecoolingcoilsfollowing manualrealignment. | |||
Atanaveragelaketemperature of81'Fthatexistedduringthe22dayperiodin>ugust1988,thetemperature inside'he controlroomcouldhavereached110.4'Fhadthenon-safety relatedchillersnotfunctioned. | |||
Atatemperature of110.4'F,thelifetimeofsomeinstrumentation insidethecontrolroom,thesolidstateprotection,system, andthenuclearinstrumentation, isestimated tobeat150hoursor6.25days.Theimpactofthisshortened instrument lifespanonplantoperation hadnotbeencvaluatcd. | |||
/Atthetimeofthisevent,theplantTechnical Specifications allowedcontinuous operation withcontrolroomtcmpcraturcs upto120'F.TheTechnical Specifications havesincebeenrcviscdsuchthatcontinued operation withcontrolroomtemperatures incxccssof95'Fisnotpermitted. | |||
Operation ofthcplantduringthctimeperiodwhenlaketemperature exceededthedesignbasislimit,withoutanalysisindicating acceptable controlroomcoolingcouldbcmaintained abovethistemperature limit,'and withoutprocedures toalertpersonnel ofthesituation, isconsidered asoperation inanunanalyzed condition. | |||
Thcinstrumentation wasnotadversely impactedbythclughlaketempcraturcs asthenon-safety relatedchillcrscontinued tofunctionandmaintainacceptable control,roomtemperatures. | |||
POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32915OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION OFTHECOMPONENT COOLINGWATERSYSTEMPIPINGNOTINACCORDANCE WITHTHEANSICODEREQUIREMENTS iChapter9.5oftheFSARsta'tes:Thcreliefvalveonthecomponent | |||
[coolingwater]surgetankissizedtorelievethemaximumflowrate,ofwaterthatwouldenterthcsurgetankfollowing aruptureofareactorcoolantthermalbamercoolingcoil.Thesetprcssureassuresthatthcdesignpressureofthccomponent coolingsystemisnotexceeded.'he pipingdesigncodeatthcCookplantisB31.1.B31.1statesthatanintercepting stopvalvecannotbelocatedbetweenthesourceofpressureandtheprcssurereliefdcvicccreditedforprotecting thepipe.Inthisinstance, theprcssuresourceistherupturedthermalbarrier,theprcssurereliefdeviceisasafetyreliefvalveonthesurgetank.Contrarytothecoderequirement, thcrcaremanualvalvesmaintained openbehveenthetwo.Thesevalveswerenotcontrolled inaccordance withorexemptedfromB31.1,Anevaluation isbeingperformed todetermine themostcQcctivemethodofestablishing andmaintaining thccode'cquircmcnt. | |||
Acondition reporthasbeenwrittentoinitiateaninvestigation intothiseventanddetermine theappropriate preventative actions." | |||
Tluscondition wasidentified inresponseto'anongoingNRCarchitect/engineer designinspection. | |||
0'IiWE+lWfV,IIIIilr1P\ls1EI'}} | 0'IiWE+lWfV,IIIIilr1P\ls1EI'}} |
Revision as of 07:15, 29 June 2018
ML17334B659 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Cook |
Issue date: | 10/09/1997 |
From: | LOCHBAUM D A UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS |
To: | CALLAN L J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
References | |
2.206, DD-99-03, DD-99-3, NUDOCS 9711180014 | |
Download: ML17334B659 (30) | |
Text
NOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME INTERNAFILECENTEREXTERNAL:
NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL1111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME NUDOCS-ABSTRACT NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL1111CATEGORY2REGULA~.YINFORMATION.DISTRIBUTIO YSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSXON NBR:9711180014 DOC.DATE:
97/10/09NOTARIZED:
NODOCKETFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM0500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION LOCHBAUM,D.A.
UnionofConcerned Scientists RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
'CALLAN,L.J.
OfcoftheExecutive DirectorforOperations
SUBJECT:
Submitspetitionper10CFR2.206 recgxesting thatoperating licensesbemodified, revokedorsuspended untilreasonable assurance thatsysinconformance w/designslicensing recgxirements.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:DF01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:DirectFlowDistribution:
50Docket(PDRAvail)EQ0DUNNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:
PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
LTTR4ENCL4
~\UNIONOFCONCERNED SCIENTISTS October9,1997Mr.L.JosephCallanExecutive DirectorforOperations UnitedStatesNuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, DC20555-0001 SUBJECTiPETITIONPURSUANTTO10CFR'2.206, DONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTSUNITS1AND2,DOCKETNOS.50-315AND50-316
DearMr.Callan:
TheUnionofConcerned Scientists submitsthispetitionpursuantto10CFR2.206requesting thattheoperating licensesforDonaldC.CookUnits1and2bemodified, revoked,orsuspended untilthereisreasonable assurance thattheirsystemsareinconformance withdesignandlicensing basesrequirements.
Aprocesscomparable tothesystemcertifications recentlyusedbytheSalemandMillstone licensees wouldprovidethisnecessary levelofassurance.
UCSadditionally requeststhatapublichearingintothismatter'eheldintheWashington, DCareapriortothefirstunitatDCCookbeingauthorized torestart.Atthishearing,wewillpresentinformation supporting thecontentions inthispetition.
BBackBroundhOnOctober9,1996,theNRCrequested thatitspowerreactorlicensees provideinformation pursuantto10CFR50.54(f)regarding theadequacyandavailability ofdesignbasesinformation.
TheNRC'sissuedthisrequestasaresultofitsinvestigations attheMillstone PowerStation.ThelicenseefortheDCCookplantresponded withaletterdatedFebruary6,1997,describing theadministrative controlsitusestoprovideassurance thattheCookNuclearPlantisoperatedandmaintained withintheestablished designbases.AnNRCteamrecentlyconducted anarchitect/engineer designinspection atDCCook.According totheNRC'sProjectManagerfor9CCook,thisNRCteamexaminedtwosafetysystemsandtheirsupporting systems.Theteam'sfindingsforcedthelicenseetoshutdownbothunitsonSeptember 10,1997.TheNRCissuedaconfirmatory actionlettertothelicenseedatedSeptember 19,1997,specifying issuesarisingfromthedesigninspection thatmustberesolvedpriortorestarting theunits.Theseissues(listedinAttachment 1)includephysicalmodifications totheplantsandrevisions totheplants',operating licenses.
NumerousNRCDailyEventReports(listedinAttachment 2)described thefindings&omdesigninspection asreportedbythelicensee.
TheNRChasnotyetreleasedthedesigninspection reportandwehavebeentoldthatitwillnotbeissueduntilnextweekattheearliest.
PDRnoOCi0Sao03XSHPDRllllllliilllllllllllllllllllllllllllliilI.,
['.~~~Washington Office:1616PStreetNWSuite310~Washington, DC20036-1495
~202-332-0900
~FAX:202-332-0905 Cambridge Headquarters:
TwoBrattleSquare~Cambridge, MA02238-9105
~617-547-5552
~FAX:617-864-9405 California Office:2397ShattuckAvenueSuite203~Berkeley, CA94704-1567
~510-843-1872
~FAX:510-843-3785
'II~~'
i~~~~October9,1997Page2of4BasisforRuestedActionTheNRCconducte'd architect/engineer designinspections atonlysixofitsnearly70operating powerreactorlicenseesites.Thesedesigninspections examinedonlyoneorhvosafetysystemsalongwiththeirsupporting systemsateachsite.TheNRCProjectManagerreportedthatthedesigninspection atDCCookexaminedtheresidualheatremovalandcomponent coolingwatersystemsalongwiththeirsupporting systems.Thesedesigninspections focusedonthefacilities'riginal designandthelicensees'onformance withthesafetyanalysisreports.ThesystemsexaminedbytheNRCatDCCookhadalreadybeencoveredbythelicensee's designbasisdocumentation reconstitution pr'ogram.
Designbasisdocuments (DBDs)forthecontainment, containment structure, containment spray,emergency corecooling,component coolingwater,andresidualheatremovalsystemshadbeenapprovedbythelicenseepriortotheNRCteam'sarrival.ThelicenseeinformedtheNRCthatits'BDprogramhadnotidentified anydeficiencie involving equipment operability.
ThefindingsbytheNRCdesigninspection teampromptedthelicenseetodeclarebothtrainsoftheemergency corecoolingsystemsandthecontainment spraysysteminoperable.
TheunitswereshutdownonSeptember 8and9,1997.Thelicenseereportedmakingphysicalchangestotheplanttocorrectsomeoftheproblemsandindicated thatadditional physicalchangesmayberequired.
Thelicenseehasproposedfixingthespecificoperability issuesidentified duringtheNRCdesigninspection andthenrestarting theunits.Confining thescopeoftherestartactivities inthiswaywouldbetreatingthesymptomsratherthanthecauseoftheproblems.
TheNRCdesigninspection revealedseriousdeficiencies inthelicensee's designcontrolprograms.
Thesedeficiencie crcatcdthespecificproblemsthatforcedtheplantstobeshutdown.Thesedeficiencies
>ayalsoberesponsible forsimilarproblemsinothersafetysystemswhichwerenotexaminedbytheNRC.Itisimportant tonotethattheNRCidentified significant operability problemsinsystemsthatthelicenseehadcoveredinrecentlyapprovedDBDs.ThelicenseestatedinitsFebruary6,1997,submittal that.itverifiesandvalidates theinformation initsDBDsviareviewsandphysicalplantwalkdowns priortotheirapproval.
Thus,theNRCdiscovered significant problemsinsystemswhichhadbeencloselyscrutinized bythelicensee.
HadtheNRC'sfindingsinvolvedsystemswhichhavenotyetbeencoveredunderthelicensees'BD program,itmightbereasonable toassumethatthelicenseewouldhaveidentifiicd thematthatlaterdate.However,thereislittlereasontobelievethattheseproblemswouldhave.beenresolvedunlesstheNRChadidentified them.Attachment 2listsNRCDailyEventReports(DERs)involving issuesidentified bytheNRCdesigninspection atDCCook.DERNos.32740,32806,32822,32839,32843,32875,32890,32904,32914,32915,32921,32948,and329S8describepotential deficiencies thatappeartohaveexistedatDCCookpriortotheinitiation ofitsdesignbasisdocumentation reconstitution effortin1992.Thateffortwastherefore apparently unabletodetectthesepotential deficiencies.
DERNos.32823,32824,32903,32939,and3294Sdescribepotential deficiencies thatappeartohavebeenintroduced since1992.Thus,thelicensee's designcontrolandqualityassurance programsareapparently unabletoensurethatthefacilityismaintained withinitsdesignbases.
00I~r,fh't,~
~~~QOctober9,1997Page3of4IUCSfeelsthatthedesignbasisdocumentation reconstitution andUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)validation programsasdescribed inthelicensee's responsetotheNRC's50.54(f)letterlacktherigorandfocusnecessary toidentifypotential design-related operability issues.Ourconviction issupported bythefindings&omtheNRCdesigninspection.
Sincethecorrections totheNRC'sfindingswerenotlimitedtomerepaperwork fixesbutincludedactualchangestotheplant'sphysicalconfiguration, thesafetysignificance oftheseandpotentially otherundetected problemscannotbeunderstated.
I~Thefiawsinthelicensee's designcontrolprogramsmustbecorrected.
ThesystemsatDCCook,atleastthosewithasafetyfunction, mustbecertified tobecapableofperforming theirrequiredactionsunderalldesignconditions.
Then,andonlythen,cantheunitsbcrestarted withreasonable assurance thatpublicsafetywillbeadequately protected.
Itwouldbeirresponsible torestarttheseunitsknowingthattheprogrammatic failuresthatcausedthesafetyproblemsidentified bytheNRCteammayhaveproducedcomparable problemsaffecting theoperability ofothersafety'systems.
Thelegalprecedent forourpositionisstatedbytheNRC'sAtomicSafetyandLicensing AppealBoardin'heMatterofVermontYankeeNuclearPowerCorporation, Memorandum andOrder(ALAB-138),
datedJuly31,1973:"Asageneralrulc,theCommission's regulations precludeachallenge toapplicable regulations inanindividual licensing proceeding.
10CFR2.758.Thisrulehasbeenfrequently appliedinsuchproceedings toprecludechallenges byintervenors toCommission regulations.
Generally, then,anintervenor cannotvalidlyargueonsafetygroundsthatareactorwhichmeetsapplicable standards shouldnotbelicensed.
Bythesametoken,neithertheapplicant northestaffshouldbepermitted to=-challenge applicable regulations, eitherdirectlyorindirectly..
Thus,thosepartiesshouldnotgenerally bepermitted toseekorjustifythelicensing ofareactorwhichdoesnotcomplywithapplicable standards.
Norcantheyavoidcompliance byarguingthat,althoughanapplicable, regulation isnotmet,thepublichealthandsafetywillstillbe'protected.
For,oncearegulation isadopted,thestandards itembodiesrepresent theCommission's definition ofwhatisrequiredtoprotectthepublichealthandsafety."[emphasis added]"Inshort,inorder'for afacilitytobelicensedtooperate,theapplicant mustestablish thatthe'acilitycomplicswithallapplicable regulations.
Ifthefacilitydoesnotcomply,oiiftherehasbeennoshowingthatitdoescomply,itmaynotbelicensed."
[emphasis added]TheNRCdesigninspection atDCCookidentified significant issueswhichcausedbothunitstobeshutdown.Theseissueswerecausedbyprogrammatic deficiencies inthelicensee's designcontrolpi'ograms.
Acontributing factorfortheseissuesisthefailureofthelicensee's qualityassurance andself-assessment programstodetecttheseproblems.
Nothinginthereportedfindingsfromthedesigninspection supportsaconclusion thatthesefindingsareisolatedconsequences.
TheNRC'sdesigninspection invalidates anyshowingthatthisfacilitycomplieswithallapplicable'regulations.
Therefore, thedesigncontroldeficiencies mustbecorrected topreventfuturenon-compliances withsafetyregulations.
Andjustasimportantly, a.thoroughreviewofallsystemswithsafetyfunctions mustbe'completed priortorestarttodetectandcorrectpastnon-compliances.
PJ~Ptlt'I VOctober9,1997Page4of41hrUCS.isnotadvocating thattheNRCapply-ahigherstandardatDCCook.-Instead, wearerequesting thattheNRCensurethattheDCCookfacilityisinaccordance withtheminimumsafetystandards whichconstitute thelegalgroundsfo'rallowingtheunitstooperate.Ourrequestisconsistent withthemeasuresrequiredbytheNRCwhenothersamplinginspections findproblems.
WeasktheNRCtoexpandtheinspection scope.basedupontheidentified problemsjustaswouldberequiredwhensnubber(e.g.,piperestraint) andreactorvesselinternals inspections foundproblems:
'uestedActions*~I'CSpetitions theNRCtoprotectpublichealthandsafetybypreventing theunitsatDCCookfromoperating untilsuchtimethatthereisreasonable assurance thatallsignificant non-compliances havebeenidentified andcorrected.
Thesystemcertification processrecentlyusedattheSalemGenerating StationandtheMillstone PowerStationwouldprovidesuchreasonable assurance.
WerequestapublichearingonthismatterbeheldintheWashington, DCareabeforeanyunitatDCCookisauthorized torestart.Sincerely, auiug'DavidA.LochaumNuclearSafetyEngineerCC:ChairmanShirleyAnnJackson.UnitedStatesNuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, DC20555-0001.
Honorable SpencerAbrahamUnitedStatesSen'ateWashington, DC20510-2203 Mr.A.B.Beach,RegionalAdministrator UnitedStatesNuclearRegulatory Commission
.801Warrenville RoadLisle,IL60532-4351 Honorable CarlLevinUnitedStatesSenate.Washington, DC20510-2202
.Honorable FredUptonUnitedStatesHouseofRepresentatives Washington, DC,20515-2206
~Attachments:
1)DesignInspection Issues,ThatWillBeResolvedPriortoDCCookRestart2)NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDe'signInspection Findings=VIg 0JI~SIn'l/Jvs/lP,I'IIrphrIII
~~PyAttachment 1DesignInspection IssuesThatWillBeResolvedPriortoDCCookRestart1Thefollowing issues,quotedverbatim, werespecified ontheNRC'sConfirmatory ActionLetterdated,September 19,1997,asrequiring resolution priortorestartofanyDCCookunit:.1.Recirculation SumpInventor'y/Containment DeadEndedCompartnients IssueAnalyseswillbeperformed todemonstrate thattherecirculation sumplevelisadequatetoprevent'ortexing,"
orappropriate modifications willbemade.[SeealsoAttachment 2-PowerReactorEventNumber32890],Recirculation Sump-Venting Issue'rr!IIVentingwillbere-installed intherecirculation sumpcover.Thedesignwill-incorporate foreignmaterialexclusion requirements forthesump.[See'alsoAttachment 2-PowerReactorEventNumbers32875and32903]Thirty-six HourCooldown, withOneTrainofCooling4Analyseswillbeperformed thatwilldemonstrate thecapability tocooldowntheunitsconsistent withdesignbasisrequirements andnecessary changestoprocedures willbecompleted; ES-1.3(Switchover toRecirculation Sump)Procedure 6.Changestotheemergency procedure usedforswitchover oftheemergency corecooling-and containment spraypumpstotherecirculation sumpwillbeimplemented.
Thesechangeswillprovideassurance therewillbeadequatesumpvolume,withpr'opercorisideration ofinstrument biasandsinglefailurecriteria.
[SeealsoAtt.2-PowerReactorEventNumbers32806and32904]hll,Compressed AirOverpressure IssueOverpressure protection willbeprovideddownstream ofthe20psig,50psig,andS5psigcontrolairregulators tomitigatetheeffectsofapostulated failedregulator.
[SeealsoAttachment 2-PowerReactorEventNumbers32939and32988]IResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)SuctionValveInterlock Issue'technical specification changetoallowoperation inmode4withtheRHRsuctionvalvesopenandpowerremovedisbeingprocessed.
Approval.
ofthischangebytheNRCwillberequiredprior'orestart.[SeealsoAttachment 2-PowerReactorEventNumbers32914and32921]-FibrousMaterialinContainment Removaloffibrousmaterialfromcontainment thatcouldclog.therecirculation sumpwillbecorn'pleted.
[SeealsoAttachment 2-PowerReactorEventNumber3294S]
0lI~'
Attachment 2NRCDailyEventReportson'CCookDesignInspection FindingsThefollowing summaries weretakenfromthedailyeventreportsavailable ontheNRC'swcbsite(mvw.nrc.gov).
~Theonlyeditinginvolveddclctionofunnecessary detail,suchaswhowasnotifiedabouttheevents,'andtheadditionofclarification foracronyms.
Othcrivisc, thesenarratives areverbatim.
1POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32890UNUSUALEVENT,DECLARED4TECHNICAL SPECIFlCAITON REQUIREDSHUTDOWNONBOTHUNITSDUETOINOPERABLE CONTAINMENTS
+aresultofissuesraisedduringtheongoingarchitect/engi'neer designinspection, theliccnscewasreviewing thedesignaspectsofthecontainmcnts (bothunits,havesimilarcontainmcnts).
Aflcrconsulting withthenuclearsteamsupplysystemsupplier(Westinghouse) thelicenseedetermined thatconcernsexistedaboutwhetheradequatecommunication (flowpaths)existsbetweentheactiveandinactiveportioris ofthecontainmcnt sump.Duringcertainscenario, thevolumeofwaterflowbacktothecontainment recirculation sumpmaynotbeadequatetosupportlong-term emergency corecooling(ECC)systems(RHR[residual heatremoval]system,safetyinjection system,chargingsystem)orcontainment spraypumpoperation duringthcrecirculation phaseofalargeorsmall.brcakLOCA.Thccontainmcnt drainagesystemisdesignedtoensurethatwateren'tering thccontainment fromthebreachintliereactorcoolantsystem,ECCsystems-injection, andicecondenser meltflowsbackintothe.containment recirculation sumpviadrains.Licenseeanalysiswasunabletoconfirmthatsuflicient communication
-'xistedbctwccninactiveandactivevolumesofthecontainment toensureadequatedrainagetotherecirculation sump.-Withoutadequatedrainageintothesump,alowsumplevelwillresult,whichjeopardizes longtermoperation oftheECCSystemsandcontainment spraypumpsduetovortcxing andairentrainment.
Asaconservative measurebecauseoftheseconcerns, thelicensccdeclaredbothtrainsofthcECCSystemsandthe,containment spraysysteminoperable forbothunitsandenteredTcchnical SpcciTication limitingcondition foroperation actionstatement 3.0.3toshutdownbothunits.Theliccnscecommenced shuttingUnit1downfrom100%powerat1655aildUill't2downfi'om100%powerat1728.At2000,thelicenseedcclarcdanunusualeventonbothunitsduetothe'potential lossofcontainmcnt barrier,onbothunits.Thelicensccplanstoperformfurtheranalysistodetermine theextentofthcexistingcommunication betweentheportionsofthesumpsandwhetherplantmodifications willbenecessary.
~~~Update 0311EDTon09/10/97byTillytakenbyMacKinnon*~~
IThcunusualcvcntwastcrminatcd andexitedat0303EDTwhen.Unit 1cntcrcdmode5(coldshutdown).
Unit2cntcredmode5at0015EDT(coldshutdown).
fPOWERREACTOREVENT.NUMBER:32875FAILURETOMAINTAINTHECONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SUMP1/4"PARTICULATE RETENTION REQUIREMENT (HISTORICAL ISSUE)Ik.A1/4"particulate retention requirement forthecontainment recirculation sumpwasnotproperlyestablished in1979following sumpmodifications.
Thecontainment recirculation sumprcquircment toretain1/4"particles istoensurethatcontainment spray,nozzlesdonotbecomeplugged.Thccontainmcnt spraysystemtakessuctionfromthecontainment recirculation sumpfollowing injection oftherefueling'water storagetanksupplyduringalossofcoolantaccident.
~~llr1 IAttachment 2(continued)
NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDesignInspection FindingsIIIn1979,modifications wereperformed onthecontainment recirculation sump.Oneofthemodifications involvedmovinga1/4"rctcntion elementfrominsidetherecirculation sumptotheentranceofthesump.Whenthe'retention elementwasmoved,thc1/4"retention requirement ivasnotfullyaddressed, andpathwaysexcccding the1/4"requirement, wereinadvertently established.
Thcinadvcrtcnt pathwaysestablished included:
3/4",vents intheroofoftherecirculation sumpentrance, thecontainment sumpdrainlinefromtherecirculation sump,andsmallgapsaroundthesumpentrance.
Thesepathwayshavesincebeenelimi'nated orthe1/4"requirement hasbeenestablished.'
.Thclicenseeisreporting thefactthatsince1979,until the1/4"requirement wasestablished orthepathwaywaseliminated, thecontainment recirculation sumpdidnotmeetitsdesignrcquircment.
Thccontainment recirculation sumpcurrently meetsthe1/4"requircmcnt.
Acondition rcporthas,beenwrittentoinitiateinvestigation intotluseventanddetermine appropriate preventive actions.Thiseventwasdctcrmined tobcreportable at0856onSeptember 5,1997.l~~~Updateat1905on09/10/97byRandyPtacckenteredbyJolliQ'e~**'IMerfurtherreviewoftheabovecondition, thelicenseeconcluded thatthcemergency corecooling(ECC)systemwasoutsideitsdesignbasisasaresultofthe1/4"rcquircmcnt notbeingmctfollowing thc1979plantmodifications.
Bynotadequately coveringthe1/4"particulate retention requirement, largerparticles hadthepotential toenterthcrecirculation sump.ThcECCSystemhasnotbeenanalyzedfortheselargerparticles norisitwithintliedesignoftheECCSystemtohandletheselargerparticles.
Thelicenseehasconcluded thatthiseventisalsorcportablc tothcNRCinaccordance withtherequirements of'0CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(a) unanalyzed condition, and10CF50.72(b)(2)(iii)(d)accident mitigation.
IPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32903'ONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SUMPVENTHOLESHAVESEENFILLEDWITHCONCRETErIAsaresultofquestions posedbytheNRCarchitect/engineer designinspection team,thelicenseedetcrmincd that~thcinletventingrequirement forthccontainmcnt recirculation sumpswasnotproperlymaintained following modifications tothcUnit2.sumpin1996andtheUnit1sumpin1997(bothunitshavesimilarcontainmcnts).
'hecontainment recirculation sumpventingrcquircment wascstablishcd in1979aspartoftheoriginalsumpdesigntoreducethepotential forairentrainment throughthesump.Theventingrequirement wIasmetthroughthe,additionoffive3/4-inchdiameterholesdrilledinthcroofofthcsumpinlet.(Theholesdidnotmeetthe1/4-inch~
diamctcrrequirement asreportedinEvent¹32875.)Whentheseholeswercdiscovered duringtheUnit21996refueling outageandtheUnit11997refueling outage,theywereclassified asabandoned equipment holesthatexceededthe1/4-inchparticulate retention rcquiremcnt forthcsumpsandtheywerefilledwithconcrete.
0'I/II IAttachment 2(c'ontinued)
NRCDailyXventReportsonDCCookDesignInspection FindingsPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER;32806~INSTRUMENTATION INDICATIONS USEDTODETERMINE WHENREFUELING WATER'TORAGETANKTOCONTAINMENT SWITCHOVER IS'REQUIRED MAYNOTHAVEBEENCORRECTTOPREVENTVORTEXING INTHECONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SUMP.*IDuringtheevaluation ofaproposedprocedure changethataGectsmvitchover fromtherefueling waterstoragetank(RWST)tothecontainment sumpduringaloss-of-coolant, accident(LOCA),itwasdctermincd thattheinstrumentation indications usedtodetermine whentheswitchover isrequiredmaynothavebccncorrect.to preventvortcxing inthecontainmcnt recirculation sump.IToaddressthissituation, procedures associated withthemvitchover (onbothunits)havebeenconservatively changedtoaccommodate therelatedinstrument inaccuracies.
ThesechangesassureadequateRWSTwaterisincontainment beforemvitchover toeliminate concernsthatvorteungwouldoccurinthccontainmcnt sumpafterswitchover.
TheproblemisthattheRWSTwaterlevelindicators areconnected totlicsuctionlincthatgoestotheresidualheatrcmov'al(RHR)pumps.Duetothcflowintheselines,theindicated waterlevelatwinchtheswitchover wouldbeinitiated wouldbelessthantheactualwaterleveloftheRWST(thclicenseewouldbcputtinglesswaterintothecontainmcnt thaner~ted).Also,thclicensccsaidthattheyliadsomeinaccuracies associated witlitheircontainmcnt sumpinstrumentation.
Thelicenseeadjustedthccontainmcnt sumpindication toassurethattheyhaveanadequatevolumeinthecontainment topreventvortexing.
Thelicenseereliesupontwoindications formvitchover, RWSTwaterlevelandcontainmcnt waterlevel.POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32904.SINGLEFAILUREDURINGRECIRCSUMPSWITCHOVER COULDBEUNANALYZED CONDITION I'IAsaresultofquestions posedbytheNRCarclutect/engineer designinspection team,thelicenseedetermined thatthcpossibility ofasinglefailureduringanaccidentwlulcperforming switchover oftheemergency corecooling~systempumpsfromtherefueling waterstoragetank(RWST)suctiontotherecirculation sumpsuctioncouldhaveresultedinthcplantbeinginanunanalyzed condition.
Tluscondition isoutsidethcplantdesignbasis,anditpotentially couldhaveprevented thefulfillment ofasafetyfunctionofstructures orsystems.Theplantemergency, operating procedures (EOPs)ascurrently writtenrequirethatthewestresidualheatremoval(BHR)pumpbcthefirstpumpmvitchcdfromthcRWSTsuctiontotherccircsumpsuction.Oncethisis*accomplished, thecentrifugal charging(CC)pumps'uctions andthesafetyinjection (Sl)pumps'uctions arcthenswapped'from theRWSTsupplytothedischarge ofthewestRHRpump.IfthcwestRHRpumpwerctofailatthis.,pointwhenallCCandSIpumpswerebeingsuppliedfromitsdischarge, priortothceastRHRpumpsuctionbeingtransferred fromtheRWSTtothcrccircsump,allCCandSIpumpscouldalsofailductothclossofsuctionflow.Thiswouldresultinthelossofallhighandmediumheadinjection withonlytheflowfromtheeastRHRpumpavailable forinjection intothereactorcoolantsystem.Thcliccnseciscurrently reviewing thcEOPstodetermine analternate mvitchovcr sequencethatwouldeliminate thecondition asdescribed above.l
~~IAt 1Attachment 2(continued)
NRCDailyEventReports.onDCCookDesignInspection FindingsPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32939INSTALLED PLANT.MODIFICATION INTRODUCED THEPOSSIBILITY.
OFASINGLEFAILUREWHICHCOULDRESULTINTHELOSSOFBOTHTRAINSOFTHEESFVENTILATION SYSTEM.At1620on09/16/97, thelicenseedetermined thataplantmodiTication installed behveenDecember1996andAugust1997introduced thepossibility ofasinglefailurewhichcouldresultinthelossofbothtrainsoftheengincercd safetyfeatures(ESF)ventilation systemif'the85-psiairheaderwastobelost.Priortothcinstallation ofthe'plant modification, theESFventilation systemcharcoalinletandbypassdampersbothutilizeda20-'psiairheaderandwercpositioned suchthatthecharcoalbypassdampcrswercnormallyopenandwouldfailclosed;andthccharcoalinletdamperswerenormallyclosedandwouldfailopen.Theplantmodification installed ncwbypassdamperswhichrequiredhigherairprcssuretooperateandwere,thercforc, transferred tothc85-psiheader.Ifthe,~85-psiairheaderwaslost,itwouldresultinthc,rcpositioning ofthenormallyopenbypassdampersivithoutthe,,openingofthecharcoalinletdampersonbothtrains.Thiswouldresultindeadheadingofthcfiltertrainfansand-lossofcoolingtoemergency corecoolingsystem(ECCS)equipment.
"POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32988NON-SAFETY~RELATED AIRHEADERSLACKOVERPRESSURE PROTECTION f.'uringanarclutectural engineering inspection aquestionwasraisedregarding thelackofovcrpressurc protcction-onthc20,50and85psigcontrolairheaders.Thcspecificconcernisthepotential forcommonmodefailureofbothtrainsofsafetyrelatedequipmcnt servedbythc,airhcadcrs'.
Theovcrprcssurc condition is'ostulated'to becausedbyregulator failure.Althoughsystemrcvicwshavefoundno,component failuremodewhichwouldresultinthedevicesbeingincapable ofgoingtotheirfail-safe
- position, adesignchangepackagehasbeenpreparedtoprovideovcrprcssure protection, onthe20,50and85psigheaders.If-POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32914LICENSEEIDENTIFIED THATBOTHUNITSHADOPERATEDTHEIRRHRSYSTEMCONTRARYTOTHEDESCRIPTION INTHEFSAR.'CAt1615EDT,withUnits1and2shutdowninmode5,itwasdctcrmined thatbothunitshaveoperatedcontrarytothcdesignbasisfortheresidualheatremoval(RHR)systemasdescribed intheFinaLSafetyAnalysisrcport(FSAR).FSARChapter9,Section9.3,describes theinterlocks associated withtheresiduallicatremoval(RHR)suctionvalvesfromthcreactorcoolantsystem(RCS).Thesuctionlincvalvesarcinterlocked throughseparate, channelsoftheRCSsystemprcssuresignalstoprovideautomatic closureofbothvalveswheneverRCSprcssurecxccedsRHRdesignprcssure..Thc FSARstatesthattheinterlock maybedcfcatcdwhenthcRCSisopentoatmosphere.
However,foranumberofyearsthisinterlock hasbeenprocedurally'defeated onbothunitstopreventinadvertent closureandlossofRHRsuctionduringshutdowncoolingoperation byopeningthevalvesandracking'uttheir.breakersinmode4.'Thcovcrpressurc protection affordedbythcautomatic closurefunctiondcscribcd intheFSARwasdefeatedwithoutasafetyevaluation beingpcrformcd.
Thislossofautomatic closurefunctionrepresents anunanalyzed condition andis,thcrcforc, reportable.
0J41
~~~~'ttachment 2(continued)
,NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDesignInspection.Fin'dings IPlansaretodegas,dcpressurizc, andopentheRCSonbothunitstoatmosphere.
DegaswillstartonUnit1,andwhencompleted, thcunitwillproceedtodepressurize whileUnit2startsdegasprocedures.
WhentheRCSisopentoatmosphere onbothunits,theplantwillbeincompliance withtheFSAR.Thiscondition wasidentified bythe1iccnsee duringanongoingNRCarchitect/engineer inspection.
II*~~Updateat2130EDTon9/13/97fiomRobertBlythtoS.Sandin~**Thelicenseehascompleted itssafetyevaluation formode5operation andconcluded thatthcrcwasnounreviewcd safetyquestionorchangeofoperation asdescribed inthcFSAR.Conscqucntly, degasofUnit1hasbeen"'erminated, andneitherunitwillbcventedtoatmosphere.
POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32921THELICENSEEIDENTIFIED THATBOTHRHRPUMPSHADBEENOPERATEDWHENTHERCSWASDEPRESSURIZED, WHICHISCONTRARYTOTHEDESCRIPTION INTHEFSAR.Chapter9oftheFinalSafety'nalysis Rcport(FSAR)states:'Onlyoneresidualheatremoval'(RHR) pumpwillbe"operatedwhenthereactorcoolantsystemisopentoatmosphere topreventdamagingbothpumpsintheunlikely" eventthatsuctionshouldbelost.'perating proccdurcs for,theRHRsystemdonotpreventoperation ofbothRHRpumpswhenthcreactorcoolant'system (RCS)isopentoatmosphere, andinthcpast,bothRHRpumpshavebeenrunwhentheRCSwasvcntcdtoatmosphere.
IPlantoperating proccdurcs arebeingreviewedtodetermine theimpact.Procedure changeswillbeimplemented asnecessary toaddresstheFSARrcquircmcnt.
Acondition rcporthasbccninitiated toinvestigate'and determine appropriate preventative actions.HPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32948ITWASDETERMINED THATFIBROUSMATERIALISPRESENTINBOTHUNIT1ANDUNIT2-CONTAINMENT INENOUGHQUANTITYTOPOTENTIALLY CAUSEEXCESSIVE BLOCKAGEOFTHECONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SUMPSCREENDURINGTHERECIRCULATION PHASEOFALOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT.
In1985,1986,,and 1995"Fiberfrax" refractory insulation materials inbulk,blanketorboardformwercusedasdammingmaterialwheninstalling firestopsincabletraysinbothcontainments.
Thcspecification governing installation ofthefirestopsdidnotrequireremovalofthcmaterial, only.statingthatitshouldberemoved"ifnecessary."
Thematerialwasnotremoved.Thematerialisprcscntin12cable,traysinUnit1and15cabletraysinUnit2.rWhentheFiberfrax isexposedtowaterorsteam/water environment itcouldpotentially, breakintosmallpieces',whichcouldbetransported totherecirculation sumpbythe-water, flowincontainment duringalossofcoolantaccident.
Onceitreachestherecirculation sumpithasthepotential toclogthescrccnsinexcessoftlicdesignvalue.Excessive screenblockagecouldresultinECCSinoperability duringtherecirculation mode.TheFibcrfrax material,is currently beingremovedfromthecontainmcnts, andremovalwillbccompleted priorto,restartoftheunits.Thepossibility thatthelicensee's worke'ontrol"processalloweduncncapsulatcd fibrousmaterialtobeinstalled inotherlocations insidecontainment isbeinginvestigated.
AK'PhIJlrktIIPIV 1,Attachment 2(continued)
NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDesignInspection FindingsPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32740UNITS1&2OPERATEDOUTSIDETHEDESIGN BASISFORSERVICEWATERINLETTEMP'saresultofquestions posedbymembersoftheongoingNRCdesigninspection team,thclicenseehas'etermined thatUnits1&2haveoperatedoutsidetheplantdesignbasisforservicewaterinlettemperature.
/'tTheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR),Table9.5-3,listsservicewaterinlettemperature designvalueas76'F.Thisvalueisusedasinputtoanalysessuchascontainment peakprcssureandcontrolroomhabitability.
Althoughengineering analyseswereperformed in1988'raising thetemperature to87.5'FaslistedintheplantTcdmicalSpecifications, a10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation wasneverperformed, norwasthcUFSARproperly'evised:
Plantservicewaterinlettemperature isthcsameasLakeMichiganwatertcmpcraturc.
Areviewofhistorical dataindicates thatduringJuly'andAugustofanyyear,LakeMichigan"water temperature islikelytoexceedthc76'Fvalue.Specificdatafor1997showsthatLakeMichiganwatertemperature, andthcrcforc plantservicewaterinlet'emperature, wasgreaterthan76'FonJuly17,July18,andAugust4,1997.Allplantsystemswhichutilizeservicewaterasacoolingmediumhavebccndctcrmincd tobcoperable.
A10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation willbe-p'erformed andappropriate changeswillbeincorporated intothcUFSAR.Thisreportisintendedtocoveranytemperature exclusions above76'Fandbelowthe87.5'FvaluelistedintheplantTechnical Specifications thatmayoccurpriortothecompletion ofthc10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation.
POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32822*DISCOVERY THATANORMALOPERATING PROCEDURE ALLOWEDPLANTOPERATION WITHCOMPONENT COOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANGER OUTLETTEMPERATURES GREATERTHANTHEDESIGNLIMITSPECIFIED INTHEFINALSAFETYANALYSISREPORTDuringthe'ongoing NRCarchitect/engineer designinspection, aquestion,was askedrelativetoastatement usedinthenormaloperating procedure forthecomponent coolingwater(CCW)system.Thestatement allowsforaheat-exchanger outlettemperature forCCWtoreach120'Fforaperiodof3hoursduringnormalcooldownontheresidualheatremovalsystem.Investigation revealedthatthisstatement divasintheoriginalissueoftheprocedure in1976.However,no10CFR50.59unreyicwed safetyevaluation determination documentation couldbefoundtosuppoittlusdesignparameter.
Thclicensee's FinalSafety-Analysis Rcport(FSAR)statesthatthcCCWheatexchanger outletdesigntemperature
's95'F.BasedontheFSARrequiring the93'Foutlettemperature andthe.lackofanunrcvicwed safetyquestiondctcrmination tojustifyoperation cxcceding 95'F,theunitswereinacondition thatallowedoperation outsidethedesignbasisbecausethcprocedure allowedoperation upto120'Fforaperiodof3hoursduringnormalcooldownontheresidualheatremovalsystem.Theunitsarcn'otcuncntlyinaTechnical Specification limitingcondition foroperation asaresultoftinsissue.II'Procedure changeshavebeenmadetoremovethcinappropriate statement.
Acondition rcporthasalsobeenwrittentoinitiateaninvestigation intothiseventanddetermine appropriate preventive actions.
0V/4S41lI
~)~~IAttachment 2(continued)
NRCDailyEventReportson'DC-CookDesignInspection FindingsPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32823FAILUREOFASAFETYREVIEWTOADDRESSFINALSAFETYANALYSISATTRIBUTES ON,ASSOCIATED COMPONENT COOLINGWATERCOOLINGREQUIREMENTS During,theongoingNRCarchitect/engineer designinspection, aquestionwasaskedrelativetodualtraincomponent coolingwater(CCW)systemoutages.DuringdualtrainCCWoutagcs,CCWcoolingissuppliedtothcspentfuelpool(SFP)heatexchanger onlyfromtheoppositeunit.Ifthatunithasalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),CCWtotheSFPheatexchanger willisolate.FinalSafetyAnalysisRcport(FSAR)Table9:5-2,footnote3,indicates thattheSFPheatexchanger isassumedtobconthenon-accident unit.hThelicenseereportedthefollowing inspection questions:
r,1)Doesadualtrain-CCW outagerepresent acondition outsidethcplantdesignbasis22)WasthisreviewedaspartoftheprocessofallowingadualtrainCCWoutage2'ased onareviewofFSARTable9.5-2,itwasconcluded thatfootnote3wasestablished toclarifywhynovaluesforSFPheatexchanger flowforthcunitundergoing theLOCAarelistedinthetable.Footnote3reflectnormal'FPcoolingsystemdesignandoperation.
IAreviewwasperformed ofthesafetyevaluation pcrformcd fortheUnit2fullcoreoflloadwithonetrainofspent--'uelcooling.ThissafetyreviewcoveredtheUnit2refueling outageschedulewhichincludedadualtrainCCWoutage.1'ootnote3ofTable9.5-2reprcscnts thenormaldesignofthcSFPcoolingsystem,thatis,theSFPcoolingsystemisdesignedtorcmovethe.heatgenerated bystoredspentfuelelementsintlic[SFP].Thesystemincorporates twoseparatetrains.ThesafetyreviewfortheUnit2full.coreoflloadxvithonetrainofspentfuelcoolingaddressed thcFSARsection9.4attribute oftheSFP,coolingdealingwithtimetoboileventsandbulkpooltcmpcraturc requirements; however,thesafetyreviewfailedtoaddressESARsection9.5attributes associated CCWcoolingrcquiremcnts asgiveninTable9.5-2.t'hisissueimpactsbothunits.However,theunitsarenotcurrently inaTcchnical Specification limitingcondition foroperation asaresultofthisissue.,POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32824FAILURETOPERFORMA10CFR50.59EVALUATION FORAPROCEDURE CHANGEINVOLVING COMPONENT COOLINGWATERHEAT.EXCHANGER OUTLETTEMPERATURE LIMITS~DuringtheongoingNRCarchitect/engineer'esign inspection, aquestionwasaskedrelativetothcfactthatduringthclastUnit2refueling outage;anadininistrative limitof90'Fwasplacedonthecomponent coolingwater(CCW)system.Thethermalanalysisindicated thatamaxiinumCCWtempcraturc of90'Fwouldeliminate allmarginassociated withthcspentfuelpool(SFP)designassumingadesignflowof3,000.gpm.
+w't'ttllIt Attachment 2(continued),,
".NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDesignInspection FindingsThefollowing inspection questionwasasked:SinceachangeinCCWtcmpcraturc wasrequiredtomeettheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)valueof160'FfortheSFP,wasa10CFR50.59unrevicwcd safetyevaluation perfoimed?
I'helicenseereviewedtliccliangetotheprocedure tolimitCCWtcmperaturc to90'F.Thelicenseeconsidered this~changetobcanadniinistrative changeonlytolowertheallowable tcmperaturc totheSFPcoolingheatexchanger.'
10CFR50.59evaluation wasnotperformed becauseitwasnotrccognizcd thatthe95'Frequirement wasessentially beingchanged.IWithoutthecompletion ofanunrevicwcd safetyquestiondetermination, thcplantwasi'nacondition outsidethe"designbasis.Theunitsarcnotcurrently inatechnical specification limitingcondition foroperation asaresultofthisissue.1Il'condition rcporthasbeenwrittentoinitiateactionstoinvestigate thiseventandprovideprcventivc actions.The90'Flimitisnolongerintheoperating proccdurcs.
'POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32839AVAILABLE WATERVOLUMEINRWSTNOTADEQUATEINMODES5AND6DuringtheongoingNRCarchitect/engineer design.inspection, NRCinspectors askedaquestionaboutthcreactor,coolantmakeuprcquircdaAcra10CFR50,AppendixRfire.Torcsporidtothcquestion, thelicenseereviewedtwoassociated designcalculations.
Themorerestrictive calculation wasdetermined tobcthecalculation ofrrccordtomcctthercquircment.
Thiscalculation.requires 87,000gallonsofavatertobcavailable inthcrefueling waterstoragetank(RWST).Thevalueof87,000gallonswasapproved,on 02/20/90:
Duringmodes1through4,plantproccdurcs adequately ensurethatthisrequirement ismet.Duringmodes5and6,plantprocedures arcnot'dcquatctoensurethatthisrequirement ismet.rIThcplanthasbeeninmodes5and6manytimessincethisrcquircmcnt becameeffective on02/20/90.
Basedontlus,theplanthasbeeninanunanalyzed condition severaltimessince02/20/90.
rCurrently bothunitsarcinmode1.Thelicensccisreviewing plantoperating procedures todetermine'impact and'illimplement procedure chancesasneededpriortoeitherunitenteringmodes5or6.Thelicenseeiscontinuing toevaluatethesubjectcalculations andplanstosubmitaliccnsceeventrcporttotheNRContinssubject.POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:,32843 LAKEMICHIGANTEMPERATURE EXCEEDEDPLANTDESIGNBASISLIMITINAUGUST1988'Asaresultofquestions posedbymembersoftheongoingNRCarchitect/enginccr designinspection team,thelicenseehas'dctcrmined thatthewatertemperature ofLakeMichigan, thcplant'sultimateheatsink,cxcccdedtheplantdesignbasislaketemperature limitof76'Ffor22daysduringAugust1988.I 0~flI1 Attachment 2(continued)
NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDesignInspection FindingsThecontrolroomisnormallycooledbyanairconditioning systemwhichutilizesnon-safety relatedclullers.
Thesafetyrelatedportionofthecontrolroomairconditioning systemutilizeswaterfromLakeMichiganasthecoolingmedium.Thiswaterwouldbcsupplieddirectlytothecoolingcoilsfollowing manualrealignment.
Atanaveragelaketemperature of81'Fthatexistedduringthe22dayperiodin>ugust1988,thetemperature inside'he controlroomcouldhavereached110.4'Fhadthenon-safety relatedchillersnotfunctioned.
Atatemperature of110.4'F,thelifetimeofsomeinstrumentation insidethecontrolroom,thesolidstateprotection,system, andthenuclearinstrumentation, isestimated tobeat150hoursor6.25days.Theimpactofthisshortened instrument lifespanonplantoperation hadnotbeencvaluatcd.
/Atthetimeofthisevent,theplantTechnical Specifications allowedcontinuous operation withcontrolroomtcmpcraturcs upto120'F.TheTechnical Specifications havesincebeenrcviscdsuchthatcontinued operation withcontrolroomtemperatures incxccssof95'Fisnotpermitted.
Operation ofthcplantduringthctimeperiodwhenlaketemperature exceededthedesignbasislimit,withoutanalysisindicating acceptable controlroomcoolingcouldbcmaintained abovethistemperature limit,'and withoutprocedures toalertpersonnel ofthesituation, isconsidered asoperation inanunanalyzed condition.
Thcinstrumentation wasnotadversely impactedbythclughlaketempcraturcs asthenon-safety relatedchillcrscontinued tofunctionandmaintainacceptable control,roomtemperatures.
POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32915OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION OFTHECOMPONENT COOLINGWATERSYSTEMPIPINGNOTINACCORDANCE WITHTHEANSICODEREQUIREMENTS iChapter9.5oftheFSARsta'tes:Thcreliefvalveonthecomponent
[coolingwater]surgetankissizedtorelievethemaximumflowrate,ofwaterthatwouldenterthcsurgetankfollowing aruptureofareactorcoolantthermalbamercoolingcoil.Thesetprcssureassuresthatthcdesignpressureofthccomponent coolingsystemisnotexceeded.'he pipingdesigncodeatthcCookplantisB31.1.B31.1statesthatanintercepting stopvalvecannotbelocatedbetweenthesourceofpressureandtheprcssurereliefdcvicccreditedforprotecting thepipe.Inthisinstance, theprcssuresourceistherupturedthermalbarrier,theprcssurereliefdeviceisasafetyreliefvalveonthesurgetank.Contrarytothecoderequirement, thcrcaremanualvalvesmaintained openbehveenthetwo.Thesevalveswerenotcontrolled inaccordance withorexemptedfromB31.1,Anevaluation isbeingperformed todetermine themostcQcctivemethodofestablishing andmaintaining thccode'cquircmcnt.
Acondition reporthasbeenwrittentoinitiateaninvestigation intothiseventanddetermine theappropriate preventative actions."
Tluscondition wasidentified inresponseto'anongoingNRCarchitect/engineer designinspection.
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